DivestOS/Patches/LineageOS-20.0/android_system_core/snet-20.patch

86 lines
3.4 KiB
Diff

From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Danny Lin <danny@kdrag0n.dev>
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2020 00:24:54 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] init: Set properties to make SafetyNet pass
Google's SafetyNet integrity checks will check the values of these
properties when performing basic attestation. Setting fake values helps
us pass basic SafetyNet with no Magisk Hide or kernel patches necessary.
Note that these properties need to be set very early, before parsing the
kernel command-line, as they are read-only properties that the bootloader
sets using androidboot kernel arguments. The bootloader's real values
cause SafetyNet to fail with an unlocked bootloader and/or custom
software because the verified boot chain is broken in that case.
Change-Id: I66d23fd91d82906b00d5eb020668f01ae83ec31f
fastboot: Revert to Android 11 method of checking lock status
Now that we're setting system-wide properties for SafetyNet, which
includes ro.boot.verifiedbootstate=green, fastbootd always detects the
bootloader as being locked. Revert to the Android 11 method of reading
directly from the kernel cmdline to work arround the issue.
- Also don't set these in recovery
Change-Id: I57f6d48acddb29748778053edf354d7bd8994bd7
---
fastboot/device/utility.cpp | 7 ++++++-
init/property_service.cpp | 17 +++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fastboot/device/utility.cpp b/fastboot/device/utility.cpp
index 2d9b71213..a14eea376 100644
--- a/fastboot/device/utility.cpp
+++ b/fastboot/device/utility.cpp
@@ -196,7 +196,12 @@ std::vector<std::string> ListPartitions(FastbootDevice* device) {
}
bool GetDeviceLockStatus() {
- return android::base::GetProperty("ro.boot.verifiedbootstate", "") == "green";
+ std::string cmdline;
+ // Return lock status true if unable to read kernel command line.
+ if (!android::base::ReadFileToString("/proc/cmdline", &cmdline)) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ return cmdline.find("androidboot.verifiedbootstate=orange") == std::string::npos;
}
bool UpdateAllPartitionMetadata(FastbootDevice* device, const std::string& super_name,
diff --git a/init/property_service.cpp b/init/property_service.cpp
index 7fd64b389..06709cb7c 100644
--- a/init/property_service.cpp
+++ b/init/property_service.cpp
@@ -1286,6 +1286,15 @@ static void ProcessBootconfig() {
});
}
+static void SetSafetyNetProps() {
+ InitPropertySet("ro.boot.flash.locked", "1");
+ InitPropertySet("ro.boot.verifiedbootstate", "green");
+ InitPropertySet("ro.boot.veritymode", "enforcing");
+ InitPropertySet("ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state", "locked");
+ InitPropertySet("ro.boot.warranty_bit", "0");
+ InitPropertySet("ro.warranty_bit", "0");
+}
+
void PropertyInit() {
selinux_callback cb;
cb.func_audit = PropertyAuditCallback;
@@ -1300,6 +1309,14 @@ void PropertyInit() {
LOG(FATAL) << "Failed to load serialized property info file";
}
+ // Report a valid verified boot chain to make Google SafetyNet integrity
+ // checks pass. This needs to be done before parsing the kernel cmdline as
+ // these properties are read-only and will be set to invalid values with
+ // androidboot cmdline arguments.
+ if (!IsRecoveryMode()) {
+ SetSafetyNetProps();
+ }
+
// If arguments are passed both on the command line and in DT,
// properties set in DT always have priority over the command-line ones.
ProcessKernelDt();