DivestOS/Patches/LineageOS-15.1/android_system_bt/342097.patch

From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ted Wang <tedwang@google.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2022 11:22:34 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] Fix potential interger overflow when parsing vendor response

Add check for str_len to prevent potential OOB read in vendor response.

Bug: 205570663
Tag: #security
Test: net_test_stack:StackAvrcpTest
Ignore-AOSP-First: Security
Change-Id: Iea2c3e17c2c8cc56468c4456822e1c4c5c15f5bc
Merged-In: Iea2c3e17c2c8cc56468c4456822e1c4c5c15f5bc
(cherry picked from commit 96ef1fc9cbe38f1224b4e4a2dca3ecfb44a6aece)
Merged-In: Iea2c3e17c2c8cc56468c4456822e1c4c5c15f5bc
---
 stack/avrc/avrc_pars_ct.cc     | 19 ++++++++++---
 stack/test/stack_avrcp_test.cc | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/stack/avrc/avrc_pars_ct.cc b/stack/avrc/avrc_pars_ct.cc
index ef5aa1647..dd22fa3d5 100644
--- a/stack/avrc/avrc_pars_ct.cc
+++ b/stack/avrc/avrc_pars_ct.cc
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static tAVRC_STS avrc_pars_browse_rsp(tAVRC_MSG_BROWSE* p_msg,
   }
   BE_STREAM_TO_UINT8(pdu, p);
   uint16_t pkt_len;
-  int min_len = 0;
+  uint16_t min_len = 0;
   /* read the entire packet len */
   BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(pkt_len, p);
 
@@ -373,8 +373,14 @@ static tAVRC_STS avrc_pars_browse_rsp(tAVRC_MSG_BROWSE* p_msg,
               /* Parse the name now */
               BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(attr_entry->name.charset_id, p);
               BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(attr_entry->name.str_len, p);
+              if (static_cast<uint16_t>(min_len + attr_entry->name.str_len) <
+                  min_len) {
+                // Check for overflow
+                android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "205570663");
+              }
+              if (pkt_len - min_len < attr_entry->name.str_len)
+                goto browse_length_error;
               min_len += attr_entry->name.str_len;
-              if (pkt_len < min_len) goto browse_length_error;
               attr_entry->name.p_str = (uint8_t*)osi_malloc(
                   attr_entry->name.str_len * sizeof(uint8_t));
               BE_STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p, attr_entry->name.p_str,
@@ -777,8 +783,12 @@ static tAVRC_STS avrc_ctrl_pars_vendor_rsp(tAVRC_MSG_VENDOR* p_msg,
           BE_STREAM_TO_UINT32(p_attrs[i].attr_id, p);
           BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(p_attrs[i].name.charset_id, p);
           BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(p_attrs[i].name.str_len, p);
-          min_len += p_attrs[i].name.str_len;
-          if (len < min_len) {
+          if (static_cast<uint16_t>(min_len + p_attrs[i].name.str_len) <
+              min_len) {
+            // Check for overflow
+            android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "205570663");
+          }
+          if (len - min_len < p_attrs[i].name.str_len) {
             for (int j = 0; j < i; j++) {
               osi_free(p_attrs[j].name.p_str);
             }
@@ -786,6 +796,7 @@ static tAVRC_STS avrc_ctrl_pars_vendor_rsp(tAVRC_MSG_VENDOR* p_msg,
             p_result->get_attrs.num_attrs = 0;
             goto length_error;
           }
+          min_len += p_attrs[i].name.str_len;
           if (p_attrs[i].name.str_len > 0) {
             p_attrs[i].name.p_str =
                 (uint8_t*)osi_calloc(p_attrs[i].name.str_len);
diff --git a/stack/test/stack_avrcp_test.cc b/stack/test/stack_avrcp_test.cc
index 7bf2f4c9f..1dffd48c9 100644
--- a/stack/test/stack_avrcp_test.cc
+++ b/stack/test/stack_avrcp_test.cc
@@ -27,6 +27,56 @@ class StackAvrcpTest : public ::testing::Test {
   virtual ~StackAvrcpTest() = default;
 };
 
+TEST_F(StackAvrcpTest, test_avrcp_ctrl_parse_vendor_rsp) {
+  uint8_t scratch_buf[512]{};
+  uint16_t scratch_buf_len = 512;
+  tAVRC_MSG msg{};
+  tAVRC_RESPONSE result{};
+  uint8_t vendor_rsp_buf[512]{};
+
+  msg.hdr.opcode = AVRC_OP_VENDOR;
+  msg.hdr.ctype = AVRC_CMD_STATUS;
+
+  memset(vendor_rsp_buf, 0, sizeof(vendor_rsp_buf));
+  vendor_rsp_buf[0] = AVRC_PDU_GET_ELEMENT_ATTR;
+  uint8_t* p = &vendor_rsp_buf[2];
+  UINT16_TO_BE_STREAM(p, 0x0009);   // parameter length
+  UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, 0x01);         // number of attributes
+  UINT32_TO_STREAM(p, 0x00000000);  // attribute ID
+  UINT16_TO_STREAM(p, 0x0000);      // character set ID
+  UINT16_TO_STREAM(p, 0xffff);      // attribute value length
+  msg.vendor.p_vendor_data = vendor_rsp_buf;
+  msg.vendor.vendor_len = 13;
+  EXPECT_EQ(
+      AVRC_Ctrl_ParsResponse(&msg, &result, scratch_buf, &scratch_buf_len),
+      AVRC_STS_INTERNAL_ERR);
+}
+
+TEST_F(StackAvrcpTest, test_avrcp_parse_browse_rsp) {
+  uint8_t scratch_buf[512]{};
+  uint16_t scratch_buf_len = 512;
+  tAVRC_MSG msg{};
+  tAVRC_RESPONSE result{};
+  uint8_t browse_rsp_buf[512]{};
+
+  msg.hdr.opcode = AVRC_OP_BROWSE;
+
+  memset(browse_rsp_buf, 0, sizeof(browse_rsp_buf));
+  browse_rsp_buf[0] = AVRC_PDU_GET_ITEM_ATTRIBUTES;
+  uint8_t* p = &browse_rsp_buf[1];
+  UINT16_TO_BE_STREAM(p, 0x000a);   // parameter length;
+  UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, 0x04);         // status
+  UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, 0x01);         // number of attribute
+  UINT32_TO_STREAM(p, 0x00000000);  // attribute ID
+  UINT16_TO_STREAM(p, 0x0000);      // character set ID
+  UINT16_TO_STREAM(p, 0xffff);      // attribute value length
+  msg.browse.p_browse_data = browse_rsp_buf;
+  msg.browse.browse_len = 13;
+  EXPECT_EQ(
+      AVRC_Ctrl_ParsResponse(&msg, &result, scratch_buf, &scratch_buf_len),
+      AVRC_STS_BAD_CMD);
+}
+
 TEST_F(StackAvrcpTest, test_avrcp_parse_browse_cmd) {
   uint8_t scratch_buf[512]{};
   tAVRC_MSG msg{};