DivestOS/Patches/LineageOS-20.0/ASB-2024-06/fwb-05.patch
Tavi 7f00fd1dde
20.0: June 2024 ASB picks
Signed-off-by: Tavi <tavi@divested.dev>
2024-06-13 15:11:11 -04:00

72 lines
3.2 KiB
Diff

From 091715c8307fed95ba63870f0c54e74208a78332 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lokesh Kumar Goel <lokeshgoel@google.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2024 23:05:05 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix vulnerability in AttributionSource due to incorrect
Binder call
AttributionSource uses Binder.getCallingUid to verify the UID of the
caller from another process. However, getCallingUid does not always
behave as expected. If the AttributionSource is unparceled outside a
transaction thread, which is quite possible, getCallingUid will return
the UID of the current process instead. If this is a system process,
the UID check gets bypassed entirely, meaning any uid can be provided.
This patch fixes the vulnerability by emptying out the state of the
AttributionSource, so that the service checking its credentials will
fail to give permission to the app.
Bug: 267231571
Test: v2/android-virtual-infra/test_mapping/presubmit-avd
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:5d79e535b9a802680062545e15fc1faaf779c0bf)
Merged-In: I3f228064fbd62e1c907f1ebe870cb61102f788f0
Change-Id: I3f228064fbd62e1c907f1ebe870cb61102f788f0
---
.../android/content/AttributionSource.java | 20 ++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/core/java/android/content/AttributionSource.java b/core/java/android/content/AttributionSource.java
index 3f2fa2188d24..16b18c85e790 100644
--- a/core/java/android/content/AttributionSource.java
+++ b/core/java/android/content/AttributionSource.java
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
import android.os.Process;
import android.permission.PermissionManager;
import android.util.ArraySet;
+import android.util.Log;
import com.android.internal.annotations.Immutable;
@@ -87,6 +88,8 @@
*/
@Immutable
public final class AttributionSource implements Parcelable {
+ private static final String TAG = "AttributionSource";
+
private static final String DESCRIPTOR = "android.content.AttributionSource";
private static final Binder sDefaultToken = new Binder(DESCRIPTOR);
@@ -154,9 +157,20 @@ public AttributionSource(@NonNull AttributionSource current, @Nullable Attributi
AttributionSource(@NonNull Parcel in) {
this(AttributionSourceState.CREATOR.createFromParcel(in));
- // Since we just unpacked this object as part of it transiting a Binder
- // call, this is the perfect time to enforce that its UID and PID can be trusted
- enforceCallingUidAndPid();
+ if (!Binder.isDirectlyHandlingTransaction()) {
+ Log.e(TAG, "Unable to verify calling UID #" + mAttributionSourceState.uid + " PID #"
+ + mAttributionSourceState.pid + " when not handling Binder transaction; "
+ + "clearing.");
+ mAttributionSourceState.pid = -1;
+ mAttributionSourceState.uid = -1;
+ mAttributionSourceState.packageName = null;
+ mAttributionSourceState.attributionTag = null;
+ mAttributionSourceState.next = null;
+ } else {
+ // Since we just unpacked this object as part of it transiting a Binder
+ // call, this is the perfect time to enforce that its UID and PID can be trusted
+ enforceCallingUidAndPid();
+ }
}
/** @hide */