From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: William Escande Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 09:48:59 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Check Avrcp packet vendor length before extracting length Bug: 205571133 Test: build + ag/18105403 for sts test Ignore-AOSP-First: Security vulnerability Change-Id: Ic9fa9400ab15785cfdb251af66b1867daf09570e (cherry picked from commit 003e42896493afb7a0cd7406720987725d4e9da3) Merged-In: Ic9fa9400ab15785cfdb251af66b1867daf09570e --- stack/avrc/avrc_pars_tg.cc | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/stack/avrc/avrc_pars_tg.cc b/stack/avrc/avrc_pars_tg.cc index 82f0269c8..ebeff219e 100644 --- a/stack/avrc/avrc_pars_tg.cc +++ b/stack/avrc/avrc_pars_tg.cc @@ -43,6 +43,12 @@ static tAVRC_STS avrc_ctrl_pars_vendor_cmd(tAVRC_MSG_VENDOR* p_msg, tAVRC_COMMAND* p_result) { tAVRC_STS status = AVRC_STS_NO_ERROR; + if (p_msg->vendor_len < 4) { // 4 == pdu + reserved byte + len as uint16 + AVRC_TRACE_WARNING("%s: message length %d too short: must be at least 4", + __func__, p_msg->vendor_len); + android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "205571133"); + return AVRC_STS_INTERNAL_ERR; + } uint8_t* p = p_msg->p_vendor_data; p_result->pdu = *p++; AVRC_TRACE_DEBUG("%s pdu:0x%x", __func__, p_result->pdu);