From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Brian Delwiche Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2024 21:14:56 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Fix an authentication bypass bug in SMP When pairing with BLE legacy pairing initiated from remote, authentication can be bypassed. This change fixes it. Bug: 251514170 Test: m com.android.btservices Test: manual run against PoC Ignore-AOSP-First: security (cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:8a3dbadc71428a30b172a74343be08498c656747) Merged-In: I66b1f9a80060f48a604001829db8ea7c96c7b7f8 Change-Id: I66b1f9a80060f48a604001829db8ea7c96c7b7f8 --- stack/smp/smp_act.cc | 12 ++++++++++++ stack/smp/smp_int.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/stack/smp/smp_act.cc b/stack/smp/smp_act.cc index c1f143e92..7edd7bd60 100644 --- a/stack/smp/smp_act.cc +++ b/stack/smp/smp_act.cc @@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ void smp_send_pair_rsp(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) { void smp_send_confirm(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) { SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_CONFIRM, p_cb); + p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_CMD_CONFIRM_SENT; } /******************************************************************************* @@ -665,6 +666,17 @@ void smp_proc_rand(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) { return; } + if (!((p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT) && + (p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT)) && + !(p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_CMD_CONFIRM_SENT)) { + // in legacy pairing, the peer should send its rand after + // we send our confirm + tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data{}; + smp_int_data.status = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS; + smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data); + return; + } + /* save the SRand for comparison */ STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->rrand.data(), p, OCTET16_LEN); } diff --git a/stack/smp/smp_int.h b/stack/smp/smp_int.h index 72fdf55a9..e3063c57d 100644 --- a/stack/smp/smp_int.h +++ b/stack/smp/smp_int.h @@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ typedef union { (1 << 7) /* used to resolve race condition */ #define SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_LOCAL_PUBL_KEY \ (1 << 8) /* used on slave to resolve race condition */ +#define SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_CMD_CONFIRM_SENT (1 << 9) /* check if authentication requirement need MITM protection */ #define SMP_NO_MITM_REQUIRED(x) (((x)&SMP_AUTH_YN_BIT) == 0)