From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Martijn Coenen Date: Thu, 29 Feb 2024 12:03:05 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Verify UID of incoming Zygote connections. Only the system UID should be allowed to connect to the Zygote. While for generic Zygotes this is also covered by SELinux policy, this is not true for App Zygotes: the preload code running in an app zygote could connect to another app zygote socket, if it had access to its (random) socket address. On the Java layer, simply check the UID when the connection is made. In the native layer, this check was already present, but it actually didn't work in the case where we receive a new incoming connection on the socket, and receive a 'non-fork' command: in that case, we will simply exit the native loop, and let the Java layer handle the command, without any further UID checking. Modified the native logic to drop new connections with a mismatching UID, and to keep serving the existing connection (if it was still there). [Backport: No native layer for ZygoteCommandBuffer present] Bug: 319081336 Test: manual (cherry picked from commit 2ffc7cb220e4220b7e108c4043a3f0f2a85b6508) (cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:e397fd3d20c3f409311e411387ec1524ccecf085) Merged-In: I3f85a17107849e2cd3e82d6ef15c90b9e2f26532 Change-Id: I3f85a17107849e2cd3e82d6ef15c90b9e2f26532 --- core/java/com/android/internal/os/ZygoteConnection.java | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/core/java/com/android/internal/os/ZygoteConnection.java b/core/java/com/android/internal/os/ZygoteConnection.java index 52d0adba0a05..fe2ff54194fb 100644 --- a/core/java/com/android/internal/os/ZygoteConnection.java +++ b/core/java/com/android/internal/os/ZygoteConnection.java @@ -106,6 +106,9 @@ class ZygoteConnection { throw ex; } + if (peer.getUid() != Process.SYSTEM_UID) { + throw new ZygoteSecurityException("Only system UID is allowed to connect to Zygote."); + } isEof = false; }