From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hui Peng Date: Tue, 16 May 2023 21:24:07 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Fix an integer overflow bug in avdt_msg_asmbl This is a backport of Iaa4d603921fc4ffb8cfb5783f99ec0963affd6a2 to rvc-dev Bug: 280633699 Test: manual Ignore-AOSP-First: security Tag: #security (cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:26347d4bdba646bbba4d27337d2888a04de42639) Merged-In: Iaa4d603921fc4ffb8cfb5783f99ec0963affd6a2 Change-Id: Iaa4d603921fc4ffb8cfb5783f99ec0963affd6a2 --- stack/avdt/avdt_msg.cc | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/stack/avdt/avdt_msg.cc b/stack/avdt/avdt_msg.cc index b6a952bcf..b5f512a03 100644 --- a/stack/avdt/avdt_msg.cc +++ b/stack/avdt/avdt_msg.cc @@ -1261,14 +1261,14 @@ BT_HDR* avdt_msg_asmbl(tAVDT_CCB* p_ccb, BT_HDR* p_buf) { * NOTE: The buffer is allocated above at the beginning of the * reassembly, and is always of size BT_DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE. */ - uint16_t buf_len = BT_DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(BT_HDR); + size_t buf_len = BT_DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(BT_HDR); /* adjust offset and len of fragment for header byte */ p_buf->offset += AVDT_LEN_TYPE_CONT; p_buf->len -= AVDT_LEN_TYPE_CONT; /* verify length */ - if ((p_ccb->p_rx_msg->offset + p_buf->len) > buf_len) { + if (((size_t) p_ccb->p_rx_msg->offset + (size_t) p_buf->len) > buf_len) { /* won't fit; free everything */ AVDT_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Fragmented message too big!", __func__); osi_free_and_reset((void**)&p_ccb->p_rx_msg);