- enable the patchset for 18.1
- add an ugly patch that extends the Pixel 3* camera workaround to all camera executables
Signed-off-by: Tad <tad@spotco.us>
- No patches were found with incorrect authorship/From: lines
- The older AndroidHardening patch repos are no longer available to verify CID.
- New GrapheneOS patches do not include a CID.
- *Signature_Spoofing.patch CID could not be found.
- Fixed CID of *Harden_Sig_Spoofing.patch to match 14.1
- Fixed CID of *LGE_Fixes.patch to match 14.1
- Fixed CID of *Harden.patch to match 14.1
- Added edit note to *Harden.patch
- Fixed CID of *PREREQ_Handle_All_Modes.patch to match 14.1
- Fixed CID of *More_Preferred_Network_Modes.patch to match 14.1
- Fixed CID of *AES256.patch to match 14.1
- Fixed CID of *0001-OTA_Keys.patch to match 18.1
- Fixed CID of *Camera_Fix.patch to match 15.1
- Fixed CID of *Connectivity.patch to match 14.1
- Fixed CID of *Fix_Calling.patch to match 14.1
- Fixed CID of *Remove_Analytics.patch to match 14.1
- Fixed CID of Unused-*.patch/audio_extn to match original
Signed-off-by: Tad <tad@spotco.us>
Some patches were ported from 12 to 10/11
Some patches from 11 were ported to 10
This 10/11 port should be very close to 12
BOUNS: 16.0 patches, disabled
Signed-off-by: Tad <tad@spotco.us>
- 16.0: drop wallpaper optimization patch, questionable source
- deblobber: don't remove libmmparser_lite.so, potentially used by camera
- 17.1: pick Q_asb_2021-12, excluding a broken patch
- clark 17.1: some camera denial fixes
- alioth: unmark broken
- 17.1: switch to upstream glibc fix
- 17.1/18.1: disable per app sensors permission patchset, potential camera issues
Signed-off-by: Tad <tad@spotco.us>
Switch these patches to MODE_ALLOWED from MODE_ASK to fix breakage
of system services.
Also remove some code that adds a likely security issue.
Will need some extra regression testing.
Signed-off-by: Tad <tad@spotco.us>
Based off of patches from CalyxOS as noted in each included patch.
Tested and verified working on klte and mata 18.1
Signed-off-by: Tad <tad@spotco.us>
PRODUCT_OTA_PUBLIC_KEYS is meant to be set by a vendor tree, something
we don't use.
Override it at the source and set it explicitely as well.
This ensures that the compiled recovery.img and the one generated by
sign_target_files_apks.py includes the real public keys for verification.
11.0 signing is ignored.
This will need to be extensively tested as breakage can mean brick on locked
devices.
Although in failure cases it seems test-keys are accepted.
--
After much testing there appears to be a deeper issue with how keys
are inserted into the recovery and handled
- 15.1+16.0: Replace in-line build signing patch with bash function
- From GrapheneOS/script
- 15.1+16.0: Enable fingerprint failed lockout after 5 attempts
- From GrapheneOS
+ 16.0: some other misc hardening patches from GrapheneOS
- always restrict access to Build.SERIAL
- don't grant location permission to system browsers
- fbe: pad filenames more
+ 16.0: Contacts: remove Privacy Policy and Terms of Service links
