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18: November 2024 ASB Picks

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Signed-off-by: Tavi <tavi@divested.dev>
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Tavi 2024-11-13 07:54:08 -05:00
parent ffddff80bf
commit 8b43c0a51a
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14 changed files with 847 additions and 2 deletions
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2
Container/Dockerfile
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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ ARG username
RUN dnf -y update \
# && dnf -y install bash coreutils bzip2 curl java-1.8.0-openjdk java-1.8.0-openjdk-devel unzip zip zlib \
# && dnf -y install @development-tools tini android-tools automake bc bison bzip2-libs ccache
&& dnf -y install @development-tools android-tools automake bc bison bzip2 bzip2-libs ccache curl dpkg-dev flex gcc gcc-c++ git git-lfs glibc-devel.{x86_64,i686} gnupg gperf ImageMagick ImageMagick-c++-devel ImageMagick-devel java-1.8.0-openjdk java-1.8.0-openjdk-devel libgcc.{x86_64,i686} libstdc++.{x86_64,i686} libX11-devel.{x86_64,i686} libxml2-devel libXrandr.{x86_64,i686} libXrender.{x86_64,i686} libxslt lz4-libs lzop make maven mesa-libGL-devel.{x86_64,i686} ncurses ncurses-compat-libs ncurses-devel.{x86_64,i686} ninja-build openssl-devel optipng jpegoptim perl perl-Digest-MD5-File perl-Switch pngcrush python python2 python3-virtualenv python3 python3-mako python-mako python-markdown python-networkx readline-devel.{x86_64,i686} rsync schedtool SDL squashfs-tools syslinux-devel unzip wxGTK xml2 xz-lzma-compat zip zlib zlib-devel vim-common vboot-utils mozilla-fira-mono-fonts mozilla-fira-sans-fonts openssl nano htop wget libxcrypt-compat.x86_64 golang \
&& dnf -y install @development-tools android-tools automake bc bison bzip2 bzip2-libs ccache curl dpkg-dev flex gcc gcc-c++ git git-lfs glibc-devel.{x86_64,i686} gnupg gperf ImageMagick ImageMagick-c++-devel ImageMagick-devel java-1.8.0-openjdk java-1.8.0-openjdk-devel libgcc.{x86_64,i686} libstdc++.{x86_64,i686} libX11-devel.{x86_64,i686} libxml2-devel libXrandr.{x86_64,i686} libXrender.{x86_64,i686} libxslt lz4-libs lzop make maven mesa-libGL-devel.{x86_64,i686} ncurses ncurses-compat-libs ncurses-devel.{x86_64,i686} ninja-build openssl-devel optipng jpegoptim perl perl-Digest-MD5-File perl-Switch pngcrush python python2 python3-virtualenv python3 python3-mako python-mako python-markdown python-networkx readline-devel.{x86_64,i686} rsync schedtool SDL squashfs-tools syslinux-devel unzip wxGTK xml2 xz-lzma-compat zip zlib zlib-devel vim-common vboot-utils mozilla-fira-mono-fonts mozilla-fira-sans-fonts openssl nano htop wget libxcrypt-compat.x86_64 golang openssl-devel-engine \
&& dnf clean all \
&& curl -o /usr/local/bin/repo https://storage.googleapis.com/git-repo-downloads/repo \
&& chmod a+x /usr/local/bin/repo \

48
Patches/LineageOS-18.1/android_external_skia/408442.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
From cfb96168e5e753a0bdcca4874b012c25a7f7737a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Brian Osman <brianosman@google.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2024 14:22:52 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] RESTRICT AUTOMERGE: Avoid potential overflow when allocating
3D mask from emboss filter
Note: the original fix landed after
Iac8b937e516dbfbbcefef54360dd5b7300bacb67 introduced SkMaskBuilder, so
this cherry-pick had to be tweaked to avoid conflicts. Unfortuantely
that means we need RESTRICT AUTOMERGE to prevent this modified version
from flowing through API boundaries into VIC, and we need to manually
cherry-pick it to each API level.
Bug: 344620577
Test: N/A -- unclear if even reachable
Reviewed-on: https://skia-review.googlesource.com/c/skia/+/893738
Commit-Queue: Brian Osman <brianosman@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Wagner <bungeman@google.com>
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:2bc38734eec777bf2574d4b38a7fd4fc05f0ecde)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:69fc79acf3f05f269c55069ba5e2fbd00e1a76b6)
Merged-In: Ia35860371d45120baca63238e77faa5c0eb25d51
Change-Id: Ia35860371d45120baca63238e77faa5c0eb25d51
---
src/effects/SkEmbossMaskFilter.cpp | 10 ++++++----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/effects/SkEmbossMaskFilter.cpp b/src/effects/SkEmbossMaskFilter.cpp
index 2dcce2b9102..8ea8c08039b 100644
--- a/src/effects/SkEmbossMaskFilter.cpp
+++ b/src/effects/SkEmbossMaskFilter.cpp
@@ -95,11 +95,13 @@ bool SkEmbossMaskFilter::filterMask(SkMask* dst, const SkMask& src,
{
uint8_t* alphaPlane = dst->fImage;
- size_t planeSize = dst->computeImageSize();
- if (0 == planeSize) {
- return false; // too big to allocate, abort
+ size_t totalSize = dst->computeTotalImageSize();
+ if (totalSize == 0) {
+ return false; // too big to allocate, abort
}
- dst->fImage = SkMask::AllocImage(planeSize * 3);
+ size_t planeSize = dst->computeImageSize();
+ SkASSERT(planeSize != 0); // if totalSize didn't overflow, this can't either
+ dst->fImage = SkMask::AllocImage(totalSize);
memcpy(dst->fImage, alphaPlane, planeSize);
SkMask::FreeImage(alphaPlane);
}

31
Patches/LineageOS-18.1/android_frameworks_base/408443.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From 3651d27fdb579b51ea8a9b12fc18ca6e495566da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Dementyev <dementyev@google.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2024 11:02:07 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Remove authenticator data if it was disabled.
Test: manual
Bug: 343440463
Flag: EXEMPT bugfix
(cherry picked from commit ddfc078af7e89641360b896f99af23a6b371b847)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:c2660dcf7fca3f652528d219767f65858bbbe622)
Merged-In: I36bd6bf101da03c9c30a6d3c0080b801e7898bc6
Change-Id: I36bd6bf101da03c9c30a6d3c0080b801e7898bc6
---
.../com/android/server/accounts/AccountManagerService.java | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/services/core/java/com/android/server/accounts/AccountManagerService.java b/services/core/java/com/android/server/accounts/AccountManagerService.java
index fb79904a5b3a8..5718071c2bc4e 100644
--- a/services/core/java/com/android/server/accounts/AccountManagerService.java
+++ b/services/core/java/com/android/server/accounts/AccountManagerService.java
@@ -1165,6 +1165,10 @@ private void validateAccountsInternal(
obsoleteAuthType.add(type);
// And delete it from the TABLE_META
accountsDb.deleteMetaByAuthTypeAndUid(type, uid);
+ } else if (knownUid != null && knownUid != uid) {
+ Slog.w(TAG, "authenticator no longer exist for type " + type);
+ obsoleteAuthType.add(type);
+ accountsDb.deleteMetaByAuthTypeAndUid(type, uid);
}
}
}

76
Patches/LineageOS-18.1/android_frameworks_base/408444.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
From 3f5562449aad196198d0d36c312e6461920cebce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jean-Michel Trivi <jmtrivi@google.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2024 17:29:14 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] RingtoneManager: allow video ringtone URI
When checking the MIME type for the default ringtone, also
allow it to refer to video content.
Bug: 205837340
Test: see POC + atest android.media.audio.cts.RingtoneManagerTest
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:a8d2785d69314086dc3b5b2531386fefff079ce7)
Merged-In: Iac9f27f14bae29e0fabc31e05da2357f6f4f16c7
Change-Id: Iac9f27f14bae29e0fabc31e05da2357f6f4f16c7
---
media/java/android/media/RingtoneManager.java | 8 ++++++--
.../android/providers/settings/SettingsProvider.java | 11 +++++++----
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/media/java/android/media/RingtoneManager.java b/media/java/android/media/RingtoneManager.java
index 918a9d8943dde..1e1142387d149 100644
--- a/media/java/android/media/RingtoneManager.java
+++ b/media/java/android/media/RingtoneManager.java
@@ -833,9 +833,13 @@ public static void setActualDefaultRingtoneUri(Context context, int type, Uri ri
+ " ignored: failure to find mimeType (no access from this context?)");
return;
}
- if (!(mimeType.startsWith("audio/") || mimeType.equals("application/ogg"))) {
+ if (!(mimeType.startsWith("audio/") || mimeType.equals("application/ogg")
+ || mimeType.equals("application/x-flac")
+ // also check for video ringtones
+ || mimeType.startsWith("video/") || mimeType.equals("application/mp4"))) {
Log.e(TAG, "setActualDefaultRingtoneUri for URI:" + ringtoneUri
- + " ignored: associated mimeType:" + mimeType + " is not an audio type");
+ + " ignored: associated MIME type:" + mimeType
+ + " is not a recognized audio or video type");
return;
}
}
diff --git a/packages/SettingsProvider/src/com/android/providers/settings/SettingsProvider.java b/packages/SettingsProvider/src/com/android/providers/settings/SettingsProvider.java
index d3c10574ea134..f58016acd290f 100644
--- a/packages/SettingsProvider/src/com/android/providers/settings/SettingsProvider.java
+++ b/packages/SettingsProvider/src/com/android/providers/settings/SettingsProvider.java
@@ -1781,7 +1781,7 @@ private boolean mutateSystemSetting(String name, String value, int runAsUserId,
cacheName = Settings.System.ALARM_ALERT_CACHE;
}
if (cacheName != null) {
- if (!isValidAudioUri(name, value)) {
+ if (!isValidMediaUri(name, value)) {
return false;
}
final File cacheFile = new File(
@@ -1816,7 +1816,7 @@ owningUserId, name, value, null, false, getCallingPackage(),
}
}
- private boolean isValidAudioUri(String name, String uri) {
+ private boolean isValidMediaUri(String name, String uri) {
if (uri != null) {
Uri audioUri = Uri.parse(uri);
if (Settings.AUTHORITY.equals(
@@ -1834,10 +1834,13 @@ private boolean isValidAudioUri(String name, String uri) {
return false;
}
if (!(mimeType.startsWith("audio/") || mimeType.equals("application/ogg")
- || mimeType.equals("application/x-flac"))) {
+ || mimeType.equals("application/x-flac")
+ // also check for video ringtones
+ || mimeType.startsWith("video/") || mimeType.equals("application/mp4"))) {
Slog.e(LOG_TAG,
"mutateSystemSetting for setting: " + name + " URI: " + audioUri
- + " ignored: associated mimeType: " + mimeType + " is not an audio type");
+ + " ignored: associated MIME type: " + mimeType
+ + " is not a recognized audio or video type");
return false;
}
}

53
Patches/LineageOS-18.1/android_frameworks_base/408445.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
From 12f53fb98530441d6612b06f07db77db9de2eaf9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ashish Kumar Gupta <kumarashishg@google.com>
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2024 16:02:29 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Set no data transfer on function switch timeout for accessory
mode
In case of function switch times out, we will check whether
the last function set was accessory. If this is the case, it is
recommended to set the function to NONE(No data transfer) rather than
setting it to the default USB function.
Bug: 353712853
Test: Build the code, flash the device and test it.
Test: atest CtsUsbManagerTestCases
Test: run CtsVerifier tool
Test: atest CtsUsbTests
(cherry picked from commit 7c6ec68537ba8abf798afd9ab7c3e5889841171f)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:b032a602cdad00687e1fe089d66a6c4fa6925d79)
Merged-In: I698e9df0333cbb51dd9bd5917a94d81273a2784a
Change-Id: I698e9df0333cbb51dd9bd5917a94d81273a2784a
---
.../java/com/android/server/usb/UsbDeviceManager.java | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/services/usb/java/com/android/server/usb/UsbDeviceManager.java b/services/usb/java/com/android/server/usb/UsbDeviceManager.java
index a7a51a151b973..8a6731e2e5ee6 100644
--- a/services/usb/java/com/android/server/usb/UsbDeviceManager.java
+++ b/services/usb/java/com/android/server/usb/UsbDeviceManager.java
@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ private void updateCurrentAccessory() {
}
}
- private void notifyAccessoryModeExit() {
+ protected void notifyAccessoryModeExit() {
// make sure accessory mode is off
// and restore default functions
Slog.d(TAG, "exited USB accessory mode");
@@ -1791,8 +1791,13 @@ public void handleMessage(Message msg) {
* Dont force to default when the configuration is already set to default.
*/
if (msg.arg1 != 1) {
- // Set this since default function may be selected from Developer options
- setEnabledFunctions(mScreenUnlockedFunctions, false);
+ if (mCurrentFunctions == UsbManager.FUNCTION_ACCESSORY) {
+ notifyAccessoryModeExit();
+ } else {
+ // Set this since default function may be selected from Developer
+ // options
+ setEnabledFunctions(mScreenUnlockedFunctions, false);
+ }
}
break;
case MSG_GADGET_HAL_REGISTERED:

46
Patches/LineageOS-18.1/android_frameworks_base/408446.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From 67f7515c79ea18e50bb87f8fbe083493a0aac0d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: lpeter <lpeter@google.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2024 09:22:12 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Disallow device admin package and protected packages to be
reinstalled as instant.
We should prevent the following types of apps from being reinstalled with
--install-existing as an instant.
(1)device admin package
(2)protected packages
Flag: EXEMPT bugfix
Bug: 341256043
Test: Manual test
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:77c5ebbd2a83e060577dd584aed7802452339ca5)
Merged-In: I4e913a12477fd4a64990033eaae533e30863e2a2
Change-Id: I4e913a12477fd4a64990033eaae533e30863e2a2
---
.../java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java b/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java
index 819a1437a4f1f..c0dd1f1e02f5b 100644
--- a/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java
+++ b/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java
@@ -13390,6 +13390,9 @@ int installExistingPackageAsUser(@Nullable String packageName, @UserIdInt int us
(installFlags & PackageManager.INSTALL_INSTANT_APP) != 0;
final boolean fullApp =
(installFlags & PackageManager.INSTALL_FULL_APP) != 0;
+ final boolean isPackageDeviceAdmin = isPackageDeviceAdmin(packageName, userId);
+ final boolean isProtectedPackage = mProtectedPackages != null
+ && mProtectedPackages.isPackageStateProtected(userId, packageName);
// writer
synchronized (mLock) {
@@ -13397,7 +13400,8 @@ int installExistingPackageAsUser(@Nullable String packageName, @UserIdInt int us
if (pkgSetting == null) {
return PackageManager.INSTALL_FAILED_INVALID_URI;
}
- if (instantApp && (pkgSetting.isSystem() || isUpdatedSystemApp(pkgSetting))) {
+ if (instantApp && (pkgSetting.isSystem() || isUpdatedSystemApp(pkgSetting)
+ || isPackageDeviceAdmin || isProtectedPackage)) {
return PackageManager.INSTALL_FAILED_INVALID_URI;
}
if (!canViewInstantApps(callingUid, UserHandle.getUserId(callingUid))) {

82
Patches/LineageOS-18.1/android_frameworks_base/408447.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
From 527ea3afca9a6ae7d330e5f982f9d22011adab7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ben Murdoch <benm@google.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2024 17:22:59 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] RESTRICT AUTOMERGE Clear app-provided shortcut icons
When displaying keyboard shortcuts provided by an app, clear
any icon that may have been set (this is only possible via
reflection, and is not a intended for usage outside of the system).
Bug: 331180422
Test: Verify on device
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:a031e9f221cf87657c42d3ed0ddbe93fc6d7a9c3)
Merged-In: If7e291eb2254c3cbec23673c65e7477e6ad45b09
Change-Id: If7e291eb2254c3cbec23673c65e7477e6ad45b09
---
core/java/android/view/KeyboardShortcutInfo.java | 13 +++++++++++--
.../systemui/statusbar/KeyboardShortcuts.java | 9 +++++++++
2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/core/java/android/view/KeyboardShortcutInfo.java b/core/java/android/view/KeyboardShortcutInfo.java
index 2660e74dcb205..2075d77a9871e 100644
--- a/core/java/android/view/KeyboardShortcutInfo.java
+++ b/core/java/android/view/KeyboardShortcutInfo.java
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
*/
public final class KeyboardShortcutInfo implements Parcelable {
private final CharSequence mLabel;
- private final Icon mIcon;
+ private Icon mIcon;
private final char mBaseCharacter;
private final int mKeycode;
private final int mModifiers;
@@ -115,6 +115,15 @@ public Icon getIcon() {
return mIcon;
}
+ /**
+ * Removes an icon that was previously set.
+ *
+ * @hide
+ */
+ public void clearIcon() {
+ mIcon = null;
+ }
+
/**
* Returns the base keycode that, combined with the modifiers, triggers this shortcut. If the
* base character was set instead, returns {@link KeyEvent#KEYCODE_UNKNOWN}. Valid keycodes are
@@ -165,4 +174,4 @@ public KeyboardShortcutInfo[] newArray(int size) {
return new KeyboardShortcutInfo[size];
}
};
-}
\ No newline at end of file
+}
diff --git a/packages/SystemUI/src/com/android/systemui/statusbar/KeyboardShortcuts.java b/packages/SystemUI/src/com/android/systemui/statusbar/KeyboardShortcuts.java
index 7e6ddcfea7620..cc373d3c8b0f1 100644
--- a/packages/SystemUI/src/com/android/systemui/statusbar/KeyboardShortcuts.java
+++ b/packages/SystemUI/src/com/android/systemui/statusbar/KeyboardShortcuts.java
@@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ private void showKeyboardShortcuts(int deviceId) {
@Override
public void onKeyboardShortcutsReceived(
final List<KeyboardShortcutGroup> result) {
+ sanitiseShortcuts(result);
result.add(getSystemShortcuts());
final KeyboardShortcutGroup appShortcuts = getDefaultApplicationShortcuts();
if (appShortcuts != null) {
@@ -388,6 +389,14 @@ public void onKeyboardShortcutsReceived(
}, deviceId);
}
+ static void sanitiseShortcuts(List<KeyboardShortcutGroup> shortcutGroups) {
+ for (KeyboardShortcutGroup group : shortcutGroups) {
+ for (KeyboardShortcutInfo info : group.getItems()) {
+ info.clearIcon();
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
private void dismissKeyboardShortcuts() {
if (mKeyboardShortcutsDialog != null) {
mKeyboardShortcutsDialog.dismiss();

137
Patches/LineageOS-18.1/android_frameworks_base/408448.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
From e1c64096a439b5d54a5cb6de77242217b1516ca1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dipankar Bhardwaj <dipankarb@google.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2024 14:26:50 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Restrict access to directories
Restricted access to Android/data, Android/obb and Android/sandbox
directories and its sub-directories. Replacing path's pattern match
check with file equality check.
Test: atest DocumentsClientTest
Bug: 341680936
Flag: EXEMPT bug fix
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:22ea85377ad49594e46c57b398fb477d3d12c668)
Merged-In: I8879900e57e1702d11797b81e86d0cc3f55bac22
Change-Id: I8879900e57e1702d11797b81e86d0cc3f55bac22
---
.../ExternalStorageProvider.java | 79 ++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 68 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/packages/ExternalStorageProvider/src/com/android/externalstorage/ExternalStorageProvider.java b/packages/ExternalStorageProvider/src/com/android/externalstorage/ExternalStorageProvider.java
index 53e17e35953d1..a722c08605083 100644
--- a/packages/ExternalStorageProvider/src/com/android/externalstorage/ExternalStorageProvider.java
+++ b/packages/ExternalStorageProvider/src/com/android/externalstorage/ExternalStorageProvider.java
@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@
package com.android.externalstorage;
-import static java.util.regex.Pattern.CASE_INSENSITIVE;
-
import android.annotation.NonNull;
import android.annotation.Nullable;
import android.app.usage.StorageStatsManager;
@@ -61,12 +59,15 @@
import java.io.FileNotFoundException;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.PrintWriter;
+import java.nio.file.Files;
+import java.nio.file.Paths;
+import java.util.Arrays;
import java.util.Collections;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Locale;
import java.util.Objects;
import java.util.UUID;
-import java.util.regex.Pattern;
+import java.util.stream.Collectors;
/**
* Presents content of the shared (a.k.a. "external") storage.
@@ -89,12 +90,9 @@ public class ExternalStorageProvider extends FileSystemProvider {
private static final Uri BASE_URI =
new Uri.Builder().scheme(ContentResolver.SCHEME_CONTENT).authority(AUTHORITY).build();
- /**
- * Regex for detecting {@code /Android/data/}, {@code /Android/obb/} and
- * {@code /Android/sandbox/} along with all their subdirectories and content.
- */
- private static final Pattern PATTERN_RESTRICTED_ANDROID_SUBTREES =
- Pattern.compile("^Android/(?:data|obb|sandbox)(?:/.+)?", CASE_INSENSITIVE);
+ private static final String PRIMARY_EMULATED_STORAGE_PATH = "/storage/emulated/";
+
+ private static final String STORAGE_PATH = "/storage/";
private static final String[] DEFAULT_ROOT_PROJECTION = new String[] {
Root.COLUMN_ROOT_ID, Root.COLUMN_FLAGS, Root.COLUMN_ICON, Root.COLUMN_TITLE,
@@ -308,10 +306,69 @@ protected boolean shouldHideDocument(@NonNull String documentId) {
return false;
}
- final String path = getPathFromDocId(documentId);
- return PATTERN_RESTRICTED_ANDROID_SUBTREES.matcher(path).matches();
+ try {
+ final RootInfo root = getRootFromDocId(documentId);
+ final String canonicalPath = getPathFromDocId(documentId);
+ return isRestrictedPath(root.rootId, canonicalPath);
+ } catch (Exception e) {
+ return true;
+ }
}
+ /**
+ * Based on the given root id and path, we restrict path access if file is Android/data or
+ * Android/obb or Android/sandbox or one of their subdirectories.
+ *
+ * @param canonicalPath of the file
+ * @return true if path is restricted
+ */
+ private boolean isRestrictedPath(String rootId, String canonicalPath) {
+ if (rootId == null || canonicalPath == null) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ final String rootPath;
+ if (rootId.equalsIgnoreCase(ROOT_ID_PRIMARY_EMULATED)) {
+ // Creates "/storage/emulated/<user-id>"
+ rootPath = PRIMARY_EMULATED_STORAGE_PATH + UserHandle.myUserId();
+ } else {
+ // Creates "/storage/<volume-uuid>"
+ rootPath = STORAGE_PATH + rootId;
+ }
+ List<java.nio.file.Path> restrictedPathList = Arrays.asList(
+ Paths.get(rootPath, "Android", "data"),
+ Paths.get(rootPath, "Android", "obb"),
+ Paths.get(rootPath, "Android", "sandbox"));
+ // We need to identify restricted parent paths which actually exist on the device
+ List<java.nio.file.Path> validRestrictedPathsToCheck = restrictedPathList.stream().filter(
+ Files::exists).collect(Collectors.toList());
+
+ boolean isRestricted = false;
+ java.nio.file.Path filePathToCheck = Paths.get(rootPath, canonicalPath);
+ try {
+ while (filePathToCheck != null) {
+ for (java.nio.file.Path restrictedPath : validRestrictedPathsToCheck) {
+ if (Files.isSameFile(restrictedPath, filePathToCheck)) {
+ isRestricted = true;
+ Log.v(TAG, "Restricting access for path: " + filePathToCheck);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (isRestricted) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ filePathToCheck = filePathToCheck.getParent();
+ }
+ } catch (Exception e) {
+ Log.w(TAG, "Error in checking file equality check.", e);
+ isRestricted = true;
+ }
+
+ return isRestricted;
+ }
+
+
/**
* Check that the directory is the root of storage or blocked file from tree.
* <p>

123
Patches/LineageOS-18.1/android_frameworks_opt_net_wifi/408452.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
From 77dbe1a766a8207f7039b9b55643599e2210b0da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nate Jiang <qiangjiang@google.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2024 18:13:39 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] [BACKPORT] Fix security issue by change the field in
WifiConfig
Flag: EXEMPT bugfix
Bug: 347912017
Bug: 348352288
Bug: 346289032
Test: atest com.android.server.wifi
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:eca3f190d2a5b6b634224863f5ee5f584babd0dc)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:0597dc97b34e1d1609c1e33f9b6e524474a94144)
Merged-In: I8998340ae557660036895dd906808d682b83c6f0
Change-Id: I8998340ae557660036895dd906808d682b83c6f0
---
.../server/wifi/WifiConfigurationUtil.java | 72 ++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 71 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/service/java/com/android/server/wifi/WifiConfigurationUtil.java b/service/java/com/android/server/wifi/WifiConfigurationUtil.java
index ffa9facf55..6b942735b5 100644
--- a/service/java/com/android/server/wifi/WifiConfigurationUtil.java
+++ b/service/java/com/android/server/wifi/WifiConfigurationUtil.java
@@ -63,6 +63,11 @@ public class WifiConfigurationUtil {
private static final int SAE_ASCII_MIN_LEN = 1 + ENCLOSING_QUOTES_LEN;
private static final int PSK_SAE_ASCII_MAX_LEN = 63 + ENCLOSING_QUOTES_LEN;
private static final int PSK_SAE_HEX_LEN = 64;
+ private static final int MAX_STRING_LENGTH = 512;
+
+ // BACKPORT
+ private static final int MAX_NUMBER_OF_OI = 36;
+ private static final long MAX_OI_VALUE = ((long) 1 << 40) - 1;
@VisibleForTesting
public static final String PASSWORD_MASK = "*";
@@ -597,7 +602,8 @@ public static boolean validate(WifiConfiguration config, boolean isAdd) {
if (!validateSsid(config.SSID, isAdd)) {
return false;
}
- if (!validateBssid(config.BSSID)) {
+ if (!validateBssid(config.BSSID) || !validateBssid(config.dhcpServer)
+ || !validateBssid(config.defaultGwMacAddress)) {
return false;
}
if (!validateBitSets(config)) {
@@ -606,6 +612,12 @@ public static boolean validate(WifiConfiguration config, boolean isAdd) {
if (!validateKeyMgmt(config.allowedKeyManagement)) {
return false;
}
+ if (!validatePasspoint(config)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (!validateNetworkSelectionStatus(config.getNetworkSelectionStatus())) {
+ return false;
+ }
if (config.allowedKeyManagement.get(WifiConfiguration.KeyMgmt.WPA_PSK)
&& !validatePassword(config.preSharedKey, isAdd, false, false)) {
return false;
@@ -651,6 +663,64 @@ public static boolean validate(WifiConfiguration config, boolean isAdd) {
return true;
}
+ private static boolean validateStringField(String field, int maxLength) {
+ return field == null || field.length() <= maxLength;
+ }
+
+ private static boolean validatePasspoint(WifiConfiguration config) {
+ if (!validateStringField(config.FQDN, 255)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (!validateStringField(config.providerFriendlyName, 255)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (!validateRoamingConsortiumIds(config.roamingConsortiumIds)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (!validateUpdateIdentifier(config.updateIdentifier)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ private static boolean validateUpdateIdentifier(String updateIdentifier) {
+ if (TextUtils.isEmpty(updateIdentifier)) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ try {
+ Integer.valueOf(updateIdentifier);
+ } catch (NumberFormatException e) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ private static boolean validateNetworkSelectionStatus(
+ WifiConfiguration.NetworkSelectionStatus status) {
+ if (status == null) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ return validateStringField(status.getConnectChoice(), MAX_STRING_LENGTH)
+ && validateBssid(status.getNetworkSelectionBSSID());
+ }
+
+ private static boolean validateRoamingConsortiumIds(long[] roamingConsortiumIds) {
+ if (roamingConsortiumIds != null) {
+ if (roamingConsortiumIds.length > MAX_NUMBER_OF_OI) {
+ Log.d(TAG, "too many Roaming Consortium Organization Identifiers in the "
+ + "profile");
+ return false;
+ }
+ for (long oi : roamingConsortiumIds) {
+ if (oi < 0 || oi > MAX_OI_VALUE) {
+ Log.d(TAG, "Organization Identifiers is out of range");
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return true;
+ }
+
private static boolean validateBssidPattern(
Pair<MacAddress, MacAddress> bssidPatternMatcher) {
if (bssidPatternMatcher == null) return true;

72
Patches/LineageOS-18.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/408449.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
From 9411c079df368653f34617e2e07487c00b5da4bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Norman <danielnorman@google.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2024 21:15:42 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] RESTRICT AUTOMERGE Stops hiding a11y services with the same
package+label as an activity.
Bug: 353700779
Test: Install poc APKs from the bug, observe issue not reproducible
Test: (automated tests on 'main' branch)
Flag: NONE security fix
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:fecb99475e019614d6eba07a79ddc7f46b335892)
Merged-In: Ia8d43229d277dd4442173166ae0402f05096da4b
Change-Id: Ia8d43229d277dd4442173166ae0402f05096da4b
---
.../accessibility/AccessibilitySettings.java | 25 -------------------
1 file changed, 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/com/android/settings/accessibility/AccessibilitySettings.java b/src/com/android/settings/accessibility/AccessibilitySettings.java
index f918046bc37..b2f37c026ff 100644
--- a/src/com/android/settings/accessibility/AccessibilitySettings.java
+++ b/src/com/android/settings/accessibility/AccessibilitySettings.java
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
import android.content.pm.ActivityInfo;
import android.content.pm.PackageManager;
import android.content.pm.ResolveInfo;
-import android.content.pm.ServiceInfo;
import android.graphics.drawable.Drawable;
import android.hardware.display.ColorDisplayManager;
import android.net.Uri;
@@ -407,17 +406,11 @@ private List<RestrictedPreference> getInstalledAccessibilityList(Context context
final List<AccessibilityShortcutInfo> installedShortcutList =
a11yManager.getInstalledAccessibilityShortcutListAsUser(context,
UserHandle.myUserId());
-
- // Remove duplicate item here, new a ArrayList to copy unmodifiable list result
- // (getInstalledAccessibilityServiceList).
final List<AccessibilityServiceInfo> installedServiceList = new ArrayList<>(
a11yManager.getInstalledAccessibilityServiceList());
- installedServiceList.removeIf(
- target -> containsTargetNameInList(installedShortcutList, target));
final List<RestrictedPreference> activityList =
preferenceHelper.createAccessibilityActivityPreferenceList(installedShortcutList);
-
final List<RestrictedPreference> serviceList =
preferenceHelper.createAccessibilityServicePreferenceList(installedServiceList);
@@ -428,24 +421,6 @@ private List<RestrictedPreference> getInstalledAccessibilityList(Context context
return preferenceList;
}
- private boolean containsTargetNameInList(List<AccessibilityShortcutInfo> shortcutInfos,
- AccessibilityServiceInfo targetServiceInfo) {
- final ServiceInfo serviceInfo = targetServiceInfo.getResolveInfo().serviceInfo;
- final String servicePackageName = serviceInfo.packageName;
- final CharSequence serviceLabel = serviceInfo.loadLabel(getPackageManager());
-
- for (int i = 0, count = shortcutInfos.size(); i < count; ++i) {
- final ActivityInfo activityInfo = shortcutInfos.get(i).getActivityInfo();
- final String activityPackageName = activityInfo.packageName;
- final CharSequence activityLabel = activityInfo.loadLabel(getPackageManager());
- if (servicePackageName.equals(activityPackageName)
- && serviceLabel.equals(activityLabel)) {
- return true;
- }
- }
- return false;
- }
-
private void initializePreBundledServicesMapFromArray(String categoryKey, int key) {
String[] services = getResources().getStringArray(key);
PreferenceCategory category = mCategoryToPrefCategoryMap.get(categoryKey);

33
Patches/LineageOS-18.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/408450.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
From 57ac15dfd212fd91ef2501248ac6fab1ec3f6bc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Adam Bookatz <bookatz@google.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2024 17:03:12 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] startActivityForResult with new Intent
Rather than use the raw Intent, we make a copy of it. See bug.
Bug: 330722900
Flag: EXEMPT bugfix
Test: manual
Test: atest com.android.settings.users.UserSettingsTest
com.android.settings.users.UserDetailsSettingsTest
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:1189e24e47571eae86634aeaa7dc60b8fe7f4820)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:fdb148b6efb16af018a39511001b48286f401512)
Merged-In: Id74e4b7ae261f2916eedaef04a679f83409a4b67
Change-Id: Id74e4b7ae261f2916eedaef04a679f83409a4b67
---
src/com/android/settings/users/AppRestrictionsFragment.java | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/com/android/settings/users/AppRestrictionsFragment.java b/src/com/android/settings/users/AppRestrictionsFragment.java
index 51624ca63b4..e9e60fb319e 100644
--- a/src/com/android/settings/users/AppRestrictionsFragment.java
+++ b/src/com/android/settings/users/AppRestrictionsFragment.java
@@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) {
int requestCode = generateCustomActivityRequestCode(
RestrictionsResultReceiver.this.preference);
AppRestrictionsFragment.this.startActivityForResult(
- restrictionsIntent, requestCode);
+ new Intent(restrictionsIntent), requestCode);
}
}
}

90
Patches/LineageOS-18.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/408451.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
From e02728d51e013033f3cc168e8630d0322ccfd803 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Fan Wu <cechkahn@google.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2024 16:12:46 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] [BACKPORT] Checks cross user permission before handling
intent
Bug: 326057017
Test: atest
Flag: EXEMPT bug fix
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:d3b3edd45167515579ab156533754e56ac813f35)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:0f67d233c1cd653c113df5956f1ed29a42e1d32f)
Merged-In: I3444e55b22b7487f96b0e3e9deb3f844c4c4723a
Change-Id: I3444e55b22b7487f96b0e3e9deb3f844c4c4723a
---
.../settings/applications/AppInfoBase.java | 38 ++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/com/android/settings/applications/AppInfoBase.java b/src/com/android/settings/applications/AppInfoBase.java
index 71043400ff8..ef5297acaec 100644
--- a/src/com/android/settings/applications/AppInfoBase.java
+++ b/src/com/android/settings/applications/AppInfoBase.java
@@ -18,7 +18,9 @@
import static com.android.settingslib.RestrictedLockUtils.EnforcedAdmin;
+import android.Manifest;
import android.app.Activity;
+import android.app.ActivityManager;
import android.app.Dialog;
import android.app.admin.DevicePolicyManager;
import android.app.settings.SettingsEnums;
@@ -38,6 +40,7 @@
import android.text.TextUtils;
import android.util.Log;
+import androidx.annotation.VisibleForTesting;
import androidx.appcompat.app.AlertDialog;
import androidx.fragment.app.DialogFragment;
import androidx.fragment.app.Fragment;
@@ -134,8 +137,13 @@ protected String retrieveAppEntry() {
}
}
if (intent != null && intent.hasExtra(Intent.EXTRA_USER_HANDLE)) {
- mUserId = ((UserHandle) intent.getParcelableExtra(
- Intent.EXTRA_USER_HANDLE)).getIdentifier();
+ mUserId = ((UserHandle) intent.getParcelableExtra(Intent.EXTRA_USER_HANDLE))
+ .getIdentifier();
+ if (mUserId != UserHandle.myUserId() && !hasInteractAcrossUsersPerm()) {
+ Log.w(TAG, "Intent not valid.");
+ finish();
+ return "";
+ }
} else {
mUserId = UserHandle.myUserId();
}
@@ -158,6 +166,32 @@ protected String retrieveAppEntry() {
return mPackageName;
}
+ @VisibleForTesting
+ protected boolean hasInteractAcrossUsersPerm() {
+ Activity activity = getActivity();
+ if (activity == null) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ String callingPackageName = null;
+ try {
+ callingPackageName = ActivityManager.getService()
+ .getLaunchedFromPackage(activity.getActivityToken());
+ } catch (Exception e) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (TextUtils.isEmpty(callingPackageName)) {
+ Log.w(TAG, "Not able to get calling package name for permission check");
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (mPm.checkPermission(Manifest.permission.INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS_FULL, callingPackageName)
+ != PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED) {
+ Log.w(TAG, "Package " + callingPackageName + " does not have required permission "
+ + Manifest.permission.INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS_FULL);
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+ }
+
protected void setIntentAndFinish(boolean appChanged) {
Log.i(TAG, "appChanged=" + appChanged);
Intent intent = new Intent();

39
Patches/LineageOS-18.1/android_packages_providers_MediaProvider/408453.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From a062609478ba61d2b015ea4eaee550f7c4a31c9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Omar Eissa <oeissa@google.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2024 13:24:21 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Prevent apps from renaming files they don't own
Malicious apps could rename files in lower file system using
MediaProvider.update even if they don't have access to such files. They
weren't able to update the DB of MediaProvider, but by renaming such
files they could create fake records in MediaProvider DB and then rename
the file to have the same name as their created record, which would
allow them to access these files.
IMAGES_MEDIA_ID, AUDIO_MEDIA_ID and VIDEO_MEDIA_ID URIs were already
guaraded against this vulnerability and the aim of this fix to fix it
for all other Media URIs.
Bug: 304280682
Flag: EXEMPT bug fix
Test: Manual
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:191ae46fed057cb96f78d8f140f90f0cec50a797)
Merged-In: I91e9966c012fe292cebc0b544f77032613516fac
Change-Id: I91e9966c012fe292cebc0b544f77032613516fac
---
src/com/android/providers/media/MediaProvider.java | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/com/android/providers/media/MediaProvider.java b/src/com/android/providers/media/MediaProvider.java
index a01ba34c6..c15193414 100644
--- a/src/com/android/providers/media/MediaProvider.java
+++ b/src/com/android/providers/media/MediaProvider.java
@@ -5351,6 +5351,8 @@ && getCallingPackageTargetSdkVersion() <= Build.VERSION_CODES.Q) {
case IMAGES_MEDIA_ID:
case DOWNLOADS_ID:
case FILES_ID:
+ // Check if the caller has the required permissions to do placement
+ enforceCallingPermission(uri, extras, true);
break;
default:
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Movement of " + uri

17
Scripts/LineageOS-18.1/Patch.sh
View File

@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES_COMMON/android_build/0001-verity-openssl3.patch"; #Fix
sed -i '75i$(my_res_package): PRIVATE_AAPT_FLAGS += --auto-add-overlay' core/aapt2.mk; #Enable auto-add-overlay for packages, this allows the vendor overlay to easily work across all branches.
awk -i inplace '!/updatable_apex.mk/' target/product/mainline_system.mk; #Disable APEX
sed -i 's/PLATFORM_MIN_SUPPORTED_TARGET_SDK_VERSION := 23/PLATFORM_MIN_SUPPORTED_TARGET_SDK_VERSION := 28/' core/version_defaults.mk; #Set the minimum supported target SDK to Pie (GrapheneOS)
sed -i 's/2024-02-05/2024-10-05/' core/version_defaults.mk; #Bump Security String #R_asb_2024-10
sed -i 's/2024-02-05/2024-11-05/' core/version_defaults.mk; #Bump Security String #R_asb_2024-11
fi;
if enterAndClear "build/soong"; then
@ -132,6 +132,10 @@ awk -i inplace '!/vendor_ramdisk_available/' Android.bp; #fix compile under A11
rm -rfv androidtest; #fix compile under A11
fi;
if enterAndClear "external/skia"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_skia/408442.patch"; #R_asb_2024-11 Avoid potential overflow when allocating 3D mask from emboss filter
fi;
if enterAndClear "external/sonivox"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES_COMMON/android_external_sonivox/391896.patch"; #n-asb-2024-05 Fix buffer overrun in eas_wtengine
fi;
@ -178,6 +182,12 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/405515.patch"; #R_asb_2024-10 U
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/405516.patch"; #R_asb_2024-10 Fail parseUri if end is missing
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/405517.patch"; #R_asb_2024-10 Prevent Sharing when FRP enforcement is in effect
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/405518.patch"; #R_asb_2024-10 Check whether installerPackageName contains only valid characters
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/408443.patch"; #R_asb_2024-11 Remove authenticator data if it was disabled.
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/408444.patch"; #R_asb_2024-11 RingtoneManager: allow video ringtone URI
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/408445.patch"; #R_asb_2024-11 Set no data transfer on function switch timeout for accessory mode
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/408446.patch"; #R_asb_2024-11 Disallow device admin package and protected packages to be reinstalled as instant.
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/408447.patch"; #R_asb_2024-11 Clear app-provided shortcut icons
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/408448.patch"; #R_asb_2024-11 Restrict access to directories
git revert --no-edit 438d9feacfcad73d3ee918541574132928a93644; #Reverts "Allow signature spoofing for microG Companion/Services" in favor of below patch
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0007-Always_Restict_Serial.patch"; #Always restrict access to Build.SERIAL (GrapheneOS)
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0008-Browser_No_Location.patch"; #Don't grant location permission to system browsers (GrapheneOS)
@ -254,6 +264,7 @@ fi;
fi;
if enterAndClear "frameworks/opt/net/wifi"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_opt_net_wifi/408452.patch"; #R_asb_2024-11 Fix security issue by change the field in WifiConfig
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_opt_net_wifi/0001-Random_MAC.patch"; #Add support for always generating new random MAC (GrapheneOS)
fi;
@ -379,6 +390,9 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/403220.patch"; #R_asb_20
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/403221.patch"; #R_asb_2024-09 Ignore fragment attr from ext authenticator resource
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/403222.patch"; #R_asb_2024-09 Restrict Settings Homepage prior to provisioning
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/405534.patch"; #R_asb_2024-10 FRP bypass defense in App battery usage page
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/408449.patch"; #R_asb_2024-11 Stops hiding a11y services with the same package+label as an activity.
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/408450.patch"; #R_asb_2024-11 startActivityForResult with new Intent
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/408451.patch"; #R_asb_2024-11 Checks cross user permission before handling intent
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/0001-Captive_Portal_Toggle.patch"; #Add option to disable captive portal checks (MSe1969)
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/0001-Captive_Portal_Toggle-gos.patch"; #Add option to disable captive portal checks (GrapheneOS)
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/0003-Remove_SensorsOff_Tile.patch"; #Remove the Sensors Off development tile (DivestOS)
@ -438,6 +452,7 @@ fi;
if enterAndClear "packages/providers/MediaProvider"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_providers_MediaProvider/397544.patch"; #R_asb_2024-07 Prevent insertion in other users storage volumes
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_providers_MediaProvider/408453.patch"; #R_asb_2024-11 Prevent apps from renaming files they don't own
fi;
if enterAndClear "packages/providers/TelephonyProvider"; then