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Fix empty CVE patches

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Tad 2017-10-31 13:24:35 -04:00
parent 9a09d20695
commit 77fc7b452c
35 changed files with 2887 additions and 7 deletions
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53
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-8709/ANY/0.patch
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From 338f977f4eb441e69bb9a46eaa0ac715c931a67f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Date: Sat, 1 Feb 2014 00:16:23 +0100
Subject: mac80211: fix fragmentation code, particularly for encryption
The "new" fragmentation code (since my rewrite almost 5 years ago)
erroneously sets skb->len rather than using skb_trim() to adjust
the length of the first fragment after copying out all the others.
This leaves the skb tail pointer pointing to after where the data
originally ended, and thus causes the encryption MIC to be written
at that point, rather than where it belongs: immediately after the
data.
The impact of this is that if software encryption is done, then
a) encryption doesn't work for the first fragment, the connection
becomes unusable as the first fragment will never be properly
verified at the receiver, the MIC is practically guaranteed to
be wrong
b) we leak up to 8 bytes of plaintext (!) of the packet out into
the air
This is only mitigated by the fact that many devices are capable
of doing encryption in hardware, in which case this can't happen
as the tail pointer is irrelevant in that case. Additionally,
fragmentation is not used very frequently and would normally have
to be configured manually.
Fix this by using skb_trim() properly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2de8e0d999b8 ("mac80211: rewrite fragmentation")
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
---
net/mac80211/tx.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c
index 27c990b..97a02d3 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/tx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c
@@ -878,7 +878,7 @@ static int ieee80211_fragment(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
}
/* adjust first fragment's length */
- skb->len = hdrlen + per_fragm;
+ skb_trim(skb, hdrlen + per_fragm);
return 0;
}
--
cgit v1.1

178
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9914/ANY/0.patch
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From 9709674e68646cee5a24e3000b3558d25412203a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2014 06:43:01 -0700
Subject: ipv4: fix a race in ip4_datagram_release_cb()
Alexey gave a AddressSanitizer[1] report that finally gave a good hint
at where was the origin of various problems already reported by Dormando
in the past [2]
Problem comes from the fact that UDP can have a lockless TX path, and
concurrent threads can manipulate sk_dst_cache, while another thread,
is holding socket lock and calls __sk_dst_set() in
ip4_datagram_release_cb() (this was added in linux-3.8)
It seems that all we need to do is to use sk_dst_check() and
sk_dst_set() so that all the writers hold same spinlock
(sk->sk_dst_lock) to prevent corruptions.
TCP stack do not need this protection, as all sk_dst_cache writers hold
the socket lock.
[1]
https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free in ipv4_dst_check
Read of size 2 by thread T15453:
[<ffffffff817daa3a>] ipv4_dst_check+0x1a/0x90 ./net/ipv4/route.c:1116
[<ffffffff8175b789>] __sk_dst_check+0x89/0xe0 ./net/core/sock.c:531
[<ffffffff81830a36>] ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x46/0x390 ??:0
[<ffffffff8175eaea>] release_sock+0x17a/0x230 ./net/core/sock.c:2413
[<ffffffff81830882>] ip4_datagram_connect+0x462/0x5d0 ??:0
[<ffffffff81846d06>] inet_dgram_connect+0x76/0xd0 ./net/ipv4/af_inet.c:534
[<ffffffff817580ac>] SYSC_connect+0x15c/0x1c0 ./net/socket.c:1701
[<ffffffff817596ce>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 ./net/socket.c:1682
[<ffffffff818b0a29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
./arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:629
Freed by thread T15455:
[<ffffffff8178d9b8>] dst_destroy+0xa8/0x160 ./net/core/dst.c:251
[<ffffffff8178de25>] dst_release+0x45/0x80 ./net/core/dst.c:280
[<ffffffff818304c1>] ip4_datagram_connect+0xa1/0x5d0 ??:0
[<ffffffff81846d06>] inet_dgram_connect+0x76/0xd0 ./net/ipv4/af_inet.c:534
[<ffffffff817580ac>] SYSC_connect+0x15c/0x1c0 ./net/socket.c:1701
[<ffffffff817596ce>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 ./net/socket.c:1682
[<ffffffff818b0a29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
./arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:629
Allocated by thread T15453:
[<ffffffff8178d291>] dst_alloc+0x81/0x2b0 ./net/core/dst.c:171
[<ffffffff817db3b7>] rt_dst_alloc+0x47/0x50 ./net/ipv4/route.c:1406
[< inlined >] __ip_route_output_key+0x3e8/0xf70
__mkroute_output ./net/ipv4/route.c:1939
[<ffffffff817dde08>] __ip_route_output_key+0x3e8/0xf70 ./net/ipv4/route.c:2161
[<ffffffff817deb34>] ip_route_output_flow+0x14/0x30 ./net/ipv4/route.c:2249
[<ffffffff81830737>] ip4_datagram_connect+0x317/0x5d0 ??:0
[<ffffffff81846d06>] inet_dgram_connect+0x76/0xd0 ./net/ipv4/af_inet.c:534
[<ffffffff817580ac>] SYSC_connect+0x15c/0x1c0 ./net/socket.c:1701
[<ffffffff817596ce>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 ./net/socket.c:1682
[<ffffffff818b0a29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
./arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:629
[2]
<4>[196727.311203] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
<4>[196727.311224] Modules linked in: xt_TEE xt_dscp xt_DSCP macvlan bridge coretemp crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel gpio_ich microcode ipmi_watchdog ipmi_devintf sb_edac edac_core lpc_ich mfd_core tpm_tis tpm tpm_bios ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler isci igb libsas i2c_algo_bit ixgbe ptp pps_core mdio
<4>[196727.311333] CPU: 17 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/17 Not tainted 3.10.26 #1
<4>[196727.311344] Hardware name: Supermicro X9DRi-LN4+/X9DR3-LN4+/X9DRi-LN4+/X9DR3-LN4+, BIOS 3.0 07/05/2013
<4>[196727.311364] task: ffff885e6f069700 ti: ffff885e6f072000 task.ti: ffff885e6f072000
<4>[196727.311377] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff815f8c7f>] [<ffffffff815f8c7f>] ipv4_dst_destroy+0x4f/0x80
<4>[196727.311399] RSP: 0018:ffff885effd23a70 EFLAGS: 00010282
<4>[196727.311409] RAX: dead000000200200 RBX: ffff8854c398ecc0 RCX: 0000000000000040
<4>[196727.311423] RDX: dead000000100100 RSI: dead000000100100 RDI: dead000000200200
<4>[196727.311437] RBP: ffff885effd23a80 R08: ffffffff815fd9e0 R09: ffff885d5a590800
<4>[196727.311451] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
<4>[196727.311464] R13: ffffffff81c8c280 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880e85ee16ce
<4>[196727.311510] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff885effd20000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
<4>[196727.311554] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
<4>[196727.311581] CR2: 00007a46751eb000 CR3: 0000005e65688000 CR4: 00000000000407e0
<4>[196727.311625] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
<4>[196727.311669] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
<4>[196727.311713] Stack:
<4>[196727.311733] ffff8854c398ecc0 ffff8854c398ecc0 ffff885effd23ab0 ffffffff815b7f42
<4>[196727.311784] ffff88be6595bc00 ffff8854c398ecc0 0000000000000000 ffff8854c398ecc0
<4>[196727.311834] ffff885effd23ad0 ffffffff815b86c6 ffff885d5a590800 ffff8816827821c0
<4>[196727.311885] Call Trace:
<4>[196727.311907] <IRQ>
<4>[196727.311912] [<ffffffff815b7f42>] dst_destroy+0x32/0xe0
<4>[196727.311959] [<ffffffff815b86c6>] dst_release+0x56/0x80
<4>[196727.311986] [<ffffffff81620bd5>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x2a5/0x4a0
<4>[196727.312013] [<ffffffff81622b5a>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x7da/0x820
<4>[196727.312041] [<ffffffff815fd9e0>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x360/0x360
<4>[196727.312070] [<ffffffff815de02d>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x7d/0x150
<4>[196727.312097] [<ffffffff815fd9e0>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x360/0x360
<4>[196727.312125] [<ffffffff815fda92>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xb2/0x230
<4>[196727.312154] [<ffffffff815fdd9a>] ip_local_deliver+0x4a/0x90
<4>[196727.312183] [<ffffffff815fd799>] ip_rcv_finish+0x119/0x360
<4>[196727.312212] [<ffffffff815fe00b>] ip_rcv+0x22b/0x340
<4>[196727.312242] [<ffffffffa0339680>] ? macvlan_broadcast+0x160/0x160 [macvlan]
<4>[196727.312275] [<ffffffff815b0c62>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x512/0x640
<4>[196727.312308] [<ffffffff811427fb>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x13b/0x150
<4>[196727.312338] [<ffffffff815b0db1>] __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0x70
<4>[196727.312368] [<ffffffff815b0fa1>] netif_receive_skb+0x31/0xa0
<4>[196727.312397] [<ffffffff815b1ae8>] napi_gro_receive+0xe8/0x140
<4>[196727.312433] [<ffffffffa00274f1>] ixgbe_poll+0x551/0x11f0 [ixgbe]
<4>[196727.312463] [<ffffffff815fe00b>] ? ip_rcv+0x22b/0x340
<4>[196727.312491] [<ffffffff815b1691>] net_rx_action+0x111/0x210
<4>[196727.312521] [<ffffffff815b0db1>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0x70
<4>[196727.312552] [<ffffffff810519d0>] __do_softirq+0xd0/0x270
<4>[196727.312583] [<ffffffff816cef3c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
<4>[196727.312613] [<ffffffff81004205>] do_softirq+0x55/0x90
<4>[196727.312640] [<ffffffff81051c85>] irq_exit+0x55/0x60
<4>[196727.312668] [<ffffffff816cf5c3>] do_IRQ+0x63/0xe0
<4>[196727.312696] [<ffffffff816c5aaa>] common_interrupt+0x6a/0x6a
<4>[196727.312722] <EOI>
<1>[196727.313071] RIP [<ffffffff815f8c7f>] ipv4_dst_destroy+0x4f/0x80
<4>[196727.313100] RSP <ffff885effd23a70>
<4>[196727.313377] ---[ end trace 64b3f14fae0f2e29 ]---
<0>[196727.380908] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Reported-by: Alexey Preobrazhensky <preobr@google.com>
Reported-by: dormando <dormando@rydia.ne>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: 8141ed9fcedb2 ("ipv4: Add a socket release callback for datagram sockets")
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/ipv4/datagram.c | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/datagram.c b/net/ipv4/datagram.c
index 8b5134c..a3095fd 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/datagram.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/datagram.c
@@ -86,18 +86,26 @@ out:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip4_datagram_connect);
+/* Because UDP xmit path can manipulate sk_dst_cache without holding
+ * socket lock, we need to use sk_dst_set() here,
+ * even if we own the socket lock.
+ */
void ip4_datagram_release_cb(struct sock *sk)
{
const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
const struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt;
__be32 daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
+ struct dst_entry *dst;
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
- if (! __sk_dst_get(sk) || __sk_dst_check(sk, 0))
- return;
-
rcu_read_lock();
+
+ dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);
+ if (!dst || !dst->obsolete || dst->ops->check(dst, 0)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return;
+ }
inet_opt = rcu_dereference(inet->inet_opt);
if (inet_opt && inet_opt->opt.srr)
daddr = inet_opt->opt.faddr;
@@ -105,8 +113,10 @@ void ip4_datagram_release_cb(struct sock *sk)
inet->inet_saddr, inet->inet_dport,
inet->inet_sport, sk->sk_protocol,
RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
- if (!IS_ERR(rt))
- __sk_dst_set(sk, &rt->dst);
+
+ dst = !IS_ERR(rt) ? &rt->dst : NULL;
+ sk_dst_set(sk, dst);
+
rcu_read_unlock();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ip4_datagram_release_cb);
--
cgit v1.1

76
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2015-3288/ANY/0.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
From 6b7339f4c31ad69c8e9c0b2859276e22cf72176d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2015 23:18:37 +0300
Subject: mm: avoid setting up anonymous pages into file mapping
Reading page fault handler code I've noticed that under right
circumstances kernel would map anonymous pages into file mappings: if
the VMA doesn't have vm_ops->fault() and the VMA wasn't fully populated
on ->mmap(), kernel would handle page fault to not populated pte with
do_anonymous_page().
Let's change page fault handler to use do_anonymous_page() only on
anonymous VMA (->vm_ops == NULL) and make sure that the VMA is not
shared.
For file mappings without vm_ops->fault() or shred VMA without vm_ops,
page fault on pte_none() entry would lead to SIGBUS.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/memory.c | 20 +++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
index a84fbb7..388dcf9 100644
--- a/mm/memory.c
+++ b/mm/memory.c
@@ -2670,6 +2670,10 @@ static int do_anonymous_page(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
pte_unmap(page_table);
+ /* File mapping without ->vm_ops ? */
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)
+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
/* Check if we need to add a guard page to the stack */
if (check_stack_guard_page(vma, address) < 0)
return VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV;
@@ -3099,6 +3103,9 @@ static int do_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + vma->vm_pgoff;
pte_unmap(page_table);
+ /* The VMA was not fully populated on mmap() or missing VM_DONTEXPAND */
+ if (!vma->vm_ops->fault)
+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
if (!(flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE))
return do_read_fault(mm, vma, address, pmd, pgoff, flags,
orig_pte);
@@ -3244,13 +3251,12 @@ static int handle_pte_fault(struct mm_struct *mm,
barrier();
if (!pte_present(entry)) {
if (pte_none(entry)) {
- if (vma->vm_ops) {
- if (likely(vma->vm_ops->fault))
- return do_fault(mm, vma, address, pte,
- pmd, flags, entry);
- }
- return do_anonymous_page(mm, vma, address,
- pte, pmd, flags);
+ if (vma->vm_ops)
+ return do_fault(mm, vma, address, pte, pmd,
+ flags, entry);
+
+ return do_anonymous_page(mm, vma, address, pte, pmd,
+ flags);
}
return do_swap_page(mm, vma, address,
pte, pmd, flags, entry);
--
cgit v1.1

121
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2015-4170/ANY/0.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
From cf872776fc84128bb779ce2b83a37c884c3203ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2013 21:11:58 -0500
Subject: tty: Fix hang at ldsem_down_read()
When a controlling tty is being hung up and the hang up is
waiting for a just-signalled tty reader or writer to exit, and a new tty
reader/writer tries to acquire an ldisc reference concurrently with the
ldisc reference release from the signalled reader/writer, the hangup
can hang. The new reader/writer is sleeping in ldsem_down_read() and the
hangup is sleeping in ldsem_down_write() [1].
The new reader/writer fails to wakeup the waiting hangup because the
wrong lock count value is checked (the old lock count rather than the new
lock count) to see if the lock is unowned.
Change helper function to return the new lock count if the cmpxchg was
successful; document this behavior.
[1] edited dmesg log from reporter
SysRq : Show Blocked State
task PC stack pid father
systemd D ffff88040c4f0000 0 1 0 0x00000000
ffff88040c49fbe0 0000000000000046 ffff88040c4a0000 ffff88040c49ffd8
00000000001d3980 00000000001d3980 ffff88040c4a0000 ffff88040593d840
ffff88040c49fb40 ffffffff810a4cc0 0000000000000006 0000000000000023
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff817a6649>] schedule+0x24/0x5e
[<ffffffff817a588b>] schedule_timeout+0x15b/0x1ec
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff817aa691>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x26
[<ffffffff817aa10c>] down_read_failed+0xe3/0x1b9
[<ffffffff817aa26d>] ldsem_down_read+0x8b/0xa5
[<ffffffff8142b5ca>] ? tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x1b/0x44
[<ffffffff8142b5ca>] tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x1b/0x44
[<ffffffff81423f5b>] tty_write+0x7d/0x28a
[<ffffffff814241f5>] redirected_tty_write+0x8d/0x98
[<ffffffff81424168>] ? tty_write+0x28a/0x28a
[<ffffffff8115d03f>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x56/0x79
[<ffffffff8115e604>] do_readv_writev+0x1b0/0x1ff
[<ffffffff8116ea0b>] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x32a/0x489
[<ffffffff81167d9d>] ? final_putname+0x1d/0x3a
[<ffffffff8115e6c7>] vfs_writev+0x2e/0x49
[<ffffffff8115e7d3>] SyS_writev+0x47/0xaa
[<ffffffff817ab822>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
bash D ffffffff81c104c0 0 5469 5302 0x00000082
ffff8800cf817ac0 0000000000000046 ffff8804086b22a0 ffff8800cf817fd8
00000000001d3980 00000000001d3980 ffff8804086b22a0 ffff8800cf817a48
000000000000b9a0 ffff8800cf817a78 ffffffff81004675 ffff8800cf817a44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81004675>] ? dump_trace+0x165/0x29c
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff8100edda>] ? save_stack_trace+0x26/0x41
[<ffffffff817a6649>] schedule+0x24/0x5e
[<ffffffff817a588b>] schedule_timeout+0x15b/0x1ec
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff817a9f03>] ? down_write_failed+0xa3/0x1c9
[<ffffffff817aa691>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x26
[<ffffffff817a9f0b>] down_write_failed+0xab/0x1c9
[<ffffffff817aa300>] ldsem_down_write+0x79/0xb1
[<ffffffff817aada3>] ? tty_ldisc_lock_pair_timeout+0xa5/0xd9
[<ffffffff817aada3>] tty_ldisc_lock_pair_timeout+0xa5/0xd9
[<ffffffff8142bf33>] tty_ldisc_hangup+0xc4/0x218
[<ffffffff81423ab3>] __tty_hangup+0x2e2/0x3ed
[<ffffffff81424a76>] disassociate_ctty+0x63/0x226
[<ffffffff81078aa7>] do_exit+0x79f/0xa11
[<ffffffff81086bdb>] ? get_signal_to_deliver+0x206/0x62f
[<ffffffff810b4bfb>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.8+0xf/0x16e
[<ffffffff81079b05>] do_group_exit+0x47/0xb5
[<ffffffff81086c16>] get_signal_to_deliver+0x241/0x62f
[<ffffffff810020a7>] do_signal+0x43/0x59d
[<ffffffff810f2af7>] ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x21a/0x2a8
[<ffffffff810b4bfb>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.8+0xf/0x16e
[<ffffffff81002655>] do_notify_resume+0x54/0x6c
[<ffffffff817abaf8>] int_signal+0x12/0x17
Reported-by: Sami Farin <sami.farin@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.12.x
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c b/drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c
index 22fad8a..d8a55e8 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c
@@ -86,11 +86,21 @@ static inline long ldsem_atomic_update(long delta, struct ld_semaphore *sem)
return atomic_long_add_return(delta, (atomic_long_t *)&sem->count);
}
+/*
+ * ldsem_cmpxchg() updates @*old with the last-known sem->count value.
+ * Returns 1 if count was successfully changed; @*old will have @new value.
+ * Returns 0 if count was not changed; @*old will have most recent sem->count
+ */
static inline int ldsem_cmpxchg(long *old, long new, struct ld_semaphore *sem)
{
- long tmp = *old;
- *old = atomic_long_cmpxchg(&sem->count, *old, new);
- return *old == tmp;
+ long tmp = atomic_long_cmpxchg(&sem->count, *old, new);
+ if (tmp == *old) {
+ *old = new;
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ *old = tmp;
+ return 0;
+ }
}
/*
--
cgit v1.1

39
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2015-5706/ANY/0.patch
View File

@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From f15133df088ecadd141ea1907f2c96df67c729f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Date: Fri, 8 May 2015 22:53:15 -0400
Subject: path_openat(): fix double fput()
path_openat() jumps to the wrong place after do_tmpfile() - it has
already done path_cleanup() (as part of path_lookupat() called by
do_tmpfile()), so doing that again can lead to double fput().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
fs/namei.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index f67cf6c..fe30d3b 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -3233,7 +3233,7 @@ static struct file *path_openat(int dfd, struct filename *pathname,
if (unlikely(file->f_flags & __O_TMPFILE)) {
error = do_tmpfile(dfd, pathname, nd, flags, op, file, &opened);
- goto out;
+ goto out2;
}
error = path_init(dfd, pathname, flags, nd);
@@ -3263,6 +3263,7 @@ static struct file *path_openat(int dfd, struct filename *pathname,
}
out:
path_cleanup(nd);
+out2:
if (!(opened & FILE_OPENED)) {
BUG_ON(!error);
put_filp(file);
--
cgit v1.1

78
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2015-8964/ANY/0.patch
View File

@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
From dd42bf1197144ede075a9d4793123f7689e164bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Nov 2015 14:30:21 -0500
Subject: tty: Prevent ldisc drivers from re-using stale tty fields
Line discipline drivers may mistakenly misuse ldisc-related fields
when initializing. For example, a failure to initialize tty->receive_room
in the N_GIGASET_M101 line discipline was recently found and fixed [1].
Now, the N_X25 line discipline has been discovered accessing the previous
line discipline's already-freed private data [2].
Harden the ldisc interface against misuse by initializing revelant
tty fields before instancing the new line discipline.
[1]
commit fd98e9419d8d622a4de91f76b306af6aa627aa9c
Author: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Date: Tue Jul 14 00:37:13 2015 +0200
isdn/gigaset: reset tty->receive_room when attaching ser_gigaset
[2] Report from Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
[ 634.336761] ==================================================================
[ 634.338226] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in x25_asy_open_tty+0x13d/0x490 at addr ffff8800a743efd0
[ 634.339558] Read of size 4 by task syzkaller_execu/8981
[ 634.340359] =============================================================================
[ 634.341598] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
...
[ 634.405018] Call Trace:
[ 634.405277] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52)
[ 634.405775] print_trailer (mm/slub.c:655)
[ 634.406361] object_err (mm/slub.c:662)
[ 634.406824] kasan_report_error (mm/kasan/report.c:138 mm/kasan/report.c:236)
[ 634.409581] __asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report.c:279)
[ 634.411355] x25_asy_open_tty (drivers/net/wan/x25_asy.c:559 (discriminator 1))
[ 634.413997] tty_ldisc_open.isra.2 (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:447)
[ 634.414549] tty_set_ldisc (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:567)
[ 634.415057] tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2646 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2879)
[ 634.423524] do_vfs_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:43 fs/ioctl.c:607)
[ 634.427491] SyS_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:622 fs/ioctl.c:613)
[ 634.427945] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:188)
Cc: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c b/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c
index 9ec1250..a054d03 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c
@@ -417,6 +417,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tty_ldisc_flush);
* they are not on hot paths so a little discipline won't do
* any harm.
*
+ * The line discipline-related tty_struct fields are reset to
+ * prevent the ldisc driver from re-using stale information for
+ * the new ldisc instance.
+ *
* Locking: takes termios_rwsem
*/
@@ -425,6 +429,9 @@ static void tty_set_termios_ldisc(struct tty_struct *tty, int num)
down_write(&tty->termios_rwsem);
tty->termios.c_line = num;
up_write(&tty->termios_rwsem);
+
+ tty->disc_data = NULL;
+ tty->receive_room = 0;
}
/**
--
cgit v1.1

5
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2016-0806/3.10/0.patch
View File

@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
<option value='APSS.FSM.3.0'>APSS.FSM.3.0</option>
<option value='APSS.FSM.3.0.r6'>APSS.FSM.3.0.r6</option>
<option value='APSS.FSM.3.0.r7'>APSS.FSM.3.0.r7</option>
<option value='APSS.FSM.3.0.r8'>APSS.FSM.3.0.r8</option>
<option value='APSS.FSM4.1.0'>APSS.FSM4.1.0</option>
<option value='LA.BF.2.1.2_rb1.10'>LA.BF.2.1.2_rb1.10</option>
<option value='LA.BF.2.1.2_rb1.11'>LA.BF.2.1.2_rb1.11</option>
@ -832,6 +833,7 @@
<option value='LA.BR.1.3.6_rb1.9'>LA.BR.1.3.6_rb1.9</option>
<option value='LA.BR.1.3.7_rb1.3'>LA.BR.1.3.7_rb1.3</option>
<option value='LA.BR.1.3.7_rb1.4'>LA.BR.1.3.7_rb1.4</option>
<option value='LA.BR.1.3.7_rb1.5'>LA.BR.1.3.7_rb1.5</option>
<option value='LA.BR64.1.1'>LA.BR64.1.1</option>
<option value='LA.BR64.1.1.1_rb1.3'>LA.BR64.1.1.1_rb1.3</option>
<option value='LA.BR64.1.1.1_rb2.6'>LA.BR64.1.1.1_rb2.6</option>
@ -4112,6 +4114,8 @@
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-media'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-media</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-merge-171026'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-merge-171026</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-merge-171027'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-merge-171027</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-merge-171030'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-merge-171030</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-merge-normalize'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-merge-normalize</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-misc'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-misc</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-mmc'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-mmc</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-mtd'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-mtd</option>
@ -4123,6 +4127,7 @@
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-regulator'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-regulator</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-sched'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-sched</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-scsi'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-scsi</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-security'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-security</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-security-groeck'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-security-groeck</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-sound'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-sound</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-sysrq'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-sysrq</option>

5
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2016-0806/3.4/1.patch
View File

@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
<option value='APSS.FSM.3.0'>APSS.FSM.3.0</option>
<option value='APSS.FSM.3.0.r6'>APSS.FSM.3.0.r6</option>
<option value='APSS.FSM.3.0.r7'>APSS.FSM.3.0.r7</option>
<option value='APSS.FSM.3.0.r8'>APSS.FSM.3.0.r8</option>
<option value='APSS.FSM4.1.0'>APSS.FSM4.1.0</option>
<option value='LA.BF.2.1.2_rb1.10'>LA.BF.2.1.2_rb1.10</option>
<option value='LA.BF.2.1.2_rb1.11'>LA.BF.2.1.2_rb1.11</option>
@ -832,6 +833,7 @@
<option value='LA.BR.1.3.6_rb1.9'>LA.BR.1.3.6_rb1.9</option>
<option value='LA.BR.1.3.7_rb1.3'>LA.BR.1.3.7_rb1.3</option>
<option value='LA.BR.1.3.7_rb1.4'>LA.BR.1.3.7_rb1.4</option>
<option value='LA.BR.1.3.7_rb1.5'>LA.BR.1.3.7_rb1.5</option>
<option value='LA.BR64.1.1'>LA.BR64.1.1</option>
<option value='LA.BR64.1.1.1_rb1.3'>LA.BR64.1.1.1_rb1.3</option>
<option value='LA.BR64.1.1.1_rb2.6'>LA.BR64.1.1.1_rb2.6</option>
@ -4112,6 +4114,8 @@
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-media'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-media</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-merge-171026'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-merge-171026</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-merge-171027'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-merge-171027</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-merge-171030'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-merge-171030</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-merge-normalize'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-merge-normalize</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-misc'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-misc</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-mmc'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-mmc</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-mtd'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-mtd</option>
@ -4123,6 +4127,7 @@
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-regulator'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-regulator</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-sched'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-sched</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-scsi'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-scsi</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-security'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-security</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-security-groeck'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-security-groeck</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-sound'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-sound</option>
<option value='caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-sysrq'>caf/chromium-googlesource-kernel-next/chromeos-4.14-sysrq</option>

48
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2016-10088/ANY/0.patch
View File

@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
From 128394eff343fc6d2f32172f03e24829539c5835 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2016 13:42:06 -0500
Subject: sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS
Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
block/bsg.c | 3 +++
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/block/bsg.c b/block/bsg.c
index 8a05a40..a57046d 100644
--- a/block/bsg.c
+++ b/block/bsg.c
@@ -655,6 +655,9 @@ bsg_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
dprintk("%s: write %Zd bytes\n", bd->name, count);
+ if (unlikely(segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
bsg_set_block(bd, file);
bytes_written = 0;
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/sg.c b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
index 070332e..dbe5b4b 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -581,6 +581,9 @@ sg_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t * ppos)
sg_io_hdr_t *hp;
unsigned char cmnd[SG_MAX_CDB_SIZE];
+ if (unlikely(segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if ((!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) filp->private_data)) || (!(sdp = sfp->parentdp)))
return -ENXIO;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sdp,
--
cgit v1.1

57
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2016-1583/ANY/0.patch
View File

@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
From f0fe970df3838c202ef6c07a4c2b36838ef0a88b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2016 17:32:30 -0400
Subject: ecryptfs: don't allow mmap when the lower fs doesn't support it
There are legitimate reasons to disallow mmap on certain files, notably
in sysfs or procfs. We shouldn't emulate mmap support on file systems
that don't offer support natively.
CVE-2016-1583
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[tyhicks: clean up f_op check by using ecryptfs_file_to_lower()]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
---
fs/ecryptfs/file.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
(limited to 'fs/ecryptfs/file.c')
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/file.c b/fs/ecryptfs/file.c
index 53d0141..ca4e837 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/file.c
@@ -169,6 +169,19 @@ out:
return rc;
}
+static int ecryptfs_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ struct file *lower_file = ecryptfs_file_to_lower(file);
+ /*
+ * Don't allow mmap on top of file systems that don't support it
+ * natively. If FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH > 2 or ecryptfs
+ * allows recursive mounting, this will need to be extended.
+ */
+ if (!lower_file->f_op->mmap)
+ return -ENODEV;
+ return generic_file_mmap(file, vma);
+}
+
/**
* ecryptfs_open
* @inode: inode specifying file to open
@@ -403,7 +416,7 @@ const struct file_operations ecryptfs_main_fops = {
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
.compat_ioctl = ecryptfs_compat_ioctl,
#endif
- .mmap = generic_file_mmap,
+ .mmap = ecryptfs_mmap,
.open = ecryptfs_open,
.flush = ecryptfs_flush,
.release = ecryptfs_release,
--
cgit v1.1

49
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2016-3137/ANY/0.patch
View File

@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
From c55aee1bf0e6b6feec8b2927b43f7a09a6d5f754 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2016 12:04:25 -0400
Subject: USB: cypress_m8: add endpoint sanity check
An attack using missing endpoints exists.
CVE-2016-3137
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/serial/cypress_m8.c | 11 +++++------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/cypress_m8.c b/drivers/usb/serial/cypress_m8.c
index b283eb8..bbeeb2b 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/cypress_m8.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/cypress_m8.c
@@ -447,6 +447,11 @@ static int cypress_generic_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
struct usb_serial *serial = port->serial;
struct cypress_private *priv;
+ if (!port->interrupt_out_urb || !port->interrupt_in_urb) {
+ dev_err(&port->dev, "required endpoint is missing\n");
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
priv = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cypress_private), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!priv)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -606,12 +611,6 @@ static int cypress_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct usb_serial_port *port)
cypress_set_termios(tty, port, &priv->tmp_termios);
/* setup the port and start reading from the device */
- if (!port->interrupt_in_urb) {
- dev_err(&port->dev, "%s - interrupt_in_urb is empty!\n",
- __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
usb_fill_int_urb(port->interrupt_in_urb, serial->dev,
usb_rcvintpipe(serial->dev, port->interrupt_in_endpointAddress),
port->interrupt_in_urb->transfer_buffer,
--
cgit v1.1

107
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2016-4794/ANY/0.patch
View File

@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
From 6710e594f71ccaad8101bc64321152af7cd9ea28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 25 May 2016 11:48:25 -0400
Subject: percpu: fix synchronization between synchronous map extension and
chunk destruction
For non-atomic allocations, pcpu_alloc() can try to extend the area
map synchronously after dropping pcpu_lock; however, the extension
wasn't synchronized against chunk destruction and the chunk might get
freed while extension is in progress.
This patch fixes the bug by putting most of non-atomic allocations
under pcpu_alloc_mutex to synchronize against pcpu_balance_work which
is responsible for async chunk management including destruction.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-and-tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.18+
Fixes: 1a4d76076cda ("percpu: implement asynchronous chunk population")
---
mm/percpu.c | 16 ++++++++--------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/percpu.c b/mm/percpu.c
index b1d2a38..9903830 100644
--- a/mm/percpu.c
+++ b/mm/percpu.c
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static struct pcpu_chunk *pcpu_reserved_chunk;
static int pcpu_reserved_chunk_limit;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pcpu_lock); /* all internal data structures */
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(pcpu_alloc_mutex); /* chunk create/destroy, [de]pop */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(pcpu_alloc_mutex); /* chunk create/destroy, [de]pop, map ext */
static struct list_head *pcpu_slot __read_mostly; /* chunk list slots */
@@ -444,6 +444,8 @@ static int pcpu_extend_area_map(struct pcpu_chunk *chunk, int new_alloc)
size_t old_size = 0, new_size = new_alloc * sizeof(new[0]);
unsigned long flags;
+ lockdep_assert_held(&pcpu_alloc_mutex);
+
new = pcpu_mem_zalloc(new_size);
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -890,6 +892,9 @@ static void __percpu *pcpu_alloc(size_t size, size_t align, bool reserved,
return NULL;
}
+ if (!is_atomic)
+ mutex_lock(&pcpu_alloc_mutex);
+
spin_lock_irqsave(&pcpu_lock, flags);
/* serve reserved allocations from the reserved chunk if available */
@@ -962,12 +967,9 @@ restart:
if (is_atomic)
goto fail;
- mutex_lock(&pcpu_alloc_mutex);
-
if (list_empty(&pcpu_slot[pcpu_nr_slots - 1])) {
chunk = pcpu_create_chunk();
if (!chunk) {
- mutex_unlock(&pcpu_alloc_mutex);
err = "failed to allocate new chunk";
goto fail;
}
@@ -978,7 +980,6 @@ restart:
spin_lock_irqsave(&pcpu_lock, flags);
}
- mutex_unlock(&pcpu_alloc_mutex);
goto restart;
area_found:
@@ -988,8 +989,6 @@ area_found:
if (!is_atomic) {
int page_start, page_end, rs, re;
- mutex_lock(&pcpu_alloc_mutex);
-
page_start = PFN_DOWN(off);
page_end = PFN_UP(off + size);
@@ -1000,7 +999,6 @@ area_found:
spin_lock_irqsave(&pcpu_lock, flags);
if (ret) {
- mutex_unlock(&pcpu_alloc_mutex);
pcpu_free_area(chunk, off, &occ_pages);
err = "failed to populate";
goto fail_unlock;
@@ -1040,6 +1038,8 @@ fail:
/* see the flag handling in pcpu_blance_workfn() */
pcpu_atomic_alloc_failed = true;
pcpu_schedule_balance_work();
+ } else {
+ mutex_unlock(&pcpu_alloc_mutex);
}
return NULL;
}
--
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@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
From 4f996e234dad488e5d9ba0858bc1bae12eff82c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 25 May 2016 11:48:25 -0400
Subject: percpu: fix synchronization between chunk->map_extend_work and chunk
destruction
Atomic allocations can trigger async map extensions which is serviced
by chunk->map_extend_work. pcpu_balance_work which is responsible for
destroying idle chunks wasn't synchronizing properly against
chunk->map_extend_work and may end up freeing the chunk while the work
item is still in flight.
This patch fixes the bug by rolling async map extension operations
into pcpu_balance_work.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-and-tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.18+
Fixes: 9c824b6a172c ("percpu: make sure chunk->map array has available space")
---
mm/percpu.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/percpu.c b/mm/percpu.c
index 0c59684..b1d2a38 100644
--- a/mm/percpu.c
+++ b/mm/percpu.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct pcpu_chunk {
int map_used; /* # of map entries used before the sentry */
int map_alloc; /* # of map entries allocated */
int *map; /* allocation map */
- struct work_struct map_extend_work;/* async ->map[] extension */
+ struct list_head map_extend_list;/* on pcpu_map_extend_chunks */
void *data; /* chunk data */
int first_free; /* no free below this */
@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(pcpu_alloc_mutex); /* chunk create/destroy, [de]pop */
static struct list_head *pcpu_slot __read_mostly; /* chunk list slots */
+/* chunks which need their map areas extended, protected by pcpu_lock */
+static LIST_HEAD(pcpu_map_extend_chunks);
+
/*
* The number of empty populated pages, protected by pcpu_lock. The
* reserved chunk doesn't contribute to the count.
@@ -395,13 +398,19 @@ static int pcpu_need_to_extend(struct pcpu_chunk *chunk, bool is_atomic)
{
int margin, new_alloc;
+ lockdep_assert_held(&pcpu_lock);
+
if (is_atomic) {
margin = 3;
if (chunk->map_alloc <
- chunk->map_used + PCPU_ATOMIC_MAP_MARGIN_LOW &&
- pcpu_async_enabled)
- schedule_work(&chunk->map_extend_work);
+ chunk->map_used + PCPU_ATOMIC_MAP_MARGIN_LOW) {
+ if (list_empty(&chunk->map_extend_list)) {
+ list_add_tail(&chunk->map_extend_list,
+ &pcpu_map_extend_chunks);
+ pcpu_schedule_balance_work();
+ }
+ }
} else {
margin = PCPU_ATOMIC_MAP_MARGIN_HIGH;
}
@@ -467,20 +476,6 @@ out_unlock:
return 0;
}
-static void pcpu_map_extend_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
-{
- struct pcpu_chunk *chunk = container_of(work, struct pcpu_chunk,
- map_extend_work);
- int new_alloc;
-
- spin_lock_irq(&pcpu_lock);
- new_alloc = pcpu_need_to_extend(chunk, false);
- spin_unlock_irq(&pcpu_lock);
-
- if (new_alloc)
- pcpu_extend_area_map(chunk, new_alloc);
-}
-
/**
* pcpu_fit_in_area - try to fit the requested allocation in a candidate area
* @chunk: chunk the candidate area belongs to
@@ -740,7 +735,7 @@ static struct pcpu_chunk *pcpu_alloc_chunk(void)
chunk->map_used = 1;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&chunk->list);
- INIT_WORK(&chunk->map_extend_work, pcpu_map_extend_workfn);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&chunk->map_extend_list);
chunk->free_size = pcpu_unit_size;
chunk->contig_hint = pcpu_unit_size;
@@ -1129,6 +1124,7 @@ static void pcpu_balance_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
if (chunk == list_first_entry(free_head, struct pcpu_chunk, list))
continue;
+ list_del_init(&chunk->map_extend_list);
list_move(&chunk->list, &to_free);
}
@@ -1146,6 +1142,25 @@ static void pcpu_balance_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
pcpu_destroy_chunk(chunk);
}
+ /* service chunks which requested async area map extension */
+ do {
+ int new_alloc = 0;
+
+ spin_lock_irq(&pcpu_lock);
+
+ chunk = list_first_entry_or_null(&pcpu_map_extend_chunks,
+ struct pcpu_chunk, map_extend_list);
+ if (chunk) {
+ list_del_init(&chunk->map_extend_list);
+ new_alloc = pcpu_need_to_extend(chunk, false);
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock_irq(&pcpu_lock);
+
+ if (new_alloc)
+ pcpu_extend_area_map(chunk, new_alloc);
+ } while (chunk);
+
/*
* Ensure there are certain number of free populated pages for
* atomic allocs. Fill up from the most packed so that atomic
@@ -1644,7 +1659,7 @@ int __init pcpu_setup_first_chunk(const struct pcpu_alloc_info *ai,
*/
schunk = memblock_virt_alloc(pcpu_chunk_struct_size, 0);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&schunk->list);
- INIT_WORK(&schunk->map_extend_work, pcpu_map_extend_workfn);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&schunk->map_extend_list);
schunk->base_addr = base_addr;
schunk->map = smap;
schunk->map_alloc = ARRAY_SIZE(smap);
@@ -1673,7 +1688,7 @@ int __init pcpu_setup_first_chunk(const struct pcpu_alloc_info *ai,
if (dyn_size) {
dchunk = memblock_virt_alloc(pcpu_chunk_struct_size, 0);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dchunk->list);
- INIT_WORK(&dchunk->map_extend_work, pcpu_map_extend_workfn);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dchunk->map_extend_list);
dchunk->base_addr = base_addr;
dchunk->map = dmap;
dchunk->map_alloc = ARRAY_SIZE(dmap);
--
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From 8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 16:22:26 -0700
Subject: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index b1755b2..92e37e2 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -955,7 +955,8 @@ static ssize_t environ_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
struct mm_struct *mm = file->private_data;
unsigned long env_start, env_end;
- if (!mm)
+ /* Ensure the process spawned far enough to have an environment. */
+ if (!mm || !mm->env_end)
return 0;
page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY);
--
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From f5527fffff3f002b0a6b376163613b82f69de073 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2016 13:23:10 +0000
Subject: mpi: Fix NULL ptr dereference in mpi_powm() [ver #3]
This fixes CVE-2016-8650.
If mpi_powm() is given a zero exponent, it wants to immediately return
either 1 or 0, depending on the modulus. However, if the result was
initalised with zero limb space, no limbs space is allocated and a
NULL-pointer exception ensues.
Fix this by allocating a minimal amount of limb space for the result when
the 0-exponent case when the result is 1 and not touching the limb space
when the result is 0.
This affects the use of RSA keys and X.509 certificates that carry them.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 3014 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6-fscache+ #278
Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014
task: ffff8804011944c0 task.stack: ffff880401294000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8138ce5d>] [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6
RSP: 0018:ffff880401297ad8 EFLAGS: 00010212
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88040868bec0 RCX: ffff88040868bba0
RDX: ffff88040868b260 RSI: ffff88040868bec0 RDI: ffff88040868bee0
RBP: ffff880401297ba8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000047 R11: ffffffff8183b210 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8804087c7600 R14: 000000000000001f R15: ffff880401297c50
FS: 00007f7a7918c700(0000) GS:ffff88041fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000401250000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Stack:
ffff88040868bec0 0000000000000020 ffff880401297b00 ffffffff81376cd4
0000000000000100 ffff880401297b10 ffffffff81376d12 ffff880401297b30
ffffffff81376f37 0000000000000100 0000000000000000 ffff880401297ba8
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81376cd4>] ? __sg_page_iter_next+0x43/0x66
[<ffffffff81376d12>] ? sg_miter_get_next_page+0x1b/0x5d
[<ffffffff81376f37>] ? sg_miter_next+0x17/0xbd
[<ffffffff8138ba3a>] ? mpi_read_raw_from_sgl+0xf2/0x146
[<ffffffff8132a95c>] rsa_verify+0x9d/0xee
[<ffffffff8132acca>] ? pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf+0x2e/0xbb
[<ffffffff8132af40>] pkcs1pad_verify+0xc0/0xe1
[<ffffffff8133cb5e>] public_key_verify_signature+0x1b0/0x228
[<ffffffff8133d974>] x509_check_for_self_signed+0xa1/0xc4
[<ffffffff8133cdde>] x509_cert_parse+0x167/0x1a1
[<ffffffff8133d609>] x509_key_preparse+0x21/0x1a1
[<ffffffff8133c3d7>] asymmetric_key_preparse+0x34/0x61
[<ffffffff812fc9f3>] key_create_or_update+0x145/0x399
[<ffffffff812fe227>] SyS_add_key+0x154/0x19e
[<ffffffff81001c2b>] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x191
[<ffffffff816825e4>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Code: 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 81 ec a8 00 00 00 44 8b 71 04 8b 42 04 4c 8b 67 18 45 85 f6 89 45 80 0f 84 b4 06 00 00 85 c0 75 2f 41 ff ce <49> c7 04 24 01 00 00 00 b0 01 75 0b 48 8b 41 18 48 83 38 01 0f
RIP [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6
RSP <ffff880401297ad8>
CR2: 0000000000000000
---[ end trace d82015255d4a5d8d ]---
Basically, this is a backport of a libgcrypt patch:
http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgcrypt.git;a=patch;h=6e1adb05d290aeeb1c230c763970695f4a538526
Fixes: cdec9cb5167a ("crypto: GnuPG based MPI lib - source files (part 1)")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
---
lib/mpi/mpi-pow.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/mpi/mpi-pow.c b/lib/mpi/mpi-pow.c
index 5464c87..e24388a 100644
--- a/lib/mpi/mpi-pow.c
+++ b/lib/mpi/mpi-pow.c
@@ -64,8 +64,13 @@ int mpi_powm(MPI res, MPI base, MPI exp, MPI mod)
if (!esize) {
/* Exponent is zero, result is 1 mod MOD, i.e., 1 or 0
* depending on if MOD equals 1. */
- rp[0] = 1;
res->nlimbs = (msize == 1 && mod->d[0] == 1) ? 0 : 1;
+ if (res->nlimbs) {
+ if (mpi_resize(res, 1) < 0)
+ goto enomem;
+ rp = res->d;
+ rp[0] = 1;
+ }
res->sign = 0;
goto leave;
}
--
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Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2016-9191/ANY/0.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
From 93362fa47fe98b62e4a34ab408c4a418432e7939 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Jan 2017 09:32:32 +0800
Subject: sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir
Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.
The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:
[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230
One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.
See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13
Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Yang Shukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
index 55313d9..d4e37ac 100644
--- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
+++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ static int proc_sys_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
ctl_dir = container_of(head, struct ctl_dir, header);
if (!dir_emit_dots(file, ctx))
- return 0;
+ goto out;
pos = 2;
@@ -719,6 +719,7 @@ static int proc_sys_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
break;
}
}
+out:
sysctl_head_finish(head);
return 0;
}
--
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Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2016-9754/ANY/0.patch
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From 59643d1535eb220668692a5359de22545af579f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Steven Rostedt (Red Hat)" <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Date: Fri, 13 May 2016 09:34:12 -0400
Subject: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
---
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c | 9 ++++-----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
index 99d64cd..9c14373 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
@@ -1657,14 +1657,13 @@ int ring_buffer_resize(struct ring_buffer *buffer, unsigned long size,
!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu_id, buffer->cpumask))
return size;
- size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
- size *= BUF_PAGE_SIZE;
+ nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
/* we need a minimum of two pages */
- if (size < BUF_PAGE_SIZE * 2)
- size = BUF_PAGE_SIZE * 2;
+ if (nr_pages < 2)
+ nr_pages = 2;
- nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
+ size = nr_pages * BUF_PAGE_SIZE;
/*
* Don't succeed if resizing is disabled, as a reader might be
--
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Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2016-9793/ANY/0.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
From b98b0bc8c431e3ceb4b26b0dfc8db509518fb290 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2016 09:44:53 -0800
Subject: net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.
This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.
Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/core/sock.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index 5e3ca41..00a074d 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
val = min_t(u32, val, sysctl_wmem_max);
set_sndbuf:
sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_SNDBUF_LOCK;
- sk->sk_sndbuf = max_t(u32, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF);
+ sk->sk_sndbuf = max_t(int, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF);
/* Wake up sending tasks if we upped the value. */
sk->sk_write_space(sk);
break;
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ set_rcvbuf:
* returning the value we actually used in getsockopt
* is the most desirable behavior.
*/
- sk->sk_rcvbuf = max_t(u32, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF);
+ sk->sk_rcvbuf = max_t(int, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF);
break;
case SO_RCVBUFFORCE:
--
cgit v1.1

44
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2016-9794/ANY/0.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
From 3aa02cb664c5fb1042958c8d1aa8c35055a2ebc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2016 18:02:37 +0200
Subject: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
---
sound/core/pcm_lib.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/pcm_lib.c b/sound/core/pcm_lib.c
index 3a9b66c..0aca397 100644
--- a/sound/core/pcm_lib.c
+++ b/sound/core/pcm_lib.c
@@ -1886,8 +1886,8 @@ void snd_pcm_period_elapsed(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
snd_timer_interrupt(substream->timer, 1);
#endif
_end:
- snd_pcm_stream_unlock_irqrestore(substream, flags);
kill_fasync(&runtime->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
+ snd_pcm_stream_unlock_irqrestore(substream, flags);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_pcm_period_elapsed);
--
cgit v1.1

50
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2016-9806/ANY/0.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
From 92964c79b357efd980812c4de5c1fd2ec8bb5520 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Date: Mon, 16 May 2016 17:28:16 +0800
Subject: netlink: Fix dump skb leak/double free
When we free cb->skb after a dump, we do it after releasing the
lock. This means that a new dump could have started in the time
being and we'll end up freeing their skb instead of ours.
This patch saves the skb and module before we unlock so we free
the right memory.
Fixes: 16b304f3404f ("netlink: Eliminate kmalloc in netlink dump operation.")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index aeefe12..627f898 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -2059,6 +2059,7 @@ static int netlink_dump(struct sock *sk)
struct netlink_callback *cb;
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
+ struct module *module;
int len, err = -ENOBUFS;
int alloc_min_size;
int alloc_size;
@@ -2134,9 +2135,11 @@ static int netlink_dump(struct sock *sk)
cb->done(cb);
nlk->cb_running = false;
+ module = cb->module;
+ skb = cb->skb;
mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex);
- module_put(cb->module);
- consume_skb(cb->skb);
+ module_put(module);
+ consume_skb(skb);
return 0;
errout_skb:
--
cgit v1.1

939
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-5967/ANY/0.patch
View File

@ -0,0 +1,939 @@
From dfb4357da6ddbdf57d583ba64361c9d792b0e0b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2017 11:26:59 -0800
Subject: time: Remove CONFIG_TIMER_STATS
Currently CONFIG_TIMER_STATS exposes process information across namespaces:
kernel/time/timer_list.c print_timer():
SEQ_printf(m, ", %s/%d", tmp, timer->start_pid);
/proc/timer_list:
#11: <0000000000000000>, hrtimer_wakeup, S:01, do_nanosleep, cron/2570
Given that the tracer can give the same information, this patch entirely
removes CONFIG_TIMER_STATS.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Xing Gao <xgao01@email.wm.edu>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jessica Frazelle <me@jessfraz.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170208192659.GA32582@beast
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
Documentation/timers/timer_stats.txt | 73 ------
include/linux/hrtimer.h | 11 -
include/linux/timer.h | 45 ----
kernel/kthread.c | 1 -
kernel/time/Makefile | 1 -
kernel/time/hrtimer.c | 38 ----
kernel/time/timer.c | 48 +---
kernel/time/timer_list.c | 10 -
kernel/time/timer_stats.c | 425 -----------------------------------
kernel/workqueue.c | 2 -
lib/Kconfig.debug | 14 --
11 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 666 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 Documentation/timers/timer_stats.txt
delete mode 100644 kernel/time/timer_stats.c
diff --git a/Documentation/timers/timer_stats.txt b/Documentation/timers/timer_stats.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index de835ee..0000000
--- a/Documentation/timers/timer_stats.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-timer_stats - timer usage statistics
-------------------------------------
-
-timer_stats is a debugging facility to make the timer (ab)usage in a Linux
-system visible to kernel and userspace developers. If enabled in the config
-but not used it has almost zero runtime overhead, and a relatively small
-data structure overhead. Even if collection is enabled runtime all the
-locking is per-CPU and lookup is hashed.
-
-timer_stats should be used by kernel and userspace developers to verify that
-their code does not make unduly use of timers. This helps to avoid unnecessary
-wakeups, which should be avoided to optimize power consumption.
-
-It can be enabled by CONFIG_TIMER_STATS in the "Kernel hacking" configuration
-section.
-
-timer_stats collects information about the timer events which are fired in a
-Linux system over a sample period:
-
-- the pid of the task(process) which initialized the timer
-- the name of the process which initialized the timer
-- the function where the timer was initialized
-- the callback function which is associated to the timer
-- the number of events (callbacks)
-
-timer_stats adds an entry to /proc: /proc/timer_stats
-
-This entry is used to control the statistics functionality and to read out the
-sampled information.
-
-The timer_stats functionality is inactive on bootup.
-
-To activate a sample period issue:
-# echo 1 >/proc/timer_stats
-
-To stop a sample period issue:
-# echo 0 >/proc/timer_stats
-
-The statistics can be retrieved by:
-# cat /proc/timer_stats
-
-While sampling is enabled, each readout from /proc/timer_stats will see
-newly updated statistics. Once sampling is disabled, the sampled information
-is kept until a new sample period is started. This allows multiple readouts.
-
-Sample output of /proc/timer_stats:
-
-Timerstats sample period: 3.888770 s
- 12, 0 swapper hrtimer_stop_sched_tick (hrtimer_sched_tick)
- 15, 1 swapper hcd_submit_urb (rh_timer_func)
- 4, 959 kedac schedule_timeout (process_timeout)
- 1, 0 swapper page_writeback_init (wb_timer_fn)
- 28, 0 swapper hrtimer_stop_sched_tick (hrtimer_sched_tick)
- 22, 2948 IRQ 4 tty_flip_buffer_push (delayed_work_timer_fn)
- 3, 3100 bash schedule_timeout (process_timeout)
- 1, 1 swapper queue_delayed_work_on (delayed_work_timer_fn)
- 1, 1 swapper queue_delayed_work_on (delayed_work_timer_fn)
- 1, 1 swapper neigh_table_init_no_netlink (neigh_periodic_timer)
- 1, 2292 ip __netdev_watchdog_up (dev_watchdog)
- 1, 23 events/1 do_cache_clean (delayed_work_timer_fn)
-90 total events, 30.0 events/sec
-
-The first column is the number of events, the second column the pid, the third
-column is the name of the process. The forth column shows the function which
-initialized the timer and in parenthesis the callback function which was
-executed on expiry.
-
- Thomas, Ingo
-
-Added flag to indicate 'deferrable timer' in /proc/timer_stats. A deferrable
-timer will appear as follows
- 10D, 1 swapper queue_delayed_work_on (delayed_work_timer_fn)
-
diff --git a/include/linux/hrtimer.h b/include/linux/hrtimer.h
index cdab81b..e52b427 100644
--- a/include/linux/hrtimer.h
+++ b/include/linux/hrtimer.h
@@ -88,12 +88,6 @@ enum hrtimer_restart {
* @base: pointer to the timer base (per cpu and per clock)
* @state: state information (See bit values above)
* @is_rel: Set if the timer was armed relative
- * @start_pid: timer statistics field to store the pid of the task which
- * started the timer
- * @start_site: timer statistics field to store the site where the timer
- * was started
- * @start_comm: timer statistics field to store the name of the process which
- * started the timer
*
* The hrtimer structure must be initialized by hrtimer_init()
*/
@@ -104,11 +98,6 @@ struct hrtimer {
struct hrtimer_clock_base *base;
u8 state;
u8 is_rel;
-#ifdef CONFIG_TIMER_STATS
- int start_pid;
- void *start_site;
- char start_comm[16];
-#endif
};
/**
diff --git a/include/linux/timer.h b/include/linux/timer.h
index 51d601f..5a209b8 100644
--- a/include/linux/timer.h
+++ b/include/linux/timer.h
@@ -20,11 +20,6 @@ struct timer_list {
unsigned long data;
u32 flags;
-#ifdef CONFIG_TIMER_STATS
- int start_pid;
- void *start_site;
- char start_comm[16];
-#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
struct lockdep_map lockdep_map;
#endif
@@ -197,46 +192,6 @@ extern int mod_timer_pending(struct timer_list *timer, unsigned long expires);
*/
#define NEXT_TIMER_MAX_DELTA ((1UL << 30) - 1)
-/*
- * Timer-statistics info:
- */
-#ifdef CONFIG_TIMER_STATS
-
-extern int timer_stats_active;
-
-extern void init_timer_stats(void);
-
-extern void timer_stats_update_stats(void *timer, pid_t pid, void *startf,
- void *timerf, char *comm, u32 flags);
-
-extern void __timer_stats_timer_set_start_info(struct timer_list *timer,
- void *addr);
-
-static inline void timer_stats_timer_set_start_info(struct timer_list *timer)
-{
- if (likely(!timer_stats_active))
- return;
- __timer_stats_timer_set_start_info(timer, __builtin_return_address(0));
-}
-
-static inline void timer_stats_timer_clear_start_info(struct timer_list *timer)
-{
- timer->start_site = NULL;
-}
-#else
-static inline void init_timer_stats(void)
-{
-}
-
-static inline void timer_stats_timer_set_start_info(struct timer_list *timer)
-{
-}
-
-static inline void timer_stats_timer_clear_start_info(struct timer_list *timer)
-{
-}
-#endif
-
extern void add_timer(struct timer_list *timer);
extern int try_to_del_timer_sync(struct timer_list *timer);
diff --git a/kernel/kthread.c b/kernel/kthread.c
index 2318fba..8461a43 100644
--- a/kernel/kthread.c
+++ b/kernel/kthread.c
@@ -850,7 +850,6 @@ void __kthread_queue_delayed_work(struct kthread_worker *worker,
list_add(&work->node, &worker->delayed_work_list);
work->worker = worker;
- timer_stats_timer_set_start_info(&dwork->timer);
timer->expires = jiffies + delay;
add_timer(timer);
}
diff --git a/kernel/time/Makefile b/kernel/time/Makefile
index 976840d..938dbf3 100644
--- a/kernel/time/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/time/Makefile
@@ -15,6 +15,5 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST),y)
endif
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_SCHED_CLOCK) += sched_clock.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TICK_ONESHOT) += tick-oneshot.o tick-sched.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_TIMER_STATS) += timer_stats.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_FS) += timekeeping_debug.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_UDELAY) += test_udelay.o
diff --git a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
index c6ecedd..edabde6 100644
--- a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
@@ -766,34 +766,6 @@ void hrtimers_resume(void)
clock_was_set_delayed();
}
-static inline void timer_stats_hrtimer_set_start_info(struct hrtimer *timer)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_TIMER_STATS
- if (timer->start_site)
- return;
- timer->start_site = __builtin_return_address(0);
- memcpy(timer->start_comm, current->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
- timer->start_pid = current->pid;
-#endif
-}
-
-static inline void timer_stats_hrtimer_clear_start_info(struct hrtimer *timer)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_TIMER_STATS
- timer->start_site = NULL;
-#endif
-}
-
-static inline void timer_stats_account_hrtimer(struct hrtimer *timer)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_TIMER_STATS
- if (likely(!timer_stats_active))
- return;
- timer_stats_update_stats(timer, timer->start_pid, timer->start_site,
- timer->function, timer->start_comm, 0);
-#endif
-}
-
/*
* Counterpart to lock_hrtimer_base above:
*/
@@ -932,7 +904,6 @@ remove_hrtimer(struct hrtimer *timer, struct hrtimer_clock_base *base, bool rest
* rare case and less expensive than a smp call.
*/
debug_deactivate(timer);
- timer_stats_hrtimer_clear_start_info(timer);
reprogram = base->cpu_base == this_cpu_ptr(&hrtimer_bases);
if (!restart)
@@ -990,8 +961,6 @@ void hrtimer_start_range_ns(struct hrtimer *timer, ktime_t tim,
/* Switch the timer base, if necessary: */
new_base = switch_hrtimer_base(timer, base, mode & HRTIMER_MODE_PINNED);
- timer_stats_hrtimer_set_start_info(timer);
-
leftmost = enqueue_hrtimer(timer, new_base);
if (!leftmost)
goto unlock;
@@ -1128,12 +1097,6 @@ static void __hrtimer_init(struct hrtimer *timer, clockid_t clock_id,
base = hrtimer_clockid_to_base(clock_id);
timer->base = &cpu_base->clock_base[base];
timerqueue_init(&timer->node);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_TIMER_STATS
- timer->start_site = NULL;
- timer->start_pid = -1;
- memset(timer->start_comm, 0, TASK_COMM_LEN);
-#endif
}
/**
@@ -1217,7 +1180,6 @@ static void __run_hrtimer(struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base,
raw_write_seqcount_barrier(&cpu_base->seq);
__remove_hrtimer(timer, base, HRTIMER_STATE_INACTIVE, 0);
- timer_stats_account_hrtimer(timer);
fn = timer->function;
/*
diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c
index ec33a69..82a6bfa 100644
--- a/kernel/time/timer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/timer.c
@@ -571,38 +571,6 @@ internal_add_timer(struct timer_base *base, struct timer_list *timer)
trigger_dyntick_cpu(base, timer);
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_TIMER_STATS
-void __timer_stats_timer_set_start_info(struct timer_list *timer, void *addr)
-{
- if (timer->start_site)
- return;
-
- timer->start_site = addr;
- memcpy(timer->start_comm, current->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
- timer->start_pid = current->pid;
-}
-
-static void timer_stats_account_timer(struct timer_list *timer)
-{
- void *site;
-
- /*
- * start_site can be concurrently reset by
- * timer_stats_timer_clear_start_info()
- */
- site = READ_ONCE(timer->start_site);
- if (likely(!site))
- return;
-
- timer_stats_update_stats(timer, timer->start_pid, site,
- timer->function, timer->start_comm,
- timer->flags);
-}
-
-#else
-static void timer_stats_account_timer(struct timer_list *timer) {}
-#endif
-
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_TIMERS
static struct debug_obj_descr timer_debug_descr;
@@ -789,11 +757,6 @@ static void do_init_timer(struct timer_list *timer, unsigned int flags,
{
timer->entry.pprev = NULL;
timer->flags = flags | raw_smp_processor_id();
-#ifdef CONFIG_TIMER_STATS
- timer->start_site = NULL;
- timer->start_pid = -1;
- memset(timer->start_comm, 0, TASK_COMM_LEN);
-#endif
lockdep_init_map(&timer->lockdep_map, name, key, 0);
}
@@ -1001,8 +964,6 @@ __mod_timer(struct timer_list *timer, unsigned long expires, bool pending_only)
base = lock_timer_base(timer, &flags);
}
- timer_stats_timer_set_start_info(timer);
-
ret = detach_if_pending(timer, base, false);
if (!ret && pending_only)
goto out_unlock;
@@ -1130,7 +1091,6 @@ void add_timer_on(struct timer_list *timer, int cpu)
struct timer_base *new_base, *base;
unsigned long flags;
- timer_stats_timer_set_start_info(timer);
BUG_ON(timer_pending(timer) || !timer->function);
new_base = get_timer_cpu_base(timer->flags, cpu);
@@ -1176,7 +1136,6 @@ int del_timer(struct timer_list *timer)
debug_assert_init(timer);
- timer_stats_timer_clear_start_info(timer);
if (timer_pending(timer)) {
base = lock_timer_base(timer, &flags);
ret = detach_if_pending(timer, base, true);
@@ -1204,10 +1163,9 @@ int try_to_del_timer_sync(struct timer_list *timer)
base = lock_timer_base(timer, &flags);
- if (base->running_timer != timer) {
- timer_stats_timer_clear_start_info(timer);
+ if (base->running_timer != timer)
ret = detach_if_pending(timer, base, true);
- }
+
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base->lock, flags);
return ret;
@@ -1331,7 +1289,6 @@ static void expire_timers(struct timer_base *base, struct hlist_head *head)
unsigned long data;
timer = hlist_entry(head->first, struct timer_list, entry);
- timer_stats_account_timer(timer);
base->running_timer = timer;
detach_timer(timer, true);
@@ -1868,7 +1825,6 @@ static void __init init_timer_cpus(void)
void __init init_timers(void)
{
init_timer_cpus();
- init_timer_stats();
open_softirq(TIMER_SOFTIRQ, run_timer_softirq);
}
diff --git a/kernel/time/timer_list.c b/kernel/time/timer_list.c
index afe6cd1..387a3a5 100644
--- a/kernel/time/timer_list.c
+++ b/kernel/time/timer_list.c
@@ -62,21 +62,11 @@ static void
print_timer(struct seq_file *m, struct hrtimer *taddr, struct hrtimer *timer,
int idx, u64 now)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_TIMER_STATS
- char tmp[TASK_COMM_LEN + 1];
-#endif
SEQ_printf(m, " #%d: ", idx);
print_name_offset(m, taddr);
SEQ_printf(m, ", ");
print_name_offset(m, timer->function);
SEQ_printf(m, ", S:%02x", timer->state);
-#ifdef CONFIG_TIMER_STATS
- SEQ_printf(m, ", ");
- print_name_offset(m, timer->start_site);
- memcpy(tmp, timer->start_comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
- tmp[TASK_COMM_LEN] = 0;
- SEQ_printf(m, ", %s/%d", tmp, timer->start_pid);
-#endif
SEQ_printf(m, "\n");
SEQ_printf(m, " # expires at %Lu-%Lu nsecs [in %Ld to %Ld nsecs]\n",
(unsigned long long)ktime_to_ns(hrtimer_get_softexpires(timer)),
diff --git a/kernel/time/timer_stats.c b/kernel/time/timer_stats.c
deleted file mode 100644
index afddded..0000000
--- a/kernel/time/timer_stats.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,425 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * kernel/time/timer_stats.c
- *
- * Collect timer usage statistics.
- *
- * Copyright(C) 2006, Red Hat, Inc., Ingo Molnar
- * Copyright(C) 2006 Timesys Corp., Thomas Gleixner <tglx@timesys.com>
- *
- * timer_stats is based on timer_top, a similar functionality which was part of
- * Con Kolivas dyntick patch set. It was developed by Daniel Petrini at the
- * Instituto Nokia de Tecnologia - INdT - Manaus. timer_top's design was based
- * on dynamic allocation of the statistics entries and linear search based
- * lookup combined with a global lock, rather than the static array, hash
- * and per-CPU locking which is used by timer_stats. It was written for the
- * pre hrtimer kernel code and therefore did not take hrtimers into account.
- * Nevertheless it provided the base for the timer_stats implementation and
- * was a helpful source of inspiration. Kudos to Daniel and the Nokia folks
- * for this effort.
- *
- * timer_top.c is
- * Copyright (C) 2005 Instituto Nokia de Tecnologia - INdT - Manaus
- * Written by Daniel Petrini <d.pensator@gmail.com>
- * timer_top.c was released under the GNU General Public License version 2
- *
- * We export the addresses and counting of timer functions being called,
- * the pid and cmdline from the owner process if applicable.
- *
- * Start/stop data collection:
- * # echo [1|0] >/proc/timer_stats
- *
- * Display the information collected so far:
- * # cat /proc/timer_stats
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
- * published by the Free Software Foundation.
- */
-
-#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/spinlock.h>
-#include <linux/sched.h>
-#include <linux/seq_file.h>
-#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
-
-#include <linux/uaccess.h>
-
-/*
- * This is our basic unit of interest: a timer expiry event identified
- * by the timer, its start/expire functions and the PID of the task that
- * started the timer. We count the number of times an event happens:
- */
-struct entry {
- /*
- * Hash list:
- */
- struct entry *next;
-
- /*
- * Hash keys:
- */
- void *timer;
- void *start_func;
- void *expire_func;
- pid_t pid;
-
- /*
- * Number of timeout events:
- */
- unsigned long count;
- u32 flags;
-
- /*
- * We save the command-line string to preserve
- * this information past task exit:
- */
- char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN + 1];
-
-} ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
-
-/*
- * Spinlock protecting the tables - not taken during lookup:
- */
-static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(table_lock);
-
-/*
- * Per-CPU lookup locks for fast hash lookup:
- */
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(raw_spinlock_t, tstats_lookup_lock);
-
-/*
- * Mutex to serialize state changes with show-stats activities:
- */
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(show_mutex);
-
-/*
- * Collection status, active/inactive:
- */
-int __read_mostly timer_stats_active;
-
-/*
- * Beginning/end timestamps of measurement:
- */
-static ktime_t time_start, time_stop;
-
-/*
- * tstat entry structs only get allocated while collection is
- * active and never freed during that time - this simplifies
- * things quite a bit.
- *
- * They get freed when a new collection period is started.
- */
-#define MAX_ENTRIES_BITS 10
-#define MAX_ENTRIES (1UL << MAX_ENTRIES_BITS)
-
-static unsigned long nr_entries;
-static struct entry entries[MAX_ENTRIES];
-
-static atomic_t overflow_count;
-
-/*
- * The entries are in a hash-table, for fast lookup:
- */
-#define TSTAT_HASH_BITS (MAX_ENTRIES_BITS - 1)
-#define TSTAT_HASH_SIZE (1UL << TSTAT_HASH_BITS)
-#define TSTAT_HASH_MASK (TSTAT_HASH_SIZE - 1)
-
-#define __tstat_hashfn(entry) \
- (((unsigned long)(entry)->timer ^ \
- (unsigned long)(entry)->start_func ^ \
- (unsigned long)(entry)->expire_func ^ \
- (unsigned long)(entry)->pid ) & TSTAT_HASH_MASK)
-
-#define tstat_hashentry(entry) (tstat_hash_table + __tstat_hashfn(entry))
-
-static struct entry *tstat_hash_table[TSTAT_HASH_SIZE] __read_mostly;
-
-static void reset_entries(void)
-{
- nr_entries = 0;
- memset(entries, 0, sizeof(entries));
- memset(tstat_hash_table, 0, sizeof(tstat_hash_table));
- atomic_set(&overflow_count, 0);
-}
-
-static struct entry *alloc_entry(void)
-{
- if (nr_entries >= MAX_ENTRIES)
- return NULL;
-
- return entries + nr_entries++;
-}
-
-static int match_entries(struct entry *entry1, struct entry *entry2)
-{
- return entry1->timer == entry2->timer &&
- entry1->start_func == entry2->start_func &&
- entry1->expire_func == entry2->expire_func &&
- entry1->pid == entry2->pid;
-}
-
-/*
- * Look up whether an entry matching this item is present
- * in the hash already. Must be called with irqs off and the
- * lookup lock held:
- */
-static struct entry *tstat_lookup(struct entry *entry, char *comm)
-{
- struct entry **head, *curr, *prev;
-
- head = tstat_hashentry(entry);
- curr = *head;
-
- /*
- * The fastpath is when the entry is already hashed,
- * we do this with the lookup lock held, but with the
- * table lock not held:
- */
- while (curr) {
- if (match_entries(curr, entry))
- return curr;
-
- curr = curr->next;
- }
- /*
- * Slowpath: allocate, set up and link a new hash entry:
- */
- prev = NULL;
- curr = *head;
-
- raw_spin_lock(&table_lock);
- /*
- * Make sure we have not raced with another CPU:
- */
- while (curr) {
- if (match_entries(curr, entry))
- goto out_unlock;
-
- prev = curr;
- curr = curr->next;
- }
-
- curr = alloc_entry();
- if (curr) {
- *curr = *entry;
- curr->count = 0;
- curr->next = NULL;
- memcpy(curr->comm, comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
-
- smp_mb(); /* Ensure that curr is initialized before insert */
-
- if (prev)
- prev->next = curr;
- else
- *head = curr;
- }
- out_unlock:
- raw_spin_unlock(&table_lock);
-
- return curr;
-}
-
-/**
- * timer_stats_update_stats - Update the statistics for a timer.
- * @timer: pointer to either a timer_list or a hrtimer
- * @pid: the pid of the task which set up the timer
- * @startf: pointer to the function which did the timer setup
- * @timerf: pointer to the timer callback function of the timer
- * @comm: name of the process which set up the timer
- * @tflags: The flags field of the timer
- *
- * When the timer is already registered, then the event counter is
- * incremented. Otherwise the timer is registered in a free slot.
- */
-void timer_stats_update_stats(void *timer, pid_t pid, void *startf,
- void *timerf, char *comm, u32 tflags)
-{
- /*
- * It doesn't matter which lock we take:
- */
- raw_spinlock_t *lock;
- struct entry *entry, input;
- unsigned long flags;
-
- if (likely(!timer_stats_active))
- return;
-
- lock = &per_cpu(tstats_lookup_lock, raw_smp_processor_id());
-
- input.timer = timer;
- input.start_func = startf;
- input.expire_func = timerf;
- input.pid = pid;
- input.flags = tflags;
-
- raw_spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flags);
- if (!timer_stats_active)
- goto out_unlock;
-
- entry = tstat_lookup(&input, comm);
- if (likely(entry))
- entry->count++;
- else
- atomic_inc(&overflow_count);
-
- out_unlock:
- raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
-}
-
-static void print_name_offset(struct seq_file *m, unsigned long addr)
-{
- char symname[KSYM_NAME_LEN];
-
- if (lookup_symbol_name(addr, symname) < 0)
- seq_printf(m, "<%p>", (void *)addr);
- else
- seq_printf(m, "%s", symname);
-}
-
-static int tstats_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
-{
- struct timespec64 period;
- struct entry *entry;
- unsigned long ms;
- long events = 0;
- ktime_t time;
- int i;
-
- mutex_lock(&show_mutex);
- /*
- * If still active then calculate up to now:
- */
- if (timer_stats_active)
- time_stop = ktime_get();
-
- time = ktime_sub(time_stop, time_start);
-
- period = ktime_to_timespec64(time);
- ms = period.tv_nsec / 1000000;
-
- seq_puts(m, "Timer Stats Version: v0.3\n");
- seq_printf(m, "Sample period: %ld.%03ld s\n", (long)period.tv_sec, ms);
- if (atomic_read(&overflow_count))
- seq_printf(m, "Overflow: %d entries\n", atomic_read(&overflow_count));
- seq_printf(m, "Collection: %s\n", timer_stats_active ? "active" : "inactive");
-
- for (i = 0; i < nr_entries; i++) {
- entry = entries + i;
- if (entry->flags & TIMER_DEFERRABLE) {
- seq_printf(m, "%4luD, %5d %-16s ",
- entry->count, entry->pid, entry->comm);
- } else {
- seq_printf(m, " %4lu, %5d %-16s ",
- entry->count, entry->pid, entry->comm);
- }
-
- print_name_offset(m, (unsigned long)entry->start_func);
- seq_puts(m, " (");
- print_name_offset(m, (unsigned long)entry->expire_func);
- seq_puts(m, ")\n");
-
- events += entry->count;
- }
-
- ms += period.tv_sec * 1000;
- if (!ms)
- ms = 1;
-
- if (events && period.tv_sec)
- seq_printf(m, "%ld total events, %ld.%03ld events/sec\n",
- events, events * 1000 / ms,
- (events * 1000000 / ms) % 1000);
- else
- seq_printf(m, "%ld total events\n", events);
-
- mutex_unlock(&show_mutex);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * After a state change, make sure all concurrent lookup/update
- * activities have stopped:
- */
-static void sync_access(void)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- int cpu;
-
- for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
- raw_spinlock_t *lock = &per_cpu(tstats_lookup_lock, cpu);
-
- raw_spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flags);
- /* nothing */
- raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
- }
-}
-
-static ssize_t tstats_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
- size_t count, loff_t *offs)
-{
- char ctl[2];
-
- if (count != 2 || *offs)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if (copy_from_user(ctl, buf, count))
- return -EFAULT;
-
- mutex_lock(&show_mutex);
- switch (ctl[0]) {
- case '0':
- if (timer_stats_active) {
- timer_stats_active = 0;
- time_stop = ktime_get();
- sync_access();
- }
- break;
- case '1':
- if (!timer_stats_active) {
- reset_entries();
- time_start = ktime_get();
- smp_mb();
- timer_stats_active = 1;
- }
- break;
- default:
- count = -EINVAL;
- }
- mutex_unlock(&show_mutex);
-
- return count;
-}
-
-static int tstats_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
-{
- return single_open(filp, tstats_show, NULL);
-}
-
-static const struct file_operations tstats_fops = {
- .open = tstats_open,
- .read = seq_read,
- .write = tstats_write,
- .llseek = seq_lseek,
- .release = single_release,
-};
-
-void __init init_timer_stats(void)
-{
- int cpu;
-
- for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
- raw_spin_lock_init(&per_cpu(tstats_lookup_lock, cpu));
-}
-
-static int __init init_tstats_procfs(void)
-{
- struct proc_dir_entry *pe;
-
- pe = proc_create("timer_stats", 0644, NULL, &tstats_fops);
- if (!pe)
- return -ENOMEM;
- return 0;
-}
-__initcall(init_tstats_procfs);
diff --git a/kernel/workqueue.c b/kernel/workqueue.c
index 1d9fb65..072cbc9 100644
--- a/kernel/workqueue.c
+++ b/kernel/workqueue.c
@@ -1523,8 +1523,6 @@ static void __queue_delayed_work(int cpu, struct workqueue_struct *wq,
return;
}
- timer_stats_timer_set_start_info(&dwork->timer);
-
dwork->wq = wq;
dwork->cpu = cpu;
timer->expires = jiffies + delay;
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index eb9e9a7..132af33 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -980,20 +980,6 @@ config DEBUG_TIMEKEEPING
If unsure, say N.
-config TIMER_STATS
- bool "Collect kernel timers statistics"
- depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && PROC_FS
- help
- If you say Y here, additional code will be inserted into the
- timer routines to collect statistics about kernel timers being
- reprogrammed. The statistics can be read from /proc/timer_stats.
- The statistics collection is started by writing 1 to /proc/timer_stats,
- writing 0 stops it. This feature is useful to collect information
- about timer usage patterns in kernel and userspace. This feature
- is lightweight if enabled in the kernel config but not activated
- (it defaults to deactivated on bootup and will only be activated
- if some application like powertop activates it explicitly).
-
config DEBUG_PREEMPT
bool "Debug preemptible kernel"
depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && PREEMPT && TRACE_IRQFLAGS_SUPPORT
--
cgit v1.1

39
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-5986/ANY/0.patch
View File

@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From 2dcab598484185dea7ec22219c76dcdd59e3cb90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 18:10:31 -0200
Subject: sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf
Alexander Popov reported that an application may trigger a BUG_ON in
sctp_wait_for_sndbuf if the socket tx buffer is full, a thread is
waiting on it to queue more data and meanwhile another thread peels off
the association being used by the first thread.
This patch replaces the BUG_ON call with a proper error handling. It
will return -EPIPE to the original sendmsg call, similarly to what would
have been done if the association wasn't found in the first place.
Acked-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/sctp/socket.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index 37eeab7..e214d2e 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -7426,7 +7426,8 @@ static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p,
*/
release_sock(sk);
current_timeo = schedule_timeout(current_timeo);
- BUG_ON(sk != asoc->base.sk);
+ if (sk != asoc->base.sk)
+ goto do_error;
lock_sock(sk);
*timeo_p = current_timeo;
--
cgit v1.1

159
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-6001/3.4/0.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
From 9eb0e01be831d0f37ea6278a92c32424141f55fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2017 21:09:50 +0100
Subject: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
commit 321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290 upstream.
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Use ACCESS_ONCE() instead of READ_ONCE()
- Test perf_event::group_flags instead of group_caps
- Add the err_locked cleanup block, which we didn't need before
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
kernel/events/core.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index a301c68..49a1db4 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -6474,6 +6474,37 @@ static void mutex_lock_double(struct mutex *a, struct mutex *b)
mutex_lock_nested(b, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
}
+/*
+ * Variation on perf_event_ctx_lock_nested(), except we take two context
+ * mutexes.
+ */
+static struct perf_event_context *
+__perf_event_ctx_lock_double(struct perf_event *group_leader,
+ struct perf_event_context *ctx)
+{
+ struct perf_event_context *gctx;
+
+again:
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ gctx = ACCESS_ONCE(group_leader->ctx);
+ if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&gctx->refcount)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto again;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ mutex_lock_double(&gctx->mutex, &ctx->mutex);
+
+ if (group_leader->ctx != gctx) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
+ put_ctx(gctx);
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ return gctx;
+}
+
/**
* sys_perf_event_open - open a performance event, associate it to a task/cpu
*
@@ -6661,14 +6692,31 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
}
if (move_group) {
- gctx = group_leader->ctx;
+ gctx = __perf_event_ctx_lock_double(group_leader, ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * Check if we raced against another sys_perf_event_open() call
+ * moving the software group underneath us.
+ */
+ if (!(group_leader->group_flags & PERF_GROUP_SOFTWARE)) {
+ /*
+ * If someone moved the group out from under us, check
+ * if this new event wound up on the same ctx, if so
+ * its the regular !move_group case, otherwise fail.
+ */
+ if (gctx != ctx) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto err_locked;
+ } else {
+ perf_event_ctx_unlock(group_leader, gctx);
+ move_group = 0;
+ }
+ }
/*
* See perf_event_ctx_lock() for comments on the details
* of swizzling perf_event::ctx.
*/
- mutex_lock_double(&gctx->mutex, &ctx->mutex);
-
perf_remove_from_context(group_leader, false);
/*
@@ -6710,7 +6758,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
perf_unpin_context(ctx);
if (move_group) {
- mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
+ perf_event_ctx_unlock(group_leader, gctx);
put_ctx(gctx);
}
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
@@ -6737,6 +6785,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
fd_install(event_fd, event_file);
return event_fd;
+err_locked:
+ if (move_group)
+ perf_event_ctx_unlock(group_leader, gctx);
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
+ fput(event_file);
err_context:
perf_unpin_context(ctx);
put_ctx(ctx);
--
cgit v1.1

58
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-6345/ANY/0.patch
View File

@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
From 8b74d439e1697110c5e5c600643e823eb1dd0762 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2017 14:03:52 -0800
Subject: net/llc: avoid BUG_ON() in skb_orphan()
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/llc/llc_conn.c | 3 +++
net/llc/llc_sap.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/llc/llc_conn.c b/net/llc/llc_conn.c
index 3e821da..8bc5a1b 100644
--- a/net/llc/llc_conn.c
+++ b/net/llc/llc_conn.c
@@ -821,7 +821,10 @@ void llc_conn_handler(struct llc_sap *sap, struct sk_buff *skb)
* another trick required to cope with how the PROCOM state
* machine works. -acme
*/
+ skb_orphan(skb);
+ sock_hold(sk);
skb->sk = sk;
+ skb->destructor = sock_efree;
}
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
llc_conn_rcv(sk, skb);
diff --git a/net/llc/llc_sap.c b/net/llc/llc_sap.c
index d0e1e80..5404d0d 100644
--- a/net/llc/llc_sap.c
+++ b/net/llc/llc_sap.c
@@ -290,7 +290,10 @@ static void llc_sap_rcv(struct llc_sap *sap, struct sk_buff *skb,
ev->type = LLC_SAP_EV_TYPE_PDU;
ev->reason = 0;
+ skb_orphan(skb);
+ sock_hold(sk);
skb->sk = sk;
+ skb->destructor = sock_efree;
llc_sap_state_process(sap, skb);
}
--
cgit v1.1

126
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-6346/ANY/0.patch
View File

@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
From d199fab63c11998a602205f7ee7ff7c05c97164b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2017 09:03:51 -0800
Subject: packet: fix races in fanout_add()
Multiple threads can call fanout_add() at the same time.
We need to grab fanout_mutex earlier to avoid races that could
lead to one thread freeing po->rollover that was set by another thread.
Do the same in fanout_release(), for peace of mind, and to help us
finding lockdep issues earlier.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Fixes: 0648ab70afe6 ("packet: rollover prepare: per-socket state")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index d56ee46..0f03f6a 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -1619,6 +1619,7 @@ static void fanout_release_data(struct packet_fanout *f)
static int fanout_add(struct sock *sk, u16 id, u16 type_flags)
{
+ struct packet_rollover *rollover = NULL;
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct packet_fanout *f, *match;
u8 type = type_flags & 0xff;
@@ -1641,23 +1642,28 @@ static int fanout_add(struct sock *sk, u16 id, u16 type_flags)
return -EINVAL;
}
+ mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex);
+
+ err = -EINVAL;
if (!po->running)
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ err = -EALREADY;
if (po->fanout)
- return -EALREADY;
+ goto out;
if (type == PACKET_FANOUT_ROLLOVER ||
(type_flags & PACKET_FANOUT_FLAG_ROLLOVER)) {
- po->rollover = kzalloc(sizeof(*po->rollover), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!po->rollover)
- return -ENOMEM;
- atomic_long_set(&po->rollover->num, 0);
- atomic_long_set(&po->rollover->num_huge, 0);
- atomic_long_set(&po->rollover->num_failed, 0);
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ rollover = kzalloc(sizeof(*rollover), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rollover)
+ goto out;
+ atomic_long_set(&rollover->num, 0);
+ atomic_long_set(&rollover->num_huge, 0);
+ atomic_long_set(&rollover->num_failed, 0);
+ po->rollover = rollover;
}
- mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex);
match = NULL;
list_for_each_entry(f, &fanout_list, list) {
if (f->id == id &&
@@ -1704,11 +1710,11 @@ static int fanout_add(struct sock *sk, u16 id, u16 type_flags)
}
}
out:
- mutex_unlock(&fanout_mutex);
- if (err) {
- kfree(po->rollover);
+ if (err && rollover) {
+ kfree(rollover);
po->rollover = NULL;
}
+ mutex_unlock(&fanout_mutex);
return err;
}
@@ -1717,23 +1723,22 @@ static void fanout_release(struct sock *sk)
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct packet_fanout *f;
- f = po->fanout;
- if (!f)
- return;
-
mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex);
- po->fanout = NULL;
+ f = po->fanout;
+ if (f) {
+ po->fanout = NULL;
+
+ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&f->sk_ref)) {
+ list_del(&f->list);
+ dev_remove_pack(&f->prot_hook);
+ fanout_release_data(f);
+ kfree(f);
+ }
- if (atomic_dec_and_test(&f->sk_ref)) {
- list_del(&f->list);
- dev_remove_pack(&f->prot_hook);
- fanout_release_data(f);
- kfree(f);
+ if (po->rollover)
+ kfree_rcu(po->rollover, rcu);
}
mutex_unlock(&fanout_mutex);
-
- if (po->rollover)
- kfree_rcu(po->rollover, rcu);
}
static bool packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(const struct net_device *dev,
--
cgit v1.1

2
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-7187/ANY/0.patch
View File

@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert &lt;dgilbert@interlog.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
</div><div class='diffstat-header'><a href='/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/diff/?id=bf33f87dd04c371ea33feb821b60d63d754e3124'>Diffstat</a></div><table summary='diffstat' class='diffstat'><tr><td class='mode'>-rw-r--r--</td><td class='upd'><a href='/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/diff/drivers/scsi/sg.c?id=bf33f87dd04c371ea33feb821b60d63d754e3124'>drivers/scsi/sg.c</a></td><td class='right'>2</td><td class='graph'><table summary='file diffstat' width='2%'><tr><td class='add' style='width: 100.0%;'/><td class='rem' style='width: 0.0%;'/><td class='none' style='width: 0.0%;'/></tr></table></td></tr>
</table><div class='diffstat-summary'>1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions</div><table summary='diff' class='diff'><tr><td><div class='head'>diff --git a/drivers/scsi/sg.c b/drivers/scsi/sg.c<br/>index e831e01..849ff810 100644<br/>--- a/<a href='/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/drivers/scsi/sg.c?id=645b8ef5943f95b74240568105ce2be21c6640b4'>drivers/scsi/sg.c</a><br/>+++ b/<a href='/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/drivers/scsi/sg.c?id=bf33f87dd04c371ea33feb821b60d63d754e3124'>drivers/scsi/sg.c</a></div><div class='hunk'>@@ -996,6 +996,8 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd_in, unsigned long arg)</div><div class='ctx'> result = get_user(val, ip);</div><div class='ctx'> if (result)</div><div class='ctx'> return result;</div><div class='add'>+ if (val &gt; SG_MAX_CDB_SIZE)</div><div class='add'>+ return -ENOMEM;</div><div class='ctx'> sfp-&gt;next_cmd_len = (val &gt; 0) ? val : 0;</div><div class='ctx'> return 0;</div><div class='ctx'> case SG_GET_VERSION_NUM:</div></td></tr></table></div> <!-- class=content -->
<div class='footer'>generated by <a href='https://git.zx2c4.com/cgit/about/'>cgit v1.1</a> at 2017-10-29 19:56:55 +0000</div>
<div class='footer'>generated by <a href='https://git.zx2c4.com/cgit/about/'>cgit v1.1</a> at 2017-10-31 17:14:35 +0000</div>
</div> <!-- id=cgit -->
</body>
</html>

33
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-9075/ANY/0.patch
View File

@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
From fdcee2cbb8438702ea1b328fb6e0ac5e9a40c7f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 07:16:40 -0700
Subject: sctp: do not inherit ipv6_{mc|ac|fl}_list from parent
SCTP needs fixes similar to 83eaddab4378 ("ipv6/dccp: do not inherit
ipv6_mc_list from parent"), otherwise bad things can happen.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/sctp/ipv6.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/sctp/ipv6.c b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
index 142b70e..f5b45b8 100644
--- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
@@ -677,6 +677,9 @@ static struct sock *sctp_v6_create_accept_sk(struct sock *sk,
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
+ newnp->ipv6_mc_list = NULL;
+ newnp->ipv6_ac_list = NULL;
+ newnp->ipv6_fl_list = NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt);
--
cgit v1.1

64
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-9076/ANY/0.patch
View File

@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
From 83eaddab4378db256d00d295bda6ca997cd13a52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 16:59:54 -0700
Subject: ipv6/dccp: do not inherit ipv6_mc_list from parent
Like commit 657831ffc38e ("dccp/tcp: do not inherit mc_list from parent")
we should clear ipv6_mc_list etc. for IPv6 sockets too.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/dccp/ipv6.c | 6 ++++++
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 2 ++
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv6.c b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
index d9b6a4e..b6bbb71 100644
--- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
@@ -426,6 +426,9 @@ static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,
newsk->sk_backlog_rcv = dccp_v4_do_rcv;
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
newnp->opt = NULL;
+ newnp->ipv6_mc_list = NULL;
+ newnp->ipv6_ac_list = NULL;
+ newnp->ipv6_fl_list = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = inet6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
@@ -490,6 +493,9 @@ static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,
/* Clone RX bits */
newnp->rxopt.all = np->rxopt.all;
+ newnp->ipv6_mc_list = NULL;
+ newnp->ipv6_ac_list = NULL;
+ newnp->ipv6_fl_list = NULL;
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = inet6_iif(skb);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index aeb9497..df5a9ff 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -1062,6 +1062,7 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *
newtp->af_specific = &tcp_sock_ipv6_mapped_specific;
#endif
+ newnp->ipv6_mc_list = NULL;
newnp->ipv6_ac_list = NULL;
newnp->ipv6_fl_list = NULL;
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
@@ -1131,6 +1132,7 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *
First: no IPv4 options.
*/
newinet->inet_opt = NULL;
+ newnp->ipv6_mc_list = NULL;
newnp->ipv6_ac_list = NULL;
newnp->ipv6_fl_list = NULL;
--
cgit v1.1

14
Patches/Linux_CVEs/Fix.sh Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
#!/bin/bash
mv CVE-2016-0819/ANY/0.patch CVE-2016-0819/ANY/0.patch.disabled
mv CVE-2016-2185/ANY/1.patch CVE-2016-2185/ANY/1.patch.dupe
mv CVE-2016-2186/ANY/1.patch CVE-2016-2186/ANY/1.patch.dupe
mv CVE-2016-2187/ANY/1.patch CVE-2016-2187/ANY/1.patch.dupe
mv CVE-2016-3136/ANY/1.patch CVE-2016-3136/ANY/1.patch.dupe
mv CVE-2016-3138/ANY/1.patch CVE-2016-3138/ANY/1.patch.dupe
mv CVE-2016-3140/ANY/1.patch CVE-2016-3140/ANY/1.patch.dupe
mv CVE-2016-3689/ANY/1.patch CVE-2016-3689/ANY/1.patch.dupe
mv CVE-2017-0452/ANY/0.patch CVE-2017-0452/ANY/0.patch.dupe
mv CVE-2017-0794/3.10/0.patch CVE-2017-0794/3.10/0.patch.disabled
mv CVE-2017-5669/ANY/1.patch CVE-2017-5669/ANY/1.patch.dupe
mv CVE-2017-6074/ANY/1.patch CVE-2017-6074/ANY/1.patch.dupe
mv CVE-2017-7371/ANY/1.patch CVE-2017-7371/ANY/1.patch.dupe

1
Scripts/LineageOS-14.1/00init.sh
View File

@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
#!/bin/bash
#Copyright (c) 2017 Spot Communications, Inc.
#Sets settings used by all other scripts

2
Scripts/LineageOS-14.1/Optimize.sh
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#!/bin/bash
#Copyright (c) 2015-2017 Spot Communications, Inc.
#Copyright (c) 2017 Spot Communications, Inc.
#Attempts to increase performance and battery life

4
Scripts/LineageOS-14.1/Patch.sh
View File

@ -81,8 +81,8 @@ enableZram() {
enabledForcedEncryption() {
cd $base$1;
sed -i 's|encryptable=/|forceencrypt,encryptable=/|' fstab.* rootdir/fstab.* rootdir/etc/fstab.* || true;
echo "Enabled forceencrypt";
sed -i 's|encryptable=/|forceencrypt=/|' fstab.* rootdir/fstab.* rootdir/etc/fstab.* || true;
echo "Enabled forceencrypt for $1";
cd $base;
}
export -f enabledForcedEncryption;

2
Scripts/LineageOS-14.1/Patch_CVE.sh
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#!/bin/bash
#Copyright (c) 2015-2017 Spot Communications, Inc.
#Copyright (c) 2017 Spot Communications, Inc.
#Attempts to patch kernels to be more secure

2
Scripts/LineageOS-14.1/Rebrand.sh
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#!/bin/bash
#Copyright (c) 2015-2017 Spot Communications, Inc.
#Copyright (c) 2017 Spot Communications, Inc.
#Updates select user facing strings

2
Scripts/LineageOS-14.1/Theme.sh
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#!/bin/bash
#Copyright (c) 2015-2017 Spot Communications, Inc.
#Copyright (c) 2017 Spot Communications, Inc.
#Replaces teal accents with orange/yellow ones