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Many new CVE patches

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Tad 2017-11-25 19:39:02 -05:00
parent c75ac86118
commit 67e224cb1a
69 changed files with 3603 additions and 127 deletions
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0
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2013-7446/ANY/0001.patch → Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2013-7446/^4.3/0001.patch
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334
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2013-7446/^4.3/0002.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
From 8a292b04183e82d59721ab0893e4216010aa3db9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 22:07:23 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] BACKPORT: unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Bug: 29119002
(cherry picked from commit 7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c)
Signed-off-by: Aarthi Thiruvengadam <athiru@google.com>
Change-Id: Ia374ee061195088f8c777940baa75cedbe897f4e
---
include/net/af_unix.h | 1 +
net/unix/af_unix.c | 183 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
2 files changed, 165 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
index dbdfd2b0f3b3d..9120783132e71 100644
--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct unix_sock {
#define UNIX_GC_CANDIDATE 0
#define UNIX_GC_MAYBE_CYCLE 1
struct socket_wq peer_wq;
+ wait_queue_t peer_wake;
};
#define unix_sk(__sk) ((struct unix_sock *)__sk)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 924108f17b9a6..5e6323792a5e0 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -314,6 +314,118 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_socket_byinode(struct inode *i)
return s;
}
+/* Support code for asymmetrically connected dgram sockets
+ *
+ * If a datagram socket is connected to a socket not itself connected
+ * to the first socket (eg, /dev/log), clients may only enqueue more
+ * messages if the present receive queue of the server socket is not
+ * "too large". This means there's a second writeability condition
+ * poll and sendmsg need to test. The dgram recv code will do a wake
+ * up on the peer_wait wait queue of a socket upon reception of a
+ * datagram which needs to be propagated to sleeping would-be writers
+ * since these might not have sent anything so far. This can't be
+ * accomplished via poll_wait because the lifetime of the server
+ * socket might be less than that of its clients if these break their
+ * association with it or if the server socket is closed while clients
+ * are still connected to it and there's no way to inform "a polling
+ * implementation" that it should let go of a certain wait queue
+ *
+ * In order to propagate a wake up, a wait_queue_t of the client
+ * socket is enqueued on the peer_wait queue of the server socket
+ * whose wake function does a wake_up on the ordinary client socket
+ * wait queue. This connection is established whenever a write (or
+ * poll for write) hit the flow control condition and broken when the
+ * association to the server socket is dissolved or after a wake up
+ * was relayed.
+ */
+
+static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_relay(wait_queue_t *q, unsigned mode, int flags,
+ void *key)
+{
+ struct unix_sock *u;
+ wait_queue_head_t *u_sleep;
+
+ u = container_of(q, struct unix_sock, peer_wake);
+
+ __remove_wait_queue(&unix_sk(u->peer_wake.private)->peer_wait,
+ q);
+ u->peer_wake.private = NULL;
+
+ /* relaying can only happen while the wq still exists */
+ u_sleep = sk_sleep(&u->sk);
+ if (u_sleep)
+ wake_up_interruptible_poll(u_sleep, key);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other)
+{
+ struct unix_sock *u, *u_other;
+ int rc;
+
+ u = unix_sk(sk);
+ u_other = unix_sk(other);
+ rc = 0;
+ spin_lock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock);
+
+ if (!u->peer_wake.private) {
+ u->peer_wake.private = other;
+ __add_wait_queue(&u_other->peer_wait, &u->peer_wake);
+
+ rc = 1;
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sock *other)
+{
+ struct unix_sock *u, *u_other;
+
+ u = unix_sk(sk);
+ u_other = unix_sk(other);
+ spin_lock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock);
+
+ if (u->peer_wake.private == other) {
+ __remove_wait_queue(&u_other->peer_wait, &u->peer_wake);
+ u->peer_wake.private = NULL;
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock);
+}
+
+static void unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sock *other)
+{
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, other);
+ wake_up_interruptible_poll(sk_sleep(sk),
+ POLLOUT |
+ POLLWRNORM |
+ POLLWRBAND);
+}
+
+/* preconditions:
+ * - unix_peer(sk) == other
+ * - association is stable
+ */
+static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other)
+{
+ int connected;
+
+ connected = unix_dgram_peer_wake_connect(sk, other);
+
+ if (unix_recvq_full(other))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (connected)
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, other);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int unix_writable(struct sock *sk)
{
return (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) << 2) <= sk->sk_sndbuf;
@@ -418,6 +530,8 @@ static void unix_release_sock(struct sock *sk, int embrion)
skpair->sk_state_change(skpair);
sk_wake_async(skpair, SOCK_WAKE_WAITD, POLL_HUP);
}
+
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, skpair);
sock_put(skpair); /* It may now die */
unix_peer(sk) = NULL;
}
@@ -651,6 +765,7 @@ static struct sock *unix_create1(struct net *net, struct socket *sock)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&u->link);
mutex_init(&u->readlock); /* single task reading lock */
init_waitqueue_head(&u->peer_wait);
+ init_waitqueue_func_entry(&u->peer_wake, unix_dgram_peer_wake_relay);
unix_insert_socket(unix_sockets_unbound(sk), sk);
out:
if (sk == NULL)
@@ -1020,6 +1135,8 @@ static int unix_dgram_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
if (unix_peer(sk)) {
struct sock *old_peer = unix_peer(sk);
unix_peer(sk) = other;
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(sk, old_peer);
+
unix_state_double_unlock(sk, other);
if (other != old_peer)
@@ -1459,6 +1576,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
struct scm_cookie tmp_scm;
int max_level;
int data_len = 0;
+ int sk_locked;
if (NULL == siocb->scm)
siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
@@ -1535,12 +1653,14 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
goto out_free;
}
+ sk_locked = 0;
unix_state_lock(other);
+restart_locked:
err = -EPERM;
if (!unix_may_send(sk, other))
goto out_unlock;
- if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD)) {
+ if (unlikely(sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD))) {
/*
* Check with 1003.1g - what should
* datagram error
@@ -1548,10 +1668,14 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
unix_state_unlock(other);
sock_put(other);
+ if (!sk_locked)
+ unix_state_lock(sk);
+
err = 0;
- unix_state_lock(sk);
if (unix_peer(sk) == other) {
unix_peer(sk) = NULL;
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(sk, other);
+
unix_state_unlock(sk);
unix_dgram_disconnected(sk, other);
@@ -1577,21 +1701,38 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
goto out_unlock;
}
- if (unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other)) {
- if (!timeo) {
- err = -EAGAIN;
- goto out_unlock;
+ if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
+ if (timeo) {
+ timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
+
+ err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
+ if (signal_pending(current))
+ goto out_free;
+
+ goto restart;
}
- timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
+ if (!sk_locked) {
+ unix_state_unlock(other);
+ unix_state_double_lock(sk, other);
+ }
- err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
- if (signal_pending(current))
- goto out_free;
+ if (unix_peer(sk) != other ||
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(sk, other)) {
+ err = -EAGAIN;
+ sk_locked = 1;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
- goto restart;
+ if (!sk_locked) {
+ sk_locked = 1;
+ goto restart_locked;
+ }
}
+ if (unlikely(sk_locked))
+ unix_state_unlock(sk);
+
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP))
__net_timestamp(skb);
maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other);
@@ -1605,6 +1746,8 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
return len;
out_unlock:
+ if (sk_locked)
+ unix_state_unlock(sk);
unix_state_unlock(other);
out_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
@@ -2243,14 +2386,16 @@ static unsigned int unix_dgram_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
return mask;
writable = unix_writable(sk);
- other = unix_peer_get(sk);
- if (other) {
- if (unix_peer(other) != sk) {
- sock_poll_wait(file, &unix_sk(other)->peer_wait, wait);
- if (unix_recvq_full(other))
- writable = 0;
- }
- sock_put(other);
+ if (writable) {
+ unix_state_lock(sk);
+
+ other = unix_peer(sk);
+ if (other && unix_peer(other) != sk &&
+ unix_recvq_full(other) &&
+ unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(sk, other))
+ writable = 0;
+
+ unix_state_unlock(sk);
}
if (writable)

56
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2013-7446/^4.3/0003.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
From 5bed19c9f463f9078063363779548c50aea271a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2016 19:37:27 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] UPSTREAM: af_unix: Guard against other == sk in
unix_dgram_sendmsg
(cherry picked from commit a5527dda344fff0514b7989ef7a755729769daa1)
The unix_dgram_sendmsg routine use the following test
if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
to determine if sk and other are in an n:1 association (either
established via connect or by using sendto to send messages to an
unrelated socket identified by address). This isn't correct as the
specified address could have been bound to the sending socket itself or
because this socket could have been connected to itself by the time of
the unix_peer_get but disconnected before the unix_state_lock(other). In
both cases, the if-block would be entered despite other == sk which
might either block the sender unintentionally or lead to trying to unlock
the same spin lock twice for a non-blocking send. Add a other != sk
check to guard against this.
Fixes: 7d267278a9ec ("unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue")
Reported-By: Philipp Hahn <pmhahn@pmhahn.de>
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Tested-by: Philipp Hahn <pmhahn@pmhahn.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fixes: Change-Id: Ia374ee061195088f8c777940baa75cedbe897f4e
("UPSTREAM: unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue")
Change-Id: I4ebef6a390df3487903b166b837e34c653e01cb2
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Bug: 29119002
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 5e6323792a5e0..204bee47aa10c 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1701,7 +1701,12 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
goto out_unlock;
}
- if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
+ /* other == sk && unix_peer(other) != sk if
+ * - unix_peer(sk) == NULL, destination address bound to sk
+ * - unix_peer(sk) == sk by time of get but disconnected before lock
+ */
+ if (other != sk &&
+ unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
if (timeo) {
timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);

72
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9922/3.10/0002.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
From 48a6c91c1d967cc8375621509676a9eabfac5777 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 00:14:39 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] BACKPORT: fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
(cherry picked from commit 69c433ed2ecd2d3264efd7afec4439524b319121)
Bug: 32761463
Change-Id: I69b2fba2112db2ece09a1bf61a44f8fc4db00820
---
fs/ecryptfs/main.c | 7 +++++++
include/linux/fs.h | 10 ++++++++++
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
index 329a9cc2b2ebe..8a041bb0753fa 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
@@ -577,6 +577,13 @@ static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags
s->s_maxbytes = path.dentry->d_sb->s_maxbytes;
s->s_blocksize = path.dentry->d_sb->s_blocksize;
s->s_magic = ECRYPTFS_SUPER_MAGIC;
+ s->s_stack_depth = path.dentry->d_sb->s_stack_depth + 1;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (s->s_stack_depth > FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH) {
+ pr_err("eCryptfs: maximum fs stacking depth exceeded\n");
+ goto out_free;
+ }
inode = ecryptfs_get_inode(path.dentry->d_inode, s);
rc = PTR_ERR(inode);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 1bbd26958874f..0d1e1680f3657 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -244,6 +244,12 @@ struct iattr {
*/
#include <linux/quota.h>
+/*
+ * Maximum number of layers of fs stack. Needs to be limited to
+ * prevent kernel stack overflow
+ */
+#define FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH 2
+
/**
* enum positive_aop_returns - aop return codes with specific semantics
*
@@ -1331,6 +1337,10 @@ struct super_block {
/* AIO completions deferred from interrupt context */
struct workqueue_struct *s_dio_done_wq;
+ /*
+ * Indicates how deep in a filesystem stack this SB is
+ */
+ int s_stack_depth;
};
/* superblock cache pruning functions */

32
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-9922/3.10/0003.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From 57bc19ec472ab303209b2d96a59a619c5221594d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Chant <achant@google.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2017 15:33:48 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] sdcardfs: limit stacking depth
Limit filesystem stacking to prevent stack overflow.
Bug: 32761463
Change-Id: I8b1462b9c0d6c7f00cf110724ffb17e7f307c51e
Signed-off-by: Andrew Chant <achant@google.com>
---
fs/sdcardfs/main.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/sdcardfs/main.c b/fs/sdcardfs/main.c
index a6522286d7314..8b51a124298f4 100755
--- a/fs/sdcardfs/main.c
+++ b/fs/sdcardfs/main.c
@@ -223,6 +223,13 @@ static int sdcardfs_read_super(struct super_block *sb, const char *dev_name,
atomic_inc(&lower_sb->s_active);
sdcardfs_set_lower_super(sb, lower_sb);
+ sb->s_stack_depth = lower_sb->s_stack_depth + 1;
+ if (sb->s_stack_depth > FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH) {
+ pr_err("sdcardfs: maximum fs stacking depth exceeded\n");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_sput;
+ }
+
/* inherit maxbytes from lower file system */
sb->s_maxbytes = lower_sb->s_maxbytes;

425
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2016-7097/3.10/0002.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
From 6b0c893dc08060d6999b07136391d8a298678dae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 17:39:09 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] BACKPORT: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file
permissions
(cherry pick from commit 073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef)
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
NB: conflicts resolution included extending the change to all visible
users of the near deprecated function posix_acl_equiv_mode
replaced with posix_acl_update_mode. We did not resolve the ACL
leak in this CL, require additional upstream fixes.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Bug: 32458736
Change-Id: I19591ad452cc825ac282b3cfd2daaa72aa9a1ac1
---
fs/9p/acl.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++-----------------------
fs/btrfs/acl.c | 6 ++----
fs/ext2/acl.c | 12 ++++--------
fs/ext3/acl.c | 12 ++++--------
fs/ext4/acl.c | 12 ++++--------
fs/f2fs/acl.c | 6 ++----
fs/generic_acl.c | 8 ++------
fs/gfs2/acl.c | 11 +++--------
fs/jffs2/acl.c | 9 ++++-----
fs/jfs/xattr.c | 6 +++---
fs/ocfs2/acl.c | 18 ++++++------------
fs/posix_acl.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/reiserfs/xattr_acl.c | 8 ++------
fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c | 13 +++----------
include/linux/posix_acl.h | 1 +
15 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 105 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/9p/acl.c b/fs/9p/acl.c
index 7af425f53beef..9686c1f17653f 100644
--- a/fs/9p/acl.c
+++ b/fs/9p/acl.c
@@ -320,32 +320,26 @@ static int v9fs_xattr_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = POSIX_ACL_XATTR_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
- umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
- retval = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &mode);
- if (retval < 0)
+ struct iattr iattr;
+
+ retval = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &iattr.ia_mode, &acl);
+ if (retval)
goto err_out;
- else {
- struct iattr iattr;
- if (retval == 0) {
- /*
- * ACL can be represented
- * by the mode bits. So don't
- * update ACL.
- */
- acl = NULL;
- value = NULL;
- size = 0;
- }
- /* Updte the mode bits */
- iattr.ia_mode = ((mode & S_IALLUGO) |
- (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO));
- iattr.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
- /* FIXME should we update ctime ?
- * What is the following setxattr update the
- * mode ?
+ if (!acl) {
+ /*
+ * ACL can be represented
+ * by the mode bits. So don't
+ * update ACL.
*/
- v9fs_vfs_setattr_dotl(dentry, &iattr);
+ value = NULL;
+ size = 0;
}
+ iattr.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
+ /* FIXME should we update ctime ?
+ * What is the following setxattr update the
+ * mode ?
+ */
+ v9fs_vfs_setattr_dotl(dentry, &iattr);
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/acl.c b/fs/btrfs/acl.c
index 0890c83643e94..d6d53e5e7945d 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/acl.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/acl.c
@@ -118,11 +118,9 @@ static int btrfs_set_acl(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = POSIX_ACL_XATTR_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
- ret = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
- if (ret < 0)
+ ret = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &inode->i_mode, &acl);
+ if (ret)
return ret;
- if (ret == 0)
- acl = NULL;
}
ret = 0;
break;
diff --git a/fs/ext2/acl.c b/fs/ext2/acl.c
index 110b6b371a4ed..48c3c2d7d2619 100644
--- a/fs/ext2/acl.c
+++ b/fs/ext2/acl.c
@@ -206,15 +206,11 @@ ext2_set_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, struct posix_acl *acl)
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name_index = EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
- error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
- if (error < 0)
+ error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &inode->i_mode, &acl);
+ if (error)
return error;
- else {
- inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME_SEC;
- mark_inode_dirty(inode);
- if (error == 0)
- acl = NULL;
- }
+ inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME_SEC;
+ mark_inode_dirty(inode);
}
break;
diff --git a/fs/ext3/acl.c b/fs/ext3/acl.c
index dbb5ad59a7fc3..bb2f60a62d82a 100644
--- a/fs/ext3/acl.c
+++ b/fs/ext3/acl.c
@@ -205,15 +205,11 @@ ext3_set_acl(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, int type,
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name_index = EXT3_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
- error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
- if (error < 0)
+ error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &inode->i_mode, &acl);
+ if (error)
return error;
- else {
- inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME_SEC;
- ext3_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
- if (error == 0)
- acl = NULL;
- }
+ inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME_SEC;
+ ext3_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
}
break;
diff --git a/fs/ext4/acl.c b/fs/ext4/acl.c
index d40c8dbbb0d66..87d9bbf6a53f3 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/acl.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/acl.c
@@ -201,15 +201,11 @@ __ext4_set_acl(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, int type,
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name_index = EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
- error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
- if (error < 0)
+ error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &inode->i_mode, &acl);
+ if (error)
return error;
- else {
- inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
- ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
- if (error == 0)
- acl = NULL;
- }
+ inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
+ ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
}
break;
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/acl.c b/fs/f2fs/acl.c
index 44abc2f286e00..9c4f3c732bce4 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/acl.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/acl.c
@@ -223,12 +223,10 @@ static int f2fs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, struct posix_acl *acl)
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name_index = F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
- error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
- if (error < 0)
+ error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &inode->i_mode, &acl);
+ if (error)
return error;
set_acl_inode(fi, inode->i_mode);
- if (error == 0)
- acl = NULL;
}
break;
diff --git a/fs/generic_acl.c b/fs/generic_acl.c
index b3f3676796d31..21408084c3b34 100644
--- a/fs/generic_acl.c
+++ b/fs/generic_acl.c
@@ -87,14 +87,10 @@ generic_acl_set(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
goto failed;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
- error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
- if (error < 0)
+ error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &inode->i_mode, &acl);
+ if (error)
goto failed;
inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
- if (error == 0) {
- posix_acl_release(acl);
- acl = NULL;
- }
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
diff --git a/fs/gfs2/acl.c b/fs/gfs2/acl.c
index f69ac0af5496c..e7b330ef4dfda 100644
--- a/fs/gfs2/acl.c
+++ b/fs/gfs2/acl.c
@@ -268,15 +268,10 @@ static int gfs2_xattr_system_set(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) {
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
- error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &mode);
+ error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &inode->i_mode, &acl);
- if (error <= 0) {
- posix_acl_release(acl);
- acl = NULL;
-
- if (error < 0)
- return error;
- }
+ if (error)
+ goto out_release;
error = gfs2_set_mode(inode, mode);
if (error)
diff --git a/fs/jffs2/acl.c b/fs/jffs2/acl.c
index 223283c301116..9335b8d3cf521 100644
--- a/fs/jffs2/acl.c
+++ b/fs/jffs2/acl.c
@@ -243,9 +243,10 @@ static int jffs2_set_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, struct posix_acl *acl)
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
- umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
- rc = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &mode);
- if (rc < 0)
+ umode_t mode;
+
+ rc = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &mode, &acl);
+ if (rc)
return rc;
if (inode->i_mode != mode) {
struct iattr attr;
@@ -257,8 +258,6 @@ static int jffs2_set_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, struct posix_acl *acl)
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
}
- if (rc == 0)
- acl = NULL;
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
diff --git a/fs/jfs/xattr.c b/fs/jfs/xattr.c
index 42d67f9757bf6..c79b1d7a53e24 100644
--- a/fs/jfs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/jfs/xattr.c
@@ -693,11 +693,11 @@ static int can_set_system_xattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
return rc;
}
if (acl) {
- rc = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
+ rc = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &inode->i_mode, &acl);
posix_acl_release(acl);
- if (rc < 0) {
+ if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR
- "posix_acl_equiv_mode returned %d\n",
+ "posix_acl_update_mode returned %d\n",
rc);
return rc;
}
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/acl.c b/fs/ocfs2/acl.c
index 8a404576fb265..2fe643160cf73 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/acl.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/acl.c
@@ -275,19 +275,13 @@ static int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle,
name_index = OCFS2_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
- ret = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &mode);
- if (ret < 0)
+ ret = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &mode, &acl);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh,
+ handle, mode);
+ if (ret)
return ret;
- else {
- if (ret == 0)
- acl = NULL;
-
- ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh,
- handle, mode);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- }
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c
index 3542f1f814e2a..35cc1f40b82df 100644
--- a/fs/posix_acl.c
+++ b/fs/posix_acl.c
@@ -341,6 +341,37 @@ static int posix_acl_create_masq(struct posix_acl *acl, umode_t *mode_p)
return not_equiv;
}
+/**
+ * posix_acl_update_mode - update mode in set_acl
+ *
+ * Update the file mode when setting an ACL: compute the new file permission
+ * bits based on the ACL. In addition, if the ACL is equivalent to the new
+ * file mode, set *acl to NULL to indicate that no ACL should be set.
+ *
+ * As with chmod, clear the setgit bit if the caller is not in the owning group
+ * or capable of CAP_FSETID (see inode_change_ok).
+ *
+ * Called from set_acl inode operations.
+ */
+int posix_acl_update_mode(struct inode *inode, umode_t *mode_p,
+ struct posix_acl **acl)
+{
+ umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
+ int error;
+
+ error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(*acl, &mode);
+ if (error < 0)
+ return error;
+ if (error == 0)
+ *acl = NULL;
+ if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
+ !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
+ mode &= ~S_ISGID;
+ *mode_p = mode;
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_update_mode);
+
/*
* Modify the ACL for the chmod syscall.
*/
diff --git a/fs/reiserfs/xattr_acl.c b/fs/reiserfs/xattr_acl.c
index 6c8767fdfc6a2..2d73589f37d64 100644
--- a/fs/reiserfs/xattr_acl.c
+++ b/fs/reiserfs/xattr_acl.c
@@ -286,13 +286,9 @@ reiserfs_set_acl(struct reiserfs_transaction_handle *th, struct inode *inode,
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = POSIX_ACL_XATTR_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
- error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
- if (error < 0)
+ error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &inode->i_mode, &acl);
+ if (error)
return error;
- else {
- if (error == 0)
- acl = NULL;
- }
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c
index 306d883d89bc7..4f8e4770229cf 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c
@@ -389,16 +389,9 @@ xfs_xattr_acl_set(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) {
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
- error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &mode);
-
- if (error <= 0) {
- posix_acl_release(acl);
- acl = NULL;
-
- if (error < 0)
- return error;
- }
-
+ error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &mode, &acl);
+ if (error)
+ goto out_release;
error = xfs_set_mode(inode, mode);
if (error)
goto out_release;
diff --git a/include/linux/posix_acl.h b/include/linux/posix_acl.h
index 7931efe711755..2ae0bba45f124 100644
--- a/include/linux/posix_acl.h
+++ b/include/linux/posix_acl.h
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ extern struct posix_acl *posix_acl_from_mode(umode_t, gfp_t);
extern int posix_acl_equiv_mode(const struct posix_acl *, umode_t *);
extern int posix_acl_create(struct posix_acl **, gfp_t, umode_t *);
extern int posix_acl_chmod(struct posix_acl **, gfp_t, umode_t);
+extern int posix_acl_update_mode(struct inode *, umode_t *, struct posix_acl **);
extern struct posix_acl *get_posix_acl(struct inode *, int);
extern int set_posix_acl(struct inode *, int, struct posix_acl *);

45
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2016-7097/3.10/0003.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
From aedf77d56472d1fddf050c61c1017d4f51149fb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2016 10:33:34 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] FROMLIST: 9p: fix a potential acl leak
(https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/12/13/579)
posix_acl_update_mode() could possibly clear 'acl', if so
we leak the memory pointed by 'acl'. Save this pointer
before calling posix_acl_update_mode() and release the memory
if 'acl' really gets cleared.
Reported-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Cc: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
Cc: Ron Minnich <rminnich@sandia.gov>
Cc: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Bug: 32458736
Change-Id: Ia78da401e6fd1bfd569653bd2cd0ebd3f9c737a0
---
fs/9p/acl.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/9p/acl.c b/fs/9p/acl.c
index 9686c1f17653f..c19a66472d2eb 100644
--- a/fs/9p/acl.c
+++ b/fs/9p/acl.c
@@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ static int v9fs_xattr_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
name = POSIX_ACL_XATTR_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
struct iattr iattr;
+ struct posix_acl *old_acl = acl;
retval = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &iattr.ia_mode, &acl);
if (retval)
@@ -331,6 +332,7 @@ static int v9fs_xattr_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
* by the mode bits. So don't
* update ACL.
*/
+ posix_acl_release(old_acl);
value = NULL;
size = 0;
}

0
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2016-7097/ANY/0001.patch → Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2016-7097/^4.8/0001.patch
View File

0
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2016-7117/ANY/0001.patch → Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2016-7117/^4.5/0001.patch
View File

49
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2016-7117/^4.5/0002.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
From 0b5240c45e2029986526b1405ab24906c708f770 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Maxime Jayat <maxime.jayat@mobile-devices.fr>
Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2017 18:35:51 +0100
Subject: net: socket: fix recvmmsg not returning error from sock_error
commit e623a9e9dec29ae811d11f83d0074ba254aba374 upstream.
Commit 34b88a68f26a ("net: Fix use after free in the recvmmsg exit path"),
changed the exit path of recvmmsg to always return the datagrams
variable and modified the error paths to set the variable to the error
code returned by recvmsg if necessary.
However in the case sock_error returned an error, the error code was
then ignored, and recvmmsg returned 0.
Change the error path of recvmmsg to correctly return the error code
of sock_error.
The bug was triggered by using recvmmsg on a CAN interface which was
not up. Linux 4.6 and later return 0 in this case while earlier
releases returned -ENETDOWN.
Fixes: 34b88a68f26a ("net: Fix use after free in the recvmmsg exit path")
Signed-off-by: Maxime Jayat <maxime.jayat@mobile-devices.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
net/socket.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
index e91e8ed..773ba3a 100644
--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -2326,8 +2326,10 @@ int __sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct mmsghdr __user *mmsg, unsigned int vlen,
return err;
err = sock_error(sock->sk);
- if (err)
+ if (err) {
+ datagrams = err;
goto out_put;
+ }
entry = mmsg;
compat_entry = (struct compat_mmsghdr __user *)mmsg;
--
cgit v1.1

80
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-0630/3.10/0001.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
From 28fb06421ab3d9256d32611138306470996cc4c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Steven Rostedt (Red Hat)" <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2016 17:30:58 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] UPSTREAM: tracing: Fix trace_printk() to print when not using
bprintk()
The trace_printk() code will allocate extra buffers if the compile detects
that a trace_printk() is used. To do this, the format of the trace_printk()
is saved to the __trace_printk_fmt section, and if that section is bigger
than zero, the buffers are allocated (along with a message that this has
happened).
If trace_printk() uses a format that is not a constant, and thus something
not guaranteed to be around when the print happens, the compiler optimizes
the fmt out, as it is not used, and the __trace_printk_fmt section is not
filled. This means the kernel will not allocate the special buffers needed
for the trace_printk() and the trace_printk() will not write anything to the
tracing buffer.
Adding a "__used" to the variable in the __trace_printk_fmt section will
keep it around, even though it is set to NULL. This will keep the string
from being printed in the debugfs/tracing/printk_formats section as it is
not needed.
Reported-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Fixes: 07d777fe8c398 "tracing: Add percpu buffers for trace_printk()"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.5+
Bug: 34277115
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Change-Id: I10ce56caa41c7644d9d290d9ed272a6d156c938c
---
include/linux/kernel.h | 6 +++---
kernel/trace/trace_printk.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
index 44d0a02224897..0d1fa1b442209 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ do { \
#define do_trace_printk(fmt, args...) \
do { \
- static const char *trace_printk_fmt \
+ static const char *trace_printk_fmt __used \
__attribute__((section("__trace_printk_fmt"))) = \
__builtin_constant_p(fmt) ? fmt : NULL; \
\
@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ extern int __trace_puts(unsigned long ip, const char *str, int size);
*/
#define trace_puts(str) ({ \
- static const char *trace_printk_fmt \
+ static const char *trace_printk_fmt __used \
__attribute__((section("__trace_printk_fmt"))) = \
__builtin_constant_p(str) ? str : NULL; \
\
@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ extern void trace_dump_stack(int skip);
#define ftrace_vprintk(fmt, vargs) \
do { \
if (__builtin_constant_p(fmt)) { \
- static const char *trace_printk_fmt \
+ static const char *trace_printk_fmt __used \
__attribute__((section("__trace_printk_fmt"))) = \
__builtin_constant_p(fmt) ? fmt : NULL; \
\
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_printk.c b/kernel/trace/trace_printk.c
index a9077c1b4ad3f..fdb23e84b011b 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_printk.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_printk.c
@@ -272,6 +272,9 @@ static int t_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
const char *str = *fmt;
int i;
+ if (!*fmt)
+ return 0;
+
seq_printf(m, "0x%lx : \"", *(unsigned long *)fmt);
/*

27
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-0630/3.10/0002.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
From 45e5a5e1b85f23843b90f3cddcfc26fa862ff80c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2017 15:40:12 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses
This likely breaks tracing tools like trace-cmd. It logs in the same
format but now addresses are all 0x0.
Bug: 34277115
Change-Id: Ifb0d4d2a184bf0d95726de05b1acee0287a375d9
---
kernel/trace/trace_printk.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_printk.c b/kernel/trace/trace_printk.c
index fdb23e84b011b..f423e8d551c0a 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_printk.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_printk.c
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static int t_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
if (!*fmt)
return 0;
- seq_printf(m, "0x%lx : \"", *(unsigned long *)fmt);
+ seq_printf(m, "0x%lx : \"", 0L);
/*
* Tabs and new lines need to be converted.

32
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-0861/3.10/0001.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From 93533f313a1bf465ff8c33032e91b88315dcf9bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robb Glasser <rglasser@google.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2017 11:33:31 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] ALSA: pcm: prevent UAF in snd_pcm_info
When the device descriptor is closed, the `substream->runtime` pointer
is freed. But another thread may be in the ioctl handler, case
SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_PCM_INFO. This case calls snd_pcm_info_user() which
calls snd_pcm_info() which accesses the now freed `substream->runtime`.
Bug: 36006981
Signed-off-by: Robb Glasser <rglasser@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Change-Id: I445d24bc21dc0af6d9522a8daabe64969042236a
---
sound/core/pcm.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sound/core/pcm.c b/sound/core/pcm.c
index 0ad1231c15372..6548b3af383fa 100644
--- a/sound/core/pcm.c
+++ b/sound/core/pcm.c
@@ -150,7 +150,9 @@ static int snd_pcm_control_ioctl(struct snd_card *card,
err = -ENXIO;
goto _error;
}
+ mutex_lock(&pcm->open_mutex);
err = snd_pcm_info_user(substream, info);
+ mutex_unlock(&pcm->open_mutex);
_error:
mutex_unlock(&register_mutex);
return err;

28
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-0862/3.10/0001.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
From 19384322b5b51987bd6037f7a6b18a62a5d4d654 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jianqiang Zhao <zhaojianqiang1@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2017 16:33:42 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] ANDROID: input: keychord: fix race condition bug
Change-Id: I9c7c759c99e21cad9a7f9a09128122bf6ae11302
Signed-off-by: Jianqiang Zhao <zhaojianqiang1@gmail.com>
Bug: 36006779
---
drivers/input/misc/keychord.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/input/misc/keychord.c b/drivers/input/misc/keychord.c
index a5ea27ad0e16c..f580edf1c87ce 100644
--- a/drivers/input/misc/keychord.c
+++ b/drivers/input/misc/keychord.c
@@ -300,8 +300,10 @@ static ssize_t keychord_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
ret = input_register_handler(&kdev->input_handler);
if (ret) {
- kfree(keychords);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&kdev->lock, flags);
+ kfree(kdev->keychords);
kdev->keychords = 0;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kdev->lock, flags);
return ret;
}
kdev->registered = 1;

25
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-0866/3.18/0001.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_usif.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_usif.c
index cb1182d..8d4fcc1 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_usif.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_usif.c
@@ -316,6 +316,12 @@
} else
goto done;
+ object = (void *)(unsigned long)argv->v0.token;
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, object, sizeof(struct usif_object))) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
mutex_lock(&cli->mutex);
switch (argv->v0.type) {
case NVIF_IOCTL_V0_NEW:
@@ -340,7 +346,6 @@
break;
}
if (argv->v0.route == NVDRM_OBJECT_USIF) {
- object = (void *)(unsigned long)argv->v0.token;
argv->v0.route = object->route;
argv->v0.token = object->token;
if (ret == 0 && argv->v0.type == NVIF_IOCTL_V0_DEL) {

1
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-0866/3.18/0001.patch.base64 Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1 @@
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

63
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11013/qcacld-2.0/0002.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
diff --git a/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/src/include/dot11f.h b/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/src/include/dot11f.h
index 111c093..10f1872 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/src/include/dot11f.h
+++ b/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/src/include/dot11f.h
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
* under proprietary terms before Copyright ownership was assigned
* to the Linux Foundation.
*/
-
#ifndef DOT11F_H
#define DOT11F_H
/**
@@ -37,7 +36,7 @@
*
*
* This file was automatically generated by 'framesc'
- * Tue Sep 29 17:32:33 2015 from the following file(s):
+ * Tue Jul 4 11:07:27 2017 from the following file(s):
*
* dot11f.frms
*
@@ -91,8 +90,8 @@
#define DOT11F_BUFFER_OVERFLOW ( 0x10000005 )
#define DOT11F_MANDATORY_TLV_MISSING ( 0x00001000 )
#define DOT11F_FAILED(code) ( (code) & 0x10000000 )
-#define DOT11F_WARNED(code) ( ( ( 0 == (code) ) & 0x10000000 ) && code)
#define DOT11F_SUCCEEDED(code) ( (code) == 0 )
+#define DOT11F_WARNED(code) (!DOT11F_SUCCEEDED(code) && !DOT11F_FAILED(code))
/*********************************************************************
* Fixed Fields *
diff --git a/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/SYS/legacy/src/utils/src/dot11f.c b/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/SYS/legacy/src/utils/src/dot11f.c
index 0f542d0..c19e9c0 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/SYS/legacy/src/utils/src/dot11f.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/SYS/legacy/src/utils/src/dot11f.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
*
*
* This file was automatically generated by 'framesc'
- * Tue Sep 29 17:32:33 2015 from the following file(s):
+ * Tue Jul 4 11:07:27 2017 from the following file(s):
*
* dot11f.frms
*
@@ -18778,6 +18778,10 @@
}
countOffset = ( (0 != pIe->arraybound) * ( *(tANI_U16* )(pFrm + pIe->countOffset)));
+ if (0 != pIe->arraybound && countOffset >= pIe->arraybound) {
+ status |= DOT11F_DUPLICATE_IE;
+ goto skip_dup_ie;
+ }
switch (pIe->sig)
{
case SigIeCondensedCountryStr:
@@ -19215,6 +19219,7 @@
status |= DOT11F_UNKNOWN_IES;
}
+skip_dup_ie:
pBufRemaining += len;
if (len > nBufRemaining)

1
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11013/qcacld-2.0/0002.patch.base64 Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1 @@
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

0
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11013/qcacld-3.0/0002.patch → Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11013/qcacld-3.0/0003.patch
View File

49
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11014/qcacld-2.0/0001.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
From adb96af5b080dfe4ee29961a17ed3f04c87d5519 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2017 16:56:01 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] qcacld-2.0: Add bound check before writing to channel list
qcacld-3.0 to qcacld-2.0 propagation
In function rrm_process_beacon_report_req, add bound check before
writing to channel list which is of fixed size.
Change-Id: I3c80974bba84a96f7b85e4ce62bbb01c23b4babf
CRs-Fixed: 2060138
Bug: 64438727
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/src/pe/rrm/rrmApi.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/src/pe/rrm/rrmApi.c b/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/src/pe/rrm/rrmApi.c
index 3fb65c45c2925..ddf22cd957db2 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/src/pe/rrm/rrmApi.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/src/pe/rrm/rrmApi.c
@@ -628,14 +628,21 @@ rrmProcessBeaconReportReq( tpAniSirGlobal pMac,
pSmeBcnReportReq->channelList.numChannels = num_channels;
if( pBeaconReq->measurement_request.Beacon.num_APChannelReport )
{
- tANI_U8 *pChanList = pSmeBcnReportReq->channelList.channelNumber;
+ tANI_U8 *ch_lst = pSmeBcnReportReq->channelList.channelNumber;
+ uint8_t len;
+ uint16_t ch_ctr = 0;
for( num_APChanReport = 0 ; num_APChanReport < pBeaconReq->measurement_request.Beacon.num_APChannelReport ; num_APChanReport++ )
{
- vos_mem_copy(pChanList,
- pBeaconReq->measurement_request.Beacon.APChannelReport[num_APChanReport].channelList,
- pBeaconReq->measurement_request.Beacon.APChannelReport[num_APChanReport].num_channelList);
+ len = pBeaconReq->measurement_request.Beacon.
+ APChannelReport[num_APChanReport].num_channelList;
+ if(ch_ctr + len > sizeof(pSmeBcnReportReq->channelList.channelNumber))
+ break;
+
+ vos_mem_copy(&ch_lst[ch_ctr],
+ pBeaconReq->measurement_request.Beacon.
+ APChannelReport[num_APChanReport].channelList, len);
- pChanList += pBeaconReq->measurement_request.Beacon.APChannelReport[num_APChanReport].num_channelList;
+ ch_ctr += len;
}
}

0
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11014/qcacld-3.0/0001.patch → Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11014/qcacld-3.0/0002.patch
View File

54
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11015/qcacld-2.0/0003.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
From d7285900f6fa28b0be51f5d18c52bd06385f8aee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2017 18:23:29 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] qcacld-2.0: Update limComputeCrc32 to pass uint16_t
qcacld-3.0 to qcacld-2.0 propagation
Update limComputeCrc32() to pass uint16_t as a length type.
Currently uint8_t is being passed as length and there will be type
mismatch when authentication frame to be encrypted will be larger
than 255 bytes.
Change-Id: Ic009197c13a2d70c9015a184acff2e82bf80eaba
CRs-Fixed: 2072937
Bug: 64438728
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/src/pe/lim/limSecurityUtils.c | 2 +-
drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/src/pe/lim/limSecurityUtils.h | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/src/pe/lim/limSecurityUtils.c b/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/src/pe/lim/limSecurityUtils.c
index 0241dc010adce..049c86aa55f78 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/src/pe/lim/limSecurityUtils.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/src/pe/lim/limSecurityUtils.c
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ limEncryptAuthFrame(tpAniSirGlobal pMac, tANI_U8 keyId, tANI_U8 *pKey, tANI_U8 *
*/
void
-limComputeCrc32(tANI_U8 *pDest, tANI_U8 * pSrc, tANI_U8 len)
+limComputeCrc32(tANI_U8 *pDest, tANI_U8 * pSrc, tANI_U16 len)
{
tANI_U32 crc;
int i;
diff --git a/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/src/pe/lim/limSecurityUtils.h b/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/src/pe/lim/limSecurityUtils.h
index 4ede5005b556f..9139ce20f3b4c 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/src/pe/lim/limSecurityUtils.h
+++ b/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/src/pe/lim/limSecurityUtils.h
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2011-2015 The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2011-2015, 2017 The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved.
*
* Previously licensed under the ISC license by Qualcomm Atheros, Inc.
*
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ tANI_U8 limDeleteOpenAuthPreAuthNode(tpAniSirGlobal pMac);
// Encryption/Decryption related functions
tCfgWepKeyEntry *limLookUpKeyMappings(tSirMacAddr);
-void limComputeCrc32(tANI_U8 *, tANI_U8 *, tANI_U8);
+void limComputeCrc32(tANI_U8 *, tANI_U8 *, tANI_U16);
void limRC4(tANI_U8 *, tANI_U8 *, tANI_U8 *, tANI_U32, tANI_U16);
void limEncryptAuthFrame(tpAniSirGlobal, tANI_U8, tANI_U8 *, tANI_U8 *, tANI_U8 *, tANI_U32);
tANI_U8 limDecryptAuthFrame(tpAniSirGlobal, tANI_U8 *, tANI_U8 *, tANI_U8 *, tANI_U32, tANI_U16);

35
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11015/qcacld-2.0/0004.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From a50ca3ce494ab6bb6b2e37cdd0428aa6d6260bef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2017 21:25:55 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] qcacld-2.0: Update SIR_MAC_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LENGTH as per IEEE
spec
qcacld-3.0 to qcacld-2.0 propagation
Update SIR_MAC_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LENGTH to 253 as per IEEE spec.
Currently value of SIR_MAC_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LENGTH is set to 128.
This may result in potential buffer overflow since frame parser
allows challenge text of length upto 253 but driver can not handle
challenge text longer than 128 bytes.
Change-Id: I7baf860fdde51a14a6573b4f0f26817f5071193e
CRs-Fixed: 2072937
Bug: 64438728
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/inc/sirMacProtDef.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/inc/sirMacProtDef.h b/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/inc/sirMacProtDef.h
index bb43167c255cc..c5d8ad5dbcbc0 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/inc/sirMacProtDef.h
+++ b/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/MAC/inc/sirMacProtDef.h
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@
#define SIR_MAC_MAX_NUMBER_OF_RATES 12
#define SIR_MAC_MAX_NUM_OF_DEFAULT_KEYS 4
#define SIR_MAC_KEY_LENGTH 13 // WEP Maximum key length size
-#define SIR_MAC_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 128
+#define SIR_MAC_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 253
#define SIR_MAC_WEP_IV_LENGTH 4
#define SIR_MAC_WEP_ICV_LENGTH 4

0
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11015/qcacld-3.0/0003.patch → Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11015/qcacld-3.0/0005.patch
View File

0
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11015/qcacld-3.0/0004.patch → Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11015/qcacld-3.0/0006.patch
View File

178
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11023/3.18/0001.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
From 17ef83c708be034454df7914ef5484c36515eece Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jonathan Solnit <jsolnit@google.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Sep 2017 15:19:29 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] diag: Add protection while processing non-hdlc packets
Currently, there is possibility of out-of-bound accesses during
handling of data in non-hdlc path. The patch adds proper protection
when processing non-hdlc packet information to fix the issue.
Bug: 64434485
CRs-Fixed: 2029216
Change-Id: I07c466f85bd8ac08226948fea86b1d8567e68431
Signed-off-by: Hardik Arya <harya@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Mishra Mahima <mahima@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Solnit <jsolnit@google.com>
---
drivers/char/diag/diagchar.h | 1 +
drivers/char/diag/diagchar_core.c | 1 +
drivers/char/diag/diagfwd.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/diag/diagchar.h b/drivers/char/diag/diagchar.h
index de3e160762e9f..c1749d3435732 100644
--- a/drivers/char/diag/diagchar.h
+++ b/drivers/char/diag/diagchar.h
@@ -537,6 +537,7 @@ struct diagchar_dev {
unsigned char *buf_feature_mask_update;
uint8_t hdlc_disabled;
struct mutex hdlc_disable_mutex;
+ struct mutex hdlc_recovery_mutex;
struct timer_list hdlc_reset_timer;
struct mutex diag_hdlc_mutex;
unsigned char *hdlc_buf;
diff --git a/drivers/char/diag/diagchar_core.c b/drivers/char/diag/diagchar_core.c
index 590f53c36e511..048e1fd60b805 100644
--- a/drivers/char/diag/diagchar_core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/diag/diagchar_core.c
@@ -3392,6 +3392,7 @@ static int __init diagchar_init(void)
mutex_init(&apps_data_mutex);
mutex_init(&driver->msg_mask_lock);
mutex_init(&driver->diagfwd_channel_mutex);
+ mutex_init(&driver->hdlc_recovery_mutex);
init_waitqueue_head(&driver->wait_q);
INIT_WORK(&(driver->diag_drain_work), diag_drain_work_fn);
INIT_WORK(&(driver->update_user_clients),
diff --git a/drivers/char/diag/diagfwd.c b/drivers/char/diag/diagfwd.c
index 65bbe7cdd8347..60d126acae99a 100644
--- a/drivers/char/diag/diagfwd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/diag/diagfwd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2008-2016, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved.
+/* Copyright (c) 2008-2017, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 and
@@ -1348,7 +1348,9 @@ static void diag_hdlc_start_recovery(unsigned char *buf, int len,
if (start_ptr) {
/* Discard any partial packet reads */
+ mutex_lock(&driver->hdlc_recovery_mutex);
driver->incoming_pkt.processing = 0;
+ mutex_unlock(&driver->hdlc_recovery_mutex);
diag_process_non_hdlc_pkt(start_ptr, len - i, info);
}
}
@@ -1362,18 +1364,24 @@ void diag_process_non_hdlc_pkt(unsigned char *buf, int len,
const uint32_t header_len = sizeof(struct diag_pkt_frame_t);
struct diag_pkt_frame_t *actual_pkt = NULL;
unsigned char *data_ptr = NULL;
- struct diag_partial_pkt_t *partial_pkt = &driver->incoming_pkt;
+ struct diag_partial_pkt_t *partial_pkt = NULL;
- if (!buf || len <= 0)
+ mutex_lock(&driver->hdlc_recovery_mutex);
+ if (!buf || len <= 0) {
+ mutex_unlock(&driver->hdlc_recovery_mutex);
return;
-
- if (!partial_pkt->processing)
+ }
+ partial_pkt = &driver->incoming_pkt;
+ if (!partial_pkt->processing) {
+ mutex_unlock(&driver->hdlc_recovery_mutex);
goto start;
+ }
if (partial_pkt->remaining > len) {
if ((partial_pkt->read_len + len) > partial_pkt->capacity) {
pr_err("diag: Invalid length %d, %d received in %s\n",
partial_pkt->read_len, len, __func__);
+ mutex_unlock(&driver->hdlc_recovery_mutex);
goto end;
}
memcpy(partial_pkt->data + partial_pkt->read_len, buf, len);
@@ -1387,6 +1395,7 @@ void diag_process_non_hdlc_pkt(unsigned char *buf, int len,
pr_err("diag: Invalid length during partial read %d, %d received in %s\n",
partial_pkt->read_len,
partial_pkt->remaining, __func__);
+ mutex_unlock(&driver->hdlc_recovery_mutex);
goto end;
}
memcpy(partial_pkt->data + partial_pkt->read_len, buf,
@@ -1400,20 +1409,27 @@ void diag_process_non_hdlc_pkt(unsigned char *buf, int len,
if (partial_pkt->remaining == 0) {
actual_pkt = (struct diag_pkt_frame_t *)(partial_pkt->data);
data_ptr = partial_pkt->data + header_len;
- if (*(uint8_t *)(data_ptr + actual_pkt->length) != CONTROL_CHAR)
+ if (*(uint8_t *)(data_ptr + actual_pkt->length) !=
+ CONTROL_CHAR) {
+ mutex_unlock(&driver->hdlc_recovery_mutex);
diag_hdlc_start_recovery(buf, len, info);
+ mutex_lock(&driver->hdlc_recovery_mutex);
+ }
err = diag_process_apps_pkt(data_ptr,
actual_pkt->length, info);
if (err) {
pr_err("diag: In %s, unable to process incoming data packet, err: %d\n",
__func__, err);
+ mutex_unlock(&driver->hdlc_recovery_mutex);
goto end;
}
partial_pkt->read_len = 0;
partial_pkt->total_len = 0;
partial_pkt->processing = 0;
+ mutex_unlock(&driver->hdlc_recovery_mutex);
goto start;
}
+ mutex_unlock(&driver->hdlc_recovery_mutex);
goto end;
start:
@@ -1426,14 +1442,14 @@ void diag_process_non_hdlc_pkt(unsigned char *buf, int len,
diag_send_error_rsp(buf, len);
goto end;
}
-
+ mutex_lock(&driver->hdlc_recovery_mutex);
if (pkt_len + header_len > partial_pkt->capacity) {
pr_err("diag: In %s, incoming data is too large for the request buffer %d\n",
__func__, pkt_len);
+ mutex_unlock(&driver->hdlc_recovery_mutex);
diag_hdlc_start_recovery(buf, len, info);
break;
}
-
if ((pkt_len + header_len) > (len - read_bytes)) {
partial_pkt->read_len = len - read_bytes;
partial_pkt->total_len = pkt_len + header_len;
@@ -1441,19 +1457,27 @@ void diag_process_non_hdlc_pkt(unsigned char *buf, int len,
partial_pkt->read_len;
partial_pkt->processing = 1;
memcpy(partial_pkt->data, buf, partial_pkt->read_len);
+ mutex_unlock(&driver->hdlc_recovery_mutex);
break;
}
data_ptr = buf + header_len;
- if (*(uint8_t *)(data_ptr + actual_pkt->length) != CONTROL_CHAR)
+ if (*(uint8_t *)(data_ptr + actual_pkt->length) !=
+ CONTROL_CHAR) {
+ mutex_unlock(&driver->hdlc_recovery_mutex);
diag_hdlc_start_recovery(buf, len, info);
+ mutex_lock(&driver->hdlc_recovery_mutex);
+ }
else
hdlc_reset = 0;
err = diag_process_apps_pkt(data_ptr,
actual_pkt->length, info);
- if (err)
+ if (err) {
+ mutex_unlock(&driver->hdlc_recovery_mutex);
break;
+ }
read_bytes += header_len + pkt_len + 1;
buf += header_len + pkt_len + 1; /* advance to next pkt */
+ mutex_unlock(&driver->hdlc_recovery_mutex);
}
end:
return;

0
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11023/ANY/0001.patch → Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11023/4.4/0002.patch
View File

42
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11028/3.18/0001.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
From a96e06fac09e182b5211f20dd6311f93a5d056af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Senthil Kumar Rajagopal <skrajago@codeaurora.org>
Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2017 16:53:33 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] msm: camera: isp: Initialize stream info
Initialize the Stream info before passing as an
argument to msm_isp_request_frame and add bound check to the
stream index
CRs-fixed: 2008683
Bug: 64453533
Change-Id: I0039a5d01f4f376060c8b0ba3baf4ce55acc9446
Signed-off-by: Senthil Kumar Rajagopal <skrajago@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c | 10 +++++++++-
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c
index 5e0b685aec801..54ab560f09137 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2013-2016, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved.
+/* Copyright (c) 2013-2017, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 and
@@ -3488,6 +3488,14 @@ int msm_isp_update_axi_stream(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev, void *arg)
case UPDATE_STREAM_REQUEST_FRAMES_VER2: {
struct msm_vfe_axi_stream_cfg_update_info_req_frm *req_frm =
&update_cmd->req_frm_ver2;
+ if (HANDLE_TO_IDX(req_frm->stream_handle) >= VFE_AXI_SRC_MAX) {
+ pr_err("%s: Invalid stream handle \n", __func__);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ stream_info = &axi_data->stream_info[HANDLE_TO_IDX(
+ req_frm->stream_handle)];
+
rc = msm_isp_request_frame(vfe_dev, stream_info,
req_frm->user_stream_id,
req_frm->frame_id,

57
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11028/ANY/0001.patch
View File

@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
From fd70b655d901e626403f132b65fc03d993f0a09b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Senthil Kumar Rajagopal <skrajago@codeaurora.org>
Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2017 15:11:14 +0530
Subject: msm: camera: isp: add bound check to handle array out of access
The pointer req_frm comes from userspace,
req_frm->stream_handle is passed as an argument to
the function msm_isp_get_stream_common_data,
stream_idx can overflow common_data->streams[] and
the code ends up copying an out of bound
kernel address into stream_info. Adding bound check to
handle the same.
CRs-fixed: 2008683
Change-Id: Ib4a059bfd573cdc4e18ce630b4091576ff8edc7e
Signed-off-by: Senthil Kumar Rajagopal <skrajago@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c | 6 ++++++
drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.h | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c
index dce474e..8ab2e85 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c
@@ -3909,6 +3909,12 @@ int msm_isp_update_axi_stream(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev, void *arg)
&update_cmd->req_frm_ver2;
stream_info = msm_isp_get_stream_common_data(vfe_dev,
HANDLE_TO_IDX(req_frm->stream_handle));
+ if (stream_info == NULL) {
+ pr_err_ratelimited("%s: stream_info is NULL\n",
+ __func__);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
rc = msm_isp_request_frame(vfe_dev, stream_info,
req_frm->user_stream_id,
req_frm->frame_id,
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.h b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.h
index 65009cb..a8d4cfb 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.h
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.h
@@ -141,6 +141,11 @@ static inline struct msm_vfe_axi_stream *msm_isp_get_stream_common_data(
struct msm_vfe_common_dev_data *common_data = vfe_dev->common_data;
struct msm_vfe_axi_stream *stream_info;
+ if (stream_idx >= VFE_AXI_SRC_MAX) {
+ pr_err("invalid stream_idx %d\n", stream_idx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
if (vfe_dev->is_split && stream_idx < RDI_INTF_0)
stream_info = &common_data->streams[stream_idx];
else
--
cgit v1.1

65
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11028/ANY/0002.patch
View File

@ -1,36 +1,57 @@
From 6724296d3f3b2821b83219768c1b9e971e380a9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sriraj Hebbar <srirajh@qti.qualcomm.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2017 13:14:28 +0530
Subject: msm: camera: isp: Handle array out of bound access
From fd70b655d901e626403f132b65fc03d993f0a09b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Senthil Kumar Rajagopal <skrajago@codeaurora.org>
Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2017 15:11:14 +0530
Subject: msm: camera: isp: add bound check to handle array out of access
The pointer req_frm is coming from userspace, it may overflow stream_info.
Adding a bound check to prevent the same.
The pointer req_frm comes from userspace,
req_frm->stream_handle is passed as an argument to
the function msm_isp_get_stream_common_data,
stream_idx can overflow common_data->streams[] and
the code ends up copying an out of bound
kernel address into stream_info. Adding bound check to
handle the same.
CRs-fixed: 2008683
Change-Id: I8682e09ff2ab7ba490bbbd9e20db978493c5f3e4
Change-Id: Ib4a059bfd573cdc4e18ce630b4091576ff8edc7e
Signed-off-by: Senthil Kumar Rajagopal <skrajago@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Sun <bins@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/media/platform/msm/ais/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c | 6 ++++++
drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.h | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/ais/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/ais/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c
index 373a963..a85ee30 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/ais/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/ais/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c
@@ -3889,6 +3889,12 @@ int msm_isp_update_axi_stream(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev, void *arg)
case UPDATE_STREAM_REQUEST_FRAMES_VER2: {
struct msm_vfe_axi_stream_cfg_update_info_req_frm *req_frm =
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c
index dce474e..8ab2e85 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c
@@ -3909,6 +3909,12 @@ int msm_isp_update_axi_stream(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev, void *arg)
&update_cmd->req_frm_ver2;
+ if (HANDLE_TO_IDX(req_frm->stream_handle) >= VFE_AXI_SRC_MAX) {
+ pr_err("%s: Invalid stream handle\n", __func__);
stream_info = msm_isp_get_stream_common_data(vfe_dev,
HANDLE_TO_IDX(req_frm->stream_handle));
+ if (stream_info == NULL) {
+ pr_err_ratelimited("%s: stream_info is NULL\n",
+ __func__);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
stream_info = &axi_data->stream_info[HANDLE_TO_IDX(
req_frm->stream_handle)];
rc = msm_isp_request_frame(vfe_dev, stream_info,
req_frm->user_stream_id,
req_frm->frame_id,
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.h b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.h
index 65009cb..a8d4cfb 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.h
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.h
@@ -141,6 +141,11 @@ static inline struct msm_vfe_axi_stream *msm_isp_get_stream_common_data(
struct msm_vfe_common_dev_data *common_data = vfe_dev->common_data;
struct msm_vfe_axi_stream *stream_info;
+ if (stream_idx >= VFE_AXI_SRC_MAX) {
+ pr_err("invalid stream_idx %d\n", stream_idx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
if (vfe_dev->is_split && stream_idx < RDI_INTF_0)
stream_info = &common_data->streams[stream_idx];
else
--
cgit v1.1

36
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11028/ANY/0003.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
From 6724296d3f3b2821b83219768c1b9e971e380a9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sriraj Hebbar <srirajh@qti.qualcomm.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2017 13:14:28 +0530
Subject: msm: camera: isp: Handle array out of bound access
The pointer req_frm is coming from userspace, it may overflow stream_info.
Adding a bound check to prevent the same.
CRs-fixed: 2008683
Change-Id: I8682e09ff2ab7ba490bbbd9e20db978493c5f3e4
Signed-off-by: Senthil Kumar Rajagopal <skrajago@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Sun <bins@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/media/platform/msm/ais/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/ais/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/ais/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c
index 373a963..a85ee30 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/ais/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/ais/isp/msm_isp_axi_util.c
@@ -3889,6 +3889,12 @@ int msm_isp_update_axi_stream(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev, void *arg)
case UPDATE_STREAM_REQUEST_FRAMES_VER2: {
struct msm_vfe_axi_stream_cfg_update_info_req_frm *req_frm =
&update_cmd->req_frm_ver2;
+ if (HANDLE_TO_IDX(req_frm->stream_handle) >= VFE_AXI_SRC_MAX) {
+ pr_err("%s: Invalid stream handle\n", __func__);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
stream_info = &axi_data->stream_info[HANDLE_TO_IDX(
req_frm->stream_handle)];
rc = msm_isp_request_frame(vfe_dev, stream_info,
--
cgit v1.1

108
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11029/3.10/0001.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
From e13a16c079cf8f5c758f5c31fbd72edca2656e54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jonathan Solnit <jsolnit@google.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Sep 2017 17:21:05 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] msm: camera2: cpp: Fix iommu_attach/detach compat_ioctl issue
When the Camera application exercises the V4L2 ioctl operations, CPP
driver would attempt to the copy user space buffer contents into the
internal kernel buffer. If an invalid length of the user space buffer
is passed onto the driver, it could trigger buffer overflow condition.
Thus, fix this by copying user space buffer contents into kernel space
buffer of the driver for further processing, only after checking for
proper length of user space buffer.
Bug: 64433362
CRs-fixed: 2025367
Change-Id: I85cf4a961884c7bb0d036299b886044aef7baf7c
Signed-off-by: Ravi kumar Koyyana <rkoyyana@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Paresh Purabhiya <ppurab@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Solnit <jsolnit@google.com>
---
.../platform/msm/camera_v2/pproc/cpp/msm_cpp.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/pproc/cpp/msm_cpp.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/pproc/cpp/msm_cpp.c
index 1dfe7f6abc312..9d7e51c37f486 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/pproc/cpp/msm_cpp.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/pproc/cpp/msm_cpp.c
@@ -2288,11 +2288,13 @@ static void msm_cpp_fw_version(struct cpp_device *cpp_dev)
msm_cpp_poll(cpp_dev->base, MSM_CPP_MSG_ID_TRAILER);
}
-static int msm_cpp_validate_input(unsigned int cmd, void *arg,
+static int msm_cpp_validate_ioctl_input(unsigned int cmd, void *arg,
struct msm_camera_v4l2_ioctl_t **ioctl_ptr)
{
switch (cmd) {
case MSM_SD_SHUTDOWN:
+ case VIDIOC_MSM_CPP_IOMMU_ATTACH:
+ case VIDIOC_MSM_CPP_IOMMU_DETACH:
break;
default: {
if (ioctl_ptr == NULL) {
@@ -2301,8 +2303,9 @@ static int msm_cpp_validate_input(unsigned int cmd, void *arg,
}
*ioctl_ptr = arg;
- if ((*ioctl_ptr == NULL) ||
- (*ioctl_ptr)->ioctl_ptr == NULL) {
+ if (((*ioctl_ptr) == NULL) ||
+ ((*ioctl_ptr)->ioctl_ptr == NULL) ||
+ ((*ioctl_ptr)->len == 0)) {
pr_err("Error invalid ioctl argument cmd %u", cmd);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -2334,7 +2337,7 @@ long msm_cpp_subdev_ioctl(struct v4l2_subdev *sd,
return -EINVAL;
}
- rc = msm_cpp_validate_input(cmd, arg, &ioctl_ptr);
+ rc = msm_cpp_validate_ioctl_input(cmd, arg, &ioctl_ptr);
if (rc != 0) {
pr_err("input validation failed\n");
return rc;
@@ -2799,6 +2802,7 @@ long msm_cpp_subdev_ioctl(struct v4l2_subdev *sd,
pr_err("%s:%dError iommu_attach_device failed\n",
__func__, __LINE__);
rc = -EINVAL;
+ break;
}
cpp_dev->iommu_state = CPP_IOMMU_STATE_ATTACHED;
} else {
@@ -2813,10 +2817,17 @@ long msm_cpp_subdev_ioctl(struct v4l2_subdev *sd,
(cpp_dev->stream_cnt == 0)) {
iommu_detach_device(cpp_dev->domain,
cpp_dev->iommu_ctx);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ pr_err("%s:%dError iommu detach failed\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
cpp_dev->iommu_state = CPP_IOMMU_STATE_DETACHED;
} else {
pr_err("%s:%d IOMMMU attach triggered in invalid state\n",
__func__, __LINE__);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
}
break;
}
@@ -3422,7 +3433,7 @@ static long msm_cpp_subdev_fops_compat_ioctl(struct file *file,
default:
pr_err_ratelimited("%s: unsupported compat type :%x LOAD %lu\n",
__func__, cmd, VIDIOC_MSM_CPP_LOAD_FIRMWARE);
- break;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
switch (cmd) {
@@ -3448,7 +3459,7 @@ static long msm_cpp_subdev_fops_compat_ioctl(struct file *file,
default:
pr_err_ratelimited("%s: unsupported compat type :%d\n",
__func__, cmd);
- break;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
up32_ioctl.id = kp_ioctl.id;

0
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11029/3.18/0001.patch → Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11029/3.18/0002.patch
View File

0
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11029/4.4/0002.patch → Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11029/4.4/0003.patch
View File

0
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11035/qcacld-2.0/0002.patch → Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11035/qcacld-2.0/0001.patch
View File

0
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11035/qcacld-3.0/0001.patch → Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11035/qcacld-3.0/0002.patch
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143
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@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
From 120d28bad9890eca3a6451a83a7c71cb650dfef7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Poddar, Siddarth" <siddpodd@codeaurora.org>
Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2017 12:31:03 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] qcacld-2.0: Remove code related to mmap functionality for
pktlog
Remove the code related to mmap functionality for pktlog
as it is no longer used/required.
Bug: 62084791
Change-Id: I06767f108c0ff6462a9e20e7b50d08bf4ac9555f
CRs-Fixed: 2064767
Signed-off-by: Ahmed ElArabawy <arabawy@google.com>
---
.../qcacld-2.0/CORE/UTILS/PKTLOG/linux_ac.c | 102 ---------------------
1 file changed, 102 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/UTILS/PKTLOG/linux_ac.c b/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/UTILS/PKTLOG/linux_ac.c
index 173ed4e8eec1a..ec61b77e827cf 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/UTILS/PKTLOG/linux_ac.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/qcacld-2.0/CORE/UTILS/PKTLOG/linux_ac.c
@@ -82,14 +82,12 @@ static int pktlog_attach(struct ol_softc *sc);
static void pktlog_detach(struct ol_softc *sc);
static int pktlog_open(struct inode *i, struct file *f);
static int pktlog_release(struct inode *i, struct file *f);
-static int pktlog_mmap(struct file *f, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
static ssize_t pktlog_read(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t nbytes,
loff_t * ppos);
static struct file_operations pktlog_fops = {
open:pktlog_open,
release:pktlog_release,
- mmap:pktlog_mmap,
read:pktlog_read,
};
@@ -921,106 +919,6 @@ static volatile void *pktlog_virt_to_logical(volatile void *addr)
}
#endif
-/* vma operations for mapping vmalloced area to user space */
-static void pktlog_vopen(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
-{
- PKTLOG_MOD_INC_USE_COUNT;
-}
-
-static void pktlog_vclose(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
-{
- PKTLOG_MOD_DEC_USE_COUNT;
-}
-
-#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE > KERNEL_VERSION(2,6,25)
-int pktlog_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_fault *vmf)
-{
- unsigned long address = (unsigned long)vmf->virtual_address;
-
- if (address == 0UL)
- return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
-
- if (vmf->pgoff > vma->vm_end)
- return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
-
- get_page(virt_to_page((void *)address));
- vmf->page = virt_to_page((void *)address);
- return VM_FAULT_MINOR;
-}
-#else
-#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(2,6,0)
-struct page *pktlog_vmmap(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
- int *type)
-#else
-struct page *pktlog_vmmap(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
- int write_access)
-#endif
-{
- unsigned long offset, vaddr;
- struct proc_dir_entry *proc_entry;
- struct ath_pktlog_info *pl_info =
-
- proc_entry = PDE(vma->vm_file->f_dentry->d_inode);
- pl_info = (struct ath_pktlog_info *)proc_entry->data;
-
- offset = addr - vma->vm_start + (vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT);
- vaddr = (unsigned long) pktlog_virt_to_logical(
- (void *)(pl_info->buf) + offset);
-
- if (vaddr == 0UL) {
- printk(PKTLOG_TAG "%s: page fault out of range\n", __func__);
- return ((struct page *) 0UL);
- }
-
- /* increment the usage count of the page */
- get_page(virt_to_page((void*)vaddr));
-
-#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(2,6,0)
- if (type)
- *type = VM_FAULT_MINOR;
-#endif
-
- return virt_to_page((void *)vaddr);
-}
-#endif /* LINUX_VERSION_CODE > KERNEL_VERSION(2,6,25) */
-
-static struct vm_operations_struct pktlog_vmops = {
- open:pktlog_vopen,
- close:pktlog_vclose,
-#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE > KERNEL_VERSION(2,6,25)
- fault:pktlog_fault,
-#else
- nopage:pktlog_vmmap,
-#endif
-};
-
-static int pktlog_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
-{
-#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(3,10,0)
- struct ath_pktlog_info *pl_info = (struct ath_pktlog_info *)
- PDE_DATA(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
-#else
- struct proc_dir_entry *proc_entry = PDE(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
- struct ath_pktlog_info *pl_info = (struct ath_pktlog_info *)
- proc_entry->data;
-#endif
-
- if (vma->vm_pgoff != 0) {
- /* Entire buffer should be mapped */
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- if (!pl_info->buf) {
- printk(PKTLOG_TAG "%s: Log buffer unavailable\n", __func__);
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
- vma->vm_flags |= VM_LOCKED;
- vma->vm_ops = &pktlog_vmops;
- pktlog_vopen(vma);
- return 0;
-}
-
int pktlogmod_init(void *context)
{
int ret;

274
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@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
From dc8f7a19762df2c84678482b60f6b807b919eb44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Weiyin Jiang <wjiang@codeaurora.org>
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2017 11:01:40 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] SoC: msm: audio-effects: return directly to avoid integer
overflow
Return error code directly to avoid further integer overflow leading
to buffer overflow.
Bug: 62952032
Change-Id: I8b74efda227726494724f4387c45b5b6fa04637b
CRs-Fixed: 2077909
Signed-off-by: Weiyin Jiang <wjiang@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Paresh Purabhiya <ppurab@codeaurora.org>
---
sound/soc/msm/qdsp6v2/msm-audio-effects-q6-v2.c | 56 ++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/soc/msm/qdsp6v2/msm-audio-effects-q6-v2.c b/sound/soc/msm/qdsp6v2/msm-audio-effects-q6-v2.c
index 2bcd339f1ff59..95c382ddb77b9 100644
--- a/sound/soc/msm/qdsp6v2/msm-audio-effects-q6-v2.c
+++ b/sound/soc/msm/qdsp6v2/msm-audio-effects-q6-v2.c
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_virtualizer_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"VIRT ENABLE", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_VIRTUALIZER;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_virtualizer_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"VIRT STRENGTH", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_VIRTUALIZER;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_virtualizer_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"VIRT OUT_TYPE", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_VIRTUALIZER;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_virtualizer_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"VIRT GAIN_ADJUST", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_VIRTUALIZER;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_reverb_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"REVERB_ENABLE", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_REVERB;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_reverb_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"REVERB_MODE", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_REVERB;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_reverb_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"REVERB_PRESET", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_REVERB;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_reverb_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"REVERB_WET_MIX", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_REVERB;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_reverb_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"REVERB_GAIN_ADJUST", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_REVERB;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_reverb_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"REVERB_ROOM_LEVEL", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_REVERB;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_reverb_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"REVERB_ROOM_HF_LEVEL", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_REVERB;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_reverb_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"REVERB_DECAY_TIME", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_REVERB;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_reverb_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"REVERB_DECAY_HF_RATIO", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_REVERB;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_reverb_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"REVERB_REFLECTIONS_LEVEL", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_REVERB;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_reverb_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"REVERB_REFLECTIONS_DELAY", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_REVERB;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_reverb_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"REVERB_LEVEL", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_REVERB;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -674,7 +674,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_reverb_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"REVERB_DELAY", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_REVERB;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_reverb_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"REVERB_DIFFUSION", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_REVERB;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_reverb_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"REVERB_DENSITY", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_REVERB;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -810,7 +810,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_bass_boost_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"BASS_BOOST_ENABLE", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_BASS_BOOST;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_bass_boost_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"BASS_BOOST_MODE", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_BASS_BOOST;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_bass_boost_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"BASS_BOOST_STRENGTH", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_BASS_BOOST;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_popless_eq_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"EQ_ENABLE", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_POPLESS_EQUALIZER;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_popless_eq_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"EQ_CONFIG", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_POPLESS_EQUALIZER;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_popless_eq_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"EQ_BAND_INDEX", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_POPLESS_EQUALIZER;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -1098,7 +1098,7 @@ int msm_audio_effects_popless_eq_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
MAX_INBAND_PARAM_SZ,
"EQ_SINGLE_BAND_FREQ", rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
*updt_params++ =
AUDPROC_MODULE_ID_POPLESS_EQUALIZER;
*updt_params++ =
@@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@ static int __msm_audio_effects_volume_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
"VOLUME/VOLUME2_GAIN_2CH",
rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
if (instance == SOFT_VOLUME_INSTANCE_2)
*updt_params++ =
ASM_MODULE_ID_VOL_CTRL2;
@@ -1237,7 +1237,7 @@ static int __msm_audio_effects_volume_handler(struct audio_client *ac,
"VOLUME/VOLUME2_GAIN_MASTER",
rc);
if (rc != 0)
- break;
+ goto invalid_config;
if (instance == SOFT_VOLUME_INSTANCE_2)
*updt_params++ =
ASM_MODULE_ID_VOL_CTRL2;

12
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11089/ANY/0001.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
index 78b6f74..f927434 100644
--- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c
+++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
@@ -365,6 +365,7 @@
[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[NL80211_ATTR_P2P_CTWINDOW] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
[NL80211_ATTR_P2P_OPPPS] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
+ [NL80211_ATTR_LOCAL_MESH_POWER_MODE] = {. type = NLA_U32 },
[NL80211_ATTR_ACL_POLICY] = {. type = NLA_U32 },
[NL80211_ATTR_MAC_ADDRS] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
[NL80211_ATTR_STA_CAPABILITY] = { .type = NLA_U16 },

1
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11089/ANY/0001.patch.base64 Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1 @@
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

14
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11090/ANY/0001.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
index 5112673..78b6f74 100644
--- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c
+++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
@@ -310,8 +310,7 @@
[NL80211_ATTR_WPA_VERSIONS] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[NL80211_ATTR_PID] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[NL80211_ATTR_4ADDR] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
- [NL80211_ATTR_PMKID] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
- .len = WLAN_PMKID_LEN },
+ [NL80211_ATTR_PMKID] = { .len = WLAN_PMKID_LEN },
[NL80211_ATTR_DURATION] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[NL80211_ATTR_COOKIE] = { .type = NLA_U64 },
[NL80211_ATTR_TX_RATES] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },

1
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11090/ANY/0001.patch.base64 Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1 @@
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

61
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11091/3.18/0001.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
From 10b0cb47e92abe52c5372ded0fe80a5a5f18586f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Harsh Sahu <hsahu@codeaurora.org>
Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2017 18:50:20 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] msm: mdss: fix the use after free problem in rotator ioctl
Currently the fence fd is installed too early. This can cause a
use after free problem if the fence fd is closed in some other thread.
This change will install the fence fd where it is required and
eliminates the problem.
Bug: 37478866
Change-Id: I5cf585ea87ef75fccae06da6cb5a6c16fc74eff3
Signed-off-by: Harsh Sahu <hsahu@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdss_rotator.c | 12 +++++++++++-
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdss_rotator.c b/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdss_rotator.c
index 95ca5b74e2369..5910a69bc844b 100644
--- a/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdss_rotator.c
+++ b/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdss_rotator.c
@@ -375,6 +375,15 @@ static bool mdss_rotator_is_work_pending(struct mdss_rot_mgr *mgr,
return false;
}
+static void mdss_rotator_install_fence_fd(struct mdss_rot_entry_container *req)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < req->count; i++)
+ sync_fence_install(req->entries[i].output_fence,
+ req->entries[i].output_fence_fd);
+}
+
static int mdss_rotator_create_fence(struct mdss_rot_entry *entry)
{
int ret = 0, fd;
@@ -413,7 +422,6 @@ static int mdss_rotator_create_fence(struct mdss_rot_entry *entry)
goto get_fd_err;
}
- sync_fence_install(fence, fd);
rot_timeline->next_value++;
mutex_unlock(&rot_timeline->lock);
@@ -2248,6 +2256,7 @@ static int mdss_rotator_handle_request(struct mdss_rot_mgr *mgr,
goto handle_request_err1;
}
+ mdss_rotator_install_fence_fd(req);
mdss_rotator_queue_request(mgr, private, req);
mutex_unlock(&mgr->lock);
@@ -2408,6 +2417,7 @@ static int mdss_rotator_handle_request32(struct mdss_rot_mgr *mgr,
goto handle_request32_err1;
}
+ mdss_rotator_install_fence_fd(req);
mdss_rotator_queue_request(mgr, private, req);
mutex_unlock(&mgr->lock);

164
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11092/ANY/0001.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/msm/kgsl.c b/drivers/gpu/msm/kgsl.c
index 350ad08..44f981c 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/msm/kgsl.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/msm/kgsl.c
@@ -1609,6 +1609,7 @@
struct kgsl_device *device;
struct kgsl_cmdbatch *cmdbatch = (struct kgsl_cmdbatch *) data;
struct kgsl_cmdbatch_sync_event *event;
+ unsigned long flags;
if (cmdbatch == NULL || cmdbatch->context == NULL)
return;
@@ -1623,14 +1624,14 @@
kgsl_context_dump(cmdbatch->context);
clear_bit(CMDBATCH_FLAG_FENCE_LOG, &cmdbatch->priv);
- spin_lock(&cmdbatch->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&cmdbatch->lock, flags);
/* Print all the fences */
list_for_each_entry(event, &cmdbatch->synclist, node) {
if (KGSL_CMD_SYNCPOINT_TYPE_FENCE == event->type &&
event->handle && event->handle->fence)
kgsl_sync_fence_log(event->handle->fence);
}
- spin_unlock(&cmdbatch->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmdbatch->lock, flags);
dev_err(device->dev, "--gpu syncpoint deadlock print end--\n");
}
/**
@@ -1685,15 +1686,16 @@
struct kgsl_cmdbatch_sync_event *event)
{
struct kgsl_cmdbatch_sync_event *e, *tmp;
+ unsigned long flags;
int sched = 0;
int removed = 0;
/*
- * We may have cmdbatch timer running, which also uses same lock,
- * take a lock with software interrupt disabled (bh) to avoid
- * spin lock recursion.
+ * cmdbatch timer or event callback might run at
+ * this time in interrupt context and uses same lock.
+ * So use irq-save version of spin lock.
*/
- spin_lock_bh(&event->cmdbatch->lock);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&event->cmdbatch->lock, flags);
/*
* sync events that are contained by a cmdbatch which has been
@@ -1708,8 +1710,9 @@
}
}
+ event->handle = NULL;
sched = list_empty(&event->cmdbatch->synclist) ? 1 : 0;
- spin_unlock_bh(&event->cmdbatch->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&event->cmdbatch->lock, flags);
/* If the list is empty delete the canary timer */
if (sched)
@@ -1771,16 +1774,20 @@
struct kgsl_cmdbatch_sync_event *event, *tmpsync;
LIST_HEAD(cancel_synclist);
int sched = 0;
+ unsigned long flags;
/* Zap the canary timer */
del_timer_sync(&cmdbatch->timer);
- /* non-bh because we just destroyed timer */
- spin_lock(&cmdbatch->lock);
+ /*
+ * callback might run in interrupt context
+ * so need to use irqsave version of spinlocks.
+ */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&cmdbatch->lock, flags);
/* Empty the synclist before canceling events */
list_splice_init(&cmdbatch->synclist, &cancel_synclist);
- spin_unlock(&cmdbatch->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmdbatch->lock, flags);
/*
* Finish canceling events outside the cmdbatch spinlock and
@@ -1802,8 +1809,15 @@
kgsl_cmdbatch_sync_func, event);
} else if (event->type == KGSL_CMD_SYNCPOINT_TYPE_FENCE) {
/* Put events that are successfully canceled */
- if (kgsl_sync_fence_async_cancel(event->handle))
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&cmdbatch->lock, flags);
+
+ if (kgsl_sync_fence_async_cancel(event->handle)) {
+ event->handle = NULL;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmdbatch->lock, flags);
kgsl_cmdbatch_sync_event_put(event);
+ } else {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmdbatch->lock, flags);
+ }
}
/* Put events that have been removed from the synclist */
@@ -1864,6 +1878,7 @@
{
struct kgsl_cmd_syncpoint_fence *sync = priv;
struct kgsl_cmdbatch_sync_event *event;
+ unsigned long flags;
event = kzalloc(sizeof(*event), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1892,11 +1907,6 @@
kref_get(&event->refcount);
- /* non-bh because, we haven't started cmdbatch timer yet */
- spin_lock(&cmdbatch->lock);
- list_add(&event->node, &cmdbatch->synclist);
- spin_unlock(&cmdbatch->lock);
-
/*
* Increment the reference count for the async callback.
* Decrement when the callback is successfully canceled, when
@@ -1904,6 +1914,10 @@
*/
kref_get(&event->refcount);
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&cmdbatch->lock, flags);
+ list_add(&event->node, &cmdbatch->synclist);
+
event->handle = kgsl_sync_fence_async_wait(sync->fd,
kgsl_cmdbatch_sync_fence_func, event);
@@ -1911,17 +1925,14 @@
int ret = PTR_ERR(event->handle);
event->handle = NULL;
-
- /* Failed to add the event to the async callback */
- kgsl_cmdbatch_sync_event_put(event);
-
/* Remove event from the synclist */
- spin_lock(&cmdbatch->lock);
list_del(&event->node);
- spin_unlock(&cmdbatch->lock);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmdbatch->lock, flags);
+ /* Put for event removal from the synclist */
kgsl_cmdbatch_sync_event_put(event);
-
- /* Event no longer needed by this function */
+ /* Unable to add event to the async callback so a put */
+ kgsl_cmdbatch_sync_event_put(event);
+ /* Put since event no longer needed by this function */
kgsl_cmdbatch_sync_event_put(event);
/*
@@ -1935,6 +1946,7 @@
}
trace_syncpoint_fence(cmdbatch, event->handle->name);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmdbatch->lock, flags);
/*
* Event was successfully added to the synclist, the async

1
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11092/ANY/0001.patch.base64 Normal file
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File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long

35
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11093/3.18/0001.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 072d53b2ca00ac57ca4e0ebe2315b431256cf786 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Narender Ankam <nankam@codeaurora.org>
Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 15:55:50 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] msm: mdss: hdmi: validate HDMI EDID's max number of CEA
blocks
No upper-bound validation is performed when reading number of
extended CEA blocks from the untrusted source (EDID). Add a check
to limit the number of CEA extension blocks.
Bug: 37625232
Change-Id: I69f09ed0ad28a4c267cf3e8f7a12efe46f75e244
Signed-off-by: Narender Ankam <nankam@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdss_hdmi_edid.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdss_hdmi_edid.c b/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdss_hdmi_edid.c
index 36c24302658d8..5c8f52c42302c 100644
--- a/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdss_hdmi_edid.c
+++ b/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdss_hdmi_edid.c
@@ -2180,6 +2180,13 @@ int hdmi_edid_parser(void *input)
goto bail;
}
+ /* Find out if CEA extension blocks exceeding max limit */
+ if (num_of_cea_blocks >= MAX_EDID_BLOCKS) {
+ DEV_WARN("%s: HDMI EDID exceeded max CEA blocks limit\n",
+ __func__);
+ num_of_cea_blocks = MAX_EDID_BLOCKS - 1;
+ }
+
/* check for valid CEA block */
if (edid_buf[EDID_BLOCK_SIZE] != 2) {
DEV_ERR("%s: Invalid CEA block\n", __func__);

97
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11600/3.10/0001.patch
View File

@ -1,44 +1,67 @@
From 7bab09631c2a303f87a7eb7e3d69e888673b9b7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Aug 2017 19:50:14 +0200
Subject: xfrm: policy: check policy direction value
From 0af5440977299a17a0f226ce00d872572a426c14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2017 15:12:24 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] ANDROID: check dir value of xfrm_userpolicy_id
The 'dir' parameter in xfrm_migrate() is a user-controlled byte which is used
as an array index. This can lead to an out-of-bound access, kernel lockup and
DoS. Add a check for the 'dir' value.
Check user provided dir value to prevent out-of-bound access
which may occur if dir is not less than XFRM_POLICY_MAX.
This fixes CVE-2017-11600.
(url: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2017/Jul/30)
References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1474928
Fixes: 80c9abaabf42 ("[XFRM]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.21-rc1
Reported-by: "bo Zhang" <zhangbo5891001@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Bug: 64257838
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Change-Id: I5bbdf95e14a61bdf5207977d9a5a4465bc848da0
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
index ff61d85..6f5a0dad 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -3308,9 +3308,15 @@ int xfrm_migrate(const struct xfrm_selector *sel, u8 dir, u8 type,
struct xfrm_state *x_new[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
struct xfrm_migrate *mp;
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 3f565e495ac6..0cc105403826 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -1583,6 +1583,10 @@ static struct sk_buff *xfrm_policy_netlink(struct sk_buff *in_skb,
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
+ /* Stage 0 - sanity checks */
if ((err = xfrm_migrate_check(m, num_migrate)) < 0)
goto out;
+ if (dir >= XFRM_POLICY_MAX) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ err = verify_policy_dir(dir);
+ if (err)
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+
/* Stage 1 - find policy */
if ((pol = xfrm_migrate_policy_find(sel, dir, type, net)) == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
--
cgit v1.1
skb = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
@@ -2129,6 +2133,10 @@ static int xfrm_do_migrate(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
int err;
int n = 0;
+ err = verify_policy_dir(pi->dir);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
if (attrs[XFRMA_MIGRATE] == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2243,6 +2251,11 @@ static int xfrm_send_migrate(const struct xfrm_selector *sel, u8 dir, u8 type,
{
struct net *net = &init_net;
struct sk_buff *skb;
+ int err;
+
+ err = verify_policy_dir(dir);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
skb = nlmsg_new(xfrm_migrate_msgsize(num_migrate, !!k), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
@@ -2871,6 +2884,11 @@ static int xfrm_notify_policy_flush(const struct km_event *c)
static int xfrm_send_policy_notify(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int dir, const struct km_event *c)
{
+ int err;
+
+ err = verify_policy_dir(dir);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
switch (c->event) {
case XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY:

44
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-11600/3.10/0002.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
From 7bab09631c2a303f87a7eb7e3d69e888673b9b7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Aug 2017 19:50:14 +0200
Subject: xfrm: policy: check policy direction value
The 'dir' parameter in xfrm_migrate() is a user-controlled byte which is used
as an array index. This can lead to an out-of-bound access, kernel lockup and
DoS. Add a check for the 'dir' value.
This fixes CVE-2017-11600.
References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1474928
Fixes: 80c9abaabf42 ("[XFRM]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.21-rc1
Reported-by: "bo Zhang" <zhangbo5891001@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
index ff61d85..6f5a0dad 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -3308,9 +3308,15 @@ int xfrm_migrate(const struct xfrm_selector *sel, u8 dir, u8 type,
struct xfrm_state *x_new[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
struct xfrm_migrate *mp;
+ /* Stage 0 - sanity checks */
if ((err = xfrm_migrate_check(m, num_migrate)) < 0)
goto out;
+ if (dir >= XFRM_POLICY_MAX) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/* Stage 1 - find policy */
if ((pol = xfrm_migrate_policy_find(sel, dir, type, net)) == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
--
cgit v1.1

32
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-16537/^4.13/0001.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From 58fd55e838276a0c13d1dc7c387f90f25063cbf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2017 20:14:48 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] media: imon: Fix null-ptr-deref in imon_probe
It seems that the return value of usb_ifnum_to_if() can be NULL and
needs to be checked.
Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Young <sean@mess.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
---
drivers/media/rc/imon.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/media/rc/imon.c b/drivers/media/rc/imon.c
index 9724fe8110e3d..9fef8cc171140 100644
--- a/drivers/media/rc/imon.c
+++ b/drivers/media/rc/imon.c
@@ -2515,6 +2515,11 @@ static int imon_probe(struct usb_interface *interface,
mutex_lock(&driver_lock);
first_if = usb_ifnum_to_if(usbdev, 0);
+ if (!first_if) {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
first_if_ctx = usb_get_intfdata(first_if);
if (ifnum == 0) {

182
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-16648/ANY/0001.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
From b1cb7372fa822af6c06c8045963571d13ad6348b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2017 08:39:39 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] dvb_frontend: don't use-after-free the frontend struct
dvb_frontend_invoke_release() may free the frontend struct.
So, the free logic can't update it anymore after calling it.
That's OK, as __dvb_frontend_free() is called only when the
krefs are zeroed, so nobody is using it anymore.
That should fix the following KASAN error:
The KASAN report looks like this (running on kernel 3e0cc09a3a2c40ec1ffb6b4e12da86e98feccb11 (4.14-rc5+)):
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __dvb_frontend_free+0x113/0x120
Write of size 8 at addr ffff880067d45a00 by task kworker/0:1/24
CPU: 0 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc5-43687-g06ab8a23e0e6 #545
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_store8_noabort+0x1c/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:435
__dvb_frontend_free+0x113/0x120 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c:156
dvb_frontend_put+0x59/0x70 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c:176
dvb_frontend_detach+0x120/0x150 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c:2803
dvb_usb_adapter_frontend_exit+0xd6/0x160 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-dvb.c:340
dvb_usb_adapter_exit drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:116
dvb_usb_exit+0x9b/0x200 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:132
dvb_usb_device_exit+0xa5/0xf0 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:295
usb_unbind_interface+0x21c/0xa90 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:423
__device_release_driver drivers/base/dd.c:861
device_release_driver_internal+0x4f1/0x5c0 drivers/base/dd.c:893
device_release_driver+0x1e/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:918
bus_remove_device+0x2f4/0x4b0 drivers/base/bus.c:565
device_del+0x5c4/0xab0 drivers/base/core.c:1985
usb_disable_device+0x1e9/0x680 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1170
usb_disconnect+0x260/0x7a0 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2124
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4754
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x1318/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc73/0x1d90 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x363/0x440 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
Allocated by task 24:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
dtt200u_fe_attach+0x4c/0x110 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dtt200u-fe.c:212
dtt200u_frontend_attach+0x35/0x80 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dtt200u.c:136
dvb_usb_adapter_frontend_init+0x32b/0x660 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-dvb.c:286
dvb_usb_adapter_init drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:86
dvb_usb_init drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:162
dvb_usb_device_init+0xf73/0x17f0 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:277
dtt200u_usb_probe+0xa1/0xe0 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dtt200u.c:155
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26b/0x3c0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932
generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174
usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26b/0x3c0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc73/0x1d90 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x363/0x440 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
Freed by task 24:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
dtt200u_fe_release+0x3c/0x50 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dtt200u-fe.c:202
dvb_frontend_invoke_release.part.13+0x1c/0x30 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c:2790
dvb_frontend_invoke_release drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c:2789
__dvb_frontend_free+0xad/0x120 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c:153
dvb_frontend_put+0x59/0x70 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c:176
dvb_frontend_detach+0x120/0x150 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c:2803
dvb_usb_adapter_frontend_exit+0xd6/0x160 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-dvb.c:340
dvb_usb_adapter_exit drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:116
dvb_usb_exit+0x9b/0x200 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:132
dvb_usb_device_exit+0xa5/0xf0 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:295
usb_unbind_interface+0x21c/0xa90 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:423
__device_release_driver drivers/base/dd.c:861
device_release_driver_internal+0x4f1/0x5c0 drivers/base/dd.c:893
device_release_driver+0x1e/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:918
bus_remove_device+0x2f4/0x4b0 drivers/base/bus.c:565
device_del+0x5c4/0xab0 drivers/base/core.c:1985
usb_disable_device+0x1e9/0x680 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1170
usb_disconnect+0x260/0x7a0 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2124
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4754
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x1318/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc73/0x1d90 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x363/0x440 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff880067d45500
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2048 of size 2048
The buggy address is located 1280 bytes inside of
2048-byte region [ffff880067d45500, ffff880067d45d00)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00019f5000 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null)
index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head)
raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001000f000f
raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff88006c002d80 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880067d45900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880067d45980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880067d45a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880067d45a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880067d45b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: ead666000a5f ("media: dvb_frontend: only use kref after initialized")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Suggested-by: Matthias Schwarzott <zzam@gentoo.org>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
---
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c | 7 ++-----
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c
index d485d5f6cc887..3ad83359098bd 100644
--- a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c
+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c
@@ -150,11 +150,8 @@ static void __dvb_frontend_free(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
dvb_frontend_invoke_release(fe, fe->ops.release);
- if (!fepriv)
- return;
-
- kfree(fepriv);
- fe->frontend_priv = NULL;
+ if (fepriv)
+ kfree(fepriv);
}
static void dvb_frontend_free(struct kref *ref)

96
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From f9a1c372299fed53d4b72bb601f7f3bfe6f9999c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2017 10:47:14 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] ALSA: usx2y: Fix invalid stream URBs
The us122l driver creates URBs per the fixed endpoints, and this may
end up with URBs with inconsistent pipes when a fuzzer or a malicious
program deals with the manipulated endpoints. It ends up with a
kernel warning like:
usb 1-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 0 != type 3
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 24 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:471
usb_submit_urb+0x113e/0x1400
Call Trace:
usb_stream_start+0x48a/0x9f0 sound/usb/usx2y/usb_stream.c:690
us122l_start+0x116/0x290 sound/usb/usx2y/us122l.c:365
us122l_create_card sound/usb/usx2y/us122l.c:502
us122l_usb_probe sound/usb/usx2y/us122l.c:588
....
For avoiding the bad access, this patch adds a few sanity checks of
the validity of created URBs like previous similar fixes using the new
usb_urb_ep_type_check() helper function.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
---
sound/usb/usx2y/usb_stream.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/usb/usx2y/usb_stream.c b/sound/usb/usx2y/usb_stream.c
index e229abd216526..b0f8979ff2d2f 100644
--- a/sound/usb/usx2y/usb_stream.c
+++ b/sound/usb/usx2y/usb_stream.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static void playback_prep_freqn(struct usb_stream_kernel *sk, struct urb *urb)
lb, s->period_size);
}
-static void init_pipe_urbs(struct usb_stream_kernel *sk, unsigned use_packsize,
+static int init_pipe_urbs(struct usb_stream_kernel *sk, unsigned use_packsize,
struct urb **urbs, char *transfer,
struct usb_device *dev, int pipe)
{
@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ static void init_pipe_urbs(struct usb_stream_kernel *sk, unsigned use_packsize,
urb->interval = 1;
if (usb_pipeout(pipe))
continue;
+ if (usb_urb_ep_type_check(urb))
+ return -EINVAL;
urb->transfer_buffer_length = transfer_length;
desc = urb->iso_frame_desc;
@@ -87,9 +89,11 @@ static void init_pipe_urbs(struct usb_stream_kernel *sk, unsigned use_packsize,
desc[p].length = maxpacket;
}
}
+
+ return 0;
}
-static void init_urbs(struct usb_stream_kernel *sk, unsigned use_packsize,
+static int init_urbs(struct usb_stream_kernel *sk, unsigned use_packsize,
struct usb_device *dev, int in_pipe, int out_pipe)
{
struct usb_stream *s = sk->s;
@@ -103,9 +107,12 @@ static void init_urbs(struct usb_stream_kernel *sk, unsigned use_packsize,
sk->outurb[u] = usb_alloc_urb(sk->n_o_ps, GFP_KERNEL);
}
- init_pipe_urbs(sk, use_packsize, sk->inurb, indata, dev, in_pipe);
- init_pipe_urbs(sk, use_packsize, sk->outurb, sk->write_page, dev,
- out_pipe);
+ if (init_pipe_urbs(sk, use_packsize, sk->inurb, indata, dev, in_pipe) ||
+ init_pipe_urbs(sk, use_packsize, sk->outurb, sk->write_page, dev,
+ out_pipe))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
}
@@ -226,7 +233,11 @@ struct usb_stream *usb_stream_new(struct usb_stream_kernel *sk,
else
sk->freqn = get_usb_high_speed_rate(sample_rate);
- init_urbs(sk, use_packsize, dev, in_pipe, out_pipe);
+ if (init_urbs(sk, use_packsize, dev, in_pipe, out_pipe) < 0) {
+ usb_stream_free(sk);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
sk->s->state = usb_stream_stopped;
out:
return sk->s;

51
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From 58fc7f73a85d45a47057dad2af53502fdf6cf778 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2017 15:07:21 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] ALSA: caiaq: Add a sanity check for invalid EPs
As syzkaller spotted, currently caiaq driver submits a URB with the
fixed EP without checking whether it's actually available, which may
result in a kernel warning like:
usb 1-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 3 != type 1
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1150 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:449
usb_submit_urb+0xf8a/0x11d0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 1150 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted
4.14.0-rc2-42660-g24b7bd59eec0 #277
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
init_card sound/usb/caiaq/device.c:467
snd_probe+0x81c/0x1150 sound/usb/caiaq/device.c:525
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
....
This patch adds a sanity check of validity of EPs at the device
initialization phase for avoiding the call with an invalid EP.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
---
sound/usb/caiaq/device.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sound/usb/caiaq/device.c b/sound/usb/caiaq/device.c
index 0fb6b1b792617..a29674bf96e57 100644
--- a/sound/usb/caiaq/device.c
+++ b/sound/usb/caiaq/device.c
@@ -461,6 +461,13 @@ static int init_card(struct snd_usb_caiaqdev *cdev)
cdev->midi_out_buf, EP1_BUFSIZE,
snd_usb_caiaq_midi_output_done, cdev);
+ /* sanity checks of EPs before actually submitting */
+ if (usb_urb_ep_type_check(&cdev->ep1_in_urb) ||
+ usb_urb_ep_type_check(&cdev->midi_out_urb)) {
+ dev_err(dev, "invalid EPs\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
init_waitqueue_head(&cdev->ep1_wait_queue);
init_waitqueue_head(&cdev->prepare_wait_queue);

52
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From 2a4340c57717162c6bf07a0860d05711d4de994b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2017 15:09:24 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] ALSA: line6: Add a sanity check for invalid EPs
As syzkaller spotted, currently line6 drivers submit a URB with the
fixed EP without checking whether it's actually available, which may
result in a kernel warning like:
usb 1-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 3 != type 1
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 24 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:449
usb_submit_urb+0xf8a/0x11d0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc2-42613-g1488251d1a98 #238
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
line6_start_listen+0x55f/0x9e0 sound/usb/line6/driver.c:82
line6_init_cap_control sound/usb/line6/driver.c:690
line6_probe+0x7c9/0x1310 sound/usb/line6/driver.c:764
podhd_probe+0x64/0x70 sound/usb/line6/podhd.c:474
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
....
This patch adds a sanity check of validity of EPs at the device
initialization phase for avoiding the call with an invalid EP.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
---
sound/usb/line6/driver.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sound/usb/line6/driver.c b/sound/usb/line6/driver.c
index 0ff5a7d2e19fe..0da6f68761e3e 100644
--- a/sound/usb/line6/driver.c
+++ b/sound/usb/line6/driver.c
@@ -78,6 +78,13 @@ static int line6_start_listen(struct usb_line6 *line6)
line6->buffer_listen, LINE6_BUFSIZE_LISTEN,
line6_data_received, line6);
}
+
+ /* sanity checks of EP before actually submitting */
+ if (usb_urb_ep_type_check(line6->urb_listen)) {
+ dev_err(line6->ifcdev, "invalid control EP\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
line6->urb_listen->actual_length = 0;
err = usb_submit_urb(line6->urb_listen, GFP_ATOMIC);
return err;

52
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From 6815a0b444572527256f0d0efd8efe3ddede6018 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2017 15:03:40 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] ALSA: bcd2000: Add a sanity check for invalid EPs
As syzkaller spotted, currently bcd2000 driver submits a URB with the
fixed EP without checking whether it's actually available, which may
result in a kernel warning like:
usb 1-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 1 != type 3
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1846 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:449
usb_submit_urb+0xf8a/0x11d0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1846 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted
4.14.0-rc2-42613-g1488251d1a98 #238
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
bcd2000_init_device sound/usb/bcd2000/bcd2000.c:289
bcd2000_init_midi sound/usb/bcd2000/bcd2000.c:345
bcd2000_probe+0xe64/0x19e0 sound/usb/bcd2000/bcd2000.c:406
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
....
This patch adds a sanity check of validity of EPs at the device
initialization phase for avoiding the call with an invalid EP.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
---
sound/usb/bcd2000/bcd2000.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sound/usb/bcd2000/bcd2000.c b/sound/usb/bcd2000/bcd2000.c
index 7371e5b060356..a6408209d7f1d 100644
--- a/sound/usb/bcd2000/bcd2000.c
+++ b/sound/usb/bcd2000/bcd2000.c
@@ -342,6 +342,13 @@ static int bcd2000_init_midi(struct bcd2000 *bcd2k)
bcd2k->midi_out_buf, BUFSIZE,
bcd2000_output_complete, bcd2k, 1);
+ /* sanity checks of EPs before actually submitting */
+ if (usb_urb_ep_type_check(bcd2k->midi_in_urb) ||
+ usb_urb_ep_type_check(bcd2k->midi_out_urb)) {
+ dev_err(&bcd2k->dev->dev, "invalid MIDI EP\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
bcd2000_init_device(bcd2k);
return 0;

61
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diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/clk/gm20b.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/clk/gm20b.c
index 1dcaba4..e08cf95 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/clk/gm20b.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/clk/gm20b.c
@@ -1613,6 +1613,9 @@
int tstate, throt_cur_tstate, edp_cur_tstate;
unsigned long freq, cur_freq = ULONG_MAX;
+ if (cur_state > bthrot_ins->throt_tab_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (bthrot_ins->cur_state == cur_state)
return 0;
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/volt/gk20a.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/volt/gk20a.c
index a18e4c9..1243d21 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/volt/gk20a.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/volt/gk20a.c
@@ -314,6 +314,9 @@
struct gk20a_volt_priv *priv = (struct gk20a_volt_priv *)cdev->devdata;
struct nvkm_volt *volt = &priv->base;
+ if (cur_state >= MAX_THERMAL_LIMITS)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
mutex_lock(&volt->therm_lock);
if (priv->therm_idx == cur_state)
diff --git a/drivers/soc/tegra/tegra-dvfs.c b/drivers/soc/tegra/tegra-dvfs.c
index 5c0af3b..990cd61 100644
--- a/drivers/soc/tegra/tegra-dvfs.c
+++ b/drivers/soc/tegra/tegra-dvfs.c
@@ -1068,6 +1068,14 @@
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(tegra_core_rail) || !tegra_core_rail->is_ready)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (type == TEGRA_DVFS_CORE_THERMAL_FLOOR) {
+ if (new_idx >= rail->therm_floors_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (type == TEGRA_DVFS_CORE_THERMAL_CAP) {
+ if (new_idx > rail->therm_caps_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
mutex_lock(&dvfs_lock);
if (type == TEGRA_DVFS_CORE_THERMAL_FLOOR) {
if (rail->therm_floor_idx != new_idx) {
diff --git a/drivers/thermal/tegra/tegra_throttle.c b/drivers/thermal/tegra/tegra_throttle.c
index 39a913e..e9991db 100644
--- a/drivers/thermal/tegra/tegra_throttle.c
+++ b/drivers/thermal/tegra/tegra_throttle.c
@@ -198,6 +198,9 @@
if (bthrot->cpu_freq_table == NULL)
return 0;
+ if (cur_state > bthrot_ins->throt_tab_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (bthrot_ins->cur_state == cur_state)
return 0;

1
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@ -0,0 +1 @@
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

61
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-6275/3.18/0001.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/clk/gm20b.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/clk/gm20b.c
index 1dcaba4..e08cf95 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/clk/gm20b.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/clk/gm20b.c
@@ -1613,6 +1613,9 @@
int tstate, throt_cur_tstate, edp_cur_tstate;
unsigned long freq, cur_freq = ULONG_MAX;
+ if (cur_state > bthrot_ins->throt_tab_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (bthrot_ins->cur_state == cur_state)
return 0;
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/volt/gk20a.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/volt/gk20a.c
index a18e4c9..1243d21 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/volt/gk20a.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/volt/gk20a.c
@@ -314,6 +314,9 @@
struct gk20a_volt_priv *priv = (struct gk20a_volt_priv *)cdev->devdata;
struct nvkm_volt *volt = &priv->base;
+ if (cur_state >= MAX_THERMAL_LIMITS)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
mutex_lock(&volt->therm_lock);
if (priv->therm_idx == cur_state)
diff --git a/drivers/soc/tegra/tegra-dvfs.c b/drivers/soc/tegra/tegra-dvfs.c
index 5c0af3b..990cd61 100644
--- a/drivers/soc/tegra/tegra-dvfs.c
+++ b/drivers/soc/tegra/tegra-dvfs.c
@@ -1068,6 +1068,14 @@
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(tegra_core_rail) || !tegra_core_rail->is_ready)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (type == TEGRA_DVFS_CORE_THERMAL_FLOOR) {
+ if (new_idx >= rail->therm_floors_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (type == TEGRA_DVFS_CORE_THERMAL_CAP) {
+ if (new_idx > rail->therm_caps_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
mutex_lock(&dvfs_lock);
if (type == TEGRA_DVFS_CORE_THERMAL_FLOOR) {
if (rail->therm_floor_idx != new_idx) {
diff --git a/drivers/thermal/tegra/tegra_throttle.c b/drivers/thermal/tegra/tegra_throttle.c
index 39a913e..e9991db 100644
--- a/drivers/thermal/tegra/tegra_throttle.c
+++ b/drivers/thermal/tegra/tegra_throttle.c
@@ -198,6 +198,9 @@
if (bthrot->cpu_freq_table == NULL)
return 0;
+ if (cur_state > bthrot_ins->throt_tab_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (bthrot_ins->cur_state == cur_state)
return 0;

1
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-6275/3.18/0001.patch.base64 Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1 @@
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

50
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-7541/3.10/0002.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
From 7136ca73ff3496758b56f60b6fe76d675e69cd21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2017 21:09:06 +0100
Subject: brcmfmac: fix possible buffer overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
commit 8f44c9a41386729fea410e688959ddaa9d51be7c upstream.
The lower level nl80211 code in cfg80211 ensures that "len" is between
25 and NL80211_ATTR_FRAME (2304). We subtract DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN (24) from
"len" so thats's max of 2280. However, the action_frame->data[] buffer is
only BRCMF_FIL_ACTION_FRAME_SIZE (1800) bytes long so this memcpy() can
overflow.
memcpy(action_frame->data, &buf[DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN],
le16_to_cpu(action_frame->len));
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.9.x
Fixes: 18e2f61db3b70 ("brcmfmac: P2P action frame tx.")
Reported-by: "freenerguo(郭大兴)" <freenerguo@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[wt: s/cfg80211.c/wl_cfg80211.c in 3.10]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmfmac/wl_cfg80211.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmfmac/wl_cfg80211.c b/drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmfmac/wl_cfg80211.c
index 2c52430..8afb609 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmfmac/wl_cfg80211.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmfmac/wl_cfg80211.c
@@ -4019,6 +4019,11 @@ brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct wireless_dev *wdev,
cfg80211_mgmt_tx_status(wdev, *cookie, buf, len, true,
GFP_KERNEL);
} else if (ieee80211_is_action(mgmt->frame_control)) {
+ if (len > BRCMF_FIL_ACTION_FRAME_SIZE + DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN) {
+ brcmf_err("invalid action frame length\n");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto exit;
+ }
af_params = kzalloc(sizeof(*af_params), GFP_KERNEL);
if (af_params == NULL) {
brcmf_err("unable to allocate frame\n");
--
cgit v1.1

0
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-7541/ANY/0001.patch → Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-7541/^4.12/0001.patch
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42
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-8890/3.10/0002.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
From 1853870b216d3446efd39190a8ff0006c54dfd46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 06:29:19 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] BACKPORT: dccp/tcp: do not inherit mc_list from parent
syzkaller found a way to trigger double frees from ip_mc_drop_socket()
It turns out that leave a copy of parent mc_list at accept() time,
which is very bad.
Very similar to commit 8b485ce69876 ("tcp: do not inherit
fastopen_req from parent")
Initial report from Pray3r, completed by Andrey one.
Thanks a lot to them !
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Pray3r <pray3r.z@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Pereira <rpere@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit 657831ffc38e30092a2d5f03d385d710eb88b09a)
Bug:38413975
Change-Id: Icf89ad025cb8225e806e52c573d68533912111ad
---
net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c
index 64198a381ddca..008b52bc99a3d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c
@@ -697,6 +697,8 @@ struct sock *inet_csk_clone_lock(const struct sock *sk,
inet_sk(newsk)->inet_sport = inet_rsk(req)->loc_port;
newsk->sk_write_space = sk_stream_write_space;
+ inet_sk(newsk)->mc_list = NULL;
+
newsk->sk_mark = inet_rsk(req)->ir_mark;
newicsk->icsk_retransmits = 0;

0
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-8890/^4.11/0002.patch → Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-8890/^4.11/0003.patch
View File

29
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-9690/3.18/0001.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
From b59b67fbd2f1d4f71e7a4f9e6723f04b717efc74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Siarhei Vishniakou <svv@google.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2017 16:26:53 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] arm64: dts: marlin: remove QBT1000 from device tree
Marlin does not use QBT1000.
Bug: 36575870
Bug: 36227548
Test: Tested on marlin and sailfish.
Change-Id: I48a2b75f1cd678a673a8706e8d3304b25f45d3cd
Signed-off-by: Siarhei Vishniakou <svv@google.com>
---
arch/arm64/boot/dts/htc/msm8996-htc-common.dtsi | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/htc/msm8996-htc-common.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/htc/msm8996-htc-common.dtsi
index 831a99c32c0aa..4fedb4b6149c4 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/htc/msm8996-htc-common.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/htc/msm8996-htc-common.dtsi
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@
qcom,mitigation-freq-khz = <1132800>;
};
};
+ /delete-node/ qcom,qbt1000;
};
&wdog {

34
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-9696/3.10/0001.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From 8b44a684139301fa31548e8120b7e6299965572a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alok Kediya <kediya@codeaurora.org>
Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2017 15:51:35 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] msm: camera: Bound check for num_of_stream.
- num of stream comes from userspace and used without
any bound check.It may result to overflow update_info.
CRs-Fixed: 2006829
Bug: 36232584
Change-Id: I8226e8f7081b28108dbed738ea4579e2051a85f2
Signed-off-by: Alok Kediya <kediya@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_stats_util.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_stats_util.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_stats_util.c
index 43a2c77dcc8da..490ab13e4e607 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_stats_util.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/isp/msm_isp_stats_util.c
@@ -817,6 +817,12 @@ int msm_isp_update_stats_stream(struct vfe_device *vfe_dev, void *arg)
struct msm_vfe_axi_stream_cfg_update_info *update_info = NULL;
struct msm_isp_sw_framskip *sw_skip_info = NULL;
+ if (update_cmd->num_streams > MSM_ISP_STATS_MAX) {
+ pr_err("%s: Invalid num_streams %d\n",
+ __func__, update_cmd->num_streams);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
/*validate request*/
for (i = 0; i < update_cmd->num_streams; i++) {
update_info = &update_cmd->update_info[i];

43
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-9702/3.10/0001.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
From 2ae1eab54e874553c078e5275421398597401ac9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Haibin Liu <haibinl@codeaurora.org>
Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 18:52:30 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] msm: camera: fix untrusted pointer for power down setting
When getting power down setting, there is an untrusted pointer
from a user space pointer.Need to copy to the kernel space first.
CRs-Fixed: 2037398
Bug: 36492827
Change-Id: I64032a96e62ddfeec85eebe984d8ba52754f6148
Signed-off-by: Haibin Liu <haibinl@codeaurora.org>
---
.../platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/msm_sensor_driver.c | 16 +++++-----------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/msm_sensor_driver.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/msm_sensor_driver.c
index 87e741b651c4a..5d3c56191e0d4 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/msm_sensor_driver.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/msm_sensor_driver.c
@@ -407,17 +407,11 @@ static int32_t msm_sensor_create_pd_settings(void *setting,
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (is_compat_task()) {
- int i = 0;
- struct msm_sensor_power_setting32 *power_setting_iter =
- (struct msm_sensor_power_setting32 *)compat_ptr((
- (struct msm_camera_sensor_slave_info32 *)setting)->
- power_setting_array.power_setting);
-
- for (i = 0; i < size_down; i++) {
- pd[i].config_val = power_setting_iter[i].config_val;
- pd[i].delay = power_setting_iter[i].delay;
- pd[i].seq_type = power_setting_iter[i].seq_type;
- pd[i].seq_val = power_setting_iter[i].seq_val;
+ rc = msm_sensor_get_pw_settings_compat(
+ pd, pu, size_down);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ pr_err("failed");
+ return -EFAULT;
}
} else
#endif

122
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-9702/3.10/0002.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
From c46b2ecd901a12867d0dd91ae019f4b7256bcfec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Haibin Liu <haibinl@codeaurora.org>
Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2017 16:26:41 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] msm: sensor: Fix crash when ioctl VIDIOC_MSM_SENSOR_INIT_CFG
Issue:
the invalid slave_info is used by msm_sensor_driver_probe.
This cause crash when ioctl VIDIOC_MSM_SENSOR_INIT_CFG repeatedly.
Fix:
1) avoid the same msm_sd_subdev added into the ordered_sd_list.
2) enlarge the buffer size for i2c addr and data.
Bug: 36492827
Change-Id: Idffcd3b82b9590dbfdcaf14b80668cc894178f54
Signed-off-by: Haibin Liu <haibinl@codeaurora.org>
---
drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/msm.c | 5 +++++
.../msm/camera_v2/sensor/io/msm_camera_cci_i2c.c | 5 +++--
.../msm/camera_v2/sensor/msm_sensor_driver.c | 25 ++++++++++++++--------
3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/msm.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/msm.c
index e517f0f589ce6..47ba2f99dd001 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/msm.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/msm.c
@@ -334,6 +334,11 @@ static void msm_add_sd_in_position(struct msm_sd_subdev *msm_subdev,
struct msm_sd_subdev *temp_sd;
list_for_each_entry(temp_sd, sd_list, list) {
+ if (temp_sd == msm_subdev) {
+ pr_err("%s :Fail to add the same sd %d\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__);
+ return;
+ }
if (msm_subdev->close_seq < temp_sd->close_seq) {
list_add_tail(&msm_subdev->list, &temp_sd->list);
return;
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/io/msm_camera_cci_i2c.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/io/msm_camera_cci_i2c.c
index 877021edc776d..4243005beff50 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/io/msm_camera_cci_i2c.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/io/msm_camera_cci_i2c.c
@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@
#undef CDBG
#define CDBG(fmt, args...) pr_debug(fmt, ##args)
#define S_I2C_DBG(fmt, args...) pr_debug(fmt, ##args)
-
+#define MAX_I2C_ADDR_TYPE_SIZE (MSM_CAMERA_I2C_3B_ADDR + 1)
+#define MAX_I2C_DATA_TYPE_SIZE (MSM_CAMERA_I2C_SET_BYTE_WRITE_MASK_DATA + 1)
#define I2C_COMPARE_MATCH 0
#define I2C_COMPARE_MISMATCH 1
#define I2C_POLL_MAX_ITERATION 20
@@ -27,7 +28,7 @@ int32_t msm_camera_cci_i2c_read(struct msm_camera_i2c_client *client,
enum msm_camera_i2c_data_type data_type)
{
int32_t rc = -EFAULT;
- unsigned char buf[client->addr_type+data_type];
+ unsigned char buf[MAX_I2C_ADDR_TYPE_SIZE + MAX_I2C_DATA_TYPE_SIZE];
struct msm_camera_cci_ctrl cci_ctrl;
if ((client->addr_type != MSM_CAMERA_I2C_BYTE_ADDR
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/msm_sensor_driver.c b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/msm_sensor_driver.c
index 5d3c56191e0d4..bd376ffa28c10 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/msm_sensor_driver.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/msm/camera_v2/sensor/msm_sensor_driver.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2013-2015, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved.
+/* Copyright (c) 2013-2015,2017 The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 and
@@ -103,7 +103,11 @@ static int32_t msm_sensor_driver_create_i2c_v4l_subdev
s_ctrl->msm_sd.sd.entity.name = s_ctrl->msm_sd.sd.name;
s_ctrl->sensordata->sensor_info->session_id = session_id;
s_ctrl->msm_sd.close_seq = MSM_SD_CLOSE_2ND_CATEGORY | 0x3;
- msm_sd_register(&s_ctrl->msm_sd);
+ rc = msm_sd_register(&s_ctrl->msm_sd);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ pr_err("failed: msm_sd_register rc %d", rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
CDBG("%s:%d\n", __func__, __LINE__);
return rc;
}
@@ -133,7 +137,11 @@ static int32_t msm_sensor_driver_create_v4l_subdev
s_ctrl->msm_sd.sd.entity.group_id = MSM_CAMERA_SUBDEV_SENSOR;
s_ctrl->msm_sd.sd.entity.name = s_ctrl->msm_sd.sd.name;
s_ctrl->msm_sd.close_seq = MSM_SD_CLOSE_2ND_CATEGORY | 0x3;
- msm_sd_register(&s_ctrl->msm_sd);
+ rc = msm_sd_register(&s_ctrl->msm_sd);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ pr_err("failed: msm_sd_register rc %d", rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
msm_sensor_v4l2_subdev_fops = v4l2_subdev_fops;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
msm_sensor_v4l2_subdev_fops.compat_ioctl32 =
@@ -885,12 +893,6 @@ int32_t msm_sensor_driver_probe(void *setting,
pr_err("%s probe succeeded", slave_info->sensor_name);
- /*
- Set probe succeeded flag to 1 so that no other camera shall
- * probed on this slot
- */
- s_ctrl->is_probe_succeed = 1;
-
/*
* Update the subdevice id of flash-src based on availability in kernel.
*/
@@ -940,6 +942,11 @@ int32_t msm_sensor_driver_probe(void *setting,
msm_sensor_fill_sensor_info(s_ctrl, probed_info, entity_name);
+ /*
+ * Set probe succeeded flag to 1 so that no other camera shall
+ * probed on this slot
+ */
+ s_ctrl->is_probe_succeed = 1;
return rc;
camera_power_down:

0
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-9719/ANY/0001.patch → Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-9719/3.18/0001.patch
View File

0
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-9719/ANY/0002.patch → Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-9719/4.4/0002.patch
View File

80
Patches/Linux_CVEs/Kernel_CVE_Patch_List.txt
View File

@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
#Last checked 2017-11-25
#This is a combined list from the following sources
# https://source.android.com/security/bulletin
# https://source.android.com/security/advisory
# https://cve.lineageos.org
# https://cve.lineageos.org/api/v1/cves
# https://www.codeaurora.org/security-advisories
# https://www.codeaurora.org/security-advisories/security-bulletins
# https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/found_bugs_usb.md
@ -71,7 +72,9 @@ CVE-2013-6123
CVE-2013-6282
Link - https://www.codeaurora.org/cgit/quic/la/kernel/msm/commit/?id=76565e3d786bed66f247c682bd9f591098522483
CVE-2013-7446
Link - https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/net/unix/af_unix.c?id=7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c
Link - ^4.3 - https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/net/unix/af_unix.c?id=7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c
Link - ^4.3 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/8a292b04183e82d59721ab0893e4216010aa3db9
Link - ^4.3 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/5bed19c9f463f9078063363779548c50aea271a0
CVE-2014-0196
Link - https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4291086b1f081b869c6d79e5b7441633dc3ace00
Link - 3.2 - https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1e5099713ce
@ -293,7 +296,10 @@ CVE-2014-9904
CVE-2014-9914
Link - http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=9709674e68646cee5a24e3000b3558d25412203a
CVE-2014-9922
Depends
Link - http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=69c433ed2ecd2d3264efd7afec4439524b319121
Link - 3.10 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/48a6c91c1d967cc8375621509676a9eabfac5777
Link - 3.10 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/57bc19ec472ab303209b2d96a59a619c5221594d
CVE-2014-9940
Link - https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=60a2362f769cf549dc466134efe71c8bf9fbaaba
CVE-2015-3636
@ -968,9 +974,13 @@ CVE-2016-6828
CVE-2016-7042
Link - http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=03dab869b7b239c4e013ec82aea22e181e441cfc
CVE-2016-7097
Link - http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef
Depends
Link - ^4.8 - http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef
Link - 3.10 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/6b0c893dc08060d6999b07136391d8a298678dae
Link - 3.10 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/aedf77d56472d1fddf050c61c1017d4f51149fb1
CVE-2016-7117
Link - http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=34b88a68f26a75e4fded796f1a49c40f82234b7d
Link - ^4.5 - http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=34b88a68f26a75e4fded796f1a49c40f82234b7d
Link - ^4.5 - https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0b5240c45e2029986526b1405ab24906c708f770
CVE-2016-7910
Link - https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=77da160530dd1dc94f6ae15a981f24e5f0021e84
CVE-2016-7911
@ -1339,6 +1349,9 @@ CVE-2017-0628
Link - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la//kernel/msm-4.4/commit/?id=012e37bf91490c5b59ba2ab68a4d214b632b613f
CVE-2017-0629
Link - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la//kernel/msm-4.4/commit/?id=012e37bf91490c5b59ba2ab68a4d214b632b613f
CVE-2017-0630
Link - 3.10 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/28fb06421ab3d9256d32611138306470996cc4c1
Link - 3.10 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/45e5a5e1b85f23843b90f3cddcfc26fa862ff80c
CVE-2017-0631
Link - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la//kernel/msm-4.4/commit/?id=8236d6ebc7e26361ca7078cbeba01509f10941d8
CVE-2017-0632
@ -1393,6 +1406,12 @@ CVE-2017-0824
Link - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/tegra/commit/?id=3d6c7b39db34369e28b0581be26f57e9467f8408
CVE-2017-0825
Link - https://github.com/android/kernel_msm/commit/83366dd9ddb9337450f704ceef750a06c69df9ff
CVE-2017-0861
Link - 3.10 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/93533f313a1bf465ff8c33032e91b88315dcf9bf
CVE-2017-0862
Link - 3.10 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/19384322b5b51987bd6037f7a6b18a62a5d4d654
CVE-2017-0866
Link - 3.18 - https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/tegra/+/40286163f84a29993c2f552a237256541875a1b4
CVE-2017-1000251
Link - 3.0 - https://review.lineageos.org/#/c/189602/
Link - 3.4 - https://review.lineageos.org/#/c/189415/
@ -1443,12 +1462,16 @@ CVE-2017-11012
Link - qcacld-3.0 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/platform/vendor/qcom-opensource/wlan/qcacld-3.0/commit/?id=7d0e40d328fa092c36b9585516ed29fc6041be55
CVE-2017-11013
Link - prima - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/platform/vendor/qcom-opensource/wlan/prima/commit/?id=64297e4caffdf6b1a90807bbdb65a66b43582228
Link - qcacld-2.0 - https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/msm/+/bb3c16f2e001eef9dcdd73e8c6ed6331e5fdd86b
Link - qcacld-3.0 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/platform/vendor/qcom-opensource/wlan/qcacld-3.0/commit/?id=c9f8654b11a1e693022ad7f163b3bc477fea8ce8
CVE-2017-11014
Link - qcacld-2.0 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/adb96af5b080dfe4ee29961a17ed3f04c87d5519
Link - qcacld-3.0 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/platform/vendor/qcom-opensource/wlan/qcacld-3.0/commit/?id=ec58bc99e29d89f8e164954999ef8a45cec21754
CVE-2017-11015
Link - prima - https://github.com/LineageOS/lge-kernel-mako/commit/ac39bfffe109a6cffcaf3b537505130712161dce
Link - prima - https://github.com/LineageOS/lge-kernel-mako/commit/d0cd3ede7c17ee7fcf0f9b6d125d027bc28640be
Link - qcacld-2.0 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/d7285900f6fa28b0be51f5d18c52bd06385f8aee
Link - qcacld-2.0 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/a50ca3ce494ab6bb6b2e37cdd0428aa6d6260bef
Link - qcacld-3.0 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/platform/vendor/qcom-opensource/wlan/qcacld-3.0/commit/?id=ec58bc99e29d89f8e164954999ef8a45cec21754
Link - qcacld-3.0 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/platform/vendor/qcom-opensource/wlan/qcacld-3.0/commit/?id=1ef6add65a36de6c4da788f776de2b5b5c528d8e
CVE-2017-11018
@ -1457,23 +1480,26 @@ CVE-2017-11022
Link - qcacld-2.0 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/platform/vendor/qcom-opensource/wlan/qcacld-2.0/commit/?id=1379bfb6c09ee2ad5969db45c27fb675602b4ed0
Link - qcacld-3.0 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/platform/vendor/qcom-opensource/wlan/qcacld-3.0/commit/?id=f41e3dbc92d448d3d56cae5517e41a4bafafdf3f
CVE-2017-11023
Link - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-4.4/commit/?id=c36e61af0f770125d0061a8d988d0987cc8d116a
Link - 3.18 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/17ef83c708be034454df7914ef5484c36515eece
Link - 4.4 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-4.4/commit/?id=c36e61af0f770125d0061a8d988d0987cc8d116a
CVE-2017-11024
Link - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.10/commit/?id=f2a482422fefadfa0fa9b4146fc0e2b46ac04922
CVE-2017-11025
Link - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.10/commit/?id=95e72ae9281b77abc3ed0cc6a33c17b989241efa
CVE-2017-11028
Depends
Link - 3.18 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/a96e06fac09e182b5211f20dd6311f93a5d056af
Link - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-4.4/commit/?id=fd70b655d901e626403f132b65fc03d993f0a09b
Link - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-4.4/commit/?id=6724296d3f3b2821b83219768c1b9e971e380a9f
CVE-2017-11029
Link - 3.10 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/e13a16c079cf8f5c758f5c31fbd72edca2656e54
Link - 3.18 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.18/commit/?id=74ab23917b82769644a3299da47b58e080aa63f2
Link - 4.4 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-4.4/commit/?id=86f0d207d478e1681f6711b46766cfb3c6a30fb5
CVE-2017-11032
Link - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.18/commit/?id=2720294757d0ad5294283c15dc837852f7b2329a
CVE-2017-11035
Link - qcacld-3.0 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/platform/vendor/qcom-opensource/wlan/qcacld-3.0/commit/?id=c5060da3e741577578d66dfadb7922d853da6156
Link - qcacld-2.0 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/platform/vendor/qcom-opensource/wlan/qcacld-2.0/commit/?id=cc1896424ae7a346090f601bc69c6ca51d9c3e04
Link - qcacld-3.0 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/platform/vendor/qcom-opensource/wlan/qcacld-3.0/commit/?id=c5060da3e741577578d66dfadb7922d853da6156
CVE-2017-11040
Link - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-4.4/commit/?id=7a4d0eea0ca0c8a72111ae58d9829be817f102c9
CVE-2017-11046
@ -1510,7 +1536,22 @@ CVE-2017-11064
Link - qcacld-2.0 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/platform/vendor/qcom-opensource/wlan/qcacld-2.0/commit/?id=38d6f16b8583bae6a1881c744ae08d609c99cb7e
CVE-2017-11067
Link - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/3fabdcba3a09ce8f3cc757bf6240e53421a1e363
CVE-2017-11073
Link - 3.10 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/120d28bad9890eca3a6451a83a7c71cb650dfef7
CVE-2017-11085
Link - 3.10 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/dc8f7a19762df2c84678482b60f6b807b919eb44
CVE-2017-11089
Link - https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/msm/+/a30bdf229ab1efd96e500c43aabbff20e223128a
CVE-2017-11090
Link - https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/msm/+/98f7c17df33355e78417e6bb2395f810a903bb64
CVE-2017-11091
Link - 3.18 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/10b0cb47e92abe52c5372ded0fe80a5a5f18586f
CVE-2017-11092
Link - https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/msm/+/d78717de292b114f388e900e3e7947ae44630982
CVE-2017-11093
Link - 3.18 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/072d53b2ca00ac57ca4e0ebe2315b431256cf786
CVE-2017-11600
Link - 3.10 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_common/commit/0af5440977299a17a0f226ce00d872572a426c14
Link - 3.10 - https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec.git/commit/?id=7bab09631c2a303f87a7eb7e3d69e888673b9b7e
CVE-2017-12146
Link - 3.16+ - https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core.git/commit/?h=driver-core-next&id=6265539776a0810b7ce6398c27866ddb9c6bd154
@ -1563,6 +1604,10 @@ CVE-2017-6074
Link - ^4.9 - https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5edabca9d4cff7f1f2b68f0bac55ef99d9798ba4
CVE-2017-6214
Link - ^4.9 - http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=ccf7abb93af09ad0868ae9033d1ca8108bdaec82
CVE-2017-6274
Link - 3.18 - https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/tegra/+/0f08eca74276e7ebab4b712d98970c6425207ccc
CVE-2017-6275
Link - 3.18 - https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/tegra/+/0f08eca74276e7ebab4b712d98970c6425207ccc
CVE-2017-6345
Link - ^4.9 - http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=8b74d439e1697110c5e5c600643e823eb1dd0762
CVE-2017-6346
@ -1645,7 +1690,8 @@ CVE-2017-7495
Link - 3.18 - https://review.lineageos.org/#/c/175289
Link - ^4.6 - http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=06bd3c36a733ac27962fea7d6f47168841376824
CVE-2017-7541
Link - https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=8f44c9a41386729fea410e688959ddaa9d51be7c
Link - ^4.12 - https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=8f44c9a41386729fea410e688959ddaa9d51be7c
Link - 3.10 - https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?h=v3.10.108&id=7136ca73ff3496758b56f60b6fe76d675e69cd21
CVE-2017-7616
Link - ^4.10 - https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=cf01fb9985e8deb25ccf0ea54d916b8871ae0e62
CVE-2017-7618
@ -1757,6 +1803,7 @@ CVE-2017-8281
Link - 4.4 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-4.4/commit/?id=9b209c4552779edb86221787fb8681dd212e3a0c
CVE-2017-8890
Link - 3.4 - https://review.lineageos.org/#/c/173325/
Link - 3.10 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/1853870b216d3446efd39190a8ff0006c54dfd46
Link - ^4.11 - http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=657831ffc38e30092a2d5f03d385d710eb88b09a
CVE-2017-9074
Depends
@ -1798,6 +1845,8 @@ CVE-2017-9686
CVE-2017-9687
Link - 3.18 - https://github.com/android/kernel_msm/commit/34cff2eb2adc663de32ca682b57551c50c9253c6
Link - 4.4 - https://www.codeaurora.org/gitweb/quic/la/?p=kernel/msm-4.4.git;a=commit;h=8f1a77f5da53edd2b5a1c42ddd766712a90109d6
CVE-2017-9690
Link - 3.18 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/b59b67fbd2f1d4f71e7a4f9e6723f04b717efc74
CVE-2017-9691
Depends
Link - https://github.com/android/kernel_msm/commit/869bd2cd3d6c17826b6f162e0d721174224b867a
@ -1808,9 +1857,14 @@ CVE-2017-9693
Link - qcacld-2.0 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/platform/vendor/qcom-opensource/wlan/qcacld-2.0/commit/?id=05a5abb21e4d97001f77d344444a3ec2f9c275f9
CVE-2017-9694
Link - qcacld-2.0 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/platform/vendor/qcom-opensource/wlan/qcacld-2.0/commit/?id=1e47d44de7bab5500d27f17ae5c4ebebc7d2b4ef
CVE-2017-9696
Link - 3.10 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/8b44a684139301fa31548e8120b7e6299965572a
CVE-2017-9697
Link - 3.18 - https://github.com/android/kernel_msm/commit/4b788ca419ec37e4cdb421fef9edc208a491ce30
Link - 4.4 - https://www.codeaurora.org/gitweb/quic/la/?p=kernel/msm-4.4.git;a=commit;h=7e45e3a6c1f6dd46d71fb6824a7cf702d2e79225
CVE-2017-9702
Link - 3.10 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/2ae1eab54e874553c078e5275421398597401ac9
Link - 3.10 - https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_msm/commit/c46b2ecd901a12867d0dd91ae019f4b7256bcfec
CVE-2017-9706
Link - https://github.com/android/kernel_msm/commit/7489a0a8f68d0f018d0f9df5df157bb20f83b05e
CVE-2017-9714
@ -1820,8 +1874,8 @@ CVE-2017-9715
CVE-2017-9717
Link - qcacld-2.0 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/platform/vendor/qcom-opensource/wlan/qcacld-2.0/commit/?id=bf7486fb6d82fb9ad02e303b6fdf4061cfc0375d
CVE-2017-9719
Link - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.18/commit/?id=a491499c3490999555b7ccf8ad1a7d6455625807
Link - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-4.4/commit/?id=d815f54f15d765b5e0035a9d208d71567bcaace0
Link - 3.18 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.18/commit/?id=a491499c3490999555b7ccf8ad1a7d6455625807
Link - 4.4 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-4.4/commit/?id=d815f54f15d765b5e0035a9d208d71567bcaace0
CVE-2017-9720
Link - 3.10 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.10/commit/?id=c74dbab508c7c07d8e2cf8230cc78bff4b710272
Link - 3.18 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.18/commit/?id=737f415a5c637802786ec6d36288220cb4d3ae4d
@ -1857,7 +1911,7 @@ CVE-2017-16535
CVE-2017-16536
Link - ^4.13 - https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9963527/
CVE-2017-16537
Link - ^4.13 - https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9994017/
Link - ^4.13 - https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/58fd55e838276a0c13d1dc7c387f90f25063cbf3
CVE-2017-16538
Link - ^4.13 - https://patchwork.linuxtv.org/patch/44566/
Link - ^4.13 - https://patchwork.linuxtv.org/patch/44567/
@ -1872,7 +1926,7 @@ CVE-2017-16646
CVE-2017-16647
Link - https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/834686/
CVE-2017-16648
Link - https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10046189/
Link - https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b1cb7372fa822af6c06c8045963571d13ad6348b
CVE-2017-16649
Link - https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/834771/
CVE-2017-16650
@ -1883,6 +1937,10 @@ CVE-2017-16USB
Link - https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/70e743e4cec3733dc13559f6184b35d358b9ef3f
Link - https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/122d6a347329818419b032c5a1776e6b3866d9b9
Link - https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0a8fd1346254974c3a852338508e4a4cddbb35f1
Link - https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f9a1c372299fed53d4b72bb601f7f3bfe6f9999c
Link - https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/58fc7f73a85d45a47057dad2af53502fdf6cf778
Link - https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2a4340c57717162c6bf07a0860d05711d4de994b
Link - https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6815a0b444572527256f0d0efd8efe3ddede6018
CVE-2016-GadgetFS
Link - https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0173a68bfb0ad1c72a6ee39cc485aa2c97540b98
Link - https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/520b72fc64debf8a86c3853b8e486aa5982188f0