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17.1: August 2024 ASB work

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Signed-off-by: Tavi <tavi@divested.dev>
This commit is contained in:
Tavi 2024-08-17 10:04:14 -04:00
parent c3555ebac2
commit 439af0cc9d
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6 changed files with 262 additions and 1 deletions
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38
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_frameworks_av/399741.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
From c68f62f62fc3ffe077098e45f26ffa2fb3300d6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rakesh Kumar <rakesh.kumar@ittiam.com>
Date: Thu, 30 May 2024 11:17:48 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] StagefrightRecoder: Disabling B-frame support
Disabling b-frame support from stagefright recorder in case of
audio source as mic and video source is surface use case only
because screen recorder with microphone doesn't play in sync
if b-frame is enabled.
If the audio source selected is INTERNAL (i.e. device) or
MIC_AND_INTERNAL with screen recorder then b frame is supported.
Bug: 288549440
Test: manually check screen recording with audio from mic has audio/video in synch
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:af685c66bab17b71fe1624f76b5d55628f79e6fa)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:da3407f7688f35eb2dce79f1405feeb182241a3c)
Merged-In: I4098655eb9687fb633085333bc140634441566e6
Change-Id: I4098655eb9687fb633085333bc140634441566e6
---
media/libmediaplayerservice/StagefrightRecorder.cpp | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/media/libmediaplayerservice/StagefrightRecorder.cpp b/media/libmediaplayerservice/StagefrightRecorder.cpp
index a7344de402b..c66def491b9 100644
--- a/media/libmediaplayerservice/StagefrightRecorder.cpp
+++ b/media/libmediaplayerservice/StagefrightRecorder.cpp
@@ -1843,6 +1843,11 @@ status_t StagefrightRecorder::setupVideoEncoder(
if (tsLayers > 1) {
uint32_t bLayers = std::min(2u, tsLayers - 1); // use up-to 2 B-layers
+ // TODO(b/341121900): Remove this once B frames are handled correctly in screen recorder
+ // use case in case of mic only
+ if (mAudioSource == AUDIO_SOURCE_MIC && mVideoSource == VIDEO_SOURCE_SURFACE) {
+ bLayers = 0;
+ }
uint32_t pLayers = tsLayers - bLayers;
format->setString(
"ts-schema", AStringPrintf("android.generic.%u+%u", pLayers, bLayers));

65
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_frameworks_base/399739.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
From 45ee08b07a12600ead2f3a789d60094c9d886fb8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kiran S <krns@google.com>
Date: Mon, 13 May 2024 05:49:06 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Restrict USB poups while setup is in progress
Test: Cherry pick of http://ag/27094197
Bug: 294105066
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:2ce2e54a040342373e401f9c2e70035ede4e63ad)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:ec96cc3e3a81d21f2249db381c10638bb307cf39)
Merged-In: I7d54534696fd73f3b94c5b4250142eed9341c5d8
Change-Id: I7d54534696fd73f3b94c5b4250142eed9341c5d8
---
.../usb/UsbProfileGroupSettingsManager.java | 21 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/services/usb/java/com/android/server/usb/UsbProfileGroupSettingsManager.java b/services/usb/java/com/android/server/usb/UsbProfileGroupSettingsManager.java
index d7b6b5d0d36a2..de49091759df3 100644
--- a/services/usb/java/com/android/server/usb/UsbProfileGroupSettingsManager.java
+++ b/services/usb/java/com/android/server/usb/UsbProfileGroupSettingsManager.java
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
package com.android.server.usb;
+import static android.provider.Settings.Secure.USER_SETUP_COMPLETE;
+
import static com.android.internal.app.IntentForwarderActivity.FORWARD_INTENT_TO_MANAGED_PROFILE;
import android.annotation.NonNull;
@@ -42,6 +44,7 @@
import android.os.Environment;
import android.os.UserHandle;
import android.os.UserManager;
+import android.provider.Settings;
import android.service.usb.UsbProfileGroupSettingsManagerProto;
import android.service.usb.UsbSettingsAccessoryPreferenceProto;
import android.service.usb.UsbSettingsDevicePreferenceProto;
@@ -900,10 +903,28 @@ private void resolveActivity(Intent intent, UsbDevice device, boolean showMtpNot
return;
}
+ if (shouldRestrictOverlayActivities()) {
+ return;
+ }
+
// Start activity with registered intent
resolveActivity(intent, matches, defaultActivity, device, null);
}
+ private boolean shouldRestrictOverlayActivities() {
+ if (Settings.Secure.getIntForUser(
+ mContext.getContentResolver(),
+ USER_SETUP_COMPLETE,
+ /* defaultValue= */ 1,
+ UserHandle.CURRENT.getIdentifier())
+ == 0) {
+ Slog.d(TAG, "restricting usb overlay activities as setup is not complete");
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+ }
+
public void deviceAttachedForFixedHandler(UsbDevice device, ComponentName component) {
final Intent intent = createDeviceAttachedIntent(device);

33
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_frameworks_base/399740.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
From 644e95940f57497b7dd155d42f6b0bf42b5540b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Linus Tufvesson <lus@google.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2024 16:32:15 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Hide SAW subwindows
.. when top window is hidden through Window#setHideOverlayWindows
Bug: 318683640
Test: atest CtsWindowManagerDeviceWindow:HideOverlayWindowsTest
Flag: EXEMPT securityfix
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:c37bc9147086f497ac7b1595083836014f524d5f)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:89bc634cb534b8e0ffd798ac9f9f89ac1be0f785)
Merged-In: If19240f5aec2e048de80d75cbbdc00be47622d7f
Change-Id: If19240f5aec2e048de80d75cbbdc00be47622d7f
---
services/core/java/com/android/server/wm/WindowState.java | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/services/core/java/com/android/server/wm/WindowState.java b/services/core/java/com/android/server/wm/WindowState.java
index 319b7e88258db..12c301b300d69 100644
--- a/services/core/java/com/android/server/wm/WindowState.java
+++ b/services/core/java/com/android/server/wm/WindowState.java
@@ -3041,8 +3041,9 @@ boolean hideLw(boolean doAnimation, boolean requestAnim) {
}
void setForceHideNonSystemOverlayWindowIfNeeded(boolean forceHide) {
+ final int baseType = getBaseType();
if (mOwnerCanAddInternalSystemWindow
- || (!isSystemAlertWindowType(mAttrs.type) && mAttrs.type != TYPE_TOAST)) {
+ || (!isSystemAlertWindowType(baseType) && baseType != TYPE_TOAST)) {
return;
}
if (mForceHideNonSystemOverlayWindow == forceHide) {

60
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_system_bt/399742.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
From 2c0deba7d780ae11d16fc675fc6aa9abba344fd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Brian Delwiche <delwiche@google.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2024 16:43:29 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix heap-buffer overflow in sdp_utils.cc
Fuzzer identifies a case where sdpu_compare_uuid_with_attr crashes with
an out of bounds comparison. Although the bug claims this is due to a
comparison of a uuid with a smaller data field thana the discovery
attribute, my research suggests that this instead stems from a
comparison of a 128 bit UUID with a discovery attribute of some other,
invalid size.
Add checks for discovery attribute size.
Bug: 287184435
Test: atest bluetooth_test_gd_unit, net_test_stack_sdp
Tag: #security
Ignore-AOSP-First: Security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:99210e2f251e2189c1eede15942c832e017404c2)
Merged-In: Ib536cbeac454efbf6af3d713c05c8e3e077e069b
Change-Id: Ib536cbeac454efbf6af3d713c05c8e3e077e069b
---
stack/sdp/sdp_utils.cc | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/stack/sdp/sdp_utils.cc b/stack/sdp/sdp_utils.cc
index f8cde2c34c5..9581dc72a77 100644
--- a/stack/sdp/sdp_utils.cc
+++ b/stack/sdp/sdp_utils.cc
@@ -949,8 +949,28 @@ bool sdpu_compare_uuid_arrays(uint8_t* p_uuid1, uint32_t len1, uint8_t* p_uuid2,
******************************************************************************/
bool sdpu_compare_uuid_with_attr(const Uuid& uuid, tSDP_DISC_ATTR* p_attr) {
int len = uuid.GetShortestRepresentationSize();
- if (len == 2) return uuid.As16Bit() == p_attr->attr_value.v.u16;
- if (len == 4) return uuid.As32Bit() == p_attr->attr_value.v.u32;
+ if (len == 2) {
+ if (SDP_DISC_ATTR_LEN(p_attr->attr_len_type) == Uuid::kNumBytes16) {
+ return uuid.As16Bit() == p_attr->attr_value.v.u16;
+ } else {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "invalid length for discovery attribute";
+ return (false);
+ }
+ }
+ if (len == 4) {
+ if (SDP_DISC_ATTR_LEN(p_attr->attr_len_type) == Uuid::kNumBytes32) {
+ return uuid.As32Bit() == p_attr->attr_value.v.u32;
+ } else {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "invalid length for discovery attribute";
+ return (false);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (SDP_DISC_ATTR_LEN(p_attr->attr_len_type) != Uuid::kNumBytes128) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "invalid length for discovery attribute";
+ return (false);
+ }
+
if (memcmp(uuid.To128BitBE().data(), (void*)p_attr->attr_value.v.array,
Uuid::kNumBytes128) == 0)
return (true);

60
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/399743.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
From f33554bf3b2998d04a78d19c46d9db26f2d27478 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Brian Delwiche <delwiche@google.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2024 16:43:29 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix heap-buffer overflow in sdp_utils.cc
Fuzzer identifies a case where sdpu_compare_uuid_with_attr crashes with
an out of bounds comparison. Although the bug claims this is due to a
comparison of a uuid with a smaller data field thana the discovery
attribute, my research suggests that this instead stems from a
comparison of a 128 bit UUID with a discovery attribute of some other,
invalid size.
Add checks for discovery attribute size.
Bug: 287184435
Test: atest bluetooth_test_gd_unit, net_test_stack_sdp
Tag: #security
Ignore-AOSP-First: Security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:99210e2f251e2189c1eede15942c832e017404c2)
Merged-In: Ib536cbeac454efbf6af3d713c05c8e3e077e069b
Change-Id: Ib536cbeac454efbf6af3d713c05c8e3e077e069b
---
stack/sdp/sdp_utils.cc | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/stack/sdp/sdp_utils.cc b/stack/sdp/sdp_utils.cc
index ec48361fd..66f52c32f 100644
--- a/stack/sdp/sdp_utils.cc
+++ b/stack/sdp/sdp_utils.cc
@@ -739,8 +739,28 @@ bool sdpu_compare_uuid_arrays(uint8_t* p_uuid1, uint32_t len1, uint8_t* p_uuid2,
******************************************************************************/
bool sdpu_compare_uuid_with_attr(const Uuid& uuid, tSDP_DISC_ATTR* p_attr) {
int len = uuid.GetShortestRepresentationSize();
- if (len == 2) return uuid.As16Bit() == p_attr->attr_value.v.u16;
- if (len == 4) return uuid.As32Bit() == p_attr->attr_value.v.u32;
+ if (len == 2) {
+ if (SDP_DISC_ATTR_LEN(p_attr->attr_len_type) == Uuid::kNumBytes16) {
+ return uuid.As16Bit() == p_attr->attr_value.v.u16;
+ } else {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "invalid length for discovery attribute";
+ return (false);
+ }
+ }
+ if (len == 4) {
+ if (SDP_DISC_ATTR_LEN(p_attr->attr_len_type) == Uuid::kNumBytes32) {
+ return uuid.As32Bit() == p_attr->attr_value.v.u32;
+ } else {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "invalid length for discovery attribute";
+ return (false);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (SDP_DISC_ATTR_LEN(p_attr->attr_len_type) != Uuid::kNumBytes128) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "invalid length for discovery attribute";
+ return (false);
+ }
+
if (memcmp(uuid.To128BitBE().data(), (void*)p_attr->attr_value.v.array,
Uuid::kNumBytes128) == 0)
return (true);

7
Scripts/LineageOS-17.1/Patch.sh
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@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES_COMMON/android_build/0001-verity-openssl3.patch"; #Fix
sed -i '75i$(my_res_package): PRIVATE_AAPT_FLAGS += --auto-add-overlay' core/aapt2.mk; #Enable auto-add-overlay for packages, this allows the vendor overlay to easily work across all branches.
awk -i inplace '!/updatable_apex.mk/' target/product/mainline_system.mk; #Disable APEX
sed -i 's/PLATFORM_MIN_SUPPORTED_TARGET_SDK_VERSION := 23/PLATFORM_MIN_SUPPORTED_TARGET_SDK_VERSION := 28/' core/version_defaults.mk; #Set the minimum supported target SDK to Pie (GrapheneOS)
sed -i 's/2023-02-05/2024-07-05/' core/version_defaults.mk; #Bump Security String #Q_asb_2024-07
sed -i 's/2023-02-05/2024-08-05/' core/version_defaults.mk; #Bump Security String #x_asb_2024-08
fi;
if enterAndClear "build/soong"; then
@ -193,6 +193,7 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_av/383255.patch"; #Q_asb_2024-02 Upd
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_av/391906.patch"; #Q_asb_2024-03 Validate OMX Params for VPx encoders
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_av/391907.patch"; #Q_asb_2024-03 SoftVideoDecodeOMXComponent: validate OMX params for dynamic HDR
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_av/391908.patch"; #Q_asb_2024-03 Fix out of bounds read and write in onQueueFilled in outQueue
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_av/399741.patch"; #R_asb_2024-08 StagefrightRecoder: Disabling B-frame support
fi;
if enterAndClear "frameworks/base"; then
@ -313,6 +314,8 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/399086.patch"; #Q_asb_2024-06 A
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/399413.patch"; #Q_asb_2024-06 Check permissions for CDM shell commands
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/399088.patch"; #Q_asb_2024-07 Verify UID of incoming Zygote connections.
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/399089.patch"; #Q_asb_2024-07 Fix security vulnerability of non-dynamic permission removal
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/399739.patch"; #R_asb_2024-08 Restrict USB poups while setup is in progress
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/399740.patch"; #R_asb_2024-08 Hide SAW subwindows
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/272645.patch"; #ten-bt-sbc-hd-dualchannel: Add CHANNEL_MODE_DUAL_CHANNEL constant (ValdikSS)
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/272646-forwardport.patch"; #ten-bt-sbc-hd-dualchannel: Add Dual Channel into Bluetooth Audio Channel Mode developer options menu (ValdikSS)
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/272647.patch"; #ten-bt-sbc-hd-dualchannel: Allow SBC as HD audio codec in Bluetooth device configuration (ValdikSS)
@ -637,6 +640,7 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/391914.patch"; #Q_asb_2024-03 Fix an
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/391915.patch"; #Q_asb_2024-03 Reland: Fix an OOB write bug in attp_build_value_cmd
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/391916.patch"; #Q_asb_2024-03 Fix a security bypass issue in access_secure_service_from_temp_bond
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/399092.patch"; #Q_asb_2024-07 Fix an authentication bypass bug in SMP
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/399742.patch"; #R_asb_2024-08 Fix heap-buffer overflow in sdp_utils.cc
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES_COMMON/android_system_bt/0001-alloc_size.patch"; #Add alloc_size attributes to the allocator (GrapheneOS)
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/272648.patch"; #ten-bt-sbc-hd-dualchannel: Increase maximum Bluetooth SBC codec bitrate for SBC HD (ValdikSS)
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/272649.patch"; #ten-bt-sbc-hd-dualchannel: Explicit SBC Dual Channel (SBC HD) support (ValdikSS)
@ -749,6 +753,7 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/391917.patch";
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/391918.patch"; #Q_asb_2024-03 Fix a security bypass issue in access_secure_service_from_temp_bond
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/391919.patch"; #Q_asb_2024-03 Reland: Fix an OOB write bug in attp_build_value_cmd
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/399091.patch"; #Q_asb_2024-07 Fix an authentication bypass bug in SMP
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/399743.patch"; #R_asb_2024-08 Fix heap-buffer overflow in sdp_utils.cc
fi;
if enterAndClear "vendor/lineage"; then