diff --git a/Patches/Common/android_vendor_divested/overlay/common/frameworks/base/core/res/res/values/config.xml b/Patches/Common/android_vendor_divested/overlay/common/frameworks/base/core/res/res/values/config.xml index 24a3e667..b5252ba6 100644 --- a/Patches/Common/android_vendor_divested/overlay/common/frameworks/base/core/res/res/values/config.xml +++ b/Patches/Common/android_vendor_divested/overlay/common/frameworks/base/core/res/res/values/config.xml @@ -123,10 +123,10 @@ com.android.location.fused - - org.microg.nlp - - com.google.android.gms + + + com.android.location.fused ++ + + + +diff --git a/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java b/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java +index 1bd1396c6d45..1831c3770f51 100644 +--- a/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java ++++ b/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java +@@ -4203,8 +4203,19 @@ public class PackageManagerService extends IPackageManager.Stub + }); + } + +- PackageInfo packageInfo = PackageParser.generatePackageInfo(p, gids, flags, +- ps.firstInstallTime, ps.lastUpdateTime, permissions, state, userId); ++ // Allow microG GmsCore and FakeStore to spoof signature ++ final boolean isMicroG = ArrayUtils.contains(MICROG_FAKE_SIGNATURE_PACKAGES, ++ p.getPackageName()); ++ PackageInfo packageInfo; ++ if (isMicroG && SystemProperties.getBoolean(SPOOF_CONTROL, false)) { ++ packageInfo = fakeSignature(p, PackageParser.generatePackageInfo(p, gids, flags, ++ ps.firstInstallTime, ps.lastUpdateTime, permissions, state, ++ userId, ps), permissions); ++ } else { ++ packageInfo =PackageParser.generatePackageInfo(p, gids, flags, ++ ps.firstInstallTime, ps.lastUpdateTime, permissions, state, ++ userId, ps); ++ } + + if (packageInfo == null) { + return null; +@@ -4240,6 +4251,31 @@ public class PackageManagerService extends IPackageManager.Stub + } + } + ++ // The setting to control spoofing enablement. ++ private static final String SPOOF_CONTROL = "persist.security.sigspoof"; ++ // The Google signature faked by microG. ++ private static final String GOOGLE_CERT = "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"; ++ // The signing key hash of official microG builds. ++ private static final String MICROG_HASH = "9BD06727E62796C0130EB6DAB39B73157451582CBD138E86C468ACC395D14165"; ++ // List of packages which require signature spoofing. ++ private static final String[] MICROG_FAKE_SIGNATURE_PACKAGES = new String[] { "com.google.android.gms", "com.android.vending" }; ++ ++ private PackageInfo fakeSignature(AndroidPackage p, PackageInfo pi, ++ Set permissions) { ++ String hash = p.getSigningDetails().getSha256Certificate(); ++ try { ++ if (hash.equals(MICROG_HASH)) { ++ pi.signatures = new Signature[] {new Signature(GOOGLE_CERT)}; ++ if (DEBUG_PACKAGE_INFO) { ++ Log.v(TAG, "Spoofing signature for microG"); ++ } ++ } ++ } catch (Throwable t) { ++ Log.w("Unable to fake signature!", t); ++ } ++ return pi; ++ } ++ + @Override + public void checkPackageStartable(String packageName, int userId) { + final int callingUid = Binder.getCallingUid(); diff --git a/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0005-Automatic_Reboot.patch b/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0005-Automatic_Reboot.patch index 612fd4a9..044893f7 100644 --- a/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0005-Automatic_Reboot.patch +++ b/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0005-Automatic_Reboot.patch @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ index b983f467df..5813bb18db 100644 Small Default diff --git a/res/values/strings.xml b/res/values/strings.xml -index f6e3b0f62d..8f4a3c6115 100644 +index 2180ea45f6..eeee1c039f 100644 --- a/res/values/strings.xml +++ b/res/values/strings.xml @@ -810,6 +810,9 @@ diff --git a/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0006-Bluetooth_Timeout.patch b/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0006-Bluetooth_Timeout.patch index b6195ddb..bbed0a6d 100644 --- a/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0006-Bluetooth_Timeout.patch +++ b/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0006-Bluetooth_Timeout.patch @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ index 5813bb18db..40d01907a4 100644 15 seconds diff --git a/res/values/strings.xml b/res/values/strings.xml -index 8f4a3c6115..ef517e8503 100644 +index eeee1c039f..c5287c4489 100644 --- a/res/values/strings.xml +++ b/res/values/strings.xml @@ -25,6 +25,25 @@ diff --git a/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0007-WiFi_Timeout.patch b/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0007-WiFi_Timeout.patch index 3f80d913..173fb8a7 100644 --- a/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0007-WiFi_Timeout.patch +++ b/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0007-WiFi_Timeout.patch @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ index 40d01907a4..0a9a9a31e8 100644 15 seconds diff --git a/res/values/strings.xml b/res/values/strings.xml -index ef517e8503..228d9570dd 100644 +index c5287c4489..0f254706ff 100644 --- a/res/values/strings.xml +++ b/res/values/strings.xml @@ -44,6 +44,25 @@ diff --git a/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0008-ptrace_scope.patch b/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0008-ptrace_scope.patch index 0110274c..e9348fc6 100644 --- a/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0008-ptrace_scope.patch +++ b/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0008-ptrace_scope.patch @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Subject: [PATCH] add native debugging setting create mode 100644 src/com/android/settings/security/NativeDebugPreferenceController.java diff --git a/res/values/strings.xml b/res/values/strings.xml -index 228d9570dd..d965a63b0d 100644 +index 0f254706ff..fcac812417 100644 --- a/res/values/strings.xml +++ b/res/values/strings.xml @@ -11316,6 +11316,9 @@ diff --git a/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0009-exec_spawning_toggle.patch b/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0009-exec_spawning_toggle.patch index 6327853e..e7e6b123 100644 --- a/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0009-exec_spawning_toggle.patch +++ b/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0009-exec_spawning_toggle.patch @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Subject: [PATCH] add exec spawning toggle create mode 100644 src/com/android/settings/security/ExecSpawnPreferenceController.java diff --git a/res/values/strings.xml b/res/values/strings.xml -index d965a63b0d..e7dcf62ddc 100644 +index fcac812417..197882d66e 100644 --- a/res/values/strings.xml +++ b/res/values/strings.xml @@ -11316,6 +11316,8 @@ diff --git a/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0011-LTE_Only_Mode.patch b/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0011-LTE_Only_Mode.patch index 7d2d6166..4ba8b5b0 100644 --- a/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0011-LTE_Only_Mode.patch +++ b/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0011-LTE_Only_Mode.patch @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ index 6d95bcc58b..072004e447 100644 "18" "1" diff --git a/res/values/strings.xml b/res/values/strings.xml -index e7dcf62ddc..fedb9f3fde 100644 +index 197882d66e..88bd100122 100644 --- a/res/values/strings.xml +++ b/res/values/strings.xml @@ -10942,6 +10942,8 @@ diff --git a/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0012-hosts_toggle.patch b/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0012-hosts_toggle.patch index 44750f22..0381aa75 100644 --- a/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0012-hosts_toggle.patch +++ b/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0012-hosts_toggle.patch @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Change-Id: Ic01a142722372d9d57f52947025cd9db23e58ef4 create mode 100644 src/com/android/settings/security/HostsPreferenceController.java diff --git a/res/values/strings.xml b/res/values/strings.xml -index fedb9f3fde..b5dbdc7d81 100644 +index 88bd100122..a64940d793 100644 --- a/res/values/strings.xml +++ b/res/values/strings.xml @@ -11327,6 +11327,9 @@ diff --git a/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0014-signature_spoofing_toggle.patch b/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0014-signature_spoofing_toggle.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aee409a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0014-signature_spoofing_toggle.patch @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tad +Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2022 01:04:27 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Add a toggle to opt-in to restricted signature spoofing + +Copy and pasted from the GrapheneOS exec spawning toggle patch + +Change-Id: Ibea6ea9bed1c2ae3491f403d9e5c17c1d1c403f1 +Signed-off-by: Tad +--- + res/values/strings.xml | 3 + + res/xml/security_dashboard_settings.xml | 6 + + .../settings/security/SecuritySettings.java | 1 + + .../SigSpoofPreferenceController.java | 106 ++++++++++++++++++ + 4 files changed, 116 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 src/com/android/settings/security/SigSpoofPreferenceController.java + +diff --git a/res/values/strings.xml b/res/values/strings.xml +index a64940d793..a0149bc124 100644 +--- a/res/values/strings.xml ++++ b/res/values/strings.xml +@@ -11330,6 +11330,9 @@ + Disable DNS content blocker + Disables use of the included /etc/hosts database for data collection and malware blocking. + ++ microG enablement (not recommended) ++ Allows official builds of microG apps to spoof the Google signature. Not supported, not recommended. May break apps and/or degrade their security model. Notes: 1) microG connects directly to Google, 2) microG can download/execute proprietary code from Google, 3) apps talking to microG do so using proprietary Google libraries. ++ + + Privacy + +diff --git a/res/xml/security_dashboard_settings.xml b/res/xml/security_dashboard_settings.xml +index 23a39d3106..c5a6c8cada 100644 +--- a/res/xml/security_dashboard_settings.xml ++++ b/res/xml/security_dashboard_settings.xml +@@ -81,6 +81,12 @@ + android:title="@string/hosts_disable_title" + android:summary="@string/hosts_disable_summary" + android:persistent="false" /> ++ ++ + + + +diff --git a/src/com/android/settings/security/SecuritySettings.java b/src/com/android/settings/security/SecuritySettings.java +index 88ba2ece3a..3ba3f518b0 100644 +--- a/src/com/android/settings/security/SecuritySettings.java ++++ b/src/com/android/settings/security/SecuritySettings.java +@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ public class SecuritySettings extends DashboardFragment { + securityPreferenceControllers.add(new ExecSpawnPreferenceController(context)); + securityPreferenceControllers.add(new NativeDebugPreferenceController(context)); + securityPreferenceControllers.add(new HostsPreferenceController(context)); ++ securityPreferenceControllers.add(new SigSpoofPreferenceController(context)); + controllers.add(new PreferenceCategoryController(context, SECURITY_CATEGORY) + .setChildren(securityPreferenceControllers)); + controllers.addAll(securityPreferenceControllers); +diff --git a/src/com/android/settings/security/SigSpoofPreferenceController.java b/src/com/android/settings/security/SigSpoofPreferenceController.java +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..258b59b0b0 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/src/com/android/settings/security/SigSpoofPreferenceController.java +@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2022 The Android Open Source Project ++ * ++ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); ++ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. ++ * You may obtain a copy of the License at ++ * ++ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 ++ * ++ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software ++ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, ++ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. ++ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and ++ * limitations under the License ++ */ ++ ++package com.android.settings.security; ++ ++import android.content.Context; ++ ++import android.os.UserHandle; ++import android.os.UserManager; ++import android.os.SystemProperties; ++ ++import android.provider.Settings; ++ ++import androidx.preference.Preference; ++import androidx.preference.PreferenceCategory; ++import androidx.preference.PreferenceGroup; ++import androidx.preference.PreferenceScreen; ++import androidx.preference.TwoStatePreference; ++import androidx.preference.SwitchPreference; ++ ++import com.android.internal.widget.LockPatternUtils; ++import com.android.settings.core.PreferenceControllerMixin; ++import com.android.settingslib.core.AbstractPreferenceController; ++import com.android.settingslib.core.lifecycle.events.OnResume; ++ ++public class SigSpoofPreferenceController extends AbstractPreferenceController ++ implements PreferenceControllerMixin, OnResume, Preference.OnPreferenceChangeListener { ++ ++ private static final String SYS_KEY_SIG_SPOOF_ENABLE = "persist.security.sigspoof"; ++ private static final String PREF_KEY_SIG_SPOOF_ENABLE = "sig_spoof"; ++ private static final String PREF_KEY_SECURITY_CATEGORY = "security_category"; ++ ++ private PreferenceCategory mSecurityCategory; ++ private SwitchPreference mSigSpoofEnable; ++ private boolean mIsAdmin; ++ private UserManager mUm; ++ ++ public SigSpoofPreferenceController(Context context) { ++ super(context); ++ mUm = UserManager.get(context); ++ } ++ ++ @Override ++ public void displayPreference(PreferenceScreen screen) { ++ super.displayPreference(screen); ++ mSecurityCategory = screen.findPreference(PREF_KEY_SECURITY_CATEGORY); ++ updatePreferenceState(); ++ } ++ ++ @Override ++ public boolean isAvailable() { ++ mIsAdmin = mUm.isAdminUser(); ++ return mIsAdmin; ++ } ++ ++ @Override ++ public String getPreferenceKey() { ++ return PREF_KEY_SIG_SPOOF_ENABLE; ++ } ++ ++ // TODO: should we use onCreatePreferences() instead? ++ private void updatePreferenceState() { ++ if (mSecurityCategory == null) { ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ if (mIsAdmin) { ++ mSigSpoofEnable = (SwitchPreference) mSecurityCategory.findPreference(PREF_KEY_SIG_SPOOF_ENABLE); ++ mSigSpoofEnable.setChecked(SystemProperties.getInt(SYS_KEY_SIG_SPOOF_ENABLE, 0) == 1); ++ } else { ++ mSecurityCategory.removePreference(mSecurityCategory.findPreference(PREF_KEY_SIG_SPOOF_ENABLE)); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ @Override ++ public void onResume() { ++ updatePreferenceState(); ++ if (mSigSpoofEnable != null) { ++ boolean mode = mSigSpoofEnable.isChecked(); ++ SystemProperties.set(SYS_KEY_SIG_SPOOF_ENABLE, mode ? "1" : "0"); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ @Override ++ public boolean onPreferenceChange(Preference preference, Object value) { ++ final String key = preference.getKey(); ++ if (PREF_KEY_SIG_SPOOF_ENABLE.equals(key)) { ++ final boolean mode = !mSigSpoofEnable.isChecked(); ++ SystemProperties.set(SYS_KEY_SIG_SPOOF_ENABLE, mode ? "1" : "0"); ++ } ++ return true; ++ } ++} diff --git a/Patches/LineageOS-18.1/android_frameworks_base/0024-Hardened-signature-spoofing.patch b/Patches/LineageOS-18.1/android_frameworks_base/0024-Hardened-signature-spoofing.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000..12f3a439 --- /dev/null +++ b/Patches/LineageOS-18.1/android_frameworks_base/0024-Hardened-signature-spoofing.patch @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tad +Date: Mon, 3 Jul 2023 12:00:12 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Hardened signature spoofing + +- Must be enabled by user +- Must match microG package ID +- Must match official microG build signing key +- Only spoofs the Google package signature + +This is an effective merge + tweak of two existing patches, credits: + Dylanger Daly + https://github.com/dylangerdaly/platform_frameworks_base/commit/b58aa11631fadab3309a1d9268118bd9f2c2a79f + Chirayu Desai of CalyxOS + https://gitlab.com/CalyxOS/platform_frameworks_base/-/commit/76485abb36dc01b65506b010d0458e96e0116369 + +Change-Id: I64a252aac9bb196a11ed7b4b5d8c7e59a3413bd4 +--- + .../android/content/pm/PackageParser.java | 32 +++++++++++++++ + core/res/res/values/config.xml | 2 + + .../server/pm/PackageManagerService.java | 40 ++++++++++++++++++- + 3 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/core/java/android/content/pm/PackageParser.java b/core/java/android/content/pm/PackageParser.java +index 57f8a713ec13..ec2cf1ace99f 100644 +--- a/core/java/android/content/pm/PackageParser.java ++++ b/core/java/android/content/pm/PackageParser.java +@@ -6457,6 +6457,38 @@ public class PackageParser { + return false; + } + ++ /** ++ * Return the Cerificate's Digest ++ */ ++ public @Nullable String getSha256Certificate() { ++ return getSha256CertificateInternal(); ++ } ++ ++ private @Nullable String getSha256CertificateInternal() { ++ String digest; ++ if (this == UNKNOWN) { ++ return null; ++ } ++ if (hasPastSigningCertificates()) { ++ ++ // check all past certs, except for the last one, which automatically gets all ++ // capabilities, since it is the same as the current signature, and is checked below ++ for (int i = 0; i < pastSigningCertificates.length - 1; i++) { ++ digest = PackageUtils.computeSha256Digest( ++ pastSigningCertificates[i].toByteArray()); ++ return digest; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ // not in previous certs signing history, just check the current signer ++ if (signatures.length == 1) { ++ digest = ++ PackageUtils.computeSha256Digest(signatures[0].toByteArray()); ++ return digest; ++ } ++ return null; ++ } ++ + /** Returns true if the signatures in this and other match exactly. */ + public boolean signaturesMatchExactly(SigningDetails other) { + return Signature.areExactMatch(this.signatures, other.signatures); +diff --git a/core/res/res/values/config.xml b/core/res/res/values/config.xml +index f4efcc7e4eec..6ff71f0e6d2e 100644 +--- a/core/res/res/values/config.xml ++++ b/core/res/res/values/config.xml +@@ -1654,6 +1654,8 @@ + + + com.android.location.fused ++ + + + +diff --git a/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java b/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java +index 9611b381942c..900ba7ba68d2 100644 +--- a/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java ++++ b/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java +@@ -4465,8 +4465,19 @@ public class PackageManagerService extends IPackageManager.Stub + }); + } + +- PackageInfo packageInfo = PackageInfoUtils.generate(p, gids, flags, +- ps.firstInstallTime, ps.lastUpdateTime, permissions, state, userId, ps); ++ // Allow microG GmsCore and FakeStore to spoof signature ++ final boolean isMicroG = ArrayUtils.contains(MICROG_FAKE_SIGNATURE_PACKAGES, ++ p.getPackageName()); ++ PackageInfo packageInfo; ++ if (isMicroG && SystemProperties.getBoolean(SPOOF_CONTROL, false)) { ++ packageInfo = fakeSignature(p, PackageInfoUtils.generate(p, gids, flags, ++ ps.firstInstallTime, ps.lastUpdateTime, permissions, state, ++ userId, ps), permissions); ++ } else { ++ packageInfo = PackageInfoUtils.generate(p, gids, flags, ++ ps.firstInstallTime, ps.lastUpdateTime, permissions, state, ++ userId, ps); ++ } + + if (packageInfo == null) { + return null; +@@ -4502,6 +4513,31 @@ public class PackageManagerService extends IPackageManager.Stub + } + } + ++ // The setting to control spoofing enablement. ++ private static final String SPOOF_CONTROL = "persist.security.sigspoof"; ++ // The Google signature faked by microG. ++ private static final String GOOGLE_CERT = "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"; ++ // The signing key hash of official microG builds. ++ private static final String MICROG_HASH = "9BD06727E62796C0130EB6DAB39B73157451582CBD138E86C468ACC395D14165"; ++ // List of packages which require signature spoofing. ++ private static final String[] MICROG_FAKE_SIGNATURE_PACKAGES = new String[] { "com.google.android.gms", "com.android.vending" }; ++ ++ private PackageInfo fakeSignature(AndroidPackage p, PackageInfo pi, ++ Set permissions) { ++ String hash = p.getSigningDetails().getSha256Certificate(); ++ try { ++ if (hash.equals(MICROG_HASH)) { ++ pi.signatures = new Signature[] {new Signature(GOOGLE_CERT)}; ++ if (DEBUG_PACKAGE_INFO) { ++ Log.v(TAG, "Spoofing signature for microG"); ++ } ++ } ++ } catch (Throwable t) { ++ Log.w("Unable to fake signature!", t); ++ } ++ return pi; ++ } ++ + @Override + public void checkPackageStartable(String packageName, int userId) { + final int callingUid = Binder.getCallingUid(); diff --git a/Patches/LineageOS-18.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0015-signature_spoofing_toggle.patch b/Patches/LineageOS-18.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0015-signature_spoofing_toggle.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8d094f64 --- /dev/null +++ b/Patches/LineageOS-18.1/android_packages_apps_Settings/0015-signature_spoofing_toggle.patch @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tad +Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2022 01:04:27 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Add a toggle to opt-in to restricted signature spoofing + +Copy and pasted from the GrapheneOS exec spawning toggle patch + +Change-Id: Ibea6ea9bed1c2ae3491f403d9e5c17c1d1c403f1 +Signed-off-by: Tad +--- + res/values/strings.xml | 3 + + res/xml/security_dashboard_settings.xml | 6 + + .../settings/security/SecuritySettings.java | 1 + + .../SigSpoofPreferenceController.java | 106 ++++++++++++++++++ + 4 files changed, 116 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 src/com/android/settings/security/SigSpoofPreferenceController.java + +diff --git a/res/values/strings.xml b/res/values/strings.xml +index 5af3638555..6d410415bc 100644 +--- a/res/values/strings.xml ++++ b/res/values/strings.xml +@@ -11972,6 +11972,9 @@ + Disable DNS content blocker + Disables use of the included /etc/hosts database for data collection and malware blocking. + ++ microG enablement (not recommended) ++ Allows official builds of microG apps to spoof the Google signature. Not supported, not recommended. May break apps and/or degrade their security model. Notes: 1) microG connects directly to Google, 2) microG can download/execute proprietary code from Google, 3) apps talking to microG do so using proprietary Google libraries. ++ + + Privacy + +diff --git a/res/xml/security_dashboard_settings.xml b/res/xml/security_dashboard_settings.xml +index 62d42246a3..21ce054889 100644 +--- a/res/xml/security_dashboard_settings.xml ++++ b/res/xml/security_dashboard_settings.xml +@@ -81,6 +81,12 @@ + android:title="@string/hosts_disable_title" + android:summary="@string/hosts_disable_summary" + android:persistent="false" /> ++ ++ + + + +diff --git a/src/com/android/settings/security/SecuritySettings.java b/src/com/android/settings/security/SecuritySettings.java +index 0fbcd27104..5248d74c37 100644 +--- a/src/com/android/settings/security/SecuritySettings.java ++++ b/src/com/android/settings/security/SecuritySettings.java +@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ public class SecuritySettings extends DashboardFragment { + securityPreferenceControllers.add(new ExecSpawnPreferenceController(context)); + securityPreferenceControllers.add(new NativeDebugPreferenceController(context)); + securityPreferenceControllers.add(new HostsPreferenceController(context)); ++ securityPreferenceControllers.add(new SigSpoofPreferenceController(context)); + controllers.add(new PreferenceCategoryController(context, SECURITY_CATEGORY) + .setChildren(securityPreferenceControllers)); + controllers.addAll(securityPreferenceControllers); +diff --git a/src/com/android/settings/security/SigSpoofPreferenceController.java b/src/com/android/settings/security/SigSpoofPreferenceController.java +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..258b59b0b0 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/src/com/android/settings/security/SigSpoofPreferenceController.java +@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2022 The Android Open Source Project ++ * ++ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); ++ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. ++ * You may obtain a copy of the License at ++ * ++ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 ++ * ++ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software ++ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, ++ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. ++ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and ++ * limitations under the License ++ */ ++ ++package com.android.settings.security; ++ ++import android.content.Context; ++ ++import android.os.UserHandle; ++import android.os.UserManager; ++import android.os.SystemProperties; ++ ++import android.provider.Settings; ++ ++import androidx.preference.Preference; ++import androidx.preference.PreferenceCategory; ++import androidx.preference.PreferenceGroup; ++import androidx.preference.PreferenceScreen; ++import androidx.preference.TwoStatePreference; ++import androidx.preference.SwitchPreference; ++ ++import com.android.internal.widget.LockPatternUtils; ++import com.android.settings.core.PreferenceControllerMixin; ++import com.android.settingslib.core.AbstractPreferenceController; ++import com.android.settingslib.core.lifecycle.events.OnResume; ++ ++public class SigSpoofPreferenceController extends AbstractPreferenceController ++ implements PreferenceControllerMixin, OnResume, Preference.OnPreferenceChangeListener { ++ ++ private static final String SYS_KEY_SIG_SPOOF_ENABLE = "persist.security.sigspoof"; ++ private static final String PREF_KEY_SIG_SPOOF_ENABLE = "sig_spoof"; ++ private static final String PREF_KEY_SECURITY_CATEGORY = "security_category"; ++ ++ private PreferenceCategory mSecurityCategory; ++ private SwitchPreference mSigSpoofEnable; ++ private boolean mIsAdmin; ++ private UserManager mUm; ++ ++ public SigSpoofPreferenceController(Context context) { ++ super(context); ++ mUm = UserManager.get(context); ++ } ++ ++ @Override ++ public void displayPreference(PreferenceScreen screen) { ++ super.displayPreference(screen); ++ mSecurityCategory = screen.findPreference(PREF_KEY_SECURITY_CATEGORY); ++ updatePreferenceState(); ++ } ++ ++ @Override ++ public boolean isAvailable() { ++ mIsAdmin = mUm.isAdminUser(); ++ return mIsAdmin; ++ } ++ ++ @Override ++ public String getPreferenceKey() { ++ return PREF_KEY_SIG_SPOOF_ENABLE; ++ } ++ ++ // TODO: should we use onCreatePreferences() instead? ++ private void updatePreferenceState() { ++ if (mSecurityCategory == null) { ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ if (mIsAdmin) { ++ mSigSpoofEnable = (SwitchPreference) mSecurityCategory.findPreference(PREF_KEY_SIG_SPOOF_ENABLE); ++ mSigSpoofEnable.setChecked(SystemProperties.getInt(SYS_KEY_SIG_SPOOF_ENABLE, 0) == 1); ++ } else { ++ mSecurityCategory.removePreference(mSecurityCategory.findPreference(PREF_KEY_SIG_SPOOF_ENABLE)); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ @Override ++ public void onResume() { ++ updatePreferenceState(); ++ if (mSigSpoofEnable != null) { ++ boolean mode = mSigSpoofEnable.isChecked(); ++ SystemProperties.set(SYS_KEY_SIG_SPOOF_ENABLE, mode ? "1" : "0"); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ @Override ++ public boolean onPreferenceChange(Preference preference, Object value) { ++ final String key = preference.getKey(); ++ if (PREF_KEY_SIG_SPOOF_ENABLE.equals(key)) { ++ final boolean mode = !mSigSpoofEnable.isChecked(); ++ SystemProperties.set(SYS_KEY_SIG_SPOOF_ENABLE, mode ? "1" : "0"); ++ } ++ return true; ++ } ++} diff --git a/Patches/LineageOS-19.1/android_frameworks_base/0031-Hardened-signature-spoofing.patch b/Patches/LineageOS-19.1/android_frameworks_base/0031-Hardened-signature-spoofing.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b2f918a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/Patches/LineageOS-19.1/android_frameworks_base/0031-Hardened-signature-spoofing.patch @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tad +Date: Mon, 3 Jul 2023 12:00:12 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Hardened signature spoofing + +- Must be enabled by user +- Must match microG package ID +- Must match official microG build signing key +- Only spoofs the Google package signature + +This is an effective merge + tweak of two existing patches, credits: + Dylanger Daly + https://github.com/dylangerdaly/platform_frameworks_base/commit/b58aa11631fadab3309a1d9268118bd9f2c2a79f + Chirayu Desai of CalyxOS + https://gitlab.com/CalyxOS/platform_frameworks_base/-/commit/76485abb36dc01b65506b010d0458e96e0116369 + +Change-Id: I64a252aac9bb196a11ed7b4b5d8c7e59a3413bd4 +--- + .../android/content/pm/PackageParser.java | 32 +++++++++++++++ + core/res/res/values/config.xml | 2 + + .../server/pm/PackageManagerService.java | 40 ++++++++++++++++++- + 3 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/core/java/android/content/pm/PackageParser.java b/core/java/android/content/pm/PackageParser.java +index f92c2951fdef..052d7db60379 100644 +--- a/core/java/android/content/pm/PackageParser.java ++++ b/core/java/android/content/pm/PackageParser.java +@@ -6567,6 +6567,38 @@ public class PackageParser { + return false; + } + ++ /** ++ * Return the Cerificate's Digest ++ */ ++ public @Nullable String getSha256Certificate() { ++ return getSha256CertificateInternal(); ++ } ++ ++ private @Nullable String getSha256CertificateInternal() { ++ String digest; ++ if (this == UNKNOWN) { ++ return null; ++ } ++ if (hasPastSigningCertificates()) { ++ ++ // check all past certs, except for the last one, which automatically gets all ++ // capabilities, since it is the same as the current signature, and is checked below ++ for (int i = 0; i < pastSigningCertificates.length - 1; i++) { ++ digest = PackageUtils.computeSha256Digest( ++ pastSigningCertificates[i].toByteArray()); ++ return digest; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ // not in previous certs signing history, just check the current signer ++ if (signatures.length == 1) { ++ digest = ++ PackageUtils.computeSha256Digest(signatures[0].toByteArray()); ++ return digest; ++ } ++ return null; ++ } ++ + /** Returns true if the signatures in this and other match exactly. */ + public boolean signaturesMatchExactly(SigningDetails other) { + return Signature.areExactMatch(this.signatures, other.signatures); +diff --git a/core/res/res/values/config.xml b/core/res/res/values/config.xml +index a7d55479d2c3..c3616d28dd66 100644 +--- a/core/res/res/values/config.xml ++++ b/core/res/res/values/config.xml +@@ -1804,6 +1804,8 @@ + + + com.android.location.fused ++ + + + + Privacy + +diff --git a/res/xml/security_dashboard_settings.xml b/res/xml/security_dashboard_settings.xml +index 011f6e1117..f5384fa104 100644 +--- a/res/xml/security_dashboard_settings.xml ++++ b/res/xml/security_dashboard_settings.xml +@@ -81,6 +81,12 @@ + android:summary="@string/hosts_disable_summary" + android:persistent="false" /> + ++ ++ + com.android.location.fused -+ -+ com.google.android.gms ++ diff --git a/Scripts/LineageOS-17.1/Patch.sh b/Scripts/LineageOS-17.1/Patch.sh index 3638d02a..e948da72 100644 --- a/Scripts/LineageOS-17.1/Patch.sh +++ b/Scripts/LineageOS-17.1/Patch.sh @@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0017-WiFi_Timeout.patch"; #Time if [ "$DOS_GRAPHENE_CONSTIFY" = true ]; then applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0018-constify_JNINativeMethod.patch"; fi; #Constify JNINativeMethod tables (GrapheneOS) applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0019-Random_MAC.patch"; #Add option of always randomizing MAC addresses (GrapheneOS) applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0020-SUPL_Toggle.patch"; #Add a setting for forcibly disabling SUPL (GrapheneOS) +if [ "$DOS_MICROG_SUPPORT" = true ]; then applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0021-Hardened-signature-spoofing.patch"; fi; #Hardened signature spoofing ability (DivestOS) applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES_COMMON/android_frameworks_base/0006-Do-not-throw-in-setAppOnInterfaceLocked.patch"; #Fix random reboots on broken kernels when an app has data restricted XXX: ugly (DivestOS) applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES_COMMON/android_frameworks_base/0007-ABI_Warning.patch"; #Warn when running activity from 32 bit app on ARM64 devices. (AOSP) applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES_COMMON/android_frameworks_base/0008-No_Crash_GSF.patch"; #Don't crash apps that depend on missing Gservices provider (GrapheneOS) @@ -321,6 +322,7 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/0010-Random_MAC-2.patch" applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/0011-LTE_Only_Mode.patch"; #Add LTE-only option (GrapheneOS) applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/0012-hosts_toggle.patch"; #Add a toggle to disable /etc/hosts lookup (heavily based off of a GrapheneOS patch) applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/0013-SUPL_Toggle.patch"; #Add a toggle for forcibly disabling SUPL (GrapheneOS) +if [ "$DOS_MICROG_SUPPORT" = true ]; then applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/0014-signature_spoofing_toggle.patch"; fi; #Add a toggle to opt-in to restricted signature spoofing (heavily based off of a GrapheneOS patch) sed -i 's/private int mPasswordMaxLength = 16;/private int mPasswordMaxLength = 64;/' src/com/android/settings/password/ChooseLockPassword.java; #Increase default max password length to 64 (GrapheneOS) sed -i 's/if (isFullDiskEncrypted()) {/if (false) {/' src/com/android/settings/accessibility/*AccessibilityService*.java; #Never disable secure start-up when enabling an accessibility service fi; diff --git a/Scripts/LineageOS-18.1/Patch.sh b/Scripts/LineageOS-18.1/Patch.sh index 9f69ea96..6638c731 100644 --- a/Scripts/LineageOS-18.1/Patch.sh +++ b/Scripts/LineageOS-18.1/Patch.sh @@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0020-Burnin_Protection.patch"; applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0021-SUPL_Toggle.patch"; #Add a setting for forcibly disabling SUPL (GrapheneOS) applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0022-Allow_Disabling_NTP.patch"; #Dont ping ntp server when nitz time update is toggled off (GrapheneOS) applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0023-System_JobScheduler_Allowance.patch"; #DeviceIdleJobsController: don't ignore whitelisted system apps (GrapheneOS) +if [ "$DOS_MICROG_SUPPORT" = true ]; then applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0024-Hardened-signature-spoofing.patch"; fi; #Hardened signature spoofing ability (DivestOS) applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES_COMMON/android_frameworks_base/0006-Do-not-throw-in-setAppOnInterfaceLocked.patch"; #Fix random reboots on broken kernels when an app has data restricted XXX: ugly (DivestOS) applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES_COMMON/android_frameworks_base/0007-ABI_Warning.patch"; #Warn when running activity from 32 bit app on ARM64 devices. (AOSP) applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES_COMMON/android_frameworks_base/0008-No_Crash_GSF.patch"; #Don't crash apps that depend on missing Gservices provider (GrapheneOS) @@ -328,6 +329,7 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/0013-LTE_Only_Mode-1.pat applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/0013-LTE_Only_Mode-2.patch"; #Show preferred network options no matter the carrier configuration (GrapheneOS) applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/0013-LTE_Only_Mode-3.patch"; #Add LTE only entry when carrier enables world mode (GrapheneOS) applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/0014-SUPL_Toggle.patch"; #Add a toggle for forcibly disabling SUPL (GrapheneOS) +if [ "$DOS_MICROG_SUPPORT" = true ]; then applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/0015-signature_spoofing_toggle.patch"; fi; #Add a toggle to opt-in to restricted signature spoofing (heavily based off of a GrapheneOS patch) sed -i 's/if (isFullDiskEncrypted()) {/if (false) {/' src/com/android/settings/accessibility/*AccessibilityService*.java; #Never disable secure start-up when enabling an accessibility service fi; diff --git a/Scripts/LineageOS-19.1/Patch.sh b/Scripts/LineageOS-19.1/Patch.sh index ed51327a..eb80c25a 100644 --- a/Scripts/LineageOS-19.1/Patch.sh +++ b/Scripts/LineageOS-19.1/Patch.sh @@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0027-appops_reset_fix-2.patch"; applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0028-SUPL_Toggle.patch"; #Add a setting for forcibly disabling SUPL (GrapheneOS) applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0029-Allow_Disabling_NTP.patch"; #Dont ping ntp server when nitz time update is toggled off (GrapheneOS) applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0030-System_JobScheduler_Allowance.patch"; #DeviceIdleJobsController: don't ignore whitelisted system apps (GrapheneOS) +if [ "$DOS_MICROG_SUPPORT" = true ]; then applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0031-Hardened-signature-spoofing.patch"; fi; #Hardened signature spoofing ability (DivestOS) applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES_COMMON/android_frameworks_base/0007-ABI_Warning.patch"; #Warn when running activity from 32 bit app on ARM64 devices. (AOSP) applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES_COMMON/android_frameworks_base/0008-No_Crash_GSF.patch"; #Don't crash apps that depend on missing Gservices provider (GrapheneOS) hardenLocationConf services/core/java/com/android/server/location/gnss/gps_debug.conf; #Harden the default GPS config @@ -304,6 +305,7 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/0012-hosts_toggle.patch" applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/0013-Captive_Portal_Toggle.patch"; #Add option to disable captive portal checks (GrapheneOS) applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/0014-LTE_Only_Mode.patch"; #Add LTE only setting (GrapheneOS) applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/0015-SUPL_Toggle.patch"; #Add a toggle for forcibly disabling SUPL (GrapheneOS) +if [ "$DOS_MICROG_SUPPORT" = true ]; then applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Settings/0016-signature_spoofing_toggle.patch"; fi; #Add a toggle to opt-in to restricted signature spoofing (heavily based off of a GrapheneOS patch) sed -i 's/if (isFullDiskEncrypted()) {/if (false) {/' src/com/android/settings/accessibility/*AccessibilityService*.java; #Never disable secure start-up when enabling an accessibility service fi;