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15.1: July 2024 ASB work

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Signed-off-by: Tavi <tavi@divested.dev>
This commit is contained in:
Tavi 2024-07-17 17:54:17 -04:00
parent 105767c7a7
commit 3400a35eb1
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5 changed files with 116 additions and 3 deletions
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48
Patches/LineageOS-15.1/android_frameworks_base/397594.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Martijn Coenen <maco@google.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Feb 2024 12:03:05 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Verify UID of incoming Zygote connections.
Only the system UID should be allowed to connect to the Zygote. While
for generic Zygotes this is also covered by SELinux policy, this is not
true for App Zygotes: the preload code running in an app zygote could
connect to another app zygote socket, if it had access to its (random)
socket address.
On the Java layer, simply check the UID when the connection is made. In
the native layer, this check was already present, but it actually didn't
work in the case where we receive a new incoming connection on the
socket, and receive a 'non-fork' command: in that case, we will simply
exit the native loop, and let the Java layer handle the command, without
any further UID checking.
Modified the native logic to drop new connections with a mismatching
UID, and to keep serving the existing connection (if it was still
there).
[Backport: No native layer for ZygoteCommandBuffer present]
Bug: 319081336
Test: manual
(cherry picked from commit 2ffc7cb220e4220b7e108c4043a3f0f2a85b6508)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:e397fd3d20c3f409311e411387ec1524ccecf085)
Merged-In: I3f85a17107849e2cd3e82d6ef15c90b9e2f26532
Change-Id: I3f85a17107849e2cd3e82d6ef15c90b9e2f26532
---
core/java/com/android/internal/os/ZygoteConnection.java | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/core/java/com/android/internal/os/ZygoteConnection.java b/core/java/com/android/internal/os/ZygoteConnection.java
index 9fa3239b60cf..6b11ed43f171 100644
--- a/core/java/com/android/internal/os/ZygoteConnection.java
+++ b/core/java/com/android/internal/os/ZygoteConnection.java
@@ -98,6 +98,9 @@ class ZygoteConnection {
throw ex;
}
+ if (peer.getUid() != Process.SYSTEM_UID) {
+ throw new ZygoteSecurityException("Only system UID is allowed to connect to Zygote.");
+ }
isEof = false;
}

63
Patches/LineageOS-15.1/android_system_bt/397596.patch Normal file
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From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Brian Delwiche <delwiche@google.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2024 21:14:56 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix an authentication bypass bug in SMP
When pairing with BLE legacy pairing initiated
from remote, authentication can be bypassed.
This change fixes it.
Bug: 251514170
Test: m com.android.btservices
Test: manual run against PoC
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:8a3dbadc71428a30b172a74343be08498c656747)
Merged-In: I66b1f9a80060f48a604001829db8ea7c96c7b7f8
Change-Id: I66b1f9a80060f48a604001829db8ea7c96c7b7f8
---
stack/smp/smp_act.cc | 12 ++++++++++++
stack/smp/smp_int.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/stack/smp/smp_act.cc b/stack/smp/smp_act.cc
index 7b6ae6f2c..db0617904 100644
--- a/stack/smp/smp_act.cc
+++ b/stack/smp/smp_act.cc
@@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ void smp_send_pair_rsp(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
void smp_send_confirm(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_CONFIRM, p_cb);
+ p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_CMD_CONFIRM_SENT;
}
/*******************************************************************************
@@ -631,6 +632,17 @@ void smp_proc_rand(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
return;
}
+ if (!((p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT) &&
+ (p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT)) &&
+ !(p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_CMD_CONFIRM_SENT)) {
+ // in legacy pairing, the peer should send its rand after
+ // we send our confirm
+ tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data{};
+ smp_int_data.status = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
+ smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
+ return;
+ }
+
/* save the SRand for comparison */
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->rrand, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
}
diff --git a/stack/smp/smp_int.h b/stack/smp/smp_int.h
index fc8717f7c..b3e13b3ee 100644
--- a/stack/smp/smp_int.h
+++ b/stack/smp/smp_int.h
@@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ typedef union {
(1 << 7) /* used to resolve race condition */
#define SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_LOCAL_PUBL_KEY \
(1 << 8) /* used on slave to resolve race condition */
+#define SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_CMD_CONFIRM_SENT (1 << 9)
/* check if authentication requirement need MITM protection */
#define SMP_NO_MITM_REQUIRED(x) (((x)&SMP_AUTH_YN_BIT) == 0)