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15.1: March ASB work

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Signed-off-by: Tavi <tavi@divested.dev>
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Tavi 2024-03-14 23:18:06 -04:00
parent 6b0362d46f
commit 26d99a04f0
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10 changed files with 618 additions and 1 deletions
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105
Patches/LineageOS-15.1/android_frameworks_av/385670.patch Normal file
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From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Haripriya Deshmukh <haripriya.deshmukh@ittiam.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2023 20:42:45 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Validate OMX Params for VPx encoders
Bug: 273936274
Bug: 273937171
Bug: 273937136
Bug: 273936553
Bug: 273936601
Test: POC in bug descriptions
(cherry picked from https://partner-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:022086b76536cd2e19a44053271190bdf6e181f7)
(cherry picked from commit 0e4ca1cb5c16af8f1dfb0ae41941c16c104d38e8)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:90641b2799fd3940cdf0bf8a73b2f76839e651a6)
Merged-In: I9bb17112d9f0217b6af0343afecc9c943453b757
Change-Id: I9bb17112d9f0217b6af0343afecc9c943453b757
---
media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVP8Encoder.cpp | 10 ++++++++++
media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVP9Encoder.cpp | 10 ++++++++++
media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVPXEncoder.cpp | 9 +++++++++
3 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
diff --git a/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVP8Encoder.cpp b/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVP8Encoder.cpp
index 04737a9ccf..9198b7c327 100644
--- a/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVP8Encoder.cpp
+++ b/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVP8Encoder.cpp
@@ -120,6 +120,11 @@ OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVP8Encoder::internalSetParameter(OMX_INDEXTYPE index,
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVP8Encoder::internalGetVp8Params(
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE* vp8Params) {
+ if (!isValidOMXParam(vp8Params)) {
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "273936274");
+ return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
+ }
+
if (vp8Params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
@@ -133,6 +138,11 @@ OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVP8Encoder::internalGetVp8Params(
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVP8Encoder::internalSetVp8Params(
const OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE* vp8Params) {
+ if (!isValidOMXParam(vp8Params)) {
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "273937171");
+ return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
+ }
+
if (vp8Params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
diff --git a/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVP9Encoder.cpp b/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVP9Encoder.cpp
index 4c7290db14..1ab5046daf 100644
--- a/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVP9Encoder.cpp
+++ b/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVP9Encoder.cpp
@@ -112,6 +112,11 @@ OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVP9Encoder::internalSetParameter(
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVP9Encoder::internalGetVp9Params(
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP9TYPE *vp9Params) {
+ if (!isValidOMXParam(vp9Params)) {
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "273936553");
+ return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
+ }
+
if (vp9Params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
@@ -126,6 +131,11 @@ OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVP9Encoder::internalGetVp9Params(
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVP9Encoder::internalSetVp9Params(
const OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP9TYPE *vp9Params) {
+ if (!isValidOMXParam(vp9Params)) {
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "273937136");
+ return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
+ }
+
if (vp9Params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
diff --git a/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVPXEncoder.cpp b/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVPXEncoder.cpp
index f6257b1556..173bbe37d6 100644
--- a/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVPXEncoder.cpp
+++ b/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVPXEncoder.cpp
@@ -484,6 +484,11 @@ OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVPXEncoder::internalSetBitrateParams(
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVPXEncoder::internalGetAndroidVpxParams(
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ANDROID_VP8ENCODERTYPE *vpxAndroidParams) {
+ if (!isValidOMXParam(vpxAndroidParams)) {
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "273936601");
+ return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
+ }
+
if (vpxAndroidParams->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
@@ -500,6 +505,10 @@ OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVPXEncoder::internalGetAndroidVpxParams(
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVPXEncoder::internalSetAndroidVpxParams(
const OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ANDROID_VP8ENCODERTYPE *vpxAndroidParams) {
+ if (!isValidOMXParam(vpxAndroidParams)) {
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "273937551");
+ return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
+ }
if (vpxAndroidParams->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}

34
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From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Haripriya Deshmukh <haripriya.deshmukh@ittiam.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2023 18:32:38 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix out of bounds read and write in onQueueFilled in outQueue
Bug: 276442130
Test: POC in bug descriptions
(cherry picked from https://partner-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:7aef41e59412e2f95bab5de7e33f5f04bb808643)
(cherry picked from commit 8f4cfda9fc75f1e9ba3b6dee3fbffda4b6111d64)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:208e430bc6380fafafca8041b239f835263a9d47)
Merged-In: Ic230d10048193a785f185dc6a7de6f455f9318c1
Change-Id: Ic230d10048193a785f185dc6a7de6f455f9318c1
---
media/libstagefright/codecs/m4v_h263/dec/SoftMPEG4.cpp | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/media/libstagefright/codecs/m4v_h263/dec/SoftMPEG4.cpp b/media/libstagefright/codecs/m4v_h263/dec/SoftMPEG4.cpp
index 39b67abd5e..fde9a849ae 100644
--- a/media/libstagefright/codecs/m4v_h263/dec/SoftMPEG4.cpp
+++ b/media/libstagefright/codecs/m4v_h263/dec/SoftMPEG4.cpp
@@ -308,8 +308,11 @@ void SoftMPEG4::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = frameSize;
List<BufferInfo *>::iterator it = outQueue.begin();
- while ((*it)->mHeader != outHeader) {
- ++it;
+ while (it != outQueue.end() && (*it)->mHeader != outHeader) {
+ ++it;
+ }
+ if (it == outQueue.end()) {
+ return;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *it;

67
Patches/LineageOS-15.1/android_frameworks_base/385672.patch Normal file
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From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: kumarashishg <kumarashishg@google.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2023 12:01:18 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Resolve custom printer icon boundary exploit.
Because Settings grants the INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS_FULL permission, an exploit is possible where the third party print plugin service can pass other's User Icon URI. This CL provides a lightweight solution for parsing the image URI to detect profile exploitation.
Bug: 281525042
Test: Build and flash the code. Try to reproduce the issue with
mentioned steps in the bug
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:0e0693ca9cb408d0dc82f6c6b3feb453fc8ddd83)
Merged-In: Iaaa6fe2a627a265c4d1d7b843a033a132e1fe2ce
Change-Id: Iaaa6fe2a627a265c4d1d7b843a033a132e1fe2ce
---
.../server/print/PrintManagerService.java | 34 ++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/services/print/java/com/android/server/print/PrintManagerService.java b/services/print/java/com/android/server/print/PrintManagerService.java
index 5121c29d688d..703118fdb26c 100644
--- a/services/print/java/com/android/server/print/PrintManagerService.java
+++ b/services/print/java/com/android/server/print/PrintManagerService.java
@@ -202,12 +202,44 @@ public final class PrintManagerService extends SystemService {
}
final long identity = Binder.clearCallingIdentity();
try {
- return userState.getCustomPrinterIcon(printerId);
+ Icon icon = userState.getCustomPrinterIcon(printerId);
+ return validateIconUserBoundary(icon);
} finally {
Binder.restoreCallingIdentity(identity);
}
}
+ /**
+ * Validates the custom printer icon to see if it's not in the calling user space.
+ * If the condition is not met, return null. Otherwise, return the original icon.
+ *
+ * @param icon
+ * @return icon (validated)
+ */
+ private Icon validateIconUserBoundary(Icon icon) {
+ // Refer to Icon#getUriString for context. The URI string is invalid for icons of
+ // incompatible types.
+ if (icon != null && (icon.getType() == Icon.TYPE_URI)) {
+ String encodedUser = icon.getUri().getEncodedUserInfo();
+
+ // If there is no encoded user, the URI is calling into the calling user space
+ if (encodedUser != null) {
+ int userId = Integer.parseInt(encodedUser);
+ // resolve encoded user
+ final int resolvedUserId = resolveCallingUserEnforcingPermissions(userId);
+
+ synchronized (mLock) {
+ // Only the current group members can get the printer icons.
+ if (resolveCallingProfileParentLocked(resolvedUserId)
+ != getCurrentUserId()) {
+ return null;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return icon;
+ }
+
@Override
public void cancelPrintJob(PrintJobId printJobId, int appId, int userId) {
if (printJobId == null) {

29
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@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Buynytskyy <alexbuy@google.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2023 01:50:36 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Disallow system apps to be installed/updated as instant.
Bug: 299441833
Test: atest android.content.pm.cts.PackageManagerTest
(cherry picked from commit 496e78a1951f2ed69290f03c5625c0f8382f4d31)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:0d0f185c0d526c1dac0a8894b2c2f2e378328d73)
Merged-In: Idd89a6dd72f0e68259095f677185f0494391025c
Change-Id: Idd89a6dd72f0e68259095f677185f0494391025c
---
.../core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java b/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java
index 682dc46e5713..e2f257e1fce0 100644
--- a/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java
+++ b/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java
@@ -15429,6 +15429,9 @@ public class PackageManagerService extends IPackageManager.Stub
if (pkgSetting == null) {
return PackageManager.INSTALL_FAILED_INVALID_URI;
}
+ if (instantApp && (pkgSetting.isSystem() || isUpdatedSystemApp(pkgSetting))) {
+ return PackageManager.INSTALL_FAILED_INVALID_URI;
+ }
if (!canViewInstantApps(callingUid, UserHandle.getUserId(callingUid))) {
// only allow the existing package to be used if it's installed as a full
// application for at least one user

57
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@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Dementyev <dementyev@google.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2024 09:26:56 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] Close AccountManagerService.session after timeout.
Bug: 303905130
Bug: 316893159
Test: manual
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:bb53f192e0ceaa026a083da156ef0cb0140f0c09)
Merged-In: Ib4cebf1750fc6324dc1c8853e0d716ea5e8ec073
Change-Id: Ib4cebf1750fc6324dc1c8853e0d716ea5e8ec073
---
.../android/server/accounts/AccountManagerService.java | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/services/core/java/com/android/server/accounts/AccountManagerService.java b/services/core/java/com/android/server/accounts/AccountManagerService.java
index e06c4b3ef480..b06fce9128e6 100644
--- a/services/core/java/com/android/server/accounts/AccountManagerService.java
+++ b/services/core/java/com/android/server/accounts/AccountManagerService.java
@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ public class AccountManagerService
final MessageHandler mHandler;
+ private static final int TIMEOUT_DELAY_MS = 1000 * 60 * 15;
// Messages that can be sent on mHandler
private static final int MESSAGE_TIMED_OUT = 3;
private static final int MESSAGE_COPY_SHARED_ACCOUNT = 4;
@@ -4723,6 +4724,7 @@ public class AccountManagerService
synchronized (mSessions) {
mSessions.put(toString(), this);
}
+ scheduleTimeout();
if (response != null) {
try {
response.asBinder().linkToDeath(this, 0 /* flags */);
@@ -4887,6 +4889,11 @@ public class AccountManagerService
}
}
+ private void scheduleTimeout() {
+ mHandler.sendMessageDelayed(
+ mHandler.obtainMessage(MESSAGE_TIMED_OUT, this), TIMEOUT_DELAY_MS);
+ }
+
public void cancelTimeout() {
mHandler.removeMessages(MESSAGE_TIMED_OUT, this);
}
@@ -4923,6 +4930,9 @@ public class AccountManagerService
public void onTimedOut() {
IAccountManagerResponse response = getResponseAndClose();
+ if (Log.isLoggable(TAG, Log.VERBOSE)) {
+ Log.v(TAG, "Session.onTimedOut");
+ }
if (response != null) {
try {
response.onError(AccountManager.ERROR_CODE_REMOTE_EXCEPTION,

133
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From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ugo Yu <ugoyu@google.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2018 17:55:40 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] Fix OOB caused by invalid SMP packet length
Bug: 111850706
Bug: 111213909
Bug: 111214770
Bug: 111214470
Test: PoC, Manully
Change-Id: I889d2de97b1aab706c850a950f668aba558f240f
---
stack/smp/smp_act.cc | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
stack/smp/smp_int.h | 1 +
stack/smp/smp_utils.cc | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 62 insertions(+)
diff --git a/stack/smp/smp_act.cc b/stack/smp/smp_act.cc
index 7b6ae6f2c..8667cc8fd 100644
--- a/stack/smp/smp_act.cc
+++ b/stack/smp/smp_act.cc
@@ -503,6 +503,14 @@ void smp_proc_pair_cmd(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAG_ENC_AFTER_PAIR;
+ if (smp_command_has_invalid_length(p_cb)) {
+ tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
+ smp_int_data.status = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "111850706");
+ smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
+ return;
+ }
+
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_io_caps, p);
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_oob_flag, p);
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_auth_req, p);
@@ -776,6 +784,14 @@ void smp_br_process_pairing_command(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAG_ENC_AFTER_PAIR;
+ if (smp_command_has_invalid_length(p_cb)) {
+ tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
+ smp_int_data.status = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "111213909");
+ smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
+ return;
+ }
+
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_io_caps, p);
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_oob_flag, p);
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_auth_req, p);
@@ -981,6 +997,15 @@ void smp_proc_id_addr(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE pid_key;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
+
+ if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) {
+ tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
+ smp_int_data.status = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "111214770");
+ smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
+ return;
+ }
+
smp_update_key_mask(p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ID, true);
STREAM_TO_UINT8(pid_key.pid_key.addr_type, p);
@@ -1007,6 +1032,15 @@ void smp_proc_srk_info(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE le_key;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
+
+ if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) {
+ tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
+ smp_int_data.status = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "111214470");
+ smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
+ return;
+ }
+
smp_update_key_mask(p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_CSRK, true);
/* save CSRK to security record */
diff --git a/stack/smp/smp_int.h b/stack/smp/smp_int.h
index fc8717f7c..e0ee76a1a 100644
--- a/stack/smp/smp_int.h
+++ b/stack/smp/smp_int.h
@@ -479,6 +479,7 @@ extern void smp_xor_128(BT_OCTET16 a, BT_OCTET16 b);
extern bool smp_encrypt_data(uint8_t* key, uint8_t key_len, uint8_t* plain_text,
uint8_t pt_len, tSMP_ENC* p_out);
extern bool smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(tSMP_CB* p_cb);
+extern bool smp_command_has_invalid_length(tSMP_CB* p_cb);
extern void smp_reject_unexpected_pairing_command(const RawAddress& bd_addr);
extern tSMP_ASSO_MODEL smp_select_association_model(tSMP_CB* p_cb);
extern void smp_reverse_array(uint8_t* arr, uint8_t len);
diff --git a/stack/smp/smp_utils.cc b/stack/smp/smp_utils.cc
index 441b178d1..36a7b1be8 100644
--- a/stack/smp/smp_utils.cc
+++ b/stack/smp/smp_utils.cc
@@ -936,6 +936,33 @@ void smp_proc_pairing_cmpl(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
if (p_callback) (*p_callback)(SMP_COMPLT_EVT, pairing_bda, &evt_data);
}
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * Function smp_command_has_invalid_length
+ *
+ * Description Checks if the received SMP command has invalid length
+ * It returns true if the command has invalid length.
+ *
+ * Returns true if the command has invalid length, false otherwise.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+bool smp_command_has_invalid_length(tSMP_CB* p_cb) {
+ uint8_t cmd_code = p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code;
+
+ if ((cmd_code > (SMP_OPCODE_MAX + 1 /* for SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_COMMITM */)) ||
+ (cmd_code < SMP_OPCODE_MIN)) {
+ SMP_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Received command with RESERVED code 0x%02x",
+ __func__, cmd_code);
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if (!smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length(p_cb)) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function smp_command_has_invalid_parameters

35
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 19:57:20 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix an OOB bug in smp_proc_sec_req
This is a backport of I400cfa3523c6d8b25c233205748c2db5dc803d1d
Bug: 300903400
Test: m com.android.btservices
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:970c95d7c06c909c34a849587f701098129fc2ef)
Merged-In: Id4c65801ff8519aff18b24007e344934493cab55
Change-Id: Id4c65801ff8519aff18b24007e344934493cab55
---
stack/smp/smp_act.cc | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/stack/smp/smp_act.cc b/stack/smp/smp_act.cc
index 8667cc8fd..f814b9cf1 100644
--- a/stack/smp/smp_act.cc
+++ b/stack/smp/smp_act.cc
@@ -414,6 +414,13 @@ void smp_send_ltk_reply(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
* Description process security request.
******************************************************************************/
void smp_proc_sec_req(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
+ if (smp_command_has_invalid_length(p_cb)) {
+ tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
+ smp_int_data.status = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
+ smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
+ return;
+ }
+
tBTM_LE_AUTH_REQ auth_req = *(tBTM_LE_AUTH_REQ*)p_data;
tBTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT sec_req_act;
uint8_t reason;

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@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 22:55:33 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Reland: Fix an OOB write bug in attp_build_value_cmd
This is a backport of I291fd665a68d90813b8c21c80d23cc438f84f285
Bug: 295887535
Bug: 315127634
Test: m com.android.btservices
Test: atest net_test_stack_gatt
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:70f7ff2b34e6683301c9c6cd021e1ddef76c5b1c)
Merged-In: Ieffac6db5c6359b071efc599f7a70de609b80b72
Change-Id: Ieffac6db5c6359b071efc599f7a70de609b80b72
---
stack/gatt/att_protocol.cc | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/stack/gatt/att_protocol.cc b/stack/gatt/att_protocol.cc
index 35be063ee..c113c825f 100644
--- a/stack/gatt/att_protocol.cc
+++ b/stack/gatt/att_protocol.cc
@@ -277,46 +277,80 @@ BT_HDR* attp_build_opcode_cmd(uint8_t op_code) {
BT_HDR* attp_build_value_cmd(uint16_t payload_size, uint8_t op_code,
uint16_t handle, uint16_t offset, uint16_t len,
uint8_t* p_data) {
- uint8_t *p, *pp, pair_len, *p_pair_len;
+ uint8_t *p, *pp, *p_pair_len;
+ size_t pair_len;
+ size_t size_now = 1;
+
+#define CHECK_SIZE() \
+ do { \
+ if (size_now > payload_size) { \
+ LOG(ERROR) << "payload size too small"; \
+ osi_free(p_buf); \
+ return nullptr; \
+ } \
+ } while (false)
+
BT_HDR* p_buf =
(BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + payload_size + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET);
p = pp = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
+
+ CHECK_SIZE();
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, op_code);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
- p_buf->len = 1;
if (op_code == GATT_RSP_READ_BY_TYPE) {
- p_pair_len = p;
+ p_pair_len = p++;
pair_len = len + 2;
- UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, pair_len);
- p_buf->len += 1;
+ size_now += 1;
+ CHECK_SIZE();
+ // this field will be backfilled in the end of this function
}
+
if (op_code != GATT_RSP_READ_BLOB && op_code != GATT_RSP_READ) {
+ size_now += 2;
+ CHECK_SIZE();
UINT16_TO_STREAM(p, handle);
- p_buf->len += 2;
}
if (op_code == GATT_REQ_PREPARE_WRITE || op_code == GATT_RSP_PREPARE_WRITE) {
+ size_now += 2;
+ CHECK_SIZE();
UINT16_TO_STREAM(p, offset);
- p_buf->len += 2;
}
if (len > 0 && p_data != NULL) {
/* ensure data not exceed MTU size */
- if (payload_size - p_buf->len < len) {
- len = payload_size - p_buf->len;
+ if (payload_size - size_now < len) {
+ len = payload_size - size_now;
/* update handle value pair length */
- if (op_code == GATT_RSP_READ_BY_TYPE) *p_pair_len = (len + 2);
+ if (op_code == GATT_RSP_READ_BY_TYPE) {
+ pair_len = (len + 2);
+ }
LOG(WARNING) << StringPrintf(
"attribute value too long, to be truncated to %d", len);
}
+ size_now += len;
+ CHECK_SIZE();
ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, p_data, len);
- p_buf->len += len;
}
+ // backfill pair len field
+ if (op_code == GATT_RSP_READ_BY_TYPE) {
+ if (pair_len > UINT8_MAX) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << StringPrintf("pair_len greater than %d", UINT8_MAX);
+ osi_free(p_buf);
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+
+ *p_pair_len = (uint8_t)pair_len;
+ }
+
+#undef CHECK_SIZE
+
+ p_buf->len = (uint16_t)size_now;
return p_buf;
}

33
Patches/LineageOS-15.1/android_system_bt/385678.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 22:38:20 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix a security bypass issue in
access_secure_service_from_temp_bond
Backport I48df2c2d77810077e97d4131540277273d441998
to rvc-dev
Bug: 318374503
Test: m com.android.btservices | manual test against PoC | QA
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:e908c16d9157b9e4a936117f06b8f964cf8386b8)
Merged-In: Ib7cf66019b3d45a2a23d235ad5f9dc406394456f
Change-Id: Ib7cf66019b3d45a2a23d235ad5f9dc406394456f
---
stack/btm/btm_sec.cc | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
index 29ca8320f..21d03d19a 100644
--- a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
+++ b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
@@ -231,8 +231,7 @@ static bool access_secure_service_from_temp_bond(const tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_r
bool locally_initiated,
uint16_t security_req) {
return !locally_initiated && (security_req & BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE) &&
- btm_dev_authenticated(p_dev_rec) &&
- p_dev_rec->bond_type == BOND_TYPE_TEMPORARY;
+ p_dev_rec->bond_type == BOND_TYPE_TEMPORARY;
}
/*******************************************************************************

11
Scripts/LineageOS-15.1/Patch.sh
View File

@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_build/0002-Enable_fwrapv.patch"; #Use -fwrapv a
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_build/0003-verity-openssl3.patch"; #Fix VB 1.0 failure due to openssl output format change
sed -i '57i$(my_res_package): PRIVATE_AAPT_FLAGS += --auto-add-overlay' core/aapt2.mk; #Enable auto-add-overlay for packages, this allows the vendor overlay to easily work across all branches.
awk -i inplace '!/Email/' target/product/core.mk; #Remove Email
sed -i 's/2021-10-05/2024-02-05/' core/version_defaults.mk; #Bump Security String #XXX
sed -i 's/2021-10-05/2024-03-05/' core/version_defaults.mk; #Bump Security String #XXX
fi;
if enterAndClear "build/soong"; then
@ -152,6 +152,8 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_av/358729.patch"; #n-asb-2023-06 Fix
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_av/365962.patch"; #R_asb_2023-09 Fix Segv on unknown address error flagged by fuzzer test.
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_av/373949.patch"; #R_asb_2023-11 Fix for heap buffer overflow issue flagged by fuzzer test.
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_av/381886.patch"; #R_asb_2024-02 Update mtp packet buffer
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_av/385670.patch"; #P_asb_2024-03 Validate OMX Params for VPx encoders
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_av/385671.patch"; #P_asb_2024-03 Fix out of bounds read and write in onQueueFilled in outQueue
fi;
if enterAndClear "frameworks/base"; then
@ -235,6 +237,9 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/379149-backport.patch"; #R_asb_
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/379150.patch"; #R_asb_2024-01 Fix vulnerability that allowed attackers to start arbitary activities
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/379136.patch"; #R_asb_2024-01 Fix ActivityManager#killBackgroundProcesses permissions
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/381889-backport.patch"; #R_asb_2024-02 Unbind TileService onNullBinding #XXX: TileLifecycleManager.java:197.17: The method onNullBinding(ComponentName) of type TileLifecycleManager must override or implement a supertype method
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/385672.patch"; #P_asb_2024-03 Resolve custom printer icon boundary exploit.
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/385673.patch"; #P_asb_2024-03 Disallow system apps to be installed/updated as instant.
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/385674.patch"; #P_asb_2024-03 Close AccountManagerService.session after timeout.
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES_COMMON/android_frameworks_base/0001-Browser_No_Location.patch"; #Don't grant location permission to system browsers (GrapheneOS)
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES_COMMON/android_frameworks_base/0003-SUPL_No_IMSI.patch"; #Don't send IMSI to SUPL (MSe1969)
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES_COMMON/android_frameworks_base/0004-Fingerprint_Lockout.patch"; #Enable fingerprint lockout after five failed attempts (GrapheneOS)
@ -508,6 +513,10 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/379154-prereq-2.patch"; #R_asb_2024-0
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/379154.patch"; #R_asb_2024-01 Fix some OOB errors in BTM parsing
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/381894-backport.patch"; #R_asb_2024-02 Fix an OOB bug in btif_to_bta_response and attp_build_value_cmd
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/381895.patch"; #R_asb_2024-02 Fix an OOB write bug in attp_build_read_by_type_value_cmd
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/385675.patch"; #P_asb_2024-03 Fix OOB caused by invalid SMP packet length #XXX: needs to switch to `reason =` or backport `smp_int_data.status`
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/385676-backport.patch"; #P_asb_2024-03 Fix an OOB bug in smp_proc_sec_req #XXX: alternatively forward-port 385236 & 385237
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/385677.patch"; #P_asb_2024-03 Reland: Fix an OOB write bug in attp_build_value_cmd
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/385678.patch"; #P_asb_2024-03 Fix a security bypass issue in access_secure_service_from_temp_bond
fi;
if enterAndClear "system/ca-certificates"; then