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ASB cherrypicks

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Signed-off-by: Tad <tad@spotco.us>
This commit is contained in:
Tad 2023-07-07 13:39:05 -04:00
parent 5bc210f135
commit 2651f33e5c
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11 changed files with 489 additions and 3 deletions
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51
Patches/LineageOS-14.1/android_external_freetype/360899.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
From 82159c4fb4f274c5f0b21c987f44cb48cf3b28a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Werner Lemberg <wl@gnu.org>
Date: Sat, 19 Mar 2022 06:40:17 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] DO NOT MERGE - Cherry-pick two upstream changes
This cherry picks following two changes:
0c2bdb01a2e1d24a3e592377a6d0822856e10df2
22a0cccb4d9d002f33c1ba7a4b36812c7d4f46b5
Bug: 271680254
Test: N/A
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:4ffa271ab538f57b65a65d434a2df9d3f8cd2f4a)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:b0f8930701bf19229075cc930ad15813ff5fb07b)
Merged-In: I42469df8e8b07221d64e3f8574c4f30110dbda7e
Change-Id: I42469df8e8b07221d64e3f8574c4f30110dbda7e
Change-Id: Ia584ab1f2633a84e5896c09113513c582ce95dad
---
src/base/ftobjs.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/base/ftobjs.c b/src/base/ftobjs.c
index 9006b598b..4e1d32aa0 100644
--- a/src/base/ftobjs.c
+++ b/src/base/ftobjs.c
@@ -2118,6 +2118,14 @@
FT_Module* cur;
FT_Module* limit;
+ /* only use lower 31 bits together with sign bit */
+ if ( face_index > 0 )
+ face_index &= 0x7FFFFFFFL;
+ else
+ {
+ face_index &= 0x7FFFFFFFL;
+ face_index = -face_index;
+ }
/* test for valid `library' delayed to `FT_Stream_New' */
@@ -2953,6 +2961,9 @@
if ( !face )
return FT_THROW( Invalid_Face_Handle );
+ if ( !face->size )
+ return FT_THROW( Invalid_Size_Handle );
+
if ( !req || req->width < 0 || req->height < 0 ||
req->type >= FT_SIZE_REQUEST_TYPE_MAX )
return FT_THROW( Invalid_Argument );

37
Patches/LineageOS-14.1/android_external_libnfc-nci/360898.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
From f73e2d95da050a0b08e3ed5ae8c04968e8297230 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alisher Alikhodjaev <alisher@google.com>
Date: Tue, 2 May 2023 14:20:57 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] OOBW in rw_i93_send_to_upper()
Bug: 271849189
Test: tag r/w
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:dc9d09e1698725712628d394bf9be4c9003579e8)
Merged-In: I1d55954e56a3f995f8dd48bf484fe9fce02b2ed1
Change-Id: I1d55954e56a3f995f8dd48bf484fe9fce02b2ed1
Change-Id: I9cd9658bf50144092c1cf196fd9272ffbac2fc55
---
src/nfc/tags/rw_i93.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/nfc/tags/rw_i93.c b/src/nfc/tags/rw_i93.c
index 3773324..ecf7c37 100644
--- a/src/nfc/tags/rw_i93.c
+++ b/src/nfc/tags/rw_i93.c
@@ -437,6 +437,16 @@ void rw_i93_send_to_upper (BT_HDR *p_resp)
case I93_CMD_READ_MULTI_BLOCK:
case I93_CMD_GET_MULTI_BLK_SEC:
+ if (UINT16_MAX - length < BT_HDR_SIZE)
+ {
+ rw_data.i93_cmd_cmpl.status = NFC_STATUS_FAILED;
+ rw_data.i93_cmd_cmpl.command = p_i93->sent_cmd;
+ rw_cb.tcb.i93.sent_cmd = 0;
+
+ event = RW_I93_CMD_CMPL_EVT;
+ break;
+ }
+
/* forward tag data or security status */
p_buff = (BT_HDR*) GKI_getbuf ((UINT16) (length + BT_HDR_SIZE));

148
Patches/LineageOS-14.1/android_frameworks_base/360893.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
From 2f780d815579ec2500046fadd4a3c7b09aa0bf62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lucas Lin <lucaslin@google.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2023 08:13:50 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Sanitize VPN label to prevent HTML injection
This commit will try to sanitize the content of VpnDialog. This
commit creates a function which will try to sanitize the VPN
label, if the sanitized VPN label is different from the original
one, which means the VPN label might contain HTML tag or the VPN
label violates the words restriction(may contain some wording
which will mislead the user). For this kind of case, show the
package name instead of the VPN label to prevent misleading the
user.
The malicious VPN app might be able to add a large number of line
breaks with HTML in order to hide the system-displayed text from
the user in the connection request dialog. Thus, sanitizing the
content of the dialog is needed.
Bug: 204554636
Test: N/A
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:2178216b98bf9865edee198f45192f0b883624ab)
Merged-In: I8eb890fd2e5797d8d6ab5b12f9c628bc9616081d
Change-Id: I8eb890fd2e5797d8d6ab5b12f9c628bc9616081d
Change-Id: Ieb148594d8e9a6505567f80d78810f687bb6e489
---
packages/VpnDialogs/res/values/strings.xml | 29 ++++++++++
.../com/android/vpndialogs/ConfirmDialog.java | 53 +++++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/packages/VpnDialogs/res/values/strings.xml b/packages/VpnDialogs/res/values/strings.xml
index 406bcc34a1015..7389f765c717d 100644
--- a/packages/VpnDialogs/res/values/strings.xml
+++ b/packages/VpnDialogs/res/values/strings.xml
@@ -50,4 +50,33 @@
<xliff:g id="number">%1$s</xliff:g> bytes /
<xliff:g id="number">%2$s</xliff:g> packets
</string>
+
+ <!-- Malicious VPN apps may provide very long labels or cunning HTML to trick the system dialogs
+ into displaying what they want. The system will attempt to sanitize the label, and if the
+ label is deemed dangerous, then this string is used instead. The first argument is the
+ first 30 characters of the label, and the second argument is the package name of the app.
+ Example : Normally a VPN app may be called "My VPN app" in which case the dialog will read
+ "My VPN app wants to set up a VPN connection...". If the label is very long, then, this
+ will be used to show "VerylongVPNlabel… (com.my.vpn.app) wants to set up a VPN
+ connection...". For this case, the code will refer to sanitized_vpn_label_with_ellipsis.
+ -->
+ <string name="sanitized_vpn_label_with_ellipsis">
+ <xliff:g id="sanitized_vpn_label_with_ellipsis" example="My VPN app">%1$s</xliff:g>… (
+ <xliff:g id="sanitized_vpn_label_with_ellipsis" example="com.my.vpn.app">%2$s</xliff:g>)
+ </string>
+
+ <!-- Malicious VPN apps may provide very long labels or cunning HTML to trick the system dialogs
+ into displaying what they want. The system will attempt to sanitize the label, and if the
+ label is deemed dangerous, then this string is used instead. The first argument is the
+ label, and the second argument is the package name of the app.
+ Example : Normally a VPN app may be called "My VPN app" in which case the dialog will read
+ "My VPN app wants to set up a VPN connection...". If the VPN label contains HTML tag but
+ the length is not very long, the dialog will show "VpnLabelWith&lt;br&gt;HtmlTag
+ (com.my.vpn.app) wants to set up a VPN connection...". For this case, the code will refer
+ to sanitized_vpn_label.
+ -->
+ <string name="sanitized_vpn_label">
+ <xliff:g id="sanitized_vpn_label" example="My VPN app">%1$s</xliff:g> (
+ <xliff:g id="sanitized_vpn_label" example="com.my.vpn.app">%2$s</xliff:g>)
+ </string>
</resources>
diff --git a/packages/VpnDialogs/src/com/android/vpndialogs/ConfirmDialog.java b/packages/VpnDialogs/src/com/android/vpndialogs/ConfirmDialog.java
index 09339743db5c5..43d18df3a10dd 100644
--- a/packages/VpnDialogs/src/com/android/vpndialogs/ConfirmDialog.java
+++ b/packages/VpnDialogs/src/com/android/vpndialogs/ConfirmDialog.java
@@ -42,10 +42,52 @@ public class ConfirmDialog extends AlertActivity
implements DialogInterface.OnClickListener, ImageGetter {
private static final String TAG = "VpnConfirm";
+ // Usually the label represents the app name, 150 code points might be enough to display the app
+ // name, and 150 code points won't cover the warning message from VpnDialog.
+ static final int MAX_VPN_LABEL_LENGTH = 150;
+
private String mPackage;
private IConnectivityManager mService;
+ private View mView;
+
+ /**
+ * This function will use the string resource to combine the VPN label and the package name.
+ *
+ * If the VPN label violates the length restriction, the first 30 code points of VPN label and
+ * the package name will be returned. Or return the VPN label and the package name directly if
+ * the VPN label doesn't violate the length restriction.
+ *
+ * The result will be something like,
+ * - ThisIsAVeryLongVpnAppNameWhich... (com.vpn.app)
+ * if the VPN label violates the length restriction.
+ * or
+ * - VpnLabelWith&lt;br&gt;HtmlTag (com.vpn.app)
+ * if the VPN label doesn't violate the length restriction.
+ *
+ */
+ private String getSimplifiedLabel(String vpnLabel, String packageName) {
+ if (vpnLabel.codePointCount(0, vpnLabel.length()) > 30) {
+ return getString(R.string.sanitized_vpn_label_with_ellipsis,
+ vpnLabel.substring(0, vpnLabel.offsetByCodePoints(0, 30)),
+ packageName);
+ }
+
+ return getString(R.string.sanitized_vpn_label, vpnLabel, packageName);
+ }
+
+ protected String getSanitizedVpnLabel(String vpnLabel, String packageName) {
+ final String sanitizedVpnLabel = Html.escapeHtml(vpnLabel);
+ final boolean exceedMaxVpnLabelLength = sanitizedVpnLabel.codePointCount(0,
+ sanitizedVpnLabel.length()) > MAX_VPN_LABEL_LENGTH;
+ if (exceedMaxVpnLabelLength || !vpnLabel.equals(sanitizedVpnLabel)) {
+ return getSimplifiedLabel(sanitizedVpnLabel, packageName);
+ }
+
+ return sanitizedVpnLabel;
+ }
+
@Override
protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
@@ -68,15 +110,16 @@ protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
finish();
return;
}
- View view = View.inflate(this, R.layout.confirm, null);
- ((TextView) view.findViewById(R.id.warning)).setText(
- Html.fromHtml(getString(R.string.warning, getVpnLabel()),
- this, null /* tagHandler */));
+ mView = View.inflate(this, R.layout.confirm, null);
+ ((TextView) mView.findViewById(R.id.warning)).setText(
+ Html.fromHtml(getString(R.string.warning, getSanitizedVpnLabel(
+ getVpnLabel().toString(), mPackage)),
+ this /* imageGetter */, null /* tagHandler */));
mAlertParams.mTitle = getText(R.string.prompt);
mAlertParams.mPositiveButtonText = getText(android.R.string.ok);
mAlertParams.mPositiveButtonListener = this;
mAlertParams.mNegativeButtonText = getText(android.R.string.cancel);
- mAlertParams.mView = view;
+ mAlertParams.mView = mView;
setupAlert();
getWindow().setCloseOnTouchOutside(false);

84
Patches/LineageOS-14.1/android_frameworks_base/360894.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
From 0459c2c0db0c0187a8d9a3074534a34c1cbf2ccc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Groover <mpgroover@google.com>
Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2023 21:31:22 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Limit the number of supported v1 and v2 signers
The v1 and v2 APK Signature Schemes support multiple signers; this
was intended to allow multiple entities to sign an APK. Previously,
the platform had no limits placed on the number of signers supported
in an APK, but this commit sets a hard limit of 10 supported signers
for these signature schemes to ensure a large number of signers
does not place undue burden on the platform.
Bug: 266580022
Test: Manually verified the platform only allowed an APK with the
maximum number of supported signers.
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:6f6ee8a55f37c2b8c0df041b2bd53ec928764597)
Merged-In: I6aa86b615b203cdc69d58a593ccf8f18474ca091
Change-Id: I6aa86b615b203cdc69d58a593ccf8f18474ca091
---
.../util/apk/ApkSignatureSchemeV2Verifier.java | 10 ++++++++++
core/java/android/util/jar/StrictJarVerifier.java | 11 +++++++++++
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/core/java/android/util/apk/ApkSignatureSchemeV2Verifier.java b/core/java/android/util/apk/ApkSignatureSchemeV2Verifier.java
index 78d3b7bf81d28..f4631c68832b2 100644
--- a/core/java/android/util/apk/ApkSignatureSchemeV2Verifier.java
+++ b/core/java/android/util/apk/ApkSignatureSchemeV2Verifier.java
@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ public class ApkSignatureSchemeV2Verifier {
public static final String SF_ATTRIBUTE_ANDROID_APK_SIGNED_NAME = "X-Android-APK-Signed";
public static final int SF_ATTRIBUTE_ANDROID_APK_SIGNED_ID = 2;
+ /**
+ * The maximum number of signers supported by the v2 APK signature scheme.
+ */
+ private static final int MAX_V2_SIGNERS = 10;
+
/**
* Returns {@code true} if the provided APK contains an APK Signature Scheme V2 signature.
*
@@ -219,6 +224,11 @@ private static X509Certificate[][] verify(
}
while (signers.hasRemaining()) {
signerCount++;
+ if (signerCount > MAX_V2_SIGNERS) {
+ throw new SecurityException(
+ "APK Signature Scheme v2 only supports a maximum of " + MAX_V2_SIGNERS
+ + " signers");
+ }
try {
ByteBuffer signer = getLengthPrefixedSlice(signers);
X509Certificate[] certs = verifySigner(signer, contentDigests, certFactory);
diff --git a/core/java/android/util/jar/StrictJarVerifier.java b/core/java/android/util/jar/StrictJarVerifier.java
index cb71ecc1da8b3..1ce078704be32 100644
--- a/core/java/android/util/jar/StrictJarVerifier.java
+++ b/core/java/android/util/jar/StrictJarVerifier.java
@@ -70,6 +70,11 @@ class StrictJarVerifier {
"SHA1",
};
+ /**
+ * The maximum number of signers supported by the JAR signature scheme.
+ */
+ private static final int MAX_JAR_SIGNERS = 10;
+
private final String jarName;
private final StrictJarManifest manifest;
private final HashMap<String, byte[]> metaEntries;
@@ -285,10 +290,16 @@ synchronized boolean readCertificates() {
return false;
}
+ int signerCount = 0;
Iterator<String> it = metaEntries.keySet().iterator();
while (it.hasNext()) {
String key = it.next();
if (key.endsWith(".DSA") || key.endsWith(".RSA") || key.endsWith(".EC")) {
+ if (++signerCount > MAX_JAR_SIGNERS) {
+ throw new SecurityException(
+ "APK Signature Scheme v1 only supports a maximum of " + MAX_JAR_SIGNERS
+ + " signers");
+ }
verifyCertificate(key);
it.remove();
}

99
Patches/LineageOS-14.1/android_frameworks_base/360895.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
From 303a97a99b75bae716c109b810e6bccb732483df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Andr=C3=A1s=20Kurucz?= <kurucz@google.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2023 09:45:07 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Truncate ShortcutInfo Id
Creating Conversation with a ShortcutId longer than 65_535 (max unsigned short), we did not save the conversation settings into the notification_policy.xml due to a restriction in FastDataOutput.
This put us to a state where the user changing the importance or turning off the notifications for the given conversation had no effect on notification behavior.
Fixes: 273729476
Test: atest ShortcutManagerTest2
Test: Create a test app which creates a Conversation with a long shortcutId. Go to the Conversation Settings and turn off Notifications. Post a new Notification to this Conversation and see if it is displayed.
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:f31df6234091b5b1de258a01dd4b2d8e5415ee2e)
Merged-In: I2617de6f9e8a7dbfd8fbeff589a7d592f00d87c5
Change-Id: I2617de6f9e8a7dbfd8fbeff589a7d592f00d87c5
---
.../java/android/content/pm/ShortcutInfo.java | 20 ++++++++++++++++---
.../server/pm/ShortcutManagerTest2.java | 10 ++++++++++
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/core/java/android/content/pm/ShortcutInfo.java b/core/java/android/content/pm/ShortcutInfo.java
index a854b899a82af..3ac20ff39327b 100644
--- a/core/java/android/content/pm/ShortcutInfo.java
+++ b/core/java/android/content/pm/ShortcutInfo.java
@@ -128,6 +128,12 @@ public final class ShortcutInfo implements Parcelable {
public static final int CLONE_REMOVE_FOR_LAUNCHER = CLONE_REMOVE_ICON | CLONE_REMOVE_INTENT
| CLONE_REMOVE_RES_NAMES;
+ /**
+ * The maximum length of Shortcut ID. IDs will be truncated at this limit.
+ * @hide
+ */
+ public static final int MAX_ID_LENGTH = 1000;
+
/** @hide */
@IntDef(flag = true,
value = {
@@ -226,8 +232,7 @@ public final class ShortcutInfo implements Parcelable {
private ShortcutInfo(Builder b) {
mUserId = b.mContext.getUserId();
-
- mId = Preconditions.checkStringNotEmpty(b.mId, "Shortcut ID must be provided");
+ mId = getSafeId(Preconditions.checkStringNotEmpty(b.mId, "Shortcut ID must be provided"));
// Note we can't do other null checks here because SM.updateShortcuts() takes partial
// information.
@@ -309,6 +314,14 @@ private static PersistableBundle[] clonePersistableBundle(PersistableBundle[] bu
return ret;
}
+ @NonNull
+ private static String getSafeId(@NonNull String id) {
+ if (id.length() > MAX_ID_LENGTH) {
+ return id.substring(0, MAX_ID_LENGTH);
+ }
+ return id;
+ }
+
/**
* Throws if any of the mandatory fields is not set.
*
@@ -1602,7 +1615,8 @@ private ShortcutInfo(Parcel source) {
final ClassLoader cl = getClass().getClassLoader();
mUserId = source.readInt();
- mId = source.readString();
+ mId = getSafeId(Preconditions.checkStringNotEmpty(source.readString(),
+ "Shortcut ID must be provided"));
mPackageName = source.readString();
mActivity = source.readParcelable(cl);
mFlags = source.readInt();
diff --git a/services/tests/servicestests/src/com/android/server/pm/ShortcutManagerTest2.java b/services/tests/servicestests/src/com/android/server/pm/ShortcutManagerTest2.java
index d25923c019cac..6b86ef0e0704c 100644
--- a/services/tests/servicestests/src/com/android/server/pm/ShortcutManagerTest2.java
+++ b/services/tests/servicestests/src/com/android/server/pm/ShortcutManagerTest2.java
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
import java.io.PrintWriter;
import java.io.StringWriter;
import java.io.Writer;
+import java.util.Collections;
import java.util.Locale;
/**
@@ -223,6 +224,15 @@ public void testShortcutInfoMissingMandatoryFields() {
});
}
+ public void testShortcutIdTruncated() {
+ ShortcutInfo si = new ShortcutInfo.Builder(getTestContext(),
+ String.join("", Collections.nCopies(Short.MAX_VALUE, "s"))).build();
+
+ assertTrue(
+ "id must be truncated to MAX_ID_LENGTH",
+ si.getId().length() <= ShortcutInfo.MAX_ID_LENGTH);
+ }
+
public void testShortcutInfoParcel() {
setCaller(CALLING_PACKAGE_1, USER_10);
ShortcutInfo si = parceled(new ShortcutInfo.Builder(mClientContext)

46
Patches/LineageOS-14.1/android_system_bt/360892.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From fa5c4429ae75e687b87313b79512c4a90f90ee3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: tyiu <tyiu@google.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2023 18:40:51 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix gatt_end_operation buffer overflow
Added boundary check for gatt_end_operation to prevent writing out of
boundary.
Since response of the GATT server is handled in
gatt_client_handle_server_rsp() and gatt_process_read_rsp(), the maximum
lenth that can be passed into the handlers is bounded by
GATT_MAX_MTU_SIZE, which is set to 517, which is greater than
GATT_MAX_ATTR_LEN which is set to 512. The fact that there is no spec
that gaurentees MTU response to be less than or equal to 512 bytes can
cause a buffer overflow when performing memcpy without length check.
Bug: 261068592
Test: No test since not affecting behavior
Tag: #security
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:dd7298e982e4bbf0138a490562679c9a4a755200)
Merged-In: I49e2797cd9300ee4cd69f2c7fa5f0073db78b873
Change-Id: I49e2797cd9300ee4cd69f2c7fa5f0073db78b873
---
stack/gatt/gatt_utils.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/stack/gatt/gatt_utils.c b/stack/gatt/gatt_utils.c
index 4582b5ae477..e56c1a4e793 100644
--- a/stack/gatt/gatt_utils.c
+++ b/stack/gatt/gatt_utils.c
@@ -2190,6 +2190,14 @@ void gatt_end_operation(tGATT_CLCB *p_clcb, tGATT_STATUS status, void *p_data)
cb_data.att_value.handle = p_clcb->s_handle;
cb_data.att_value.len = p_clcb->counter;
+ if (cb_data.att_value.len > GATT_MAX_ATTR_LEN)
+ {
+ GATT_TRACE_DEBUG ("%s", __func__);
+ GATT_TRACE_DEBUG ("Large cb_data.att_value, size=%d",
+ cb_data.att_value.len);
+ cb_data.att_value.len = GATT_MAX_ATTR_LEN;
+ }
+
if (p_data && p_clcb->counter)
memcpy (cb_data.att_value.value, p_data, cb_data.att_value.len);
}

11
Scripts/LineageOS-14.1/Patch.sh
View File

@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ sed -i '50i$(my_res_package): PRIVATE_AAPT_FLAGS += --auto-add-overlay' core/aap
sed -i '296iLOCAL_AAPT_FLAGS += --auto-add-overlay' core/package_internal.mk;
awk -i inplace '!/Email/' target/product/core.mk; #Remove Email
awk -i inplace '!/Exchange2/' target/product/core.mk;
sed -i 's/2021-06-05/2023-06-05/' core/version_defaults.mk; #Bump Security String #n-asb-2023-06 #XXX
sed -i 's/2021-06-05/2023-07-05/' core/version_defaults.mk; #Bump Security String #n-asb-2023-07 #XXX
fi;
if enterAndClear "device/qcom/sepolicy"; then
@ -100,6 +100,10 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_expat/337989-backport.patch"; #n-asb-2
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_expat/348649.patch"; #n-asb-2023-02 Fix overeager DTD destruction (fixes #649)
fi;
if enterAndClear "external/freetype"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_freetype/360899.patch"; #n-asb-2023-07 Cherry-pick two upstream changes
fi;
if enterAndClear "external/libavc"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_libavc/315711.patch"; #n-asb-2021-09 Decoder: Update check for increment u2_cur_slice_num
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_libavc/323462.patch"; #n-asb-2022-02 Move slice increments after completing header parsing
@ -120,6 +124,7 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_libnfc-nci/332460.patch"; #n-asb-2022-
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_libnfc-nci/341071.patch"; #n-asb-2022-10 The length of a packet should be non-zero
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_libnfc-nci/343955.patch"; #n-asb-2022-11 OOBW in phNxpNciHal_write_unlocked()
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_libnfc-nci/353760.patch"; #n-asb-2023-04 OOBW in nci_snd_set_routing_cmd()
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_libnfc-nci/360898.patch"; #n-asb-2023-07 OOBW in rw_i93_send_to_upper()
fi;
if enterAndClear "external/sonivox"; then
@ -199,6 +204,9 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/355866.patch"; #n-asb-2023-05 C
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/358732.patch"; #n-asb-2023-06 Prevent RemoteViews crashing SystemUi
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/358733.patch"; #n-asb-2023-06 Check key intent for selectors and prohibited flags
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/358734.patch"; #n-asb-2023-06 Handle invalid data during job loading.
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/360893.patch"; #n-asb-2023-07 Sanitize VPN label to prevent HTML injection
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/360894.patch"; #n-asb-2023-07 Limit the number of supported v1 and v2 signers
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/360895.patch"; #n-asb-2023-07 Truncate ShortcutInfo Id
git revert --no-edit 0326bb5e41219cf502727c3aa44ebf2daa19a5b3; #Re-enable doze on devices without gms
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/248599.patch"; #Make SET_TIME_ZONE permission match SET_TIME (AOSP)
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0001-Reduced_Resolution.patch"; #Allow reducing resolution to save power TODO: Add 800x480 (DivestOS)
@ -464,6 +472,7 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/353755.patch"; #n-asb-2023-04 Fix an
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/358735.patch"; #n-asb-2023-06 Prevent use-after-free of HID reports
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/358736.patch"; #n-asb-2023-06 Revert "Revert "[RESTRICT AUTOMERGE] Validate buffer length in sdpu_build_uuid_seq""
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/358737.patch"; #n-asb-2023-06 Revert "Revert "Fix wrong BR/EDR link key downgrades (P_256->P_192)""
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/360892.patch"; #n-asb-2023-07 Fix gatt_end_operation buffer overflow
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/229574.patch"; #bt-sbc-hd-dualchannel-nougat: Increase maximum Bluetooth SBC codec bitrate for SBC HD (ValdikSS)
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/229575.patch"; #bt-sbc-hd-dualchannel-nougat: Explicit SBC Dual Channel (SBC HD) support (ValdikSS)
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/242134.patch"; #avrc_bld_get_attrs_rsp - fix attribute length position off by one (cprhokie)

3
Scripts/LineageOS-18.1/Functions.sh
View File

@ -114,10 +114,11 @@ patchWorkspaceReal() {
verifyAllPlatformTags;
gpgVerifyGitHead "$DOS_BUILD_BASE/external/chromium-webview";
#source build/envsetup.sh;
source build/envsetup.sh;
#repopick -it eleven-firewall;
#repopick -i 314453; #TaskViewTouchController: Null check current animation on drag
#repopick -i 325011; #lineage: Opt-in to shipping full recovery image by default
repopick -it R_asb_2023-07;
sh "$DOS_SCRIPTS/Patch.sh";
sh "$DOS_SCRIPTS_COMMON/Enable_Verity.sh";

1
Scripts/LineageOS-18.1/Patch.sh
View File

@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ sed -i '75i$(my_res_package): PRIVATE_AAPT_FLAGS += --auto-add-overlay' core/aap
awk -i inplace '!/updatable_apex.mk/' target/product/mainline_system.mk; #Disable APEX
sed -i 's/PLATFORM_MIN_SUPPORTED_TARGET_SDK_VERSION := 23/PLATFORM_MIN_SUPPORTED_TARGET_SDK_VERSION := 28/' core/version_defaults.mk; #Set the minimum supported target SDK to Pie (GrapheneOS)
#sed -i 's/PRODUCT_OTA_ENFORCE_VINTF_KERNEL_REQUIREMENTS := true/PRODUCT_OTA_ENFORCE_VINTF_KERNEL_REQUIREMENTS := false/' core/product_config.mk; #broken by hardenDefconfig
sed -i 's/2023-06-05/2023-07-05/' core/version_defaults.mk; #Bump Security String #R_asb_2023-07 #XXX
fi;
if enterAndClear "build/soong"; then

3
Scripts/LineageOS-19.1/Functions.sh
View File

@ -88,9 +88,10 @@ patchWorkspaceReal() {
verifyAllPlatformTags;
gpgVerifyGitHead "$DOS_BUILD_BASE/external/chromium-webview";
#source build/envsetup.sh;
source build/envsetup.sh;
#repopick -ift twelve-bt-sbc-hd-dualchannel;
#repopick -it twelve-colors;
repopick -it S_asb_2023-07;
sh "$DOS_SCRIPTS/Patch.sh";
sh "$DOS_SCRIPTS_COMMON/Enable_Verity.sh";

9
Scripts/LineageOS-19.1/Patch.sh
View File

@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ sed -i '75i$(my_res_package): PRIVATE_AAPT_FLAGS += --auto-add-overlay' core/aap
awk -i inplace '!/updatable_apex.mk/' target/product/generic_system.mk; #Disable APEX
sed -i 's/PLATFORM_MIN_SUPPORTED_TARGET_SDK_VERSION := 23/PLATFORM_MIN_SUPPORTED_TARGET_SDK_VERSION := 28/' core/version_defaults.mk; #Set the minimum supported target SDK to Pie (GrapheneOS)
#sed -i 's/PRODUCT_OTA_ENFORCE_VINTF_KERNEL_REQUIREMENTS := true/PRODUCT_OTA_ENFORCE_VINTF_KERNEL_REQUIREMENTS := false/' core/product_config.mk; #broken by hardenDefconfig
sed -i 's/2023-06-05/2023-07-05/' core/version_defaults.mk; #Bump Security String #S_asb_2023-07 #XXX
fi;
if enterAndClear "build/soong"; then
@ -113,6 +114,10 @@ if enterAndClear "external/conscrypt"; then
if [ "$DOS_GRAPHENE_CONSTIFY" = true ]; then applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_conscrypt/0001-constify_JNINativeMethod.patch"; fi; #Constify JNINativeMethod tables (GrapheneOS)
fi;
if enterAndClear "external/freetype"; then
git fetch https://github.com/LineageOS/android_external_freetype refs/changes/29/360929/1 && git cherry-pick FETCH_HEAD; #S_asb_2023-07
fi;
if [ "$DOS_GRAPHENE_MALLOC" = true ]; then
if enterAndClear "external/hardened_malloc"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_hardened_malloc/0001-Broken_Cameras-1.patch"; #Workarounds for Pixel 3 SoC era camera driver bugs (GrapheneOS)
@ -421,6 +426,10 @@ if enterAndClear "system/update_engine"; then
git revert --no-edit a5a18ac5e2a2377fe036fcae93548967a7b40470; #Do not skip payload signature verification
fi;
if enterAndClear "tools/apksig"; then
git fetch https://github.com/LineageOS/android_tools_apksig refs/changes/46/360946/1 && git cherry-pick FETCH_HEAD; #S_asb_2023-07
fi;
if enterAndClear "vendor/lineage"; then
rm build/target/product/security/lineage.x509.pem; #Remove Lineage keys
rm -rf overlay/common/lineage-sdk/packages/LineageSettingsProvider/res/values/defaults.xml; #Remove analytics