Fixup + Churn

Signed-off-by: Tavi <tavi@divested.dev>
This commit is contained in:
Tavi 2024-07-13 14:51:09 -04:00
parent f0de4dbf4c
commit 236a403d12
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: E599F62ECBAEAF2E
6 changed files with 14 additions and 14 deletions

View File

@ -1021,7 +1021,7 @@ kernel/samsung/exynos9810 6a9461f9460ca51d1217e5069a5d5556fcc79e63
kernel/sony/sdm660 3e2dae044d515ec25c87cd3b02a2831be858c6fc
kernel/sony/sdm845 4ee668ab2da1095a1373ba5dee5762a43bbe1bc3
kernel/tests 2ad90182e2d9b2ac924c113d3c97e6f008a5e756
kernel/xiaomi/msm8937 f73537d5e5e8f951fa806158758de9e71f916697
kernel/xiaomi/msm8937 fd86ec0c2a9240fe6ebe730bb92c64d3b8ed7f03
kernel/xiaomi/sdm845 4583022b1192b0e6668b144786835d8e4b5c25c8
kernel/xiaomi/sm6150 749a9b6f6704202e61dea9981435107356db3cae
kernel/xiaomi/sm8250 f3d39dae3253e7f8bb623eb83a146088f3174148

View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From e4ea22f79e2995c16f19b45925d4dd66f9813646 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Martijn Coenen <maco@google.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Feb 2024 12:03:05 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] [BACKPORT] Verify UID of incoming Zygote connections.
Subject: [PATCH] Verify UID of incoming Zygote connections.
Only the system UID should be allowed to connect to the Zygote. While
for generic Zygotes this is also covered by SELinux policy, this is not
@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Change-Id: I3f85a17107849e2cd3e82d6ef15c90b9e2f26532
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/core/java/com/android/internal/os/ZygoteConnection.java b/core/java/com/android/internal/os/ZygoteConnection.java
index 85d84bb3f9867..40ab4839195bc 100644
index 85d84bb3f986..40ab4839195b 100644
--- a/core/java/com/android/internal/os/ZygoteConnection.java
+++ b/core/java/com/android/internal/os/ZygoteConnection.java
@@ -104,6 +104,10 @@ class ZygoteConnection {

View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From 9dabeb4f8d2ab8936c84823786fab90d0e929ce3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Brian Delwiche <delwiche@google.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2024 21:14:56 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] [BACKPORT] Fix an authentication bypass bug in SMP
Subject: [PATCH] Fix an authentication bypass bug in SMP
When pairing with BLE legacy pairing initiated
from remote, authentication can be bypassed.
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Change-Id: I66b1f9a80060f48a604001829db8ea7c96c7b7f8
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/stack/smp/smp_act.c b/stack/smp/smp_act.c
index 8702e109578..a9bcd4c87c2 100644
index 7491d0972..925bcd832 100644
--- a/stack/smp/smp_act.c
+++ b/stack/smp/smp_act.c
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ void smp_send_confirm(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ index 8702e109578..a9bcd4c87c2 100644
}
/*******************************************************************************
@@ -704,6 +705,16 @@ void smp_proc_init(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
@@ -720,6 +721,16 @@ void smp_proc_init(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
return;
}
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ index 8702e109578..a9bcd4c87c2 100644
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->rrand, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
}
diff --git a/stack/smp/smp_int.h b/stack/smp/smp_int.h
index aea85380edd..aac64ea2ef1 100644
index bfac772b9..ab7676861 100644
--- a/stack/smp/smp_int.h
+++ b/stack/smp/smp_int.h
@@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ typedef union

View File

@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Tad <tad@spotco.us>
create mode 100644 src/com/android/settings/security/OpenEuiccPreferenceController.java
diff --git a/res/values/strings.xml b/res/values/strings.xml
index ce056d7ab0..27c7f9abc7 100644
index ce056d7ab0..7dcc89b560 100644
--- a/res/values/strings.xml
+++ b/res/values/strings.xml
@@ -759,6 +759,9 @@
@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ index ce056d7ab0..27c7f9abc7 100644
<string name="sig_spoof_summary">Allows official builds of microG apps to function. Not supported, not recommended. May break apps and/or degrade their security model. Notes: 1) microG connects directly to Google, 2) apps talking to microG do so using proprietary Google libraries, 3) microG can download/execute proprietary code from Google.</string>
+ <string name="openeuicc_title">Enable eUICC management</string>
+ <string name="openeuicc_summary">Enables the OpenEUICC app to allow management of virtual (eSIM) and physical eUICC cards. Reboot required after toggling. Requires reboot.</string>
+ <string name="openeuicc_summary">Enables the OpenEUICC app to allow management of virtual (eSIM) and physical eUICC cards. Requires reboot.</string>
+
<!-- Text shown for the title of the lock when trust lost option [CHAR LIMIT=40] -->
<string name="trust_lost_locks_screen_title">Lock screen when trust is lost</string>

View File

@ -17,12 +17,12 @@ Signed-off-by: Tad <tad@spotco.us>
create mode 100644 src/com/android/settings/security/CarrierConfig2PreferenceController.java
diff --git a/res/values/strings.xml b/res/values/strings.xml
index 27c7f9abc7..2543ef0677 100644
index 7dcc89b560..cd6ee50ad7 100644
--- a/res/values/strings.xml
+++ b/res/values/strings.xml
@@ -762,6 +762,9 @@
<string name="openeuicc_title">Enable eUICC management</string>
<string name="openeuicc_summary">Enables the OpenEUICC app to allow management of virtual (eSIM) and physical eUICC cards. Reboot required after toggling. Requires reboot.</string>
<string name="openeuicc_summary">Enables the OpenEUICC app to allow management of virtual (eSIM) and physical eUICC cards. Requires reboot.</string>
+ <string name="carrierconfig2_title">Enable CarrierConfig2</string>
+ <string name="carrierconfig2_summary">Use a larger Google database instead of the AOSP database for carrier specific configurations. May improve cellular network compatibility &amp; functionality. Requires reboot.</string>

View File

@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ commentPatches android_kernel_samsung_manta.sh "CVE-2021-Misc2/3.4/0055.patch" "
commentPatches android_kernel_samsung_msm8930-common.sh "CVE-2017-11015/prima" "CVE-2019-11599" "CVE-2021-Misc2/ANY/0031.patch";
commentPatches android_kernel_samsung_smdk4412.sh "CVE-2012-2127" "CVE-2016-8463/ANY/0001.patch";
commentPatches android_kernel_samsung_tuna.sh "CVE-2012-2127";
commentPatches android_kernel_samsung_universal8890.sh "0008-Graphene-Kernel_Hardening-ro" "CVE-2016-7917" "CVE-2018-1092" "CVE-2018-17972" "CVE-2019-16746" "CVE-2020-0427" "CVE-2020-14381" "CVE-2020-16166" "CVE-2022-42896/4.9";
commentPatches android_kernel_samsung_universal8890.sh "0008-Graphene-Kernel_Hardening-ro" "CVE-2016-7917" "CVE-2016-20022" "CVE-2018-1092" "CVE-2018-17972" "CVE-2019-16746" "CVE-2020-0427" "CVE-2020-14381" "CVE-2020-16166" "CVE-2022-42896/4.9";
commentPatches android_kernel_samsung_exynos9810.sh "CVE-2020-1749" "CVE-2019-ctnl-addr-leak" "CVE-2019-18282" "CVE-2019-11599" "CVE-2022-20566" "CVE-2019-16746" "CVE-2021-45469" "CVE-2020-0305" "CVE-2021-3506/4.19" "CVE-2024-26934/4.19";
commentPatches android_kernel_samsung_universal9810.sh "CVE-2020-1749";
commentPatches android_kernel_sony_sdm660.sh "0008-Graphene-Kernel_Hardening-canaries/4.4/0002.patch" "CVE-2019-19319" "CVE-2020-0305" "CVE-2020-8992" "CVE-2020-16166";