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Patch against towelroot

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Tad 2017-11-10 03:06:09 -05:00
parent d1f4933957
commit 1b74baddf0
10 changed files with 990 additions and 4 deletions
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84
Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2014-3153/ANY/0001.patch Normal file
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From e9c243a5a6de0be8e584c604d353412584b592f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2014 12:27:06 +0000
Subject: futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr ==
uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.
This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
different depending on the mapping ]
Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
kernel/futex.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c
index 81dbe77..663ea2b 100644
--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -1442,6 +1442,13 @@ static int futex_requeue(u32 __user *uaddr1, unsigned int flags,
if (requeue_pi) {
/*
+ * Requeue PI only works on two distinct uaddrs. This
+ * check is only valid for private futexes. See below.
+ */
+ if (uaddr1 == uaddr2)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
* requeue_pi requires a pi_state, try to allocate it now
* without any locks in case it fails.
*/
@@ -1479,6 +1486,15 @@ retry:
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out_put_key1;
+ /*
+ * The check above which compares uaddrs is not sufficient for
+ * shared futexes. We need to compare the keys:
+ */
+ if (requeue_pi && match_futex(&key1, &key2)) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_put_keys;
+ }
+
hb1 = hash_futex(&key1);
hb2 = hash_futex(&key2);
@@ -2525,6 +2541,15 @@ static int futex_wait_requeue_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags,
if (ret)
goto out_key2;
+ /*
+ * The check above which compares uaddrs is not sufficient for
+ * shared futexes. We need to compare the keys:
+ */
+ if (match_futex(&q.key, &key2)) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_put_keys;
+ }
+
/* Queue the futex_q, drop the hb lock, wait for wakeup. */
futex_wait_queue_me(hb, &q, to);
--
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From 13fbca4c6ecd96ec1a1cfa2e4f2ce191fe928a5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2014 12:27:07 +0000
Subject: futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi
If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not
cleanup the user space futex. So the owner TID of the current owner
(the unlocker) persists. That's observable inconsistant state,
especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred.
Clean it up unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
kernel/futex.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c
index 520e7b2..e1cb1ba 100644
--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -1052,6 +1052,7 @@ static int wake_futex_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, struct futex_q *this)
struct task_struct *new_owner;
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = this->pi_state;
u32 uninitialized_var(curval), newval;
+ int ret = 0;
if (!pi_state)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1075,23 +1076,19 @@ static int wake_futex_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, struct futex_q *this)
new_owner = this->task;
/*
- * We pass it to the next owner. (The WAITERS bit is always
- * kept enabled while there is PI state around. We must also
- * preserve the owner died bit.)
+ * We pass it to the next owner. The WAITERS bit is always
+ * kept enabled while there is PI state around. We cleanup the
+ * owner died bit, because we are the owner.
*/
- if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED)) {
- int ret = 0;
-
- newval = FUTEX_WAITERS | task_pid_vnr(new_owner);
+ newval = FUTEX_WAITERS | task_pid_vnr(new_owner);
- if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval))
- ret = -EFAULT;
- else if (curval != uval)
- ret = -EINVAL;
- if (ret) {
- raw_spin_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- return ret;
- }
+ if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ else if (curval != uval)
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (ret) {
+ raw_spin_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
+ return ret;
}
raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->owner->pi_lock);
@@ -2351,9 +2348,10 @@ retry:
/*
* To avoid races, try to do the TID -> 0 atomic transition
* again. If it succeeds then we can return without waking
- * anyone else up:
+ * anyone else up. We only try this if neither the waiters nor
+ * the owner died bit are set.
*/
- if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) &&
+ if (!(uval & ~FUTEX_TID_MASK) &&
cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&uval, uaddr, vpid, 0))
goto pi_faulted;
/*
@@ -2383,11 +2381,9 @@ retry:
/*
* No waiters - kernel unlocks the futex:
*/
- if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED)) {
- ret = unlock_futex_pi(uaddr, uval);
- if (ret == -EFAULT)
- goto pi_faulted;
- }
+ ret = unlock_futex_pi(uaddr, uval);
+ if (ret == -EFAULT)
+ goto pi_faulted;
out_unlock:
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
--
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From 54a217887a7b658e2650c3feff22756ab80c7339 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2014 12:27:08 +0000
Subject: futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust
The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of
the TID value 0 in the user space futex. We can get into the kernel
even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters bit
or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi path
or from user space just for fun.
The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case
that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space
address. This can lead to state leakage and worse under some
circumstances.
Handle the cases explicit:
Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID | uODIED | ?
[1] NULL | --- | --- | 0 | 0/1 | Valid
[2] NULL | --- | --- | >0 | 0/1 | Valid
[3] Found | NULL | -- | Any | 0/1 | Invalid
[4] Found | Found | NULL | 0 | 1 | Valid
[5] Found | Found | NULL | >0 | 1 | Invalid
[6] Found | Found | task | 0 | 1 | Valid
[7] Found | Found | NULL | Any | 0 | Invalid
[8] Found | Found | task | ==taskTID | 0/1 | Valid
[9] Found | Found | task | 0 | 0 | Invalid
[10] Found | Found | task | !=taskTID | 0/1 | Invalid
[1] Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.
[2] Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.
[3] Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex
[4] Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.
[5] The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
and exit_pi_state_list()
[6] Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.
[7] pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.
[8] Owner and user space value match
[9] There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]
[10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
TID out of sync.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
kernel/futex.c | 134 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 106 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c
index e1cb1ba..de938d2 100644
--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -743,10 +743,58 @@ void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr)
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
}
+/*
+ * We need to check the following states:
+ *
+ * Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID | uODIED | ?
+ *
+ * [1] NULL | --- | --- | 0 | 0/1 | Valid
+ * [2] NULL | --- | --- | >0 | 0/1 | Valid
+ *
+ * [3] Found | NULL | -- | Any | 0/1 | Invalid
+ *
+ * [4] Found | Found | NULL | 0 | 1 | Valid
+ * [5] Found | Found | NULL | >0 | 1 | Invalid
+ *
+ * [6] Found | Found | task | 0 | 1 | Valid
+ *
+ * [7] Found | Found | NULL | Any | 0 | Invalid
+ *
+ * [8] Found | Found | task | ==taskTID | 0/1 | Valid
+ * [9] Found | Found | task | 0 | 0 | Invalid
+ * [10] Found | Found | task | !=taskTID | 0/1 | Invalid
+ *
+ * [1] Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
+ * came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.
+ *
+ * [2] Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
+ * thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.
+ *
+ * [3] Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex
+ *
+ * [4] Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
+ * value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.
+ *
+ * [5] The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
+ * and exit_pi_state_list()
+ *
+ * [6] Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
+ * the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.
+ *
+ * [7] pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.
+ *
+ * [8] Owner and user space value match
+ *
+ * [9] There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
+ * except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
+ * FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]
+ *
+ * [10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
+ * TID out of sync.
+ */
static int
lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
- union futex_key *key, struct futex_pi_state **ps,
- struct task_struct *task)
+ union futex_key *key, struct futex_pi_state **ps)
{
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = NULL;
struct futex_q *this, *next;
@@ -756,12 +804,13 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, &hb->chain, list) {
if (match_futex(&this->key, key)) {
/*
- * Another waiter already exists - bump up
- * the refcount and return its pi_state:
+ * Sanity check the waiter before increasing
+ * the refcount and attaching to it.
*/
pi_state = this->pi_state;
/*
- * Userspace might have messed up non-PI and PI futexes
+ * Userspace might have messed up non-PI and
+ * PI futexes [3]
*/
if (unlikely(!pi_state))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -769,44 +818,70 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
WARN_ON(!atomic_read(&pi_state->refcount));
/*
- * When pi_state->owner is NULL then the owner died
- * and another waiter is on the fly. pi_state->owner
- * is fixed up by the task which acquires
- * pi_state->rt_mutex.
- *
- * We do not check for pid == 0 which can happen when
- * the owner died and robust_list_exit() cleared the
- * TID.
+ * Handle the owner died case:
*/
- if (pid && pi_state->owner) {
+ if (uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) {
/*
- * Bail out if user space manipulated the
- * futex value.
+ * exit_pi_state_list sets owner to NULL and
+ * wakes the topmost waiter. The task which
+ * acquires the pi_state->rt_mutex will fixup
+ * owner.
*/
- if (pid != task_pid_vnr(pi_state->owner))
+ if (!pi_state->owner) {
+ /*
+ * No pi state owner, but the user
+ * space TID is not 0. Inconsistent
+ * state. [5]
+ */
+ if (pid)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * Take a ref on the state and
+ * return. [4]
+ */
+ goto out_state;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If TID is 0, then either the dying owner
+ * has not yet executed exit_pi_state_list()
+ * or some waiter acquired the rtmutex in the
+ * pi state, but did not yet fixup the TID in
+ * user space.
+ *
+ * Take a ref on the state and return. [6]
+ */
+ if (!pid)
+ goto out_state;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * If the owner died bit is not set,
+ * then the pi_state must have an
+ * owner. [7]
+ */
+ if (!pi_state->owner)
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
- * Protect against a corrupted uval. If uval
- * is 0x80000000 then pid is 0 and the waiter
- * bit is set. So the deadlock check in the
- * calling code has failed and we did not fall
- * into the check above due to !pid.
+ * Bail out if user space manipulated the
+ * futex value. If pi state exists then the
+ * owner TID must be the same as the user
+ * space TID. [9/10]
*/
- if (task && pi_state->owner == task)
- return -EDEADLK;
+ if (pid != task_pid_vnr(pi_state->owner))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ out_state:
atomic_inc(&pi_state->refcount);
*ps = pi_state;
-
return 0;
}
}
/*
* We are the first waiter - try to look up the real owner and attach
- * the new pi_state to it, but bail out when TID = 0
+ * the new pi_state to it, but bail out when TID = 0 [1]
*/
if (!pid)
return -ESRCH;
@@ -839,6 +914,9 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
return ret;
}
+ /*
+ * No existing pi state. First waiter. [2]
+ */
pi_state = alloc_pi_state();
/*
@@ -959,7 +1037,7 @@ retry:
* We dont have the lock. Look up the PI state (or create it if
* we are the first waiter):
*/
- ret = lookup_pi_state(uval, hb, key, ps, task);
+ ret = lookup_pi_state(uval, hb, key, ps);
if (unlikely(ret)) {
switch (ret) {
@@ -1565,7 +1643,7 @@ retry_private:
* rereading and handing potential crap to
* lookup_pi_state.
*/
- ret = lookup_pi_state(ret, hb2, &key2, &pi_state, NULL);
+ ret = lookup_pi_state(ret, hb2, &key2, &pi_state);
}
switch (ret) {
--
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From b3eaa9fc5cd0a4d74b18f6b8dc617aeaf1873270 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2014 12:27:06 +0000
Subject: futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic()
We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue
user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side
acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel
associated to the real owner.
Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state. If
it has, return -EINVAL. The state is corrupted already, so no point in
cleaning it up. Subsequent calls will fail as well. Not our problem.
[ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try
restoring the already corrupted user space state. ]
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
kernel/futex.c | 14 +++++++++++---
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c
index 663ea2b..520e7b2 100644
--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -910,10 +910,18 @@ retry:
return -EDEADLK;
/*
- * Surprise - we got the lock. Just return to userspace:
+ * Surprise - we got the lock, but we do not trust user space at all.
*/
- if (unlikely(!curval))
- return 1;
+ if (unlikely(!curval)) {
+ /*
+ * We verify whether there is kernel state for this
+ * futex. If not, we can safely assume, that the 0 ->
+ * TID transition is correct. If state exists, we do
+ * not bother to fixup the user space state as it was
+ * corrupted already.
+ */
+ return futex_top_waiter(hb, key) ? -EINVAL : 1;
+ }
uval = curval;
--
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From 637b58c2887e5e57850865839cc75f59184b23d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Date: Mon, 3 Feb 2014 19:11:42 -0500
Subject: switch pipe_read() to copy_page_to_iter()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
fs/pipe.c | 79 +++++++--------------------------------------------------------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
index 6679c95..034bffa 100644
--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -142,55 +142,6 @@ pipe_iov_copy_from_user(void *to, struct iovec *iov, unsigned long len,
return 0;
}
-static int
-pipe_iov_copy_to_user(struct iovec *iov, const void *from, unsigned long len,
- int atomic)
-{
- unsigned long copy;
-
- while (len > 0) {
- while (!iov->iov_len)
- iov++;
- copy = min_t(unsigned long, len, iov->iov_len);
-
- if (atomic) {
- if (__copy_to_user_inatomic(iov->iov_base, from, copy))
- return -EFAULT;
- } else {
- if (copy_to_user(iov->iov_base, from, copy))
- return -EFAULT;
- }
- from += copy;
- len -= copy;
- iov->iov_base += copy;
- iov->iov_len -= copy;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Attempt to pre-fault in the user memory, so we can use atomic copies.
- * Returns the number of bytes not faulted in.
- */
-static int iov_fault_in_pages_write(struct iovec *iov, unsigned long len)
-{
- while (!iov->iov_len)
- iov++;
-
- while (len > 0) {
- unsigned long this_len;
-
- this_len = min_t(unsigned long, len, iov->iov_len);
- if (fault_in_pages_writeable(iov->iov_base, this_len))
- break;
-
- len -= this_len;
- iov++;
- }
-
- return len;
-}
-
/*
* Pre-fault in the user memory, so we can use atomic copies.
*/
@@ -329,12 +280,15 @@ pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *_iov,
ssize_t ret;
struct iovec *iov = (struct iovec *)_iov;
size_t total_len;
+ struct iov_iter iter;
total_len = iov_length(iov, nr_segs);
/* Null read succeeds. */
if (unlikely(total_len == 0))
return 0;
+ iov_iter_init(&iter, iov, nr_segs, total_len, 0);
+
do_wakeup = 0;
ret = 0;
__pipe_lock(pipe);
@@ -344,9 +298,9 @@ pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *_iov,
int curbuf = pipe->curbuf;
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + curbuf;
const struct pipe_buf_operations *ops = buf->ops;
- void *addr;
size_t chars = buf->len;
- int error, atomic;
+ size_t written;
+ int error;
if (chars > total_len)
chars = total_len;
@@ -358,27 +312,10 @@ pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *_iov,
break;
}
- atomic = !iov_fault_in_pages_write(iov, chars);
-redo:
- if (atomic)
- addr = kmap_atomic(buf->page);
- else
- addr = kmap(buf->page);
- error = pipe_iov_copy_to_user(iov, addr + buf->offset, chars, atomic);
- if (atomic)
- kunmap_atomic(addr);
- else
- kunmap(buf->page);
- if (unlikely(error)) {
- /*
- * Just retry with the slow path if we failed.
- */
- if (atomic) {
- atomic = 0;
- goto redo;
- }
+ written = copy_page_to_iter(buf->page, buf->offset, chars, &iter);
+ if (unlikely(written < chars)) {
if (!ret)
- ret = error;
+ ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
ret += chars;
--
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From f0d1bec9d58d4c038d0ac958c9af82be6eb18045 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Date: Thu, 3 Apr 2014 15:05:18 -0400
Subject: new helper: copy_page_from_iter()
parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became
->write_iter()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
fs/pipe.c | 129 ++++++++--------------------------------------------
include/linux/uio.h | 2 +
mm/iov_iter.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 110 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
index 05ccb00..21981e5 100644
--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -116,50 +116,6 @@ void pipe_wait(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe)
pipe_lock(pipe);
}
-static int
-pipe_iov_copy_from_user(void *to, struct iovec *iov, unsigned long len,
- int atomic)
-{
- unsigned long copy;
-
- while (len > 0) {
- while (!iov->iov_len)
- iov++;
- copy = min_t(unsigned long, len, iov->iov_len);
-
- if (atomic) {
- if (__copy_from_user_inatomic(to, iov->iov_base, copy))
- return -EFAULT;
- } else {
- if (copy_from_user(to, iov->iov_base, copy))
- return -EFAULT;
- }
- to += copy;
- len -= copy;
- iov->iov_base += copy;
- iov->iov_len -= copy;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Pre-fault in the user memory, so we can use atomic copies.
- */
-static void iov_fault_in_pages_read(struct iovec *iov, unsigned long len)
-{
- while (!iov->iov_len)
- iov++;
-
- while (len > 0) {
- unsigned long this_len;
-
- this_len = min_t(unsigned long, len, iov->iov_len);
- fault_in_pages_readable(iov->iov_base, this_len);
- len -= this_len;
- iov++;
- }
-}
-
static void anon_pipe_buf_release(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
struct pipe_buffer *buf)
{
@@ -380,24 +336,19 @@ static inline int is_packetized(struct file *file)
}
static ssize_t
-pipe_write(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *_iov,
- unsigned long nr_segs, loff_t ppos)
+pipe_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from)
{
struct file *filp = iocb->ki_filp;
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe = filp->private_data;
- ssize_t ret;
- int do_wakeup;
- struct iovec *iov = (struct iovec *)_iov;
- size_t total_len;
+ ssize_t ret = 0;
+ int do_wakeup = 0;
+ size_t total_len = iov_iter_count(from);
ssize_t chars;
- total_len = iov_length(iov, nr_segs);
/* Null write succeeds. */
if (unlikely(total_len == 0))
return 0;
- do_wakeup = 0;
- ret = 0;
__pipe_lock(pipe);
if (!pipe->readers) {
@@ -416,38 +367,19 @@ pipe_write(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *_iov,
int offset = buf->offset + buf->len;
if (ops->can_merge && offset + chars <= PAGE_SIZE) {
- int error, atomic = 1;
- void *addr;
-
- error = ops->confirm(pipe, buf);
+ int error = ops->confirm(pipe, buf);
if (error)
goto out;
- iov_fault_in_pages_read(iov, chars);
-redo1:
- if (atomic)
- addr = kmap_atomic(buf->page);
- else
- addr = kmap(buf->page);
- error = pipe_iov_copy_from_user(offset + addr, iov,
- chars, atomic);
- if (atomic)
- kunmap_atomic(addr);
- else
- kunmap(buf->page);
- ret = error;
- do_wakeup = 1;
- if (error) {
- if (atomic) {
- atomic = 0;
- goto redo1;
- }
+ ret = copy_page_from_iter(buf->page, offset, chars, from);
+ if (unlikely(ret < chars)) {
+ error = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
+ do_wakeup = 1;
buf->len += chars;
- total_len -= chars;
ret = chars;
- if (!total_len)
+ if (!iov_iter_count(from))
goto out;
}
}
@@ -466,8 +398,7 @@ redo1:
int newbuf = (pipe->curbuf + bufs) & (pipe->buffers-1);
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + newbuf;
struct page *page = pipe->tmp_page;
- char *src;
- int error, atomic = 1;
+ int copied;
if (!page) {
page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
@@ -483,40 +414,19 @@ redo1:
* FIXME! Is this really true?
*/
do_wakeup = 1;
- chars = PAGE_SIZE;
- if (chars > total_len)
- chars = total_len;
-
- iov_fault_in_pages_read(iov, chars);
-redo2:
- if (atomic)
- src = kmap_atomic(page);
- else
- src = kmap(page);
-
- error = pipe_iov_copy_from_user(src, iov, chars,
- atomic);
- if (atomic)
- kunmap_atomic(src);
- else
- kunmap(page);
-
- if (unlikely(error)) {
- if (atomic) {
- atomic = 0;
- goto redo2;
- }
+ copied = copy_page_from_iter(page, 0, PAGE_SIZE, from);
+ if (unlikely(copied < PAGE_SIZE && iov_iter_count(from))) {
if (!ret)
- ret = error;
+ ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
- ret += chars;
+ ret += copied;
/* Insert it into the buffer array */
buf->page = page;
buf->ops = &anon_pipe_buf_ops;
buf->offset = 0;
- buf->len = chars;
+ buf->len = copied;
buf->flags = 0;
if (is_packetized(filp)) {
buf->ops = &packet_pipe_buf_ops;
@@ -525,8 +435,7 @@ redo2:
pipe->nrbufs = ++bufs;
pipe->tmp_page = NULL;
- total_len -= chars;
- if (!total_len)
+ if (!iov_iter_count(from))
break;
}
if (bufs < pipe->buffers)
@@ -1040,8 +949,8 @@ const struct file_operations pipefifo_fops = {
.llseek = no_llseek,
.read = new_sync_read,
.read_iter = pipe_read,
- .write = do_sync_write,
- .aio_write = pipe_write,
+ .write = new_sync_write,
+ .write_iter = pipe_write,
.poll = pipe_poll,
.unlocked_ioctl = pipe_ioctl,
.release = pipe_release,
diff --git a/include/linux/uio.h b/include/linux/uio.h
index 532f59d..6601235 100644
--- a/include/linux/uio.h
+++ b/include/linux/uio.h
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ int iov_iter_fault_in_readable(struct iov_iter *i, size_t bytes);
size_t iov_iter_single_seg_count(const struct iov_iter *i);
size_t copy_page_to_iter(struct page *page, size_t offset, size_t bytes,
struct iov_iter *i);
+size_t copy_page_from_iter(struct page *page, size_t offset, size_t bytes,
+ struct iov_iter *i);
unsigned long iov_iter_alignment(const struct iov_iter *i);
void iov_iter_init(struct iov_iter *i, int direction, const struct iovec *iov,
unsigned long nr_segs, size_t count);
diff --git a/mm/iov_iter.c b/mm/iov_iter.c
index a5c691c..081e327 100644
--- a/mm/iov_iter.c
+++ b/mm/iov_iter.c
@@ -82,6 +82,84 @@ done:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_page_to_iter);
+size_t copy_page_from_iter(struct page *page, size_t offset, size_t bytes,
+ struct iov_iter *i)
+{
+ size_t skip, copy, left, wanted;
+ const struct iovec *iov;
+ char __user *buf;
+ void *kaddr, *to;
+
+ if (unlikely(bytes > i->count))
+ bytes = i->count;
+
+ if (unlikely(!bytes))
+ return 0;
+
+ wanted = bytes;
+ iov = i->iov;
+ skip = i->iov_offset;
+ buf = iov->iov_base + skip;
+ copy = min(bytes, iov->iov_len - skip);
+
+ if (!fault_in_pages_readable(buf, copy)) {
+ kaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
+ to = kaddr + offset;
+
+ /* first chunk, usually the only one */
+ left = __copy_from_user_inatomic(to, buf, copy);
+ copy -= left;
+ skip += copy;
+ to += copy;
+ bytes -= copy;
+
+ while (unlikely(!left && bytes)) {
+ iov++;
+ buf = iov->iov_base;
+ copy = min(bytes, iov->iov_len);
+ left = __copy_from_user_inatomic(to, buf, copy);
+ copy -= left;
+ skip = copy;
+ to += copy;
+ bytes -= copy;
+ }
+ if (likely(!bytes)) {
+ kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ offset = to - kaddr;
+ buf += copy;
+ kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
+ copy = min(bytes, iov->iov_len - skip);
+ }
+ /* Too bad - revert to non-atomic kmap */
+ kaddr = kmap(page);
+ to = kaddr + offset;
+ left = __copy_from_user(to, buf, copy);
+ copy -= left;
+ skip += copy;
+ to += copy;
+ bytes -= copy;
+ while (unlikely(!left && bytes)) {
+ iov++;
+ buf = iov->iov_base;
+ copy = min(bytes, iov->iov_len);
+ left = __copy_from_user(to, buf, copy);
+ copy -= left;
+ skip = copy;
+ to += copy;
+ bytes -= copy;
+ }
+ kunmap(page);
+done:
+ i->count -= wanted - bytes;
+ i->nr_segs -= iov - i->iov;
+ i->iov = iov;
+ i->iov_offset = skip;
+ return wanted - bytes;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_page_from_iter);
+
static size_t __iovec_copy_from_user_inatomic(char *vaddr,
const struct iovec *iov, size_t base, size_t bytes)
{
--
cgit v1.1

12
Patches/Linux_CVEs/Kernel_CVE_Patch_List.txt
View File

@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
#This is a combined list from the following sources
# https://source.android.com/security/bulletin
# https://source.android.com/security/advisory
# https://cve.lineageos.org
# https://www.codeaurora.org/security-advisories
# https://www.codeaurora.org/security-advisories/security-bulletins
@ -77,6 +78,11 @@ CVE-2014-0196
Link - 3.4 - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm/commit/?h=LA.BF.1.1.3_rb1.12&id=9aabfc9e7775abbbcf534cdecccc4f12ee423b27
CVE-2014-0206
Link - https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d36db46c2cba973557eb6138d22210c4e0cf17d6
CVE-2014-3153
Link - https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=e9c243a5a6de0be8e584c604d353412584b592f8
Link - https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=13fbca4c6ecd96ec1a1cfa2e4f2ce191fe928a5e
Link - https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=54a217887a7b658e2650c3feff22756ab80c7339
Link - https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=b3eaa9fc5cd0a4d74b18f6b8dc617aeaf1873270
CVE-2014-0972
Link - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.10/commit/?id=7613c9d520ee4d227e635f6db0270d4cf26102bc
Link - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.10/commit/?id=d7d07936a166e7421a6308eec443b707a9678580
@ -329,6 +335,8 @@ CVE-2015-1805
Link - 3.10 - https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common/+/4a5a45669796c5b4617109182e25b321f9f00beb
Link - 3.14 - https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common/+/bf010e99c9bc48002f6bfa1ad801a59bf996270f
Link - 3.16 - https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a39bf4a8e29c7336c0c72652b7d0dd1cd1b13c51
Link - https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=637b58c2887e5e57850865839cc75f59184b23d1
Link - https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=f0d1bec9d58d4c038d0ac958c9af82be6eb18045
CVE-2015-2041
Link - 3.2 - https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=88fe14be08a475ad0eea4ca7c51f32437baf41af
Link - ^3.19 - https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6b8d9117ccb4f81b1244aafa7bc70ef8fa45fc49
@ -553,8 +561,6 @@ CVE-2016-2053
Link - http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=0d62e9dd6da45bbf0f33a8617afc5fe774c8f45f
CVE-2016-2059
Link - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.18/commit/?id=9e8bdd63f7011dff5523ea435433834b3702398d
CVE-2016-2059
Link - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.18/commit/?id=9e8bdd63f7011dff5523ea435433834b3702398d
CVE-2016-2060
Link - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/platform/system/netd/commit/?id=e9925f5acb4401588e23ea8a27c3e318f71b5cf8
CVE-2016-2061
@ -802,8 +808,6 @@ CVE-2016-4998
CVE-2016-5195
Link - https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9691eac5593ff1e2f82391ad327f21d90322aec1
Link - https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e45a502bdeae5a075257c4f061d1ff4ff0821354
CVE-2016-5340
Link - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la//kernel/msm-3.10/commit/?id=06e51489061e5473b4e2035c79dcf7c27a6f75a6
CVE-2016-5340
Link - https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.10/commit/?id=06e51489061e5473b4e2035c79dcf7c27a6f75a6
CVE-2016-5342

2
Scripts/LineageOS-14.1/CVE_Patchers/android_kernel_amazon_hdx-common.sh
View File

@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
cd $base"kernel/amazon/hdx-common"
git apply $cvePatches/CVE-2012-6704/^3.5/0001.patch
git apply $cvePatches/CVE-2014-1739/ANY/0001.patch
git apply $cvePatches/CVE-2014-3153/ANY/0002.patch
git apply $cvePatches/CVE-2014-3153/ANY/0004.patch
git apply $cvePatches/CVE-2014-4656/ANY/0001.patch
git apply $cvePatches/CVE-2014-7822/3.2-^3.16/0001.patch
git apply $cvePatches/CVE-2014-8709/ANY/0001.patch

2
Scripts/LineageOS-14.1/CVE_Patchers/android_kernel_htc_msm8974.sh
View File

@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
#!/bin/bash
cd $base"kernel/htc/msm8974"
git apply $cvePatches/CVE-2014-1739/ANY/0001.patch
git apply $cvePatches/CVE-2014-3153/ANY/0002.patch
git apply $cvePatches/CVE-2014-3153/ANY/0004.patch
git apply $cvePatches/CVE-2014-9715/^3.14/0002.patch
git apply $cvePatches/CVE-2014-9781/ANY/0001.patch
git apply $cvePatches/CVE-2015-1593/ANY/0001.patch

1
Scripts/LineageOS-14.1/CVE_Patchers/android_kernel_samsung_smdk4412.sh
View File

@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
#!/bin/bash
cd $base"kernel/samsung/smdk4412"
git apply $cvePatches/CVE-2014-1739/ANY/0001.patch
git apply $cvePatches/CVE-2014-3153/ANY/0004.patch
git apply $cvePatches/CVE-2014-4656/ANY/0001.patch
git apply $cvePatches/CVE-2014-9420/ANY/0001.patch
git apply $cvePatches/CVE-2014-9781/ANY/0001.patch