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17.1: reconcile picks

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Signed-off-by: Tavi <tavi@divested.dev>
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Tavi 2024-05-08 11:01:06 -04:00
parent bea8f92380
commit 1816472bac
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14 changed files with 1 additions and 714 deletions
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105
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_frameworks_av/385529.patch
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@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Haripriya Deshmukh <haripriya.deshmukh@ittiam.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2023 20:42:45 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Validate OMX Params for VPx encoders
Bug: 273936274
Bug: 273937171
Bug: 273937136
Bug: 273936553
Bug: 273936601
Test: POC in bug descriptions
(cherry picked from https://partner-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:022086b76536cd2e19a44053271190bdf6e181f7)
(cherry picked from commit 0e4ca1cb5c16af8f1dfb0ae41941c16c104d38e8)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:90641b2799fd3940cdf0bf8a73b2f76839e651a6)
Merged-In: I9bb17112d9f0217b6af0343afecc9c943453b757
Change-Id: I9bb17112d9f0217b6af0343afecc9c943453b757
---
media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVP8Encoder.cpp | 10 ++++++++++
media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVP9Encoder.cpp | 10 ++++++++++
media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVPXEncoder.cpp | 9 +++++++++
3 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
diff --git a/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVP8Encoder.cpp b/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVP8Encoder.cpp
index 04737a9ccf..9198b7c327 100644
--- a/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVP8Encoder.cpp
+++ b/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVP8Encoder.cpp
@@ -120,6 +120,11 @@ OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVP8Encoder::internalSetParameter(OMX_INDEXTYPE index,
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVP8Encoder::internalGetVp8Params(
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE* vp8Params) {
+ if (!isValidOMXParam(vp8Params)) {
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "273936274");
+ return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
+ }
+
if (vp8Params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
@@ -133,6 +138,11 @@ OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVP8Encoder::internalGetVp8Params(
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVP8Encoder::internalSetVp8Params(
const OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE* vp8Params) {
+ if (!isValidOMXParam(vp8Params)) {
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "273937171");
+ return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
+ }
+
if (vp8Params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
diff --git a/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVP9Encoder.cpp b/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVP9Encoder.cpp
index 1ea1c85f76..f8495c2da4 100644
--- a/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVP9Encoder.cpp
+++ b/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVP9Encoder.cpp
@@ -119,6 +119,11 @@ OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVP9Encoder::internalSetParameter(
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVP9Encoder::internalGetVp9Params(
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP9TYPE *vp9Params) {
+ if (!isValidOMXParam(vp9Params)) {
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "273936553");
+ return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
+ }
+
if (vp9Params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
@@ -133,6 +138,11 @@ OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVP9Encoder::internalGetVp9Params(
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVP9Encoder::internalSetVp9Params(
const OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP9TYPE *vp9Params) {
+ if (!isValidOMXParam(vp9Params)) {
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "273937136");
+ return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
+ }
+
if (vp9Params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
diff --git a/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVPXEncoder.cpp b/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVPXEncoder.cpp
index d0cb0718c2..054413e7c0 100644
--- a/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVPXEncoder.cpp
+++ b/media/libstagefright/codecs/on2/enc/SoftVPXEncoder.cpp
@@ -485,6 +485,11 @@ OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVPXEncoder::internalSetBitrateParams(
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVPXEncoder::internalGetAndroidVpxParams(
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ANDROID_VP8ENCODERTYPE *vpxAndroidParams) {
+ if (!isValidOMXParam(vpxAndroidParams)) {
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "273936601");
+ return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
+ }
+
if (vpxAndroidParams->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
@@ -501,6 +506,10 @@ OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVPXEncoder::internalGetAndroidVpxParams(
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVPXEncoder::internalSetAndroidVpxParams(
const OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ANDROID_VP8ENCODERTYPE *vpxAndroidParams) {
+ if (!isValidOMXParam(vpxAndroidParams)) {
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "273937551");
+ return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
+ }
if (vpxAndroidParams->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}

43
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_frameworks_av/385530.patch
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@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Harish Mahendrakar <harish.mahendrakar@ittiam.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Oct 2023 20:38:56 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] SoftVideoDecodeOMXComponent: validate OMX params for dynamic
HDR
Bug: 273935108
Bug: 281065553
(cherry picked from https://partner-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:b2c67bdcf57149a5e19a04466205266dc543fd86)
(cherry picked from commit a542f2c50700ca6df93e966fe8d4c468e1a15d9a)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:80e0acc096d201e80a1b65af944b1e47c9dd6f7b)
Merged-In: I707745594a9196d8d85d4c4bb498eba3c6198b42
Change-Id: I707745594a9196d8d85d4c4bb498eba3c6198b42
---
media/libstagefright/omx/SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent.cpp | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/media/libstagefright/omx/SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent.cpp b/media/libstagefright/omx/SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent.cpp
index e853da9763..418302389d 100644
--- a/media/libstagefright/omx/SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent.cpp
+++ b/media/libstagefright/omx/SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent.cpp
@@ -616,6 +616,10 @@ OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::getConfig(
DescribeHDR10PlusInfoParams* outParams =
(DescribeHDR10PlusInfoParams *)params;
+ if (!isValidOMXParam(outParams)) {
+ return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
+ }
+
outParams->nParamSizeUsed = info->size();
// If the buffer provided by the client does not have enough
@@ -694,6 +698,10 @@ OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::internalSetConfig(
const DescribeHDR10PlusInfoParams* inParams =
(DescribeHDR10PlusInfoParams *)params;
+ if (!isValidOMXParam(inParams)) {
+ return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
+ }
+
if (*frameConfig) {
// This is a request to append to the current frame config set.
// For now, we only support kDescribeHdr10PlusInfoIndex, which

34
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_frameworks_av/385531.patch
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@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Haripriya Deshmukh <haripriya.deshmukh@ittiam.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2023 18:32:38 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix out of bounds read and write in onQueueFilled in outQueue
Bug: 276442130
Test: POC in bug descriptions
(cherry picked from https://partner-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:7aef41e59412e2f95bab5de7e33f5f04bb808643)
(cherry picked from commit 8f4cfda9fc75f1e9ba3b6dee3fbffda4b6111d64)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:208e430bc6380fafafca8041b239f835263a9d47)
Merged-In: Ic230d10048193a785f185dc6a7de6f455f9318c1
Change-Id: Ic230d10048193a785f185dc6a7de6f455f9318c1
---
media/libstagefright/codecs/m4v_h263/dec/SoftMPEG4.cpp | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/media/libstagefright/codecs/m4v_h263/dec/SoftMPEG4.cpp b/media/libstagefright/codecs/m4v_h263/dec/SoftMPEG4.cpp
index 60750d9a61..db08030ad1 100644
--- a/media/libstagefright/codecs/m4v_h263/dec/SoftMPEG4.cpp
+++ b/media/libstagefright/codecs/m4v_h263/dec/SoftMPEG4.cpp
@@ -312,8 +312,11 @@ void SoftMPEG4::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = frameSize;
List<BufferInfo *>::iterator it = outQueue.begin();
- while ((*it)->mHeader != outHeader) {
- ++it;
+ while (it != outQueue.end() && (*it)->mHeader != outHeader) {
+ ++it;
+ }
+ if (it == outQueue.end()) {
+ return;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *it;

29
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_frameworks_base/385538.patch
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@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Buynytskyy <alexbuy@google.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2023 01:50:36 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Disallow system apps to be installed/updated as instant.
Bug: 299441833
Test: atest android.content.pm.cts.PackageManagerTest
(cherry picked from commit 496e78a1951f2ed69290f03c5625c0f8382f4d31)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:0d0f185c0d526c1dac0a8894b2c2f2e378328d73)
Merged-In: Idd89a6dd72f0e68259095f677185f0494391025c
Change-Id: Idd89a6dd72f0e68259095f677185f0494391025c
---
.../core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java b/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java
index 5bd1b4ac0195..d27b5ad0d646 100644
--- a/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java
+++ b/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/PackageManagerService.java
@@ -13673,6 +13673,9 @@ public class PackageManagerService extends IPackageManager.Stub
if (pkgSetting == null) {
return PackageManager.INSTALL_FAILED_INVALID_URI;
}
+ if (instantApp && (pkgSetting.isSystem() || isUpdatedSystemApp(pkgSetting))) {
+ return PackageManager.INSTALL_FAILED_INVALID_URI;
+ }
if (!canViewInstantApps(callingUid, UserHandle.getUserId(callingUid))) {
// only allow the existing package to be used if it's installed as a full
// application for at least one user

57
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_frameworks_base/385539.patch
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@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Dementyev <dementyev@google.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2024 09:26:56 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] Close AccountManagerService.session after timeout.
Bug: 303905130
Bug: 316893159
Test: manual
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:bb53f192e0ceaa026a083da156ef0cb0140f0c09)
Merged-In: Ib4cebf1750fc6324dc1c8853e0d716ea5e8ec073
Change-Id: Ib4cebf1750fc6324dc1c8853e0d716ea5e8ec073
---
.../android/server/accounts/AccountManagerService.java | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/services/core/java/com/android/server/accounts/AccountManagerService.java b/services/core/java/com/android/server/accounts/AccountManagerService.java
index 715b32687054..326acdfe3a3f 100644
--- a/services/core/java/com/android/server/accounts/AccountManagerService.java
+++ b/services/core/java/com/android/server/accounts/AccountManagerService.java
@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ public class AccountManagerService
final MessageHandler mHandler;
+ private static final int TIMEOUT_DELAY_MS = 1000 * 60 * 15;
// Messages that can be sent on mHandler
private static final int MESSAGE_TIMED_OUT = 3;
private static final int MESSAGE_COPY_SHARED_ACCOUNT = 4;
@@ -4766,6 +4767,7 @@ public class AccountManagerService
synchronized (mSessions) {
mSessions.put(toString(), this);
}
+ scheduleTimeout();
if (response != null) {
try {
response.asBinder().linkToDeath(this, 0 /* flags */);
@@ -4932,6 +4934,11 @@ public class AccountManagerService
}
}
+ private void scheduleTimeout() {
+ mHandler.sendMessageDelayed(
+ mHandler.obtainMessage(MESSAGE_TIMED_OUT, this), TIMEOUT_DELAY_MS);
+ }
+
public void cancelTimeout() {
mHandler.removeMessages(MESSAGE_TIMED_OUT, this);
}
@@ -4968,6 +4975,9 @@ public class AccountManagerService
public void onTimedOut() {
IAccountManagerResponse response = getResponseAndClose();
+ if (Log.isLoggable(TAG, Log.VERBOSE)) {
+ Log.v(TAG, "Session.onTimedOut");
+ }
if (response != null) {
try {
response.onError(AccountManager.ERROR_CODE_REMOTE_EXCEPTION,

67
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_frameworks_base/385672.patch
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@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: kumarashishg <kumarashishg@google.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2023 12:01:18 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Resolve custom printer icon boundary exploit.
Because Settings grants the INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS_FULL permission, an exploit is possible where the third party print plugin service can pass other's User Icon URI. This CL provides a lightweight solution for parsing the image URI to detect profile exploitation.
Bug: 281525042
Test: Build and flash the code. Try to reproduce the issue with
mentioned steps in the bug
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:0e0693ca9cb408d0dc82f6c6b3feb453fc8ddd83)
Merged-In: Iaaa6fe2a627a265c4d1d7b843a033a132e1fe2ce
Change-Id: Iaaa6fe2a627a265c4d1d7b843a033a132e1fe2ce
---
.../server/print/PrintManagerService.java | 34 ++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/services/print/java/com/android/server/print/PrintManagerService.java b/services/print/java/com/android/server/print/PrintManagerService.java
index c9b9f3e6bd48..2bed4b5a81f5 100644
--- a/services/print/java/com/android/server/print/PrintManagerService.java
+++ b/services/print/java/com/android/server/print/PrintManagerService.java
@@ -252,12 +252,44 @@ public final class PrintManagerService extends SystemService {
}
final long identity = Binder.clearCallingIdentity();
try {
- return userState.getCustomPrinterIcon(printerId);
+ Icon icon = userState.getCustomPrinterIcon(printerId);
+ return validateIconUserBoundary(icon);
} finally {
Binder.restoreCallingIdentity(identity);
}
}
+ /**
+ * Validates the custom printer icon to see if it's not in the calling user space.
+ * If the condition is not met, return null. Otherwise, return the original icon.
+ *
+ * @param icon
+ * @return icon (validated)
+ */
+ private Icon validateIconUserBoundary(Icon icon) {
+ // Refer to Icon#getUriString for context. The URI string is invalid for icons of
+ // incompatible types.
+ if (icon != null && (icon.getType() == Icon.TYPE_URI)) {
+ String encodedUser = icon.getUri().getEncodedUserInfo();
+
+ // If there is no encoded user, the URI is calling into the calling user space
+ if (encodedUser != null) {
+ int userId = Integer.parseInt(encodedUser);
+ // resolve encoded user
+ final int resolvedUserId = resolveCallingUserEnforcingPermissions(userId);
+
+ synchronized (mLock) {
+ // Only the current group members can get the printer icons.
+ if (resolveCallingProfileParentLocked(resolvedUserId)
+ != getCurrentUserId()) {
+ return null;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return icon;
+ }
+
@Override
public void cancelPrintJob(PrintJobId printJobId, int appId, int userId) {
if (printJobId == null) {

35
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_system_bt/385557.patch
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@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 19:57:20 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix an OOB bug in smp_proc_sec_req
This is a backport of I400cfa3523c6d8b25c233205748c2db5dc803d1d
Bug: 300903400
Test: m com.android.btservices
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:970c95d7c06c909c34a849587f701098129fc2ef)
Merged-In: Id4c65801ff8519aff18b24007e344934493cab55
Change-Id: Id4c65801ff8519aff18b24007e344934493cab55
---
stack/smp/smp_act.cc | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/stack/smp/smp_act.cc b/stack/smp/smp_act.cc
index 03d73f781..c1f143e92 100644
--- a/stack/smp/smp_act.cc
+++ b/stack/smp/smp_act.cc
@@ -423,6 +423,13 @@ void smp_send_ltk_reply(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
* Description process security request.
******************************************************************************/
void smp_proc_sec_req(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
+ if (smp_command_has_invalid_length(p_cb)) {
+ tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
+ smp_int_data.status = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
+ smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
+ return;
+ }
+
tBTM_LE_AUTH_REQ auth_req = *(tBTM_LE_AUTH_REQ*)p_data->p_data;
tBTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT sec_req_act;

115
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_system_bt/385558.patch
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@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 22:55:33 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Reland: Fix an OOB write bug in attp_build_value_cmd
This is a backport of I291fd665a68d90813b8c21c80d23cc438f84f285
Bug: 295887535
Bug: 315127634
Test: m com.android.btservices
Test: atest net_test_stack_gatt
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:70f7ff2b34e6683301c9c6cd021e1ddef76c5b1c)
Merged-In: Ieffac6db5c6359b071efc599f7a70de609b80b72
Change-Id: Ieffac6db5c6359b071efc599f7a70de609b80b72
---
stack/gatt/att_protocol.cc | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/stack/gatt/att_protocol.cc b/stack/gatt/att_protocol.cc
index cdf472e40..aaf1a53a3 100644
--- a/stack/gatt/att_protocol.cc
+++ b/stack/gatt/att_protocol.cc
@@ -278,46 +278,80 @@ BT_HDR* attp_build_opcode_cmd(uint8_t op_code) {
BT_HDR* attp_build_value_cmd(uint16_t payload_size, uint8_t op_code,
uint16_t handle, uint16_t offset, uint16_t len,
uint8_t* p_data) {
- uint8_t *p, *pp, pair_len, *p_pair_len;
+ uint8_t *p, *pp, *p_pair_len;
+ size_t pair_len;
+ size_t size_now = 1;
+
+#define CHECK_SIZE() \
+ do { \
+ if (size_now > payload_size) { \
+ LOG(ERROR) << "payload size too small"; \
+ osi_free(p_buf); \
+ return nullptr; \
+ } \
+ } while (false)
+
BT_HDR* p_buf =
(BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + payload_size + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET);
p = pp = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
+
+ CHECK_SIZE();
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, op_code);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
- p_buf->len = 1;
if (op_code == GATT_RSP_READ_BY_TYPE) {
- p_pair_len = p;
+ p_pair_len = p++;
pair_len = len + 2;
- UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, pair_len);
- p_buf->len += 1;
+ size_now += 1;
+ CHECK_SIZE();
+ // this field will be backfilled in the end of this function
}
+
if (op_code != GATT_RSP_READ_BLOB && op_code != GATT_RSP_READ) {
+ size_now += 2;
+ CHECK_SIZE();
UINT16_TO_STREAM(p, handle);
- p_buf->len += 2;
}
if (op_code == GATT_REQ_PREPARE_WRITE || op_code == GATT_RSP_PREPARE_WRITE) {
+ size_now += 2;
+ CHECK_SIZE();
UINT16_TO_STREAM(p, offset);
- p_buf->len += 2;
}
if (len > 0 && p_data != NULL) {
/* ensure data not exceed MTU size */
- if (payload_size - p_buf->len < len) {
- len = payload_size - p_buf->len;
+ if (payload_size - size_now < len) {
+ len = payload_size - size_now;
/* update handle value pair length */
- if (op_code == GATT_RSP_READ_BY_TYPE) *p_pair_len = (len + 2);
+ if (op_code == GATT_RSP_READ_BY_TYPE) {
+ pair_len = (len + 2);
+ }
LOG(WARNING) << StringPrintf(
"attribute value too long, to be truncated to %d", len);
}
+ size_now += len;
+ CHECK_SIZE();
ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, p_data, len);
- p_buf->len += len;
}
+ // backfill pair len field
+ if (op_code == GATT_RSP_READ_BY_TYPE) {
+ if (pair_len > UINT8_MAX) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << StringPrintf("pair_len greater than %d", UINT8_MAX);
+ osi_free(p_buf);
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+
+ *p_pair_len = (uint8_t)pair_len;
+ }
+
+#undef CHECK_SIZE
+
+ p_buf->len = (uint16_t)size_now;
return p_buf;
}

33
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_system_bt/385559.patch
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@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 22:38:20 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix a security bypass issue in
access_secure_service_from_temp_bond
Backport I48df2c2d77810077e97d4131540277273d441998
to rvc-dev
Bug: 318374503
Test: m com.android.btservices | manual test against PoC | QA
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:e908c16d9157b9e4a936117f06b8f964cf8386b8)
Merged-In: Ib7cf66019b3d45a2a23d235ad5f9dc406394456f
Change-Id: Ib7cf66019b3d45a2a23d235ad5f9dc406394456f
---
stack/btm/btm_sec.cc | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
index de91023c6..72dc9a2ed 100644
--- a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
+++ b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
@@ -235,8 +235,7 @@ static bool access_secure_service_from_temp_bond(const tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_r
bool locally_initiated,
uint16_t security_req) {
return !locally_initiated && (security_req & BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE) &&
- btm_dev_authenticated(p_dev_rec) &&
- p_dev_rec->bond_type == BOND_TYPE_TEMPORARY;
+ p_dev_rec->bond_type == BOND_TYPE_TEMPORARY;
}
/*******************************************************************************

35
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/385591.patch
View File

@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 19:57:20 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix an OOB bug in smp_proc_sec_req
This is a backport of I400cfa3523c6d8b25c233205748c2db5dc803d1d
Bug: 300903400
Test: m com.android.btservices
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:970c95d7c06c909c34a849587f701098129fc2ef)
Merged-In: Id4c65801ff8519aff18b24007e344934493cab55
Change-Id: Id4c65801ff8519aff18b24007e344934493cab55
---
stack/smp/smp_act.cc | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/stack/smp/smp_act.cc b/stack/smp/smp_act.cc
index 196eeacd7..a18d8389b 100755
--- a/stack/smp/smp_act.cc
+++ b/stack/smp/smp_act.cc
@@ -429,6 +429,13 @@ void smp_send_ltk_reply(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
* Description process security request.
******************************************************************************/
void smp_proc_sec_req(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
+ if (smp_command_has_invalid_length(p_cb)) {
+ tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
+ smp_int_data.status = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
+ smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
+ return;
+ }
+
tBTM_LE_AUTH_REQ auth_req = *(tBTM_LE_AUTH_REQ*)p_data->p_data;
tBTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT sec_req_act;

115
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/385592.patch
View File

@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 22:55:33 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Reland: Fix an OOB write bug in attp_build_value_cmd
This is a backport of I291fd665a68d90813b8c21c80d23cc438f84f285
Bug: 295887535
Bug: 315127634
Test: m com.android.btservices
Test: atest net_test_stack_gatt
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:70f7ff2b34e6683301c9c6cd021e1ddef76c5b1c)
Merged-In: Ieffac6db5c6359b071efc599f7a70de609b80b72
Change-Id: Ieffac6db5c6359b071efc599f7a70de609b80b72
---
stack/gatt/att_protocol.cc | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/stack/gatt/att_protocol.cc b/stack/gatt/att_protocol.cc
index d1e0ece59..41839b072 100644
--- a/stack/gatt/att_protocol.cc
+++ b/stack/gatt/att_protocol.cc
@@ -278,46 +278,80 @@ BT_HDR* attp_build_opcode_cmd(uint8_t op_code) {
BT_HDR* attp_build_value_cmd(uint16_t payload_size, uint8_t op_code,
uint16_t handle, uint16_t offset, uint16_t len,
uint8_t* p_data) {
- uint8_t *p, *pp, pair_len, *p_pair_len;
+ uint8_t *p, *pp, *p_pair_len;
+ size_t pair_len;
+ size_t size_now = 1;
+
+#define CHECK_SIZE() \
+ do { \
+ if (size_now > payload_size) { \
+ LOG(ERROR) << "payload size too small"; \
+ osi_free(p_buf); \
+ return nullptr; \
+ } \
+ } while (false)
+
BT_HDR* p_buf =
(BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + payload_size + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET);
p = pp = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
+
+ CHECK_SIZE();
UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, op_code);
p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET;
- p_buf->len = 1;
if (op_code == GATT_RSP_READ_BY_TYPE) {
- p_pair_len = p;
+ p_pair_len = p++;
pair_len = len + 2;
- UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, pair_len);
- p_buf->len += 1;
+ size_now += 1;
+ CHECK_SIZE();
+ // this field will be backfilled in the end of this function
}
+
if (op_code != GATT_RSP_READ_BLOB && op_code != GATT_RSP_READ) {
+ size_now += 2;
+ CHECK_SIZE();
UINT16_TO_STREAM(p, handle);
- p_buf->len += 2;
}
if (op_code == GATT_REQ_PREPARE_WRITE || op_code == GATT_RSP_PREPARE_WRITE) {
+ size_now += 2;
+ CHECK_SIZE();
UINT16_TO_STREAM(p, offset);
- p_buf->len += 2;
}
if (len > 0 && p_data != NULL) {
/* ensure data not exceed MTU size */
- if (payload_size - p_buf->len < len) {
- len = payload_size - p_buf->len;
+ if (payload_size - size_now < len) {
+ len = payload_size - size_now;
/* update handle value pair length */
- if (op_code == GATT_RSP_READ_BY_TYPE) *p_pair_len = (len + 2);
+ if (op_code == GATT_RSP_READ_BY_TYPE) {
+ pair_len = (len + 2);
+ }
LOG(WARNING) << StringPrintf(
"attribute value too long, to be truncated to %d", len);
}
+ size_now += len;
+ CHECK_SIZE();
ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, p_data, len);
- p_buf->len += len;
}
+ // backfill pair len field
+ if (op_code == GATT_RSP_READ_BY_TYPE) {
+ if (pair_len > UINT8_MAX) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << StringPrintf("pair_len greater than %d", UINT8_MAX);
+ osi_free(p_buf);
+ return nullptr;
+ }
+
+ *p_pair_len = (uint8_t)pair_len;
+ }
+
+#undef CHECK_SIZE
+
+ p_buf->len = (uint16_t)size_now;
return p_buf;
}

33
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/385593.patch
View File

@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 22:38:20 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix a security bypass issue in
access_secure_service_from_temp_bond
Backport I48df2c2d77810077e97d4131540277273d441998
to rvc-dev
Bug: 318374503
Test: m com.android.btservices | manual test against PoC | QA
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:e908c16d9157b9e4a936117f06b8f964cf8386b8)
Merged-In: Ib7cf66019b3d45a2a23d235ad5f9dc406394456f
Change-Id: Ib7cf66019b3d45a2a23d235ad5f9dc406394456f
---
stack/btm/btm_sec.cc | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
index 80f4d3031..1e7913854 100644
--- a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
+++ b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
@@ -235,8 +235,7 @@ static bool access_secure_service_from_temp_bond(const tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_r
bool locally_initiated,
uint16_t security_req) {
return !locally_initiated && (security_req & BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE) &&
- btm_dev_authenticated(p_dev_rec) &&
- p_dev_rec->bond_type == BOND_TYPE_TEMPORARY;
+ p_dev_rec->bond_type == BOND_TYPE_TEMPORARY;
}
/*******************************************************************************

2
Scripts/LineageOS-17.1/Functions.sh
View File

@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ patchWorkspaceReal() {
repopick -t Q_asb_2023-12 -e 377251,378083,378084,378085,378086,378087,378088,378314,378315;
repopick -t Q_asb_2024-01;
repopick -t Q_asb_2024-02;
#repopick -t Q_asb_2024-03;
repopick -t Q_asb_2024-03;
sh "$DOS_SCRIPTS/Patch.sh";
sh "$DOS_SCRIPTS_COMMON/Enable_Verity.sh";

12
Scripts/LineageOS-17.1/Patch.sh
View File

@ -174,17 +174,11 @@ git fetch https://github.com/LineageOS/android_external_zlib refs/changes/70/352
fi;
if enterAndClear "frameworks/av"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_av/385529.patch"; #R_asb_2024-03 Validate OMX Params for VPx encoders
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_av/385530.patch"; #R_asb_2024-03 SoftVideoDecodeOMXComponent: validate OMX params for dynamic HDR
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_av/385531.patch"; #R_asb_2024-03 Fix out of bounds read and write in onQueueFilled in outQueue
fi;
if enterAndClear "frameworks/base"; then
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/379145.patch"; #R_asb_2024-01 Dismiss keyguard when simpin auth'd and...
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/379136.patch"; #R_asb_2024-01 Fix ActivityManager#killBackgroundProcesses permissions
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/385672.patch"; #P_asb_2024-03 Resolve custom printer icon boundary exploit.
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/385538.patch"; #R_asb_2024-03 Disallow system apps to be installed/updated as instant.
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/385539.patch"; #R_asb_2024-03 Close AccountManagerService.session after timeout.
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/389014-backport.patch"; #S_asb_2024-04 Fix security vulnerability that creates user with no restrictions when accountOptions are too long.
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/389269-backport.patch"; #P_asb_2024-04 Close isUserInLockDown can be true when there are other strong auth requirements
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/272645.patch"; #ten-bt-sbc-hd-dualchannel: Add CHANNEL_MODE_DUAL_CHANNEL constant (ValdikSS)
@ -422,9 +416,6 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_prebuilts_abi-dumps_vndk/0001-protobuf-avi.patc
fi;
if enterAndClear "system/bt"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/385557.patch"; #R_asb_2024-03 Fix an OOB bug in smp_proc_sec_req
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/385558.patch"; #R_asb_2024-03 Reland: Fix an OOB write bug in attp_build_value_cmd
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/385559.patch"; #R_asb_2024-03 Fix a security bypass issue in access_secure_service_from_temp_bond
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES_COMMON/android_system_bt/0001-alloc_size.patch"; #Add alloc_size attributes to the allocator (GrapheneOS)
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/272648.patch"; #ten-bt-sbc-hd-dualchannel: Increase maximum Bluetooth SBC codec bitrate for SBC HD (ValdikSS)
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/272649.patch"; #ten-bt-sbc-hd-dualchannel: Explicit SBC Dual Channel (SBC HD) support (ValdikSS)
@ -478,9 +469,6 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_tools_apksig/360973-backport.patch"; #R_asb_202
fi;
if enterAndClear "vendor/qcom/opensource/commonsys/system/bt/"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/385591.patch"; #R_asb_2024-03 Fix an OOB bug in smp_proc_sec_req
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/385592.patch"; #R_asb_2024-03 Reland: Fix an OOB write bug in attp_build_value_cmd
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/385593.patch"; #R_asb_2024-03 Fix a security bypass issue in access_secure_service_from_temp_bond
fi;
if enterAndClear "vendor/lineage"; then