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Adds one patch for 14.1, thanks to @syphyr
Adds two patches for 16.0, thanks to @MSe1969
Adds many patches for 17.1, thanks to @flamefire

TODO check if 377768 applies to 15.1

Signed-off-by: Tad <tad@spotco.us>
This commit is contained in:
Tad 2023-12-26 09:32:44 -05:00
parent 7c46f43fc4
commit 12d0711d60
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: B286E9F57A07424B
56 changed files with 28 additions and 2966 deletions
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28
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_frameworks_base/377006.patch → Patches/LineageOS-14.1/android_frameworks_base/377939.patch
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 52459a71e45159f7fd837a29c2455deebae61424 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marzia Favaro <marziana@google.com>
Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2023 15:10:34 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Require permission to unlock keyguard
Subject: [PATCH] BACKPORT: Require permission to unlock keyguard
Bug: 288896339
Test: Manual, verify that the app which can be found on the bug can no longer call
@ -17,27 +17,29 @@ keyguardGoingAway successfully
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:ad8e7e3b1db22684988a179e23639567a4096ca6)
Merged-In: I7ba7e56f954c8e6f1f734311f735215918975bc6
Change-Id: I7ba7e56f954c8e6f1f734311f735215918975bc6
Change-Id: Id9a5ac676c7047c5c4d73b617a1cd628ba885ffe
---
.../java/com/android/server/wm/ActivityTaskManagerService.java | 2 ++
.../core/java/com/android/server/am/ActivityManagerService.java | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/services/core/java/com/android/server/wm/ActivityTaskManagerService.java b/services/core/java/com/android/server/wm/ActivityTaskManagerService.java
index d0dad0a23729..5bcc5975604a 100644
--- a/services/core/java/com/android/server/wm/ActivityTaskManagerService.java
+++ b/services/core/java/com/android/server/wm/ActivityTaskManagerService.java
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ package com.android.server.wm;
diff --git a/services/core/java/com/android/server/am/ActivityManagerService.java b/services/core/java/com/android/server/am/ActivityManagerService.java
index 4e48f422a2fe3..61563f40b825c 100644
--- a/services/core/java/com/android/server/am/ActivityManagerService.java
+++ b/services/core/java/com/android/server/am/ActivityManagerService.java
@@ -254,6 +254,7 @@
import libcore.io.IoUtils;
import libcore.util.EmptyArray;
import static android.Manifest.permission.BIND_VOICE_INTERACTION;
import static android.Manifest.permission.CHANGE_CONFIGURATION;
+import static android.Manifest.permission.CONTROL_KEYGUARD;
import static android.Manifest.permission.CONTROL_REMOTE_APP_TRANSITION_ANIMATIONS;
import static android.Manifest.permission.INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS;
import static android.Manifest.permission.INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS_FULL;
@@ -3890,6 +3891,7 @@ public class ActivityTaskManagerService extends IActivityTaskManager.Stub {
import static android.Manifest.permission.MANAGE_ACTIVITY_STACKS;
@@ -6973,6 +6974,7 @@ public void keyguardWaitingForActivityDrawn() {
@Override
public void keyguardGoingAway(int flags) {
+ mAmInternal.enforceCallingPermission(CONTROL_KEYGUARD, "unlock keyguard");
+ enforceCallingPermission(CONTROL_KEYGUARD, "keyguardGoingAway()");
enforceNotIsolatedCaller("keyguardGoingAway");
final long token = Binder.clearCallingIdentity();
try {

95
Patches/LineageOS-16.0/android_frameworks_base/377001-backport.patch
View File

@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Mat=C3=ADas=20Hern=C3=A1ndez?= <matiashe@google.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2023 13:52:21 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Visit Uris added by WearableExtender
Bug: 283962802
Test: atest + manual (POC app now crashes on notify() as expected)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:a6f44e911f2d7204cc28c710e54f97c96231abab)
Merged-In: I0da18c631eb5e4844a48760c7aaedab715a0bfed
Change-Id: I0da18c631eb5e4844a48760c7aaedab715a0bfed
---
core/java/android/app/Notification.java | 17 +++++++++++++++-
.../NotificationManagerServiceTest.java | 20 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/core/java/android/app/Notification.java b/core/java/android/app/Notification.java
index d456e3d57039..d1354a7e5c21 100644
--- a/core/java/android/app/Notification.java
+++ b/core/java/android/app/Notification.java
@@ -1700,6 +1700,10 @@ public class Notification implements Parcelable
}
}
+ private void visitUris(@NonNull Consumer<Uri> visitor) {
+ visitIconUri(visitor, getIcon());
+ }
+
@Override
public Action clone() {
return new Action(
@@ -2362,7 +2366,7 @@ public class Notification implements Parcelable
if (actions != null) {
for (Action action : actions) {
- visitIconUri(visitor, action.getIcon());
+ action.visitUris(visitor);
}
}
@@ -2390,6 +2394,11 @@ public class Notification implements Parcelable
}
}
}
+
+ if (extras != null && extras.containsKey(WearableExtender.EXTRA_WEARABLE_EXTENSIONS)) {
+ WearableExtender extender = new WearableExtender(this);
+ extender.visitUris(visitor);
+ }
}
/**
@@ -9045,6 +9054,12 @@ public class Notification implements Parcelable
mFlags &= ~mask;
}
}
+
+ private void visitUris(@NonNull Consumer<Uri> visitor) {
+ for (Action action : mActions) {
+ action.visitUris(visitor);
+ }
+ }
}
/**
diff --git a/services/tests/uiservicestests/src/com/android/server/notification/NotificationManagerServiceTest.java b/services/tests/uiservicestests/src/com/android/server/notification/NotificationManagerServiceTest.java
index e073e6767da6..379290bcf0ad 100644
--- a/services/tests/uiservicestests/src/com/android/server/notification/NotificationManagerServiceTest.java
+++ b/services/tests/uiservicestests/src/com/android/server/notification/NotificationManagerServiceTest.java
@@ -2797,6 +2797,26 @@ public class NotificationManagerServiceTest extends UiServiceTestCase {
anyInt(), anyInt());
}
+ @Test
+ public void testVisitUris_wearableExtender() {
+ Icon actionIcon = Icon.createWithContentUri("content://media/action");
+ Icon wearActionIcon = Icon.createWithContentUri("content://media/wearAction");
+ PendingIntent intent = PendingIntent.getActivity(mContext, 0, new Intent(),
+ PendingIntent.FLAG_IMMUTABLE);
+ Notification n = new Notification.Builder(mContext, "a")
+ .setSmallIcon(android.R.drawable.sym_def_app_icon)
+ .addAction(new Notification.Action.Builder(actionIcon, "Hey!", intent).build())
+ .extend(new Notification.WearableExtender().addAction(
+ new Notification.Action.Builder(wearActionIcon, "Wear!", intent).build()))
+ .build();
+
+ Consumer<Uri> visitor = (Consumer<Uri>) spy(Consumer.class);
+ n.visitUris(visitor);
+
+ verify(visitor).accept(eq(actionIcon.getUri()));
+ verify(visitor).accept(eq(wearActionIcon.getUri()));
+ }
+
@Test
public void testSetNotificationPolicy_preP_setOldFields() {
ZenModeHelper mZenModeHelper = mock(ZenModeHelper.class);

26
Patches/LineageOS-16.0/android_frameworks_base/377002.patch
View File

@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lifu Tang <lifu@google.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2023 13:03:00 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Fix bypass BAL via `requestGeofence`
Bug: 273729172
Test: manually
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:7f9be7c3c859dc82d37452570d9878b58f6437a9)
Merged-In: Ia8094244f908b20d42711b6ea8f58f9b3345b563
Change-Id: Ia8094244f908b20d42711b6ea8f58f9b3345b563
---
services/core/java/com/android/server/PendingIntentUtils.java | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/services/core/java/com/android/server/PendingIntentUtils.java b/services/core/java/com/android/server/PendingIntentUtils.java
index 1600101b20f4..a72a4d254a2a 100644
--- a/services/core/java/com/android/server/PendingIntentUtils.java
+++ b/services/core/java/com/android/server/PendingIntentUtils.java
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ public class PendingIntentUtils {
public static Bundle createDontSendToRestrictedAppsBundle(@Nullable Bundle bundle) {
final BroadcastOptions options = BroadcastOptions.makeBasic();
options.setDontSendToRestrictedApps(true);
+ options.setPendingIntentBackgroundActivityLaunchAllowed(false);
if (bundle == null) {
return options.toBundle();
}

123
Patches/LineageOS-16.0/android_frameworks_base/377004-backport.patch
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@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kweku Adams <kwekua@google.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2022 21:06:53 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] RESTRICT AUTOMERGE: Drop invalid data.
Drop invalid data when writing or reading from XML. PersistableBundle
does lazy unparcelling, so checking the values during unparcelling would
remove the benefit of the lazy unparcelling. Checking the validity when
writing to or reading from XML seems like the best alternative.
Bug: 246542285
Bug: 247513680
Test: install test app with invalid job config, start app to schedule job, then check logcat and jobscheduler persisted file
(cherry picked from commit 666e8ac60a31e2cc52b335b41004263f28a8db06)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:62b37ab21ce27746a79a2071deee98c61b23c8d9)
Merged-In: Ie817aa0993e9046cb313a750d2323cadc8c1ef15
Change-Id: Ie817aa0993e9046cb313a750d2323cadc8c1ef15
---
core/java/android/os/PersistableBundle.java | 42 +++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/core/java/android/os/PersistableBundle.java b/core/java/android/os/PersistableBundle.java
index 40eceb8a04e1..6a6ff64c5a5f 100644
--- a/core/java/android/os/PersistableBundle.java
+++ b/core/java/android/os/PersistableBundle.java
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ package android.os;
import android.annotation.Nullable;
import android.util.ArrayMap;
+import android.util.Slog;
import android.util.proto.ProtoOutputStream;
import com.android.internal.util.XmlUtils;
@@ -38,6 +39,8 @@ import java.util.ArrayList;
*/
public final class PersistableBundle extends BaseBundle implements Cloneable, Parcelable,
XmlUtils.WriteMapCallback {
+ private static final String TAG = "PersistableBundle";
+
private static final String TAG_PERSISTABLEMAP = "pbundle_as_map";
public static final PersistableBundle EMPTY;
@@ -100,7 +103,11 @@ public final class PersistableBundle extends BaseBundle implements Cloneable, Pa
* @hide
*/
public PersistableBundle(Bundle b) {
- this(b.getMap());
+ this(b, true);
+ }
+
+ private PersistableBundle(Bundle b, boolean throwException) {
+ this(b.getMap(), throwException);
}
/**
@@ -109,7 +116,7 @@ public final class PersistableBundle extends BaseBundle implements Cloneable, Pa
* @param map a Map containing only those items that can be persisted.
* @throws IllegalArgumentException if any element of #map cannot be persisted.
*/
- private PersistableBundle(ArrayMap<String, Object> map) {
+ private PersistableBundle(ArrayMap<String, Object> map, boolean throwException) {
super();
mFlags = FLAG_DEFUSABLE;
@@ -118,16 +125,23 @@ public final class PersistableBundle extends BaseBundle implements Cloneable, Pa
// Now verify each item throwing an exception if there is a violation.
final int N = mMap.size();
- for (int i=0; i<N; i++) {
+ for (int i = N - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
Object value = mMap.valueAt(i);
if (value instanceof ArrayMap) {
// Fix up any Maps by replacing them with PersistableBundles.
- mMap.setValueAt(i, new PersistableBundle((ArrayMap<String, Object>) value));
+ mMap.setValueAt(i,
+ new PersistableBundle((ArrayMap<String, Object>) value, throwException));
} else if (value instanceof Bundle) {
- mMap.setValueAt(i, new PersistableBundle(((Bundle) value)));
+ mMap.setValueAt(i, new PersistableBundle((Bundle) value, throwException));
} else if (!isValidType(value)) {
- throw new IllegalArgumentException("Bad value in PersistableBundle key="
- + mMap.keyAt(i) + " value=" + value);
+ final String errorMsg = "Bad value in PersistableBundle key="
+ + mMap.keyAt(i) + " value=" + value;
+ if (throwException) {
+ throw new IllegalArgumentException(errorMsg);
+ } else {
+ Slog.wtfStack(TAG, errorMsg);
+ mMap.removeAt(i);
+ }
}
}
}
@@ -242,6 +256,15 @@ public final class PersistableBundle extends BaseBundle implements Cloneable, Pa
/** @hide */
public void saveToXml(XmlSerializer out) throws IOException, XmlPullParserException {
unparcel();
+ // Explicitly drop invalid types an attacker may have added before persisting.
+ for (int i = mMap.size() - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+ final Object value = mMap.valueAt(i);
+ if (!isValidType(value)) {
+ Slog.e(TAG, "Dropping bad data before persisting: "
+ + mMap.keyAt(i) + "=" + value);
+ mMap.removeAt(i);
+ }
+ }
XmlUtils.writeMapXml(mMap, out, this);
}
@@ -290,9 +313,12 @@ public final class PersistableBundle extends BaseBundle implements Cloneable, Pa
while (((event = in.next()) != XmlPullParser.END_DOCUMENT) &&
(event != XmlPullParser.END_TAG || in.getDepth() < outerDepth)) {
if (event == XmlPullParser.START_TAG) {
+ // Don't throw an exception when restoring from XML since an attacker could try to
+ // input invalid data in the persisted file.
return new PersistableBundle((ArrayMap<String, Object>)
XmlUtils.readThisArrayMapXml(in, startTag, tagName,
- new MyReadMapCallback()));
+ new MyReadMapCallback()),
+ /* throwException */ false);
}
}
return EMPTY;

63
Patches/LineageOS-16.0/android_frameworks_base/377008.patch
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@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pawan Wagh <waghpawan@google.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2023 17:37:26 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Use readUniqueFileDescriptor in incidentd service
readFileDescriptor doesn't provide ownership of the fds. fdopen
needs ownership of the fds. Fds read from parcel should be duped
in this scenario and readUniqueFileDescriptor dups fds internally.
Test: m incidentd_service_fuzzer && adb sync data && adb shell /data/fuzz/x86_64/incidentd_service_fuzzer/incidentd_service_fuzzer
Test: atest incidentd_test
Bug: 286931110
Bug: 283699145
(cherry picked from commit ba78ef276951269f7b024baebdf1b8fa40bedb23)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:b4aaf180ee8f3e375c7ab411f03cf9c24c1d8055)
Merged-In: Ibe03a17dee91ac5bf25d123d4fd9c0bdd3c7d80e
Change-Id: Ibe03a17dee91ac5bf25d123d4fd9c0bdd3c7d80e
---
cmds/incidentd/src/IncidentService.cpp | 20 ++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cmds/incidentd/src/IncidentService.cpp b/cmds/incidentd/src/IncidentService.cpp
index e305b5462b77..cdff153e9b60 100644
--- a/cmds/incidentd/src/IncidentService.cpp
+++ b/cmds/incidentd/src/IncidentService.cpp
@@ -261,9 +261,13 @@ status_t IncidentService::onTransact(uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel*
switch (code) {
case SHELL_COMMAND_TRANSACTION: {
- int in = data.readFileDescriptor();
- int out = data.readFileDescriptor();
- int err = data.readFileDescriptor();
+ unique_fd in, out, err;
+ if (status_t status = data.readUniqueFileDescriptor(&in); status != OK) return status;
+
+ if (status_t status = data.readUniqueFileDescriptor(&out); status != OK) return status;
+
+ if (status_t status = data.readUniqueFileDescriptor(&err); status != OK) return status;
+
int argc = data.readInt32();
Vector<String8> args;
for (int i = 0; i < argc && data.dataAvail() > 0; i++) {
@@ -273,15 +277,15 @@ status_t IncidentService::onTransact(uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel*
sp<IResultReceiver> resultReceiver =
IResultReceiver::asInterface(data.readStrongBinder());
- FILE* fin = fdopen(in, "r");
- FILE* fout = fdopen(out, "w");
- FILE* ferr = fdopen(err, "w");
+ FILE* fin = fdopen(in.release(), "r");
+ FILE* fout = fdopen(out.release(), "w");
+ FILE* ferr = fdopen(err.release(), "w");
if (fin == NULL || fout == NULL || ferr == NULL) {
resultReceiver->send(NO_MEMORY);
} else {
- err = command(fin, fout, ferr, args);
- resultReceiver->send(err);
+ status_t result = command(fin, fout, ferr, args);
+ resultReceiver->send(result);
}
if (fin != NULL) {

29
Patches/LineageOS-16.0/android_frameworks_base/377009.patch
View File

@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pinyao Ting <pinyaoting@google.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2023 14:58:56 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Validate userId when publishing shortcuts
Bug: 288110451
Test: manual
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:01bfd04ff445db6290ae430d44ea1bf1a115fe3c)
Merged-In: Idbde676f871db83825155730e3714f3727e25762
Change-Id: Idbde676f871db83825155730e3714f3727e25762
---
services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/ShortcutService.java | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/ShortcutService.java b/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/ShortcutService.java
index e30da13d7d16..d97f653c8326 100644
--- a/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/ShortcutService.java
+++ b/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/ShortcutService.java
@@ -1582,6 +1582,10 @@ public class ShortcutService extends IShortcutService.Stub {
android.util.EventLog.writeEvent(0x534e4554, "109824443", -1, "");
throw new SecurityException("Shortcut package name mismatch");
}
+ final int callingUid = injectBinderCallingUid();
+ if (UserHandle.getUserId(callingUid) != si.getUserId()) {
+ throw new SecurityException("User-ID in shortcut doesn't match the caller");
+ }
}
private void verifyShortcutInfoPackages(

45
Patches/LineageOS-16.0/android_frameworks_base/377010-backport.patch
View File

@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Beverly Tai <beverlyt@google.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2023 20:50:28 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Revert "On device lockdown, always show the keyguard"
This reverts commit b23c2d5fb6630ea0da503b937f62880594b13e94.
Reason for revert: b/300463732 regression
Bug: 300463732
Bug: 218495634
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:f57217125f2b124c16c463ef4507fb054cc1ba4f)
Merged-In: I31485d0d8caa3060e998636b071dbe03f6b4fc82
Change-Id: I31485d0d8caa3060e998636b071dbe03f6b4fc82
---
.../systemui/keyguard/KeyguardViewMediator.java | 10 +---------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/packages/SystemUI/src/com/android/systemui/keyguard/KeyguardViewMediator.java b/packages/SystemUI/src/com/android/systemui/keyguard/KeyguardViewMediator.java
index 820c7eac715a..292e9e752052 100644
--- a/packages/SystemUI/src/com/android/systemui/keyguard/KeyguardViewMediator.java
+++ b/packages/SystemUI/src/com/android/systemui/keyguard/KeyguardViewMediator.java
@@ -586,13 +586,6 @@ public class KeyguardViewMediator extends SystemUI {
notifyHasLockscreenWallpaperChanged(hasLockscreenWallpaper);
}
}
-
- @Override
- public void onStrongAuthStateChanged(int userId) {
- if (mLockPatternUtils.isUserInLockdown(KeyguardUpdateMonitor.getCurrentUser())) {
- doKeyguardLocked(null);
- }
- }
};
ViewMediatorCallback mViewMediatorCallback = new ViewMediatorCallback() {
@@ -1348,8 +1341,7 @@ public class KeyguardViewMediator extends SystemUI {
}
// if another app is disabling us, don't show
- if (!mExternallyEnabled
- && !mLockPatternUtils.isUserInLockdown(KeyguardUpdateMonitor.getCurrentUser())) {
+ if (!mExternallyEnabled) {
if (DEBUG) Log.d(TAG, "doKeyguard: not showing because externally disabled");
// note: we *should* set mNeedToReshowWhenReenabled=true here, but that makes

33
Patches/LineageOS-16.0/android_frameworks_base/377011.patch
View File

@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kunal Malhotra <malhk@google.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Feb 2023 23:48:27 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Adding in verification of calling UID in onShellCommand
Test: manual testing on device
Bug: b/261709193
(cherry picked from commit b651d295b44eb82d664861b77f33dbde1bce9453)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:3ef3f18ba3094c4cc4f954ba23d1da421f9ca8b0)
Merged-In: I68903ebd6d3d85f4bc820b745e3233a448b62273
Change-Id: I68903ebd6d3d85f4bc820b745e3233a448b62273
---
.../java/com/android/server/am/ActivityManagerService.java | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/services/core/java/com/android/server/am/ActivityManagerService.java b/services/core/java/com/android/server/am/ActivityManagerService.java
index 44761a523abb..0a8c45cb16cf 100644
--- a/services/core/java/com/android/server/am/ActivityManagerService.java
+++ b/services/core/java/com/android/server/am/ActivityManagerService.java
@@ -16250,6 +16250,13 @@ public class ActivityManagerService extends IActivityManager.Stub
public void onShellCommand(FileDescriptor in, FileDescriptor out,
FileDescriptor err, String[] args, ShellCallback callback,
ResultReceiver resultReceiver) {
+ final int callingUid = Binder.getCallingUid();
+ if (callingUid != ROOT_UID && callingUid != Process.SHELL_UID) {
+ if (resultReceiver != null) {
+ resultReceiver.send(-1, null);
+ }
+ throw new SecurityException("Shell commands are only callable by root or shell");
+ }
(new ActivityManagerShellCommand(this, false)).exec(
this, in, out, err, args, callback, resultReceiver);
}

71
Patches/LineageOS-16.0/android_frameworks_base/377012-backport.patch
View File

@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Beverly Tai <beverlyt@google.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2023 21:01:11 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Updated: always show the keyguard on device lockdown
Additionally, don't hide keyguard when it's disabled if the user has locked
down the device.
Manual test steps:
1. Enable app pinning and disable "Ask for PIN before unpinning" setting
2. Pin an app (ie: Settings)
3. Lockdown from the power menu
4. Observe: user is brought to the keyguard, primary auth is
required to enter the device.
=> After entering correct credential, the device is still in
app pinning mode.
=> After entering an incorrect credential, the keyguard remains
showing and the user can attempt again up to the limit
Bug: 300463732
Bug: 218495634
Test: atest KeyguardViewMediatorTest
Test: manual
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:35a6e2f2c952440b1102033b2c3e496438503cff)
Merged-In: I70fdae80f717712b3dfc9df54b9649959b4bb8f0
Change-Id: I70fdae80f717712b3dfc9df54b9649959b4bb8f0
---
.../systemui/keyguard/KeyguardViewMediator.java | 16 ++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/packages/SystemUI/src/com/android/systemui/keyguard/KeyguardViewMediator.java b/packages/SystemUI/src/com/android/systemui/keyguard/KeyguardViewMediator.java
index 292e9e752052..c7d231f6f522 100644
--- a/packages/SystemUI/src/com/android/systemui/keyguard/KeyguardViewMediator.java
+++ b/packages/SystemUI/src/com/android/systemui/keyguard/KeyguardViewMediator.java
@@ -571,6 +571,13 @@ public class KeyguardViewMediator extends SystemUI {
}
}
+ @Override
+ public void onStrongAuthStateChanged(int userId) {
+ if (mLockPatternUtils.isUserInLockdown(KeyguardUpdateMonitor.getCurrentUser())) {
+ doKeyguardLocked(null);
+ }
+ }
+
@Override
public void onTrustChanged(int userId) {
if (userId == KeyguardUpdateMonitor.getCurrentUser()) {
@@ -1129,6 +1136,10 @@ public class KeyguardViewMediator extends SystemUI {
mExternallyEnabled = enabled;
if (!enabled && mShowing) {
+ if (mLockPatternUtils.isUserInLockdown(KeyguardUpdateMonitor.getCurrentUser())) {
+ Log.d(TAG, "keyguardEnabled(false) overridden by user lockdown");
+ return;
+ }
if (mExitSecureCallback != null) {
if (DEBUG) Log.d(TAG, "in process of verifyUnlock request, ignoring");
// we're in the process of handling a request to verify the user
@@ -1340,8 +1351,9 @@ public class KeyguardViewMediator extends SystemUI {
return;
}
- // if another app is disabling us, don't show
- if (!mExternallyEnabled) {
+ // if another app is disabling us, don't show unless we're in lockdown mode
+ if (!mExternallyEnabled
+ && !mLockPatternUtils.isUserInLockdown(KeyguardUpdateMonitor.getCurrentUser())) {
if (DEBUG) Log.d(TAG, "doKeyguard: not showing because externally disabled");
// note: we *should* set mNeedToReshowWhenReenabled=true here, but that makes

38
Patches/LineageOS-16.0/android_packages_apps_Bluetooth/377014-backport.patch
View File

@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Brian Delwiche <delwiche@google.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2023 00:01:03 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix UAF in ~CallbackEnv
com_android_bluetooth_btservice_AdapterService does not null its local
JNI environment variable after detaching the thread (which frees the
environment context), allowing UAF under certain conditions.
Null the variable in this case.
Testing here was done through a custom unit test; see patchsets 4-6 for
contents. However, unit testing of the JNI layer is problematic in
production, so that part of the patch is omitted for final merge.
Bug: 291500341
Test: atest bluetooth_test_gd_unit, atest net_test_stack_btm
Tag: #security
Ignore-AOSP-First: Security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:5f543d919c4067f2f4925580fd8a690ba3440e80)
Merged-In: I3e5e3c51412640aa19f0981caaa809313d6ad030
Change-Id: I3e5e3c51412640aa19f0981caaa809313d6ad030
---
jni/com_android_bluetooth_btservice_AdapterService.cpp | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/jni/com_android_bluetooth_btservice_AdapterService.cpp b/jni/com_android_bluetooth_btservice_AdapterService.cpp
index f88a675b7..8faf670ce 100644
--- a/jni/com_android_bluetooth_btservice_AdapterService.cpp
+++ b/jni/com_android_bluetooth_btservice_AdapterService.cpp
@@ -406,6 +406,7 @@ static void callback_thread_event(bt_cb_thread_evt event) {
return;
}
vm->DetachCurrentThread();
+ callbackEnv = NULL;
}
}

40
Patches/LineageOS-16.0/android_packages_apps_Trebuchet/377015.patch
View File

@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pinyao Ting <pinyaoting@google.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2023 22:37:16 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix permission bypass in legacy shortcut
Intent created for Chooser should not be allowed in legacy shortcuts
since it doesn't make sense for user to tap on a shortcut in homescreen
to share, the expected share flow started from ShareSheet.
Bug: 295334906, 295045199
Test: manual
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:b7b192bd7f24a2aa7d6881ee949657c9760c0305)
Merged-In: I8d0cbccdc31bd4cb927830e5ecf841147400fdfa
Change-Id: I8d0cbccdc31bd4cb927830e5ecf841147400fdfa
---
.../android/launcher3/util/PackageManagerHelper.java | 11 ++---------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/com/android/launcher3/util/PackageManagerHelper.java b/src/com/android/launcher3/util/PackageManagerHelper.java
index 4eac947fd0..96c636a8e7 100644
--- a/src/com/android/launcher3/util/PackageManagerHelper.java
+++ b/src/com/android/launcher3/util/PackageManagerHelper.java
@@ -118,15 +118,8 @@ public class PackageManagerHelper {
public boolean hasPermissionForActivity(Intent intent, String srcPackage) {
// b/270152142
if (Intent.ACTION_CHOOSER.equals(intent.getAction())) {
- final Bundle extras = intent.getExtras();
- if (extras == null) {
- return true;
- }
- // If given intent is ACTION_CHOOSER, verify srcPackage has permission over EXTRA_INTENT
- intent = (Intent) extras.getParcelable(Intent.EXTRA_INTENT);
- if (intent == null) {
- return true;
- }
+ // Chooser shortcuts is not a valid target
+ return false;
}
ResolveInfo target = mPm.resolveActivity(intent, 0);
if (target == null) {

108
Patches/LineageOS-16.0/android_packages_services_Telecomm/377016-backport.patch
View File

@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pranav Madapurmath <pmadapurmath@google.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Apr 2023 21:36:12 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Resolve account image icon profile boundary exploit.
Because Telecom grants the INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS permission, an exploit
is possible where the user can upload an image icon (belonging to
another user) via registering a phone account. This CL provides a
lightweight solution for parsing the image URI to detect profile
exploitation.
Fixes: 273502295
Fixes: 296915211
Test: Unit test to enforce successful/failure path
(cherry picked from commit d0d1d38e37de54e58a7532a0020582fbd7d476b7)
(cherry picked from commit e7d0ca3fe5be6e393f643f565792ea5e7ed05f48)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:a604311f86ea8136ca2ac9f9ff0af7fa57ee3f42)
Merged-In: I2b6418f019a373ee9f02ba8683e5b694e7ab80a5
Change-Id: I2b6418f019a373ee9f02ba8683e5b694e7ab80a5
---
.../server/telecom/TelecomServiceImpl.java | 22 +++++++++++++++++++
.../telecom/tests/TelecomServiceImplTest.java | 21 ++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/com/android/server/telecom/TelecomServiceImpl.java b/src/com/android/server/telecom/TelecomServiceImpl.java
index 74a7d840b..14804f0d3 100644
--- a/src/com/android/server/telecom/TelecomServiceImpl.java
+++ b/src/com/android/server/telecom/TelecomServiceImpl.java
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ import android.content.pm.PackageManager;
import android.content.res.Resources;
import android.content.pm.ParceledListSlice;
import android.content.pm.ResolveInfo;
+import android.graphics.drawable.Icon;
import android.net.Uri;
import android.os.Binder;
import android.os.Bundle;
@@ -469,6 +470,9 @@ public class TelecomServiceImpl {
enforceRegisterMultiUser();
}
enforceUserHandleMatchesCaller(account.getAccountHandle());
+ // Validate the profile boundary of the given image URI.
+ validateAccountIconUserBoundary(account.getIcon());
+
final long token = Binder.clearCallingIdentity();
try {
mPhoneAccountRegistrar.registerPhoneAccount(account);
@@ -1820,4 +1824,22 @@ public class TelecomServiceImpl {
// If only TX or RX were set (or neither), the video state is valid.
return remainingState == 0;
}
+
+ private void validateAccountIconUserBoundary(Icon icon) {
+ // Refer to Icon#getUriString for context. The URI string is invalid for icons of
+ // incompatible types.
+ if (icon != null && (icon.getType() == Icon.TYPE_URI
+ /*|| icon.getType() == Icon.TYPE_URI_ADAPTIVE_BITMAP*/)) {
+ String encodedUser = icon.getUri().getEncodedUserInfo();
+ // If there is no encoded user, the URI is calling into the calling user space
+ if (encodedUser != null) {
+ int userId = Integer.parseInt(encodedUser);
+ if (userId != UserHandle.getUserId(Binder.getCallingUid())) {
+ // If we are transcending the profile boundary, throw an error.
+ throw new IllegalArgumentException("Attempting to register a phone account with"
+ + " an image icon belonging to another user.");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
diff --git a/tests/src/com/android/server/telecom/tests/TelecomServiceImplTest.java b/tests/src/com/android/server/telecom/tests/TelecomServiceImplTest.java
index 521d05aae..8aa6f806c 100644
--- a/tests/src/com/android/server/telecom/tests/TelecomServiceImplTest.java
+++ b/tests/src/com/android/server/telecom/tests/TelecomServiceImplTest.java
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ import android.content.Context;
import android.content.Intent;
import android.content.pm.ApplicationInfo;
import android.content.pm.PackageManager;
+import android.graphics.drawable.Icon;
import android.net.Uri;
import android.os.Binder;
import android.os.Bundle;
@@ -501,6 +502,26 @@ public class TelecomServiceImplTest extends TelecomTestCase {
}
}
+ @SmallTest
+ @Test
+ public void testRegisterPhoneAccountImageIconCrossUser() throws RemoteException {
+ String packageNameToUse = "com.android.officialpackage";
+ PhoneAccountHandle phHandle = new PhoneAccountHandle(new ComponentName(
+ packageNameToUse, "cs"), "test", Binder.getCallingUserHandle());
+ Icon icon = Icon.createWithContentUri("content://10@media/external/images/media/");
+ PhoneAccount phoneAccount = makePhoneAccount(phHandle).setIcon(icon).build();
+ doReturn(PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED)
+ .when(mContext).checkCallingOrSelfPermission(MODIFY_PHONE_STATE);
+
+ // This should fail; security exception will be thrown.
+ registerPhoneAccountTestHelper(phoneAccount, false);
+
+ icon = Icon.createWithContentUri("content://0@media/external/images/media/");
+ phoneAccount = makePhoneAccount(phHandle).setIcon(icon).build();
+ // This should succeed.
+ registerPhoneAccountTestHelper(phoneAccount, true);
+ }
+
@SmallTest
@Test
public void testUnregisterPhoneAccount() throws RemoteException {

99
Patches/LineageOS-16.0/android_system_bt/377017.patch
View File

@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Sat, 2 Sep 2023 04:20:10 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Reject access to secure service authenticated from a temp
bonding [1]
Rejecct access to services running on l2cap
Backport of
Idef4ea28eb3d17b0807ab7dc6849433ddc5581b3
Bug: 294854926
Test: m com.android.btservices
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:a36757e967ab6d956127cac298134f28ce8f0d6d)
Merged-In: Idef4ea28eb3d17b0807ab7dc6849433ddc5581b3
Change-Id: Idef4ea28eb3d17b0807ab7dc6849433ddc5581b3
---
stack/btm/btm_sec.cc | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
index 899b6b908..a4d916cc3 100644
--- a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
+++ b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static bool btm_sec_set_security_level(CONNECTION_TYPE conn_type,
uint32_t mx_proto_id,
uint32_t mx_chan_id);
-static bool btm_dev_authenticated(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec);
+static bool btm_dev_authenticated(const tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec);
static bool btm_dev_encrypted(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec);
static bool btm_dev_authorized(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec);
static bool btm_serv_trusted(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec,
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static const bool btm_sec_io_map[BTM_IO_CAP_MAX][BTM_IO_CAP_MAX] = {
* Returns bool true or false
*
******************************************************************************/
-static bool btm_dev_authenticated(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec) {
+static bool btm_dev_authenticated(const tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec) {
if (p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_AUTHENTICATED) {
return (true);
}
@@ -214,6 +214,25 @@ static bool btm_serv_trusted(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec,
return (false);
}
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * Function access_secure_service_from_temp_bond
+ *
+ * Description a utility function to test whether an access to
+ * secure service from temp bonding is happening
+ *
+ * Returns true if the aforementioned condition holds,
+ * false otherwise
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static bool access_secure_service_from_temp_bond(const tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec,
+ bool locally_initiated,
+ uint16_t security_req) {
+ return !locally_initiated && (security_req & BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE) &&
+ btm_dev_authenticated(p_dev_rec) &&
+ p_dev_rec->bond_type == BOND_TYPE_TEMPORARY;
+}
+
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function BTM_SecRegister
@@ -2075,9 +2094,13 @@ tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_l2cap_access_req(const RawAddress& bd_addr, uint16_t psm,
}
if (rc == BTM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (access_secure_service_from_temp_bond(p_dev_rec, is_originator, security_required)) {
+ LOG_ERROR(LOG_TAG, "Trying to access a secure service from a temp bonding, rejecting");
+ rc = BTM_FAILED_ON_SECURITY;
+ }
if (p_callback)
- (*p_callback)(&bd_addr, transport, (void*)p_ref_data, BTM_SUCCESS);
- return (BTM_SUCCESS);
+ (*p_callback)(&bd_addr, transport, (void*)p_ref_data, rc);
+ return (rc);
}
}
@@ -5133,6 +5156,13 @@ tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_execute_procedure(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec) {
}
}
+ if (access_secure_service_from_temp_bond(p_dev_rec,
+ p_dev_rec->is_originator,
+ p_dev_rec->security_required)) {
+ LOG_ERROR(LOG_TAG, "Trying to access a secure service from a temp bonding, rejecting");
+ return (BTM_FAILED_ON_SECURITY);
+ }
+
/* All required security procedures already established */
p_dev_rec->security_required &=
~(BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHORIZE | BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHORIZE |

37
Patches/LineageOS-16.0/android_system_bt/377018.patch
View File

@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Sat, 2 Sep 2023 04:27:29 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Reject access to secure services authenticated from temp
bonding [2]
Reject access to service running on rfcomm
this is a backport of
I10fcc2dcd78fc22ffbe3c425669fc9889b94a166
Bug: 294854926
Test: m com.android.btservices
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:5e0e907ec4948f06b3a35ecf08725c020d533ccb)
Merged-In: I10fcc2dcd78fc22ffbe3c425669fc9889b94a166
Change-Id: I10fcc2dcd78fc22ffbe3c425669fc9889b94a166
---
stack/btm/btm_sec.cc | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
index a4d916cc3..bce9eae06 100644
--- a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
+++ b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
@@ -2423,6 +2423,11 @@ tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_mx_access_request(const RawAddress& bd_addr, uint16_t psm,
mx_chan_id, p_callback, p_ref_data);
} else /* rc == BTM_SUCCESS */
{
+ if (access_secure_service_from_temp_bond(p_dev_rec,
+ is_originator, security_required)) {
+ LOG_ERROR(LOG_TAG, "Trying to access a secure rfcomm service from a temp bonding, reject");
+ rc = BTM_FAILED_ON_SECURITY;
+ }
/* access granted */
if (p_callback) {
(*p_callback)(&bd_addr, transport, p_ref_data, (uint8_t)rc);

47
Patches/LineageOS-16.0/android_system_bt/377019.patch
View File

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2023 23:47:48 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Reject access to secure service authenticated from a temp
bonding [3]
Allow access to rfcomm PSM by default
Original bug
Bug: 294854926
Nearby regressions:
Bug: 298539299
Test: m com.android.btservices
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:ab986fe4165aae74c5915f57ad2e78bf80f1d3ec)
Merged-In: If1f7c9278a9e877f64ae78b6f067c597fb5d0e66
Change-Id: If1f7c9278a9e877f64ae78b6f067c597fb5d0e66
---
stack/btm/btm_sec.cc | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
index bce9eae06..41f81631e 100644
--- a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
+++ b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
@@ -2117,15 +2117,15 @@ tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_l2cap_access_req(const RawAddress& bd_addr, uint16_t psm,
btm_cb.security_mode == BTM_SEC_MODE_SC) {
if (BTM_SEC_IS_SM4(p_dev_rec->sm4)) {
if (is_originator) {
- /* SM4 to SM4 -> always authenticate & encrypt */
- security_required |= (BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHENTICATE | BTM_SEC_OUT_ENCRYPT);
+ /* SM4 to SM4 -> always encrypt */
+ security_required |= BTM_SEC_OUT_ENCRYPT;
} else /* acceptor */
{
/* SM4 to SM4: the acceptor needs to make sure the authentication is
* already done */
chk_acp_auth_done = true;
- /* SM4 to SM4 -> always authenticate & encrypt */
- security_required |= (BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE | BTM_SEC_IN_ENCRYPT);
+ /* SM4 to SM4 -> always encrypt */
+ security_required |= BTM_SEC_IN_ENCRYPT;
}
} else if (!(BTM_SM4_KNOWN & p_dev_rec->sm4)) {
/* the remote features are not known yet */

128
Patches/LineageOS-16.0/android_system_bt/377020.patch
View File

@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2023 23:54:08 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Reorganize the code for checking auth requirement
Original bug
Bug: 294854926
regressions:
Bug: 299570702
Test: Test: m com.android.btservices
Test: QA validation
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:0c488b2420befe0f8038957861072a8e63702f91)
Merged-In: I976a5a6d7bb819fd6accdc71eb1501b9606f3ae4
Change-Id: I976a5a6d7bb819fd6accdc71eb1501b9606f3ae4
---
stack/btm/btm_sec.cc | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
index 41f81631e..b8a423d28 100644
--- a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
+++ b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
@@ -5076,46 +5076,65 @@ tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_execute_procedure(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec) {
/* If connection is not authenticated and authentication is required */
/* start authentication and return PENDING to the caller */
- if ((((!(p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_AUTHENTICATED)) &&
- ((p_dev_rec->is_originator &&
- (p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHENTICATE)) ||
- (!p_dev_rec->is_originator &&
- (p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE)))) ||
- (!(p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_16_DIGIT_PIN_AUTHED) &&
- (!p_dev_rec->is_originator &&
- (p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_IN_MIN_16_DIGIT_PIN)))) &&
- (p_dev_rec->hci_handle != BTM_SEC_INVALID_HANDLE)) {
-/*
- * We rely on BTM_SEC_16_DIGIT_PIN_AUTHED being set if MITM is in use,
- * as 16 DIGIT is only needed if MITM is not used. Unfortunately, the
- * BTM_SEC_AUTHENTICATED is used for both MITM and non-MITM
- * authenticated connections, hence we cannot distinguish here.
- */
-
- BTM_TRACE_EVENT("Security Manager: Start authentication");
+ if (p_dev_rec->hci_handle != HCI_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ bool start_auth = false;
+
+ // Check link status of BR/EDR
+ if (!(p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_AUTHENTICATED)) {
+ if (p_dev_rec->is_originator) {
+ if (p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHENTICATE) {
+ LOG_DEBUG(LOG_TAG, "Outgoing authentication Required");
+ start_auth = true;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE) {
+ LOG_DEBUG(LOG_TAG, "Incoming authentication Required");
+ start_auth = true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
- /*
- * If we do have a link-key, but we end up here because we need an
- * upgrade, then clear the link-key known and authenticated flag before
- * restarting authentication.
- * WARNING: If the controller has link-key, it is optional and
- * recommended for the controller to send a Link_Key_Request.
- * In case we need an upgrade, the only alternative would be to delete
- * the existing link-key. That could lead to very bad user experience
- * or even IOP issues, if a reconnect causes a new connection that
- * requires an upgrade.
- */
- if ((p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_KNOWN) &&
- (!(p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_16_DIGIT_PIN_AUTHED) &&
- (!p_dev_rec->is_originator &&
- (p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_IN_MIN_16_DIGIT_PIN)))) {
- p_dev_rec->sec_flags &=
- ~(BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_KNOWN | BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_AUTHED |
- BTM_SEC_AUTHENTICATED);
+ if (!(p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_16_DIGIT_PIN_AUTHED)) {
+ /*
+ * We rely on BTM_SEC_16_DIGIT_PIN_AUTHED being set if MITM is in use,
+ * as 16 DIGIT is only needed if MITM is not used. Unfortunately, the
+ * BTM_SEC_AUTHENTICATED is used for both MITM and non-MITM
+ * authenticated connections, hence we cannot distinguish here.
+ */
+ if (!p_dev_rec->is_originator) {
+ if (p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_IN_MIN_16_DIGIT_PIN) {
+ LOG_DEBUG(LOG_TAG, "BTM_SEC_IN_MIN_16_DIGIT_PIN Required");
+ start_auth = true;
+ }
+ }
}
- btm_sec_start_authentication(p_dev_rec);
- return (BTM_CMD_STARTED);
+ if (start_auth) {
+ LOG_DEBUG(LOG_TAG, "Security Manager: Start authentication");
+
+ /*
+ * If we do have a link-key, but we end up here because we need an
+ * upgrade, then clear the link-key known and authenticated flag before
+ * restarting authentication.
+ * WARNING: If the controller has link-key, it is optional and
+ * recommended for the controller to send a Link_Key_Request.
+ * In case we need an upgrade, the only alternative would be to delete
+ * the existing link-key. That could lead to very bad user experience
+ * or even IOP issues, if a reconnect causes a new connection that
+ * requires an upgrade.
+ */
+ if ((p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_KNOWN) &&
+ (!(p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_16_DIGIT_PIN_AUTHED) &&
+ (!p_dev_rec->is_originator &&
+ (p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_IN_MIN_16_DIGIT_PIN)))) {
+ p_dev_rec->sec_flags &=
+ ~(BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_KNOWN | BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_AUTHED |
+ BTM_SEC_AUTHENTICATED);
+ }
+
+ btm_sec_start_authentication(p_dev_rec);
+ return (BTM_CMD_STARTED);
+ }
}
/* If connection is not encrypted and encryption is required */

46
Patches/LineageOS-16.0/android_system_bt/377021.patch
View File

@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2023 00:00:44 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Enforce authentication if encryption is required
Original bug
Bug: 294854926
regressions:
Bug: 299570702
Bug: 299561281
Test: Test: m com.android.btservices
Test: QA validation
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:778d3fb3fb520e54425ecefe9a28453002053553)
Merged-In: I0370ed2e3166d56f708e1981c2126526e1db9eaa
Change-Id: I0370ed2e3166d56f708e1981c2126526e1db9eaa
---
stack/btm/btm_sec.cc | 10 ++++++----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
index b8a423d28..71f737ebf 100644
--- a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
+++ b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
@@ -5082,13 +5082,15 @@ tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_execute_procedure(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec) {
// Check link status of BR/EDR
if (!(p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_AUTHENTICATED)) {
if (p_dev_rec->is_originator) {
- if (p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHENTICATE) {
- LOG_DEBUG(LOG_TAG, "Outgoing authentication Required");
+ if (p_dev_rec->security_required &
+ (BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHENTICATE | BTM_SEC_OUT_ENCRYPT)) {
+ LOG_DEBUG(LOG_TAG, "Outgoing authentication/encryption Required");
start_auth = true;
}
} else {
- if (p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE) {
- LOG_DEBUG(LOG_TAG, "Incoming authentication Required");
+ if (p_dev_rec->security_required &
+ (BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE | BTM_SEC_IN_ENCRYPT)) {
+ LOG_DEBUG(LOG_TAG, "Incoming authentication/encryption Required");
start_auth = true;
}
}

56
Patches/LineageOS-16.0/android_system_bt/377023-backport.patch
View File

@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Brian Delwiche <delwiche@google.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 21:27:49 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix timing attack in BTM_BleVerifySignature
BTM_BleVerifySignature uses a stock memcmp, allowing signature contents
to be deduced through a side-channel attack.
Change to CRYPTO_memcmp, which is hardened against this attack, to
eliminate this attack.
Bug: 274478807
Test: atest bluetooth_test_gd_unit
Tag: #security
Ignore-AOSP-First: Security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:fcd1c44f7c4bf431dd6a6902d74c045174bd00ce)
Merged-In: I41a9b586d663d2ad4694222ae451d2d30a428a3c
Change-Id: I41a9b586d663d2ad4694222ae451d2d30a428a3c
---
stack/Android.bp | 1 +
stack/btm/btm_ble.cc | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/stack/Android.bp b/stack/Android.bp
index 03e2c940b..93c989ff5 100644
--- a/stack/Android.bp
+++ b/stack/Android.bp
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ cc_library_static {
"libcutils",
"liblog",
"libstatslog",
+ "libcrypto",
],
required: [
"libldacBT_enc",
diff --git a/stack/btm/btm_ble.cc b/stack/btm/btm_ble.cc
index 48f4496b1..82699286a 100644
--- a/stack/btm/btm_ble.cc
+++ b/stack/btm/btm_ble.cc
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
#include "hcimsgs.h"
#include "log/log.h"
#include "l2c_int.h"
+#include "openssl/mem.h"
#include "osi/include/log.h"
#include "osi/include/osi.h"
#include "smp_api.h"
@@ -2261,7 +2262,7 @@ bool BTM_BleVerifySignature(const RawAddress& bd_addr, uint8_t* p_orig,
if (aes_cipher_msg_auth_code(p_rec->ble.keys.pcsrk, p_orig, len,
BTM_CMAC_TLEN_SIZE, p_mac)) {
- if (memcmp(p_mac, p_comp, BTM_CMAC_TLEN_SIZE) == 0) {
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p_mac, p_comp, BTM_CMAC_TLEN_SIZE) == 0) {
btm_ble_increment_sign_ctr(bd_addr, false);
verified = true;
}

104
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_frameworks_av/376999-backport.patch
View File

@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Toni Heidenreich <tonihei@google.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Sep 2023 12:49:33 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] httplive: fix use-after-free
Implement a mutex to ensure secure multi-threaded
access to the KeyedVector in MetaDataBase.
Concurrent access by different threads can lead
to accessing the wrong memory location due to
potential changes in the vector
Bug: 298057702
Test: HTTP Live Streaming test
(cherry picked from https://partner-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:a2dfb31957a9d5358d0219a0eda7dcb5b0fff5fe)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:90fb4ca425444429ada6ce0de1c13d35829bc196)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:3c1d9613ef64e01d2e81c4aa44c90dcd8ca958b9)
Merged-In: I46b05c85d9c39f4ce549efc160c08a0646c9fd0a
Change-Id: I46b05c85d9c39f4ce549efc160c08a0646c9fd0a
---
media/libstagefright/foundation/MetaDataBase.cpp | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/media/libstagefright/foundation/MetaDataBase.cpp b/media/libstagefright/foundation/MetaDataBase.cpp
index bfea6f1537..a3c623e354 100644
--- a/media/libstagefright/foundation/MetaDataBase.cpp
+++ b/media/libstagefright/foundation/MetaDataBase.cpp
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <mutex>
+
#include <media/stagefright/foundation/ADebug.h>
#include <media/stagefright/foundation/AString.h>
#include <media/stagefright/foundation/hexdump.h>
@@ -75,6 +77,7 @@ struct MetaDataBase::Rect {
struct MetaDataBase::MetaDataInternal {
+ std::mutex mLock;
KeyedVector<uint32_t, MetaDataBase::typed_data> mItems;
};
@@ -99,10 +102,12 @@ MetaDataBase::~MetaDataBase() {
}
void MetaDataBase::clear() {
+ std::lock_guard<std::mutex> guard(mInternalData->mLock);
mInternalData->mItems.clear();
}
bool MetaDataBase::remove(uint32_t key) {
+ std::lock_guard<std::mutex> guard(mInternalData->mLock);
ssize_t i = mInternalData->mItems.indexOfKey(key);
if (i < 0) {
@@ -249,6 +254,7 @@ bool MetaDataBase::setData(
uint32_t key, uint32_t type, const void *data, size_t size) {
bool overwrote_existing = true;
+ std::lock_guard<std::mutex> guard(mInternalData->mLock);
ssize_t i = mInternalData->mItems.indexOfKey(key);
if (i < 0) {
typed_data item;
@@ -266,6 +272,7 @@ bool MetaDataBase::setData(
bool MetaDataBase::findData(uint32_t key, uint32_t *type,
const void **data, size_t *size) const {
+ std::lock_guard<std::mutex> guard(mInternalData->mLock);
ssize_t i = mInternalData->mItems.indexOfKey(key);
if (i < 0) {
@@ -280,6 +287,7 @@ bool MetaDataBase::findData(uint32_t key, uint32_t *type,
}
bool MetaDataBase::hasData(uint32_t key) const {
+ std::lock_guard<std::mutex> guard(mInternalData->mLock);
ssize_t i = mInternalData->mItems.indexOfKey(key);
if (i < 0) {
@@ -426,6 +434,7 @@ static void MakeFourCCString(uint32_t x, char *s) {
String8 MetaDataBase::toString() const {
String8 s;
+ std::lock_guard<std::mutex> guard(mInternalData->mLock);
for (int i = mInternalData->mItems.size(); --i >= 0;) {
int32_t key = mInternalData->mItems.keyAt(i);
char cc[5];
@@ -440,6 +449,7 @@ String8 MetaDataBase::toString() const {
}
void MetaDataBase::dumpToLog() const {
+ std::lock_guard<std::mutex> guard(mInternalData->mLock);
for (int i = mInternalData->mItems.size(); --i >= 0;) {
int32_t key = mInternalData->mItems.keyAt(i);
char cc[5];
@@ -451,6 +461,7 @@ void MetaDataBase::dumpToLog() const {
status_t MetaDataBase::writeToParcel(Parcel &parcel) {
status_t ret;
+ std::lock_guard<std::mutex> guard(mInternalData->mLock);
size_t numItems = mInternalData->mItems.size();
ret = parcel.writeUint32(uint32_t(numItems));
if (ret) {

95
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_frameworks_base/377001.patch
View File

@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Mat=C3=ADas=20Hern=C3=A1ndez?= <matiashe@google.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2023 13:52:21 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Visit Uris added by WearableExtender
Bug: 283962802
Test: atest + manual (POC app now crashes on notify() as expected)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:a6f44e911f2d7204cc28c710e54f97c96231abab)
Merged-In: I0da18c631eb5e4844a48760c7aaedab715a0bfed
Change-Id: I0da18c631eb5e4844a48760c7aaedab715a0bfed
---
core/java/android/app/Notification.java | 17 +++++++++++++++-
.../NotificationManagerServiceTest.java | 20 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/core/java/android/app/Notification.java b/core/java/android/app/Notification.java
index d8eefc3d3be4..9d0a5e93e2d8 100644
--- a/core/java/android/app/Notification.java
+++ b/core/java/android/app/Notification.java
@@ -1790,6 +1790,10 @@ public class Notification implements Parcelable
}
}
+ private void visitUris(@NonNull Consumer<Uri> visitor) {
+ visitIconUri(visitor, getIcon());
+ }
+
@Override
public Action clone() {
return new Action(
@@ -2467,7 +2471,7 @@ public class Notification implements Parcelable
if (actions != null) {
for (Action action : actions) {
- visitIconUri(visitor, action.getIcon());
+ action.visitUris(visitor);
}
}
@@ -2501,6 +2505,11 @@ public class Notification implements Parcelable
if (mBubbleMetadata != null) {
visitIconUri(visitor, mBubbleMetadata.getIcon());
}
+
+ if (extras != null && extras.containsKey(WearableExtender.EXTRA_WEARABLE_EXTENSIONS)) {
+ WearableExtender extender = new WearableExtender(this);
+ extender.visitUris(visitor);
+ }
}
/**
@@ -9818,6 +9827,12 @@ public class Notification implements Parcelable
mFlags &= ~mask;
}
}
+
+ private void visitUris(@NonNull Consumer<Uri> visitor) {
+ for (Action action : mActions) {
+ action.visitUris(visitor);
+ }
+ }
}
/**
diff --git a/services/tests/uiservicestests/src/com/android/server/notification/NotificationManagerServiceTest.java b/services/tests/uiservicestests/src/com/android/server/notification/NotificationManagerServiceTest.java
index 34550bb52a52..61297cf67ee0 100755
--- a/services/tests/uiservicestests/src/com/android/server/notification/NotificationManagerServiceTest.java
+++ b/services/tests/uiservicestests/src/com/android/server/notification/NotificationManagerServiceTest.java
@@ -3528,6 +3528,26 @@ public class NotificationManagerServiceTest extends UiServiceTestCase {
verify(visitor, times(1)).accept(eq(personIcon3.getUri()));
}
+ @Test
+ public void testVisitUris_wearableExtender() {
+ Icon actionIcon = Icon.createWithContentUri("content://media/action");
+ Icon wearActionIcon = Icon.createWithContentUri("content://media/wearAction");
+ PendingIntent intent = PendingIntent.getActivity(mContext, 0, new Intent(),
+ PendingIntent.FLAG_IMMUTABLE);
+ Notification n = new Notification.Builder(mContext, "a")
+ .setSmallIcon(android.R.drawable.sym_def_app_icon)
+ .addAction(new Notification.Action.Builder(actionIcon, "Hey!", intent).build())
+ .extend(new Notification.WearableExtender().addAction(
+ new Notification.Action.Builder(wearActionIcon, "Wear!", intent).build()))
+ .build();
+
+ Consumer<Uri> visitor = (Consumer<Uri>) spy(Consumer.class);
+ n.visitUris(visitor);
+
+ verify(visitor).accept(eq(actionIcon.getUri()));
+ verify(visitor).accept(eq(wearActionIcon.getUri()));
+ }
+
@Test
public void testSetNotificationPolicy_preP_setOldFields() {
ZenModeHelper mZenModeHelper = mock(ZenModeHelper.class);

26
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_frameworks_base/377002.patch
View File

@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lifu Tang <lifu@google.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2023 13:03:00 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Fix bypass BAL via `requestGeofence`
Bug: 273729172
Test: manually
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:7f9be7c3c859dc82d37452570d9878b58f6437a9)
Merged-In: Ia8094244f908b20d42711b6ea8f58f9b3345b563
Change-Id: Ia8094244f908b20d42711b6ea8f58f9b3345b563
---
services/core/java/com/android/server/PendingIntentUtils.java | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/services/core/java/com/android/server/PendingIntentUtils.java b/services/core/java/com/android/server/PendingIntentUtils.java
index 1600101b20f4..a72a4d254a2a 100644
--- a/services/core/java/com/android/server/PendingIntentUtils.java
+++ b/services/core/java/com/android/server/PendingIntentUtils.java
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ public class PendingIntentUtils {
public static Bundle createDontSendToRestrictedAppsBundle(@Nullable Bundle bundle) {
final BroadcastOptions options = BroadcastOptions.makeBasic();
options.setDontSendToRestrictedApps(true);
+ options.setPendingIntentBackgroundActivityLaunchAllowed(false);
if (bundle == null) {
return options.toBundle();
}

123
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_frameworks_base/377004-backport.patch
View File

@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kweku Adams <kwekua@google.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2022 21:06:53 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] RESTRICT AUTOMERGE: Drop invalid data.
Drop invalid data when writing or reading from XML. PersistableBundle
does lazy unparcelling, so checking the values during unparcelling would
remove the benefit of the lazy unparcelling. Checking the validity when
writing to or reading from XML seems like the best alternative.
Bug: 246542285
Bug: 247513680
Test: install test app with invalid job config, start app to schedule job, then check logcat and jobscheduler persisted file
(cherry picked from commit 666e8ac60a31e2cc52b335b41004263f28a8db06)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:62b37ab21ce27746a79a2071deee98c61b23c8d9)
Merged-In: Ie817aa0993e9046cb313a750d2323cadc8c1ef15
Change-Id: Ie817aa0993e9046cb313a750d2323cadc8c1ef15
---
core/java/android/os/PersistableBundle.java | 42 +++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/core/java/android/os/PersistableBundle.java b/core/java/android/os/PersistableBundle.java
index 6f1bf71f187b..3e6312754359 100644
--- a/core/java/android/os/PersistableBundle.java
+++ b/core/java/android/os/PersistableBundle.java
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ package android.os;
import android.annotation.Nullable;
import android.util.ArrayMap;
+import android.util.Slog;
import android.util.proto.ProtoOutputStream;
import com.android.internal.util.XmlUtils;
@@ -38,6 +39,8 @@ import java.util.ArrayList;
*/
public final class PersistableBundle extends BaseBundle implements Cloneable, Parcelable,
XmlUtils.WriteMapCallback {
+ private static final String TAG = "PersistableBundle";
+
private static final String TAG_PERSISTABLEMAP = "pbundle_as_map";
public static final PersistableBundle EMPTY;
@@ -100,7 +103,11 @@ public final class PersistableBundle extends BaseBundle implements Cloneable, Pa
* @hide
*/
public PersistableBundle(Bundle b) {
- this(b.getMap());
+ this(b, true);
+ }
+
+ private PersistableBundle(Bundle b, boolean throwException) {
+ this(b.getMap(), throwException);
}
/**
@@ -109,7 +116,7 @@ public final class PersistableBundle extends BaseBundle implements Cloneable, Pa
* @param map a Map containing only those items that can be persisted.
* @throws IllegalArgumentException if any element of #map cannot be persisted.
*/
- private PersistableBundle(ArrayMap<String, Object> map) {
+ private PersistableBundle(ArrayMap<String, Object> map, boolean throwException) {
super();
mFlags = FLAG_DEFUSABLE;
@@ -118,16 +125,23 @@ public final class PersistableBundle extends BaseBundle implements Cloneable, Pa
// Now verify each item throwing an exception if there is a violation.
final int N = mMap.size();
- for (int i=0; i<N; i++) {
+ for (int i = N - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
Object value = mMap.valueAt(i);
if (value instanceof ArrayMap) {
// Fix up any Maps by replacing them with PersistableBundles.
- mMap.setValueAt(i, new PersistableBundle((ArrayMap<String, Object>) value));
+ mMap.setValueAt(i,
+ new PersistableBundle((ArrayMap<String, Object>) value, throwException));
} else if (value instanceof Bundle) {
- mMap.setValueAt(i, new PersistableBundle(((Bundle) value)));
+ mMap.setValueAt(i, new PersistableBundle((Bundle) value, throwException));
} else if (!isValidType(value)) {
- throw new IllegalArgumentException("Bad value in PersistableBundle key="
- + mMap.keyAt(i) + " value=" + value);
+ final String errorMsg = "Bad value in PersistableBundle key="
+ + mMap.keyAt(i) + " value=" + value;
+ if (throwException) {
+ throw new IllegalArgumentException(errorMsg);
+ } else {
+ Slog.wtfStack(TAG, errorMsg);
+ mMap.removeAt(i);
+ }
}
}
}
@@ -242,6 +256,15 @@ public final class PersistableBundle extends BaseBundle implements Cloneable, Pa
/** @hide */
public void saveToXml(XmlSerializer out) throws IOException, XmlPullParserException {
unparcel();
+ // Explicitly drop invalid types an attacker may have added before persisting.
+ for (int i = mMap.size() - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+ final Object value = mMap.valueAt(i);
+ if (!isValidType(value)) {
+ Slog.e(TAG, "Dropping bad data before persisting: "
+ + mMap.keyAt(i) + "=" + value);
+ mMap.removeAt(i);
+ }
+ }
XmlUtils.writeMapXml(mMap, out, this);
}
@@ -290,9 +313,12 @@ public final class PersistableBundle extends BaseBundle implements Cloneable, Pa
while (((event = in.next()) != XmlPullParser.END_DOCUMENT) &&
(event != XmlPullParser.END_TAG || in.getDepth() < outerDepth)) {
if (event == XmlPullParser.START_TAG) {
+ // Don't throw an exception when restoring from XML since an attacker could try to
+ // input invalid data in the persisted file.
return new PersistableBundle((ArrayMap<String, Object>)
XmlUtils.readThisArrayMapXml(in, startTag, tagName,
- new MyReadMapCallback()));
+ new MyReadMapCallback()),
+ /* throwException */ false);
}
}
return EMPTY;

63
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_frameworks_base/377008.patch
View File

@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pawan Wagh <waghpawan@google.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2023 17:37:26 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Use readUniqueFileDescriptor in incidentd service
readFileDescriptor doesn't provide ownership of the fds. fdopen
needs ownership of the fds. Fds read from parcel should be duped
in this scenario and readUniqueFileDescriptor dups fds internally.
Test: m incidentd_service_fuzzer && adb sync data && adb shell /data/fuzz/x86_64/incidentd_service_fuzzer/incidentd_service_fuzzer
Test: atest incidentd_test
Bug: 286931110
Bug: 283699145
(cherry picked from commit ba78ef276951269f7b024baebdf1b8fa40bedb23)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:b4aaf180ee8f3e375c7ab411f03cf9c24c1d8055)
Merged-In: Ibe03a17dee91ac5bf25d123d4fd9c0bdd3c7d80e
Change-Id: Ibe03a17dee91ac5bf25d123d4fd9c0bdd3c7d80e
---
cmds/incidentd/src/IncidentService.cpp | 20 ++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cmds/incidentd/src/IncidentService.cpp b/cmds/incidentd/src/IncidentService.cpp
index a52726396b53..a4819633efee 100644
--- a/cmds/incidentd/src/IncidentService.cpp
+++ b/cmds/incidentd/src/IncidentService.cpp
@@ -418,9 +418,13 @@ status_t IncidentService::onTransact(uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel*
switch (code) {
case SHELL_COMMAND_TRANSACTION: {
- int in = data.readFileDescriptor();
- int out = data.readFileDescriptor();
- int err = data.readFileDescriptor();
+ unique_fd in, out, err;
+ if (status_t status = data.readUniqueFileDescriptor(&in); status != OK) return status;
+
+ if (status_t status = data.readUniqueFileDescriptor(&out); status != OK) return status;
+
+ if (status_t status = data.readUniqueFileDescriptor(&err); status != OK) return status;
+
int argc = data.readInt32();
Vector<String8> args;
for (int i = 0; i < argc && data.dataAvail() > 0; i++) {
@@ -430,15 +434,15 @@ status_t IncidentService::onTransact(uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel*
sp<IResultReceiver> resultReceiver =
IResultReceiver::asInterface(data.readStrongBinder());
- FILE* fin = fdopen(in, "r");
- FILE* fout = fdopen(out, "w");
- FILE* ferr = fdopen(err, "w");
+ FILE* fin = fdopen(in.release(), "r");
+ FILE* fout = fdopen(out.release(), "w");
+ FILE* ferr = fdopen(err.release(), "w");
if (fin == NULL || fout == NULL || ferr == NULL) {
resultReceiver->send(NO_MEMORY);
} else {
- err = command(fin, fout, ferr, args);
- resultReceiver->send(err);
+ status_t result = command(fin, fout, ferr, args);
+ resultReceiver->send(result);
}
if (fin != NULL) {

29
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_frameworks_base/377009.patch
View File

@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pinyao Ting <pinyaoting@google.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2023 14:58:56 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Validate userId when publishing shortcuts
Bug: 288110451
Test: manual
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:01bfd04ff445db6290ae430d44ea1bf1a115fe3c)
Merged-In: Idbde676f871db83825155730e3714f3727e25762
Change-Id: Idbde676f871db83825155730e3714f3727e25762
---
services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/ShortcutService.java | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/ShortcutService.java b/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/ShortcutService.java
index d1ee52eef2df..0e887d375924 100644
--- a/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/ShortcutService.java
+++ b/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/ShortcutService.java
@@ -1589,6 +1589,10 @@ public class ShortcutService extends IShortcutService.Stub {
android.util.EventLog.writeEvent(0x534e4554, "109824443", -1, "");
throw new SecurityException("Shortcut package name mismatch");
}
+ final int callingUid = injectBinderCallingUid();
+ if (UserHandle.getUserId(callingUid) != si.getUserId()) {
+ throw new SecurityException("User-ID in shortcut doesn't match the caller");
+ }
}
private void verifyShortcutInfoPackages(

45
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_frameworks_base/377010.patch
View File

@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Beverly Tai <beverlyt@google.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2023 20:50:28 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Revert "On device lockdown, always show the keyguard"
This reverts commit b23c2d5fb6630ea0da503b937f62880594b13e94.
Reason for revert: b/300463732 regression
Bug: 300463732
Bug: 218495634
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:f57217125f2b124c16c463ef4507fb054cc1ba4f)
Merged-In: I31485d0d8caa3060e998636b071dbe03f6b4fc82
Change-Id: I31485d0d8caa3060e998636b071dbe03f6b4fc82
---
.../systemui/keyguard/KeyguardViewMediator.java | 10 +---------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/packages/SystemUI/src/com/android/systemui/keyguard/KeyguardViewMediator.java b/packages/SystemUI/src/com/android/systemui/keyguard/KeyguardViewMediator.java
index a7d5c64dd3a3..e21b14dec0b0 100644
--- a/packages/SystemUI/src/com/android/systemui/keyguard/KeyguardViewMediator.java
+++ b/packages/SystemUI/src/com/android/systemui/keyguard/KeyguardViewMediator.java
@@ -556,13 +556,6 @@ public class KeyguardViewMediator extends SystemUI {
notifyHasLockscreenWallpaperChanged(hasLockscreenWallpaper);
}
}
-
- @Override
- public void onStrongAuthStateChanged(int userId) {
- if (mLockPatternUtils.isUserInLockdown(KeyguardUpdateMonitor.getCurrentUser())) {
- doKeyguardLocked(null);
- }
- }
};
ViewMediatorCallback mViewMediatorCallback = new ViewMediatorCallback() {
@@ -1326,8 +1319,7 @@ public class KeyguardViewMediator extends SystemUI {
}
// if another app is disabling us, don't show
- if (!mExternallyEnabled
- && !mLockPatternUtils.isUserInLockdown(KeyguardUpdateMonitor.getCurrentUser())) {
+ if (!mExternallyEnabled) {
if (DEBUG) Log.d(TAG, "doKeyguard: not showing because externally disabled");
mNeedToReshowWhenReenabled = true;

33
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_frameworks_base/377011.patch
View File

@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kunal Malhotra <malhk@google.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Feb 2023 23:48:27 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Adding in verification of calling UID in onShellCommand
Test: manual testing on device
Bug: b/261709193
(cherry picked from commit b651d295b44eb82d664861b77f33dbde1bce9453)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:3ef3f18ba3094c4cc4f954ba23d1da421f9ca8b0)
Merged-In: I68903ebd6d3d85f4bc820b745e3233a448b62273
Change-Id: I68903ebd6d3d85f4bc820b745e3233a448b62273
---
.../java/com/android/server/am/ActivityManagerService.java | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/services/core/java/com/android/server/am/ActivityManagerService.java b/services/core/java/com/android/server/am/ActivityManagerService.java
index 3e99e594a702..faeb5f348834 100644
--- a/services/core/java/com/android/server/am/ActivityManagerService.java
+++ b/services/core/java/com/android/server/am/ActivityManagerService.java
@@ -9884,6 +9884,13 @@ public class ActivityManagerService extends IActivityManager.Stub
public void onShellCommand(FileDescriptor in, FileDescriptor out,
FileDescriptor err, String[] args, ShellCallback callback,
ResultReceiver resultReceiver) {
+ final int callingUid = Binder.getCallingUid();
+ if (callingUid != ROOT_UID && callingUid != Process.SHELL_UID) {
+ if (resultReceiver != null) {
+ resultReceiver.send(-1, null);
+ }
+ throw new SecurityException("Shell commands are only callable by root or shell");
+ }
(new ActivityManagerShellCommand(this, false)).exec(
this, in, out, err, args, callback, resultReceiver);
}

71
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_frameworks_base/377012.patch
View File

@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Beverly Tai <beverlyt@google.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2023 21:01:11 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Updated: always show the keyguard on device lockdown
Additionally, don't hide keyguard when it's disabled if the user has locked
down the device.
Manual test steps:
1. Enable app pinning and disable "Ask for PIN before unpinning" setting
2. Pin an app (ie: Settings)
3. Lockdown from the power menu
4. Observe: user is brought to the keyguard, primary auth is
required to enter the device.
=> After entering correct credential, the device is still in
app pinning mode.
=> After entering an incorrect credential, the keyguard remains
showing and the user can attempt again up to the limit
Bug: 300463732
Bug: 218495634
Test: atest KeyguardViewMediatorTest
Test: manual
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:35a6e2f2c952440b1102033b2c3e496438503cff)
Merged-In: I70fdae80f717712b3dfc9df54b9649959b4bb8f0
Change-Id: I70fdae80f717712b3dfc9df54b9649959b4bb8f0
---
.../systemui/keyguard/KeyguardViewMediator.java | 16 ++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/packages/SystemUI/src/com/android/systemui/keyguard/KeyguardViewMediator.java b/packages/SystemUI/src/com/android/systemui/keyguard/KeyguardViewMediator.java
index e21b14dec0b0..5c343c941454 100644
--- a/packages/SystemUI/src/com/android/systemui/keyguard/KeyguardViewMediator.java
+++ b/packages/SystemUI/src/com/android/systemui/keyguard/KeyguardViewMediator.java
@@ -541,6 +541,13 @@ public class KeyguardViewMediator extends SystemUI {
}
}
+ @Override
+ public void onStrongAuthStateChanged(int userId) {
+ if (mLockPatternUtils.isUserInLockdown(KeyguardUpdateMonitor.getCurrentUser())) {
+ doKeyguardLocked(null);
+ }
+ }
+
@Override
public void onTrustChanged(int userId) {
if (userId == KeyguardUpdateMonitor.getCurrentUser()) {
@@ -1107,6 +1114,10 @@ public class KeyguardViewMediator extends SystemUI {
mExternallyEnabled = enabled;
if (!enabled && mShowing) {
+ if (mLockPatternUtils.isUserInLockdown(KeyguardUpdateMonitor.getCurrentUser())) {
+ Log.d(TAG, "keyguardEnabled(false) overridden by user lockdown");
+ return;
+ }
if (mExitSecureCallback != null) {
if (DEBUG) Log.d(TAG, "in process of verifyUnlock request, ignoring");
// we're in the process of handling a request to verify the user
@@ -1318,8 +1329,9 @@ public class KeyguardViewMediator extends SystemUI {
return;
}
- // if another app is disabling us, don't show
- if (!mExternallyEnabled) {
+ // if another app is disabling us, don't show unless we're in lockdown mode
+ if (!mExternallyEnabled
+ && !mLockPatternUtils.isUserInLockdown(KeyguardUpdateMonitor.getCurrentUser())) {
if (DEBUG) Log.d(TAG, "doKeyguard: not showing because externally disabled");
mNeedToReshowWhenReenabled = true;

99
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_frameworks_base/377013-backport.patch
View File

@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Beth Thibodeau <ethibodeau@google.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 16:19:48 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] RESTRICT AUTOMERGE: Check URI permissions for resumable media
artwork
When resumable media is added that has artwork set via URI, check the
permissions for the URI before attempting to load it
Test: atest MediaDataManagerTest UriGrantsManagerServiceTest
Test: manual with test app
Bug: 284297452
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:c13567e39cd906c8544011de537490b70ce29b2f)
Merged-In: Ie79915d3d1712f08dc2e8dfbd5bc7fd32bb308a3
Change-Id: Ie79915d3d1712f08dc2e8dfbd5bc7fd32bb308a3
---
core/java/android/app/IUriGrantsManager.aidl | 3 ++
.../server/uri/UriGrantsManagerService.java | 42 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 45 insertions(+)
diff --git a/core/java/android/app/IUriGrantsManager.aidl b/core/java/android/app/IUriGrantsManager.aidl
index 9e7f2fecfea0..b630d034dca9 100644
--- a/core/java/android/app/IUriGrantsManager.aidl
+++ b/core/java/android/app/IUriGrantsManager.aidl
@@ -39,4 +39,7 @@ interface IUriGrantsManager {
void clearGrantedUriPermissions(in String packageName, int userId);
ParceledListSlice getUriPermissions(in String packageName, boolean incoming,
boolean persistedOnly);
+
+ int checkGrantUriPermission_ignoreNonSystem(
+ int sourceUid, String targetPkg, in Uri uri, int modeFlags, int userId);
}
diff --git a/services/core/java/com/android/server/uri/UriGrantsManagerService.java b/services/core/java/com/android/server/uri/UriGrantsManagerService.java
index 55f062bca2d1..7cab7b28cfee 100644
--- a/services/core/java/com/android/server/uri/UriGrantsManagerService.java
+++ b/services/core/java/com/android/server/uri/UriGrantsManagerService.java
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ import static org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParser.END_DOCUMENT;
import static org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParser.START_TAG;
import android.annotation.Nullable;
+import android.annotation.RequiresPermission;
import android.app.ActivityManager;
import android.app.ActivityManagerInternal;
import android.app.AppGlobals;
@@ -65,6 +66,7 @@ import android.os.Handler;
import android.os.IBinder;
import android.os.Looper;
import android.os.Message;
+import android.os.Process;
import android.os.RemoteException;
import android.os.SystemClock;
import android.os.UserHandle;
@@ -1225,6 +1227,46 @@ public class UriGrantsManagerService extends IUriGrantsManager.Stub {
return false;
}
+ /**
+ * Check if the targetPkg can be granted permission to access uri by
+ * the callingUid using the given modeFlags. See {@link #checkGrantUriPermissionUnlocked}.
+ *
+ * @param callingUid The uid of the grantor app that has permissions to the uri.
+ * @param targetPkg The package name of the granted app that needs permissions to the uri.
+ * @param uri The uri for which permissions should be granted.
+ * @param modeFlags The modes to grant. See {@link Intent#FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION}, etc.
+ * @param userId The userId in which the uri is to be resolved.
+ * @return uid of the target or -1 if permission grant not required. Returns -1 if the caller
+ * does not hold INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS_FULL
+ * @throws SecurityException if the grant is not allowed.
+ */
+ @Override
+ @RequiresPermission(android.Manifest.permission.INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS_FULL)
+ public int checkGrantUriPermission_ignoreNonSystem(int callingUid, String targetPkg, Uri uri,
+ int modeFlags, int userId) {
+ if (!isCallerIsSystemOrPrivileged()) {
+ return Process.INVALID_UID;
+ }
+ final long origId = Binder.clearCallingIdentity();
+ try {
+ return checkGrantUriPermissionUnlocked(callingUid, targetPkg, uri, modeFlags,
+ userId);
+ } finally {
+ Binder.restoreCallingIdentity(origId);
+ }
+ }
+
+ private boolean isCallerIsSystemOrPrivileged() {
+ final int uid = Binder.getCallingUid();
+ if (uid == Process.SYSTEM_UID || uid == Process.ROOT_UID) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ return ActivityManager.checkComponentPermission(
+ android.Manifest.permission.INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS_FULL,
+ uid, /* owningUid = */-1, /* exported = */ true)
+ == PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED;
+ }
+
private void writeGrantedUriPermissions() {
if (DEBUG) Slog.v(TAG, "writeGrantedUriPermissions()");

38
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Bluetooth/377014-backport.patch
View File

@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Brian Delwiche <delwiche@google.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2023 00:01:03 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix UAF in ~CallbackEnv
com_android_bluetooth_btservice_AdapterService does not null its local
JNI environment variable after detaching the thread (which frees the
environment context), allowing UAF under certain conditions.
Null the variable in this case.
Testing here was done through a custom unit test; see patchsets 4-6 for
contents. However, unit testing of the JNI layer is problematic in
production, so that part of the patch is omitted for final merge.
Bug: 291500341
Test: atest bluetooth_test_gd_unit, atest net_test_stack_btm
Tag: #security
Ignore-AOSP-First: Security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:5f543d919c4067f2f4925580fd8a690ba3440e80)
Merged-In: I3e5e3c51412640aa19f0981caaa809313d6ad030
Change-Id: I3e5e3c51412640aa19f0981caaa809313d6ad030
---
jni/com_android_bluetooth_btservice_AdapterService.cpp | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/jni/com_android_bluetooth_btservice_AdapterService.cpp b/jni/com_android_bluetooth_btservice_AdapterService.cpp
index 55b391c56..aa0a13d46 100644
--- a/jni/com_android_bluetooth_btservice_AdapterService.cpp
+++ b/jni/com_android_bluetooth_btservice_AdapterService.cpp
@@ -404,6 +404,7 @@ static void callback_thread_event(bt_cb_thread_evt event) {
return;
}
vm->DetachCurrentThread();
+ callbackEnv = NULL;
}
}

40
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_apps_Trebuchet/377015.patch
View File

@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pinyao Ting <pinyaoting@google.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2023 22:37:16 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix permission bypass in legacy shortcut
Intent created for Chooser should not be allowed in legacy shortcuts
since it doesn't make sense for user to tap on a shortcut in homescreen
to share, the expected share flow started from ShareSheet.
Bug: 295334906, 295045199
Test: manual
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:b7b192bd7f24a2aa7d6881ee949657c9760c0305)
Merged-In: I8d0cbccdc31bd4cb927830e5ecf841147400fdfa
Change-Id: I8d0cbccdc31bd4cb927830e5ecf841147400fdfa
---
.../android/launcher3/util/PackageManagerHelper.java | 11 ++---------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/com/android/launcher3/util/PackageManagerHelper.java b/src/com/android/launcher3/util/PackageManagerHelper.java
index f263331f8f..1ca28f82dc 100644
--- a/src/com/android/launcher3/util/PackageManagerHelper.java
+++ b/src/com/android/launcher3/util/PackageManagerHelper.java
@@ -114,15 +114,8 @@ public class PackageManagerHelper {
public boolean hasPermissionForActivity(Intent intent, String srcPackage) {
// b/270152142
if (Intent.ACTION_CHOOSER.equals(intent.getAction())) {
- final Bundle extras = intent.getExtras();
- if (extras == null) {
- return true;
- }
- // If given intent is ACTION_CHOOSER, verify srcPackage has permission over EXTRA_INTENT
- intent = (Intent) extras.getParcelable(Intent.EXTRA_INTENT);
- if (intent == null) {
- return true;
- }
+ // Chooser shortcuts is not a valid target
+ return false;
}
ResolveInfo target = mPm.resolveActivity(intent, 0);
if (target == null) {

108
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_packages_services_Telecomm/377016-backport.patch
View File

@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pranav Madapurmath <pmadapurmath@google.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Apr 2023 21:36:12 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Resolve account image icon profile boundary exploit.
Because Telecom grants the INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS permission, an exploit
is possible where the user can upload an image icon (belonging to
another user) via registering a phone account. This CL provides a
lightweight solution for parsing the image URI to detect profile
exploitation.
Fixes: 273502295
Fixes: 296915211
Test: Unit test to enforce successful/failure path
(cherry picked from commit d0d1d38e37de54e58a7532a0020582fbd7d476b7)
(cherry picked from commit e7d0ca3fe5be6e393f643f565792ea5e7ed05f48)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:a604311f86ea8136ca2ac9f9ff0af7fa57ee3f42)
Merged-In: I2b6418f019a373ee9f02ba8683e5b694e7ab80a5
Change-Id: I2b6418f019a373ee9f02ba8683e5b694e7ab80a5
---
.../server/telecom/TelecomServiceImpl.java | 22 +++++++++++++++++++
.../telecom/tests/TelecomServiceImplTest.java | 21 ++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/com/android/server/telecom/TelecomServiceImpl.java b/src/com/android/server/telecom/TelecomServiceImpl.java
index 8c498fc55..4472ad837 100644
--- a/src/com/android/server/telecom/TelecomServiceImpl.java
+++ b/src/com/android/server/telecom/TelecomServiceImpl.java
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ import android.content.pm.PackageManager;
import android.content.res.Resources;
import android.content.pm.ParceledListSlice;
import android.content.pm.ResolveInfo;
+import android.graphics.drawable.Icon;
import android.net.Uri;
import android.os.Binder;
import android.os.Build;
@@ -513,6 +514,9 @@ public class TelecomServiceImpl {
if (callingUid != Process.SHELL_UID) {
enforceUserHandleMatchesCaller(account.getAccountHandle());
}
+ // Validate the profile boundary of the given image URI.
+ validateAccountIconUserBoundary(account.getIcon());
+
final long token = Binder.clearCallingIdentity();
try {
mPhoneAccountRegistrar.registerPhoneAccount(account);
@@ -2100,4 +2104,22 @@ public class TelecomServiceImpl {
mContext.sendBroadcast(intent);
}
}
+
+ private void validateAccountIconUserBoundary(Icon icon) {
+ // Refer to Icon#getUriString for context. The URI string is invalid for icons of
+ // incompatible types.
+ if (icon != null && (icon.getType() == Icon.TYPE_URI
+ /*|| icon.getType() == Icon.TYPE_URI_ADAPTIVE_BITMAP*/)) {
+ String encodedUser = icon.getUri().getEncodedUserInfo();
+ // If there is no encoded user, the URI is calling into the calling user space
+ if (encodedUser != null) {
+ int userId = Integer.parseInt(encodedUser);
+ if (userId != UserHandle.getUserId(Binder.getCallingUid())) {
+ // If we are transcending the profile boundary, throw an error.
+ throw new IllegalArgumentException("Attempting to register a phone account with"
+ + " an image icon belonging to another user.");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
diff --git a/tests/src/com/android/server/telecom/tests/TelecomServiceImplTest.java b/tests/src/com/android/server/telecom/tests/TelecomServiceImplTest.java
index 00d8000e4..6daf516d1 100644
--- a/tests/src/com/android/server/telecom/tests/TelecomServiceImplTest.java
+++ b/tests/src/com/android/server/telecom/tests/TelecomServiceImplTest.java
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ import android.content.Context;
import android.content.Intent;
import android.content.pm.ApplicationInfo;
import android.content.pm.PackageManager;
+import android.graphics.drawable.Icon;
import android.net.Uri;
import android.os.Binder;
import android.os.Bundle;
@@ -531,6 +532,26 @@ public class TelecomServiceImplTest extends TelecomTestCase {
}
}
+ @SmallTest
+ @Test
+ public void testRegisterPhoneAccountImageIconCrossUser() throws RemoteException {
+ String packageNameToUse = "com.android.officialpackage";
+ PhoneAccountHandle phHandle = new PhoneAccountHandle(new ComponentName(
+ packageNameToUse, "cs"), "test", Binder.getCallingUserHandle());
+ Icon icon = Icon.createWithContentUri("content://10@media/external/images/media/");
+ PhoneAccount phoneAccount = makePhoneAccount(phHandle).setIcon(icon).build();
+ doReturn(PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED)
+ .when(mContext).checkCallingOrSelfPermission(MODIFY_PHONE_STATE);
+
+ // This should fail; security exception will be thrown.
+ registerPhoneAccountTestHelper(phoneAccount, false);
+
+ icon = Icon.createWithContentUri("content://0@media/external/images/media/");
+ phoneAccount = makePhoneAccount(phHandle).setIcon(icon).build();
+ // This should succeed.
+ registerPhoneAccountTestHelper(phoneAccount, true);
+ }
+
@SmallTest
@Test
public void testUnregisterPhoneAccount() throws RemoteException {

99
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_system_bt/377017.patch
View File

@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Sat, 2 Sep 2023 04:20:10 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Reject access to secure service authenticated from a temp
bonding [1]
Rejecct access to services running on l2cap
Backport of
Idef4ea28eb3d17b0807ab7dc6849433ddc5581b3
Bug: 294854926
Test: m com.android.btservices
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:a36757e967ab6d956127cac298134f28ce8f0d6d)
Merged-In: Idef4ea28eb3d17b0807ab7dc6849433ddc5581b3
Change-Id: Idef4ea28eb3d17b0807ab7dc6849433ddc5581b3
---
stack/btm/btm_sec.cc | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
index 3ba1a6023..d4377a1fe 100644
--- a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
+++ b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static bool btm_sec_set_security_level(CONNECTION_TYPE conn_type,
uint32_t mx_proto_id,
uint32_t mx_chan_id);
-static bool btm_dev_authenticated(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec);
+static bool btm_dev_authenticated(const tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec);
static bool btm_dev_encrypted(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec);
static bool btm_dev_authorized(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec);
static bool btm_serv_trusted(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec,
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static const bool btm_sec_io_map[BTM_IO_CAP_MAX][BTM_IO_CAP_MAX] = {
* Returns bool true or false
*
******************************************************************************/
-static bool btm_dev_authenticated(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec) {
+static bool btm_dev_authenticated(const tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec) {
if (p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_AUTHENTICATED) {
return (true);
}
@@ -220,6 +220,25 @@ static bool btm_serv_trusted(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec,
return (false);
}
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * Function access_secure_service_from_temp_bond
+ *
+ * Description a utility function to test whether an access to
+ * secure service from temp bonding is happening
+ *
+ * Returns true if the aforementioned condition holds,
+ * false otherwise
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static bool access_secure_service_from_temp_bond(const tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec,
+ bool locally_initiated,
+ uint16_t security_req) {
+ return !locally_initiated && (security_req & BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE) &&
+ btm_dev_authenticated(p_dev_rec) &&
+ p_dev_rec->bond_type == BOND_TYPE_TEMPORARY;
+}
+
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function BTM_SecRegister
@@ -2077,9 +2096,13 @@ tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_l2cap_access_req(const RawAddress& bd_addr, uint16_t psm,
}
if (rc == BTM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (access_secure_service_from_temp_bond(p_dev_rec, is_originator, security_required)) {
+ LOG_ERROR(LOG_TAG, "Trying to access a secure service from a temp bonding, rejecting");
+ rc = BTM_FAILED_ON_SECURITY;
+ }
if (p_callback)
- (*p_callback)(&bd_addr, transport, (void*)p_ref_data, BTM_SUCCESS);
- return (BTM_SUCCESS);
+ (*p_callback)(&bd_addr, transport, (void*)p_ref_data, rc);
+ return (rc);
}
}
@@ -5138,6 +5161,13 @@ tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_execute_procedure(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec) {
}
}
+ if (access_secure_service_from_temp_bond(p_dev_rec,
+ p_dev_rec->is_originator,
+ p_dev_rec->security_required)) {
+ LOG_ERROR(LOG_TAG, "Trying to access a secure service from a temp bonding, rejecting");
+ return (BTM_FAILED_ON_SECURITY);
+ }
+
/* All required security procedures already established */
p_dev_rec->security_required &=
~(BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHORIZE | BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHORIZE |

37
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_system_bt/377018.patch
View File

@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Sat, 2 Sep 2023 04:27:29 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Reject access to secure services authenticated from temp
bonding [2]
Reject access to service running on rfcomm
this is a backport of
I10fcc2dcd78fc22ffbe3c425669fc9889b94a166
Bug: 294854926
Test: m com.android.btservices
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:5e0e907ec4948f06b3a35ecf08725c020d533ccb)
Merged-In: I10fcc2dcd78fc22ffbe3c425669fc9889b94a166
Change-Id: I10fcc2dcd78fc22ffbe3c425669fc9889b94a166
---
stack/btm/btm_sec.cc | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
index d4377a1fe..6163c3fb7 100644
--- a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
+++ b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
@@ -2425,6 +2425,11 @@ tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_mx_access_request(const RawAddress& bd_addr, uint16_t psm,
mx_chan_id, p_callback, p_ref_data);
} else /* rc == BTM_SUCCESS */
{
+ if (access_secure_service_from_temp_bond(p_dev_rec,
+ is_originator, security_required)) {
+ LOG_ERROR(LOG_TAG, "Trying to access a secure rfcomm service from a temp bonding, reject");
+ rc = BTM_FAILED_ON_SECURITY;
+ }
/* access granted */
if (p_callback) {
(*p_callback)(&bd_addr, transport, p_ref_data, (uint8_t)rc);

47
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_system_bt/377019.patch
View File

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2023 23:47:48 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Reject access to secure service authenticated from a temp
bonding [3]
Allow access to rfcomm PSM by default
Original bug
Bug: 294854926
Nearby regressions:
Bug: 298539299
Test: m com.android.btservices
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:ab986fe4165aae74c5915f57ad2e78bf80f1d3ec)
Merged-In: If1f7c9278a9e877f64ae78b6f067c597fb5d0e66
Change-Id: If1f7c9278a9e877f64ae78b6f067c597fb5d0e66
---
stack/btm/btm_sec.cc | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
index 6163c3fb7..e69fe9b4c 100644
--- a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
+++ b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
@@ -2119,15 +2119,15 @@ tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_l2cap_access_req(const RawAddress& bd_addr, uint16_t psm,
btm_cb.security_mode == BTM_SEC_MODE_SC) {
if (BTM_SEC_IS_SM4(p_dev_rec->sm4)) {
if (is_originator) {
- /* SM4 to SM4 -> always authenticate & encrypt */
- security_required |= (BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHENTICATE | BTM_SEC_OUT_ENCRYPT);
+ /* SM4 to SM4 -> always encrypt */
+ security_required |= BTM_SEC_OUT_ENCRYPT;
} else /* acceptor */
{
/* SM4 to SM4: the acceptor needs to make sure the authentication is
* already done */
chk_acp_auth_done = true;
- /* SM4 to SM4 -> always authenticate & encrypt */
- security_required |= (BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE | BTM_SEC_IN_ENCRYPT);
+ /* SM4 to SM4 -> always encrypt */
+ security_required |= BTM_SEC_IN_ENCRYPT;
}
} else if (!(BTM_SM4_KNOWN & p_dev_rec->sm4)) {
/* the remote features are not known yet */

128
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_system_bt/377020.patch
View File

@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2023 23:54:08 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Reorganize the code for checking auth requirement
Original bug
Bug: 294854926
regressions:
Bug: 299570702
Test: Test: m com.android.btservices
Test: QA validation
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:0c488b2420befe0f8038957861072a8e63702f91)
Merged-In: I976a5a6d7bb819fd6accdc71eb1501b9606f3ae4
Change-Id: I976a5a6d7bb819fd6accdc71eb1501b9606f3ae4
---
stack/btm/btm_sec.cc | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
index e69fe9b4c..e73cfb363 100644
--- a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
+++ b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
@@ -5081,46 +5081,65 @@ tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_execute_procedure(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec) {
/* If connection is not authenticated and authentication is required */
/* start authentication and return PENDING to the caller */
- if ((((!(p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_AUTHENTICATED)) &&
- ((p_dev_rec->is_originator &&
- (p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHENTICATE)) ||
- (!p_dev_rec->is_originator &&
- (p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE)))) ||
- (!(p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_16_DIGIT_PIN_AUTHED) &&
- (!p_dev_rec->is_originator &&
- (p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_IN_MIN_16_DIGIT_PIN)))) &&
- (p_dev_rec->hci_handle != BTM_SEC_INVALID_HANDLE)) {
-/*
- * We rely on BTM_SEC_16_DIGIT_PIN_AUTHED being set if MITM is in use,
- * as 16 DIGIT is only needed if MITM is not used. Unfortunately, the
- * BTM_SEC_AUTHENTICATED is used for both MITM and non-MITM
- * authenticated connections, hence we cannot distinguish here.
- */
-
- BTM_TRACE_EVENT("Security Manager: Start authentication");
+ if (p_dev_rec->hci_handle != HCI_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ bool start_auth = false;
+
+ // Check link status of BR/EDR
+ if (!(p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_AUTHENTICATED)) {
+ if (p_dev_rec->is_originator) {
+ if (p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHENTICATE) {
+ LOG_DEBUG(LOG_TAG, "Outgoing authentication Required");
+ start_auth = true;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE) {
+ LOG_DEBUG(LOG_TAG, "Incoming authentication Required");
+ start_auth = true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
- /*
- * If we do have a link-key, but we end up here because we need an
- * upgrade, then clear the link-key known and authenticated flag before
- * restarting authentication.
- * WARNING: If the controller has link-key, it is optional and
- * recommended for the controller to send a Link_Key_Request.
- * In case we need an upgrade, the only alternative would be to delete
- * the existing link-key. That could lead to very bad user experience
- * or even IOP issues, if a reconnect causes a new connection that
- * requires an upgrade.
- */
- if ((p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_KNOWN) &&
- (!(p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_16_DIGIT_PIN_AUTHED) &&
- (!p_dev_rec->is_originator &&
- (p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_IN_MIN_16_DIGIT_PIN)))) {
- p_dev_rec->sec_flags &=
- ~(BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_KNOWN | BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_AUTHED |
- BTM_SEC_AUTHENTICATED);
+ if (!(p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_16_DIGIT_PIN_AUTHED)) {
+ /*
+ * We rely on BTM_SEC_16_DIGIT_PIN_AUTHED being set if MITM is in use,
+ * as 16 DIGIT is only needed if MITM is not used. Unfortunately, the
+ * BTM_SEC_AUTHENTICATED is used for both MITM and non-MITM
+ * authenticated connections, hence we cannot distinguish here.
+ */
+ if (!p_dev_rec->is_originator) {
+ if (p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_IN_MIN_16_DIGIT_PIN) {
+ LOG_DEBUG(LOG_TAG, "BTM_SEC_IN_MIN_16_DIGIT_PIN Required");
+ start_auth = true;
+ }
+ }
}
- btm_sec_start_authentication(p_dev_rec);
- return (BTM_CMD_STARTED);
+ if (start_auth) {
+ LOG_DEBUG(LOG_TAG, "Security Manager: Start authentication");
+
+ /*
+ * If we do have a link-key, but we end up here because we need an
+ * upgrade, then clear the link-key known and authenticated flag before
+ * restarting authentication.
+ * WARNING: If the controller has link-key, it is optional and
+ * recommended for the controller to send a Link_Key_Request.
+ * In case we need an upgrade, the only alternative would be to delete
+ * the existing link-key. That could lead to very bad user experience
+ * or even IOP issues, if a reconnect causes a new connection that
+ * requires an upgrade.
+ */
+ if ((p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_KNOWN) &&
+ (!(p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_16_DIGIT_PIN_AUTHED) &&
+ (!p_dev_rec->is_originator &&
+ (p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_IN_MIN_16_DIGIT_PIN)))) {
+ p_dev_rec->sec_flags &=
+ ~(BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_KNOWN | BTM_SEC_LINK_KEY_AUTHED |
+ BTM_SEC_AUTHENTICATED);
+ }
+
+ btm_sec_start_authentication(p_dev_rec);
+ return (BTM_CMD_STARTED);
+ }
}
/* If connection is not encrypted and encryption is required */

46
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_system_bt/377021.patch
View File

@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2023 00:00:44 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Enforce authentication if encryption is required
Original bug
Bug: 294854926
regressions:
Bug: 299570702
Bug: 299561281
Test: Test: m com.android.btservices
Test: QA validation
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:778d3fb3fb520e54425ecefe9a28453002053553)
Merged-In: I0370ed2e3166d56f708e1981c2126526e1db9eaa
Change-Id: I0370ed2e3166d56f708e1981c2126526e1db9eaa
---
stack/btm/btm_sec.cc | 10 ++++++----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
index e73cfb363..de91023c6 100644
--- a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
+++ b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
@@ -5087,13 +5087,15 @@ tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_execute_procedure(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec) {
// Check link status of BR/EDR
if (!(p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_AUTHENTICATED)) {
if (p_dev_rec->is_originator) {
- if (p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHENTICATE) {
- LOG_DEBUG(LOG_TAG, "Outgoing authentication Required");
+ if (p_dev_rec->security_required &
+ (BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHENTICATE | BTM_SEC_OUT_ENCRYPT)) {
+ LOG_DEBUG(LOG_TAG, "Outgoing authentication/encryption Required");
start_auth = true;
}
} else {
- if (p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE) {
- LOG_DEBUG(LOG_TAG, "Incoming authentication Required");
+ if (p_dev_rec->security_required &
+ (BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE | BTM_SEC_IN_ENCRYPT)) {
+ LOG_DEBUG(LOG_TAG, "Incoming authentication/encryption Required");
start_auth = true;
}
}

56
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_system_bt/377023-backport.patch
View File

@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Brian Delwiche <delwiche@google.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 21:27:49 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix timing attack in BTM_BleVerifySignature
BTM_BleVerifySignature uses a stock memcmp, allowing signature contents
to be deduced through a side-channel attack.
Change to CRYPTO_memcmp, which is hardened against this attack, to
eliminate this attack.
Bug: 274478807
Test: atest bluetooth_test_gd_unit
Tag: #security
Ignore-AOSP-First: Security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:fcd1c44f7c4bf431dd6a6902d74c045174bd00ce)
Merged-In: I41a9b586d663d2ad4694222ae451d2d30a428a3c
Change-Id: I41a9b586d663d2ad4694222ae451d2d30a428a3c
---
stack/Android.bp | 1 +
stack/btm/btm_ble.cc | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/stack/Android.bp b/stack/Android.bp
index c4684236e..4021d9e51 100644
--- a/stack/Android.bp
+++ b/stack/Android.bp
@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ cc_library_static {
shared_libs: [
"libcutils",
"liblog",
+ "libcrypto",
],
required: [
"libldacBT_enc",
diff --git a/stack/btm/btm_ble.cc b/stack/btm/btm_ble.cc
index b1f4119d5..f34c6db59 100644
--- a/stack/btm/btm_ble.cc
+++ b/stack/btm/btm_ble.cc
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
#include "hcimsgs.h"
#include "log/log.h"
#include "l2c_int.h"
+#include "openssl/mem.h"
#include "osi/include/log.h"
#include "osi/include/osi.h"
#include "stack/crypto_toolbox/crypto_toolbox.h"
@@ -2110,7 +2111,7 @@ bool BTM_BleVerifySignature(const RawAddress& bd_addr, uint8_t* p_orig,
crypto_toolbox::aes_cmac(p_rec->ble.keys.pcsrk, p_orig, len,
BTM_CMAC_TLEN_SIZE, p_mac);
- if (memcmp(p_mac, p_comp, BTM_CMAC_TLEN_SIZE) == 0) {
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p_mac, p_comp, BTM_CMAC_TLEN_SIZE) == 0) {
btm_ble_increment_sign_ctr(bd_addr, false);
verified = true;
}

115
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_system_netd/377024-backport.patch
View File

@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lin Lee <linlee@google.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2023 09:34:41 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix Heap-use-after-free in MDnsSdListener::Monitor::run
Use thread join to avoid thread exiting after instance
recycled.
Prior to implementing this patch, fuzzing would lead to a segmentation fault after approximately 500 rounds. With the addition of the patch, the fuzzing process can now be repeated for over 30,000 rounds.
Test: m, fuzzing
Fuzzing: mma mdns_service_fuzzer && adb sync data && adb shell /data/fuzz/arm64/mdns_service_fuzzer/mdns_service_fuzzer
Bug: 272382770
Ignore-AOSP-First: Security Issue
(cherry picked from commit 9c0c15f80cffb98b36284dd169a2e62e059dbbe3)
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:75e5e2e1faec7aa2812fc6fba30d6fe80558bacd)
Merged-In: I5bc85451b4e6539bad45ceb672924a37952cc138
Change-Id: I5bc85451b4e6539bad45ceb672924a37952cc138
---
server/MDnsSdListener.cpp | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------
server/MDnsSdListener.h | 4 +++-
2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/server/MDnsSdListener.cpp b/server/MDnsSdListener.cpp
index 42dcddf3..d551d37c 100644
--- a/server/MDnsSdListener.cpp
+++ b/server/MDnsSdListener.cpp
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <sys/poll.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <thread>
#define LOG_TAG "MDnsDS"
#define DBG 1
@@ -527,12 +528,18 @@ MDnsSdListener::Monitor::Monitor() {
mPollSize = 10;
socketpair(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, mCtrlSocketPair);
- const int rval = ::android::netdutils::threadLaunch(this);
- if (rval != 0) {
- ALOGW("Error spawning monitor thread: %s (%d)", strerror(-rval), -rval);
- }
+ mRescanThread = new std::thread(&Monitor::run, this);
+ if (!mRescanThread->joinable()) ALOGE("Unable to launch thread.");
}
+MDnsSdListener::Monitor::~Monitor() {
+ if (VDBG) ALOGD("Monitor recycling");
+ close(mCtrlSocketPair[1]); // interrupt poll in MDnsSdListener::Monitor::run() and revent will
+ // be 17 = POLLIN | POLLHUP
+ mRescanThread->join();
+ delete mRescanThread;
+ if (VDBG) ALOGD("Monitor recycled");
+}
#define NAP_TIME 200 // 200 ms between polls
static int wait_for_property(const char *name, const char *desired_value, int maxwait)
{
@@ -611,14 +618,18 @@ void MDnsSdListener::Monitor::run() {
}
}
if (VDBG) ALOGD("controlSocket shows revent= %d", mPollFds[0].revents);
- switch (mPollFds[0].revents) {
- case POLLIN: {
- char readBuf[2];
- read(mCtrlSocketPair[0], &readBuf, 1);
- if (DBG) ALOGD("MDnsSdListener::Monitor got %c", readBuf[0]);
- if (memcmp(RESCAN, readBuf, 1) == 0) {
- pollCount = rescan();
- }
+ if (mPollFds[0].revents & POLLHUP) {
+ free(mPollFds);
+ free(mPollRefs);
+ if (VDBG) ALOGD("Monitor thread leaving.");
+ return;
+ }
+ if (mPollFds[0].revents == POLLIN) {
+ char readBuf[2];
+ read(mCtrlSocketPair[0], &readBuf, 1);
+ if (DBG) ALOGD("MDnsSdListener::Monitor got %c", readBuf[0]);
+ if (memcmp(RESCAN, readBuf, 1) == 0) {
+ pollCount = rescan();
}
}
mPollFds[0].revents = 0;
diff --git a/server/MDnsSdListener.h b/server/MDnsSdListener.h
index 47ddc28f..915a3bc8 100644
--- a/server/MDnsSdListener.h
+++ b/server/MDnsSdListener.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <dns_sd.h>
#include <sysutils/FrameworkListener.h>
#include <mutex>
+#include <thread>
#include "NetdCommand.h"
@@ -70,7 +71,7 @@ private:
class Monitor {
public:
Monitor();
- virtual ~Monitor() {}
+ ~Monitor();
DNSServiceRef *allocateServiceRef(int id, Context *c);
void startMonitoring(int id);
DNSServiceRef *lookupServiceRef(int id);
@@ -100,6 +101,7 @@ private:
int mPollSize;
int mCtrlSocketPair[2];
std::mutex mMutex;
+ std::thread* mRescanThread;
};
class Handler : public NetdCommand {

40
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_packages_apps_Bluetooth/377025.patch
View File

@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Brian Delwiche <delwiche@google.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2023 00:01:03 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix UAF in ~CallbackEnv
com_android_bluetooth_btservice_AdapterService does not null its local
JNI environment variable after detaching the thread (which frees the
environment context), allowing UAF under certain conditions.
Null the variable in this case.
Testing here was done through a custom unit test; see patchsets 4-6 for
contents. However, unit testing of the JNI layer is problematic in
production, so that part of the patch is omitted for final merge.
Bug: 291500341
Test: atest bluetooth_test_gd_unit, atest net_test_stack_btm
Tag: #security
Ignore-AOSP-First: Security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:5f543d919c4067f2f4925580fd8a690ba3440e80)
Merged-In: I3e5e3c51412640aa19f0981caaa809313d6ad030
Change-Id: I3e5e3c51412640aa19f0981caaa809313d6ad030
Change-Id: I6abe916720bcd6dbd8a532c2611c11d3c39f1940
---
jni/com_android_bluetooth_btservice_AdapterService.cpp | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/jni/com_android_bluetooth_btservice_AdapterService.cpp b/jni/com_android_bluetooth_btservice_AdapterService.cpp
index fdb7dbf0b..b7e927b56 100644
--- a/jni/com_android_bluetooth_btservice_AdapterService.cpp
+++ b/jni/com_android_bluetooth_btservice_AdapterService.cpp
@@ -404,6 +404,7 @@ static void callback_thread_event(bt_cb_thread_evt event) {
return;
}
vm->DetachCurrentThread();
+ callbackEnv = NULL;
}
}

101
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/377026.patch
View File

@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Sat, 2 Sep 2023 04:20:10 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Reject access to secure service authenticated from a temp
bonding [1]
Rejecct access to services running on l2cap
Backport of
Idef4ea28eb3d17b0807ab7dc6849433ddc5581b3
Bug: 294854926
Test: m com.android.btservices
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:a36757e967ab6d956127cac298134f28ce8f0d6d)
Merged-In: Idef4ea28eb3d17b0807ab7dc6849433ddc5581b3
Change-Id: Idef4ea28eb3d17b0807ab7dc6849433ddc5581b3
Change-Id: I0435b4ee14c40213f3dae8abc54143ef7e8f67e0
---
stack/btm/btm_sec.cc | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
index 40f051c0d..4da0320c5 100644
--- a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
+++ b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static bool btm_sec_set_security_level(CONNECTION_TYPE conn_type,
uint32_t mx_proto_id,
uint32_t mx_chan_id);
-static bool btm_dev_authenticated(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec);
+static bool btm_dev_authenticated(const tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec);
static bool btm_dev_encrypted(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec);
static bool btm_dev_authorized(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec);
static bool btm_serv_trusted(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec,
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ static const bool btm_sec_io_map[BTM_IO_CAP_MAX][BTM_IO_CAP_MAX] = {
* Returns bool true or false
*
******************************************************************************/
-static bool btm_dev_authenticated(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec) {
+static bool btm_dev_authenticated(const tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec) {
if (p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_AUTHENTICATED) {
return (true);
}
@@ -220,6 +220,25 @@ static bool btm_serv_trusted(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec,
return (false);
}
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * Function access_secure_service_from_temp_bond
+ *
+ * Description a utility function to test whether an access to
+ * secure service from temp bonding is happening
+ *
+ * Returns true if the aforementioned condition holds,
+ * false otherwise
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static bool access_secure_service_from_temp_bond(const tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec,
+ bool locally_initiated,
+ uint16_t security_req) {
+ return !locally_initiated && (security_req & BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE) &&
+ btm_dev_authenticated(p_dev_rec) &&
+ p_dev_rec->bond_type == BOND_TYPE_TEMPORARY;
+}
+
/*******************************************************************************
*
* Function BTM_SecRegister
@@ -2271,9 +2290,13 @@ tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_l2cap_access_req(const RawAddress& bd_addr, uint16_t psm,
}
if (rc == BTM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (access_secure_service_from_temp_bond(p_dev_rec, is_originator, security_required)) {
+ LOG_ERROR(LOG_TAG, "Trying to access a secure service from a temp bonding, rejecting");
+ rc = BTM_FAILED_ON_SECURITY;
+ }
if (p_callback)
- (*p_callback)(&bd_addr, transport, (void*)p_ref_data, BTM_SUCCESS);
- return (BTM_SUCCESS);
+ (*p_callback)(&bd_addr, transport, (void*)p_ref_data, rc);
+ return (rc);
}
}
@@ -5486,6 +5509,13 @@ extern tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_execute_procedure(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec) {
}
}
+ if (access_secure_service_from_temp_bond(p_dev_rec,
+ p_dev_rec->is_originator,
+ p_dev_rec->security_required)) {
+ LOG_ERROR(LOG_TAG, "Trying to access a secure service from a temp bonding, rejecting");
+ return (BTM_FAILED_ON_SECURITY);
+ }
+
/* All required security procedures already established */
p_dev_rec->security_required &=
~(BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHORIZE | BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHORIZE |

37
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/377027.patch
View File

@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Sat, 2 Sep 2023 04:27:29 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Reject access to secure services authenticated from temp
bonding [2]
Reject access to service running on rfcomm
this is a backport of
I10fcc2dcd78fc22ffbe3c425669fc9889b94a166
Bug: 294854926
Test: m com.android.btservices
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:5e0e907ec4948f06b3a35ecf08725c020d533ccb)
Merged-In: I10fcc2dcd78fc22ffbe3c425669fc9889b94a166
Change-Id: I10fcc2dcd78fc22ffbe3c425669fc9889b94a166
---
stack/btm/btm_sec.cc | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
index 4da0320c5..93e8b7a60 100644
--- a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
+++ b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
@@ -2633,6 +2633,11 @@ tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_mx_access_request(const RawAddress& bd_addr, uint16_t psm,
mx_chan_id, p_callback, p_ref_data);
} else /* rc == BTM_SUCCESS */
{
+ if (access_secure_service_from_temp_bond(p_dev_rec,
+ is_originator, security_required)) {
+ LOG_ERROR(LOG_TAG, "Trying to access a secure rfcomm service from a temp bonding, reject");
+ rc = BTM_FAILED_ON_SECURITY;
+ }
/* access granted */
if (p_callback) {
(*p_callback)(&bd_addr, transport, p_ref_data, (uint8_t)rc);

47
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/377028.patch
View File

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hui Peng <phui@google.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2023 23:47:48 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Reject access to secure service authenticated from a temp
bonding [3]
Allow access to rfcomm PSM by default
Original bug
Bug: 294854926
Nearby regressions:
Bug: 298539299
Test: m com.android.btservices
Ignore-AOSP-First: security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:ab986fe4165aae74c5915f57ad2e78bf80f1d3ec)
Merged-In: If1f7c9278a9e877f64ae78b6f067c597fb5d0e66
Change-Id: If1f7c9278a9e877f64ae78b6f067c597fb5d0e66
---
stack/btm/btm_sec.cc | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
index 93e8b7a60..80f4d3031 100644
--- a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
+++ b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
@@ -2313,15 +2313,15 @@ tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_l2cap_access_req(const RawAddress& bd_addr, uint16_t psm,
btm_cb.security_mode == BTM_SEC_MODE_SC) {
if (BTM_SEC_IS_SM4(p_dev_rec->sm4)) {
if (is_originator) {
- /* SM4 to SM4 -> always authenticate & encrypt */
- security_required |= (BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHENTICATE | BTM_SEC_OUT_ENCRYPT);
+ /* SM4 to SM4 -> always encrypt */
+ security_required |= BTM_SEC_OUT_ENCRYPT;
} else /* acceptor */
{
/* SM4 to SM4: the acceptor needs to make sure the authentication is
* already done */
chk_acp_auth_done = true;
- /* SM4 to SM4 -> always authenticate & encrypt */
- security_required |= (BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE | BTM_SEC_IN_ENCRYPT);
+ /* SM4 to SM4 -> always encrypt */
+ security_required |= BTM_SEC_IN_ENCRYPT;
}
} else if (!(BTM_SM4_KNOWN & p_dev_rec->sm4)) {
/* the remote features are not known yet */

23
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/377029-fix.patch
View File

@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tad <tad@spotco.us>
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2023 13:42:41 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Fixup missing import
Signed-off-by: Tad <tad@spotco.us>
Change-Id: I52177ea7c37da977a133afa791e7319c7fb4843b
---
stack/Android.bp | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/stack/Android.bp b/stack/Android.bp
index 696cd6cd2..7bc03a2c2 100644
--- a/stack/Android.bp
+++ b/stack/Android.bp
@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ cc_library_static {
shared_libs: [
"libcutils",
"liblog",
+ "libcrypto",
],
required: [
"libldacBT_enc",

45
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/377029.patch
View File

@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Brian Delwiche <delwiche@google.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 21:27:49 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix timing attack in BTM_BleVerifySignature
BTM_BleVerifySignature uses a stock memcmp, allowing signature contents
to be deduced through a side-channel attack.
Change to CRYPTO_memcmp, which is hardened against this attack, to
eliminate this attack.
Bug: 274478807
Test: atest bluetooth_test_gd_unit
Tag: #security
Ignore-AOSP-First: Security
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:fcd1c44f7c4bf431dd6a6902d74c045174bd00ce)
Merged-In: I41a9b586d663d2ad4694222ae451d2d30a428a3c
Change-Id: I41a9b586d663d2ad4694222ae451d2d30a428a3c
Change-Id: Ib7f3fff9f40140978c4dfb2f20ca57127586a05a
---
stack/btm/btm_ble.cc | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/stack/btm/btm_ble.cc b/stack/btm/btm_ble.cc
index 7fd154d2d..56f4fa1cd 100644
--- a/stack/btm/btm_ble.cc
+++ b/stack/btm/btm_ble.cc
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
#include "hcimsgs.h"
#include "log/log.h"
#include "l2c_int.h"
+#include "openssl/mem.h"
#include "osi/include/log.h"
#include "osi/include/osi.h"
#include "stack/crypto_toolbox/crypto_toolbox.h"
@@ -2183,7 +2184,7 @@ bool BTM_BleVerifySignature(const RawAddress& bd_addr, uint8_t* p_orig,
crypto_toolbox::aes_cmac(p_rec->ble.keys.pcsrk, p_orig, len,
BTM_CMAC_TLEN_SIZE, p_mac);
- if (memcmp(p_mac, p_comp, BTM_CMAC_TLEN_SIZE) == 0) {
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p_mac, p_comp, BTM_CMAC_TLEN_SIZE) == 0) {
btm_ble_increment_sign_ctr(bd_addr, false);
verified = true;
}

30
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/377030.patch
View File

@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: balakrishna <quic_kunthumu@quicinc.com>
Date: Wed, 24 May 2023 13:28:21 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] Fix OOB Write in pin_reply in bluetooth.cc
Root cause:
if the length of "pin_code" is greater than 16,
an OOBW will be triggered due to a missing bounds check.
Fix:
Check is added to avoid Out of Bound Write.
CRs-Fixed: 3507292
Change-Id: I15a1eae59b17f633e29180a01676c260189b8353
---
btif/src/bluetooth.cc | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/btif/src/bluetooth.cc b/btif/src/bluetooth.cc
index 47667abd7..584d4c5db 100644
--- a/btif/src/bluetooth.cc
+++ b/btif/src/bluetooth.cc
@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ static int pin_reply(const RawAddress* bd_addr, uint8_t accept, uint8_t pin_len,
bt_pin_code_t tmp_pin_code;
/* sanity check */
if (interface_ready() == false) return BT_STATUS_NOT_READY;
+ if (pin_code == nullptr || pin_len > PIN_CODE_LEN) return BT_STATUS_FAIL;
memcpy(&tmp_pin_code, pin_code, pin_len);
return btif_dm_pin_reply(bd_addr, accept, pin_len, &tmp_pin_code);

35
Patches/LineageOS-17.1/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/377031.patch
View File

@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: balakrishna <quic_kunthumu@quicinc.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 16:53:46 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] BT: Fixing the rfc_slot_id overflow
Root cause:
overflow causing leak in slot fds.
As slot id 0 not valid, we are not able to release these fds later.
Fix:
Changes are made to avoid overflow while allocate rfc slots.
CRs-Fixed: 3417458
Change-Id: I5d7efa34bfb97a6dd8e9d68615d29120a0ae51f0
---
btif/src/btif_sock_rfc.cc | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/btif/src/btif_sock_rfc.cc b/btif/src/btif_sock_rfc.cc
index c2a0bc868..bfe549eb7 100644
--- a/btif/src/btif_sock_rfc.cc
+++ b/btif/src/btif_sock_rfc.cc
@@ -215,7 +215,11 @@ static rfc_slot_t* alloc_rfc_slot(const RawAddress* addr, const char* name,
}
// Increment slot id and make sure we don't use id=0.
- if (++rfc_slot_id == 0) rfc_slot_id = 1;
+ if (UINT32_MAX == rfc_slot_id) {
+ rfc_slot_id = 1;
+ } else {
+ ++rfc_slot_id;
+ }
slot->fd = fds[0];
slot->app_fd = fds[1];

23
Patches/LineageOS-18.1/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/377029-fix.patch
View File

@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tad <tad@spotco.us>
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2023 13:42:41 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Fixup missing import
Signed-off-by: Tad <tad@spotco.us>
Change-Id: I52177ea7c37da977a133afa791e7319c7fb4843b
---
stack/Android.bp | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/stack/Android.bp b/stack/Android.bp
index b4a9d414c..be60b8ae7 100644
--- a/stack/Android.bp
+++ b/stack/Android.bp
@@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ cc_library_static {
shared_libs: [
"libcutils",
"liblog",
+ "libcrypto",
],
required: [
"libldacBT_enc",

1
Scripts/LineageOS-14.1/Patch.sh
View File

@ -242,6 +242,7 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/373034.patch"; #n-asb-2023-11 U
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/376458.patch"; #n-asb-2023-12 Drop invalid data.
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/376459.patch"; #n-asb-2023-12 Validate userId when publishing shortcuts
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/376460.patch"; #n-asb-2023-12 Adding in verification of calling UID in onShellCommand
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/377939.patch"; #n-asb-2023-12 Require permission to unlock keyguard
git revert --no-edit 0326bb5e41219cf502727c3aa44ebf2daa19a5b3; #Re-enable doze on devices without gms
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/248599.patch"; #Make SET_TIME_ZONE permission match SET_TIME (AOSP)
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0001-Reduced_Resolution.patch"; #Allow reducing resolution to save power TODO: Add 800x480 (DivestOS)

1
Scripts/LineageOS-16.0/Functions.sh
View File

@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ patchWorkspaceReal() {
repopick -fit P_asb_2023-09;
repopick -fit P_asb_2023-10 -e 370704;
repopick -fit P_asb_2023-11 -e 374916;
repopick -fit P_asb_2023-12;
sh "$DOS_SCRIPTS/Patch.sh";
sh "$DOS_SCRIPTS_COMMON/Enable_Verity.sh";

20
Scripts/LineageOS-16.0/Patch.sh
View File

@ -165,14 +165,6 @@ if [ "$DOS_GRAPHENE_MALLOC" = true ]; then applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_fram
fi;
if enterAndClear "frameworks/base"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/377001-backport.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Visit Uris added by WearableExtender
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/377002.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Fix bypass BAL via `requestGeofence`
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/377004-backport.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Drop invalid data.
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/377008.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Use readUniqueFileDescriptor in incidentd service #FIXME
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/377009.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Validate userId when publishing shortcuts
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/377010-backport.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Revert "On device lockdown, always show the keyguard"
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/377011.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Adding in verification of calling UID in onShellCommand
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/377012-backport.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Updated: always show the keyguard on device lockdown
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0007-Always_Restict_Serial.patch"; #Always restrict access to Build.SERIAL (GrapheneOS)
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0008-Browser_No_Location.patch"; #Don't grant location permission to system browsers (GrapheneOS)
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0009-SystemUI_No_Permission_Review.patch"; #Allow SystemUI to directly manage Bluetooth/WiFi (GrapheneOS)
@ -282,7 +274,6 @@ if [ "$DOS_DEBLOBBER_REMOVE_AUDIOFX" = true ]; then awk -i inplace '!/LineageAud
fi;
if enterAndClear "packages/apps/Bluetooth"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Bluetooth/377014-backport.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Fix UAF in ~CallbackEnv
if [ "$DOS_GRAPHENE_CONSTIFY" = true ]; then applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Bluetooth/0001-constify_JNINativeMethod.patch"; fi; #Constify JNINativeMethod tables (GrapheneOS)
fi;
@ -342,7 +333,6 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_SetupWizard/0001-Remove_Analytics
fi;
if enterAndClear "packages/apps/Trebuchet"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Trebuchet/377015.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Fix permission bypass in legacy shortcut
cp $DOS_BUILD_BASE/vendor/divested/overlay/common/packages/apps/Trebuchet/res/xml/default_workspace_*.xml res/xml/; #XXX: Likely no longer needed
fi;
@ -366,10 +356,6 @@ fi;
#cp $DOS_PATCHES_COMMON/android_packages_providers_TelephonyProvider/carrier_list.* assets/;
#fi;
if enterAndClear "packages/services/Telecomm"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_services_Telecomm/377016-backport.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Resolve account image icon profile boundary exploit.
fi;
if enterAndClear "packages/services/Telephony"; then
git revert --no-edit 99564aaf0417c9ddf7d6aeb10d326e5b24fa8f55;
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_services_Telephony/0001-PREREQ_Handle_All_Modes.patch"; #(DivestOS)
@ -377,12 +363,6 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_services_Telephony/0002-More_Preferred
fi;
if enterAndClear "system/bt"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/377017.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Reject access to secure service authenticated from a temp bonding [1]
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/377018.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Reject access to secure services authenticated from temp bonding [2]
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/377019.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Reject access to secure service authenticated from a temp bonding [3]
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/377020.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Reorganize the code for checking auth requirement
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/377021.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Enforce authentication if encryption is required
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/377023-backport.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Fix timing attack in BTM_BleVerifySignature
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/377030.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Fix OOB Write in pin_reply in bluetooth.cc
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/377031-backport.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 BT: Fixing the rfc_slot_id overflow
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES_COMMON/android_system_bt/0001-alloc_size.patch"; #Add alloc_size attributes to the allocator (GrapheneOS)

1
Scripts/LineageOS-17.1/Functions.sh
View File

@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ patchWorkspaceReal() {
repopick -fit Q_asb_2023-09;
repopick -fit Q_asb_2023-10 -e 376554;
repopick -fit Q_asb_2023-11 -e 376568;
repopick -fit Q_asb_2023-12 -e 377251;
sh "$DOS_SCRIPTS/Patch.sh";
sh "$DOS_SCRIPTS_COMMON/Enable_Verity.sh";

51
Scripts/LineageOS-17.1/Patch.sh
View File

@ -98,7 +98,6 @@ sed -i '75i$(my_res_package): PRIVATE_AAPT_FLAGS += --auto-add-overlay' core/aap
awk -i inplace '!/updatable_apex.mk/' target/product/mainline_system.mk; #Disable APEX
sed -i 's/PLATFORM_MIN_SUPPORTED_TARGET_SDK_VERSION := 23/PLATFORM_MIN_SUPPORTED_TARGET_SDK_VERSION := 28/' core/version_defaults.mk; #Set the minimum supported target SDK to Pie (GrapheneOS)
#sed -i 's/PRODUCT_OTA_ENFORCE_VINTF_KERNEL_REQUIREMENTS := true/PRODUCT_OTA_ENFORCE_VINTF_KERNEL_REQUIREMENTS := false/' core/product_config.mk; #broken by hardenDefconfig
sed -i 's/2023-11-05/2023-12-05/' core/version_defaults.mk; #Bump Security String #Q_asb_2023-12 #XXX
fi;
if enterAndClear "build/soong"; then
@ -139,6 +138,15 @@ if enterAndClear "external/libxml2"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_libxml2/368053.patch"; #R_asb_2023-10 malloc-fail: Fix OOB read after xmlRegGetCounter
fi;
if enterAndClear "external/pdfium"; then
git fetch https://github.com/LineageOS/android_external_pdfium refs/changes/83/378083/1 && git cherry-pick FETCH_HEAD; #Q_asb_2023-12
git fetch https://github.com/LineageOS/android_external_pdfium refs/changes/84/378084/1 && git cherry-pick FETCH_HEAD;
git fetch https://github.com/LineageOS/android_external_pdfium refs/changes/85/378085/1 && git cherry-pick FETCH_HEAD;
git fetch https://github.com/LineageOS/android_external_pdfium refs/changes/86/378086/1 && git cherry-pick FETCH_HEAD;
git fetch https://github.com/LineageOS/android_external_pdfium refs/changes/87/378087/1 && git cherry-pick FETCH_HEAD;
git fetch https://github.com/LineageOS/android_external_pdfium refs/changes/88/378088/1 && git cherry-pick FETCH_HEAD;
fi;
if enterAndClear "external/svox"; then
git revert --no-edit 1419d63b4889a26d22443fd8df1f9073bf229d3d; #Add back Makefiles
sed -i '12iLOCAL_SDK_VERSION := current' pico/Android.mk; #Fix build under Pie
@ -150,21 +158,7 @@ if enterAndClear "external/zlib"; then
git fetch https://github.com/LineageOS/android_external_zlib refs/changes/70/352570/1 && git cherry-pick FETCH_HEAD; #Q_asb_2023-03
fi;
if enterAndClear "frameworks/av"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_av/376999-backport.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 httplive: fix use-after-free
fi;
if enterAndClear "frameworks/base"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/377001.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Visit Uris added by WearableExtender
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/377002.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Fix bypass BAL via `requestGeofence`
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/377004-backport.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Drop invalid data.
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/377006.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Require permission to unlock keyguard
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/377008.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Use readUniqueFileDescriptor in incidentd service
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/377009.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Validate userId when publishing shortcuts
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/377010.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Revert "On device lockdown, always show the keyguard"
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/377011.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Adding in verification of calling UID in onShellCommand
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/377012.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Updated: always show the keyguard on device lockdown
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/377013-backport.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Check URI permissions for resumable media artwork #XXX
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/272645.patch"; #ten-bt-sbc-hd-dualchannel: Add CHANNEL_MODE_DUAL_CHANNEL constant (ValdikSS)
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/272646-forwardport.patch"; #ten-bt-sbc-hd-dualchannel: Add Dual Channel into Bluetooth Audio Channel Mode developer options menu (ValdikSS)
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/272647.patch"; #ten-bt-sbc-hd-dualchannel: Allow SBC as HD audio codec in Bluetooth device configuration (ValdikSS)
@ -295,7 +289,6 @@ if [ "$DOS_DEBLOBBER_REMOVE_AUDIOFX" = true ]; then awk -i inplace '!/LineageAud
fi;
if enterAndClear "packages/apps/Bluetooth"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Bluetooth/377014-backport.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Fix UAF in ~CallbackEnv
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Bluetooth/272652.patch"; #ten-bt-sbc-hd-dualchannel: SBC Dual Channel (SBC HD Audio) support (ValdikSS)
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Bluetooth/272653.patch"; #ten-bt-sbc-hd-dualchannel: Assume optional codecs are supported if were supported previously (ValdikSS)
if [ "$DOS_GRAPHENE_CONSTIFY" = true ]; then applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Bluetooth/0001-constify_JNINativeMethod.patch"; fi; #Constify JNINativeMethod tables (GrapheneOS)
@ -368,7 +361,6 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_SetupWizard/0001-Remove_Analytics
fi;
if enterAndClear "packages/apps/Trebuchet"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_apps_Trebuchet/377015.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Fix permission bypass in legacy shortcut
cp $DOS_BUILD_BASE/vendor/divested/overlay/common/packages/apps/Trebuchet/res/xml/default_workspace_*.xml res/xml/; #XXX: Likely no longer needed
fi;
@ -396,21 +388,11 @@ fi;
#cp $DOS_PATCHES_COMMON/android_packages_providers_TelephonyProvider/carrier_list.* assets/;
#fi;
if enterAndClear "packages/services/Telecomm"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_packages_services_Telecomm/377016-backport.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Resolve account image icon profile boundary exploit.
fi;
if enterAndClear "prebuilts/abi-dumps/vndk"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_prebuilts_abi-dumps_vndk/0001-protobuf-avi.patch"; #Work around ABI changes from compiler hardening (GrapheneOS)
fi;
if enterAndClear "system/bt"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/377017.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Reject access to secure service authenticated from a temp bonding [1]
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/377018.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Reject access to secure services authenticated from temp bonding [2]
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/377019.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Reject access to secure service authenticated from a temp bonding [3]
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/377020.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Reorganize the code for checking auth requirement
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/377021.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Enforce authentication if encryption is required
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/377023-backport.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Fix timing attack in BTM_BleVerifySignature
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES_COMMON/android_system_bt/0001-alloc_size.patch"; #Add alloc_size attributes to the allocator (GrapheneOS)
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/272648.patch"; #ten-bt-sbc-hd-dualchannel: Increase maximum Bluetooth SBC codec bitrate for SBC HD (ValdikSS)
#applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/272649.patch"; #ten-bt-sbc-hd-dualchannel: Explicit SBC Dual Channel (SBC HD) support (ValdikSS)
@ -437,7 +419,6 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_extras/0001-ext4_pad_filenames.patch"; #
fi;
if enterAndClear "system/netd"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_netd/377024-backport.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Fix Heap-use-after-free in MDnsSdListener::Monitor::run
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_netd/0001-Network_Permission.patch"; #Expose the NETWORK permission (GrapheneOS)
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_netd/0002-hosts_toggle.patch"; #Add a toggle to disable /etc/hosts lookup (DivestOS)
fi;
@ -489,20 +470,6 @@ if enter "vendor/divested"; then
echo "PRODUCT_PACKAGES += vendor.lineage.trust@1.0-service" >> packages.mk; #Add deny usb service, all of our kernels have the necessary patch
awk -i inplace '!/speed-profile/' build/target/product/lowram.mk; #breaks compile on some dexpreopt devices
fi;
if enterAndClear "vendor/qcom/opensource/commonsys/system/bt"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/377026.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Reject access to secure service authenticated from a temp bonding [1]
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/377027.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Reject access to secure services authenticated from temp bonding [2]
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/377028.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Reject access to secure service authenticated from a temp bonding [3]
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/377029.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Fix timing attack in BTM_BleVerifySignature
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/377029-fix.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Fix missing import
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/377030.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Fix OOB Write in pin_reply in bluetooth.cc
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/377031.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 BT: Fixing the rfc_slot_id overflow
fi;
if enterAndClear "vendor/qcom/opensource/commonsys/packages/apps/Bluetooth"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_packages_apps_Bluetooth/377025.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Fix UAF in ~CallbackEnv
fi;
#
#END OF ROM CHANGES
#

1
Scripts/LineageOS-18.1/Functions.sh
View File

@ -123,7 +123,6 @@ patchWorkspaceReal() {
repopick -fit msm8974-gps-r;
repopick -fit hh-vsync;
repopick -fi 311299; #ble: Workaround malformed HCI_BLE_VENDOR_CAP response
repopick -it R_asb_2023-12;
sh "$DOS_SCRIPTS/Patch.sh";
sh "$DOS_SCRIPTS_COMMON/Enable_Verity.sh";

12
Scripts/LineageOS-18.1/Patch.sh
View File

@ -103,10 +103,6 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_build_soong/0001-Enable_fwrapv.patch"; #Use -fw
if [ "$DOS_GRAPHENE_MALLOC" = true ]; then applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_build_soong/0002-hm_apex.patch"; fi; #(GrapheneOS)
fi;
if enterAndClear "cts"; then
git fetch https://github.com/LineageOS/android_cts refs/changes/97/376997/1 && git cherry-pick FETCH_HEAD; #R_asb_2023-12
fi;
if enterAndClear "device/qcom/sepolicy-legacy"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_device_qcom_sepolicy-legacy/0001-Camera_Fix.patch"; #Fix camera on -user builds XXX: REMOVE THIS TRASH (DivestOS)
echo "SELINUX_IGNORE_NEVERALLOWS := true" >> sepolicy.mk; #Ignore neverallow violations XXX: necessary for -user builds of legacy devices
@ -127,10 +123,6 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_hardened_malloc/0001-Broken_Cameras.pa
fi;
fi;
if enterAndClear "external/pdfium"; then
git fetch https://github.com/LineageOS/android_external_pdfium refs/changes/98/376998/1 && git cherry-pick FETCH_HEAD; #R_asb_2023-12
fi;
if enterAndClear "frameworks/base"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0007-Always_Restict_Serial.patch"; #Always restrict access to Build.SERIAL (GrapheneOS)
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_frameworks_base/0008-Browser_No_Location.patch"; #Don't grant location permission to system browsers (GrapheneOS)
@ -466,10 +458,6 @@ echo "PRODUCT_PACKAGES += vendor.lineage.trust@1.0-service" >> packages.mk; #Add
echo "PRODUCT_PACKAGES += eSpeakNG" >> packages.mk; #PicoTTS needs work to compile on 18.1, use eSpeak-NG instead
awk -i inplace '!/speed-profile/' build/target/product/lowram.mk; #breaks compile on some dexpreopt devices
fi;
if enterAndClear "vendor/qcom/opensource/commonsys/system/bt"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_vendor_qcom_opensource_system_bt/377029-fix.patch"; #R_asb_2023-12 Fix missing import
fi;
#
#END OF ROM CHANGES
#

3
Scripts/LineageOS-19.1/Functions.sh
View File

@ -66,10 +66,9 @@ patchWorkspaceReal() {
verifyAllPlatformTags;
gpgVerifyGitHead "$DOS_BUILD_BASE/external/chromium-webview";
source build/envsetup.sh;
#source build/envsetup.sh;
#repopick -ift twelve-bt-sbc-hd-dualchannel;
#repopick -it twelve-colors;
repopick -it S_asb_2023-12;
sh "$DOS_SCRIPTS/Patch.sh";
sh "$DOS_SCRIPTS_COMMON/Enable_Verity.sh";

9
Scripts/LineageOS-19.1/Patch.sh
View File

@ -105,10 +105,6 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_build_soong/0001-Enable_fwrapv.patch"; #Use -fw
if [ "$DOS_GRAPHENE_MALLOC" = true ]; then applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_build_soong/0002-hm_apex.patch"; fi; #(GrapheneOS)
fi;
if enterAndClear "cts"; then
git fetch https://github.com/LineageOS/android_cts refs/changes/75/376775/1 && git cherry-pick FETCH_HEAD; #S_asb_2023-12
fi;
if enterAndClear "external/chromium-webview"; then
if [ "$(type -t DOS_WEBVIEW_CHERRYPICK)" = "alias" ] ; then DOS_WEBVIEW_CHERRYPICK; fi; #Update the WebView to latest if available
if [ "$DOS_WEBVIEW_LFS" = true ]; then git lfs pull; fi; #Ensure the objects are available
@ -125,10 +121,6 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_hardened_malloc/0001-Broken_Cameras-2.
fi;
fi;
if enterAndClear "external/pdfium"; then
git fetch https://github.com/LineageOS/android_external_pdfium refs/changes/76/376776/1 && git cherry-pick FETCH_HEAD; #S_asb_2023-12
fi;
if enterAndClear "external/SecureCamera"; then
sed -i '/LOCAL_MODULE/s/Camera/SecureCamera/' Android.mk; #Change module name
sed -i '11iLOCAL_OVERRIDES_PACKAGES := Camera Camera2 LegacyCamera Snap OpenCamera' Android.mk; #Replace the others
@ -416,7 +408,6 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_extras/0001-ext4_pad_filenames.patch"; #
fi;
if enterAndClear "system/netd"; then
git fetch https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_netd refs/changes/09/376809/1 && git cherry-pick FETCH_HEAD; #S_asb_2023-12
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_netd/0001-Network_Permission.patch"; #Expose the NETWORK permission (GrapheneOS)
fi;