15.1: October 2022 ASB picks

Signed-off-by: Tad <tad@spotco.us>
This commit is contained in:
Tad 2022-10-19 16:07:57 -04:00
parent 6b07bc77a5
commit 006f128fc5
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: B286E9F57A07424B
3 changed files with 193 additions and 0 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
From d8ff0456cbe3b32b5f71dd0740f9a6cca6de27b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 17:52:50 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] FROMGIT: libfdt: fdt_offset_ptr(): Fix comparison warnings
With -Wsign-compare, compilers warn about mismatching signedness in
comparisons in fdt_offset_ptr().
This mostly stems from "offset" being passed in as a signed integer,
even though the function would not really tolerate negative values.
Short of changing the prototype, check that offset is not negative, and
use an unsigned type internally.
Bug: 230794395
Test: manual - see bug
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Message-Id: <20200921165303.9115-2-andre.przywara@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Change-Id: I33c4ac27780d6bdd46c5504a839c0827c9c76bfc
Merged-In: Idb30ae90e2b263d1dd2e931ef1d3662a23812120
Merged-In: Ice02ecc84d6e9ab30773d039a54664b259979521
(cherry picked from commit 35c4c2b27acf66c217865451eeecf09bc82dae66)
Merged-In: I33c4ac27780d6bdd46c5504a839c0827c9c76bfc
---
libfdt/fdt.c | 10 +++++++---
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/libfdt/fdt.c b/libfdt/fdt.c
index 22286a1..5baaed3 100644
--- a/libfdt/fdt.c
+++ b/libfdt/fdt.c
@@ -76,15 +76,19 @@ int fdt_check_header(const void *fdt)
const void *fdt_offset_ptr(const void *fdt, int offset, unsigned int len)
{
- unsigned absoffset = offset + fdt_off_dt_struct(fdt);
+ unsigned int uoffset = offset;
+ unsigned int absoffset = offset + fdt_off_dt_struct(fdt);
- if ((absoffset < offset)
+ if (offset < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if ((absoffset < uoffset)
|| ((absoffset + len) < absoffset)
|| (absoffset + len) > fdt_totalsize(fdt))
return NULL;
if (fdt_version(fdt) >= 0x11)
- if (((offset + len) < offset)
+ if (((uoffset + len) < uoffset)
|| ((offset + len) > fdt_size_dt_struct(fdt)))
return NULL;

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@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
From 024bd7b32e3298ceaf70443e9224aff56cf8de4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ted Wang <tedwang@google.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2022 11:22:34 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] Fix potential interger overflow when parsing vendor response
Add check for str_len to prevent potential OOB read in vendor response.
Bug: 205570663
Tag: #security
Test: net_test_stack:StackAvrcpTest
Ignore-AOSP-First: Security
Change-Id: Iea2c3e17c2c8cc56468c4456822e1c4c5c15f5bc
Merged-In: Iea2c3e17c2c8cc56468c4456822e1c4c5c15f5bc
(cherry picked from commit 96ef1fc9cbe38f1224b4e4a2dca3ecfb44a6aece)
Merged-In: Iea2c3e17c2c8cc56468c4456822e1c4c5c15f5bc
---
stack/avrc/avrc_pars_ct.cc | 19 ++++++++++---
stack/test/stack_avrcp_test.cc | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/stack/avrc/avrc_pars_ct.cc b/stack/avrc/avrc_pars_ct.cc
index 1ab5479139..3ea798f38d 100644
--- a/stack/avrc/avrc_pars_ct.cc
+++ b/stack/avrc/avrc_pars_ct.cc
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static tAVRC_STS avrc_pars_browse_rsp(tAVRC_MSG_BROWSE* p_msg,
}
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT8(pdu, p);
uint16_t pkt_len;
- int min_len = 0;
+ uint16_t min_len = 0;
/* read the entire packet len */
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(pkt_len, p);
@@ -371,8 +371,14 @@ static tAVRC_STS avrc_pars_browse_rsp(tAVRC_MSG_BROWSE* p_msg,
/* Parse the name now */
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(attr_entry->name.charset_id, p);
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(attr_entry->name.str_len, p);
+ if (static_cast<uint16_t>(min_len + attr_entry->name.str_len) <
+ min_len) {
+ // Check for overflow
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "205570663");
+ }
+ if (pkt_len - min_len < attr_entry->name.str_len)
+ goto browse_length_error;
min_len += attr_entry->name.str_len;
- if (pkt_len < min_len) goto browse_length_error;
attr_entry->name.p_str = (uint8_t*)osi_malloc(
attr_entry->name.str_len * sizeof(uint8_t));
BE_STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p, attr_entry->name.p_str,
@@ -775,8 +781,12 @@ static tAVRC_STS avrc_ctrl_pars_vendor_rsp(tAVRC_MSG_VENDOR* p_msg,
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT32(p_attrs[i].attr_id, p);
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(p_attrs[i].name.charset_id, p);
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(p_attrs[i].name.str_len, p);
- min_len += p_attrs[i].name.str_len;
- if (len < min_len) {
+ if (static_cast<uint16_t>(min_len + p_attrs[i].name.str_len) <
+ min_len) {
+ // Check for overflow
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "205570663");
+ }
+ if (len - min_len < p_attrs[i].name.str_len) {
for (int j = 0; j < i; j++) {
osi_free(p_attrs[j].name.p_str);
}
@@ -784,6 +794,7 @@ static tAVRC_STS avrc_ctrl_pars_vendor_rsp(tAVRC_MSG_VENDOR* p_msg,
p_result->get_attrs.num_attrs = 0;
goto length_error;
}
+ min_len += p_attrs[i].name.str_len;
if (p_attrs[i].name.str_len > 0) {
p_attrs[i].name.p_str =
(uint8_t*)osi_calloc(p_attrs[i].name.str_len);
diff --git a/stack/test/stack_avrcp_test.cc b/stack/test/stack_avrcp_test.cc
index d3a51658db..bca30cd1c9 100644
--- a/stack/test/stack_avrcp_test.cc
+++ b/stack/test/stack_avrcp_test.cc
@@ -27,6 +27,56 @@ class StackAvrcpTest : public ::testing::Test {
virtual ~StackAvrcpTest() = default;
};
+TEST_F(StackAvrcpTest, test_avrcp_ctrl_parse_vendor_rsp) {
+ uint8_t scratch_buf[512]{};
+ uint16_t scratch_buf_len = 512;
+ tAVRC_MSG msg{};
+ tAVRC_RESPONSE result{};
+ uint8_t vendor_rsp_buf[512]{};
+
+ msg.hdr.opcode = AVRC_OP_VENDOR;
+ msg.hdr.ctype = AVRC_CMD_STATUS;
+
+ memset(vendor_rsp_buf, 0, sizeof(vendor_rsp_buf));
+ vendor_rsp_buf[0] = AVRC_PDU_GET_ELEMENT_ATTR;
+ uint8_t* p = &vendor_rsp_buf[2];
+ UINT16_TO_BE_STREAM(p, 0x0009); // parameter length
+ UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, 0x01); // number of attributes
+ UINT32_TO_STREAM(p, 0x00000000); // attribute ID
+ UINT16_TO_STREAM(p, 0x0000); // character set ID
+ UINT16_TO_STREAM(p, 0xffff); // attribute value length
+ msg.vendor.p_vendor_data = vendor_rsp_buf;
+ msg.vendor.vendor_len = 13;
+ EXPECT_EQ(
+ AVRC_Ctrl_ParsResponse(&msg, &result, scratch_buf, &scratch_buf_len),
+ AVRC_STS_INTERNAL_ERR);
+}
+
+TEST_F(StackAvrcpTest, test_avrcp_parse_browse_rsp) {
+ uint8_t scratch_buf[512]{};
+ uint16_t scratch_buf_len = 512;
+ tAVRC_MSG msg{};
+ tAVRC_RESPONSE result{};
+ uint8_t browse_rsp_buf[512]{};
+
+ msg.hdr.opcode = AVRC_OP_BROWSE;
+
+ memset(browse_rsp_buf, 0, sizeof(browse_rsp_buf));
+ browse_rsp_buf[0] = AVRC_PDU_GET_ITEM_ATTRIBUTES;
+ uint8_t* p = &browse_rsp_buf[1];
+ UINT16_TO_BE_STREAM(p, 0x000a); // parameter length;
+ UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, 0x04); // status
+ UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, 0x01); // number of attribute
+ UINT32_TO_STREAM(p, 0x00000000); // attribute ID
+ UINT16_TO_STREAM(p, 0x0000); // character set ID
+ UINT16_TO_STREAM(p, 0xffff); // attribute value length
+ msg.browse.p_browse_data = browse_rsp_buf;
+ msg.browse.browse_len = 13;
+ EXPECT_EQ(
+ AVRC_Ctrl_ParsResponse(&msg, &result, scratch_buf, &scratch_buf_len),
+ AVRC_STS_BAD_CMD);
+}
+
TEST_F(StackAvrcpTest, test_avrcp_parse_browse_cmd) {
uint8_t scratch_buf[512]{};
tAVRC_MSG msg{};

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@ -95,6 +95,10 @@ if [ "$(type -t DOS_WEBVIEW_CHERRYPICK)" = "alias" ] ; then DOS_WEBVIEW_CHERRYPI
if [ "$DOS_WEBVIEW_LFS" = true ]; then git lfs pull; fi; #Ensure the objects are available if [ "$DOS_WEBVIEW_LFS" = true ]; then git lfs pull; fi; #Ensure the objects are available
fi; fi;
if enterAndClear "external/dtc"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_dtc/342096.patch"; #P_asb_2022-10 libfdt: fdt_offset_ptr(): Fix comparison warnings
fi;
if enterAndClear "external/expat"; then if enterAndClear "external/expat"; then
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_expat/337987.patch"; #Q_asb_2022-09 Prevent XML_GetBuffer signed integer overflow applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_expat/337987.patch"; #Q_asb_2022-09 Prevent XML_GetBuffer signed integer overflow
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_expat/337988-backport.patch"; #n-asb-2022-09 Prevent integer overflow in function doProlog applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_external_expat/337988-backport.patch"; #n-asb-2022-09 Prevent integer overflow in function doProlog
@ -314,6 +318,7 @@ applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/335109.patch"; #P_asb_2022-08 Removin
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/337995-backport.patch"; #Q_asb_2022-09 Fix OOB in bnep_is_packet_allowed applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/337995-backport.patch"; #Q_asb_2022-09 Fix OOB in bnep_is_packet_allowed
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/337996.patch"; #Q_asb_2022-09 Fix OOB in BNEP_Write applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/337996.patch"; #Q_asb_2022-09 Fix OOB in BNEP_Write
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/337997.patch"; #Q_asb_2022-09 Fix OOB in reassemble_and_dispatch applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/337997.patch"; #Q_asb_2022-09 Fix OOB in reassemble_and_dispatch
applyPatch "$DOS_PATCHES/android_system_bt/342097.patch"; #P_asb_2022-10 Fix potential interger overflow when parsing vendor response
fi; fi;
if enterAndClear "system/core"; then if enterAndClear "system/core"; then