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https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build.git
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235 lines
8.6 KiB
Diff
235 lines
8.6 KiB
Diff
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From 54d83fc74aa9ec72794373cb47432c5f7fb1a309 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
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Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2016 18:02:52 +0100
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Subject: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
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Ben Hawkes says:
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In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
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is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
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next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
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counter value at the supplied offset.
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Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
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the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
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an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
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However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
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It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
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However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
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(no -m args).
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The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
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passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
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mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
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proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
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Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
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Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
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Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
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Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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---
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net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 18 +++++++++---------
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net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 23 +++++++++++------------
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net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 23 +++++++++++------------
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3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
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index 51d4fe5..a1bb5e7 100644
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--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
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+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
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@@ -359,11 +359,12 @@ unsigned int arpt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
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}
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/* All zeroes == unconditional rule. */
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-static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_arp *arp)
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+static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_entry *e)
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{
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static const struct arpt_arp uncond;
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- return memcmp(arp, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
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+ return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct arpt_entry) &&
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+ memcmp(&e->arp, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
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}
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/* Figures out from what hook each rule can be called: returns 0 if
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@@ -402,11 +403,10 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
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|= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS));
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/* Unconditional return/END. */
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- if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct arpt_entry) &&
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+ if ((unconditional(e) &&
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(strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
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XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
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- t->verdict < 0 && unconditional(&e->arp)) ||
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- visited) {
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+ t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
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unsigned int oldpos, size;
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if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
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@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ static bool check_underflow(const struct arpt_entry *e)
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const struct xt_entry_target *t;
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unsigned int verdict;
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- if (!unconditional(&e->arp))
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+ if (!unconditional(e))
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return false;
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t = arpt_get_target_c(e);
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if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
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@@ -598,9 +598,9 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
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newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
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if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
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if (!check_underflow(e)) {
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- pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
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- "use the STANDARD target with "
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- "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
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+ pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
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+ "use the STANDARD target with "
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+ "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
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diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
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index fb7694e6..89b5d95 100644
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--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
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+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
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@@ -168,11 +168,12 @@ get_entry(const void *base, unsigned int offset)
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/* All zeroes == unconditional rule. */
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/* Mildly perf critical (only if packet tracing is on) */
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-static inline bool unconditional(const struct ipt_ip *ip)
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+static inline bool unconditional(const struct ipt_entry *e)
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{
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static const struct ipt_ip uncond;
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- return memcmp(ip, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
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+ return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
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+ memcmp(&e->ip, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
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#undef FWINV
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}
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@@ -229,11 +230,10 @@ get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ipt_entry *s, const struct ipt_entry *e,
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} else if (s == e) {
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(*rulenum)++;
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- if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
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+ if (unconditional(s) &&
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strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
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XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
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- t->verdict < 0 &&
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- unconditional(&s->ip)) {
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+ t->verdict < 0) {
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/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
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*comment = *chainname == hookname
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? comments[NF_IP_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
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@@ -476,11 +476,10 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
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e->comefrom |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS));
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/* Unconditional return/END. */
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- if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
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+ if ((unconditional(e) &&
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(strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
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XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
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- t->verdict < 0 && unconditional(&e->ip)) ||
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- visited) {
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+ t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
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unsigned int oldpos, size;
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if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
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@@ -715,7 +714,7 @@ static bool check_underflow(const struct ipt_entry *e)
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const struct xt_entry_target *t;
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unsigned int verdict;
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- if (!unconditional(&e->ip))
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+ if (!unconditional(e))
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return false;
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t = ipt_get_target_c(e);
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if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
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@@ -763,9 +762,9 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
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newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
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if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
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if (!check_underflow(e)) {
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- pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
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- "use the STANDARD target with "
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- "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
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+ pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
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+ "use the STANDARD target with "
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+ "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
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diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
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index b248528f..541b59f 100644
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--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
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+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
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@@ -198,11 +198,12 @@ get_entry(const void *base, unsigned int offset)
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/* All zeroes == unconditional rule. */
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/* Mildly perf critical (only if packet tracing is on) */
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-static inline bool unconditional(const struct ip6t_ip6 *ipv6)
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+static inline bool unconditional(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
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{
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static const struct ip6t_ip6 uncond;
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- return memcmp(ipv6, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
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+ return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) &&
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+ memcmp(&e->ipv6, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
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}
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static inline const struct xt_entry_target *
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@@ -258,11 +259,10 @@ get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ip6t_entry *s, const struct ip6t_entry *e,
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} else if (s == e) {
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(*rulenum)++;
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- if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) &&
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+ if (unconditional(s) &&
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strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
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XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
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- t->verdict < 0 &&
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- unconditional(&s->ipv6)) {
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+ t->verdict < 0) {
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/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
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*comment = *chainname == hookname
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? comments[NF_IP6_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
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@@ -488,11 +488,10 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
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e->comefrom |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS));
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/* Unconditional return/END. */
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- if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) &&
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+ if ((unconditional(e) &&
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(strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
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XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
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- t->verdict < 0 &&
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- unconditional(&e->ipv6)) || visited) {
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+ t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
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unsigned int oldpos, size;
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if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
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@@ -727,7 +726,7 @@ static bool check_underflow(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
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const struct xt_entry_target *t;
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unsigned int verdict;
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- if (!unconditional(&e->ipv6))
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+ if (!unconditional(e))
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return false;
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t = ip6t_get_target_c(e);
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if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
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@@ -775,9 +774,9 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
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newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
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if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
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if (!check_underflow(e)) {
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- pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
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- "use the STANDARD target with "
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- "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
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+ pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
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+ "use the STANDARD target with "
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+ "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
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--
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cgit v1.1
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