DivestOS/Patches/Linux_CVEs/CVE-2017-7308/ANY/0002.patch

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2017-11-07 17:32:46 -05:00
From 8f8d28e4d6d815a391285e121c3a53a0b6cb9e7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 16:11:21 +0200
Subject: net/packet: fix overflow in check for tp_frame_nr
When calculating rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr the result
can overflow.
Add a check that tp_block_size * tp_block_nr <= UINT_MAX.
Since frames_per_block <= tp_block_size, the expression would
never overflow.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 2323ee3..3ac286e 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -4205,6 +4205,8 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u,
rb->frames_per_block = req->tp_block_size / req->tp_frame_size;
if (unlikely(rb->frames_per_block == 0))
goto out;
+ if (unlikely(req->tp_block_size > UINT_MAX / req->tp_block_nr))
+ goto out;
if (unlikely((rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr) !=
req->tp_frame_nr))
goto out;
--
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