Incident :

Summary:
incident type:
Year started:
Countries: ,
Found via:
Date added:

Reference	Pub Date	Authors	Org	Archive

Technique	Description given for this incident
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0143.002 Fabricated Persona	IT00000268 “[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States. “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.” Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here. Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).
T0144.002 Persona Template	IT00000298 In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”. “A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.” This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template).

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97 KiB Raw Blame History

Incident :

97 KiB

Raw Blame History