# DISARM Counters:
disarm_id name summary metatechnique tactic responsetype
C00006 Charge for social media Include a paid-for privacy option, e.g. pay Facebook for an option of them not collecting your personal information. There are examples of this not working, e.g. most people don’t use proton mail etc. M004 - friction TA01 Strategic Planning D02
C00008 Create shared fact-checking database Share fact-checking resources - tips, responses, countermessages, across respose groups. M006 - scoring TA01 Strategic Planning D04
C00009 Educate high profile influencers on best practices Find online influencers. Provide training in the mechanisms of disinformation, how to spot campaigns, and/or how to contribute to responses by countermessaging, boosting information sites etc. M001 - resilience TA02 Objective Planning D02
C00010 Enhanced privacy regulation for social media Implement stronger privacy standards, to reduce the ability to microtarget community members. M004 - friction TA01 Strategic Planning D02
C00011 Media literacy. Games to identify fake news Create and use games to show people the mechanics of disinformation, and how to counter them. M001 - resilience TA02 Objective Planning D02
C00012 Platform regulation Empower existing regulators to govern social media. Also covers Destroy. Includes: Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media. The U.S. approach will need to be carefully crafted to protect First Amendment principles, create needed transparency, ensure liability, and impose costs for noncompliance. Includes Create policy that makes social media police disinformation. Includes: Use fraud legislation to clean up social media M007 - metatechnique TA01 Strategic Planning D02
C00013 Rating framework for news This is "strategic innoculation", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news. Example: journalistic ethics, or journalistic licensing body. Include full transcripts, link source, add items. M006 - scoring TA01 Strategic Planning D02
C00014 Real-time updates to fact-checking database Update fact-checking databases and resources in real time. Especially import for time-limited events like natural disasters. M006 - scoring TA06 Develop Content D04
C00016 Censorship Alter and/or block the publication/dissemination of information controlled by disinformation creators. Not recommended. M005 - removal TA01 Strategic Planning D02
C00017 Repair broken social connections For example, use a media campaign to promote in-group to out-group in person communication / activities . Technique could be in terms of forcing a reality-check by talking to people instead of reading about bogeymen. M010 - countermessaging TA01 Strategic Planning D03
C00019 Reduce effect of division-enablers includes Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers, and Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers M003 - daylight TA01 Strategic Planning D03
C00021 Encourage in-person communication Encourage offline communication M001 - resilience TA01 Strategic Planning D04
C00022 Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety Used to counter ability based and fear based attacks M001 - resilience TA01 Strategic Planning D04
C00024 Promote healthy narratives Includes promoting constructive narratives i.e. not polarising (e.g. pro-life, pro-choice, pro-USA). Includes promoting identity neutral narratives. M001 - resilience TA01 Strategic Planning D04
C00026 Shore up democracy based messages Messages about e.g. peace, freedom. And make it sexy. Includes Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft: Promote a narrative of transparency, truthfulness, liberal values, and democracy. Implement a compelling narrative via effective mechanisms of communication. Continually reassess messages, mechanisms, and audiences over time. Counteract efforts to manipulate media, undermine free markets, and suppress political freedoms via public diplomacy M010 - countermessaging TA01 Strategic Planning D04
C00027 Create culture of civility This is passive. Includes promoting civility as an identity that people will defend. M001 - resilience TA01 Strategic Planning D07
C00028 Make information provenance available Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments. Use blockchain technology to require collaborative validation before posts or comments are submitted. This could be used to adjust upvote weight via a trust factor of people and organisations you trust, or other criteria. M011 - verification TA02 Objective Planning D03
C00029 Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise Create websites in disinformation voids - spaces where people are looking for known disinformation. M002 - diversion TA02 Objective Planning D03
C00030 Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based) M002 - diversion TA02 Objective Planning D03
C00031 Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify Create competing narratives. Included "Facilitate State Propaganda" as diluting the narrative could have an effect on the pro-state narrative used by volunteers, or lower their involvement. M009 - dilution TA02 Objective Planning D03
C00032 Hijack content and link to truth- based info Link to platform M002 - diversion TA06 Develop Content D03
C00034 Create more friction at account creation Counters fake account M004 - friction TA03 Develop People D04
C00036 Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) All of these would be highly affected by infiltration or false-claims of infiltration. M013 - targeting TA03 Develop People D02
C00040 third party verification for people counters fake experts M011 - verification TA03 Develop People D02
C00042 Address truth contained in narratives Focus on and boost truths in misinformation narratives, removing misinformation from them. M010 - countermessaging TA03 Develop People D04
C00044 Keep people from posting to social media immediately Platforms can introduce friction to slow down activities, force a small delay between posts, or replies to posts. M004 - friction TA03 Develop People D03
C00046 Marginalise and discredit extremist groups Reduce the credibility of extremist groups posting misinformation. M013 - targeting TA03 Develop People D04
C00047 Honeypot with coordinated inauthentics Flood disinformation spaces with obviously fake content, to dilute core misinformation narratives in them. M008 - data pollution TA04 Develop Networks D05
C00048 Name and Shame Influencers Think about the different levels: individual vs state-sponsored account. Includes “call them out” and “name and shame”. Identify social media accounts as sources of propaganda—“calling them out”— might be helpful to prevent the spread of their message to audiences that otherwise would consider them factual. Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target externally-based nonattributed social media accounts. Impact of and Dealing with Trolls - "Chatham House has observed that trolls also sometimes function as decoys, as a way of “keeping the infantry busy” that “aims to wear down the other side” (Lough et al., 2014). Another type of troll involves “false accounts posing as authoritative information sources on social media”. M003 - daylight TA03 Develop People D07
C00051 Counter social engineering training Includes anti-elicitation training, phishing prevention education. M001 - resilience TA03 Develop People D02
C00052 Infiltrate platforms Detect and degrade M013 - targeting TA04 Develop Networks D04
C00053 Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts remove or remove access to (e.g. stop the ability to update) old social media accounts, to reduce the pool of accounts available for takeover, botnets etc. M012 - cleaning TA04 Develop Networks D04
C00056 Encourage people to leave social media Encourage people to leave spcial media. We don't expect this to work M004 - friction TA04 Develop Networks D02
C00058 Report crowdfunder as violator counters crowdfunding. Includes ‘Expose online funding as fake”. M005 - removal TA03 Develop People D02
C00059 Verification of project before posting fund requests third-party verification of projects posting funding campaigns before those campaigns can be posted. M011 - verification TA04 Develop Networks D02
C00060 Legal action against for-profit engagement factories Take legal action against for-profit "factories" creating misinformation. M013 - targeting TA02 Objective Planning D03
C00062 Free open library sources worldwide Open-source libraries could be created that aid in some way for each technique. Even for Strategic Planning, some open-source frameworks such as DISARM can be created to counter the adversarial efforts. M010 - countermessaging TA04 Develop Networks D04
C00065 Reduce political targeting Includes “ban political micro targeting” and “ban political ads” M005 - removal TA05 Microtargeting D03
C00066 Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back) Flood a disinformation-related hashtag with other content. M009 - dilution TA05 Microtargeting D03
C00067 Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding) Reduce the credibility of groups behind misinformation-linked funding campaigns. M013 - targeting TA03 Develop People D03
C00070 Block access to disinformation resources Resources = accounts, channels etc. Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. TA02*: DDOS at the critical time, to deny an adversary's time-bound objective. T0008: A quick response to a proto-viral story will affect it's ability to spread and raise questions about their legitimacy. Hashtag: Against the platform, by drowning the hashtag. T0046 - Search Engine Optimization: Sub-optimal website performance affect its search engine rank, which I interpret as "blocking access to a platform". M005 - removal TA02 Objective Planning D02
C00071 Block source of pollution Block websites, accounts, groups etc connected to misinformation and other information pollution. M005 - removal TA06 Develop Content D02
C00072 Remove non-relevant content from special interest groups - not recommended Check special-interest groups (e.g. medical, knitting) for unrelated and misinformation-linked content, and remove it. M005 - removal TA06 Develop Content D02
C00073 Inoculate populations through media literacy training Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations. Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution. Build cultural resistance to false content, e.g. cultural resistance to bullshit. Influence literacy training, to inoculate against “cult” recruiting. Media literacy training: leverage librarians / library for media literacy training. Inoculate at language. Strategic planning included as inoculating population has strategic value. Concepts of media literacy to a mass audience that authorities launch a public information campaign that teaches the program will take time to develop and establish impact, recommends curriculum-based training. Covers detect, deny, and degrade. M001 - resilience TA01 Strategic Planning D02
C00074 Identify and delete or rate limit identical content C00000 M012 - cleaning TA06 Develop Content D02
C00075 normalise language normalise the language around disinformation and misinformation; give people the words for artifact and effect types. M010 - countermessaging TA06 Develop Content D02
C00076 Prohibit images in political discourse channels Make political discussion channels text-only. M005 - removal TA06 Develop Content D02
C00077 Active defence: run TA03 "develop people” - not recommended Develop networks of communities and influencers around counter-misinformation. Match them to misinformation creators M013 - targeting TA03 Develop People D03
C00078 Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content Includes “change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists” and “Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite side” M002 - diversion TA06 Develop Content D03
C00080 Create competing narrative Create counternarratives, or narratives that compete in the same spaces as misinformation narratives. Could also be degrade M002 - diversion TA06 Develop Content D03
C00081 Highlight flooding and noise, and explain motivations Discredit by pointing out the "noise" and informing public that "flooding" is a technique of disinformation campaigns; point out intended objective of "noise" M003 - daylight TA06 Develop Content D03
C00082 Ground truthing as automated response to pollution Also inoculation. M010 - countermessaging TA06 Develop Content D03
C00084 Modify disinformation narratives, and rebroadcast them Includes “poison pill recasting of message” and “steal their truths”. Many techniques involve promotion which could be manipulated. For example, online fundings or rallies could be advertised, through compromised or fake channels, as being associated with "far-up/down/left/right" actors. "Long Game" narratives could be subjected in a similar way with negative connotations. Can also replay technique T0003. M002 - diversion TA06 Develop Content D03
C00085 Mute content Rate-limit disinformation content. Reduces its effects, whilst not running afoul of censorship concerns. Online archives of content (archives of websites, social media profiles, media, copies of published advertisements; or archives of comments attributed to bad actors, as well as anonymized metadata about users who interacted with them and analysis of the effect) is useful for intelligence analysis and public transparency, but will need similar muting or tagging/ shaming as associated with bad actors. M003 - daylight TA06 Develop Content D03
C00086 Distract from noise with addictive content Example: Interject addictive links or contents into discussions of disinformation materials and measure a "conversion rate" of users who engage with your content and away from the social media channel's "information bubble" around the disinformation item. Use bots to amplify and upvote the addictive content. M002 - diversion TA06 Develop Content D04
C00087 Make more noise than the disinformation M009 - dilution TA06 Develop Content D04
C00090 Fake engagement system Create honeypots for misinformation creators to engage with, and reduce the resources they have available for misinformation campaigns. M002 - diversion TA07 Channel Selection D05
C00091 Honeypot social community Set honeypots, e.g. communities, in networks likely to be used for disinformation. M002 - diversion TA06 Develop Content D05
C00092 Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers Includes "Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers” and “Reputation scores for social media users”. Influencers are individuals or accounts with many followers. M006 - scoring TA02 Objective Planning D07
C00093 Influencer code of conduct Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers. Can be platform code of conduct; can also be community code. M001 - resilience TA03 Develop People D07
C00094 Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research Accountability move: make sure research is published with its funding sources. M003 - daylight TA06 Develop Content D04
C00096 Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers Increase credibility, visibility, and reach of positive influencers in the information space. M006 - scoring TA01 Strategic Planning D07
C00097 Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment Reduce poll flooding by online taking comments or poll entries from verified accounts. M004 - friction TA07 Channel Selection D02
C00098 Revocation of allowlisted or "verified" status remove blue checkmarks etc from known misinformation accounts. M004 - friction TA07 Channel Selection D02
C00099 Strengthen verification methods Improve content veerification methods available to groups, individuals etc. M004 - friction TA07 Channel Selection D02
C00100 Hashtag jacking Post large volumes of unrelated content on known misinformation hashtags M002 - diversion TA08 Pump Priming D03
C00101 Create friction by rate-limiting engagement Create participant friction. Includes Make repeat voting hard, and throttle number of forwards. M004 - friction TA07 Channel Selection D04
C00103 Create a bot that engages / distract trolls This is reactive, not active measure (honeypots are active). It's a platform controlled measure. M002 - diversion TA07 Channel Selection D05
C00105 Buy more advertising than misinformation creators Shift influence and algorithms by posting more adverts into spaces than misinformation creators. M009 - dilution TA07 Channel Selection D03
C00106 Click-bait centrist content Create emotive centrist content that gets more clicks M002 - diversion TA06 Develop Content D03
C00107 Content moderation includes social media content take-downs, e.g. facebook or Twitter content take-downs M006 - scoring, M005 - removal TA06 Develop Content D02
C00109 Dampen Emotional Reaction Reduce emotional responses to misinformation through calming messages, etc. M001 - resilience TA09 Exposure D03
C00111 Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views M001 - resilience TA01 Strategic Planning D04
C00112 "Prove they are not an op!" Challenge misinformation creators to prove they're not an information operation. M004 - friction TA08 Pump Priming D02
C00113 Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials. Debunk fake experts, their credentials, and potentially also their audience quality M003 - daylight TA08 Pump Priming D02
C00114 Don't engage with payloads Stop passing on misinformation M004 - friction TA08 Pump Priming D02
C00115 Expose actor and intentions Debunk misinformation creators and posters. M003 - daylight TA08 Pump Priming D02
C00116 Provide proof of involvement Build and post information about groups etc's involvement in misinformation incidents. M003 - daylight TA08 Pump Priming D02
C00117 Downgrade / de-amplify so message is seen by fewer people Label promote counter to disinformation M010 - countermessaging TA08 Pump Priming D04
C00118 Repurpose images with new text Add countermessage text to iamges used in misinformation incidents. M010 - countermessaging TA08 Pump Priming D04
C00119 Engage payload and debunk. debunk misinformation content. Provide link to facts. M010 - countermessaging TA08 Pump Priming D07
C00120 Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes Redesign platforms and algorithms to reduce the effectiveness of disinformation M007 - metatechnique TA08 Pump Priming D07
C00121 Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow. Make algorithms in platforms explainable, and visible to people using those platforms. M001 - resilience TA08 Pump Priming D07
C00122 Content moderation Beware: content moderation misused becomes censorship. M004 - friction TA09 Exposure D02
C00123 Remove or rate limit botnets reduce the visibility of known botnets online. M004 - friction TA09 Exposure D03
C00124 Don't feed the trolls Don't engage with individuals relaying misinformation. M004 - friction TA09 Exposure D03
C00125 Prebunking Produce material in advance of misinformation incidents, by anticipating the narratives used in them, and debunking them. M001 - resilience TA09 Exposure D03
C00126 Social media amber alert Create an alert system around disinformation and misinformation artifacts, narratives, and incidents M003 - daylight TA09 Exposure D03
C00128 Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other "decelerants" Repost or comment on misinformation artifacts, using ridicule or other content to reduce the likelihood of reposting. M009 - dilution TA09 Exposure D03
C00129 Use banking to cut off access fiscal sanctions; parallel to counter terrorism M014 - reduce resources TA09 Exposure D02
C00130 Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously. Train local influencers in countering misinformation. M001 - resilience TA05 Microtargeting D07
C00131 Seize and analyse botnet servers Take botnet servers offline by seizing them. M005 - removal TA11 Persistence D02
C00133 Deplatform Account* Note: Similar to Deplatform People but less generic. Perhaps both should be left. M005 - removal TA03 Develop People D03
C00135 Deplatform message groups and/or message boards Merged two rows here. M005 - removal TA04 Develop Networks D03
C00136 Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages Find communities likely to be targetted by misinformation campaigns, and send them countermessages or pointers to information sources. M010 - countermessaging TA08 Pump Priming D03
C00138 Spam domestic actors with lawsuits File multiple lawsuits against known misinformation creators and posters, to distract them from disinformation creation. M014 - reduce resources TA11 Persistence D03
C00139 Weaponise youtube content matrices God knows what this is. Keeping temporarily in case we work it out. M004 - friction TA11 Persistence D03
C00140 "Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls Applies to most of the content used by exposure techniques except "T0055 - Use hashtag”. Applies to analytics M008 - data pollution TA12 Measure Effectiveness D03
C00142 Platform adds warning label and decision point when sharing content Includes “this has been disproved: do you want to forward it”. Includes “"Hey this story is old" popup when messaging with old URL” - this assumes that this technique is based on visits to an URL shortener or a captured news site that can publish a message of our choice. Includes “mark clickbait visually”. M004 - friction TA06 Develop Content D04
C00143 (botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time Use copyright infringement claims to remove videos etc. M013 - targeting TA11 Persistence D04
C00144 Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs Degrade the infrastructure. Could e.g. pay to not act for 30 days. Not recommended M014 - reduce resources TA02 Objective Planning D04
C00147 Make amplification of social media posts expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days) Stop new community activity (likes, comments) on old social media posts. M004 - friction TA09 Exposure D03
C00148 Add random links to network graphs If creators are using network analysis to determine how to attack networks, then adding random extra links to those networks might throw that analysis out enough to change attack outcomes. Unsure which DISARM techniques. M008 - data pollution TA12 Measure Effectiveness D04
C00149 Poison the monitoring & evaluation data Includes Pollute the AB-testing data feeds: Polluting A/B testing requires knowledge of MOEs and MOPs. A/B testing must be caught early when there is relatively little data available so infiltration of TAs and understanding of how content is migrated from testing to larger audiences is fundamental. M008 - data pollution TA12 Measure Effectiveness D04
C00153 Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure Align offensive cyber action with information operations and counter disinformation approaches, where appropriate. M013 - targeting TA01 Strategic Planning D03
C00154 Ask media not to report false information Train media to spot and respond to misinformation, and ask them not to post or transmit misinformation they've found. M005 - removal TA08 Pump Priming D02
C00155 Ban incident actors from funding sites Ban misinformation creators and posters from funding sites M005 - removal TA03 Develop People D02
C00156 Better tell your country or organization story Civil engagement activities conducted on the part of EFP forces. NATO should likewise provide support and training, where needed, to local public affairs and other communication personnel. Local government and military public affairs personnel can play their part in creating and disseminating entertaining and sharable content that supports the EFP mission. M010 - countermessaging TA02 Objective Planning D03
C00159 Have a disinformation response plan e.g. Create a campaign plan and toolkit for competition short of armed conflict (this used to be called “the grey zone”). The campaign plan should account for own vulnerabilities and strengths, and not over-rely on any one tool of statecraft or line of effort. It will identify and employ a broad spectrum of national power to deter, compete, and counter (where necessary) other countries’ approaches, and will include understanding of own capabilities, capabilities of disinformation creators, and international standards of conduct to compete in, shrink the size, and ultimately deter use of competition short of armed conflict. M007 - metatechnique TA01 Strategic Planning D03
C00160 find and train influencers Identify key influencers (e.g. use network analysis), then reach out to identified users and offer support, through either training or resources. M001 - resilience TA03 Develop People D02
C00161 Coalition Building with stakeholders and Third-Party Inducements Advance coalitions across borders and sectors, spanning public and private, as well as foreign and domestic, divides. Improve mechanisms to collaborate, share information, and develop coordinated approaches with the private sector at home and allies and partners abroad. M007 - metatechnique TA01 Strategic Planning D07
C00162 Unravel/target the Potemkin villages Kremlin’s narrative spin extends through constellations of “civil society” organizations, political parties, churches, and other actors. Moscow leverages think tanks, human rights groups, election observers, Eurasianist integration groups, and orthodox groups. A collection of Russian civil society organizations, such as the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, together receive at least US$100 million per year, in addition to government-organized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), at least 150 of which are funded by Russian presidential grants totaling US$70 million per year. M013 - targeting TA04 Develop Networks D03
C00164 compatriot policy protect the interests of a population and influence the population to not support disinformation causes and effectively influence the politics of its neighbors M013 - targeting TA02 Objective Planning D03
C00165 Ensure integrity of official documents e.g. for leaked legal documents, use court motions to limit future discovery actions M004 - friction TA06 Develop Content D02
C00169 develop a creative content hub Build funding and resources for producers and broadcasters to create content that counters disinformation and improves information landscapes. This could be a basket fund provided by international donors to a committee of local experts managing and distributing funding. M010 - countermessaging TA02 Objective Planning D03
C00170 elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft Shift from reactive to proactive response, with priority on sharing relevant information with the public and mobilizing private-sector engagement. Recent advances in data-driven technologies have elevated information as a source of power to influence the political and economic environment, to foster economic growth, to enable a decision-making advantage over competitors, and to communicate securely and quickly. M007 - metatechnique TA01 Strategic Planning D03
C00172 social media source removal Removing accounts, pages, groups, e.g. facebook page removal M005 - removal TA04 Develop Networks D02
C00174 Create a healthier news environment Free and fair press: create bipartisan, patriotic commitment to press freedom. Note difference between news and editorialising. Build alternative news sources: create alternative local-language news sources to counter local-language propaganda outlets. Delegitimize the 24 hour news cycle. includes Provide an alternative to disinformation content by expanding and improving local content: Develop content that can displace geopolitically-motivated narratives in the entire media environment, both new and old media alike. M007 - metatechnique, M002 - diversion TA01 Strategic Planning D02
C00176 Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private Coordinated disinformation challenges are increasingly multidisciplinary, there are few organizations within the national security structures that are equipped with the broad-spectrum capability to effectively counter large-scale conflict short of war tactics in real-time. Institutional hurdles currently impede diverse subject matter experts, hailing from outside of the traditional national security and foreign policy disciplines (e.g., physical science, engineering, media, legal, and economics fields), from contributing to the direct development of national security countermeasures to emerging conflict short of war threat vectors. A Cognitive Security Action Group (CSAG), akin to the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), could drive interagency alignment across equivalents of DHS, DoS, DoD, Intelligence Community, and other implementing agencies, in areas including strategic narrative, and the nexus of cyber and information operations. M007 - metatechnique TA01 Strategic Planning D07
C00178 Fill information voids with non-disinformation content 1) Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!). 2) fill data voids with relevant information, e.g. increase Russian-language programming in areas subject to Russian disinformation. M009 - dilution, M008 - data pollution TA05 Microtargeting D04
C00182 Redirection / malware detection/ remediation Detect redirction or malware, then quarantine or delete. M005 - removal TA09 Exposure D02
C00184 Media exposure highlight misinformation activities and actors in media M003 - daylight TA08 Pump Priming D04
C00188 Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves Includes SEO influence. Includes promotion of a “higher standard of journalism”: journalism training “would be helpful, especially for the online community. Includes Strengthen local media: Improve effectiveness of local media outlets. M001 - resilience TA08 Pump Priming D03
C00189 Ensure that platforms are taking down flagged accounts Use ongoing analysis/monitoring of "flagged" profiles. Confirm whether platforms are actively removing flagged accounts, and raise pressure via e.g. government organizations to encourage removal M003 - daylight TA03 Develop People D06
C00190 open engagement with civil society Government open engagement with civil society as an independent check on government action and messaging. Government seeks to coordinate and synchronize narrative themes with allies and partners while calibrating action in cases where elements in these countries may have been co-opted by competitor nations. Includes “fight in the light”: Use leadership in the arts, entertainment, and media to highlight and build on fundamental tenets of democracy. M001 - resilience TA01 Strategic Planning D03
C00195 Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content Use Google AdWords to identify instances in which people search Google about particular fake-news stories or propaganda themes. Includes Monetize centrist SEO by subsidizing the difference in greater clicks towards extremist content. M002 - diversion TA07 Channel Selection D02
C00197 remove suspicious accounts Standard reporting for false profiles (identity issues). Includes detecting hijacked accounts and reallocating them - if possible, back to original owners. M005 - removal TA03 Develop People D02
C00200 Influencer disavows misinfo Influencer is a trusted or respected figure. M010 - countermessaging TA09 Exposure D03
C00202 Set data 'honeytraps' Set honeytraps in content likely to be accessed for disinformation. M002 - diversion TA06 Develop Content D02
C00203 Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets Remove access to official press events from known misinformation actors. M004 - friction TA04 Develop Networks D03
C00205 strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting Increase civic resilience by partnering with business community to combat gray zone threats and ensuring adequate reporting and enforcement mechanisms. M007 - metatechnique TA01 Strategic Planning D03
C00207 Run a competing disinformation campaign - not recommended M013 - targeting TA02 Objective Planning D07
C00211 Use humorous counter-narratives M010 - countermessaging TA09 Exposure D03
C00212 build public resilience by making civil society more vibrant Increase public service experience, and support wider civics and history education. M001 - resilience TA01 Strategic Planning D03
C00216 Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors Prevent ad revenue going to disinformation domains M014 - reduce resources TA05 Microtargeting D02
C00219 Add metadata to content that’s out of the control of disinformation creators Steganography. Adding date, signatures etc to stop issue of photo relabelling etc. M003 - daylight TA06 Develop Content D04
C00220 Develop a monitoring and intelligence plan Create a plan for misinformation and disinformation response, before it's needed. Include connections / contacts needed, expected counteremessages etc. M007 - metatechnique TA01 Strategic Planning D03
C00221 Run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors Include PACE plans - Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency M007 - metatechnique TA01 Strategic Planning D03
C00222 Tabletop simulations Simulate misinformation and disinformation campaigns, and responses to them, before campaigns happen. M007 - metatechnique TA02 Objective Planning D03
C00223 Strengthen Trust in social media platforms Improve trust in the misinformation responses from social media and other platforms. Examples include creating greater transparancy on their actions and algorithms. M001 - resilience TA01 Strategic Planning D03