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Tried again to add some spaces before the parent technique on the techniques page
This commit is contained in:
Stephen Campbell
parent
adb4b19972
commit
bf2df6fc29
@ -543,11 +543,11 @@ class Disarm:
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if "." in row['disarm_id']:
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parent_technique_id = row['disarm_id'].split(".")[0]
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parent_technique_name = self.df_techniques.loc[self.df_techniques['disarm_id'] == parent_technique_id, 'name'].values[0]
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parent_technique = " **Parent Technique:** " + parent_technique_id + ' ' + parent_technique_name
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parent_technique = " **Parent Technique:** " + parent_technique_id + ' ' + parent_technique_name
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else:
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parent_technique = ''
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metatext = template.format(type = 'Technique', id=row['disarm_id'], name=row['name'],
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tactic=f"{row['tactic_id']} {tactic_name} {parent_technique}", summary=row['summary'],
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tactic=f"{row['tactic_id']} {tactic_name} {parent_technique}", summary=row['summary'],
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associatedtechniques=self.create_associated_techniques_string(row['disarm_id']),
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incidents=self.create_technique_incidents_string(row['disarm_id']),
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counters=self.create_technique_counters_string(row['disarm_id']))
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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**Summary**: Organise citizens around pro-state messaging. Coordinate paid or volunteer groups to push state propaganda.
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**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
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**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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**Summary**: Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consitent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplifiction practices.
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**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
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**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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**Summary**: Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centred on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on. These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the "firehose of misinformation" approach.
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**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
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**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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**Summary**: Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as "useful idiots" or "unwitting agents".
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**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets
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**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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**Summary**: Raising funds from malign actors may include contributions from foreign agents, cutouts or proxies, shell companies, dark money groups, etc.
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**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0014 Prepare Fundraising Campaigns
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**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0014 Prepare Fundraising Campaigns
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Raising funds from ignorant agents may include scams, donations intended for one stated purpose but then used for another, etc.
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**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0014 Prepare Fundraising Campaigns
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**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0014 Prepare Fundraising Campaigns
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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**Summary**: Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities.
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**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets
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**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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**Summary**: Use a dedicated, existing hashtag for the campaign/incident. This Technique covers behaviours previously documented by T0104.005: Use Hashtags, which has since been deprecated.
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**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0015 Create Hashtags and Search Artefacts
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**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0015 Create Hashtags and Search Artefacts
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Create a campaign/incident specific hashtag. This Technique covers behaviours previously documented by T0104.006: Create Dedicated Hashtag, which has since been deprecated.
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**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0015 Create Hashtags and Search Artefacts
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**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0015 Create Hashtags and Search Artefacts
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag groups. Many incident-based campaigns will create hashtags to promote their fabricated event. Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: 1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only "real" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name!, and 2. Publicise the story more widely through trending lists and search behaviour. Asset needed to direct/control/manage "conversation" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites).
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**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
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**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humour) required to drive traffic & engagement. This is a key asset.
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**Tactic**: TA05 Microtarget
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**Tactic**: TA05 Microtarget
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: An influence operation may Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns on platforms such as GoFundMe, GiveSendGo, Tipeee, Patreon, etc.
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**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity **Parent Technique:** T0017 Conduct Fundraising
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**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity **Parent Technique:** T0017 Conduct Fundraising
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services166 on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities.
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**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity
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**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations
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**Tactic**: TA05 Microtarget
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**Tactic**: TA05 Microtarget
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content enagagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates
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**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
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**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: An influence operation may amplify an existing conspiracy theory narrative that aligns with its incident or campaign goals. By amplifying existing conspiracy theory narratives, operators can leverage the power of the existing communities that support and propagate those theories without needing to expend resources creating new narratives or building momentum and buy in around new narratives.
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**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives **Parent Technique:** T0022 Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
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**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives **Parent Technique:** T0022 Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: While this requires more resources than amplifying existing conspiracy theory narratives, an influence operation may develop original conspiracy theory narratives in order to achieve greater control and alignment over the narrative and their campaign goals. Prominent examples include the USSR's Operation INFEKTION disinformation campaign run by the KGB in the 1980s to plant the idea that the United States had invented HIV/AIDS as part of a biological weapons research project at Fort Detrick, Maryland. More recently, Fort Detrick featured prominently in a new conspiracy theory narratives around the origins of the COVID-19 outbreak and pandemic.
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**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives **Parent Technique:** T0022 Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
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**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives **Parent Technique:** T0022 Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: "Conspiracy narratives" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalised or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the "firehose of falsehoods" model.
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**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
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**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Reframing context refers to removing an event from its surrounding context to distort its intended meaning. Rather than deny that an event occurred, reframing context frames an event in a manner that may lead the target audience to draw a different conclusion about its intentions.
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**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0023 Distort Facts
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**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0023 Distort Facts
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: An influence operation may edit open-source content, such as collaborative blogs or encyclopaedias, to promote its narratives on outlets with existing credibility and audiences. Editing open-source content may allow an operation to post content on platforms without dedicating resources to the creation and maintenance of its own assets.
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**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0023 Distort Facts
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**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0023 Distort Facts
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content
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**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
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**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well
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**Tactic**: TA07 Select Channels and Affordances
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**Tactic**: TA07 Select Channels and Affordances
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Influencers are people on social media platforms who have large audiences.<br /> <br />Threat Actors can try to trick Influencers such as celebrities, journalists, or local leaders who aren’t associated with their campaign into amplifying campaign content. This gives them access to the Influencer’s audience without having to go through the effort of building it themselves, and it helps legitimise their message by associating it with the Influencer, benefitting from their audience’s trust in them.
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**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure
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**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the "firehose of misinformation". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of "questions" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof.
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**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
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**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths. Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies. When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters.
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**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
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**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event, to give a misleading account or impression.
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**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
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**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Use the fake experts that were set up during Establish Legitimacy. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give "credility" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias
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**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
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**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka "Black-hat SEO"
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**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
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**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports).
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**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms
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**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Cancel culture refers to the phenomenon in which individuals collectively refrain from supporting an individual, organisation, business, or other entity, usually following a real or falsified controversy. An influence operation may exploit cancel culture by emphasising an adversary’s problematic or disputed behaviour and presenting its own content as an alternative.
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**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
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**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Examples include social identities like gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, ability, nationality, etc. as well as roles and occupations like journalist or activist.
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**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
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**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.
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**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
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**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
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**Summary**: Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.
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**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
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**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.
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**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms
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**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue (issues that can/are be politicized).
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**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
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**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Hashtags can be used by communities to collate information they post about particular topics (such as their interests, or current events) and users can find communities to join by exploring hashtags they’re interested in.<br /> <br />Threat actors can flood an existing hashtag to try to ruin hashtag functionality, posting content unrelated to the hashtag alongside it, making it a less reliable source of relevant information. They may also try to flood existing hashtags with campaign content, with the intent of maximising exposure to users.<br /> <br />This Technique covers cases where threat actors flood existing hashtags with campaign content.<br /> <br />This Technique covers behaviours previously documented by T0019.002: Hijack Hashtags, which has since been deprecated. This Technique was previously called Hijack Existing Hashtag.
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**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
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**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Automated forwarding and reposting refer to the proliferation of operation content using automated means, such as artificial intelligence or social media bots. An influence operation may use automated activity to increase content exposure without dedicating the resources, including personnel and time, traditionally required to forward and repost content. Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more "popular" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive.
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**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
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**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
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| Associated Technique | Description |
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**Summary**: Spamoflauge refers to the practice of disguising spam messages as legitimate. Spam refers to the use of electronic messaging systems to send out unrequested or unwanted messages in bulk. Simple methods of spamoflauge include replacing letters with numbers to fool keyword-based email spam filters, for example, "you've w0n our jackp0t!". Spamoflauge may extend to more complex techniques such as modifying the grammar or word choice of the language, casting messages as images which spam detectors cannot automatically read, or encapsulating messages in password protected attachments, such as .pdf or .zip files. Influence operations may use spamoflauge to avoid spam filtering systems and increase the likelihood of the target audience receiving operation messaging.
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|
||||
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Swarming refers to the coordinated use of accounts to overwhelm the information space with operation content. Unlike information flooding, swarming centres exclusively around a specific event or actor rather than a general narrative. Swarming relies on “horizontal communication” between information assets rather than a top-down, vertical command-and-control approach.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Keyword squatting refers to the creation of online content, such as websites, articles, or social media accounts, around a specific search engine-optimized term to overwhelm the search results of that term. An influence may keyword squat to increase content exposure to target audience members who query the exploited term in a search engine and manipulate the narrative around the term.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Inauthentic sites circulate cross-post stories and amplify narratives. Often these sites have no masthead, bylines or attribution.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Information Pollution occurs when threat actors attempt to ruin a source of information by flooding it with lots of inauthentic or unreliable content, intending to make it harder for legitimate users to find the information they’re looking for.<br /> <br />This sub-technique’s objective is to reduce exposure to target information, rather than promoting exposure to campaign content, for which the parent Technique T0049 can be used.<br /> <br />Analysts will need to infer what the motive for flooding an information space was when deciding whether to use T0049 or T0049.008 to tag a case when an information space is flooded. If such inference is not possible, default to T0049.<br /> <br />This Technique previously used the ID T0019.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Flooding sources of information (e.g. Social Media feeds) with a high volume of inauthentic content.<br /> <br />This can be done to control/shape online conversations, drown out opposing points of view, or make it harder to find legitimate information.<br /> <br />Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to achieve this effect.<br /> <br />This Technique previously used the name Flooding the Information Space.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Paying for physical action occurs when an influence operation pays individuals to act in the physical realm. An influence operation may pay for physical action to create specific situations and frame them in a way that supports operation narratives, for example, paying a group of people to burn a car to later post an image of the burning car and frame it as an act of protest.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity **Parent Technique:** T0057 Organise Events
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity **Parent Technique:** T0057 Organise Events
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Symbolic action refers to activities specifically intended to advance an operation’s narrative by signalling something to the audience, for example, a military parade supporting a state’s narrative of military superiority. An influence operation may use symbolic action to create falsified evidence supporting operation narratives in the physical information space.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity **Parent Technique:** T0057 Organise Events
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity **Parent Technique:** T0057 Organise Events
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold 2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA11 Persist in the Information Environment
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA11 Persist in the Information Environment
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: continue narrative or message amplification after the main incident work has finished
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA11 Persist in the Information Environment
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA11 Persist in the Information Environment
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Sell mechandise refers to getting the message or narrative into physical space in the offline world while making money
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Create or coopt broadcast capabilities (e.g. TV, radio etc).
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Plan to degrade an adversary’s image or ability to act. This could include preparation and use of harmful information about the adversary’s actions or reputation.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Media attention on a story or event is heightened during a breaking news event, where unclear facts and incomplete information increase speculation, rumours, and conspiracy theories, which are all vulnerable to manipulation.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: An influence operation may target populations in a specific geographic location, such as a region, state, or city. An influence operation may use geographic segmentation to Create Localised Content (see: Establish Legitimacy).
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on demographic segmentation, including age, gender, and income. Demographic segmentation may be useful for influence operations aiming to change state policies that affect a specific population sector. For example, an influence operation attempting to influence Medicare funding in the United States would likely target U.S. voters over 65 years of age.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on their income bracket, wealth, or other financial or economic division.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on psychographic segmentation, which uses audience values and decision-making processes. An operation may individually gather psychographic data with its own surveys or collection tools or externally purchase data from social media companies or online surveys, such as personality quizzes.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on their political affiliations, especially when aiming to manipulate voting or change policy.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Determining the target audiences (segments of the population) who will receive campaign narratives and artefacts intended to achieve the strategic ends.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Favourable position on the international stage in terms of great power politics or regional rivalry. Geopolitics plays out in the realms of foreign policy, national security, diplomacy, and intelligence. It involves nation-state governments, heads of state, foreign ministers, intergovernmental organisations, and regional security alliances.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Favourable position vis-à-vis national or sub-national political opponents such as political parties, interest groups, politicians, candidates.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Favourable position domestically or internationally in the realms of commerce, trade, finance, industry. Economics involves nation-states, corporations, banks, trade blocs, industry associations, cartels.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Favourable position domestically or internationally in the market for ideas, beliefs, and world views. Competition plays out among faith systems, political systems, and value systems. It can involve sub-national, national or supra-national movements.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: These are the long-term end-states the campaign aims to bring about. They typically involve an advantageous position vis-a-vis competitors in terms of power or influence. The strategic goal may be to improve or simply to hold one’s position. Competition occurs in the public sphere in the domains of war, diplomacy, politics, economics, and ideology, and can play out between armed groups, nation-states, political parties, corporations, interest groups, or individuals.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and degrade public trust in reporting, by discrediting credible sources. This makes it easier to promote influence operation content.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives **Parent Technique:** T0075 Dismiss
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives **Parent Technique:** T0075 Dismiss
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Push back against criticism by dismissing your critics. This might be arguing that the critics use a different standard for you than with other actors or themselves; or arguing that their criticism is biassed.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Twist the narrative. Take information, or artefacts like images, and change the framing around them.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Shift attention to a different narrative or actor, for instance by accusing critics of the same activity that they’ve accused you of (e.g. police brutality).
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Threaten the critic or narrator of events. For instance, threaten journalists or news outlets reporting on a story.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Create conflict between subgroups, to widen divisions in a community
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: An influence operation may use social media analytics to determine which factors will increase the operation content’s exposure to its target audience on social media platforms, including views, interactions, and sentiment relating to topics and content types. The social media platform itself or a third-party tool may collect the metrics.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: An influence operation may evaluate its own or third-party media surveys to determine what type of content appeals to its target audience. Media surveys may provide insight into an audience’s political views, social class, general interests, or other indicators used to tailor operation messaging to its target audience.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: An influence operation may identify trending hashtags on social media platforms for later use in boosting operation content. A hashtag40 refers to a word or phrase preceded by the hash symbol (#) on social media used to identify messages and posts relating to a specific topic. All public posts that use the same hashtag are aggregated onto a centralised page dedicated to the word or phrase and sorted either chronologically or by popularity.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: An influence operation may conduct web traffic analysis to determine which search engines, keywords, websites, and advertisements gain the most traction with its target audience.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: An influence operation may survey a target audience’s Internet availability and degree of media freedom to determine which target audience members will have access to operation content and on which platforms. An operation may face more difficulty targeting an information environment with heavy restrictions and media control than an environment with independent media, freedom of speech and of the press, and individual liberties.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Mapping the target audience information environment analyses the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience. Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Find or plan to create areas (social media groups, search term groups, hashtag groups etc) where individuals only engage with people they agree with.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation. A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news” data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalising on most search engines’ preferences for recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas, isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: An influence operation may exploit existing racial, religious, demographic, or social prejudices to further polarise its target audience from the rest of the public.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: An influence operation may identify existing fissures to pit target populations against one another or facilitate a “divide-and-conquer" approach to tailor operation narratives along the divides.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: An influence operation may assess preexisting conspiracy theories or suspicions in a population to identify existing narratives that support operational objectives.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: A wedge issue is a divisive political issue, usually concerning a social phenomenon, that divides individuals along a defined line. An influence operation may exploit wedge issues by intentionally polarising the public along the wedge issue line and encouraging opposition between factions.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: An influence operation may identify or create a real or imaginary adversary to centre operation narratives against. A real adversary may include certain politicians or political parties while imaginary adversaries may include falsified “deep state”62 actors that, according to conspiracies, run the state behind public view.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: An influence operation may exploit existing weaknesses in a target’s media system. These weaknesses may include existing biases among media agencies, vulnerability to false news agencies on social media, or existing distrust of traditional media sources. An existing distrust among the public in the media system’s credibility holds high potential for exploitation by an influence operation when establishing alternative news agencies to spread operation content.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment. Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Actors may develop new narratives to further strategic or tactical goals, especially when existing narratives adequately align with the campaign goals. New narratives provide more control in terms of crafting the message to achieve specific goals. However, new narratives may require more effort to disseminate than adapting or adopting existing narratives.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: An influence operation may seek to exploit the preexisting weaknesses, fears, and enemies of the target audience for integration into the operation’s narratives and overall strategy. Integrating existing vulnerabilities into the operational approach conserves resources by exploiting already weak areas of the target information environment instead of forcing the operation to create new vulnerabilities in the environment.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Copypasta refers to a piece of text that has been copied and pasted multiple times across various online platforms. A copypasta’s final form may differ from its original source text as users add, delete, or otherwise edit the content as they repost the text.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: An influence operation may take content from other sources without proper attribution. This content may be either misinformation content shared by others without malicious intent but now leveraged by the campaign as disinformation or disinformation content from other sources.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: An influence operation may take authentic content from other sources and add deceptive labels or deceptively translate the content into other langauges.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: An influence operation may take content from other sources with proper attribution. This content may be either misinformation content shared by others without malicious intent but now leveraged by the campaign as disinformation or disinformation content from other sources. Examples include the appropriation of content from one inauthentic news site to another inauthentic news site or network in ways that align with the originators licencing or terms of service.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarises from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilised to develop new content.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: AI-generated texts refers to synthetic text composed by computers using text-generating AI technology. Autonomous generation refers to content created by a bot without human input, also known as bot-created content generation. Autonomous generation represents the next step in automation after language generation and may lead to automated journalism. An influence operation may use read fakes or autonomous generation to quickly develop and distribute content to the target audience.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: An influence operation may develop false or misleading news articles aligned to their campaign goals or narratives.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Produce text in the form of a document.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Produce text content in the form of a book. <br /> <br />This technique covers both e-books and physical books, however, the former is more easily deployed by threat actors given the lower cost to develop.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Opinion articles (aka “Op-Eds” or “Editorials”) are articles or regular columns flagged as “opinion” posted to news sources, and can be contributed by people outside the organisation. <br /> <br />Flagging articles as opinions allow news organisations to distinguish them from the typical expectations of objective news reporting while distancing the presented opinion from the organisation or its employees.<br /> <br /> The use of this technique is not by itself an indication of malicious or inauthentic content; Op-eds are a common format in media. However, threat actors exploit op-eds to, for example, submit opinion articles to local media to promote their narratives. <br /> <br />Examples from the perspective of a news site involve publishing op-eds from perceived prestigious voices to give legitimacy to an inauthentic publication, or supporting causes by hosting op-eds from actors aligned with the organisation’s goals.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Create fake academic research. Example: fake social science research is often aimed at hot-button social issues such as gender, race and sexuality. Fake science research can target Climate Science debate or pseudoscience like anti-vaxx.<br /> <br />This Technique previously used the ID T0019.001.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
**Summary**: Text which has been translated into another language using machine translation tools, such as AI.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
|
||||
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Associated Technique | Description |
|
||||
|
||||
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user