Added some spaces before the parent technique on the techniques page

CODE/generate_DISARM_pages.py

@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ class Disarm:
                     if "." in row['disarm_id']:
                         parent_technique_id = row['disarm_id'].split(".")[0]
                         parent_technique_name = self.df_techniques.loc[self.df_techniques['disarm_id'] == parent_technique_id, 'name'].values[0]
-                        parent_technique = "**Parent Technique:** " + parent_technique_id + ' ' + parent_technique_name
+                        parent_technique = "          **Parent Technique:** " + parent_technique_id + ' ' + parent_technique_name
                     else:   
                         parent_technique = ''
                     metatext = template.format(type = 'Technique', id=row['disarm_id'], name=row['name'],

generated_pages/techniques/T0014.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Raising funds from malign actors may include contributions from foreign agents, cutouts or proxies, shell companies, dark money groups, etc.
 
-**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0014 Prepare Fundraising Campaigns
+**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets           **Parent Technique:** T0014 Prepare Fundraising Campaigns
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0014.002.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Raising funds from ignorant agents may include scams, donations intended for one stated purpose but then used for another, etc.
 
-**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0014 Prepare Fundraising Campaigns
+**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets           **Parent Technique:** T0014 Prepare Fundraising Campaigns
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0015.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Use a dedicated, existing hashtag for the campaign/incident. This Technique covers behaviours previously documented by T0104.005: Use Hashtags, which has since been deprecated.  
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0015 Create Hashtags and Search Artefacts
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0015 Create Hashtags and Search Artefacts
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0015.002.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Create a campaign/incident specific hashtag. This Technique covers behaviours previously documented by T0104.006: Create Dedicated Hashtag, which has since been deprecated. 
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0015 Create Hashtags and Search Artefacts
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0015 Create Hashtags and Search Artefacts
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0017.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns on platforms such as GoFundMe, GiveSendGo, Tipeee, Patreon, etc.
 
-**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity **Parent Technique:** T0017 Conduct Fundraising
+**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity           **Parent Technique:** T0017 Conduct Fundraising
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0022.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may amplify an existing conspiracy theory narrative that aligns with its incident or campaign goals. By amplifying existing conspiracy theory narratives, operators can leverage the power of the existing communities that support and propagate those theories without needing to expend resources creating new narratives or building momentum and buy in around new narratives.
 
-**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives **Parent Technique:** T0022 Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
+**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives           **Parent Technique:** T0022 Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0022.002.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: While this requires more resources than amplifying existing conspiracy theory narratives, an influence operation may develop original conspiracy theory narratives in order to achieve greater control and alignment over the narrative and their campaign goals. Prominent examples include the USSR's Operation INFEKTION disinformation campaign run by the KGB in the 1980s to plant the idea that the United States had invented HIV/AIDS as part of a biological weapons research project at Fort Detrick, Maryland. More recently, Fort Detrick featured prominently in a new conspiracy theory narratives around the origins of the COVID-19 outbreak and pandemic.
 
-**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives **Parent Technique:** T0022 Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
+**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives           **Parent Technique:** T0022 Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0023.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Reframing context refers to removing an event from its surrounding context to distort its intended meaning. Rather than deny that an event occurred, reframing context frames an event in a manner that may lead the target audience to draw a different conclusion about its intentions.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0023 Distort Facts
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0023 Distort Facts
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0023.002.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may edit open-source content, such as collaborative blogs or encyclopaedias, to promote its narratives on outlets with existing credibility and audiences. Editing open-source content may allow an operation to post content on platforms without dedicating resources to the creation and maintenance of its own assets.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0023 Distort Facts
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0023 Distort Facts
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0048.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Cancel culture refers to the phenomenon in which individuals collectively refrain from supporting an individual, organisation, business, or other entity, usually following a real or falsified controversy. An influence operation may exploit cancel culture by emphasising an adversary’s problematic or disputed behaviour and presenting its own content as an alternative.
 
-**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
+**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms           **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0048.002.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Examples include social identities like gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, ability, nationality, etc. as well as roles and occupations like journalist or activist.
 
-**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
+**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms           **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0048.003.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.
 
-**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
+**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms           **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0048.004.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.
 
-**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
+**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms           **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0049.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue (issues that can/are be politicized).
 
-**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
+**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure           **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0049.002.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Hashtags can be used by communities to collate information they post about particular topics (such as their interests, or current events) and users can find communities to join by exploring hashtags they’re interested in.<br /> <br />Threat actors can flood an existing hashtag to try to ruin hashtag functionality, posting content unrelated to the hashtag alongside it, making it a less reliable source of relevant information. They may also try to flood existing hashtags with campaign content, with the intent of maximising exposure to users.<br /> <br />This Technique covers cases where threat actors flood existing hashtags with campaign content.<br /> <br />This Technique covers behaviours previously documented by T0019.002: Hijack Hashtags, which has since been deprecated. This Technique was previously called Hijack Existing Hashtag.
 
-**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
+**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure           **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0049.003.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Automated forwarding and reposting refer to the proliferation of operation content using automated means, such as artificial intelligence or social media bots. An influence operation may use automated activity to increase content exposure without dedicating the resources, including personnel and time, traditionally required to forward and repost content. Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more "popular" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive.
 
-**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
+**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure           **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0049.004.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Spamoflauge refers to the practice of disguising spam messages as legitimate. Spam refers to the use of electronic messaging systems to send out unrequested or unwanted messages in bulk. Simple methods of spamoflauge include replacing letters with numbers to fool keyword-based email spam filters, for example, "you've w0n our jackp0t!". Spamoflauge may extend to more complex techniques such as modifying the grammar or word choice of the language, casting messages as images which spam detectors cannot automatically read, or encapsulating messages in password protected attachments, such as .pdf or .zip files. Influence operations may use spamoflauge to avoid spam filtering systems and increase the likelihood of the target audience receiving operation messaging.
 
-**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
+**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure           **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0049.005.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Swarming refers to the coordinated use of accounts to overwhelm the information space with operation content. Unlike information flooding, swarming centres exclusively around a specific event or actor rather than a general narrative. Swarming relies on “horizontal communication” between information assets rather than a top-down, vertical command-and-control approach.
 
-**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
+**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure           **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0049.006.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Keyword squatting refers to the creation of online content, such as websites, articles, or social media accounts, around a specific search engine-optimized term to overwhelm the search results of that term. An influence may keyword squat to increase content exposure to target audience members who query the exploited term in a search engine and manipulate the narrative around the term.
 
-**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
+**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure           **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0049.007.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Inauthentic sites circulate cross-post stories and amplify narratives. Often these sites have no masthead, bylines or attribution.
 
-**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
+**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure           **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0049.008.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Information Pollution occurs when threat actors attempt to ruin a source of information by flooding it with lots of inauthentic or unreliable content, intending to make it harder for legitimate users to find the information they’re looking for.<br /> <br />This sub-technique’s objective is to reduce exposure to target information, rather than promoting exposure to campaign content, for which the parent Technique T0049 can be used.<br /> <br />Analysts will need to infer what the motive for flooding an information space was when deciding whether to use T0049 or T0049.008 to tag a case when an information space is flooded. If such inference is not possible, default to T0049.<br /> <br />This Technique previously used the ID T0019.
 
-**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
+**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure           **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0057.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Paying for physical action occurs when an influence operation pays individuals to act in the physical realm. An influence operation may pay for physical action to create specific situations and frame them in a way that supports operation narratives, for example, paying a group of people to burn a car to later post an image of the burning car and frame it as an act of protest.
 
-**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity **Parent Technique:** T0057 Organise Events
+**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity           **Parent Technique:** T0057 Organise Events
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0057.002.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Symbolic action refers to activities specifically intended to advance an operation’s narrative by signalling something to the audience, for example, a military parade supporting a state’s narrative of military superiority. An influence operation may use symbolic action to create falsified evidence supporting operation narratives in the physical information space.
 
-**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity **Parent Technique:** T0057 Organise Events
+**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity           **Parent Technique:** T0057 Organise Events
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0072.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may target populations in a specific geographic location, such as a region, state, or city. An influence operation may use geographic segmentation to Create Localised Content (see: Establish Legitimacy).
 
-**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
+**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis           **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0072.002.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on demographic segmentation, including age, gender, and income. Demographic segmentation may be useful for influence operations aiming to change state policies that affect a specific population sector. For example, an influence operation attempting to influence Medicare funding in the United States would likely target U.S. voters over 65 years of age.
 
-**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
+**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis           **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0072.003.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on their income bracket, wealth, or other financial or economic division.
 
-**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
+**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis           **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0072.004.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on psychographic segmentation, which uses audience values and decision-making processes. An operation may individually gather psychographic data with its own surveys or collection tools or externally purchase data from social media companies or online surveys, such as personality quizzes.
 
-**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
+**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis           **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0072.005.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on their political affiliations, especially when aiming to manipulate voting or change policy.
 
-**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
+**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis           **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0074.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Favourable position on the international stage in terms of great power politics or regional rivalry. Geopolitics plays out in the realms of foreign policy, national security, diplomacy, and intelligence. It involves nation-state governments, heads of state, foreign ministers, intergovernmental organisations, and regional security alliances.
 
-**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
+**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy           **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0074.002.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Favourable position vis-à-vis national or sub-national political opponents such as political parties, interest groups, politicians, candidates.  
 
-**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
+**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy           **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0074.003.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Favourable position domestically or internationally in the realms of commerce, trade, finance, industry. Economics involves nation-states, corporations, banks, trade blocs, industry associations, cartels.  
 
-**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
+**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy           **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0074.004.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Favourable position domestically or internationally in the market for ideas, beliefs, and world views. Competition plays out among faith systems, political systems, and value systems. It can involve sub-national, national or supra-national movements.    
 
-**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
+**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy           **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0075.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and degrade public trust in reporting, by discrediting credible sources. This makes it easier to promote influence operation content.
 
-**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives **Parent Technique:** T0075 Dismiss
+**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives           **Parent Technique:** T0075 Dismiss
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0080.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may use social media analytics to determine which factors will increase the operation content’s exposure to its target audience on social media platforms, including views, interactions, and sentiment relating to topics and content types. The social media platform itself or a third-party tool may collect the metrics.
 
-**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
+**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis           **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0080.002.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may evaluate its own or third-party media surveys to determine what type of content appeals to its target audience. Media surveys may provide insight into an audience’s political views, social class, general interests, or other indicators used to tailor operation messaging to its target audience.
 
-**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
+**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis           **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0080.003.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may identify trending hashtags on social media platforms for later use in boosting operation content. A hashtag40 refers to a word or phrase preceded by the hash symbol (#) on social media used to identify messages and posts relating to a specific topic. All public posts that use the same hashtag are aggregated onto a centralised page dedicated to the word or phrase and sorted either chronologically or by popularity.
 
-**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
+**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis           **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0080.004.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may conduct web traffic analysis to determine which search engines, keywords, websites, and advertisements gain the most traction with its target audience.
 
-**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
+**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis           **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0080.005.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may survey a target audience’s Internet availability and degree of media freedom to determine which target audience members will have access to operation content and on which platforms. An operation may face more difficulty targeting an information environment with heavy restrictions and media control than an environment with independent media, freedom of speech and of the press, and individual liberties.
 
-**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
+**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis           **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0081.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Find or plan to create areas (social media groups, search term groups, hashtag groups etc) where individuals only engage with people they agree with.
 
-**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
+**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis           **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0081.002.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation. A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news” data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalising on most search engines’ preferences for recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas, isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term.
 
-**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
+**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis           **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0081.003.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may exploit existing racial, religious, demographic, or social prejudices to further polarise its target audience from the rest of the public.
 
-**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
+**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis           **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0081.004.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may identify existing fissures to pit target populations against one another or facilitate a “divide-and-conquer" approach to tailor operation narratives along the divides.
 
-**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
+**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis           **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0081.005.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may assess preexisting conspiracy theories or suspicions in a population to identify existing narratives that support operational objectives.
 
-**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
+**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis           **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0081.006.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: A wedge issue is a divisive political issue, usually concerning a social phenomenon, that divides individuals along a defined line. An influence operation may exploit wedge issues by intentionally polarising the public along the wedge issue line and encouraging opposition between factions.
 
-**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
+**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis           **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0081.007.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may identify or create a real or imaginary adversary to centre operation narratives against. A real adversary may include certain politicians or political parties while imaginary adversaries may include falsified “deep state”62 actors that, according to conspiracies, run the state behind public view.
 
-**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
+**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis           **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0081.008.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may exploit existing weaknesses in a target’s media system. These weaknesses may include existing biases among media agencies, vulnerability to false news agencies on social media, or existing distrust of traditional media sources. An existing distrust among the public in the media system’s credibility holds high potential for exploitation by an influence operation when establishing alternative news agencies to spread operation content.
 
-**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
+**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis           **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0084.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Copypasta refers to a piece of text that has been copied and pasted multiple times across various online platforms. A copypasta’s final form may differ from its original source text as users add, delete, or otherwise edit the content as they repost the text.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0084.002.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may take content from other sources without proper attribution. This content may be either misinformation content shared by others without malicious intent but now leveraged by the campaign as disinformation or disinformation content from other sources.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0084.003.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may take authentic content from other sources and add deceptive labels or deceptively translate the content into other langauges.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0084.004.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may take content from other sources with proper attribution. This content may be either misinformation content shared by others without malicious intent but now leveraged by the campaign as disinformation or disinformation content from other sources. Examples include the appropriation of content from one inauthentic news site to another inauthentic news site or network in ways that align with the originators licencing or terms of service.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0085.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: AI-generated texts refers to synthetic text composed by computers using text-generating AI technology. Autonomous generation refers to content created by a bot without human input, also known as bot-created content generation. Autonomous generation represents the next step in automation after language generation and may lead to automated journalism. An influence operation may use read fakes or autonomous generation to quickly develop and distribute content to the target audience.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0085.003.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may develop false or misleading news articles aligned to their campaign goals or narratives.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0085.004.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Produce text in the form of a document.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0085.005.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Produce text content in the form of a book. <br /> <br />This technique covers both e-books and physical books, however, the former is more easily deployed by threat actors given the lower cost to develop.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0085.006.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Opinion articles (aka “Op-Eds” or “Editorials”) are articles or regular columns flagged as “opinion” posted to news sources, and can be contributed by people outside the organisation. <br /> <br />Flagging articles as opinions allow news organisations to distinguish them from the typical expectations of objective news reporting while distancing the presented opinion from the organisation or its employees.<br /> <br /> The use of this technique is not by itself an indication of malicious or inauthentic content; Op-eds are a common format in media. However, threat actors exploit op-eds to, for example, submit opinion articles to local media to promote their narratives. <br /> <br />Examples from the perspective of a news site involve publishing op-eds from perceived prestigious voices to give legitimacy to an inauthentic publication, or supporting causes by hosting op-eds from actors aligned with the organisation’s goals.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0085.007.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Create fake academic research. Example: fake social science research is often aimed at hot-button social issues such as gender, race and sexuality. Fake science research can target Climate Science debate or pseudoscience like anti-vaxx.<br /> <br />This Technique previously used the ID T0019.001.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0085.008.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Text which has been translated into another language using machine translation tools, such as AI.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0086.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0086 Develop Image-Based Content
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0086 Develop Image-Based Content
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0086.002.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0086 Develop Image-Based Content
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0086 Develop Image-Based Content
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0086.003.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Cheap fakes utilise less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0086 Develop Image-Based Content
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0086 Develop Image-Based Content
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0086.004.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Image files that aggregate positive evidence (Joan Donovan)
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0086 Develop Image-Based Content
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0086 Develop Image-Based Content
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0087.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0087 Develop Video-Based Content
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0087 Develop Video-Based Content
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0087.002.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Cheap fakes utilise less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0087 Develop Video-Based Content
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0087 Develop Video-Based Content
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0088.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0088 Develop Audio-Based Content
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0088 Develop Audio-Based Content
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0088.002.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Cheap fakes utilise less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0088 Develop Audio-Based Content
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0088 Develop Audio-Based Content
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0089.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Procure authentic documents that are not publicly available, by whatever means -- whether legal or illegal, highly-resourced or less so. These documents can be "leaked" during later stages in the operation.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0089 Obtain Private Documents
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0089 Obtain Private Documents
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0089.003.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Alter authentic documents (public or non-public) to achieve campaign goals. The altered documents are intended to appear as if they are authentic and can be "leaked" during later stages in the operation.
 
-**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0089 Obtain Private Documents
+**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content           **Parent Technique:** T0089 Obtain Private Documents
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0091.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Operators recruit paid contractor to support the campaign.
 
-**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0091 Recruit Malign Actors
+**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets           **Parent Technique:** T0091 Recruit Malign Actors
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0091.002.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Operators recruit partisans (ideologically-aligned individuals) to support the campaign.
 
-**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0091 Recruit Malign Actors
+**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets           **Parent Technique:** T0091 Recruit Malign Actors
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0091.003.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may hire trolls, or human operators of fake accounts that aim to provoke others by posting and amplifying content about controversial issues. Trolls can serve to discredit an influence operation’s opposition or bring attention to the operation’s cause through debate. Classic trolls refer to regular people who troll for personal reasons, such as attention-seeking or boredom. Classic trolls may advance operation narratives by coincidence but are not directly affiliated with any larger operation. Conversely, hybrid trolls act on behalf of another institution, such as a state or financial organisation, and post content with a specific ideological goal. Hybrid trolls may be highly advanced and institutionalised or less organised and work for a single individual.
 
-**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0091 Recruit Malign Actors
+**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets           **Parent Technique:** T0091 Recruit Malign Actors
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0092.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Influence operations may establish organisations with legitimate or falsified hierarchies, staff, and content to structure operation assets, provide a sense of legitimacy to the operation, or provide institutional backing to operation activities.
 
-**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0092 Build Network
+**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets           **Parent Technique:** T0092 Build Network
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0092.002.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: A follow train is a group of people who follow each other on a social media platform, often as a way for an individual or campaign to grow its social media following. Follow trains may be a violation of platform Terms of Service. They are also known as follow-for-follow groups.
 
-**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0092 Build Network
+**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets           **Parent Technique:** T0092 Build Network
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0092.003.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: When there is not an existing community or sub-group that meets a campaign's goals, an influence operation may seek to create a community or sub-group.
 
-**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0092 Build Network
+**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets           **Parent Technique:** T0092 Build Network
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0093.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may fund proxies, or external entities that work for the operation. An operation may recruit/train users with existing sympathies towards the operation’s narratives and/or goals as proxies. Funding proxies serves various purposes including: - Diversifying operation locations to complicate attribution - Reducing the workload for direct operation assets
 
-**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0093 Acquire/Recruit Network
+**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets           **Parent Technique:** T0093 Acquire/Recruit Network
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0093.002.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: A botnet is a group of bots that can function in coordination with each other.
 
-**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0093 Acquire/Recruit Network
+**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets           **Parent Technique:** T0093 Acquire/Recruit Network
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0094.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: When seeking to infiltrate an existing network, an influence operation may identify individuals and groups that might be susceptible to being co-opted or influenced.
 
-**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0094 Infiltrate Existing Networks
+**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets           **Parent Technique:** T0094 Infiltrate Existing Networks
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0094.002.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Butterfly attacks occur when operators pretend to be members of a certain social group, usually a group that struggles for representation. An influence operation may mimic a group to insert controversial statements into the discourse, encourage the spread of operation content, or promote harassment among group members. Unlike astroturfing, butterfly attacks aim to infiltrate and discredit existing grassroots movements, organisations, and media campaigns.
 
-**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0094 Infiltrate Existing Networks
+**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets           **Parent Technique:** T0094 Infiltrate Existing Networks
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0096.001.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may create an organisation for creating and amplifying campaign artefacts at scale.
 
-**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0096 Leverage Content Farms
+**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets           **Parent Technique:** T0096 Leverage Content Farms
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0096.002.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An influence operation may outsource content creation to external companies to avoid attribution, increase the rate of content creation, or improve content quality, i.e., by employing an organisation that can create content in the target audience’s native language. Employed organisations may include marketing companies for tailored advertisements or external content farms for high volumes of targeted media.
 
-**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0096 Leverage Content Farms
+**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets           **Parent Technique:** T0096 Leverage Content Farms
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.100.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: This sub-technique can be used to indicate that an entity is presenting itself as an individual. If the person is presenting themselves as having one of the personas listed below then these sub-techniques should be used instead, as they indicate both the type of persona they presented and that the entity presented itself as an individual:<br><br>T0097.101: Local Persona<br>T0097.102: Journalist Persona<br>T0097.103: Activist Persona<br>T0097.104: Hacktivist Persona<br>T0097.105: Military Personnel Persona<br>T0097.106: Recruiter Persona<br>T0097.107: Researcher Persona<br>T0097.108: Expert Persona<br>T0097.109: Romantic Suitor Persona<br>T0097.110: Party Official Persona<br>T0097.111: Government Official Persona<br>T0097.112: Government Employee Persona
 
-**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
+**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy           **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.101.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: A person with a local persona presents themselves as living in a particular geography or having local knowledge relevant to a narrative.<br><br>While presenting as a local is not an indication of inauthentic behaviour,  an influence operation may have its narratives amplified by people presenting as local to a target area. Threat actors can fabricate locals (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0097.101: Local Persona) to add credibility to their narratives, or to misrepresent the real opinions of locals in the area.<br><br>People who are legitimate locals (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.101: Local Persona) can use their persona for malicious purposes, or be exploited by threat actors. For example, someone could take money for using their position as a local to provide legitimacy to a false narrative or be tricked into doing so without their knowledge.
 
-**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
+**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy           **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.102.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: A person with a journalist persona presents themselves as a reporter or journalist delivering news, conducting interviews, investigations etc.<br><br>While presenting as a journalist is not an indication of inauthentic behaviour, an influence operation may have its narratives amplified by people presenting as journalists. Threat actors can fabricate journalists to give the appearance of legitimacy, justifying the actor’s requests for interviews, etc (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0097.102: Journalist Persona).<br><br>People who have legitimately developed a persona as a journalist (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.102: Journalist Persona) can use it for malicious purposes, or be exploited by threat actors. For example, someone could take money for using their position as a trusted journalist to provide legitimacy to a false narrative or be tricked into doing so without the journalist’s knowledge.
 
-**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
+**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy           **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.103.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: A person with an activist persona presents themselves as an activist; an individual who campaigns for a political cause, organises related events, etc.<br><br>While presenting as an activist is not an indication of inauthentic behaviour, an influence operation may have its narratives amplified by people presenting as activists. Threat actors can fabricate activists to give the appearance of popular support for an evolving grassroots movement (see T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0097.103: Activist Persona).<br><br>People who are legitimate activists can use this persona for malicious purposes, or be exploited by threat actors. For example, someone could take money for using their position as an activist to provide visibility to a false narrative or be tricked into doing so without their knowledge (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.103: Activist Persona).
 
-**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
+**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy           **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.104.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: A person with a hacktivist persona presents themselves as an activist who conducts offensive cyber operations or builds technical infrastructure for political purposes, rather than the financial motivations commonly attributed to hackers; hacktivists are hacker activists who use their technical knowledge to take political action.<br><br>Hacktivists can build technical infrastructure to support other activists, including secure communication channels and surveillance and censorship circumvention. They can also conduct DDOS attacks and other offensive cyber operations, aiming to take down digital assets or gain access to proprietary information. An influence operation may use hacktivist personas to support their operational narratives and legitimise their operational activities.<br><br>Fabricated Hacktivists are sometimes referred to as “Faketivists”.
 
-**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
+**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy           **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.105.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: A person with a military personnel persona presents themselves as a serving member or veteran of a military organisation operating in an official capacity on behalf of a government.<br><br>While presenting as military personnel is not an indication of inauthentic behaviour,  an influence operation may have its narratives amplified by people presenting as military personnel. Threat actors can fabricate military personnel (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0097.105: Military Personnel Persona) to pose as experts on military topics, or to discredit geopolitical adversaries by pretending to be one of their military personnel and spreading discontent.<br><br>People who have legitimately developed a military persona (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.105: Military Personnel Persona) can use it for malicious purposes, or be exploited by threat actors. For example, someone could take money for using their position as a member of the military to provide legitimacy to a false narrative or be tricked into doing so without their knowledge.
 
-**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
+**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy           **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.106.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: A person with a recruiter persona presents themselves as a potential employer or provider of freelance work.<br><br>While presenting as a recruiter is not an indication of inauthentic behaviour, threat actors fabricate recruiters (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona) to justify asking for personal information from their targets or to trick targets into working for the threat actors (without revealing who they are).
 
-**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
+**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy           **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.107.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: A person with a researcher persona presents themselves as conducting research (e.g. for academic institutions, or think tanks), or having previously conducted research.<br><br>While presenting as a researcher is not an indication of inauthentic behaviour,  an influence operation may have its narratives amplified by people presenting as researchers. Threat actors can fabricate researchers (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0097.107: Researcher Persona) to add credibility to their narratives.<br><br>People who are legitimate researchers (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.107: Researcher Persona) can use their persona for malicious purposes, or be exploited by threat actors. For example, someone could take money for using their position as a Researcher to provide legitimacy to a false narrative or be tricked into doing so without their knowledge.
 
-**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
+**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy           **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.108.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: A person with an expert persona presents themselves as having expertise or experience in a field. Commonly the persona’s expertise will be called upon to add credibility to a given narrative.<br><br>While presenting as an expert is not an indication of inauthentic behaviour,  an influence operation may have its narratives amplified by people presenting as experts. Threat actors can fabricate experts (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0097.107: Researcher Persona) to add credibility to their narratives.<br><br>People who are legitimate experts (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.107: Researcher Persona) can make mistakes, use their persona for malicious purposes, or be exploited by threat actors. For example, someone could take money for using their position as an expert to provide legitimacy to a false narrative or be tricked into doing so without their knowledge.
 
-**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
+**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy           **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.109.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: A person with a romantic suitor persona presents themselves as seeking a romantic or physical connection with another person.<br><br>While presenting as seeking a romantic or physical connection is not an indication of inauthentic behaviour, threat actors can use dating apps, social media channels or dating websites to fabricate romantic suitors to lure targets they can blackmail, extract information from, deceive or trick into giving them money (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0097.109: Romantic Suitor Persona).<br><br>Honeypotting in espionage and Big Butchering in scamming are commonly associated with romantic suitor personas.
 
-**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
+**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy           **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.110.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: A person who presents as an official member of a political party, such as leaders of political parties, candidates standing to represent constituents, and campaign staff.<br><br>Presenting as an official of a political party is not an indication of inauthentic behaviour, however threat actors may fabricate individuals who work in political parties to add credibility to their narratives (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0097.110: Party Official Persona). They may also impersonate existing officials of political parties (T0143.003: Impersonated Persona, T0097.110: Party Official Persona).<br><br>Legitimate members of political parties could use their persona for malicious purposes, or be exploited by threat actors (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.110: Party Official Persona). For example, an electoral candidate could take money for using their position to provide legitimacy to a false narrative, or be tricked into doing so without their knowledge.
 
-**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
+**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy           **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.111.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: A person who presents as an active or previous government official has the government official persona. These are officials serving in government, such as heads of government departments, leaders of countries, and members of government selected to represent constituents.<br><br> Presenting as a government official is not an indication of inauthentic behaviour, however threat actors may fabricate individuals who work in government to add credibility to their narratives (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0097.111: Government Official Persona). They may also impersonate existing members of government (T0143.003: Impersonated Persona, T0097.111: Government Official Persona).<br><br> Legitimate government officials could use their persona for malicious purposes, or be exploited by threat actors (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.111: Government Official Persona). For example, a government official could take money for using their position to provide legitimacy to a false narrative, or be tricked into doing so without their knowledge.
 
-**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
+**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy           **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.112.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: A person who presents as an active or previous civil servant has the government employee persona. These are professionals hired to serve in government institutions and departments, not officials selected to represent constituents, or assigned official roles in government (such as heads of departments).<br><br> Presenting as a government employee is not an indication of inauthentic behaviour, however threat actors may fabricate individuals who work in government to add credibility to their narratives (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0097.112: Government Employee Persona). They may also impersonate existing government employees (T0143.003: Impersonated Persona, T0097.112: Government Employee Persona).<br><br> Legitimate government employees could use their persona for malicious purposes, or be exploited by threat actors (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.112: Government Employee Persona). For example, a government employee could take money for using their position to provide legitimacy to a false narrative, or be tricked into doing so without their knowledge.
 
-**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
+**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy           **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.200.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: This Technique can be used to indicate that an entity is presenting itself as an institution. If the organisation is presenting itself as having one of the personas listed below then these Techniques should be used instead, as they indicate both that the entity presented itself as an institution, and the type of persona they presented:<br><br> T0097.201: Local Institution Persona<br> T0097.202: News Outlet Persona<br> T0097.203: Fact Checking Organisation Persona<br> T0097.204: Think Tank Persona<br> T0097.205: Business Persona<br> T0097.206: Government Institution Persona<br> T0097.207: NGO Persona<br> T0097.208: Social Cause Persona
 
-**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
+**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy           **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.201.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Institutions which present themselves as operating in a particular geography, or as having local knowledge relevant to a narrative, are presenting a local institution persona.<br><br> While presenting as a local institution is not an indication of inauthentic behaviour, threat actors may present themselves as such (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0097.201: Local Institution Persona) to add credibility to their narratives, or misrepresent the real opinions of locals in the area.<br><br> Legitimate local institutions could use their persona for malicious purposes, or be exploited by threat actors (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.201: Local Institution Persona). For example, a local institution could take money for using their position to provide legitimacy to a false narrative, or be tricked into doing so without their knowledge.
 
-**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
+**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy           **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.202.md

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 **Summary**: An institution with a news outlet persona presents itself as an organisation which delivers new information to its target audience.<br><br> While presenting as a news outlet is not an indication of inauthentic behaviour, an influence operation may have its narratives amplified by news organisations. Threat actors can fabricate news organisations (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0097.202: News Outlet Persona), or they can impersonate existing news outlets (T0143.003: Impersonated Persona, T0097.202: News Outlet Persona).<br><br> Legitimate news organisations could use their persona for malicious purposes, or be exploited by threat actors (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.202: News Outlet Persona).
 
-**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
+**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy           **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.203.md

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 **Summary**: An institution with a fact checking organisation persona presents itself as an organisation which produces reports which assess the validity of others’ reporting / statements.<br><br> While presenting as a fact checking organisation is not an indication of inauthentic behaviour, an influence operation may have its narratives amplified by fact checking organisations. Threat actors can fabricate fact checking organisations (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0097.202: News Outlet Persona), or they can impersonate existing fact checking outlets (T0143.003: Impersonated Persona, T0097.202: News Outlet Persona).<br><br> Legitimate fact checking organisations could use their persona for malicious purposes, or be exploited by threat actors (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.202: News Outlet Persona).
 
-**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
+**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy           **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.204.md

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 **Summary**: An institution with a think tank persona presents itself as a think tank; an organisation that aims to conduct original research and propose new policies or solutions, especially for social and scientific problems.<br><br> While presenting as a think tank is not an indication of inauthentic behaviour, think tank personas are commonly used by threat actors as a front for their operational activity (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). They may be created to give legitimacy to narratives and allow them to suggest politically beneficial solutions to societal issues.<br><br> Legitimate think tanks could have a political bias that they may not be transparent about, they could use their persona for malicious purposes, or they could be exploited by threat actors (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). For example, a think tank could take money for using their position to provide legitimacy to a false narrative, or be tricked into doing so without their knowledge.
 
-**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
+**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy           **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.205.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: An institution with a business persona presents itself as a for-profit organisation which provides goods or services for a price.<br><br> While presenting as a business is not an indication of inauthentic behaviour, business personas may be used by threat actors as a front for their operational activity (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0097.205: Business Persona).<br><br> Threat actors may also impersonate existing businesses (T0143.003: Impersonated Persona, T0097.205: Business Persona) to exploit their brand or cause reputational damage.<br><br> Legitimate businesses could use their persona for malicious purposes, or be exploited by threat actors (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.205: Business Persona). For example, a business could take money for using their position to provide legitimacy to a false narrative, or be tricked into doing so without their knowledge.
 
-**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
+**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy           **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.206.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Summary**: Institutions which present themselves as governments, or government ministries, are presenting a government institution persona.<br><br> While presenting as a government institution is not an indication of inauthentic behaviour, threat actors may impersonate existing government institutions as part of their operation (T0143.003: Impersonated Persona, T0097.206: Government Institution Persona), to add legitimacy to their narratives, or discredit the government.<br><br> Legitimate government institutions could use their persona for malicious purposes, or be exploited by threat actors (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.206: Government Institution Persona). For example, a government institution could be used by elected officials to spread inauthentic narratives.
 
-**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
+**Tactic**: TA16 Establish Legitimacy           **Parent Technique:** T0097 Present Persona
 
 
 | Associated Technique | Description |