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Sara-Jayne Terp 2022-06-30 23:22:19 +01:00
parent 82053a2221
commit 9ea0ffa1d7
283 changed files with 3310 additions and 2352 deletions
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285
CODE/generate_DISARM_pages.ipynb
View file

@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
},
{
"cell_type": "code",
"execution_count": 1,
"execution_count": 3,
"metadata": {
"scrolled": true
},
@ -33,39 +33,292 @@
"updated ../generated_files/disarm_blue_framework_clickable.html\n",
"Temp: objecttype phase\n",
"updated ../generated_pages/phases_index.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/phases/P04.md\n",
"Temp: objecttype tactic\n",
"updated ../generated_pages/tactics_index.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA01.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA02.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA03.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA04.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA05.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA06.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA07.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA08.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA09.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA10.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA11.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA12.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA13.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA14.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA15.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/tactics/TA16.md\n",
"Temp: objecttype technique\n",
"updated ../generated_pages/techniques_index.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0001.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0002.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0003.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0004.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0005.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0006.md\n",
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"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0008.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0009.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0010.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0011.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0012.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0013.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0014.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0015.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0016.md\n",
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"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0019.md\n",
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"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0021.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0022.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0023.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0024.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0025.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0026.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0027.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0028.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0029.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0030.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0031.md\n",
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"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0033.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0034.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0035.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0036.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0037.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0038.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0039.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0040.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0041.md\n",
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"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0043.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0044.md\n",
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"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0059.md\n",
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"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0063.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0064.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0065.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0066.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0067.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0068.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0069.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0070.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0071.md\n",
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"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0073.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0074.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0075.md\n",
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"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0077.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0078.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0079.md\n",
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"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0095.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0096.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/techniques/T0097.md\n",
"Temp: objecttype task\n",
"updated ../generated_pages/tasks_index.md\n",
"Temp: objecttype incident\n",
"updated ../generated_pages/incidents_index.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00002.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00005.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00006.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00007.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00009.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00010.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00015.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00017.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00022.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00029.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00032.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00033.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00034.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00042.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00044.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00047.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00049.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00050.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00051.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00053.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00056.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/incidents/I00063.md\n",
"Temp: objecttype counter\n",
"updated ../generated_pages/counters_index.md\n"
"updated ../generated_pages/counters_index.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00006.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00008.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00009.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00010.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00011.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00012.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00013.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00014.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00016.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00017.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00019.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00021.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00022.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00024.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00026.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00027.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00029.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00030.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00031.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00032.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00034.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00036.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00040.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00042.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00044.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00046.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00047.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00048.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00051.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00052.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00053.md\n"
]
},
{
"ename": "KeyError",
"evalue": "\"['sector_ids'] not in index\"",
"output_type": "error",
"traceback": [
"\u001b[0;31m---------------------------------------------------------------------------\u001b[0m",
"\u001b[0;31mKeyError\u001b[0m Traceback (most recent call last)",
"\u001b[0;32m<ipython-input-1-25052c215084>\u001b[0m in \u001b[0;36m<module>\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[1;32m 2\u001b[0m \u001b[0;32mfrom\u001b[0m \u001b[0mgenerate_DISARM_pages\u001b[0m \u001b[0;32mimport\u001b[0m \u001b[0mDisarm\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[1;32m 3\u001b[0m \u001b[0mdisarm\u001b[0m \u001b[0;34m=\u001b[0m \u001b[0mDisarm\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m(\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m)\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[0;32m----> 4\u001b[0;31m \u001b[0mdisarm\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m.\u001b[0m\u001b[0mgenerate_and_write_datafiles\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m(\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m)\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[0m",
"\u001b[0;32m~/Dropbox/SJT_Projects_current/DISARM_foundation/code_repositories/DISARMframeworks/CODE/generate_DISARM_pages.py\u001b[0m in \u001b[0;36mgenerate_and_write_datafiles\u001b[0;34m(self)\u001b[0m\n\u001b[1;32m 776\u001b[0m \u001b[0mself\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m.\u001b[0m\u001b[0mwrite_disarm_frameworks\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m(\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m)\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[1;32m 777\u001b[0m \u001b[0;31m# Editable files\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[0;32m--> 778\u001b[0;31m \u001b[0mself\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m.\u001b[0m\u001b[0mupdate_markdown_files\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m(\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m)\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[0m\u001b[1;32m 779\u001b[0m \u001b[0mself\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m.\u001b[0m\u001b[0mwrite_object_indexes_to_file\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m(\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m)\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[1;32m 780\u001b[0m \u001b[0;31m# Cross tables\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n",
"\u001b[0;32m~/Dropbox/SJT_Projects_current/DISARM_foundation/code_repositories/DISARMframeworks/CODE/generate_DISARM_pages.py\u001b[0m in \u001b[0;36mupdate_markdown_files\u001b[0;34m(self)\u001b[0m\n\u001b[1;32m 476\u001b[0m \u001b[0mtactic\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m=\u001b[0m\u001b[0mrow\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m[\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m'tactic_id'\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m]\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m,\u001b[0m \u001b[0msummary\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m=\u001b[0m\u001b[0mrow\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m[\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m'summary'\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m]\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m,\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[1;32m 477\u001b[0m \u001b[0mplaybooks\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m=\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m''\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m,\u001b[0m \u001b[0mmetatechnique\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m=\u001b[0m\u001b[0mrow\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m[\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m'metatechnique'\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m]\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m,\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[0;32m--> 478\u001b[0;31m \u001b[0mactortypes\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m=\u001b[0m\u001b[0mself\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m.\u001b[0m\u001b[0mcreate_counter_actortypes_string\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m(\u001b[0m\u001b[0mrow\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m[\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m'disarm_id'\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m]\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m)\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m,\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[0m\u001b[1;32m 479\u001b[0m \u001b[0mresources_needed\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m=\u001b[0m\u001b[0mrow\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m[\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m'resources_needed'\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m]\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m,\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[1;32m 480\u001b[0m \u001b[0mtactics\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m=\u001b[0m\u001b[0mself\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m.\u001b[0m\u001b[0mcreate_counter_tactics_string\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m(\u001b[0m\u001b[0mrow\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m[\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m'disarm_id'\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m]\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m)\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m,\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n",
"\u001b[0;32m~/Dropbox/SJT_Projects_current/DISARM_foundation/code_repositories/DISARMframeworks/CODE/generate_DISARM_pages.py\u001b[0m in \u001b[0;36mcreate_counter_actortypes_string\u001b[0;34m(self, counter_id)\u001b[0m\n\u001b[1;32m 275\u001b[0m '''\n\u001b[1;32m 276\u001b[0m \u001b[0mcounter_actortypes\u001b[0m \u001b[0;34m=\u001b[0m \u001b[0mself\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m.\u001b[0m\u001b[0mcross_counterid_actortypeid\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m[\u001b[0m\u001b[0mself\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m.\u001b[0m\u001b[0mcross_counterid_actortypeid\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m[\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m'disarm_id'\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m]\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m==\u001b[0m\u001b[0mcounter_id\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m]\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[0;32m--> 277\u001b[0;31m \u001b[0mcounter_actortypes\u001b[0m \u001b[0;34m=\u001b[0m \u001b[0mpd\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m.\u001b[0m\u001b[0mmerge\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m(\u001b[0m\u001b[0mcounter_actortypes\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m,\u001b[0m \u001b[0mself\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m.\u001b[0m\u001b[0mdf_actortypes\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m[\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m[\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m'disarm_id'\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m,\u001b[0m \u001b[0;34m'name'\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m,\u001b[0m \u001b[0;34m'sector_ids'\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m]\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m]\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m,\u001b[0m \u001b[0mleft_on\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m=\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m'actortype_id'\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m,\u001b[0m \u001b[0mright_on\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m=\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m'disarm_id'\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m)\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[0m\u001b[1;32m 278\u001b[0m \u001b[0mrow_string\u001b[0m \u001b[0;34m=\u001b[0m \u001b[0;34m'| [{0} {1}]({2}actortypes/{0}.md) | {3} |\\n'\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[1;32m 279\u001b[0m \u001b[0;32mfor\u001b[0m \u001b[0mindex\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m,\u001b[0m \u001b[0mrow\u001b[0m \u001b[0;32min\u001b[0m \u001b[0mcounter_actortypes\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m.\u001b[0m\u001b[0msort_values\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m(\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m'actortype_id'\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m)\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m.\u001b[0m\u001b[0miterrows\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m(\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m)\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m:\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n",
"\u001b[0;32m~/opt/anaconda3/lib/python3.8/site-packages/pandas/core/frame.py\u001b[0m in \u001b[0;36m__getitem__\u001b[0;34m(self, key)\u001b[0m\n\u001b[1;32m 2804\u001b[0m \u001b[0;32mif\u001b[0m \u001b[0mis_iterator\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m(\u001b[0m\u001b[0mkey\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m)\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m:\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[1;32m 2805\u001b[0m \u001b[0mkey\u001b[0m \u001b[0;34m=\u001b[0m \u001b[0mlist\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m(\u001b[0m\u001b[0mkey\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m)\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[0;32m-> 2806\u001b[0;31m \u001b[0mindexer\u001b[0m \u001b[0;34m=\u001b[0m \u001b[0mself\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m.\u001b[0m\u001b[0mloc\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m.\u001b[0m\u001b[0m_get_listlike_indexer\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m(\u001b[0m\u001b[0mkey\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m,\u001b[0m \u001b[0maxis\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m=\u001b[0m\u001b[0;36m1\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m,\u001b[0m \u001b[0mraise_missing\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m=\u001b[0m\u001b[0;32mTrue\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m)\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m[\u001b[0m\u001b[0;36m1\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m]\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[0m\u001b[1;32m 2807\u001b[0m \u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[1;32m 2808\u001b[0m \u001b[0;31m# take() does not accept boolean indexers\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n",
"\u001b[0;32m~/opt/anaconda3/lib/python3.8/site-packages/pandas/core/indexing.py\u001b[0m in \u001b[0;36m_get_listlike_indexer\u001b[0;34m(self, key, axis, raise_missing)\u001b[0m\n\u001b[1;32m 1550\u001b[0m \u001b[0mkeyarr\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m,\u001b[0m \u001b[0mindexer\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m,\u001b[0m \u001b[0mnew_indexer\u001b[0m \u001b[0;34m=\u001b[0m \u001b[0max\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m.\u001b[0m\u001b[0m_reindex_non_unique\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m(\u001b[0m\u001b[0mkeyarr\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m)\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[1;32m 1551\u001b[0m \u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[0;32m-> 1552\u001b[0;31m self._validate_read_indexer(\n\u001b[0m\u001b[1;32m 1553\u001b[0m \u001b[0mkeyarr\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m,\u001b[0m \u001b[0mindexer\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m,\u001b[0m \u001b[0mo\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m.\u001b[0m\u001b[0m_get_axis_number\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m(\u001b[0m\u001b[0maxis\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m)\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m,\u001b[0m \u001b[0mraise_missing\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m=\u001b[0m\u001b[0mraise_missing\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[1;32m 1554\u001b[0m )\n",
"\u001b[0;32m~/opt/anaconda3/lib/python3.8/site-packages/pandas/core/indexing.py\u001b[0m in \u001b[0;36m_validate_read_indexer\u001b[0;34m(self, key, indexer, axis, raise_missing)\u001b[0m\n\u001b[1;32m 1644\u001b[0m \u001b[0;32mif\u001b[0m \u001b[0;32mnot\u001b[0m \u001b[0;34m(\u001b[0m\u001b[0mself\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m.\u001b[0m\u001b[0mname\u001b[0m \u001b[0;34m==\u001b[0m \u001b[0;34m\"loc\"\u001b[0m \u001b[0;32mand\u001b[0m \u001b[0;32mnot\u001b[0m \u001b[0mraise_missing\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m)\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m:\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[1;32m 1645\u001b[0m \u001b[0mnot_found\u001b[0m \u001b[0;34m=\u001b[0m \u001b[0mlist\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m(\u001b[0m\u001b[0mset\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m(\u001b[0m\u001b[0mkey\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m)\u001b[0m \u001b[0;34m-\u001b[0m \u001b[0mset\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m(\u001b[0m\u001b[0max\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m)\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m)\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[0;32m-> 1646\u001b[0;31m \u001b[0;32mraise\u001b[0m \u001b[0mKeyError\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m(\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34mf\"{not_found} not in index\"\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m)\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[0m\u001b[1;32m 1647\u001b[0m \u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n\u001b[1;32m 1648\u001b[0m \u001b[0;31m# we skip the warning on Categorical/Interval\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0;34m\u001b[0m\u001b[0m\n",
"\u001b[0;31mKeyError\u001b[0m: \"['sector_ids'] not in index\""
"name": "stdout",
"output_type": "stream",
"text": [
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00058.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00059.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00060.md\n",
"Updating ../generated_pages/counters/C00065.md\n",
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"Temp: objecttype metatechnique\n",
"updated ../generated_pages/metatechniques_index.md\n",
"Temp: objecttype actortype\n",
"updated ../generated_pages/actortypes_index.md\n",
"updated ../generated_pages/responsetype_index.md\n",
"updated ../generated_pages/detections_index.md\n",
"updated ../generated_pages/tactics_by_responsetype_table.md\n",
"updated ../generated_pages/metatechniques_by_responsetype_table.md\n"
]
}
],

104
CODE/temp_techs.csv
View file

@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
DISARM Technique,DISARM Subtechnique,Description,DISARM ID
Determine Target Audiences,,,T0001
Determine Strategic Ends,,,T0002
Dismiss,,Push back against criticism by dismissing your critics. This might be arguing that the critics use a different standard for you than with other actors or themselves; or arguing that their criticism is biased.,T0003
Distort,,"Twist the narrative. Take information, or artifacts like images, and change the framing around them.",T0004
Distract,,"Shift attention to a different narrative or actor, for instance by accusing critics of the same activity that they’ve accused you of (e.g. police brutality).",T0005
Dismay,,"Threaten the critic or narrator of events. For instance, threaten journalists or news outlets reporting on a story.",T0006
Divide,,"Create conflict between subgroups, to widen divisions in a community",T0007
Degrade Adversary,,Plan to degrade an adversary’s image or ability to act. This could include preparation and use of harmful information about the adversary’s actions or reputation.,T0008
Facilitate State Propaganda,,Organize citizens around pro-state messaging. Coordinate paid or volunteer groups to push state propaganda.,T0009
Map Target Audience Information Environment,,"Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience.
Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging.",T0010
Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,,"Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment.
Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. ",T0011
Segment Audiences,,"Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. ",T0013
Develop New Narratives,,,T0014
Leverage Existing Narratives,,"Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consitent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplifiction practices. ",T0015
Develop Competing Narratives,,"Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on. These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the ""firehose of misinformation"" approach.",T0016
Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives,,"""Conspiracy narratives"" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the ""firehose of falsehoods"" model. ",T0017
Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative,,"An influence operation may seek to exploit the preexisting weaknesses, fears, and enemies of the target audience for integration into the operation’s narratives and overall strategy. Integrating existing vulnerabilities into the operational approach conserves resources by exploiting already weak areas of the target information environment instead of forcing the operation to create new vulnerabilities in the environment.",T0018
Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis,,"Media attention on a story or event is heightened during a breaking news event, where unclear facts and incomplete information increase speculation, rumors, and conspiracy theories, which are all vulnerable to manipulation. ",T0019
Demand insurmountable proof,,"Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the ""firehose of misinformation"". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of ""questions"" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof.",T0020
Reuse Existing Content,,When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content. ,T0021
Develop Text-based Content,,,T0022
Develop Image-based Content,,,T0023
Develop Video-based Content,,,T0024
Develop Audio-based Content,,,T0025
Generate information pollution,,"Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. ""Nothing is true, but everything is possible."" Akin to astroturfing campaign.",T0026
Distort facts,,"Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content",T0027
Create hashtags and search artifacts,,"Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag groups. Many incident-based campaigns will create hashtags to promote their fabricated event. Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: 1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only ""real"" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name!, and 2. Publicize the story more widely through trending lists and search behavior. Asset needed to direct/control/manage ""conversation"" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites). ",T0028
Obtain Private Documents,,,T0029
Create Inauthentic Accounts,,,T0030
Recruit bad actors,,,T0031
Cultivate ignorant agents,,"Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as ""useful idiots"" or ""unwitting agents"".",T0032
Build Network,,,T0033
Acquire/ recruit Network,,,T0034
Infiltrate Existing Networks,,,T0035
Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups,,"Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets. Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are.",T0036
Create inauthentic websites,,"Create media assets to support inauthentic organizations (e.g. think tank), people (e.g. experts) and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations.",T0037
Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities,,"Create or coopt broadcast capabilities (e.g. TV, radio etc).",T0038
Develop Owned Media Assets,,"An owned media asset refers to an agency or organization through which an influence operation may create, develop, and host content and narratives. Owned media assets include websites, blogs, social media pages, forums, and other platforms that facilitate the creation and organization of content.",T0039
Prepare fundraising campaigns,,"Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. ",T0040
Leverage Content Farm,,,T0041
Compromise legitimate accounts,,Hack or take over legimate accounts to distribute misinformation or damaging content.,T0042
Create fake experts,,"Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself. ",T0043
Create personas,,,T0044
Establish Inauthentic News Sites,,"Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details.",T0045
Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities,,"An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities.
An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to confirm that the URL is correct. ",T0046
Co-opt Trusted Sources,,"An influence operation may co-opt trusted sources by infiltrating or repurposing a source to reach a target audience through existing, previously reliable networks. Co-opted trusted sources may include:
- National or local new outlets
- Research or academic publications
- Online blogs or websites ",T0047
Create Clickbait,,"Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humor) required to drive traffic & engagement. This is a key asset.",T0048
Purchase Targeted Advertisements,,Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations,T0049
Create Localized Content,,"Localized content refers to content that appeals to a specific community of individuals, often in defined geographic areas. An operation may create localized content using local language and dialects to resonate with its target audience and blend in with other local news and social media. Localized content may help an operation increase legitimacy, avoid detection, and complicate external attribution.",T0050
Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,"An echo chamber refers to an internet subgroup, often along ideological lines, where individuals only engage with “others with which they are already in agreement.” A filter bubble refers to an algorithm's placement of an individual in content that they agree with or regularly engage with, possibly entrapping the user into a bubble of their own making. An operation may create these isolated areas of the internet by match existing groups, or aggregating individuals into a single target audience based on shared interests, politics, values, demographics, and other characteristics. Echo chambers and filter bubbles help to reinforce similar biases and content to the same target audience members. ",T0051
Chat apps,,"Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety.",T0052
Livestream,,,T0053
Social Networks,,,T0054
Media Sharing Networks,,"Media sharing networks refer to services whose primary function is the hosting and sharing of specific forms of media. Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, Youtube, SoundCloud.",T0055
Discussion Forums,,"Platforms for finding, discussing, and sharing information and opinions. Examples include Reddit, Quora, Digg, message boards, interest-based discussion forums, etc.",T0056
Bookmarking and Content Curation,,"Platforms for searching, sharing, and curating content and media. Examples include Pinterest, Flipboard, etc.",T0057
Blogging and Publishing Networks,,"Examples include WordPress, Blogger, Weebly, Tumblr, Medium, etc. ",T0058
Consumer Review Networks,,"Platforms for finding, reviewing, and sharing information about brands, products, services, restaurants, travel destinations, etc. Examples include Yelp, TripAdvisor, etc.",T0059
Online polls,,"Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well",T0060
Formal Diplomatic Channels,,,T0061
Traditional Media,,"Examples include TV, Newspaper, Radio, etc.",T0062
Email,,,T0063
Trial content,,"Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content enagagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates",T0064
Bait legitimate influencers,,"Credibility in a social media environment is often a function of the size of a user's network. ""Influencers"" are so-called because of their reach, typically understood as: 1) the size of their network (i.e. the number of followers, perhaps weighted by their own influence); and 2) The rate at which their comments are re-circulated (these two metrics are related). Add traditional media players at all levels of credibility and professionalism to this, and the number of potential influencial carriers available for unwitting amplification becomes substantial. By targeting high-influence people and organizations in all types of media with narratives and content engineered to appeal their emotional or ideological drivers, influence campaigns are able to add perceived credibility to their messaging via saturation and adoption by trusted agents such as celebrities, journalists and local leaders.",T0065
Seed Kernel of truth,,"Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths. Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies. When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters.",T0066
Seed distortions,,"Try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event, to give a misleading account or impression. ",T0067
Use fake experts,,"Use the fake experts that were set up during Establish Legitimacy. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give ""credility"" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias",T0068
Use Search Engine Optimization,,"Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka ""Black-hat SEO"" ",T0069
Employ Commercial Analytic Firms,,"Commercial analytic firms collect data on target audience activities and evaluate the data to detect trends, such as content receiving high click-rates. An influence operation may employ commercial analytic firms to facilitate external collection on its target audience, complicating attribution efforts and better tailoring the content to audience preferences. ",T0070
Deliver Ads,,Delivering content via any form of paid media or advertising.,T0071
Post Content,,Delivering content by posting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). ,T0072
Comment or Reply on Content,,Delivering content by replying or commenting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). ,T0073
Attract Traditional Media,,Deliver content by attracting the attention of traditional media (earned media).,T0074
Flooding the Information Space,,Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.,T0075
Amplify Existing Narrative,,An influence operation may amplify existing narratives that align with its narratives to support operation objectives. ,T0076
Cross-Posting,,"Cross-posting refers to posting the same message to multiple internet discussions, social media platforms or accounts, or news groups at one time. An influence operation may post content online in multiple communities and platforms to increase the chances of content exposure to the target audience. ",T0077
Incentivize Sharing,,"Incentivizing content sharing refers to actions that encourage users to share content themselves, reducing the need for the operation itself to post and promote its own content.",T0078
Manipulate Platform Algorithm,,"Manipulating a platform algorithm refers to conducting activity on a platform in a way that intentionally targets its underlying algorithm. After analyzing a platform’s algorithm (see: Select Platforms), an influence operation may use a platform in a way that increases its content exposure, avoids content removal, or otherwise benefits the operation’s strategy. For example, an influence operation may use bots to amplify its posts so that the platform’s algorithm recognizes engagement with operation content and further promotes the content on user timelines. ",T0079
Direct Users to Alternative Platforms,,"Direct users to alternative platforms refers to encouraging users to move from the platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage with content on alternate information channels, including separate social media channels and inauthentic websites. An operation may drive users to alternative platforms to diversify its information channels and ensure the target audience knows where to access operation content if the initial platform suspends, flags, or otherwise removes original operation assets and content. ",T0080
Harass,,"Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ",T0081
Censor social media as a political force,,Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports).,T0082
Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations,,Controling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition messaging.,T0083
Suppress Opposition,,,T0084
Platform Filtering,,Platform filtering refers to the decontextualization of information as claims cross platforms (from Joan Donovan https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/disinformation-design-use-evidence-collages-and-platform-filtering-media-manipulation),T0085
Encourage Attendance at Events,,Operation encourages attendance at existing real world event.,T0086
Organize Events,,"Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives.",T0087
Conduct fundraising,,"Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services166 on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. ",T0088
Physical Violence,,"Physical violence refers to the use of force to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy. An influence operation may conduct or encourage physical violence to discourage opponents from promoting conflicting content or draw attention to operation narratives using shock value. ",T0089
Merchandising/ Advertising,,Merchandising/Advertising refers to getting the message or narrative into physical space in the offline world,T0090
Conceal People,,Conceal the identity or provenance of the account and people assets.,T0091
Conceal Operational Activity,,,T0092
Conceal Infrastructure,,,T0093
Exploit TOS/Content Moderation,,,T0094
Play the long game,,Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold 2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative.,T0095
Measure Performance,,,T0096
Measure Effectiveness,,,T0097
Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs),,,
1 DISARM Technique DISARM Subtechnique Description DISARM ID
2 Determine Target Audiences T0001
3 Determine Strategic Ends T0002
4 Dismiss Push back against criticism by dismissing your critics. This might be arguing that the critics use a different standard for you than with other actors or themselves; or arguing that their criticism is biased. T0003
5 Distort Twist the narrative. Take information, or artifacts like images, and change the framing around them. T0004
6 Distract Shift attention to a different narrative or actor, for instance by accusing critics of the same activity that they’ve accused you of (e.g. police brutality). T0005
7 Dismay Threaten the critic or narrator of events. For instance, threaten journalists or news outlets reporting on a story. T0006
8 Divide Create conflict between subgroups, to widen divisions in a community T0007
9 Degrade Adversary Plan to degrade an adversary’s image or ability to act. This could include preparation and use of harmful information about the adversary’s actions or reputation. T0008
10 Facilitate State Propaganda Organize citizens around pro-state messaging. Coordinate paid or volunteer groups to push state propaganda. T0009
11 Map Target Audience Information Environment Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience. Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging. T0010
12 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment. Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. T0011
13 Segment Audiences Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. T0013
14 Develop New Narratives T0014
15 Leverage Existing Narratives Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consitent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplifiction practices. T0015
16 Develop Competing Narratives Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on. These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the "firehose of misinformation" approach. T0016
17 Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives "Conspiracy narratives" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the "firehose of falsehoods" model. T0017
18 Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative An influence operation may seek to exploit the preexisting weaknesses, fears, and enemies of the target audience for integration into the operation’s narratives and overall strategy. Integrating existing vulnerabilities into the operational approach conserves resources by exploiting already weak areas of the target information environment instead of forcing the operation to create new vulnerabilities in the environment. T0018
19 Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis Media attention on a story or event is heightened during a breaking news event, where unclear facts and incomplete information increase speculation, rumors, and conspiracy theories, which are all vulnerable to manipulation. T0019
20 Demand insurmountable proof Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the "firehose of misinformation". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of "questions" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof. T0020
21 Reuse Existing Content When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content. T0021
22 Develop Text-based Content T0022
23 Develop Image-based Content T0023
24 Develop Video-based Content T0024
25 Develop Audio-based Content T0025
26 Generate information pollution Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. "Nothing is true, but everything is possible." Akin to astroturfing campaign. T0026
27 Distort facts Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content T0027
28 Create hashtags and search artifacts Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag groups. Many incident-based campaigns will create hashtags to promote their fabricated event. Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: 1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only "real" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name!, and 2. Publicize the story more widely through trending lists and search behavior. Asset needed to direct/control/manage "conversation" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites). T0028
29 Obtain Private Documents T0029
30 Create Inauthentic Accounts T0030
31 Recruit bad actors T0031
32 Cultivate ignorant agents Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as "useful idiots" or "unwitting agents". T0032
33 Build Network T0033
34 Acquire/ recruit Network T0034
35 Infiltrate Existing Networks T0035
36 Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets. Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are. T0036
37 Create inauthentic websites Create media assets to support inauthentic organizations (e.g. think tank), people (e.g. experts) and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations. T0037
38 Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities Create or coopt broadcast capabilities (e.g. TV, radio etc). T0038
39 Develop Owned Media Assets An owned media asset refers to an agency or organization through which an influence operation may create, develop, and host content and narratives. Owned media assets include websites, blogs, social media pages, forums, and other platforms that facilitate the creation and organization of content. T0039
40 Prepare fundraising campaigns Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. T0040
41 Leverage Content Farm T0041
42 Compromise legitimate accounts Hack or take over legimate accounts to distribute misinformation or damaging content. T0042
43 Create fake experts Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself. T0043
44 Create personas T0044
45 Establish Inauthentic News Sites Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details. T0045
46 Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities. An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to confirm that the URL is correct. T0046
47 Co-opt Trusted Sources An influence operation may co-opt trusted sources by infiltrating or repurposing a source to reach a target audience through existing, previously reliable networks. Co-opted trusted sources may include: - National or local new outlets - Research or academic publications - Online blogs or websites T0047
48 Create Clickbait Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humor) required to drive traffic & engagement. This is a key asset. T0048
49 Purchase Targeted Advertisements Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations T0049
50 Create Localized Content Localized content refers to content that appeals to a specific community of individuals, often in defined geographic areas. An operation may create localized content using local language and dialects to resonate with its target audience and blend in with other local news and social media. Localized content may help an operation increase legitimacy, avoid detection, and complicate external attribution. T0050
51 Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles An echo chamber refers to an internet subgroup, often along ideological lines, where individuals only engage with “others with which they are already in agreement.” A filter bubble refers to an algorithm's placement of an individual in content that they agree with or regularly engage with, possibly entrapping the user into a bubble of their own making. An operation may create these isolated areas of the internet by match existing groups, or aggregating individuals into a single target audience based on shared interests, politics, values, demographics, and other characteristics. Echo chambers and filter bubbles help to reinforce similar biases and content to the same target audience members. T0051
52 Chat apps Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety. T0052
53 Livestream T0053
54 Social Networks T0054
55 Media Sharing Networks Media sharing networks refer to services whose primary function is the hosting and sharing of specific forms of media. Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, Youtube, SoundCloud. T0055
56 Discussion Forums Platforms for finding, discussing, and sharing information and opinions. Examples include Reddit, Quora, Digg, message boards, interest-based discussion forums, etc. T0056
57 Bookmarking and Content Curation Platforms for searching, sharing, and curating content and media. Examples include Pinterest, Flipboard, etc. T0057
58 Blogging and Publishing Networks Examples include WordPress, Blogger, Weebly, Tumblr, Medium, etc. T0058
59 Consumer Review Networks Platforms for finding, reviewing, and sharing information about brands, products, services, restaurants, travel destinations, etc. Examples include Yelp, TripAdvisor, etc. T0059
60 Online polls Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well T0060
61 Formal Diplomatic Channels T0061
62 Traditional Media Examples include TV, Newspaper, Radio, etc. T0062
63 Email T0063
64 Trial content Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content enagagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates T0064
65 Bait legitimate influencers Credibility in a social media environment is often a function of the size of a user's network. "Influencers" are so-called because of their reach, typically understood as: 1) the size of their network (i.e. the number of followers, perhaps weighted by their own influence); and 2) The rate at which their comments are re-circulated (these two metrics are related). Add traditional media players at all levels of credibility and professionalism to this, and the number of potential influencial carriers available for unwitting amplification becomes substantial. By targeting high-influence people and organizations in all types of media with narratives and content engineered to appeal their emotional or ideological drivers, influence campaigns are able to add perceived credibility to their messaging via saturation and adoption by trusted agents such as celebrities, journalists and local leaders. T0065
66 Seed Kernel of truth Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths. Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies. When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters. T0066
67 Seed distortions Try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event, to give a misleading account or impression. T0067
68 Use fake experts Use the fake experts that were set up during Establish Legitimacy. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give "credility" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias T0068
69 Use Search Engine Optimization Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka "Black-hat SEO" T0069
70 Employ Commercial Analytic Firms Commercial analytic firms collect data on target audience activities and evaluate the data to detect trends, such as content receiving high click-rates. An influence operation may employ commercial analytic firms to facilitate external collection on its target audience, complicating attribution efforts and better tailoring the content to audience preferences. T0070
71 Deliver Ads Delivering content via any form of paid media or advertising. T0071
72 Post Content Delivering content by posting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). T0072
73 Comment or Reply on Content Delivering content by replying or commenting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). T0073
74 Attract Traditional Media Deliver content by attracting the attention of traditional media (earned media). T0074
75 Flooding the Information Space Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect. T0075
76 Amplify Existing Narrative An influence operation may amplify existing narratives that align with its narratives to support operation objectives. T0076
77 Cross-Posting Cross-posting refers to posting the same message to multiple internet discussions, social media platforms or accounts, or news groups at one time. An influence operation may post content online in multiple communities and platforms to increase the chances of content exposure to the target audience. T0077
78 Incentivize Sharing Incentivizing content sharing refers to actions that encourage users to share content themselves, reducing the need for the operation itself to post and promote its own content. T0078
79 Manipulate Platform Algorithm Manipulating a platform algorithm refers to conducting activity on a platform in a way that intentionally targets its underlying algorithm. After analyzing a platform’s algorithm (see: Select Platforms), an influence operation may use a platform in a way that increases its content exposure, avoids content removal, or otherwise benefits the operation’s strategy. For example, an influence operation may use bots to amplify its posts so that the platform’s algorithm recognizes engagement with operation content and further promotes the content on user timelines. T0079
80 Direct Users to Alternative Platforms Direct users to alternative platforms refers to encouraging users to move from the platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage with content on alternate information channels, including separate social media channels and inauthentic websites. An operation may drive users to alternative platforms to diversify its information channels and ensure the target audience knows where to access operation content if the initial platform suspends, flags, or otherwise removes original operation assets and content. T0080
81 Harass Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. T0081
82 Censor social media as a political force Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports). T0082
83 Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations Controling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition messaging. T0083
84 Suppress Opposition T0084
85 Platform Filtering Platform filtering refers to the decontextualization of information as claims cross platforms (from Joan Donovan https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/disinformation-design-use-evidence-collages-and-platform-filtering-media-manipulation) T0085
86 Encourage Attendance at Events Operation encourages attendance at existing real world event. T0086
87 Organize Events Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives. T0087
88 Conduct fundraising Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services166 on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. T0088
89 Physical Violence Physical violence refers to the use of force to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy. An influence operation may conduct or encourage physical violence to discourage opponents from promoting conflicting content or draw attention to operation narratives using shock value. T0089
90 Merchandising/ Advertising Merchandising/Advertising refers to getting the message or narrative into physical space in the offline world T0090
91 Conceal People Conceal the identity or provenance of the account and people assets. T0091
92 Conceal Operational Activity T0092
93 Conceal Infrastructure T0093
94 Exploit TOS/Content Moderation T0094
95 Play the long game Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold 2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative. T0095
96 Measure Performance T0096
97 Measure Effectiveness T0097
98 Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)

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DISARM Subtechnique_x,DISARM Technique,Description_x,DISARM ID_x,DISARM Subtechnique_y,Description_y,DISARM ID_y
Discredit Credible Sources,Dismiss,"Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and degrade public trust in reporting, by discrediting credible sources. This makes it easier to promote influence operation content.",ST0001,,Push back against criticism by dismissing your critics. This might be arguing that the critics use a different standard for you than with other actors or themselves; or arguing that their criticism is biased.,T0003
Monitor Social Media Analytics,Map Target Audience Information Environment,"An influence operation may use social media analytics to determine which factors will increase the operation content’s exposure to its target audience on social media platforms, including views, interactions, and sentiment relating to topics and content types. The social media platform itself or a third-party tool may collect the metrics. ",ST0002,,"Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience.
Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging.",T0010
Evaluate Media Surveys,Map Target Audience Information Environment,"An influence operation may evaluate its own or third-party media surveys to determine what type of content appeals to its target audience. Media surveys may provide insight into an audience’s political views, social class, general interests, or other indicators used to tailor operation messaging to its target audience.",ST0003,,"Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience.
Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging.",T0010
Identify Trending Topics/Hashtags,Map Target Audience Information Environment,An influence operation may identify trending hashtags on social media platforms for later use in boosting operation content. A hashtag40 refers to a word or phrase preceded by the hash symbol (#) on social media used to identify messages and posts relating to a specific topic. All public posts that use the same hashtag are aggregated onto a centralized page dedicated to the word or phrase and sorted either chronologically or by popularity. ,ST0004,,"Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience.
Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging.",T0010
Conduct Web Traffic Analysis,Map Target Audience Information Environment,"An influence operation may conduct web traffic analysis to determine which search engines, keywords, websites, and advertisements gain the most traction with its target audience.",ST0005,,"Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience.
Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging.",T0010
Assess Degree/Type of Media Access,Map Target Audience Information Environment,"An influence operation may survey a target audience’s Internet availability and degree of media freedom to determine which target audience members will have access to operation content and on which platforms. An operation may face more difficulty targeting an information environment with heavy restrictions and media control than an environment with independent media, freedom of speech and of the press, and individual liberties. ",ST0006,,"Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience.
Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging.",T0010
Find Echo Chambers,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,"Find or plan to create areas (social media groups, search term groups, hashtag groups etc) where individuals only engage with people they agree with. ",ST0007,,"Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment.
Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. ",T0011
Identify Data Voids,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,"A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation.
A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news” data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalizing on most search engines’ preferences for recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas, isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term. ",ST0008,,"Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment.
Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. ",T0011
Identify Existing Prejudices,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,"An influence operation may exploit existing racial, religious, demographic, or social prejudices to further polarize its target audience from the rest of the public.",ST0009,,"Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment.
Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. ",T0011
Identify Existing Fissures,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,"An influence operation may identify existing fissures to pit target populations against one another or facilitate a “divide-and-conquer"" approach to tailor operation narratives along the divides.",ST0010,,"Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment.
Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. ",T0011
Identify Existing Conspiracy Narratives/Suspicions,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,An influence operation may assess preexisting conspiracy theories or suspicions in a population to identify existing narratives that support operational objectives. ,ST0011,,"Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment.
Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. ",T0011
Identify Wedge Issues,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,"A wedge issue is a divisive political issue, usually concerning a social phenomenon, that divides individuals along a defined line. An influence operation may exploit wedge issues by intentionally polarizing the public along the wedge issue line and encouraging opposition between factions.",ST0012,,"Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment.
Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. ",T0011
Identify Target Audience Adversaries,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,"An influence operation may identify or create a real or imaginary adversary to center operation narratives against. A real adversary may include certain politicians or political parties while imaginary adversaries may include falsified “deep state”62 actors that, according to conspiracies, run the state behind public view. ",ST0013,,"Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment.
Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. ",T0011
Identify Media System Vulnerabilities,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,"An influence operation may exploit existing weaknesses in a target’s media system. These weaknesses may include existing biases among media agencies, vulnerability to false news agencies on social media, or existing distrust of traditional media sources. An existing distrust among the public in the media system’s credibility holds high potential for exploitation by an influence operation when establishing alternative news agencies to spread operation content. ",ST0014,,"Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment.
Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. ",T0011
Geographic Segmentation,Segment Audiences,"An influence operation may target populations in a specific geographic location, such as a region, state, or city. An influence operation may use geographic segmentation to Create Localized Content (see: Establish Legitimacy). ",ST0015,,"Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. ",T0012
Demographic Segmentation,Segment Audiences,"An influence operation may target populations based on demographic segmentation, including age, gender, and income. Demographic segmentation may be useful for influence operations aiming to change state policies that affect a specific population sector. For example, an influence operation attempting to influence Medicare funding in the United States would likely target U.S. voters over 65 years of age. ",ST0016,,"Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. ",T0012
Economic Segmentation,Segment Audiences,"An influence operation may target populations based on their income bracket, wealth, or other financial or economic division. ",ST0017,,"Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. ",T0012
Psychographic Segmentation,Segment Audiences,"An influence operation may target populations based on psychographic segmentation, which uses audience values and decision-making processes. An operation may individually gather psychographic data with its own surveys or collection tools or externally purchase data from social media companies or online surveys, such as personality quizzes. ",ST0018,,"Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. ",T0012
Political Segmentation,Segment Audiences,"An influence operation may target populations based on their political affiliations, especially when aiming to manipulate voting or change policy.",ST0019,,"Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. ",T0012
Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narrative,Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives,,ST0020,,"""Conspiracy narratives"" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the ""firehose of falsehoods"" model. ",T0016
Develop Original Conspiracy Theory Narratives,Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives,,ST0021,,"""Conspiracy narratives"" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the ""firehose of falsehoods"" model. ",T0016
Use Copypasta,Reuse Existing Content,"Copypasta refers to a piece of text that has been copied and pasted multiple times across various online platforms. A copypasta’s final form may differ from its original source text as users add, delete, or otherwise edit the content as they repost the text. ",ST0022,,When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content. ,T0020
Plagiarize Content,Reuse Existing Content,,ST0023,,When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content. ,T0020
Deceptively Labeled or Translated,Reuse Existing Content,,ST0024,,When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content. ,T0020
Appropriate Content,Reuse Existing Content,,ST0025,,When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content. ,T0020
Develop AI-Generated Text,Develop Text-based Content,"AI-generated texts refers to synthetic text composed by computers using text-generating AI technology. Autonomous generation refers to content created by a bot without human input, also known as bot-created content generation. Autonomous generation represents the next step in automation after language generation and may lead to automated journalism. An influence operation may use read fakes or autonomous generation to quickly develop and distribute content to the target audience.",ST0026,,,T0021
Develop False or Altered Documents,Develop Text-based Content,,ST0027,,,T0021
Develop Inauthentic News Articles,Develop Text-based Content,,ST0028,,,T0021
Develop Memes,Develop Image-based Content,"Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns.",ST0029,,,T0022
Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes),Develop Image-based Content,"Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.",ST0030,,,T0022
Deceptively Edit Image (Cheap fakes),Develop Image-based Content,"Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.",ST0031,,,T0022
Aggregate Information into Evidence Collages,Develop Image-based Content,image files that aggregate positive evidence (Joan Donovan),ST0032,,,T0022
 Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes),Develop Video-based Content,"Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.",ST0033,,,T0023
Deceptively Edit Video (Cheap fakes),Develop Video-based Content,"Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.",ST0034,,,T0023
Develop AI-Generated Audio (Deepfakes),Develop Audio-based Content,"Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.",ST0035,,,T0024
Deceptively Edit Audio (Cheap fakes),Develop Audio-based Content,"Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.",ST0036,,,T0024
Create fake research,Generate information pollution,"Create fake academic research. Example: fake social science research is often aimed at hot-button social issues such as gender, race and sexuality. Fake science research can target Climate Science debate or pseudoscience like anti-vaxx",ST0037,,"Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. ""Nothing is true, but everything is possible."" Akin to astroturfing campaign.",T0025
Hijack Hashtags,Generate information pollution,,ST0038,,"Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. ""Nothing is true, but everything is possible."" Akin to astroturfing campaign.",T0025
Reframe Context,Distort facts,"Reframing context refers to removing an event from its surrounding context to distort its intended meaning. Rather than deny that an event occurred, reframing context frames an event in a manner that may lead the target audience to draw a different conclusion about its intentions. ",ST0039,,"Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content",T0026
Edit Open-Source Content,Distort facts,"An influence operation may edit open-source content, such as collaborative blogs or encyclopedias, to promote its narratives on outlets with existing credibility and audiences. Editing open-source content may allow an operation to post content on platforms without dedicating resources to the creation and maintenance of its own assets. ",ST0040,,"Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content",T0026
Leak Authentic Documents,Obtain Private Documents,,ST0041,,,T0028
Leak False Documents,Obtain Private Documents,,ST0042,,,T0028
Leak Altered Documents,Obtain Private Documents,"Obtain documents (eg by theft or leak), then alter and release, possibly among factual documents/sources.",ST0043,,,T0028
Create Anonymous Accounts,Create Inauthentic Accounts,Anonymous accounts or anonymous users refer to users that access network resources without providing a username or password. An influence operation may use anonymous accounts to spread content without direct attribution to the operation. ,ST0044,,,T0029
Create Cyborg Accounts,Create Inauthentic Accounts,"Cyborg accounts refer to partly manned, partly automated social media accounts. Cyborg accounts primarily act as bots, but a human operator periodically takes control of the account to engage with real social media users by responding to comments and posting original content. Influence operations may use cyborg accounts to reduce the amount of direct human input required to maintain a regular account but increase the apparent legitimacy of the cyborg account by occasionally breaking its bot-like behavior with human interaction. ",ST0045,,,T0029
Create Bot Accounts,Create Inauthentic Accounts,"Bots refer to autonomous internet users that interact with systems or other users while imitating traditional human behavior. Bots use a variety of tools to stay active without direct human operation, including artificial intelligence and big data analytics. For example, an individual may program a Twitter bot to retweet a tweet every time it contains a certain keyword or hashtag. An influence operation may use bots to increase its exposure and artificially promote its content across the internet without dedicating additional time or human resources.
Amplifier bots promote operation content through reposts, shares, and likes to increase the content’s online popularity. Hacker bots are traditionally covert bots running on computer scripts that rarely engage with users and work primarily as agents of larger cyberattacks, such as a Distributed Denial of Service attacks. Spammer bots are programmed to post content on social media or in comment sections, usually as a supplementary tool. Impersonator bots102 pose as real people by mimicking human behavior, complicating their detection. ",ST0046,,,T0029
Create Sockpuppet Accounts,Create Inauthentic Accounts,Sockpuppet accounts refer to falsified accounts that either promote the influence operation’s own material or attack critics of the material online. Individuals who control sockpuppet accounts also man at least one other user account.67 Sockpuppet accounts help legitimize operation narratives by providing an appearance of external support for the material and discrediting opponents of the operation. ,ST0047,,,T0029
Recruit Contractors,Recruit bad actors,,ST0048,,,T0030
Recruit Partisans,Recruit bad actors,,ST0049,,,T0030
Enlist Troll Accounts,Recruit bad actors,"An influence operation may hire trolls, or human operators of fake accounts that aim to provoke others by posting and amplifying content about controversial issues. Trolls can serve to discredit an influence operation’s opposition or bring attention to the operation’s cause through debate.
Classic trolls refer to regular people who troll for personal reasons, such as attention-seeking or boredom. Classic trolls may advance operation narratives by coincidence but are not directly affiliated with any larger operation. Conversely, hybrid trolls act on behalf of another institution, such as a state or financial organization, and post content with a specific ideological goal. Hybrid trolls may be highly advanced and institutionalized or less organized and work for a single individual. ",ST0050,,,T0030
Create Organizations,Build Network,"Influence operations may establish organizations with legitimate or falsified hierarchies, staff, and content to structure operation assets, provide a sense of legitimacy to the operation, or provide institutional backing to operation activities.",ST0051,,,T0032
Follow Trains,Build Network,,ST0052,,,T0032
Create Community or Sub-group,Build Network,,ST0053,,,T0032
Fund Proxies,Acquire/ recruit Network,"An influence operation may fund proxies, or external entities that work for the operation. An operation may recruit/train users with existing sympathies towards the operation’s narratives and/or goals as proxies. Funding proxies serves various purposes including:
- Diversifying operation locations to complicate attribution
- Reducing the workload for direct operation assets ",ST0054,,,T0033
Botnets,Acquire/ recruit Network,,ST0055,,,T0033
Identify susceptible targets in networks,Infiltrate Existing Networks,,ST0056,,,T0034
Utilize Butterfly Attack,Infiltrate Existing Networks,"Butterfly attacks occur when operators pretend to be members of a certain social group, usually a group that struggles for representation. An influence operation may mimic a group to insert controversial statements into the discourse, encourage the spread of operation content, or promote harassment among group members. Unlike astroturfing, butterfly attacks aim to infiltrate and discredit existing grassroots movements, organizations, and media campaigns. ",ST0057,,,T0034
From bad actors,Prepare fundraising campaigns,,ST0058,,"Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. ",T0039
From ignorant agents,Prepare fundraising campaigns,,ST0059,,"Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. ",T0039
Create a Content Farm,Leverage Content Farm,,ST0060,,,T0040
Outsource Content Creation to External Organizations,Leverage Content Farm,"An influence operation may outsource content creation to external companies to avoid attribution, increase the rate of content creation, or improve content quality, i.e., by employing an organization that can create content in the target audience’s native language. Employed organizations may include marketing companies for tailored advertisements or external content farms for high volumes of targeted media. ",ST0061,,,T0040
Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications,Create fake experts,,ST0062,,"Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself. ",T0042
Backstop personas ,Create personas,"Create other assets/dossier/cover/fake relationships and/or connections or documents, sites, bylines, attributions, to establish/augment/inflate crediblity/believability",ST0063,,,T0043
Create Inauthentic News Sites,Establish Inauthentic News Sites,,ST0064,,"Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details.",T0044
Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites,Establish Inauthentic News Sites,"An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities.
An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to confirm that the URL is correct. ",ST0065,,"Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details.",T0044
Astroturfing,Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities,"Astroturfing occurs when an influence operation disguises itself as grassroots movement or organization that supports operation narratives. Unlike butterfly attacks, astroturfing aims to increase the appearance of popular support for the operation cause and does not infiltrate existing groups to discredit their objectives. ",ST0066,,"An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities.
An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to confirm that the URL is correct. ",T0045
Spoof/parody account/site,Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities,,ST0067,,"An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities.
An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to confirm that the URL is correct. ",T0045
Co-Opt Trusted Individuals,Co-opt Trusted Sources,,ST0068,,"An influence operation may co-opt trusted sources by infiltrating or repurposing a source to reach a target audience through existing, previously reliable networks. Co-opted trusted sources may include:
- National or local new outlets
- Research or academic publications
- Online blogs or websites ",T0046
Co-Opt Grassroots Groups,Co-opt Trusted Sources,,ST0069,,"An influence operation may co-opt trusted sources by infiltrating or repurposing a source to reach a target audience through existing, previously reliable networks. Co-opted trusted sources may include:
- National or local new outlets
- Research or academic publications
- Online blogs or websites ",T0046
Co-opt Influencers,Co-opt Trusted Sources,,ST0070,,"An influence operation may co-opt trusted sources by infiltrating or repurposing a source to reach a target audience through existing, previously reliable networks. Co-opted trusted sources may include:
- National or local new outlets
- Research or academic publications
- Online blogs or websites ",T0046
Use existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,ST0071,,"An echo chamber refers to an internet subgroup, often along ideological lines, where individuals only engage with “others with which they are already in agreement.” A filter bubble refers to an algorithm's placement of an individual in content that they agree with or regularly engage with, possibly entrapping the user into a bubble of their own making. An operation may create these isolated areas of the internet by match existing groups, or aggregating individuals into a single target audience based on shared interests, politics, values, demographics, and other characteristics. Echo chambers and filter bubbles help to reinforce similar biases and content to the same target audience members. ",T0050
Create Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,ST0072,,"An echo chamber refers to an internet subgroup, often along ideological lines, where individuals only engage with “others with which they are already in agreement.” A filter bubble refers to an algorithm's placement of an individual in content that they agree with or regularly engage with, possibly entrapping the user into a bubble of their own making. An operation may create these isolated areas of the internet by match existing groups, or aggregating individuals into a single target audience based on shared interests, politics, values, demographics, and other characteristics. Echo chambers and filter bubbles help to reinforce similar biases and content to the same target audience members. ",T0050
Exploit Data Voids,Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,"A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation.
A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news” data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalizing on most search engines’ preferences for recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas, isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term. ",ST0073,,"An echo chamber refers to an internet subgroup, often along ideological lines, where individuals only engage with “others with which they are already in agreement.” A filter bubble refers to an algorithm's placement of an individual in content that they agree with or regularly engage with, possibly entrapping the user into a bubble of their own making. An operation may create these isolated areas of the internet by match existing groups, or aggregating individuals into a single target audience based on shared interests, politics, values, demographics, and other characteristics. Echo chambers and filter bubbles help to reinforce similar biases and content to the same target audience members. ",T0050
Use Encrypted Chat Apps,Chat apps,,ST0074,,"Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety.",T0051
Use Unencrypted Chats Apps,Chat apps,,ST0075,,"Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety.",T0051
Video Livestream,Livestream,,ST0076,,,T0052
Audio Livestream,Livestream,,ST0077,,,T0052
Mainstream Social Networks, Social Networks,"Examples include Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, VK, ",ST0078,,,T0053
Dating Apps, Social Networks,,ST0079,,,T0053
Private/Closed Social Networks, Social Networks,,ST0080,,,T0053
Interest-Based Networks, Social Networks,"Examples include smaller and niche networks including Gettr, Truth Social, Parler, etc.",ST0081,,,T0053
Use hashtags, Social Networks,"Use a dedicated, existing hashtag for the campaign/incident.",ST0082,,,T0053
Create dedicated hashtag, Social Networks,Create a campaign/incident specific hashtag.,ST0083,,,T0053
Photo Sharing,Media Sharing Networks,"Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, Flickr, etc",ST0084,,"Media sharing networks refer to services whose primary function is the hosting and sharing of specific forms of media. Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, Youtube, SoundCloud.",T0054
Video Sharing,Media Sharing Networks,"Examples include Youtube, TikTok, ShareChat, Rumble, etc",ST0085,,"Media sharing networks refer to services whose primary function is the hosting and sharing of specific forms of media. Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, Youtube, SoundCloud.",T0054
Audio sharing,Media Sharing Networks,"Examples include podcasting apps, Soundcloud, etc.",ST0086,,"Media sharing networks refer to services whose primary function is the hosting and sharing of specific forms of media. Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, Youtube, SoundCloud.",T0054
Anonymous Message Boards,Discussion Forums,Examples include the Chans,ST0087,,"Platforms for finding, discussing, and sharing information and opinions. Examples include Reddit, Quora, Digg, message boards, interest-based discussion forums, etc.",T0055
TV,Traditional Media,,ST0088,,"Examples include TV, Newspaper, Radio, etc.",T0061
Newspaper,Traditional Media,,ST0089,,"Examples include TV, Newspaper, Radio, etc.",T0061
Radio,Traditional Media,,ST0090,,"Examples include TV, Newspaper, Radio, etc.",T0061
Social media,Deliver Ads,,ST0091,,Delivering content via any form of paid media or advertising.,T0070
Traditional Media,Deliver Ads,"Examples include TV, Radio, Newspaper, billboards",ST0092,,Delivering content via any form of paid media or advertising.,T0070
Share Memes,Post Content,"Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns.",ST0093,,Delivering content by posting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). ,T0071
Post Violative Content to Provoke Takedown and Backlash,Post Content,,ST0094,,Delivering content by posting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). ,T0071
One-Way Direct Posting,Post Content,"Direct posting refers to a method of posting content via a one-way messaging service, where the recipient cannot directly respond to the poster’s messaging. An influence operation may post directly to promote operation narratives to the target audience without allowing opportunities for fact-checking or disagreement, creating a false sense of support for the narrative. ",ST0095,,Delivering content by posting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). ,T0071
Post inauthentic social media comment,Comment or Reply on Content,"Use government-paid social media commenters, astroturfers, chat bots (programmed to reply to specific key words/hashtags) influence online conversations, product reviews, web-site comment forums.",ST0096,,Delivering content by replying or commenting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). ,T0072
Trolls amplify and manipulate,Flooding the Information Space,"Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue (issues that can/are be politicized).",ST0097,,Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.,T0074
Hijack existing hashtag,Flooding the Information Space,Take over an existing hashtag to drive exposure.,ST0098,,Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.,T0074
Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting,Flooding the Information Space,"Automated forwarding and reposting refer to the proliferation of operation content using automated means, such as artificial intelligence or social media bots. An influence operation may use automated activity to increase content exposure without dedicating the resources, including personnel and time, traditionally required to forward and repost content.
Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more ""popular"" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive.",ST0099,,Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.,T0074
Utilize Spamoflauge,Flooding the Information Space,"Spamoflauge refers to the practice of disguising spam messages as legitimate. Spam refers to the use of electronic messaging systems to send out unrequested or unwanted messages in bulk. Simple methods of spamoflauge include replacing letters with numbers to fool keyword-based email spam filters, for example, ""you've w0n our jackp0t!"". Spamoflauge may extend to more complex techniques such as modifying the grammar or word choice of the language, casting messages as images which spam detectors cannot automatically read, or encapsulating messages in password protected attachments, such as .pdf or .zip files. Influence operations may use spamoflauge to avoid spam filtering systems and increase the likelihood of the target audience receiving operation messaging. ",ST0100,,Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.,T0074
Conduct Swarming,Flooding the Information Space,"Swarming refers to the coordinated use of accounts to overwhelm the information space with operation content. Unlike information flooding, swarming centers exclusively around a specific event or actor rather than a general narrative. Swarming relies on “horizontal communication” between information assets rather than a top-down, vertical command-and-control approach. ",ST0101,,Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.,T0074
Conduct Keyword Squatting,Flooding the Information Space,"Keyword squatting refers to the creation of online content, such as websites, articles, or social media accounts, around a specific search engine-optimized term to overwhelm the search results of that term. An influence may keyword squat to increase content exposure to target audience members who query the exploited term in a search engine and manipulate the narrative around the term. ",ST0102,,Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.,T0074
Inauthentic Sites Amplify News and Narratives,Flooding the Information Space,"Inauthentic sites circulate cross-post stories and amplify narratives. Often these sites have no masthead, bylines or attribution.",ST0103,,Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.,T0074
Post Across Groups,Cross-Posting,,ST0104,,"Cross-posting refers to posting the same message to multiple internet discussions, social media platforms or accounts, or news groups at one time. An influence operation may post content online in multiple communities and platforms to increase the chances of content exposure to the target audience. ",T0076
Post Across Platform,Cross-Posting,,ST0105,,"Cross-posting refers to posting the same message to multiple internet discussions, social media platforms or accounts, or news groups at one time. An influence operation may post content online in multiple communities and platforms to increase the chances of content exposure to the target audience. ",T0076
Post Across Disciplines,Cross-Posting,,ST0106,,"Cross-posting refers to posting the same message to multiple internet discussions, social media platforms or accounts, or news groups at one time. An influence operation may post content online in multiple communities and platforms to increase the chances of content exposure to the target audience. ",T0076
Use Affiliate Marketing Programs,Incentivize Sharing,,ST0107,,"Incentivizing content sharing refers to actions that encourage users to share content themselves, reducing the need for the operation itself to post and promote its own content.",T0077
Use Contests and Prizes,Incentivize Sharing,,ST0108,,"Incentivizing content sharing refers to actions that encourage users to share content themselves, reducing the need for the operation itself to post and promote its own content.",T0077
Bypass Content Blocking,Manipulate Platform Algorithm,"Bypassing content blocking refers to actions taken to circumvent network security measures that prevent users from accessing certain servers, resources, or other online spheres. An influence operation may bypass content blocking to proliferate its content on restricted areas of the internet. Common strategies for bypassing content blocking include:
- Altering IP addresses to avoid IP filtering
- Using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to avoid IP filtering
- Using a Content Delivery Network (CDN) to avoid IP filtering
- Enabling encryption to bypass packet inspection blocking
- Manipulating text to avoid filtering by keywords
- Posting content on multiple platforms to avoid platform-specific removals - Using local facilities or modified DNS servers to avoid DNS filtering ",ST0109,,"Manipulating a platform algorithm refers to conducting activity on a platform in a way that intentionally targets its underlying algorithm. After analyzing a platform’s algorithm (see: Select Platforms), an influence operation may use a platform in a way that increases its content exposure, avoids content removal, or otherwise benefits the operation’s strategy. For example, an influence operation may use bots to amplify its posts so that the platform’s algorithm recognizes engagement with operation content and further promotes the content on user timelines. ",T0078
"Boycott/""Cancel"" Opponents",Harass,"Cancel culture refers to the phenomenon in which individuals collectively refrain from supporting an individual, organization, business, or other entity, usually following a real or falsified controversy. An influence operation may exploit cancel culture by emphasizing an adversary’s problematic or disputed behavior and presenting its own content as an alternative. ",ST0110,,"Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ",T0080
Harass People Based on Identities,Harass,"Examples include social identities like gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, ability, nationality, etc. as well as roles and occupations like journalist or activist.",ST0111,,"Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ",T0080
Threaten to Dox,Harass,"Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ",ST0112,,"Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ",T0080
Dox,Harass,"Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ",ST0113,,"Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ",T0080
Delete Opposing Content,Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations,"Deleting opposing content refers to the removal of content that conflicts with operational narratives from selected platforms. An influence operation may delete opposing content to censor contradictory information from the target audience, allowing operation narratives to take priority in the information space.",ST0114,,Controling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition messaging.,T0082
Block Content,Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations,Content blocking refers to actions taken to restrict internet access or render certain areas of the internet inaccessible. An influence operation may restrict content based on both network and content attributes. ,ST0115,,Controling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition messaging.,T0082
Destroy Information Generation Capabilities,Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations,"Destroying information generation capabilities refers to actions taken to limit, degrade, or otherwise incapacitate an actor’s ability to generate conflicting information. An influence operation may destroy an actor’s information generation capabilities by physically dismantling the information infrastructure, disconnecting resources needed for information generation, or redirecting information generation personnel. An operation may destroy an adversary’s information generation capabilities to limit conflicting content exposure to the target audience and crowd the information space with its own narratives. ",ST0116,,Controling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition messaging.,T0082
Conduct Server Redirect,Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations,"A server redirect, also known as a URL redirect, occurs when a server automatically forwards a user from one URL to another using server-side scripting languages. An influence operation may conduct a server redirect to divert target audience members from one website to another without their knowledge. The redirected website may pose as a legitimate source, host malware, or otherwise aid operation objectives.",ST0117,,Controling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition messaging.,T0082
Report Non-Violative Opposing Content,Suppress Opposition,"Reporting opposing content refers to notifying and providing an instance of a violation of a platform’s guidelines and policies for conduct on the platform. In addition to simply reporting the content, an operation may leverage copyright regulations to trick social media and web platforms into removing opposing content by manipulating the content to appear in violation of copyright laws. Reporting opposing content facilitates the suppression of contradictory information and allows operation narratives to take priority in the information space. ",ST0118,,,T0083
Goad People into Harmful Action (Stop Hitting Yourself),Suppress Opposition,Goad people into actions that violate terms of service or will lead to having their content or accounts taken down. ,ST0119,,,T0083
Exploit Platform TOS/Content Moderation,Suppress Opposition,,ST0120,,,T0083
Call to action to attend ,Encourage Attendance at Events,,ST0121,,Operation encourages attendance at existing real world event.,T0085
Facilitate logistics or support for attendance,Encourage Attendance at Events,"Facilitate logistics or support for travel, food, housing, etc.",ST0122,,Operation encourages attendance at existing real world event.,T0085
Pay for Physical Action,Organize Events,"Paying for physical action occurs when an influence operation pays individuals to act in the physical realm. An influence operation may pay for physical action to create specific situations and frame them in a way that supports operation narratives, for example, paying a group of people to burn a car to later post an image of the burning car and frame it as an act of protest. ",ST0123,,"Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives.",T0086
Conduct Symbolic Action,Organize Events,"Symbolic action refers to activities specifically intended to advance an operation’s narrative by signaling something to the audience, for example, a military parade supporting a state’s narrative of military superiority. An influence operation may use symbolic action to create falsified evidence supporting operation narratives in the physical information space. ",ST0124,,"Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives.",T0086
Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns,Conduct fundraising,,ST0125,,"Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services166 on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. ",T0087
Conduct Physical Violence,Physical Violence,,ST0126,,"Physical violence refers to the use of force to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy. An influence operation may conduct or encourage physical violence to discourage opponents from promoting conflicting content or draw attention to operation narratives using shock value. ",T0088
Encourage Physical Violence,Physical Violence,,ST0127,,"Physical violence refers to the use of force to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy. An influence operation may conduct or encourage physical violence to discourage opponents from promoting conflicting content or draw attention to operation narratives using shock value. ",T0088
Sell Merchandise,Merchandising/ Advertising,"Selling merchandise refers to the sale of often branded items to the target audience. An influence operation may sell merchandise to raise funds and promote its messaging in the physical information space, for example, by selling t-shirts with operational messaging displayed on the clothing. ",ST0128,,Merchandising/Advertising refers to getting the message or narrative into physical space in the offline world,T0089
Use Pseudonyms,Conceal People,"An operation may use pseudonyms, or fake names, to mask the identity of operation accounts, publish anonymous content, or otherwise use falsified personas to conceal identity of the operation. An operation may coordinate pseudonyms across multiple platforms, for example, by writing an article under a pseudonym and then posting a link to the article on social media on an account with the same falsified name. ",ST0129,,Conceal the identity or provenance of the account and people assets.,T0090
Conceal Network Identity,Conceal People,"Concealing network identity aims to hide the existence an influence operation’s network completely. Unlike concealing sponsorship, concealing network identity denies the existence of any sort of organization. ",ST0130,,Conceal the identity or provenance of the account and people assets.,T0090
Distance Reputable Individuals from Operation,Conceal People,"Distancing reputable individuals from the operation occurs when enlisted individuals, such as celebrities or subject matter experts, actively disengage themselves from operation activities and messaging. Individuals may distance themselves from the operation by deleting old posts or statements, unfollowing operation information assets, or otherwise detaching themselves from the operation’s timeline. An influence operation may want reputable individuals to distance themselves from the operation to reduce operation exposure, particularly if the operation aims to remove all evidence.",ST0131,,Conceal the identity or provenance of the account and people assets.,T0090
Launder Accounts,Conceal People,Account laundering occurs when an influence operation acquires control of previously legitimate online accounts from third parties through sale or exchange and often in contravention of terms of use. Influence operations use laundered accounts to reach target audience members from an existing information channel and complicate attribution. ,ST0132,,Conceal the identity or provenance of the account and people assets.,T0090
Change Names of Accounts,Conceal People,Changing names of accounts occurs when an operation changes the name of an existing social media account. An operation may change the names of its accounts throughout an operation to avoid detection or alter the names of newly acquired or repurposed accounts to fit operational narratives. ,ST0133,,Conceal the identity or provenance of the account and people assets.,T0090
Conceal Network Identity,Conceal Operational Activity,"Concealing network identity aims to hide the existence an influence operation’s network completely. Unlike concealing sponsorship, concealing network identity denies the existence of any sort of organization. ",ST0134,,,T0091
Generate Content Unrelated to Narrative,Conceal Operational Activity,"An influence operation may mix its own operation content with legitimate news or external unrelated content to disguise operational objectives, narratives, or existence. For example, an operation may generate ""lifestyle"" or ""cuisine"" content alongside regular operation content. ",ST0135,,,T0091
Break Association with Content,Conceal Operational Activity,"Breaking association with content occurs when an influence operation actively separates itself from its own content. An influence operation may break association with content by unfollowing, unliking, or unsharing its content, removing attribution from its content, or otherwise taking actions that distance the operation from its messaging. An influence operation may break association with its content to complicate attribution or regain credibility for a new operation. ",ST0136,,,T0091
Delete URLs,Conceal Operational Activity,"URL deletion occurs when an influence operation completely removes its website registration, rendering the URL inaccessible. An influence operation may delete its URLs to complicate attribution or remove online documentation that the operation ever occurred.",ST0137,,,T0091
Coordinate on encrypted/ closed networks,Conceal Operational Activity,,ST0138,,,T0091
Deny involvement,Conceal Operational Activity,"Without ""smoking gun"" proof (and even with proof), incident creator can or will deny involvement. This technique also leverages the attacker advantages outlined in ""Demand insurmountable proof"", specifically the asymmetric disadvantage for truth-tellers in a ""firehose of misinformation"" environment.",ST0139,,,T0091
Delete Accounts/Account Activity,Conceal Operational Activity,"Deleting accounts and account activity occurs when an influence operation removes its online social media assets, including social media accounts, posts, likes, comments, and other online artifacts. An influence operation may delete its accounts and account activity to complicate attribution or remove online documentation that the operation ever occurred. ",ST0140,,,T0091
Redirect URLs,Conceal Operational Activity,"An influence operation may redirect its falsified or typosquatted URLs to legitimate websites to increase the operation's appearance of legitimacy, complicate attribution, and avoid detection. ",ST0141,,,T0091
Remove Post Origins,Conceal Operational Activity,"Removing post origins refers to the elimination of evidence that indicates the initial source of operation content, often to complicate attribution. An influence operation may remove post origins by deleting watermarks, renaming files, or removing embedded links in its content. ",ST0142,,,T0091
Misattribute Activity,Conceal Operational Activity,"Misattributed activity refers to incorrectly attributed operation activity. For example, a state sponsored influence operation may conduct operation activity in a way that mimics another state so that external entities misattribute activity to the incorrect state. An operation may misattribute their activities to complicate attribution, avoid detection, or frame an adversary for negative behavior. ",ST0143,,,T0091
Conceal Sponsorship,Conceal Infrastructure,"Concealing sponsorship aims to mislead or obscure the identity of the hidden sponsor behind an operation rather than entity publicly running the operation. Operations that conceal sponsorship may maintain visible falsified groups, news outlets, non-profits, or other organizations, but seek to mislead or obscure the identity sponsoring, funding, or otherwise supporting these entities.
Influence operations may use a variety of techniques to mask the location of their social media accounts to complicate attribution and conceal evidence of foreign interference. Operation accounts may set their location to a false place, often the location of the operation’s target audience, and post in the region’s language",ST0144,,,T0092
Utilize Bulletproof Hosting,Conceal Infrastructure,"Hosting refers to services through which storage and computing resources are provided to an individual or organization for the accommodation and maintenance of one or more websites and related services. Services may include web hosting, file sharing, and email distribution. Bulletproof hosting refers to services provided by an entity, such as a domain hosting or web hosting firm, that allows its customer considerable leniency in use of the service. An influence operation may utilize bulletproof hosting to maintain continuity of service for suspicious, illegal, or disruptive operation activities that stricter hosting services would limit, report, or suspend. ",ST0145,,,T0092
Use Shell Organizations,Conceal Infrastructure,,ST0146,,,T0092
Use Cryptocurrency,Conceal Infrastructure,,ST0147,,,T0092
Obfuscate Payment,Conceal Infrastructure,,ST0148,,,T0092
Legacy web content,Exploit TOS/Content Moderation,"Make incident content visible for a long time, e.g. by exploiting platform terms of service, or placing it where it's hard to remove or unlikely to be removed.",ST0149,,,T0093
Post Borderline Content,Exploit TOS/Content Moderation,,ST0150,,,T0093
People Focused,Measure Performance,,ST0151,,,T0095
Content Focused,Measure Performance,,ST0152,,,T0095
View Focused,Measure Performance,,ST0153,,,T0095
Behavior changes,Measure Effectiveness,Monitor and evaluate behaviour changes from misinformation incidents. ,ST0154,,,T0096
Content,Measure Effectiveness,,ST0155,,,T0096
Awareness,Measure Effectiveness,,ST0156,,,T0096
Knowledge,Measure Effectiveness,,ST0157,,,T0096
Action/attitude,Measure Effectiveness,,ST0158,,,T0096
Message reach,Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs),Monitor and evaluate message reach in misinformation incidents. ,ST0159,,,T0097
Social media engagement,Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs),Monitor and evaluate social media engagement in misinformation incidents.,ST0160,,,T0097
1 DISARM Subtechnique_x DISARM Technique Description_x DISARM ID_x DISARM Subtechnique_y Description_y DISARM ID_y
2 Discredit Credible Sources Dismiss Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and degrade public trust in reporting, by discrediting credible sources. This makes it easier to promote influence operation content. ST0001 Push back against criticism by dismissing your critics. This might be arguing that the critics use a different standard for you than with other actors or themselves; or arguing that their criticism is biased. T0003
3 Monitor Social Media Analytics Map Target Audience Information Environment An influence operation may use social media analytics to determine which factors will increase the operation content’s exposure to its target audience on social media platforms, including views, interactions, and sentiment relating to topics and content types. The social media platform itself or a third-party tool may collect the metrics. ST0002 Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience. Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging. T0010
4 Evaluate Media Surveys Map Target Audience Information Environment An influence operation may evaluate its own or third-party media surveys to determine what type of content appeals to its target audience. Media surveys may provide insight into an audience’s political views, social class, general interests, or other indicators used to tailor operation messaging to its target audience. ST0003 Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience. Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging. T0010
5 Identify Trending Topics/Hashtags Map Target Audience Information Environment An influence operation may identify trending hashtags on social media platforms for later use in boosting operation content. A hashtag40 refers to a word or phrase preceded by the hash symbol (#) on social media used to identify messages and posts relating to a specific topic. All public posts that use the same hashtag are aggregated onto a centralized page dedicated to the word or phrase and sorted either chronologically or by popularity. ST0004 Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience. Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging. T0010
6 Conduct Web Traffic Analysis Map Target Audience Information Environment An influence operation may conduct web traffic analysis to determine which search engines, keywords, websites, and advertisements gain the most traction with its target audience. ST0005 Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience. Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging. T0010
7 Assess Degree/Type of Media Access Map Target Audience Information Environment An influence operation may survey a target audience’s Internet availability and degree of media freedom to determine which target audience members will have access to operation content and on which platforms. An operation may face more difficulty targeting an information environment with heavy restrictions and media control than an environment with independent media, freedom of speech and of the press, and individual liberties. ST0006 Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience. Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging. T0010
8 Find Echo Chambers Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities Find or plan to create areas (social media groups, search term groups, hashtag groups etc) where individuals only engage with people they agree with. ST0007 Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment. Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. T0011
9 Identify Data Voids Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation. A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news” data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalizing on most search engines’ preferences for recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas, isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term. ST0008 Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment. Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. T0011
10 Identify Existing Prejudices Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities An influence operation may exploit existing racial, religious, demographic, or social prejudices to further polarize its target audience from the rest of the public. ST0009 Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment. Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. T0011
11 Identify Existing Fissures Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities An influence operation may identify existing fissures to pit target populations against one another or facilitate a “divide-and-conquer" approach to tailor operation narratives along the divides. ST0010 Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment. Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. T0011
12 Identify Existing Conspiracy Narratives/Suspicions Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities An influence operation may assess preexisting conspiracy theories or suspicions in a population to identify existing narratives that support operational objectives. ST0011 Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment. Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. T0011
13 Identify Wedge Issues Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities A wedge issue is a divisive political issue, usually concerning a social phenomenon, that divides individuals along a defined line. An influence operation may exploit wedge issues by intentionally polarizing the public along the wedge issue line and encouraging opposition between factions. ST0012 Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment. Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. T0011
14 Identify Target Audience Adversaries Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities An influence operation may identify or create a real or imaginary adversary to center operation narratives against. A real adversary may include certain politicians or political parties while imaginary adversaries may include falsified “deep state”62 actors that, according to conspiracies, run the state behind public view. ST0013 Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment. Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. T0011
15 Identify Media System Vulnerabilities Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities An influence operation may exploit existing weaknesses in a target’s media system. These weaknesses may include existing biases among media agencies, vulnerability to false news agencies on social media, or existing distrust of traditional media sources. An existing distrust among the public in the media system’s credibility holds high potential for exploitation by an influence operation when establishing alternative news agencies to spread operation content. ST0014 Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment. Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. T0011
16 Geographic Segmentation Segment Audiences An influence operation may target populations in a specific geographic location, such as a region, state, or city. An influence operation may use geographic segmentation to Create Localized Content (see: Establish Legitimacy). ST0015 Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. T0012
17 Demographic Segmentation Segment Audiences An influence operation may target populations based on demographic segmentation, including age, gender, and income. Demographic segmentation may be useful for influence operations aiming to change state policies that affect a specific population sector. For example, an influence operation attempting to influence Medicare funding in the United States would likely target U.S. voters over 65 years of age. ST0016 Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. T0012
18 Economic Segmentation Segment Audiences An influence operation may target populations based on their income bracket, wealth, or other financial or economic division. ST0017 Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. T0012
19 Psychographic Segmentation Segment Audiences An influence operation may target populations based on psychographic segmentation, which uses audience values and decision-making processes. An operation may individually gather psychographic data with its own surveys or collection tools or externally purchase data from social media companies or online surveys, such as personality quizzes. ST0018 Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. T0012
20 Political Segmentation Segment Audiences An influence operation may target populations based on their political affiliations, especially when aiming to manipulate voting or change policy. ST0019 Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. T0012
21 Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narrative Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives ST0020 "Conspiracy narratives" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the "firehose of falsehoods" model. T0016
22 Develop Original Conspiracy Theory Narratives Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives ST0021 "Conspiracy narratives" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the "firehose of falsehoods" model. T0016
23 Use Copypasta Reuse Existing Content Copypasta refers to a piece of text that has been copied and pasted multiple times across various online platforms. A copypasta’s final form may differ from its original source text as users add, delete, or otherwise edit the content as they repost the text. ST0022 When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content. T0020
24 Plagiarize Content Reuse Existing Content ST0023 When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content. T0020
25 Deceptively Labeled or Translated Reuse Existing Content ST0024 When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content. T0020
26 Appropriate Content Reuse Existing Content ST0025 When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content. T0020
27 Develop AI-Generated Text Develop Text-based Content AI-generated texts refers to synthetic text composed by computers using text-generating AI technology. Autonomous generation refers to content created by a bot without human input, also known as bot-created content generation. Autonomous generation represents the next step in automation after language generation and may lead to automated journalism. An influence operation may use read fakes or autonomous generation to quickly develop and distribute content to the target audience. ST0026 T0021
28 Develop False or Altered Documents Develop Text-based Content ST0027 T0021
29 Develop Inauthentic News Articles Develop Text-based Content ST0028 T0021
30 Develop Memes Develop Image-based Content Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns. ST0029 T0022
31 Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes) Develop Image-based Content Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures. ST0030 T0022
32 Deceptively Edit Image (Cheap fakes) Develop Image-based Content Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event. ST0031 T0022
33 Aggregate Information into Evidence Collages Develop Image-based Content image files that aggregate positive evidence (Joan Donovan) ST0032 T0022
34 Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes) Develop Video-based Content Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures. ST0033 T0023
35 Deceptively Edit Video (Cheap fakes) Develop Video-based Content Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event. ST0034 T0023
36 Develop AI-Generated Audio (Deepfakes) Develop Audio-based Content Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures. ST0035 T0024
37 Deceptively Edit Audio (Cheap fakes) Develop Audio-based Content Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event. ST0036 T0024
38 Create fake research Generate information pollution Create fake academic research. Example: fake social science research is often aimed at hot-button social issues such as gender, race and sexuality. Fake science research can target Climate Science debate or pseudoscience like anti-vaxx ST0037 Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. "Nothing is true, but everything is possible." Akin to astroturfing campaign. T0025
39 Hijack Hashtags Generate information pollution ST0038 Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. "Nothing is true, but everything is possible." Akin to astroturfing campaign. T0025
40 Reframe Context Distort facts Reframing context refers to removing an event from its surrounding context to distort its intended meaning. Rather than deny that an event occurred, reframing context frames an event in a manner that may lead the target audience to draw a different conclusion about its intentions. ST0039 Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content T0026
41 Edit Open-Source Content Distort facts An influence operation may edit open-source content, such as collaborative blogs or encyclopedias, to promote its narratives on outlets with existing credibility and audiences. Editing open-source content may allow an operation to post content on platforms without dedicating resources to the creation and maintenance of its own assets. ST0040 Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content T0026
42 Leak Authentic Documents Obtain Private Documents ST0041 T0028
43 Leak False Documents Obtain Private Documents ST0042 T0028
44 Leak Altered Documents Obtain Private Documents Obtain documents (eg by theft or leak), then alter and release, possibly among factual documents/sources. ST0043 T0028
45 Create Anonymous Accounts Create Inauthentic Accounts Anonymous accounts or anonymous users refer to users that access network resources without providing a username or password. An influence operation may use anonymous accounts to spread content without direct attribution to the operation. ST0044 T0029
46 Create Cyborg Accounts Create Inauthentic Accounts Cyborg accounts refer to partly manned, partly automated social media accounts. Cyborg accounts primarily act as bots, but a human operator periodically takes control of the account to engage with real social media users by responding to comments and posting original content. Influence operations may use cyborg accounts to reduce the amount of direct human input required to maintain a regular account but increase the apparent legitimacy of the cyborg account by occasionally breaking its bot-like behavior with human interaction. ST0045 T0029
47 Create Bot Accounts Create Inauthentic Accounts Bots refer to autonomous internet users that interact with systems or other users while imitating traditional human behavior. Bots use a variety of tools to stay active without direct human operation, including artificial intelligence and big data analytics. For example, an individual may program a Twitter bot to retweet a tweet every time it contains a certain keyword or hashtag. An influence operation may use bots to increase its exposure and artificially promote its content across the internet without dedicating additional time or human resources. Amplifier bots promote operation content through reposts, shares, and likes to increase the content’s online popularity. Hacker bots are traditionally covert bots running on computer scripts that rarely engage with users and work primarily as agents of larger cyberattacks, such as a Distributed Denial of Service attacks. Spammer bots are programmed to post content on social media or in comment sections, usually as a supplementary tool. Impersonator bots102 pose as real people by mimicking human behavior, complicating their detection. ST0046 T0029
48 Create Sockpuppet Accounts Create Inauthentic Accounts Sockpuppet accounts refer to falsified accounts that either promote the influence operation’s own material or attack critics of the material online. Individuals who control sockpuppet accounts also man at least one other user account.67 Sockpuppet accounts help legitimize operation narratives by providing an appearance of external support for the material and discrediting opponents of the operation. ST0047 T0029
49 Recruit Contractors Recruit bad actors ST0048 T0030
50 Recruit Partisans Recruit bad actors ST0049 T0030
51 Enlist Troll Accounts Recruit bad actors An influence operation may hire trolls, or human operators of fake accounts that aim to provoke others by posting and amplifying content about controversial issues. Trolls can serve to discredit an influence operation’s opposition or bring attention to the operation’s cause through debate. Classic trolls refer to regular people who troll for personal reasons, such as attention-seeking or boredom. Classic trolls may advance operation narratives by coincidence but are not directly affiliated with any larger operation. Conversely, hybrid trolls act on behalf of another institution, such as a state or financial organization, and post content with a specific ideological goal. Hybrid trolls may be highly advanced and institutionalized or less organized and work for a single individual. ST0050 T0030
52 Create Organizations Build Network Influence operations may establish organizations with legitimate or falsified hierarchies, staff, and content to structure operation assets, provide a sense of legitimacy to the operation, or provide institutional backing to operation activities. ST0051 T0032
53 Follow Trains Build Network ST0052 T0032
54 Create Community or Sub-group Build Network ST0053 T0032
55 Fund Proxies Acquire/ recruit Network An influence operation may fund proxies, or external entities that work for the operation. An operation may recruit/train users with existing sympathies towards the operation’s narratives and/or goals as proxies. Funding proxies serves various purposes including: - Diversifying operation locations to complicate attribution - Reducing the workload for direct operation assets ST0054 T0033
56 Botnets Acquire/ recruit Network ST0055 T0033
57 Identify susceptible targets in networks Infiltrate Existing Networks ST0056 T0034
58 Utilize Butterfly Attack Infiltrate Existing Networks Butterfly attacks occur when operators pretend to be members of a certain social group, usually a group that struggles for representation. An influence operation may mimic a group to insert controversial statements into the discourse, encourage the spread of operation content, or promote harassment among group members. Unlike astroturfing, butterfly attacks aim to infiltrate and discredit existing grassroots movements, organizations, and media campaigns. ST0057 T0034
59 From bad actors Prepare fundraising campaigns ST0058 Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. T0039
60 From ignorant agents Prepare fundraising campaigns ST0059 Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. T0039
61 Create a Content Farm Leverage Content Farm ST0060 T0040
62 Outsource Content Creation to External Organizations Leverage Content Farm An influence operation may outsource content creation to external companies to avoid attribution, increase the rate of content creation, or improve content quality, i.e., by employing an organization that can create content in the target audience’s native language. Employed organizations may include marketing companies for tailored advertisements or external content farms for high volumes of targeted media. ST0061 T0040
63 Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications Create fake experts ST0062 Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself. T0042
64 Backstop personas Create personas Create other assets/dossier/cover/fake relationships and/or connections or documents, sites, bylines, attributions, to establish/augment/inflate crediblity/believability ST0063 T0043
65 Create Inauthentic News Sites Establish Inauthentic News Sites ST0064 Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details. T0044
66 Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites Establish Inauthentic News Sites An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities. An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to confirm that the URL is correct. ST0065 Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details. T0044
67 Astroturfing Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities Astroturfing occurs when an influence operation disguises itself as grassroots movement or organization that supports operation narratives. Unlike butterfly attacks, astroturfing aims to increase the appearance of popular support for the operation cause and does not infiltrate existing groups to discredit their objectives. ST0066 An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities. An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to confirm that the URL is correct. T0045
68 Spoof/parody account/site Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities ST0067 An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities. An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to confirm that the URL is correct. T0045
69 Co-Opt Trusted Individuals Co-opt Trusted Sources ST0068 An influence operation may co-opt trusted sources by infiltrating or repurposing a source to reach a target audience through existing, previously reliable networks. Co-opted trusted sources may include: - National or local new outlets - Research or academic publications - Online blogs or websites T0046
70 Co-Opt Grassroots Groups Co-opt Trusted Sources ST0069 An influence operation may co-opt trusted sources by infiltrating or repurposing a source to reach a target audience through existing, previously reliable networks. Co-opted trusted sources may include: - National or local new outlets - Research or academic publications - Online blogs or websites T0046
71 Co-opt Influencers Co-opt Trusted Sources ST0070 An influence operation may co-opt trusted sources by infiltrating or repurposing a source to reach a target audience through existing, previously reliable networks. Co-opted trusted sources may include: - National or local new outlets - Research or academic publications - Online blogs or websites T0046
72 Use existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles ST0071 An echo chamber refers to an internet subgroup, often along ideological lines, where individuals only engage with “others with which they are already in agreement.” A filter bubble refers to an algorithm's placement of an individual in content that they agree with or regularly engage with, possibly entrapping the user into a bubble of their own making. An operation may create these isolated areas of the internet by match existing groups, or aggregating individuals into a single target audience based on shared interests, politics, values, demographics, and other characteristics. Echo chambers and filter bubbles help to reinforce similar biases and content to the same target audience members. T0050
73 Create Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles ST0072 An echo chamber refers to an internet subgroup, often along ideological lines, where individuals only engage with “others with which they are already in agreement.” A filter bubble refers to an algorithm's placement of an individual in content that they agree with or regularly engage with, possibly entrapping the user into a bubble of their own making. An operation may create these isolated areas of the internet by match existing groups, or aggregating individuals into a single target audience based on shared interests, politics, values, demographics, and other characteristics. Echo chambers and filter bubbles help to reinforce similar biases and content to the same target audience members. T0050
74 Exploit Data Voids Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation. A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news” data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalizing on most search engines’ preferences for recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas, isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term. ST0073 An echo chamber refers to an internet subgroup, often along ideological lines, where individuals only engage with “others with which they are already in agreement.” A filter bubble refers to an algorithm's placement of an individual in content that they agree with or regularly engage with, possibly entrapping the user into a bubble of their own making. An operation may create these isolated areas of the internet by match existing groups, or aggregating individuals into a single target audience based on shared interests, politics, values, demographics, and other characteristics. Echo chambers and filter bubbles help to reinforce similar biases and content to the same target audience members. T0050
75 Use Encrypted Chat Apps Chat apps ST0074 Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety. T0051
76 Use Unencrypted Chats Apps Chat apps ST0075 Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety. T0051
77 Video Livestream Livestream ST0076 T0052
78 Audio Livestream Livestream ST0077 T0052
79 Mainstream Social Networks Social Networks Examples include Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, VK, ST0078 T0053
80 Dating Apps Social Networks ST0079 T0053
81 Private/Closed Social Networks Social Networks ST0080 T0053
82 Interest-Based Networks Social Networks Examples include smaller and niche networks including Gettr, Truth Social, Parler, etc. ST0081 T0053
83 Use hashtags Social Networks Use a dedicated, existing hashtag for the campaign/incident. ST0082 T0053
84 Create dedicated hashtag Social Networks Create a campaign/incident specific hashtag. ST0083 T0053
85 Photo Sharing Media Sharing Networks Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, Flickr, etc ST0084 Media sharing networks refer to services whose primary function is the hosting and sharing of specific forms of media. Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, Youtube, SoundCloud. T0054
86 Video Sharing Media Sharing Networks Examples include Youtube, TikTok, ShareChat, Rumble, etc ST0085 Media sharing networks refer to services whose primary function is the hosting and sharing of specific forms of media. Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, Youtube, SoundCloud. T0054
87 Audio sharing Media Sharing Networks Examples include podcasting apps, Soundcloud, etc. ST0086 Media sharing networks refer to services whose primary function is the hosting and sharing of specific forms of media. Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, Youtube, SoundCloud. T0054
88 Anonymous Message Boards Discussion Forums Examples include the Chans ST0087 Platforms for finding, discussing, and sharing information and opinions. Examples include Reddit, Quora, Digg, message boards, interest-based discussion forums, etc. T0055
89 TV Traditional Media ST0088 Examples include TV, Newspaper, Radio, etc. T0061
90 Newspaper Traditional Media ST0089 Examples include TV, Newspaper, Radio, etc. T0061
91 Radio Traditional Media ST0090 Examples include TV, Newspaper, Radio, etc. T0061
92 Social media Deliver Ads ST0091 Delivering content via any form of paid media or advertising. T0070
93 Traditional Media Deliver Ads Examples include TV, Radio, Newspaper, billboards ST0092 Delivering content via any form of paid media or advertising. T0070
94 Share Memes Post Content Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns. ST0093 Delivering content by posting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). T0071
95 Post Violative Content to Provoke Takedown and Backlash Post Content ST0094 Delivering content by posting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). T0071
96 One-Way Direct Posting Post Content Direct posting refers to a method of posting content via a one-way messaging service, where the recipient cannot directly respond to the poster’s messaging. An influence operation may post directly to promote operation narratives to the target audience without allowing opportunities for fact-checking or disagreement, creating a false sense of support for the narrative. ST0095 Delivering content by posting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). T0071
97 Post inauthentic social media comment Comment or Reply on Content Use government-paid social media commenters, astroturfers, chat bots (programmed to reply to specific key words/hashtags) influence online conversations, product reviews, web-site comment forums. ST0096 Delivering content by replying or commenting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). T0072
98 Trolls amplify and manipulate Flooding the Information Space Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue (issues that can/are be politicized). ST0097 Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect. T0074
99 Hijack existing hashtag Flooding the Information Space Take over an existing hashtag to drive exposure. ST0098 Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect. T0074
100 Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting Flooding the Information Space Automated forwarding and reposting refer to the proliferation of operation content using automated means, such as artificial intelligence or social media bots. An influence operation may use automated activity to increase content exposure without dedicating the resources, including personnel and time, traditionally required to forward and repost content. Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more "popular" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive. ST0099 Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect. T0074
101 Utilize Spamoflauge Flooding the Information Space Spamoflauge refers to the practice of disguising spam messages as legitimate. Spam refers to the use of electronic messaging systems to send out unrequested or unwanted messages in bulk. Simple methods of spamoflauge include replacing letters with numbers to fool keyword-based email spam filters, for example, "you've w0n our jackp0t!". Spamoflauge may extend to more complex techniques such as modifying the grammar or word choice of the language, casting messages as images which spam detectors cannot automatically read, or encapsulating messages in password protected attachments, such as .pdf or .zip files. Influence operations may use spamoflauge to avoid spam filtering systems and increase the likelihood of the target audience receiving operation messaging. ST0100 Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect. T0074
102 Conduct Swarming Flooding the Information Space Swarming refers to the coordinated use of accounts to overwhelm the information space with operation content. Unlike information flooding, swarming centers exclusively around a specific event or actor rather than a general narrative. Swarming relies on “horizontal communication” between information assets rather than a top-down, vertical command-and-control approach. ST0101 Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect. T0074
103 Conduct Keyword Squatting Flooding the Information Space Keyword squatting refers to the creation of online content, such as websites, articles, or social media accounts, around a specific search engine-optimized term to overwhelm the search results of that term. An influence may keyword squat to increase content exposure to target audience members who query the exploited term in a search engine and manipulate the narrative around the term. ST0102 Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect. T0074
104 Inauthentic Sites Amplify News and Narratives Flooding the Information Space Inauthentic sites circulate cross-post stories and amplify narratives. Often these sites have no masthead, bylines or attribution. ST0103 Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect. T0074
105 Post Across Groups Cross-Posting ST0104 Cross-posting refers to posting the same message to multiple internet discussions, social media platforms or accounts, or news groups at one time. An influence operation may post content online in multiple communities and platforms to increase the chances of content exposure to the target audience. T0076
106 Post Across Platform Cross-Posting ST0105 Cross-posting refers to posting the same message to multiple internet discussions, social media platforms or accounts, or news groups at one time. An influence operation may post content online in multiple communities and platforms to increase the chances of content exposure to the target audience. T0076
107 Post Across Disciplines Cross-Posting ST0106 Cross-posting refers to posting the same message to multiple internet discussions, social media platforms or accounts, or news groups at one time. An influence operation may post content online in multiple communities and platforms to increase the chances of content exposure to the target audience. T0076
108 Use Affiliate Marketing Programs Incentivize Sharing ST0107 Incentivizing content sharing refers to actions that encourage users to share content themselves, reducing the need for the operation itself to post and promote its own content. T0077
109 Use Contests and Prizes Incentivize Sharing ST0108 Incentivizing content sharing refers to actions that encourage users to share content themselves, reducing the need for the operation itself to post and promote its own content. T0077
110 Bypass Content Blocking Manipulate Platform Algorithm Bypassing content blocking refers to actions taken to circumvent network security measures that prevent users from accessing certain servers, resources, or other online spheres. An influence operation may bypass content blocking to proliferate its content on restricted areas of the internet. Common strategies for bypassing content blocking include: - Altering IP addresses to avoid IP filtering - Using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to avoid IP filtering - Using a Content Delivery Network (CDN) to avoid IP filtering - Enabling encryption to bypass packet inspection blocking - Manipulating text to avoid filtering by keywords - Posting content on multiple platforms to avoid platform-specific removals - Using local facilities or modified DNS servers to avoid DNS filtering ST0109 Manipulating a platform algorithm refers to conducting activity on a platform in a way that intentionally targets its underlying algorithm. After analyzing a platform’s algorithm (see: Select Platforms), an influence operation may use a platform in a way that increases its content exposure, avoids content removal, or otherwise benefits the operation’s strategy. For example, an influence operation may use bots to amplify its posts so that the platform’s algorithm recognizes engagement with operation content and further promotes the content on user timelines. T0078
111 Boycott/"Cancel" Opponents Harass Cancel culture refers to the phenomenon in which individuals collectively refrain from supporting an individual, organization, business, or other entity, usually following a real or falsified controversy. An influence operation may exploit cancel culture by emphasizing an adversary’s problematic or disputed behavior and presenting its own content as an alternative. ST0110 Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. T0080
112 Harass People Based on Identities Harass Examples include social identities like gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, ability, nationality, etc. as well as roles and occupations like journalist or activist. ST0111 Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. T0080
113 Threaten to Dox Harass Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ST0112 Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. T0080
114 Dox Harass Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ST0113 Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. T0080
115 Delete Opposing Content Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations Deleting opposing content refers to the removal of content that conflicts with operational narratives from selected platforms. An influence operation may delete opposing content to censor contradictory information from the target audience, allowing operation narratives to take priority in the information space. ST0114 Controling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition messaging. T0082
116 Block Content Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations Content blocking refers to actions taken to restrict internet access or render certain areas of the internet inaccessible. An influence operation may restrict content based on both network and content attributes. ST0115 Controling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition messaging. T0082
117 Destroy Information Generation Capabilities Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations Destroying information generation capabilities refers to actions taken to limit, degrade, or otherwise incapacitate an actor’s ability to generate conflicting information. An influence operation may destroy an actor’s information generation capabilities by physically dismantling the information infrastructure, disconnecting resources needed for information generation, or redirecting information generation personnel. An operation may destroy an adversary’s information generation capabilities to limit conflicting content exposure to the target audience and crowd the information space with its own narratives. ST0116 Controling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition messaging. T0082
118 Conduct Server Redirect Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations A server redirect, also known as a URL redirect, occurs when a server automatically forwards a user from one URL to another using server-side scripting languages. An influence operation may conduct a server redirect to divert target audience members from one website to another without their knowledge. The redirected website may pose as a legitimate source, host malware, or otherwise aid operation objectives. ST0117 Controling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition messaging. T0082
119 Report Non-Violative Opposing Content Suppress Opposition Reporting opposing content refers to notifying and providing an instance of a violation of a platform’s guidelines and policies for conduct on the platform. In addition to simply reporting the content, an operation may leverage copyright regulations to trick social media and web platforms into removing opposing content by manipulating the content to appear in violation of copyright laws. Reporting opposing content facilitates the suppression of contradictory information and allows operation narratives to take priority in the information space. ST0118 T0083
120 Goad People into Harmful Action (Stop Hitting Yourself) Suppress Opposition Goad people into actions that violate terms of service or will lead to having their content or accounts taken down. ST0119 T0083
121 Exploit Platform TOS/Content Moderation Suppress Opposition ST0120 T0083
122 Call to action to attend Encourage Attendance at Events ST0121 Operation encourages attendance at existing real world event. T0085
123 Facilitate logistics or support for attendance Encourage Attendance at Events Facilitate logistics or support for travel, food, housing, etc. ST0122 Operation encourages attendance at existing real world event. T0085
124 Pay for Physical Action Organize Events Paying for physical action occurs when an influence operation pays individuals to act in the physical realm. An influence operation may pay for physical action to create specific situations and frame them in a way that supports operation narratives, for example, paying a group of people to burn a car to later post an image of the burning car and frame it as an act of protest. ST0123 Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives. T0086
125 Conduct Symbolic Action Organize Events Symbolic action refers to activities specifically intended to advance an operation’s narrative by signaling something to the audience, for example, a military parade supporting a state’s narrative of military superiority. An influence operation may use symbolic action to create falsified evidence supporting operation narratives in the physical information space. ST0124 Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives. T0086
126 Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns Conduct fundraising ST0125 Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services166 on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. T0087
127 Conduct Physical Violence Physical Violence ST0126 Physical violence refers to the use of force to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy. An influence operation may conduct or encourage physical violence to discourage opponents from promoting conflicting content or draw attention to operation narratives using shock value. T0088
128 Encourage Physical Violence Physical Violence ST0127 Physical violence refers to the use of force to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy. An influence operation may conduct or encourage physical violence to discourage opponents from promoting conflicting content or draw attention to operation narratives using shock value. T0088
129 Sell Merchandise Merchandising/ Advertising Selling merchandise refers to the sale of often branded items to the target audience. An influence operation may sell merchandise to raise funds and promote its messaging in the physical information space, for example, by selling t-shirts with operational messaging displayed on the clothing. ST0128 Merchandising/Advertising refers to getting the message or narrative into physical space in the offline world T0089
130 Use Pseudonyms Conceal People An operation may use pseudonyms, or fake names, to mask the identity of operation accounts, publish anonymous content, or otherwise use falsified personas to conceal identity of the operation. An operation may coordinate pseudonyms across multiple platforms, for example, by writing an article under a pseudonym and then posting a link to the article on social media on an account with the same falsified name. ST0129 Conceal the identity or provenance of the account and people assets. T0090
131 Conceal Network Identity Conceal People Concealing network identity aims to hide the existence an influence operation’s network completely. Unlike concealing sponsorship, concealing network identity denies the existence of any sort of organization. ST0130 Conceal the identity or provenance of the account and people assets. T0090
132 Distance Reputable Individuals from Operation Conceal People Distancing reputable individuals from the operation occurs when enlisted individuals, such as celebrities or subject matter experts, actively disengage themselves from operation activities and messaging. Individuals may distance themselves from the operation by deleting old posts or statements, unfollowing operation information assets, or otherwise detaching themselves from the operation’s timeline. An influence operation may want reputable individuals to distance themselves from the operation to reduce operation exposure, particularly if the operation aims to remove all evidence. ST0131 Conceal the identity or provenance of the account and people assets. T0090
133 Launder Accounts Conceal People Account laundering occurs when an influence operation acquires control of previously legitimate online accounts from third parties through sale or exchange and often in contravention of terms of use. Influence operations use laundered accounts to reach target audience members from an existing information channel and complicate attribution. ST0132 Conceal the identity or provenance of the account and people assets. T0090
134 Change Names of Accounts Conceal People Changing names of accounts occurs when an operation changes the name of an existing social media account. An operation may change the names of its accounts throughout an operation to avoid detection or alter the names of newly acquired or repurposed accounts to fit operational narratives. ST0133 Conceal the identity or provenance of the account and people assets. T0090
135 Conceal Network Identity Conceal Operational Activity Concealing network identity aims to hide the existence an influence operation’s network completely. Unlike concealing sponsorship, concealing network identity denies the existence of any sort of organization. ST0134 T0091
136 Generate Content Unrelated to Narrative Conceal Operational Activity An influence operation may mix its own operation content with legitimate news or external unrelated content to disguise operational objectives, narratives, or existence. For example, an operation may generate "lifestyle" or "cuisine" content alongside regular operation content. ST0135 T0091
137 Break Association with Content Conceal Operational Activity Breaking association with content occurs when an influence operation actively separates itself from its own content. An influence operation may break association with content by unfollowing, unliking, or unsharing its content, removing attribution from its content, or otherwise taking actions that distance the operation from its messaging. An influence operation may break association with its content to complicate attribution or regain credibility for a new operation. ST0136 T0091
138 Delete URLs Conceal Operational Activity URL deletion occurs when an influence operation completely removes its website registration, rendering the URL inaccessible. An influence operation may delete its URLs to complicate attribution or remove online documentation that the operation ever occurred. ST0137 T0091
139 Coordinate on encrypted/ closed networks Conceal Operational Activity ST0138 T0091
140 Deny involvement Conceal Operational Activity Without "smoking gun" proof (and even with proof), incident creator can or will deny involvement. This technique also leverages the attacker advantages outlined in "Demand insurmountable proof", specifically the asymmetric disadvantage for truth-tellers in a "firehose of misinformation" environment. ST0139 T0091
141 Delete Accounts/Account Activity Conceal Operational Activity Deleting accounts and account activity occurs when an influence operation removes its online social media assets, including social media accounts, posts, likes, comments, and other online artifacts. An influence operation may delete its accounts and account activity to complicate attribution or remove online documentation that the operation ever occurred. ST0140 T0091
142 Redirect URLs Conceal Operational Activity An influence operation may redirect its falsified or typosquatted URLs to legitimate websites to increase the operation's appearance of legitimacy, complicate attribution, and avoid detection. ST0141 T0091
143 Remove Post Origins Conceal Operational Activity Removing post origins refers to the elimination of evidence that indicates the initial source of operation content, often to complicate attribution. An influence operation may remove post origins by deleting watermarks, renaming files, or removing embedded links in its content. ST0142 T0091
144 Misattribute Activity Conceal Operational Activity Misattributed activity refers to incorrectly attributed operation activity. For example, a state sponsored influence operation may conduct operation activity in a way that mimics another state so that external entities misattribute activity to the incorrect state. An operation may misattribute their activities to complicate attribution, avoid detection, or frame an adversary for negative behavior. ST0143 T0091
145 Conceal Sponsorship Conceal Infrastructure Concealing sponsorship aims to mislead or obscure the identity of the hidden sponsor behind an operation rather than entity publicly running the operation. Operations that conceal sponsorship may maintain visible falsified groups, news outlets, non-profits, or other organizations, but seek to mislead or obscure the identity sponsoring, funding, or otherwise supporting these entities. Influence operations may use a variety of techniques to mask the location of their social media accounts to complicate attribution and conceal evidence of foreign interference. Operation accounts may set their location to a false place, often the location of the operation’s target audience, and post in the region’s language ST0144 T0092
146 Utilize Bulletproof Hosting Conceal Infrastructure Hosting refers to services through which storage and computing resources are provided to an individual or organization for the accommodation and maintenance of one or more websites and related services. Services may include web hosting, file sharing, and email distribution. Bulletproof hosting refers to services provided by an entity, such as a domain hosting or web hosting firm, that allows its customer considerable leniency in use of the service. An influence operation may utilize bulletproof hosting to maintain continuity of service for suspicious, illegal, or disruptive operation activities that stricter hosting services would limit, report, or suspend. ST0145 T0092
147 Use Shell Organizations Conceal Infrastructure ST0146 T0092
148 Use Cryptocurrency Conceal Infrastructure ST0147 T0092
149 Obfuscate Payment Conceal Infrastructure ST0148 T0092
150 Legacy web content Exploit TOS/Content Moderation Make incident content visible for a long time, e.g. by exploiting platform terms of service, or placing it where it's hard to remove or unlikely to be removed. ST0149 T0093
151 Post Borderline Content Exploit TOS/Content Moderation ST0150 T0093
152 People Focused Measure Performance ST0151 T0095
153 Content Focused Measure Performance ST0152 T0095
154 View Focused Measure Performance ST0153 T0095
155 Behavior changes Measure Effectiveness Monitor and evaluate behaviour changes from misinformation incidents. ST0154 T0096
156 Content Measure Effectiveness ST0155 T0096
157 Awareness Measure Effectiveness ST0156 T0096
158 Knowledge Measure Effectiveness ST0157 T0096
159 Action/attitude Measure Effectiveness ST0158 T0096
160 Message reach Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs) Monitor and evaluate message reach in misinformation incidents. ST0159 T0097
161 Social media engagement Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs) Monitor and evaluate social media engagement in misinformation incidents. ST0160 T0097