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,DISARM Phase,DISARM Tactic,DISARM Technique,DISARM Subtechnique,Description,DISARM ID,Feedback from EEAS,Action to Do,Action Taken,Where did it come from?,Where from more info
1,Plan,n/a,n/a,n/a,"Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effective ways of achieving it. Communicate the vision, intent, and decisions, focusing on expected results.",P01,,,,AMITT,
36,Prepare,n/a,n/a,n/a,"Activities conducted before execution to improve the ability to conduct the action. Examples include: development of the ecosystem needed to support the action: people, network, channels, content etc.",P02,,,,,
126,Execute,n/a,n/a,n/a,"Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-up and/or maintaining presence etc.",P03,,,,,
263,Assess,n/a,n/a,n/a,"Assess effectiveness of action, for use in future plans ",P04,,,,,
7,Plan,Plan Objectives,Dismiss,Discredit Credible Sources,"Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and degrade public trust in reporting, by discrediting credible sources. This makes it easier to promote influence operation content.",ST0001,,,,AMITT,T0067 Plan to Discredit Credible Sources
16,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Map Target Audience Information Environment,Monitor Social Media Analytics,"An influence operation may use social media analytics to determine which factors will increase the operation content’s exposure to its target audience on social media platforms, including views, interactions, and sentiment relating to topics and content types. The social media platform itself or a third-party tool may collect the metrics. ",ST0002,,,,SPICE,
17,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Map Target Audience Information Environment,Evaluate Media Surveys,"An influence operation may evaluate its own or third-party media surveys to determine what type of content appeals to its target audience. Media surveys may provide insight into an audience’s political views, social class, general interests, or other indicators used to tailor operation messaging to its target audience.",ST0003,,,,SPICE,
18,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Map Target Audience Information Environment,Identify Trending Topics/Hashtags,An influence operation may identify trending hashtags on social media platforms for later use in boosting operation content. A hashtag40 refers to a word or phrase preceded by the hash symbol (#) on social media used to identify messages and posts relating to a specific topic. All public posts that use the same hashtag are aggregated onto a centralized page dedicated to the word or phrase and sorted either chronologically or by popularity. ,ST0004,,,,SPICE,
19,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Map Target Audience Information Environment,Conduct Web Traffic Analysis,"An influence operation may conduct web traffic analysis to determine which search engines, keywords, websites, and advertisements gain the most traction with its target audience.",ST0005,,,,SPICE,
20,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Map Target Audience Information Environment,Assess Degree/Type of Media Access,"An influence operation may survey a target audience’s Internet availability and degree of media freedom to determine which target audience members will have access to operation content and on which platforms. An operation may face more difficulty targeting an information environment with heavy restrictions and media control than an environment with independent media, freedom of speech and of the press, and individual liberties. ",ST0006,,,,SPICE,
22,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,Find Echo Chambers,"Find or plan to create areas (social media groups, search term groups, hashtag groups etc) where individuals only engage with people they agree with. ",ST0007,,,,AMITT,
23,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,Identify Data Voids,"A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation.
A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news” data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalizing on most search engines’ preferences for recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas, isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term. ",ST0008,,,,SPICE,
24,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,Identify Existing Prejudices,"An influence operation may exploit existing racial, religious, demographic, or social prejudices to further polarize its target audience from the rest of the public.",ST0009,,,,SPICE,
25,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,Identify Existing Fissures,"An influence operation may identify existing fissures to pit target populations against one another or facilitate a “divide-and-conquer"" approach to tailor operation narratives along the divides.",ST0010,,,,,
26,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,Identify Existing Conspiracy Narratives/Suspicions,An influence operation may assess preexisting conspiracy theories or suspicions in a population to identify existing narratives that support operational objectives. ,ST0011,,,,SPICE,
27,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,Identify Wedge Issues,"A wedge issue is a divisive political issue, usually concerning a social phenomenon, that divides individuals along a defined line. An influence operation may exploit wedge issues by intentionally polarizing the public along the wedge issue line and encouraging opposition between factions.",ST0012,,,,SPICE,
28,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,Identify Target Audience Adversaries,"An influence operation may identify or create a real or imaginary adversary to center operation narratives against. A real adversary may include certain politicians or political parties while imaginary adversaries may include falsified “deep state”62 actors that, according to conspiracies, run the state behind public view. ",ST0013,,,,SPICE,
29,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,Identify Media System Vulnerabilities,"An influence operation may exploit existing weaknesses in a target’s media system. These weaknesses may include existing biases among media agencies, vulnerability to false news agencies on social media, or existing distrust of traditional media sources. An existing distrust among the public in the media system’s credibility holds high potential for exploitation by an influence operation when establishing alternative news agencies to spread operation content. ",ST0014,,,,SPICE,
31,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Segment Audiences,Geographic Segmentation,"An influence operation may target populations in a specific geographic location, such as a region, state, or city. An influence operation may use geographic segmentation to Create Localized Content (see: Establish Legitimacy). ",ST0015,,,,SPICE,
32,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Segment Audiences,Demographic Segmentation,"An influence operation may target populations based on demographic segmentation, including age, gender, and income. Demographic segmentation may be useful for influence operations aiming to change state policies that affect a specific population sector. For example, an influence operation attempting to influence Medicare funding in the United States would likely target U.S. voters over 65 years of age. ",ST0016,,,,SPICE,
33,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Segment Audiences,Economic Segmentation,"An influence operation may target populations based on their income bracket, wealth, or other financial or economic division. ",ST0017,,,,SPICE,
34,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Segment Audiences,Psychographic Segmentation,"An influence operation may target populations based on psychographic segmentation, which uses audience values and decision-making processes. An operation may individually gather psychographic data with its own surveys or collection tools or externally purchase data from social media companies or online surveys, such as personality quizzes. ",ST0018,,,,SPICE,
35,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Segment Audiences,Political Segmentation,"An influence operation may target populations based on their political affiliations, especially when aiming to manipulate voting or change policy.",ST0019,,,,SPICE,
42,Prepare,Develop Narratives,Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives,Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narrative,,ST0020,,,,,
43,Prepare,Develop Narratives,Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives,Develop Original Conspiracy Theory Narratives,,ST0021,,,,,
49,Prepare,Develop Content,Reuse Existing Content,Use Copypasta,"Copypasta refers to a piece of text that has been copied and pasted multiple times across various online platforms. A copypasta’s final form may differ from its original source text as users add, delete, or otherwise edit the content as they repost the text. ",ST0022,,,,,
50,Prepare,Develop Content,Reuse Existing Content,Plagiarize Content,,ST0023,,,,,
51,Prepare,Develop Content,Reuse Existing Content,Deceptively Labeled or Translated,,ST0024,,,,,
52,Prepare,Develop Content,Reuse Existing Content,Appropriate Content,,ST0025,,,,,
54,Prepare,Develop Content,Develop Text-based Content,Develop AI-Generated Text,"AI-generated texts refers to synthetic text composed by computers using text-generating AI technology. Autonomous generation refers to content created by a bot without human input, also known as bot-created content generation. Autonomous generation represents the next step in automation after language generation and may lead to automated journalism. An influence operation may use read fakes or autonomous generation to quickly develop and distribute content to the target audience.",ST0026,,,,,
55,Prepare,Develop Content,Develop Text-based Content,Develop False or Altered Documents,,ST0027,,,,,
56,Prepare,Develop Content,Develop Text-based Content,Develop Inauthentic News Articles,,ST0028,,,,,
58,Prepare,Develop Content,Develop Image-based Content,Develop Memes,"Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns.",ST0029,,,,,T0021 Develop Memes (AMITT)
59,Prepare,Develop Content,Develop Image-based Content,Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes),"Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.",ST0030,,,,,
60,Prepare,Develop Content,Develop Image-based Content,Deceptively Edit Image (Cheap fakes),"Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.",ST0031,,,,,
61,Prepare,Develop Content,Develop Image-based Content,Aggregate Information into Evidence Collages,image files that aggregate positive evidence (Joan Donovan),ST0032,,,,,
63,Prepare,Develop Content,Develop Video-based Content, Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes),"Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.",ST0033,,,,,
64,Prepare,Develop Content,Develop Video-based Content,Deceptively Edit Video (Cheap fakes),"Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.",ST0034,,,,,
66,Prepare,Develop Content,Develop Audio-based Content,Develop AI-Generated Audio (Deepfakes),"Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.",ST0035,,,,,
67,Prepare,Develop Content,Develop Audio-based Content,Deceptively Edit Audio (Cheap fakes),"Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.",ST0036,,,,,
69,Prepare,Develop Content,Generate information pollution,Create fake research,"Create fake academic research. Example: fake social science research is often aimed at hot-button social issues such as gender, race and sexuality. Fake science research can target Climate Science debate or pseudoscience like anti-vaxx",ST0037,,,,,T0026 Create fake research (AMITT)
70,Prepare,Develop Content,Generate information pollution,Hijack Hashtags,,ST0038,,,,,
72,Prepare,Develop Content,Distort facts,Reframe Context,"Reframing context refers to removing an event from its surrounding context to distort its intended meaning. Rather than deny that an event occurred, reframing context frames an event in a manner that may lead the target audience to draw a different conclusion about its intentions. ",ST0039,,,,,
73,Prepare,Develop Content,Distort facts,Edit Open-Source Content,"An influence operation may edit open-source content, such as collaborative blogs or encyclopedias, to promote its narratives on outlets with existing credibility and audiences. Editing open-source content may allow an operation to post content on platforms without dedicating resources to the creation and maintenance of its own assets. ",ST0040,,,,,
76,Prepare,Develop Content,Obtain Private Documents,Leak Authentic Documents,,ST0040,,,,,
77,Prepare,Develop Content,Obtain Private Documents,Leak False Documents,,ST0041,,,,,
78,Prepare,Develop Content,Obtain Private Documents,Leak Altered Documents,"Obtain documents (eg by theft or leak), then alter and release, possibly among factual documents/sources.",ST0042,,,,,T0025 Leak altered documents (AMITT)
81,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Create Inauthentic Accounts,Create Anonymous Accounts,Anonymous accounts or anonymous users refer to users that access network resources without providing a username or password. An influence operation may use anonymous accounts to spread content without direct attribution to the operation. ,ST0043,,,,SPICE,
82,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Create Inauthentic Accounts,Create Cyborg Accounts,"Cyborg accounts refer to partly manned, partly automated social media accounts. Cyborg accounts primarily act as bots, but a human operator periodically takes control of the account to engage with real social media users by responding to comments and posting original content. Influence operations may use cyborg accounts to reduce the amount of direct human input required to maintain a regular account but increase the apparent legitimacy of the cyborg account by occasionally breaking its bot-like behavior with human interaction. ",ST0044,,,,SPICE,
83,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Create Inauthentic Accounts,Create Bot Accounts,"Bots refer to autonomous internet users that interact with systems or other users while imitating traditional human behavior. Bots use a variety of tools to stay active without direct human operation, including artificial intelligence and big data analytics. For example, an individual may program a Twitter bot to retweet a tweet every time it contains a certain keyword or hashtag. An influence operation may use bots to increase its exposure and artificially promote its content across the internet without dedicating additional time or human resources.
Amplifier bots promote operation content through reposts, shares, and likes to increase the content’s online popularity. Hacker bots are traditionally covert bots running on computer scripts that rarely engage with users and work primarily as agents of larger cyberattacks, such as a Distributed Denial of Service attacks. Spammer bots are programmed to post content on social media or in comment sections, usually as a supplementary tool. Impersonator bots102 pose as real people by mimicking human behavior, complicating their detection. ",ST0045,,,,SPICE,
84,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Create Inauthentic Accounts,Create Sockpuppet Accounts,Sockpuppet accounts refer to falsified accounts that either promote the influence operation’s own material or attack critics of the material online. Individuals who control sockpuppet accounts also man at least one other user account.67 Sockpuppet accounts help legitimize operation narratives by providing an appearance of external support for the material and discrediting opponents of the operation. ,ST0046,,,,SPICE,
86,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Recruit bad actors,Recruit Contractors,,ST0047,,,,,
87,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Recruit bad actors,Recruit Partisans,,ST0048,,,,,
88,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Recruit bad actors,Enlist Troll Accounts,"An influence operation may hire trolls, or human operators of fake accounts that aim to provoke others by posting and amplifying content about controversial issues. Trolls can serve to discredit an influence operation’s opposition or bring attention to the operation’s cause through debate.
Classic trolls refer to regular people who troll for personal reasons, such as attention-seeking or boredom. Classic trolls may advance operation narratives by coincidence but are not directly affiliated with any larger operation. Conversely, hybrid trolls act on behalf of another institution, such as a state or financial organization, and post content with a specific ideological goal. Hybrid trolls may be highly advanced and institutionalized or less organized and work for a single individual. ",ST0049,,,,,
91,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Build Network,Create Organizations,"Influence operations may establish organizations with legitimate or falsified hierarchies, staff, and content to structure operation assets, provide a sense of legitimacy to the operation, or provide institutional backing to operation activities.",ST0050,,,,,
92,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Build Network,Follow Trains,,ST0051,,,,,
93,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Build Network,Create Community or Sub-group,,ST0052,,,,,
95,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Acquire/ recruit Network,Fund Proxies,"An influence operation may fund proxies, or external entities that work for the operation. An operation may recruit/train users with existing sympathies towards the operation’s narratives and/or goals as proxies. Funding proxies serves various purposes including:
- Diversifying operation locations to complicate attribution
- Reducing the workload for direct operation assets ",ST0053,,,,,
96,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Acquire/ recruit Network,Botnets,,ST0054,,,,,
98,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Infiltrate Existing Networks,Identify susceptible targets in networks,,ST0055,,,,,TK0016 Identify susceptible targets in networks (AMITT)
99,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Infiltrate Existing Networks,Utilize Butterfly Attack,"Butterfly attacks occur when operators pretend to be members of a certain social group, usually a group that struggles for representation. An influence operation may mimic a group to insert controversial statements into the discourse, encourage the spread of operation content, or promote harassment among group members. Unlike astroturfing, butterfly attacks aim to infiltrate and discredit existing grassroots movements, organizations, and media campaigns. ",ST0056,,,,,
105,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Prepare fundraising campaigns,From bad actors,,ST0057,,,,,
106,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Prepare fundraising campaigns,From ignorant agents,,ST0058,,,,,
108,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Leverage Content Farm,Create a Content Farm,,ST0059,,,,,
109,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Leverage Content Farm,Outsource Content Creation to External Organizations,"An influence operation may outsource content creation to external companies to avoid attribution, increase the rate of content creation, or improve content quality, i.e., by employing an organization that can create content in the target audience’s native language. Employed organizations may include marketing companies for tailored advertisements or external content farms for high volumes of targeted media. ",ST0060,,,,,
113,Prepare,Establish Legitimacy,Create fake experts,Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications,,ST0061,,,,,
115,Prepare,Establish Legitimacy,Create personas,Backstop personas ,"Create other assets/dossier/cover/fake relationships and/or connections or documents, sites, bylines, attributions, to establish/augment/inflate crediblity/believability",ST0062,,,,,T0030 Backstop personas (AMITT)
117,Prepare,Establish Legitimacy,Establish Inauthentic News Sites,Create Inauthentic News Sites,,ST0063,,,,,T0008 Create fake or imposter news sites (AMITT)
118,Prepare,Establish Legitimacy,Establish Inauthentic News Sites,Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites,"An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities.
An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to confirm that the URL is correct. ",ST0064,,,,,
120,Prepare,Establish Legitimacy,Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities,Astroturfing,"Astroturfing occurs when an influence operation disguises itself as grassroots movement or organization that supports operation narratives. Unlike butterfly attacks, astroturfing aims to increase the appearance of popular support for the operation cause and does not infiltrate existing groups to discredit their objectives. ",ST0065,,,,,
121,Prepare,Establish Legitimacy,Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities,Spoof/parody account/site,,ST0066,,,,,
123,Prepare,Establish Legitimacy,Co-opt Trusted Sources,Co-Opt Trusted Individuals,,ST0067,,,,,
124,Prepare,Establish Legitimacy,Co-opt Trusted Sources,Co-Opt Grassroots Groups,,ST0068,,,,,
125,Prepare,Establish Legitimacy,Co-opt Trusted Sources,Co-opt Influencers,,ST0069,,,,,TK0013 Find Influencers (AMITT)
132,Execute,Microtarget,Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,Use existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,ST0070,,,,,
133,Execute,Microtarget,Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,Create Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,ST0071,,,,,
134,Execute,Microtarget,Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,Exploit Data Voids,"A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation.
A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news” data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalizing on most search engines’ preferences for recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas, isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term. ",ST0072,,,,,
137,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Chat apps,Use Encrypted Chat Apps,,ST0073,,,,,
138,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Chat apps,Use Unencrypted Chats Apps,,ST0074,,,,,
140,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Livestream,Video Livestream,,ST0075,,,,,
141,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Livestream,Audio Livestream,,ST0076,,,,,
143,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances, Social Networks,Mainstream Social Networks,"Examples include Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, VK, ",ST0077,,,,,
144,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances, Social Networks,Dating Apps,,ST0078,,,,,
145,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances, Social Networks,Private/Closed Social Networks,,ST0079,,,,,
146,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances, Social Networks,Interest-Based Networks,"Examples include smaller and niche networks including Gettr, Truth Social, Parler, etc.",ST0080,,,,,
147,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances, Social Networks,Use hashtags,"Use a dedicated, existing hashtag for the campaign/incident.",ST0081,,,,,T0055 Use hashtags (AMITT)
148,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances, Social Networks,Create dedicated hashtag,Create a campaign/incident specific hashtag.,ST0082,,,,,
150,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Media Sharing Networks,Photo Sharing,"Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, Flickr, etc",ST0083,,,,,
151,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Media Sharing Networks,Video Sharing,"Examples include Youtube, TikTok, ShareChat, Rumble, etc",ST0084,,,,,
152,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Media Sharing Networks,Audio sharing,"Examples include podcasting apps, Soundcloud, etc.",ST0085,,,,,
154,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Discussion Forums,Anonymous Message Boards,Examples include the Chans,ST0086,,,,,
161,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Traditional Media,TV,,ST0087,,,,,
162,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Traditional Media,Newspaper,,ST0088,,,,,
163,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Traditional Media,Radio,,ST0089,,,,,
175,Execute,Deliver Content,Deliver Ads,Social media,,ST0090,,,,,
176,Execute,Deliver Content,Deliver Ads,Traditional Media,"Examples include TV, Radio, Newspaper, billboards",ST0091,,,,,
178,Execute,Deliver Content,Post Content,Share Memes,"Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns.",ST0092,,,,,
179,Execute,Deliver Content,Post Content,Post Violative Content to Provoke Takedown and Backlash,,ST0093,,,,,
180,Execute,Deliver Content,Post Content,One-Way Direct Posting,"Direct posting refers to a method of posting content via a one-way messaging service, where the recipient cannot directly respond to the poster’s messaging. An influence operation may post directly to promote operation narratives to the target audience without allowing opportunities for fact-checking or disagreement, creating a false sense of support for the narrative. ",ST0094,,,,,
182,Execute,Deliver Content,Comment or Reply on Content,Post inauthentic social media comment,"Use government-paid social media commenters, astroturfers, chat bots (programmed to reply to specific key words/hashtags) influence online conversations, product reviews, web-site comment forums.",ST0095,,,,,T0051 Fabricate social media comment (AMITT)
186,Execute,Maximize Exposure,Flooding the Information Space,Trolls amplify and manipulate,"Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue (issues that can/are be politicized).",ST0096,,,,,T0053 Trolls amplify and manipulate (AMITT)
187,Execute,Maximize Exposure,Flooding the Information Space,Hijack existing hashtag,Take over an existing hashtag to drive exposure.,ST0097,,,,,
188,Execute,Maximize Exposure,Flooding the Information Space,Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting,"Automated forwarding and reposting refer to the proliferation of operation content using automated means, such as artificial intelligence or social media bots. An influence operation may use automated activity to increase content exposure without dedicating the resources, including personnel and time, traditionally required to forward and repost content.
Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more ""popular"" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive.",ST0098,,,,,
189,Execute,Maximize Exposure,Flooding the Information Space,Utilize Spamoflauge,"Spamoflauge refers to the practice of disguising spam messages as legitimate. Spam refers to the use of electronic messaging systems to send out unrequested or unwanted messages in bulk. Simple methods of spamoflauge include replacing letters with numbers to fool keyword-based email spam filters, for example, ""you've w0n our jackp0t!"". Spamoflauge may extend to more complex techniques such as modifying the grammar or word choice of the language, casting messages as images which spam detectors cannot automatically read, or encapsulating messages in password protected attachments, such as .pdf or .zip files. Influence operations may use spamoflauge to avoid spam filtering systems and increase the likelihood of the target audience receiving operation messaging. ",ST0099,,,,,
190,Execute,Maximize Exposure,Flooding the Information Space,Conduct Swarming,"Swarming refers to the coordinated use of accounts to overwhelm the information space with operation content. Unlike information flooding, swarming centers exclusively around a specific event or actor rather than a general narrative. Swarming relies on “horizontal communication” between information assets rather than a top-down, vertical command-and-control approach. ",ST0100,,,,,
191,Execute,Maximize Exposure,Flooding the Information Space,Conduct Keyword Squatting,"Keyword squatting refers to the creation of online content, such as websites, articles, or social media accounts, around a specific search engine-optimized term to overwhelm the search results of that term. An influence may keyword squat to increase content exposure to target audience members who query the exploited term in a search engine and manipulate the narrative around the term. ",ST0101,,,,,
192,Execute,Maximize Exposure,Flooding the Information Space,Inauthentic Sites Amplify News and Narratives,"Inauthentic sites circulate cross-post stories and amplify narratives. Often these sites have no masthead, bylines or attribution.",ST0102,,,,,
195,Execute,Maximize Exposure,Cross-Posting,Post Across Groups,,ST0103,,,,,
196,Execute,Maximize Exposure,Cross-Posting,Post Across Platform,,ST0104,,,,,
197,Execute,Maximize Exposure,Cross-Posting,Post Across Disciplines,,ST0105,,,,,
199,Execute,Maximize Exposure,Incentivize Sharing,Use Affiliate Marketing Programs,,ST0106,,,,,
200,Execute,Maximize Exposure,Incentivize Sharing,Use Contests and Prizes,,ST0107,,,,,
202,Execute,Maximize Exposure,Manipulate Platform Algorithm,Bypass Content Blocking,"Bypassing content blocking refers to actions taken to circumvent network security measures that prevent users from accessing certain servers, resources, or other online spheres. An influence operation may bypass content blocking to proliferate its content on restricted areas of the internet. Common strategies for bypassing content blocking include:
- Altering IP addresses to avoid IP filtering
- Using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to avoid IP filtering
- Using a Content Delivery Network (CDN) to avoid IP filtering
- Enabling encryption to bypass packet inspection blocking
- Manipulating text to avoid filtering by keywords
- Posting content on multiple platforms to avoid platform-specific removals - Using local facilities or modified DNS servers to avoid DNS filtering ",ST0108,,,,,
206,Execute,Drive Online Harms,Harass,"Boycott/""Cancel"" Opponents","Cancel culture refers to the phenomenon in which individuals collectively refrain from supporting an individual, organization, business, or other entity, usually following a real or falsified controversy. An influence operation may exploit cancel culture by emphasizing an adversary’s problematic or disputed behavior and presenting its own content as an alternative. ",ST0109,,,,,
207,Execute,Drive Online Harms,Harass,Harass People Based on Identities,"Examples include social identities like gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, ability, nationality, etc. as well as roles and occupations like journalist or activist.",ST0110,,,,,
208,Execute,Drive Online Harms,Harass,Threaten to Dox,"Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ",ST0111,,,,,
209,Execute,Drive Online Harms,Harass,Dox,"Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ",ST0112,,,,,
212,Execute,Drive Online Harms,Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations,Delete Opposing Content,"Deleting opposing content refers to the removal of content that conflicts with operational narratives from selected platforms. An influence operation may delete opposing content to censor contradictory information from the target audience, allowing operation narratives to take priority in the information space.",ST0113,,,,,
213,Execute,Drive Online Harms,Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations,Block Content,Content blocking refers to actions taken to restrict internet access or render certain areas of the internet inaccessible. An influence operation may restrict content based on both network and content attributes. ,ST0114,,,,,
214,Execute,Drive Online Harms,Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations,Destroy Information Generation Capabilities,"Destroying information generation capabilities refers to actions taken to limit, degrade, or otherwise incapacitate an actor’s ability to generate conflicting information. An influence operation may destroy an actor’s information generation capabilities by physically dismantling the information infrastructure, disconnecting resources needed for information generation, or redirecting information generation personnel. An operation may destroy an adversary’s information generation capabilities to limit conflicting content exposure to the target audience and crowd the information space with its own narratives. ",ST0115,,,,,
215,Execute,Drive Online Harms,Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations,Conduct Server Redirect,"A server redirect, also known as a URL redirect, occurs when a server automatically forwards a user from one URL to another using server-side scripting languages. An influence operation may conduct a server redirect to divert target audience members from one website to another without their knowledge. The redirected website may pose as a legitimate source, host malware, or otherwise aid operation objectives.",ST0116,,,,,
217,Execute,Drive Online Harms,Suppress Opposition,Report Non-Violative Opposing Content,"Reporting opposing content refers to notifying and providing an instance of a violation of a platform’s guidelines and policies for conduct on the platform. In addition to simply reporting the content, an operation may leverage copyright regulations to trick social media and web platforms into removing opposing content by manipulating the content to appear in violation of copyright laws. Reporting opposing content facilitates the suppression of contradictory information and allows operation narratives to take priority in the information space. ",ST0117,,,,,
218,Execute,Drive Online Harms,Suppress Opposition,Goad People into Harmful Action (Stop Hitting Yourself),Goad people into actions that violate terms of service or will lead to having their content or accounts taken down. ,ST0118,,,,,
219,Execute,Drive Online Harms,Suppress Opposition,Exploit Platform TOS/Content Moderation,,ST0119,,,,,
223,Execute,Drive Offline Activity,Encourage Attendance at Events,Call to action to attend ,,ST0120,,,,,
224,Execute,Drive Offline Activity,Encourage Attendance at Events,Facilitate logistics or support for attendance,"Facilitate logistics or support for travel, food, housing, etc.",ST0121,,,,,
226,Execute,Drive Offline Activity,Organize Events,Pay for Physical Action,"Paying for physical action occurs when an influence operation pays individuals to act in the physical realm. An influence operation may pay for physical action to create specific situations and frame them in a way that supports operation narratives, for example, paying a group of people to burn a car to later post an image of the burning car and frame it as an act of protest. ",ST0122,,,,,
227,Execute,Drive Offline Activity,Organize Events,Conduct Symbolic Action,"Symbolic action refers to activities specifically intended to advance an operation’s narrative by signaling something to the audience, for example, a military parade supporting a state’s narrative of military superiority. An influence operation may use symbolic action to create falsified evidence supporting operation narratives in the physical information space. ",ST0123,,,,,
229,Execute,Drive Offline Activity,Conduct fundraising,Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns,,ST0124,,,,,
231,Execute,Drive Offline Activity,Physical Violence,Conduct Physical Violence,,ST0125,,,,,
232,Execute,Drive Offline Activity,Physical Violence,Encourage Physical Violence,,ST0126,,,,,
234,Execute,Drive Offline Activity,Merchandising/ Advertising,Sell Merchandise,"Selling merchandise refers to the sale of often branded items to the target audience. An influence operation may sell merchandise to raise funds and promote its messaging in the physical information space, for example, by selling t-shirts with operational messaging displayed on the clothing. ",ST0127,,,,,
237,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal People,Use Pseudonyms,"An operation may use pseudonyms, or fake names, to mask the identity of operation accounts, publish anonymous content, or otherwise use falsified personas to conceal identity of the operation. An operation may coordinate pseudonyms across multiple platforms, for example, by writing an article under a pseudonym and then posting a link to the article on social media on an account with the same falsified name. ",ST0128,,,,,
238,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal People,Conceal Network Identity,"Concealing network identity aims to hide the existence an influence operation’s network completely. Unlike concealing sponsorship, concealing network identity denies the existence of any sort of organization. ",ST0129,,,,,
239,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal People,Distance Reputable Individuals from Operation,"Distancing reputable individuals from the operation occurs when enlisted individuals, such as celebrities or subject matter experts, actively disengage themselves from operation activities and messaging. Individuals may distance themselves from the operation by deleting old posts or statements, unfollowing operation information assets, or otherwise detaching themselves from the operation’s timeline. An influence operation may want reputable individuals to distance themselves from the operation to reduce operation exposure, particularly if the operation aims to remove all evidence.",ST0130,,,,,
240,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal People,Launder Accounts,Account laundering occurs when an influence operation acquires control of previously legitimate online accounts from third parties through sale or exchange and often in contravention of terms of use. Influence operations use laundered accounts to reach target audience members from an existing information channel and complicate attribution. ,ST0131,,,,,
241,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal People,Change Names of Accounts,Changing names of accounts occurs when an operation changes the name of an existing social media account. An operation may change the names of its accounts throughout an operation to avoid detection or alter the names of newly acquired or repurposed accounts to fit operational narratives. ,ST0132,,,,,
243,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal Operational Activity,Conceal Network Identity,"Concealing network identity aims to hide the existence an influence operation’s network completely. Unlike concealing sponsorship, concealing network identity denies the existence of any sort of organization. ",ST0133,,,,,
244,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal Operational Activity,Generate Content Unrelated to Narrative,"An influence operation may mix its own operation content with legitimate news or external unrelated content to disguise operational objectives, narratives, or existence. For example, an operation may generate ""lifestyle"" or ""cuisine"" content alongside regular operation content. ",ST0134,,,,,
245,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal Operational Activity,Break Association with Content,"Breaking association with content occurs when an influence operation actively separates itself from its own content. An influence operation may break association with content by unfollowing, unliking, or unsharing its content, removing attribution from its content, or otherwise taking actions that distance the operation from its messaging. An influence operation may break association with its content to complicate attribution or regain credibility for a new operation. ",ST0135,,,,,
246,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal Operational Activity,Delete URLs,"URL deletion occurs when an influence operation completely removes its website registration, rendering the URL inaccessible. An influence operation may delete its URLs to complicate attribution or remove online documentation that the operation ever occurred.",ST0136,,,,,
247,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal Operational Activity,Coordinate on encrypted/ closed networks,,ST0137,,,,,
248,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal Operational Activity,Deny involvement,"Without ""smoking gun"" proof (and even with proof), incident creator can or will deny involvement. This technique also leverages the attacker advantages outlined in ""Demand insurmountable proof"", specifically the asymmetric disadvantage for truth-tellers in a ""firehose of misinformation"" environment.",ST0138,,,,,T0041 Deny involvement (AMITT)
249,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal Operational Activity,Delete Accounts/Account Activity,"Deleting accounts and account activity occurs when an influence operation removes its online social media assets, including social media accounts, posts, likes, comments, and other online artifacts. An influence operation may delete its accounts and account activity to complicate attribution or remove online documentation that the operation ever occurred. ",ST0139,,,,,
250,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal Operational Activity,Redirect URLs,"An influence operation may redirect its falsified or typosquatted URLs to legitimate websites to increase the operation's appearance of legitimacy, complicate attribution, and avoid detection. ",ST0140,,,,,
251,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal Operational Activity,Remove Post Origins,"Removing post origins refers to the elimination of evidence that indicates the initial source of operation content, often to complicate attribution. An influence operation may remove post origins by deleting watermarks, renaming files, or removing embedded links in its content. ",ST0141,,,,,
252,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal Operational Activity,Misattribute Activity,"Misattributed activity refers to incorrectly attributed operation activity. For example, a state sponsored influence operation may conduct operation activity in a way that mimics another state so that external entities misattribute activity to the incorrect state. An operation may misattribute their activities to complicate attribution, avoid detection, or frame an adversary for negative behavior. ",ST0142,,,,,
253,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal Infrastructure,Conceal Sponsorship,"Concealing sponsorship aims to mislead or obscure the identity of the hidden sponsor behind an operation rather than entity publicly running the operation. Operations that conceal sponsorship may maintain visible falsified groups, news outlets, non-profits, or other organizations, but seek to mislead or obscure the identity sponsoring, funding, or otherwise supporting these entities.
Influence operations may use a variety of techniques to mask the location of their social media accounts to complicate attribution and conceal evidence of foreign interference. Operation accounts may set their location to a false place, often the location of the operation’s target audience, and post in the region’s language",ST0143,,,,,
255,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal Infrastructure,Utilize Bulletproof Hosting,"Hosting refers to services through which storage and computing resources are provided to an individual or organization for the accommodation and maintenance of one or more websites and related services. Services may include web hosting, file sharing, and email distribution. Bulletproof hosting refers to services provided by an entity, such as a domain hosting or web hosting firm, that allows its customer considerable leniency in use of the service. An influence operation may utilize bulletproof hosting to maintain continuity of service for suspicious, illegal, or disruptive operation activities that stricter hosting services would limit, report, or suspend. ",ST0144,,,,,
256,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal Infrastructure,Use Shell Organizations,,ST0145,,,,,
257,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal Infrastructure,Use Cryptocurrency,,ST0146,,,,,
258,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal Infrastructure,Obfuscate Payment,,ST0147,,,,,
260,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Exploit TOS/Content Moderation,Legacy web content,"Make incident content visible for a long time, e.g. by exploiting platform terms of service, or placing it where it's hard to remove or unlikely to be removed.",ST0148,,,,,
261,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Exploit TOS/Content Moderation,Post Borderline Content,,ST0149,,,,,
266,Assess,Assess Effectiveness,Measure Performance,People Focused,,ST0150,,,,,
267,Assess,Assess Effectiveness,Measure Performance,Content Focused,,ST0151,,,,,
268,Assess,Assess Effectiveness,Measure Performance,View Focused,,ST0152,,,,,
270,Assess,Assess Effectiveness,Measure Effectiveness,Behavior changes,Monitor and evaluate behaviour changes from misinformation incidents. ,ST0153,,,,,T0062 Behaviour changes (AMITT)
271,Assess,Assess Effectiveness,Measure Effectiveness,Content,,ST0154,,,,,
272,Assess,Assess Effectiveness,Measure Effectiveness,Awareness,,ST0155,,,,,
273,Assess,Assess Effectiveness,Measure Effectiveness,Knowledge,,ST0156,,,,,
274,Assess,Assess Effectiveness,Measure Effectiveness,Action/attitude,,ST0157,,,,,
276,Assess,Assess Effectiveness,Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs),Message reach,Monitor and evaluate message reach in misinformation incidents. ,ST0158,,,,,T0063 Message reach (AMITT)
277,Assess,Assess Effectiveness,Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs),Social media engagement,Monitor and evaluate social media engagement in misinformation incidents.,ST0159,,,,,T0064 Social media engagement (AMITT)
3,Plan,Plan Strategy,Determine Target Audiences,n/a,,T0001,,,,DISARM Revision Process,
4,Plan,Plan Strategy,Determine Strategic Ends,n/a,,T0002,,,,DISARM Revision Process,
6,Plan,Plan Objectives,Dismiss,n/a,Push back against criticism by dismissing your critics. This might be arguing that the critics use a different standard for you than with other actors or themselves; or arguing that their criticism is biased.,T0003,,,,,
8,Plan,Plan Objectives,Distort,n/a,"Twist the narrative. Take information, or artifacts like images, and change the framing around them.",T0004,,,,AMITT,T0001 5Ds
9,Plan,Plan Objectives,Distract,n/a,"Shift attention to a different narrative or actor, for instance by accusing critics of the same activity that they’ve accused you of (e.g. police brutality).",T0005,,,,AMITT,T0001 5Ds
10,Plan,Plan Objectives,Dismay,n/a,"Threaten the critic or narrator of events. For instance, threaten journalists or news outlets reporting on a story.",T0006,,,,AMITT,T0001 5Ds
11,Plan,Plan Objectives,Divide,n/a,"Create conflict between subgroups, to widen divisions in a community",T0007,,,,AMITT,T0001 5Ds
12,Plan,Plan Objectives,Degrade Adversary,n/a,Plan to degrade an adversary’s image or ability to act. This could include preparation and use of harmful information about the adversary’s actions or reputation.,T0008,,,,AMITT,T0066 Degrade Adversary
13,Plan,Plan Objectives,Facilitate State Propaganda,n/a,Organize citizens around pro-state messaging. Coordinate paid or volunteer groups to push state propaganda.,T0009,,,,AMITT,T0002 Facilitate State Propaganda
15,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Map Target Audience Information Environment,n/a,"Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience.
Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging.",T0010,,,,SPICE,TA04 Map Target Audience Information Environment
21,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,n/a,"Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment.
Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. ",T0011,,,,SPICE,
30,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,Segment Audiences,n/a,"Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. ",T0012,,,,AMITT,
38,Prepare,Develop Narratives,Develop New Narratives,n/a,,T0013,,,,,
39,Prepare,Develop Narratives,Leverage Existing Narratives,n/a,"Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consitent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplifiction practices. ",T0014,,,,AMITT,T0003 Leverage Existing Narratives (AMITT)
40,Prepare,Develop Narratives,Develop Competing Narratives,n/a,"Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on. These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the ""firehose of misinformation"" approach.",T0015,,,,AMITT,T0004 Develop Competing Narratives (AMITT)
41,Prepare,Develop Narratives,Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives,n/a,"""Conspiracy narratives"" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the ""firehose of falsehoods"" model. ",T0016,,,,AMITT,T0022 Leverage Conspiracy Theory narratives (AMITT)
44,Prepare,Develop Narratives,Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative,n/a,"An influence operation may seek to exploit the preexisting weaknesses, fears, and enemies of the target audience for integration into the operation’s narratives and overall strategy. Integrating existing vulnerabilities into the operational approach conserves resources by exploiting already weak areas of the target information environment instead of forcing the operation to create new vulnerabilities in the environment.",T0017,,,,,
45,Prepare,Develop Narratives,Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis,n/a,"Media attention on a story or event is heightened during a breaking news event, where unclear facts and incomplete information increase speculation, rumors, and conspiracy theories, which are all vulnerable to manipulation. ",T0018,,,,,
46,Prepare,Develop Narratives,Demand insurmountable proof,n/a,"Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the ""firehose of misinformation"". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of ""questions"" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof.",T0019,,,,,T0040 Demand insurmountable proof (AMITT)
48,Prepare,Develop Content,Reuse Existing Content,n/a,When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content. ,T0020,,,,,
53,Prepare,Develop Content,Develop Text-based Content,n/a,,T0021,,,,,
57,Prepare,Develop Content,Develop Image-based Content,n/a,,T0022,,,,,
62,Prepare,Develop Content,Develop Video-based Content,n/a,,T0023,,,,,
65,Prepare,Develop Content,Develop Audio-based Content,n/a,,T0024,,,,,
68,Prepare,Develop Content,Generate information pollution,n/a,"Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. ""Nothing is true, but everything is possible."" Akin to astroturfing campaign.",T0025,,,,,T0019 Generate information pollution
71,Prepare,Develop Content,Distort facts,n/a,"Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content",T0026,,,,,T0023 Distort facts (AMITT)
74,Prepare,Develop Content,Create hashtags and search artifacts,n/a,"Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag groups. Many incident-based campaigns will create hashtags to promote their fabricated event. Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: 1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only ""real"" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name!, and 2. Publicize the story more widely through trending lists and search behavior. Asset needed to direct/control/manage ""conversation"" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites). ",T0027,,,,,T0015 Create hashtags and search artifacts (AMITT)
75,Prepare,Develop Content,Obtain Private Documents,n/a,,T0028,,,,,
80,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Create Inauthentic Accounts,n/a,,T0029,,,,,
85,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Recruit bad actors,n/a,,T0030,,,,,
89,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Cultivate ignorant agents,n/a,"Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as ""useful idiots"" or ""unwitting agents"".",T0031,,,,,T0010 Cultivate ignorant agents (AMITT)
90,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Build Network,n/a,,T0032,,,,,TK0014 Build Network (AMITT)
94,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Acquire/ recruit Network,n/a,,T0033,,,,,
97,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Infiltrate Existing Networks,n/a,,T0034,,,,,
100,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups,n/a,"Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets. Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are.",T0035,,,,,
101,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Create inauthentic websites,n/a,"Create media assets to support inauthentic organizations (e.g. think tank), people (e.g. experts) and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations.",T0036,,,,,T0013 Create fake websites  (AMITT)
102,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities,n/a,"Create or coopt broadcast capabilities (e.g. TV, radio etc).",T0037,,,,,T0065 Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities (AMITT)
103,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Develop Owned Media Assets,n/a,"An owned media asset refers to an agency or organization through which an influence operation may create, develop, and host content and narratives. Owned media assets include websites, blogs, social media pages, forums, and other platforms that facilitate the creation and organization of content.",T0038,,,,,
104,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Prepare fundraising campaigns,n/a,"Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. ",T0039,,,,,T0014 Prepare fundraising campaigns (AMITT)
107,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,Leverage Content Farm,n/a,,T0040,,,,,
111,Prepare,Establish Legitimacy,Compromise legitimate accounts,n/a,Hack or take over legimate accounts to distribute misinformation or damaging content.,T0041,,,,,T0011 Compromise legitimate accounts (AMITT)
112,Prepare,Establish Legitimacy,Create fake experts,n/a,"Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself. ",T0042,,,,,T0009 Create fake experts (AMITT)
114,Prepare,Establish Legitimacy,Create personas,n/a,,T0043,,,,,TK0010 Create personas (AMITT)
116,Prepare,Establish Legitimacy,Establish Inauthentic News Sites,n/a,"Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details.",T0044,,,,,
119,Prepare,Establish Legitimacy,Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities,n/a,"An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities.
An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to confirm that the URL is correct. ",T0045,,,,,
122,Prepare,Establish Legitimacy,Co-opt Trusted Sources,n/a,"An influence operation may co-opt trusted sources by infiltrating or repurposing a source to reach a target audience through existing, previously reliable networks. Co-opted trusted sources may include:
- National or local new outlets
- Research or academic publications
- Online blogs or websites ",T0046,,,,,
128,Execute,Microtarget,Create Clickbait,n/a,"Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humor) required to drive traffic & engagement. This is a key asset.",T0047,,,,,T0016 Create Clickbait (AMITT)
129,Execute,Microtarget,Purchase Targeted Advertisements,n/a,Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations,T0048,,,,,T0018 Purchase Targeted Advertisements (AMITT)
130,Execute,Microtarget,Create Localized Content,n/a,"Localized content refers to content that appeals to a specific community of individuals, often in defined geographic areas. An operation may create localized content using local language and dialects to resonate with its target audience and blend in with other local news and social media. Localized content may help an operation increase legitimacy, avoid detection, and complicate external attribution.",T0049,,,,,
131,Execute,Microtarget,Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,n/a,"An echo chamber refers to an internet subgroup, often along ideological lines, where individuals only engage with “others with which they are already in agreement.” A filter bubble refers to an algorithm's placement of an individual in content that they agree with or regularly engage with, possibly entrapping the user into a bubble of their own making. An operation may create these isolated areas of the internet by match existing groups, or aggregating individuals into a single target audience based on shared interests, politics, values, demographics, and other characteristics. Echo chambers and filter bubbles help to reinforce similar biases and content to the same target audience members. ",T0050,,,,,
136,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Chat apps,n/a,"Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety.",T0051,,,,,T0043 Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps (AMITT)
139,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Livestream,n/a,,T0052,,,,,
142,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances, Social Networks,n/a,,T0053,,,,,
149,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Media Sharing Networks,n/a,"Media sharing networks refer to services whose primary function is the hosting and sharing of specific forms of media. Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, Youtube, SoundCloud.",T0054,,,,,
153,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Discussion Forums,n/a,"Platforms for finding, discussing, and sharing information and opinions. Examples include Reddit, Quora, Digg, message boards, interest-based discussion forums, etc.",T0055,,,,,
155,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Bookmarking and Content Curation,n/a,"Platforms for searching, sharing, and curating content and media. Examples include Pinterest, Flipboard, etc.",T0056,,,,,
156,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Blogging and Publishing Networks,n/a,"Examples include WordPress, Blogger, Weebly, Tumblr, Medium, etc. ",T0057,,,,,
157,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Consumer Review Networks,n/a,"Platforms for finding, reviewing, and sharing information about brands, products, services, restaurants, travel destinations, etc. Examples include Yelp, TripAdvisor, etc.",T0058,,,,,
158,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Online polls,n/a,"Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well",T0059,,,,,T0029 Manipulate online polls (AMITT)
159,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Formal Diplomatic Channels,n/a,,T0060,,,,,
160,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Traditional Media,n/a,"Examples include TV, Newspaper, Radio, etc.",T0061,,,,,
164,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,Email,n/a,,T0062,,,,,
166,Execute,Conduct Pump Priming,Trial content,n/a,"Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content enagagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates",T0063,,,,AMITT,T0020 Trial content (AMITT)
167,Execute,Conduct Pump Priming,Bait legitimate influencers,n/a,"Credibility in a social media environment is often a function of the size of a user's network. ""Influencers"" are so-called because of their reach, typically understood as: 1) the size of their network (i.e. the number of followers, perhaps weighted by their own influence); and 2) The rate at which their comments are re-circulated (these two metrics are related). Add traditional media players at all levels of credibility and professionalism to this, and the number of potential influencial carriers available for unwitting amplification becomes substantial. By targeting high-influence people and organizations in all types of media with narratives and content engineered to appeal their emotional or ideological drivers, influence campaigns are able to add perceived credibility to their messaging via saturation and adoption by trusted agents such as celebrities, journalists and local leaders.",T0064,,,,AMITT,T0039 Bait legitimate influencers (AMITT)
168,Execute,Conduct Pump Priming,Seed Kernel of truth,n/a,"Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths. Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies. When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters.",T0065,,,,AMITT,T0042 Seed Kernel of truth (AMITT)
169,Execute,Conduct Pump Priming,Seed distortions,n/a,"Try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event, to give a misleading account or impression. ",T0066,,,,AMITT,T0044 Seed distortions (AMITT)
170,Execute,Conduct Pump Priming,Use fake experts,n/a,"Use the fake experts that were set up during Establish Legitimacy. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give ""credility"" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias",T0067,,,,AMITT,T0045 Use fake experts (AMITT)
171,Execute,Conduct Pump Priming,Use Search Engine Optimization,n/a,"Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka ""Black-hat SEO"" ",T0068,,,,AMITT,T0046 Search Engine Optimization (AMITT)
172,Execute,Conduct Pump Priming,Employ Commercial Analytic Firms,n/a,"Commercial analytic firms collect data on target audience activities and evaluate the data to detect trends, such as content receiving high click-rates. An influence operation may employ commercial analytic firms to facilitate external collection on its target audience, complicating attribution efforts and better tailoring the content to audience preferences. ",T0069,,,,SPICE,Employ Commercial Analytic Firms
174,Execute,Deliver Content,Deliver Ads,n/a,Delivering content via any form of paid media or advertising.,T0070,,,,,
177,Execute,Deliver Content,Post Content,n/a,Delivering content by posting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). ,T0071,,,,,
181,Execute,Deliver Content,Comment or Reply on Content,n/a,Delivering content by replying or commenting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). ,T0072,,,,,
183,Execute,Deliver Content,Attract Traditional Media,n/a,Deliver content by attracting the attention of traditional media (earned media).,T0073,,,,,
185,Execute,Maximize Exposure,Flooding the Information Space,n/a,Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.,T0074,,,,,T0049 Flooding
193,Execute,Maximize Exposure,Amplify Existing Narrative,n/a,An influence operation may amplify existing narratives that align with its narratives to support operation objectives. ,T0075,,,,,
194,Execute,Maximize Exposure,Cross-Posting,n/a,"Cross-posting refers to posting the same message to multiple internet discussions, social media platforms or accounts, or news groups at one time. An influence operation may post content online in multiple communities and platforms to increase the chances of content exposure to the target audience. ",T0076,,,,,
198,Execute,Maximize Exposure,Incentivize Sharing,n/a,"Incentivizing content sharing refers to actions that encourage users to share content themselves, reducing the need for the operation itself to post and promote its own content.",T0077,,,,,
201,Execute,Maximize Exposure,Manipulate Platform Algorithm,n/a,"Manipulating a platform algorithm refers to conducting activity on a platform in a way that intentionally targets its underlying algorithm. After analyzing a platform’s algorithm (see: Select Platforms), an influence operation may use a platform in a way that increases its content exposure, avoids content removal, or otherwise benefits the operation’s strategy. For example, an influence operation may use bots to amplify its posts so that the platform’s algorithm recognizes engagement with operation content and further promotes the content on user timelines. ",T0078,,,,,
203,Execute,Maximize Exposure,Direct Users to Alternative Platforms,n/a,"Direct users to alternative platforms refers to encouraging users to move from the platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage with content on alternate information channels, including separate social media channels and inauthentic websites. An operation may drive users to alternative platforms to diversify its information channels and ensure the target audience knows where to access operation content if the initial platform suspends, flags, or otherwise removes original operation assets and content. ",T0079,,,,,
205,Execute,Drive Online Harms,Harass,n/a,"Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ",T0080,,,,,
210,Execute,Drive Online Harms,Censor social media as a political force,n/a,Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports).,T0081,,,,,T0047 Censor social media as a political force (AMITT)
211,Execute,Drive Online Harms,Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations,n/a,Controling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition messaging.,T0082,,,,,
216,Execute,Drive Online Harms,Suppress Opposition,n/a,,T0083,,,,,
220,Execute,Drive Online Harms,Platform Filtering,n/a,Platform filtering refers to the decontextualization of information as claims cross platforms (from Joan Donovan https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/disinformation-design-use-evidence-collages-and-platform-filtering-media-manipulation),T0084,,,,,
222,Execute,Drive Offline Activity,Encourage Attendance at Events,n/a,Operation encourages attendance at existing real world event.,T0085,,,,,
225,Execute,Drive Offline Activity,Organize Events,n/a,"Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives.",T0086,,,,,T0057 Organise remote rallies and events (AMITT)
228,Execute,Drive Offline Activity,Conduct fundraising,n/a,"Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services166 on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. ",T0087,,,,,
230,Execute,Drive Offline Activity,Physical Violence,n/a,"Physical violence refers to the use of force to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy. An influence operation may conduct or encourage physical violence to discourage opponents from promoting conflicting content or draw attention to operation narratives using shock value. ",T0088,,,,,
233,Execute,Drive Offline Activity,Merchandising/ Advertising,n/a,Merchandising/Advertising refers to getting the message or narrative into physical space in the offline world,T0089,,,,,
236,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal People,n/a,Conceal the identity or provenance of the account and people assets.,T0090,,,,,
242,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal Operational Activity,n/a,,T0091,,,,,
254,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Conceal Infrastructure,n/a,,T0092,,,,,
259,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Exploit TOS/Content Moderation,n/a,,T0093,,,,,
262,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,Play the long game,n/a,Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold 2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative.,T0094,,,,,T0059 Play the long game
265,Assess,Assess Effectiveness,Measure Performance,n/a,,T0095,,,,,
269,Assess,Assess Effectiveness,Measure Effectiveness,n/a,,T0096,,,,,
275,Assess,Assess Effectiveness,Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs),n/a,,T0097,,,,,
2,Plan,Plan Strategy,n/a,n/a,"Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all objectives.",TA01,,,,AMITT,TA01: Strategic Planning
5,Plan,Plan Objectives,n/a,n/a,"Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievable objectives. Achieving objectives ties execution of tactical tasks to reaching the desired end state. There are four primary considerations:
- Each desired effect should link directly to one or more objectives
- The effect should be measurable
- The objective statement should not specify the way and means of accomplishment
- The effect should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as another objective or task.",TA02,,,,AMITT,TA02: Objective Planning
14,Plan,Target Audience Analysis,n/a,n/a,"Identifying and analyzing the target audience examines target audience member locations, political affiliations, financial situations, and other attributes that an influence operation may incorporate into its messaging strategy. During this tactic, influence operations may also identify existing similarities and differences between target audience members to unite like groups and divide opposing groups. Identifying and analyzing target audience members allows influence operations to tailor operation strategy and content to their analysis. ",TA03,,,,SPICE and AMITT,T0005 Center of Gravity Analysis
37,Prepare,Develop Narratives,n/a,n/a,"The promotion of beneficial master narratives is perhaps the most effective method for achieving long-term strategic narrative dominance. From a ""whole of society"" perspective the promotion of the society's core master narratives should occupy a central strategic role. From a misinformation campaign / cognitive security perpectve the tactics around master narratives center more precisely on the day-to-day promotion and reinforcement of this messaging. In other words, beneficial, high-coverage master narratives are a central strategic goal and their promotion constitutes an ongoing tactical struggle carried out at a whole-of-society level. Tactically, their promotion covers a broad spectrum of activities both on- and offline.
",TA04,,,,,
47,Prepare,Develop Content,n/a,n/a,,TA05,,,,,
79,Prepare,Establish Social Assets,n/a,n/a,"Establishing information assets generates messaging tools, including social media accounts, operation personnel, and organizations, including directly and indirectly managed assets. For assets under their direct control, the operation can add, change, or remove these assets at will.
Establishing information assets allows an influence operation to promote messaging directly to the target audience without navigating through external entities. Many online influence operations create or compromise social media accounts as a primary vector of information dissemination.",TA06,,,,,
110,Prepare,Establish Legitimacy,n/a,n/a,,TA07,,,,,
127,Execute,Microtarget,n/a,n/a,Target very specific populations of people,TA08,,,,,"TA05 ""Microtargeting"""
135,Execute,Select Channels and Affordances,n/a,n/a,"Selecting platforms and affordances assesses which online or offline platforms and their associated affordances maximize an influence operation’s ability to reach its target audience. To select the most appropriate platform(s), an operation may assess the technological affordances including platform algorithms, terms of service, permitted content types, or other attributes that determine platform usability and accessibility. Selecting platforms includes both choosing platforms on which the operation will publish its own content and platforms on which the operation will attempt to restrict adversarial content.",TA09,,,,,
165,Execute,Conduct Pump Priming,n/a,n/a,"Release content on a targetted small scale, prior to general release, including releasing seed. Used for preparation before broader release, and as message honing. Used for preparation before broader release, and as message honing. ",TA10,,,,,
173,Execute,Deliver Content,n/a,n/a,Release content to general public or larger population,TA11,,,,,
184,Execute,Maximize Exposure,n/a,n/a,"Maximize exposure of the target audience to incident/campaign content via flooding, amplifying, and cross-posting.",TA12,,,,,
204,Execute,Drive Online Harms,n/a,n/a,"Actions taken by an influence operation to harm their opponents in online spaces through harassment, suppression, releasing private information, and controlling the information space through offensive cyberspace operations. ",TA13,,,,,
221,Execute,Drive Offline Activity,n/a,n/a,"Move incident/campaign from online to offline. Encouraging users to move from the platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage in the physical information space or offline world. This may include operation-aligned rallies or protests, radio, newspaper, or billboards. An influence operation may drive to physical forums to diversify its information channels and facilitate spaces where the target audience can engage with both operation content and like-minded individuals offline. ",TA14,,,,,
235,Execute,Persist in the Information Space,n/a,n/a,Persist in the Information Space refers to taking measures that allow an operation to maintain its presence and avoid takedown by an external entity. Techniques in Persist in the Information Space help campaigns operate without detection and appear legitimate to the target audience and platform monitoring services. Influence operations on social media often persist online by varying the type of information assets and platforms used throughout the campaign.,TA15,,,,,
264,Assess,Assess Effectiveness,n/a,n/a,,TA16,,,,,
1 DISARM Phase DISARM Tactic DISARM Technique DISARM Subtechnique Description DISARM ID Feedback from EEAS Action to Do Action Taken Where did it come from? Where from more info
2 1 Plan n/a n/a n/a Envision the desired outcome. Lay out effective ways of achieving it. Communicate the vision, intent, and decisions, focusing on expected results. P01 AMITT
3 36 Prepare n/a n/a n/a Activities conducted before execution to improve the ability to conduct the action. Examples include: development of the ecosystem needed to support the action: people, network, channels, content etc. P02
4 126 Execute n/a n/a n/a Run the action, from initial exposure to wrap-up and/or maintaining presence etc. P03
5 263 Assess n/a n/a n/a Assess effectiveness of action, for use in future plans P04
6 7 Plan Plan Objectives Dismiss Discredit Credible Sources Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and degrade public trust in reporting, by discrediting credible sources. This makes it easier to promote influence operation content. ST0001 AMITT T0067 Plan to Discredit Credible Sources
7 16 Plan Target Audience Analysis Map Target Audience Information Environment Monitor Social Media Analytics An influence operation may use social media analytics to determine which factors will increase the operation content’s exposure to its target audience on social media platforms, including views, interactions, and sentiment relating to topics and content types. The social media platform itself or a third-party tool may collect the metrics. ST0002 SPICE
8 17 Plan Target Audience Analysis Map Target Audience Information Environment Evaluate Media Surveys An influence operation may evaluate its own or third-party media surveys to determine what type of content appeals to its target audience. Media surveys may provide insight into an audience’s political views, social class, general interests, or other indicators used to tailor operation messaging to its target audience. ST0003 SPICE
9 18 Plan Target Audience Analysis Map Target Audience Information Environment Identify Trending Topics/Hashtags An influence operation may identify trending hashtags on social media platforms for later use in boosting operation content. A hashtag40 refers to a word or phrase preceded by the hash symbol (#) on social media used to identify messages and posts relating to a specific topic. All public posts that use the same hashtag are aggregated onto a centralized page dedicated to the word or phrase and sorted either chronologically or by popularity. ST0004 SPICE
10 19 Plan Target Audience Analysis Map Target Audience Information Environment Conduct Web Traffic Analysis An influence operation may conduct web traffic analysis to determine which search engines, keywords, websites, and advertisements gain the most traction with its target audience. ST0005 SPICE
11 20 Plan Target Audience Analysis Map Target Audience Information Environment Assess Degree/Type of Media Access An influence operation may survey a target audience’s Internet availability and degree of media freedom to determine which target audience members will have access to operation content and on which platforms. An operation may face more difficulty targeting an information environment with heavy restrictions and media control than an environment with independent media, freedom of speech and of the press, and individual liberties. ST0006 SPICE
12 22 Plan Target Audience Analysis Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities Find Echo Chambers Find or plan to create areas (social media groups, search term groups, hashtag groups etc) where individuals only engage with people they agree with. ST0007 AMITT
13 23 Plan Target Audience Analysis Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities Identify Data Voids A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation. A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news” data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalizing on most search engines’ preferences for recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas, isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term. ST0008 SPICE
14 24 Plan Target Audience Analysis Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities Identify Existing Prejudices An influence operation may exploit existing racial, religious, demographic, or social prejudices to further polarize its target audience from the rest of the public. ST0009 SPICE
15 25 Plan Target Audience Analysis Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities Identify Existing Fissures An influence operation may identify existing fissures to pit target populations against one another or facilitate a “divide-and-conquer" approach to tailor operation narratives along the divides. ST0010
16 26 Plan Target Audience Analysis Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities Identify Existing Conspiracy Narratives/Suspicions An influence operation may assess preexisting conspiracy theories or suspicions in a population to identify existing narratives that support operational objectives. ST0011 SPICE
17 27 Plan Target Audience Analysis Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities Identify Wedge Issues A wedge issue is a divisive political issue, usually concerning a social phenomenon, that divides individuals along a defined line. An influence operation may exploit wedge issues by intentionally polarizing the public along the wedge issue line and encouraging opposition between factions. ST0012 SPICE
18 28 Plan Target Audience Analysis Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities Identify Target Audience Adversaries An influence operation may identify or create a real or imaginary adversary to center operation narratives against. A real adversary may include certain politicians or political parties while imaginary adversaries may include falsified “deep state”62 actors that, according to conspiracies, run the state behind public view. ST0013 SPICE
19 29 Plan Target Audience Analysis Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities Identify Media System Vulnerabilities An influence operation may exploit existing weaknesses in a target’s media system. These weaknesses may include existing biases among media agencies, vulnerability to false news agencies on social media, or existing distrust of traditional media sources. An existing distrust among the public in the media system’s credibility holds high potential for exploitation by an influence operation when establishing alternative news agencies to spread operation content. ST0014 SPICE
20 31 Plan Target Audience Analysis Segment Audiences Geographic Segmentation An influence operation may target populations in a specific geographic location, such as a region, state, or city. An influence operation may use geographic segmentation to Create Localized Content (see: Establish Legitimacy). ST0015 SPICE
21 32 Plan Target Audience Analysis Segment Audiences Demographic Segmentation An influence operation may target populations based on demographic segmentation, including age, gender, and income. Demographic segmentation may be useful for influence operations aiming to change state policies that affect a specific population sector. For example, an influence operation attempting to influence Medicare funding in the United States would likely target U.S. voters over 65 years of age. ST0016 SPICE
22 33 Plan Target Audience Analysis Segment Audiences Economic Segmentation An influence operation may target populations based on their income bracket, wealth, or other financial or economic division. ST0017 SPICE
23 34 Plan Target Audience Analysis Segment Audiences Psychographic Segmentation An influence operation may target populations based on psychographic segmentation, which uses audience values and decision-making processes. An operation may individually gather psychographic data with its own surveys or collection tools or externally purchase data from social media companies or online surveys, such as personality quizzes. ST0018 SPICE
24 35 Plan Target Audience Analysis Segment Audiences Political Segmentation An influence operation may target populations based on their political affiliations, especially when aiming to manipulate voting or change policy. ST0019 SPICE
25 42 Prepare Develop Narratives Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narrative ST0020
26 43 Prepare Develop Narratives Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives Develop Original Conspiracy Theory Narratives ST0021
27 49 Prepare Develop Content Reuse Existing Content Use Copypasta Copypasta refers to a piece of text that has been copied and pasted multiple times across various online platforms. A copypasta’s final form may differ from its original source text as users add, delete, or otherwise edit the content as they repost the text. ST0022
28 50 Prepare Develop Content Reuse Existing Content Plagiarize Content ST0023
29 51 Prepare Develop Content Reuse Existing Content Deceptively Labeled or Translated ST0024
30 52 Prepare Develop Content Reuse Existing Content Appropriate Content ST0025
31 54 Prepare Develop Content Develop Text-based Content Develop AI-Generated Text AI-generated texts refers to synthetic text composed by computers using text-generating AI technology. Autonomous generation refers to content created by a bot without human input, also known as bot-created content generation. Autonomous generation represents the next step in automation after language generation and may lead to automated journalism. An influence operation may use read fakes or autonomous generation to quickly develop and distribute content to the target audience. ST0026
32 55 Prepare Develop Content Develop Text-based Content Develop False or Altered Documents ST0027
33 56 Prepare Develop Content Develop Text-based Content Develop Inauthentic News Articles ST0028
34 58 Prepare Develop Content Develop Image-based Content Develop Memes Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns. ST0029 T0021 Develop Memes (AMITT)
35 59 Prepare Develop Content Develop Image-based Content Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes) Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures. ST0030
36 60 Prepare Develop Content Develop Image-based Content Deceptively Edit Image (Cheap fakes) Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event. ST0031
37 61 Prepare Develop Content Develop Image-based Content Aggregate Information into Evidence Collages image files that aggregate positive evidence (Joan Donovan) ST0032
38 63 Prepare Develop Content Develop Video-based Content Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes) Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures. ST0033
39 64 Prepare Develop Content Develop Video-based Content Deceptively Edit Video (Cheap fakes) Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event. ST0034
40 66 Prepare Develop Content Develop Audio-based Content Develop AI-Generated Audio (Deepfakes) Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures. ST0035
41 67 Prepare Develop Content Develop Audio-based Content Deceptively Edit Audio (Cheap fakes) Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event. ST0036
42 69 Prepare Develop Content Generate information pollution Create fake research Create fake academic research. Example: fake social science research is often aimed at hot-button social issues such as gender, race and sexuality. Fake science research can target Climate Science debate or pseudoscience like anti-vaxx ST0037 T0026 Create fake research (AMITT)
43 70 Prepare Develop Content Generate information pollution Hijack Hashtags ST0038
44 72 Prepare Develop Content Distort facts Reframe Context Reframing context refers to removing an event from its surrounding context to distort its intended meaning. Rather than deny that an event occurred, reframing context frames an event in a manner that may lead the target audience to draw a different conclusion about its intentions. ST0039
45 73 Prepare Develop Content Distort facts Edit Open-Source Content An influence operation may edit open-source content, such as collaborative blogs or encyclopedias, to promote its narratives on outlets with existing credibility and audiences. Editing open-source content may allow an operation to post content on platforms without dedicating resources to the creation and maintenance of its own assets. ST0040
46 76 Prepare Develop Content Obtain Private Documents Leak Authentic Documents ST0040
47 77 Prepare Develop Content Obtain Private Documents Leak False Documents ST0041
48 78 Prepare Develop Content Obtain Private Documents Leak Altered Documents Obtain documents (eg by theft or leak), then alter and release, possibly among factual documents/sources. ST0042 T0025 Leak altered documents (AMITT)
49 81 Prepare Establish Social Assets Create Inauthentic Accounts Create Anonymous Accounts Anonymous accounts or anonymous users refer to users that access network resources without providing a username or password. An influence operation may use anonymous accounts to spread content without direct attribution to the operation. ST0043 SPICE
50 82 Prepare Establish Social Assets Create Inauthentic Accounts Create Cyborg Accounts Cyborg accounts refer to partly manned, partly automated social media accounts. Cyborg accounts primarily act as bots, but a human operator periodically takes control of the account to engage with real social media users by responding to comments and posting original content. Influence operations may use cyborg accounts to reduce the amount of direct human input required to maintain a regular account but increase the apparent legitimacy of the cyborg account by occasionally breaking its bot-like behavior with human interaction. ST0044 SPICE
51 83 Prepare Establish Social Assets Create Inauthentic Accounts Create Bot Accounts Bots refer to autonomous internet users that interact with systems or other users while imitating traditional human behavior. Bots use a variety of tools to stay active without direct human operation, including artificial intelligence and big data analytics. For example, an individual may program a Twitter bot to retweet a tweet every time it contains a certain keyword or hashtag. An influence operation may use bots to increase its exposure and artificially promote its content across the internet without dedicating additional time or human resources. Amplifier bots promote operation content through reposts, shares, and likes to increase the content’s online popularity. Hacker bots are traditionally covert bots running on computer scripts that rarely engage with users and work primarily as agents of larger cyberattacks, such as a Distributed Denial of Service attacks. Spammer bots are programmed to post content on social media or in comment sections, usually as a supplementary tool. Impersonator bots102 pose as real people by mimicking human behavior, complicating their detection. ST0045 SPICE
52 84 Prepare Establish Social Assets Create Inauthentic Accounts Create Sockpuppet Accounts Sockpuppet accounts refer to falsified accounts that either promote the influence operation’s own material or attack critics of the material online. Individuals who control sockpuppet accounts also man at least one other user account.67 Sockpuppet accounts help legitimize operation narratives by providing an appearance of external support for the material and discrediting opponents of the operation. ST0046 SPICE
53 86 Prepare Establish Social Assets Recruit bad actors Recruit Contractors ST0047
54 87 Prepare Establish Social Assets Recruit bad actors Recruit Partisans ST0048
55 88 Prepare Establish Social Assets Recruit bad actors Enlist Troll Accounts An influence operation may hire trolls, or human operators of fake accounts that aim to provoke others by posting and amplifying content about controversial issues. Trolls can serve to discredit an influence operation’s opposition or bring attention to the operation’s cause through debate. Classic trolls refer to regular people who troll for personal reasons, such as attention-seeking or boredom. Classic trolls may advance operation narratives by coincidence but are not directly affiliated with any larger operation. Conversely, hybrid trolls act on behalf of another institution, such as a state or financial organization, and post content with a specific ideological goal. Hybrid trolls may be highly advanced and institutionalized or less organized and work for a single individual. ST0049
56 91 Prepare Establish Social Assets Build Network Create Organizations Influence operations may establish organizations with legitimate or falsified hierarchies, staff, and content to structure operation assets, provide a sense of legitimacy to the operation, or provide institutional backing to operation activities. ST0050
57 92 Prepare Establish Social Assets Build Network Follow Trains ST0051
58 93 Prepare Establish Social Assets Build Network Create Community or Sub-group ST0052
59 95 Prepare Establish Social Assets Acquire/ recruit Network Fund Proxies An influence operation may fund proxies, or external entities that work for the operation. An operation may recruit/train users with existing sympathies towards the operation’s narratives and/or goals as proxies. Funding proxies serves various purposes including: - Diversifying operation locations to complicate attribution - Reducing the workload for direct operation assets ST0053
60 96 Prepare Establish Social Assets Acquire/ recruit Network Botnets ST0054
61 98 Prepare Establish Social Assets Infiltrate Existing Networks Identify susceptible targets in networks ST0055 TK0016 Identify susceptible targets in networks (AMITT)
62 99 Prepare Establish Social Assets Infiltrate Existing Networks Utilize Butterfly Attack Butterfly attacks occur when operators pretend to be members of a certain social group, usually a group that struggles for representation. An influence operation may mimic a group to insert controversial statements into the discourse, encourage the spread of operation content, or promote harassment among group members. Unlike astroturfing, butterfly attacks aim to infiltrate and discredit existing grassroots movements, organizations, and media campaigns. ST0056
63 105 Prepare Establish Social Assets Prepare fundraising campaigns From bad actors ST0057
64 106 Prepare Establish Social Assets Prepare fundraising campaigns From ignorant agents ST0058
65 108 Prepare Establish Social Assets Leverage Content Farm Create a Content Farm ST0059
66 109 Prepare Establish Social Assets Leverage Content Farm Outsource Content Creation to External Organizations An influence operation may outsource content creation to external companies to avoid attribution, increase the rate of content creation, or improve content quality, i.e., by employing an organization that can create content in the target audience’s native language. Employed organizations may include marketing companies for tailored advertisements or external content farms for high volumes of targeted media. ST0060
67 113 Prepare Establish Legitimacy Create fake experts Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications ST0061
68 115 Prepare Establish Legitimacy Create personas Backstop personas Create other assets/dossier/cover/fake relationships and/or connections or documents, sites, bylines, attributions, to establish/augment/inflate crediblity/believability ST0062 T0030 Backstop personas (AMITT)
69 117 Prepare Establish Legitimacy Establish Inauthentic News Sites Create Inauthentic News Sites ST0063 T0008 Create fake or imposter news sites (AMITT)
70 118 Prepare Establish Legitimacy Establish Inauthentic News Sites Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities. An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to confirm that the URL is correct. ST0064
71 120 Prepare Establish Legitimacy Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities Astroturfing Astroturfing occurs when an influence operation disguises itself as grassroots movement or organization that supports operation narratives. Unlike butterfly attacks, astroturfing aims to increase the appearance of popular support for the operation cause and does not infiltrate existing groups to discredit their objectives. ST0065
72 121 Prepare Establish Legitimacy Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities Spoof/parody account/site ST0066
73 123 Prepare Establish Legitimacy Co-opt Trusted Sources Co-Opt Trusted Individuals ST0067
74 124 Prepare Establish Legitimacy Co-opt Trusted Sources Co-Opt Grassroots Groups ST0068
75 125 Prepare Establish Legitimacy Co-opt Trusted Sources Co-opt Influencers ST0069 TK0013 Find Influencers (AMITT)
76 132 Execute Microtarget Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles Use existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles ST0070
77 133 Execute Microtarget Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles Create Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles ST0071
78 134 Execute Microtarget Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles Exploit Data Voids A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation. A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news” data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalizing on most search engines’ preferences for recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas, isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term. ST0072
79 137 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Chat apps Use Encrypted Chat Apps ST0073
80 138 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Chat apps Use Unencrypted Chats Apps ST0074
81 140 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Livestream Video Livestream ST0075
82 141 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Livestream Audio Livestream ST0076
83 143 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Social Networks Mainstream Social Networks Examples include Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, VK, ST0077
84 144 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Social Networks Dating Apps ST0078
85 145 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Social Networks Private/Closed Social Networks ST0079
86 146 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Social Networks Interest-Based Networks Examples include smaller and niche networks including Gettr, Truth Social, Parler, etc. ST0080
87 147 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Social Networks Use hashtags Use a dedicated, existing hashtag for the campaign/incident. ST0081 T0055 Use hashtags (AMITT)
88 148 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Social Networks Create dedicated hashtag Create a campaign/incident specific hashtag. ST0082
89 150 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Media Sharing Networks Photo Sharing Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, Flickr, etc ST0083
90 151 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Media Sharing Networks Video Sharing Examples include Youtube, TikTok, ShareChat, Rumble, etc ST0084
91 152 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Media Sharing Networks Audio sharing Examples include podcasting apps, Soundcloud, etc. ST0085
92 154 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Discussion Forums Anonymous Message Boards Examples include the Chans ST0086
93 161 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Traditional Media TV ST0087
94 162 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Traditional Media Newspaper ST0088
95 163 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Traditional Media Radio ST0089
96 175 Execute Deliver Content Deliver Ads Social media ST0090
97 176 Execute Deliver Content Deliver Ads Traditional Media Examples include TV, Radio, Newspaper, billboards ST0091
98 178 Execute Deliver Content Post Content Share Memes Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns. ST0092
99 179 Execute Deliver Content Post Content Post Violative Content to Provoke Takedown and Backlash ST0093
100 180 Execute Deliver Content Post Content One-Way Direct Posting Direct posting refers to a method of posting content via a one-way messaging service, where the recipient cannot directly respond to the poster’s messaging. An influence operation may post directly to promote operation narratives to the target audience without allowing opportunities for fact-checking or disagreement, creating a false sense of support for the narrative. ST0094
101 182 Execute Deliver Content Comment or Reply on Content Post inauthentic social media comment Use government-paid social media commenters, astroturfers, chat bots (programmed to reply to specific key words/hashtags) influence online conversations, product reviews, web-site comment forums. ST0095 T0051 Fabricate social media comment (AMITT)
102 186 Execute Maximize Exposure Flooding the Information Space Trolls amplify and manipulate Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue (issues that can/are be politicized). ST0096 T0053 Trolls amplify and manipulate (AMITT)
103 187 Execute Maximize Exposure Flooding the Information Space Hijack existing hashtag Take over an existing hashtag to drive exposure. ST0097
104 188 Execute Maximize Exposure Flooding the Information Space Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting Automated forwarding and reposting refer to the proliferation of operation content using automated means, such as artificial intelligence or social media bots. An influence operation may use automated activity to increase content exposure without dedicating the resources, including personnel and time, traditionally required to forward and repost content. Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more "popular" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive. ST0098
105 189 Execute Maximize Exposure Flooding the Information Space Utilize Spamoflauge Spamoflauge refers to the practice of disguising spam messages as legitimate. Spam refers to the use of electronic messaging systems to send out unrequested or unwanted messages in bulk. Simple methods of spamoflauge include replacing letters with numbers to fool keyword-based email spam filters, for example, "you've w0n our jackp0t!". Spamoflauge may extend to more complex techniques such as modifying the grammar or word choice of the language, casting messages as images which spam detectors cannot automatically read, or encapsulating messages in password protected attachments, such as .pdf or .zip files. Influence operations may use spamoflauge to avoid spam filtering systems and increase the likelihood of the target audience receiving operation messaging. ST0099
106 190 Execute Maximize Exposure Flooding the Information Space Conduct Swarming Swarming refers to the coordinated use of accounts to overwhelm the information space with operation content. Unlike information flooding, swarming centers exclusively around a specific event or actor rather than a general narrative. Swarming relies on “horizontal communication” between information assets rather than a top-down, vertical command-and-control approach. ST0100
107 191 Execute Maximize Exposure Flooding the Information Space Conduct Keyword Squatting Keyword squatting refers to the creation of online content, such as websites, articles, or social media accounts, around a specific search engine-optimized term to overwhelm the search results of that term. An influence may keyword squat to increase content exposure to target audience members who query the exploited term in a search engine and manipulate the narrative around the term. ST0101
108 192 Execute Maximize Exposure Flooding the Information Space Inauthentic Sites Amplify News and Narratives Inauthentic sites circulate cross-post stories and amplify narratives. Often these sites have no masthead, bylines or attribution. ST0102
109 195 Execute Maximize Exposure Cross-Posting Post Across Groups ST0103
110 196 Execute Maximize Exposure Cross-Posting Post Across Platform ST0104
111 197 Execute Maximize Exposure Cross-Posting Post Across Disciplines ST0105
112 199 Execute Maximize Exposure Incentivize Sharing Use Affiliate Marketing Programs ST0106
113 200 Execute Maximize Exposure Incentivize Sharing Use Contests and Prizes ST0107
114 202 Execute Maximize Exposure Manipulate Platform Algorithm Bypass Content Blocking Bypassing content blocking refers to actions taken to circumvent network security measures that prevent users from accessing certain servers, resources, or other online spheres. An influence operation may bypass content blocking to proliferate its content on restricted areas of the internet. Common strategies for bypassing content blocking include: - Altering IP addresses to avoid IP filtering - Using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to avoid IP filtering - Using a Content Delivery Network (CDN) to avoid IP filtering - Enabling encryption to bypass packet inspection blocking - Manipulating text to avoid filtering by keywords - Posting content on multiple platforms to avoid platform-specific removals - Using local facilities or modified DNS servers to avoid DNS filtering ST0108
115 206 Execute Drive Online Harms Harass Boycott/"Cancel" Opponents Cancel culture refers to the phenomenon in which individuals collectively refrain from supporting an individual, organization, business, or other entity, usually following a real or falsified controversy. An influence operation may exploit cancel culture by emphasizing an adversary’s problematic or disputed behavior and presenting its own content as an alternative. ST0109
116 207 Execute Drive Online Harms Harass Harass People Based on Identities Examples include social identities like gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, ability, nationality, etc. as well as roles and occupations like journalist or activist. ST0110
117 208 Execute Drive Online Harms Harass Threaten to Dox Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ST0111
118 209 Execute Drive Online Harms Harass Dox Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ST0112
119 212 Execute Drive Online Harms Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations Delete Opposing Content Deleting opposing content refers to the removal of content that conflicts with operational narratives from selected platforms. An influence operation may delete opposing content to censor contradictory information from the target audience, allowing operation narratives to take priority in the information space. ST0113
120 213 Execute Drive Online Harms Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations Block Content Content blocking refers to actions taken to restrict internet access or render certain areas of the internet inaccessible. An influence operation may restrict content based on both network and content attributes. ST0114
121 214 Execute Drive Online Harms Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations Destroy Information Generation Capabilities Destroying information generation capabilities refers to actions taken to limit, degrade, or otherwise incapacitate an actor’s ability to generate conflicting information. An influence operation may destroy an actor’s information generation capabilities by physically dismantling the information infrastructure, disconnecting resources needed for information generation, or redirecting information generation personnel. An operation may destroy an adversary’s information generation capabilities to limit conflicting content exposure to the target audience and crowd the information space with its own narratives. ST0115
122 215 Execute Drive Online Harms Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations Conduct Server Redirect A server redirect, also known as a URL redirect, occurs when a server automatically forwards a user from one URL to another using server-side scripting languages. An influence operation may conduct a server redirect to divert target audience members from one website to another without their knowledge. The redirected website may pose as a legitimate source, host malware, or otherwise aid operation objectives. ST0116
123 217 Execute Drive Online Harms Suppress Opposition Report Non-Violative Opposing Content Reporting opposing content refers to notifying and providing an instance of a violation of a platform’s guidelines and policies for conduct on the platform. In addition to simply reporting the content, an operation may leverage copyright regulations to trick social media and web platforms into removing opposing content by manipulating the content to appear in violation of copyright laws. Reporting opposing content facilitates the suppression of contradictory information and allows operation narratives to take priority in the information space. ST0117
124 218 Execute Drive Online Harms Suppress Opposition Goad People into Harmful Action (Stop Hitting Yourself) Goad people into actions that violate terms of service or will lead to having their content or accounts taken down. ST0118
125 219 Execute Drive Online Harms Suppress Opposition Exploit Platform TOS/Content Moderation ST0119
126 223 Execute Drive Offline Activity Encourage Attendance at Events Call to action to attend ST0120
127 224 Execute Drive Offline Activity Encourage Attendance at Events Facilitate logistics or support for attendance Facilitate logistics or support for travel, food, housing, etc. ST0121
128 226 Execute Drive Offline Activity Organize Events Pay for Physical Action Paying for physical action occurs when an influence operation pays individuals to act in the physical realm. An influence operation may pay for physical action to create specific situations and frame them in a way that supports operation narratives, for example, paying a group of people to burn a car to later post an image of the burning car and frame it as an act of protest. ST0122
129 227 Execute Drive Offline Activity Organize Events Conduct Symbolic Action Symbolic action refers to activities specifically intended to advance an operation’s narrative by signaling something to the audience, for example, a military parade supporting a state’s narrative of military superiority. An influence operation may use symbolic action to create falsified evidence supporting operation narratives in the physical information space. ST0123
130 229 Execute Drive Offline Activity Conduct fundraising Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns ST0124
131 231 Execute Drive Offline Activity Physical Violence Conduct Physical Violence ST0125
132 232 Execute Drive Offline Activity Physical Violence Encourage Physical Violence ST0126
133 234 Execute Drive Offline Activity Merchandising/ Advertising Sell Merchandise Selling merchandise refers to the sale of often branded items to the target audience. An influence operation may sell merchandise to raise funds and promote its messaging in the physical information space, for example, by selling t-shirts with operational messaging displayed on the clothing. ST0127
134 237 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal People Use Pseudonyms An operation may use pseudonyms, or fake names, to mask the identity of operation accounts, publish anonymous content, or otherwise use falsified personas to conceal identity of the operation. An operation may coordinate pseudonyms across multiple platforms, for example, by writing an article under a pseudonym and then posting a link to the article on social media on an account with the same falsified name. ST0128
135 238 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal People Conceal Network Identity Concealing network identity aims to hide the existence an influence operation’s network completely. Unlike concealing sponsorship, concealing network identity denies the existence of any sort of organization. ST0129
136 239 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal People Distance Reputable Individuals from Operation Distancing reputable individuals from the operation occurs when enlisted individuals, such as celebrities or subject matter experts, actively disengage themselves from operation activities and messaging. Individuals may distance themselves from the operation by deleting old posts or statements, unfollowing operation information assets, or otherwise detaching themselves from the operation’s timeline. An influence operation may want reputable individuals to distance themselves from the operation to reduce operation exposure, particularly if the operation aims to remove all evidence. ST0130
137 240 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal People Launder Accounts Account laundering occurs when an influence operation acquires control of previously legitimate online accounts from third parties through sale or exchange and often in contravention of terms of use. Influence operations use laundered accounts to reach target audience members from an existing information channel and complicate attribution. ST0131
138 241 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal People Change Names of Accounts Changing names of accounts occurs when an operation changes the name of an existing social media account. An operation may change the names of its accounts throughout an operation to avoid detection or alter the names of newly acquired or repurposed accounts to fit operational narratives. ST0132
139 243 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal Operational Activity Conceal Network Identity Concealing network identity aims to hide the existence an influence operation’s network completely. Unlike concealing sponsorship, concealing network identity denies the existence of any sort of organization. ST0133
140 244 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal Operational Activity Generate Content Unrelated to Narrative An influence operation may mix its own operation content with legitimate news or external unrelated content to disguise operational objectives, narratives, or existence. For example, an operation may generate "lifestyle" or "cuisine" content alongside regular operation content. ST0134
141 245 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal Operational Activity Break Association with Content Breaking association with content occurs when an influence operation actively separates itself from its own content. An influence operation may break association with content by unfollowing, unliking, or unsharing its content, removing attribution from its content, or otherwise taking actions that distance the operation from its messaging. An influence operation may break association with its content to complicate attribution or regain credibility for a new operation. ST0135
142 246 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal Operational Activity Delete URLs URL deletion occurs when an influence operation completely removes its website registration, rendering the URL inaccessible. An influence operation may delete its URLs to complicate attribution or remove online documentation that the operation ever occurred. ST0136
143 247 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal Operational Activity Coordinate on encrypted/ closed networks ST0137
144 248 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal Operational Activity Deny involvement Without "smoking gun" proof (and even with proof), incident creator can or will deny involvement. This technique also leverages the attacker advantages outlined in "Demand insurmountable proof", specifically the asymmetric disadvantage for truth-tellers in a "firehose of misinformation" environment. ST0138 T0041 Deny involvement (AMITT)
145 249 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal Operational Activity Delete Accounts/Account Activity Deleting accounts and account activity occurs when an influence operation removes its online social media assets, including social media accounts, posts, likes, comments, and other online artifacts. An influence operation may delete its accounts and account activity to complicate attribution or remove online documentation that the operation ever occurred. ST0139
146 250 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal Operational Activity Redirect URLs An influence operation may redirect its falsified or typosquatted URLs to legitimate websites to increase the operation's appearance of legitimacy, complicate attribution, and avoid detection. ST0140
147 251 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal Operational Activity Remove Post Origins Removing post origins refers to the elimination of evidence that indicates the initial source of operation content, often to complicate attribution. An influence operation may remove post origins by deleting watermarks, renaming files, or removing embedded links in its content. ST0141
148 252 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal Operational Activity Misattribute Activity Misattributed activity refers to incorrectly attributed operation activity. For example, a state sponsored influence operation may conduct operation activity in a way that mimics another state so that external entities misattribute activity to the incorrect state. An operation may misattribute their activities to complicate attribution, avoid detection, or frame an adversary for negative behavior. ST0142
149 253 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal Infrastructure Conceal Sponsorship Concealing sponsorship aims to mislead or obscure the identity of the hidden sponsor behind an operation rather than entity publicly running the operation. Operations that conceal sponsorship may maintain visible falsified groups, news outlets, non-profits, or other organizations, but seek to mislead or obscure the identity sponsoring, funding, or otherwise supporting these entities. Influence operations may use a variety of techniques to mask the location of their social media accounts to complicate attribution and conceal evidence of foreign interference. Operation accounts may set their location to a false place, often the location of the operation’s target audience, and post in the region’s language ST0143
150 255 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal Infrastructure Utilize Bulletproof Hosting Hosting refers to services through which storage and computing resources are provided to an individual or organization for the accommodation and maintenance of one or more websites and related services. Services may include web hosting, file sharing, and email distribution. Bulletproof hosting refers to services provided by an entity, such as a domain hosting or web hosting firm, that allows its customer considerable leniency in use of the service. An influence operation may utilize bulletproof hosting to maintain continuity of service for suspicious, illegal, or disruptive operation activities that stricter hosting services would limit, report, or suspend. ST0144
151 256 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal Infrastructure Use Shell Organizations ST0145
152 257 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal Infrastructure Use Cryptocurrency ST0146
153 258 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal Infrastructure Obfuscate Payment ST0147
154 260 Execute Persist in the Information Space Exploit TOS/Content Moderation Legacy web content Make incident content visible for a long time, e.g. by exploiting platform terms of service, or placing it where it's hard to remove or unlikely to be removed. ST0148
155 261 Execute Persist in the Information Space Exploit TOS/Content Moderation Post Borderline Content ST0149
156 266 Assess Assess Effectiveness Measure Performance People Focused ST0150
157 267 Assess Assess Effectiveness Measure Performance Content Focused ST0151
158 268 Assess Assess Effectiveness Measure Performance View Focused ST0152
159 270 Assess Assess Effectiveness Measure Effectiveness Behavior changes Monitor and evaluate behaviour changes from misinformation incidents. ST0153 T0062 Behaviour changes (AMITT)
160 271 Assess Assess Effectiveness Measure Effectiveness Content ST0154
161 272 Assess Assess Effectiveness Measure Effectiveness Awareness ST0155
162 273 Assess Assess Effectiveness Measure Effectiveness Knowledge ST0156
163 274 Assess Assess Effectiveness Measure Effectiveness Action/attitude ST0157
164 276 Assess Assess Effectiveness Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs) Message reach Monitor and evaluate message reach in misinformation incidents. ST0158 T0063 Message reach (AMITT)
165 277 Assess Assess Effectiveness Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs) Social media engagement Monitor and evaluate social media engagement in misinformation incidents. ST0159 T0064 Social media engagement (AMITT)
166 3 Plan Plan Strategy Determine Target Audiences n/a T0001 DISARM Revision Process
167 4 Plan Plan Strategy Determine Strategic Ends n/a T0002 DISARM Revision Process
168 6 Plan Plan Objectives Dismiss n/a Push back against criticism by dismissing your critics. This might be arguing that the critics use a different standard for you than with other actors or themselves; or arguing that their criticism is biased. T0003
169 8 Plan Plan Objectives Distort n/a Twist the narrative. Take information, or artifacts like images, and change the framing around them. T0004 AMITT T0001 5Ds
170 9 Plan Plan Objectives Distract n/a Shift attention to a different narrative or actor, for instance by accusing critics of the same activity that they’ve accused you of (e.g. police brutality). T0005 AMITT T0001 5Ds
171 10 Plan Plan Objectives Dismay n/a Threaten the critic or narrator of events. For instance, threaten journalists or news outlets reporting on a story. T0006 AMITT T0001 5Ds
172 11 Plan Plan Objectives Divide n/a Create conflict between subgroups, to widen divisions in a community T0007 AMITT T0001 5Ds
173 12 Plan Plan Objectives Degrade Adversary n/a Plan to degrade an adversary’s image or ability to act. This could include preparation and use of harmful information about the adversary’s actions or reputation. T0008 AMITT T0066 Degrade Adversary
174 13 Plan Plan Objectives Facilitate State Propaganda n/a Organize citizens around pro-state messaging. Coordinate paid or volunteer groups to push state propaganda. T0009 AMITT T0002 Facilitate State Propaganda
175 15 Plan Target Audience Analysis Map Target Audience Information Environment n/a Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience. Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging. T0010 SPICE TA04 Map Target Audience Information Environment
176 21 Plan Target Audience Analysis Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities n/a Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment. Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. T0011 SPICE
177 30 Plan Target Audience Analysis Segment Audiences n/a Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. T0012 AMITT
178 38 Prepare Develop Narratives Develop New Narratives n/a T0013
179 39 Prepare Develop Narratives Leverage Existing Narratives n/a Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consitent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplifiction practices. T0014 AMITT T0003 Leverage Existing Narratives (AMITT)
180 40 Prepare Develop Narratives Develop Competing Narratives n/a Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on. These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the "firehose of misinformation" approach. T0015 AMITT T0004 Develop Competing Narratives (AMITT)
181 41 Prepare Develop Narratives Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives n/a "Conspiracy narratives" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the "firehose of falsehoods" model. T0016 AMITT T0022 Leverage Conspiracy Theory narratives (AMITT)
182 44 Prepare Develop Narratives Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative n/a An influence operation may seek to exploit the preexisting weaknesses, fears, and enemies of the target audience for integration into the operation’s narratives and overall strategy. Integrating existing vulnerabilities into the operational approach conserves resources by exploiting already weak areas of the target information environment instead of forcing the operation to create new vulnerabilities in the environment. T0017
183 45 Prepare Develop Narratives Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis n/a Media attention on a story or event is heightened during a breaking news event, where unclear facts and incomplete information increase speculation, rumors, and conspiracy theories, which are all vulnerable to manipulation. T0018
184 46 Prepare Develop Narratives Demand insurmountable proof n/a Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the "firehose of misinformation". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of "questions" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof. T0019 T0040 Demand insurmountable proof (AMITT)
185 48 Prepare Develop Content Reuse Existing Content n/a When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content. T0020
186 53 Prepare Develop Content Develop Text-based Content n/a T0021
187 57 Prepare Develop Content Develop Image-based Content n/a T0022
188 62 Prepare Develop Content Develop Video-based Content n/a T0023
189 65 Prepare Develop Content Develop Audio-based Content n/a T0024
190 68 Prepare Develop Content Generate information pollution n/a Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. "Nothing is true, but everything is possible." Akin to astroturfing campaign. T0025 T0019 Generate information pollution
191 71 Prepare Develop Content Distort facts n/a Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content T0026 T0023 Distort facts (AMITT)
192 74 Prepare Develop Content Create hashtags and search artifacts n/a Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag groups. Many incident-based campaigns will create hashtags to promote their fabricated event. Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: 1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only "real" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name!, and 2. Publicize the story more widely through trending lists and search behavior. Asset needed to direct/control/manage "conversation" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites). T0027 T0015 Create hashtags and search artifacts (AMITT)
193 75 Prepare Develop Content Obtain Private Documents n/a T0028
194 80 Prepare Establish Social Assets Create Inauthentic Accounts n/a T0029
195 85 Prepare Establish Social Assets Recruit bad actors n/a T0030
196 89 Prepare Establish Social Assets Cultivate ignorant agents n/a Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as "useful idiots" or "unwitting agents". T0031 T0010 Cultivate ignorant agents (AMITT)
197 90 Prepare Establish Social Assets Build Network n/a T0032 TK0014 Build Network (AMITT)
198 94 Prepare Establish Social Assets Acquire/ recruit Network n/a T0033
199 97 Prepare Establish Social Assets Infiltrate Existing Networks n/a T0034
200 100 Prepare Establish Social Assets Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups n/a Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets. Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are. T0035
201 101 Prepare Establish Social Assets Create inauthentic websites n/a Create media assets to support inauthentic organizations (e.g. think tank), people (e.g. experts) and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations. T0036 T0013 Create fake websites  (AMITT)
202 102 Prepare Establish Social Assets Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities n/a Create or coopt broadcast capabilities (e.g. TV, radio etc). T0037 T0065 Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities (AMITT)
203 103 Prepare Establish Social Assets Develop Owned Media Assets n/a An owned media asset refers to an agency or organization through which an influence operation may create, develop, and host content and narratives. Owned media assets include websites, blogs, social media pages, forums, and other platforms that facilitate the creation and organization of content. T0038
204 104 Prepare Establish Social Assets Prepare fundraising campaigns n/a Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. T0039 T0014 Prepare fundraising campaigns (AMITT)
205 107 Prepare Establish Social Assets Leverage Content Farm n/a T0040
206 111 Prepare Establish Legitimacy Compromise legitimate accounts n/a Hack or take over legimate accounts to distribute misinformation or damaging content. T0041 T0011 Compromise legitimate accounts (AMITT)
207 112 Prepare Establish Legitimacy Create fake experts n/a Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself. T0042 T0009 Create fake experts (AMITT)
208 114 Prepare Establish Legitimacy Create personas n/a T0043 TK0010 Create personas (AMITT)
209 116 Prepare Establish Legitimacy Establish Inauthentic News Sites n/a Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details. T0044
210 119 Prepare Establish Legitimacy Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities n/a An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities. An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to confirm that the URL is correct. T0045
211 122 Prepare Establish Legitimacy Co-opt Trusted Sources n/a An influence operation may co-opt trusted sources by infiltrating or repurposing a source to reach a target audience through existing, previously reliable networks. Co-opted trusted sources may include: - National or local new outlets - Research or academic publications - Online blogs or websites T0046
212 128 Execute Microtarget Create Clickbait n/a Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humor) required to drive traffic & engagement. This is a key asset. T0047 T0016 Create Clickbait (AMITT)
213 129 Execute Microtarget Purchase Targeted Advertisements n/a Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations T0048 T0018 Purchase Targeted Advertisements (AMITT)
214 130 Execute Microtarget Create Localized Content n/a Localized content refers to content that appeals to a specific community of individuals, often in defined geographic areas. An operation may create localized content using local language and dialects to resonate with its target audience and blend in with other local news and social media. Localized content may help an operation increase legitimacy, avoid detection, and complicate external attribution. T0049
215 131 Execute Microtarget Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles n/a An echo chamber refers to an internet subgroup, often along ideological lines, where individuals only engage with “others with which they are already in agreement.” A filter bubble refers to an algorithm's placement of an individual in content that they agree with or regularly engage with, possibly entrapping the user into a bubble of their own making. An operation may create these isolated areas of the internet by match existing groups, or aggregating individuals into a single target audience based on shared interests, politics, values, demographics, and other characteristics. Echo chambers and filter bubbles help to reinforce similar biases and content to the same target audience members. T0050
216 136 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Chat apps n/a Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety. T0051 T0043 Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps (AMITT)
217 139 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Livestream n/a T0052
218 142 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Social Networks n/a T0053
219 149 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Media Sharing Networks n/a Media sharing networks refer to services whose primary function is the hosting and sharing of specific forms of media. Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, Youtube, SoundCloud. T0054
220 153 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Discussion Forums n/a Platforms for finding, discussing, and sharing information and opinions. Examples include Reddit, Quora, Digg, message boards, interest-based discussion forums, etc. T0055
221 155 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Bookmarking and Content Curation n/a Platforms for searching, sharing, and curating content and media. Examples include Pinterest, Flipboard, etc. T0056
222 156 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Blogging and Publishing Networks n/a Examples include WordPress, Blogger, Weebly, Tumblr, Medium, etc. T0057
223 157 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Consumer Review Networks n/a Platforms for finding, reviewing, and sharing information about brands, products, services, restaurants, travel destinations, etc. Examples include Yelp, TripAdvisor, etc. T0058
224 158 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Online polls n/a Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well T0059 T0029 Manipulate online polls (AMITT)
225 159 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Formal Diplomatic Channels n/a T0060
226 160 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Traditional Media n/a Examples include TV, Newspaper, Radio, etc. T0061
227 164 Execute Select Channels and Affordances Email n/a T0062
228 166 Execute Conduct Pump Priming Trial content n/a Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content enagagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates T0063 AMITT T0020 Trial content (AMITT)
229 167 Execute Conduct Pump Priming Bait legitimate influencers n/a Credibility in a social media environment is often a function of the size of a user's network. "Influencers" are so-called because of their reach, typically understood as: 1) the size of their network (i.e. the number of followers, perhaps weighted by their own influence); and 2) The rate at which their comments are re-circulated (these two metrics are related). Add traditional media players at all levels of credibility and professionalism to this, and the number of potential influencial carriers available for unwitting amplification becomes substantial. By targeting high-influence people and organizations in all types of media with narratives and content engineered to appeal their emotional or ideological drivers, influence campaigns are able to add perceived credibility to their messaging via saturation and adoption by trusted agents such as celebrities, journalists and local leaders. T0064 AMITT T0039 Bait legitimate influencers (AMITT)
230 168 Execute Conduct Pump Priming Seed Kernel of truth n/a Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths. Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies. When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters. T0065 AMITT T0042 Seed Kernel of truth (AMITT)
231 169 Execute Conduct Pump Priming Seed distortions n/a Try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event, to give a misleading account or impression. T0066 AMITT T0044 Seed distortions (AMITT)
232 170 Execute Conduct Pump Priming Use fake experts n/a Use the fake experts that were set up during Establish Legitimacy. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give "credility" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias T0067 AMITT T0045 Use fake experts (AMITT)
233 171 Execute Conduct Pump Priming Use Search Engine Optimization n/a Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka "Black-hat SEO" T0068 AMITT T0046 Search Engine Optimization (AMITT)
234 172 Execute Conduct Pump Priming Employ Commercial Analytic Firms n/a Commercial analytic firms collect data on target audience activities and evaluate the data to detect trends, such as content receiving high click-rates. An influence operation may employ commercial analytic firms to facilitate external collection on its target audience, complicating attribution efforts and better tailoring the content to audience preferences. T0069 SPICE Employ Commercial Analytic Firms
235 174 Execute Deliver Content Deliver Ads n/a Delivering content via any form of paid media or advertising. T0070
236 177 Execute Deliver Content Post Content n/a Delivering content by posting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). T0071
237 181 Execute Deliver Content Comment or Reply on Content n/a Delivering content by replying or commenting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). T0072
238 183 Execute Deliver Content Attract Traditional Media n/a Deliver content by attracting the attention of traditional media (earned media). T0073
239 185 Execute Maximize Exposure Flooding the Information Space n/a Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect. T0074 T0049 Flooding
240 193 Execute Maximize Exposure Amplify Existing Narrative n/a An influence operation may amplify existing narratives that align with its narratives to support operation objectives. T0075
241 194 Execute Maximize Exposure Cross-Posting n/a Cross-posting refers to posting the same message to multiple internet discussions, social media platforms or accounts, or news groups at one time. An influence operation may post content online in multiple communities and platforms to increase the chances of content exposure to the target audience. T0076
242 198 Execute Maximize Exposure Incentivize Sharing n/a Incentivizing content sharing refers to actions that encourage users to share content themselves, reducing the need for the operation itself to post and promote its own content. T0077
243 201 Execute Maximize Exposure Manipulate Platform Algorithm n/a Manipulating a platform algorithm refers to conducting activity on a platform in a way that intentionally targets its underlying algorithm. After analyzing a platform’s algorithm (see: Select Platforms), an influence operation may use a platform in a way that increases its content exposure, avoids content removal, or otherwise benefits the operation’s strategy. For example, an influence operation may use bots to amplify its posts so that the platform’s algorithm recognizes engagement with operation content and further promotes the content on user timelines. T0078
244 203 Execute Maximize Exposure Direct Users to Alternative Platforms n/a Direct users to alternative platforms refers to encouraging users to move from the platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage with content on alternate information channels, including separate social media channels and inauthentic websites. An operation may drive users to alternative platforms to diversify its information channels and ensure the target audience knows where to access operation content if the initial platform suspends, flags, or otherwise removes original operation assets and content. T0079
245 205 Execute Drive Online Harms Harass n/a Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. T0080
246 210 Execute Drive Online Harms Censor social media as a political force n/a Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports). T0081 T0047 Censor social media as a political force (AMITT)
247 211 Execute Drive Online Harms Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations n/a Controling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition messaging. T0082
248 216 Execute Drive Online Harms Suppress Opposition n/a T0083
249 220 Execute Drive Online Harms Platform Filtering n/a Platform filtering refers to the decontextualization of information as claims cross platforms (from Joan Donovan https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/disinformation-design-use-evidence-collages-and-platform-filtering-media-manipulation) T0084
250 222 Execute Drive Offline Activity Encourage Attendance at Events n/a Operation encourages attendance at existing real world event. T0085
251 225 Execute Drive Offline Activity Organize Events n/a Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives. T0086 T0057 Organise remote rallies and events (AMITT)
252 228 Execute Drive Offline Activity Conduct fundraising n/a Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services166 on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. T0087
253 230 Execute Drive Offline Activity Physical Violence n/a Physical violence refers to the use of force to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy. An influence operation may conduct or encourage physical violence to discourage opponents from promoting conflicting content or draw attention to operation narratives using shock value. T0088
254 233 Execute Drive Offline Activity Merchandising/ Advertising n/a Merchandising/Advertising refers to getting the message or narrative into physical space in the offline world T0089
255 236 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal People n/a Conceal the identity or provenance of the account and people assets. T0090
256 242 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal Operational Activity n/a T0091
257 254 Execute Persist in the Information Space Conceal Infrastructure n/a T0092
258 259 Execute Persist in the Information Space Exploit TOS/Content Moderation n/a T0093
259 262 Execute Persist in the Information Space Play the long game n/a Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold 2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative. T0094 T0059 Play the long game
260 265 Assess Assess Effectiveness Measure Performance n/a T0095
261 269 Assess Assess Effectiveness Measure Effectiveness n/a T0096
262 275 Assess Assess Effectiveness Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs) n/a T0097
263 2 Plan Plan Strategy n/a n/a Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all objectives. TA01 AMITT TA01: Strategic Planning
264 5 Plan Plan Objectives n/a n/a Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievable objectives. Achieving objectives ties execution of tactical tasks to reaching the desired end state. There are four primary considerations: - Each desired effect should link directly to one or more objectives - The effect should be measurable - The objective statement should not specify the way and means of accomplishment - The effect should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as another objective or task. TA02 AMITT TA02: Objective Planning
265 14 Plan Target Audience Analysis n/a n/a Identifying and analyzing the target audience examines target audience member locations, political affiliations, financial situations, and other attributes that an influence operation may incorporate into its messaging strategy. During this tactic, influence operations may also identify existing similarities and differences between target audience members to unite like groups and divide opposing groups. Identifying and analyzing target audience members allows influence operations to tailor operation strategy and content to their analysis. TA03 SPICE and AMITT T0005 Center of Gravity Analysis
266 37 Prepare Develop Narratives n/a n/a The promotion of beneficial master narratives is perhaps the most effective method for achieving long-term strategic narrative dominance. From a "whole of society" perspective the promotion of the society's core master narratives should occupy a central strategic role. From a misinformation campaign / cognitive security perpectve the tactics around master narratives center more precisely on the day-to-day promotion and reinforcement of this messaging. In other words, beneficial, high-coverage master narratives are a central strategic goal and their promotion constitutes an ongoing tactical struggle carried out at a whole-of-society level. Tactically, their promotion covers a broad spectrum of activities both on- and offline. TA04
267 47 Prepare Develop Content n/a n/a TA05
268 79 Prepare Establish Social Assets n/a n/a Establishing information assets generates messaging tools, including social media accounts, operation personnel, and organizations, including directly and indirectly managed assets. For assets under their direct control, the operation can add, change, or remove these assets at will. Establishing information assets allows an influence operation to promote messaging directly to the target audience without navigating through external entities. Many online influence operations create or compromise social media accounts as a primary vector of information dissemination. TA06
269 110 Prepare Establish Legitimacy n/a n/a TA07
270 127 Execute Microtarget n/a n/a Target very specific populations of people TA08 TA05 "Microtargeting"
271 135 Execute Select Channels and Affordances n/a n/a Selecting platforms and affordances assesses which online or offline platforms and their associated affordances maximize an influence operation’s ability to reach its target audience. To select the most appropriate platform(s), an operation may assess the technological affordances including platform algorithms, terms of service, permitted content types, or other attributes that determine platform usability and accessibility. Selecting platforms includes both choosing platforms on which the operation will publish its own content and platforms on which the operation will attempt to restrict adversarial content. TA09
272 165 Execute Conduct Pump Priming n/a n/a Release content on a targetted small scale, prior to general release, including releasing seed. Used for preparation before broader release, and as message honing. Used for preparation before broader release, and as message honing. TA10
273 173 Execute Deliver Content n/a n/a Release content to general public or larger population TA11
274 184 Execute Maximize Exposure n/a n/a Maximize exposure of the target audience to incident/campaign content via flooding, amplifying, and cross-posting. TA12
275 204 Execute Drive Online Harms n/a n/a Actions taken by an influence operation to harm their opponents in online spaces through harassment, suppression, releasing private information, and controlling the information space through offensive cyberspace operations. TA13
276 221 Execute Drive Offline Activity n/a n/a Move incident/campaign from online to offline. Encouraging users to move from the platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage in the physical information space or offline world. This may include operation-aligned rallies or protests, radio, newspaper, or billboards. An influence operation may drive to physical forums to diversify its information channels and facilitate spaces where the target audience can engage with both operation content and like-minded individuals offline. TA14
277 235 Execute Persist in the Information Space n/a n/a Persist in the Information Space refers to taking measures that allow an operation to maintain its presence and avoid takedown by an external entity. Techniques in Persist in the Information Space help campaigns operate without detection and appear legitimate to the target audience and platform monitoring services. Influence operations on social media often persist online by varying the type of information assets and platforms used throughout the campaign. TA15
278 264 Assess Assess Effectiveness n/a n/a TA16

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DISARM Technique,DISARM Subtechnique,Description,DISARM ID
Determine Target Audiences,,,T0001
Determine Strategic Ends,,,T0002
Dismiss,,Push back against criticism by dismissing your critics. This might be arguing that the critics use a different standard for you than with other actors or themselves; or arguing that their criticism is biased.,T0003
Distort,,"Twist the narrative. Take information, or artifacts like images, and change the framing around them.",T0004
Distract,,"Shift attention to a different narrative or actor, for instance by accusing critics of the same activity that they’ve accused you of (e.g. police brutality).",T0005
Dismay,,"Threaten the critic or narrator of events. For instance, threaten journalists or news outlets reporting on a story.",T0006
Divide,,"Create conflict between subgroups, to widen divisions in a community",T0007
Degrade Adversary,,Plan to degrade an adversary’s image or ability to act. This could include preparation and use of harmful information about the adversary’s actions or reputation.,T0008
Facilitate State Propaganda,,Organize citizens around pro-state messaging. Coordinate paid or volunteer groups to push state propaganda.,T0009
Map Target Audience Information Environment,,"Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience.
Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging.",T0010
Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities,,"Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment.
Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. ",T0011
Segment Audiences,,"Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. ",T0013
Develop New Narratives,,,T0014
Leverage Existing Narratives,,"Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consitent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplifiction practices. ",T0015
Develop Competing Narratives,,"Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on. These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the ""firehose of misinformation"" approach.",T0016
Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives,,"""Conspiracy narratives"" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the ""firehose of falsehoods"" model. ",T0017
Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative,,"An influence operation may seek to exploit the preexisting weaknesses, fears, and enemies of the target audience for integration into the operation’s narratives and overall strategy. Integrating existing vulnerabilities into the operational approach conserves resources by exploiting already weak areas of the target information environment instead of forcing the operation to create new vulnerabilities in the environment.",T0018
Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis,,"Media attention on a story or event is heightened during a breaking news event, where unclear facts and incomplete information increase speculation, rumors, and conspiracy theories, which are all vulnerable to manipulation. ",T0019
Demand insurmountable proof,,"Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the ""firehose of misinformation"". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of ""questions"" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof.",T0020
Reuse Existing Content,,When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content. ,T0021
Develop Text-based Content,,,T0022
Develop Image-based Content,,,T0023
Develop Video-based Content,,,T0024
Develop Audio-based Content,,,T0025
Generate information pollution,,"Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. ""Nothing is true, but everything is possible."" Akin to astroturfing campaign.",T0026
Distort facts,,"Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content",T0027
Create hashtags and search artifacts,,"Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag groups. Many incident-based campaigns will create hashtags to promote their fabricated event. Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: 1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only ""real"" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name!, and 2. Publicize the story more widely through trending lists and search behavior. Asset needed to direct/control/manage ""conversation"" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites). ",T0028
Obtain Private Documents,,,T0029
Create Inauthentic Accounts,,,T0030
Recruit bad actors,,,T0031
Cultivate ignorant agents,,"Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as ""useful idiots"" or ""unwitting agents"".",T0032
Build Network,,,T0033
Acquire/ recruit Network,,,T0034
Infiltrate Existing Networks,,,T0035
Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups,,"Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets. Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are.",T0036
Create inauthentic websites,,"Create media assets to support inauthentic organizations (e.g. think tank), people (e.g. experts) and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations.",T0037
Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities,,"Create or coopt broadcast capabilities (e.g. TV, radio etc).",T0038
Develop Owned Media Assets,,"An owned media asset refers to an agency or organization through which an influence operation may create, develop, and host content and narratives. Owned media assets include websites, blogs, social media pages, forums, and other platforms that facilitate the creation and organization of content.",T0039
Prepare fundraising campaigns,,"Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. ",T0040
Leverage Content Farm,,,T0041
Compromise legitimate accounts,,Hack or take over legimate accounts to distribute misinformation or damaging content.,T0042
Create fake experts,,"Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself. ",T0043
Create personas,,,T0044
Establish Inauthentic News Sites,,"Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details.",T0045
Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities,,"An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities.
An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to confirm that the URL is correct. ",T0046
Co-opt Trusted Sources,,"An influence operation may co-opt trusted sources by infiltrating or repurposing a source to reach a target audience through existing, previously reliable networks. Co-opted trusted sources may include:
- National or local new outlets
- Research or academic publications
- Online blogs or websites ",T0047
Create Clickbait,,"Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humor) required to drive traffic & engagement. This is a key asset.",T0048
Purchase Targeted Advertisements,,Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations,T0049
Create Localized Content,,"Localized content refers to content that appeals to a specific community of individuals, often in defined geographic areas. An operation may create localized content using local language and dialects to resonate with its target audience and blend in with other local news and social media. Localized content may help an operation increase legitimacy, avoid detection, and complicate external attribution.",T0050
Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles,,"An echo chamber refers to an internet subgroup, often along ideological lines, where individuals only engage with “others with which they are already in agreement.” A filter bubble refers to an algorithm's placement of an individual in content that they agree with or regularly engage with, possibly entrapping the user into a bubble of their own making. An operation may create these isolated areas of the internet by match existing groups, or aggregating individuals into a single target audience based on shared interests, politics, values, demographics, and other characteristics. Echo chambers and filter bubbles help to reinforce similar biases and content to the same target audience members. ",T0051
Chat apps,,"Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety.",T0052
Livestream,,,T0053
Social Networks,,,T0054
Media Sharing Networks,,"Media sharing networks refer to services whose primary function is the hosting and sharing of specific forms of media. Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, Youtube, SoundCloud.",T0055
Discussion Forums,,"Platforms for finding, discussing, and sharing information and opinions. Examples include Reddit, Quora, Digg, message boards, interest-based discussion forums, etc.",T0056
Bookmarking and Content Curation,,"Platforms for searching, sharing, and curating content and media. Examples include Pinterest, Flipboard, etc.",T0057
Blogging and Publishing Networks,,"Examples include WordPress, Blogger, Weebly, Tumblr, Medium, etc. ",T0058
Consumer Review Networks,,"Platforms for finding, reviewing, and sharing information about brands, products, services, restaurants, travel destinations, etc. Examples include Yelp, TripAdvisor, etc.",T0059
Online polls,,"Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well",T0060
Formal Diplomatic Channels,,,T0061
Traditional Media,,"Examples include TV, Newspaper, Radio, etc.",T0062
Email,,,T0063
Trial content,,"Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content enagagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates",T0064
Bait legitimate influencers,,"Credibility in a social media environment is often a function of the size of a user's network. ""Influencers"" are so-called because of their reach, typically understood as: 1) the size of their network (i.e. the number of followers, perhaps weighted by their own influence); and 2) The rate at which their comments are re-circulated (these two metrics are related). Add traditional media players at all levels of credibility and professionalism to this, and the number of potential influencial carriers available for unwitting amplification becomes substantial. By targeting high-influence people and organizations in all types of media with narratives and content engineered to appeal their emotional or ideological drivers, influence campaigns are able to add perceived credibility to their messaging via saturation and adoption by trusted agents such as celebrities, journalists and local leaders.",T0065
Seed Kernel of truth,,"Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths. Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies. When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters.",T0066
Seed distortions,,"Try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event, to give a misleading account or impression. ",T0067
Use fake experts,,"Use the fake experts that were set up during Establish Legitimacy. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give ""credility"" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias",T0068
Use Search Engine Optimization,,"Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka ""Black-hat SEO"" ",T0069
Employ Commercial Analytic Firms,,"Commercial analytic firms collect data on target audience activities and evaluate the data to detect trends, such as content receiving high click-rates. An influence operation may employ commercial analytic firms to facilitate external collection on its target audience, complicating attribution efforts and better tailoring the content to audience preferences. ",T0070
Deliver Ads,,Delivering content via any form of paid media or advertising.,T0071
Post Content,,Delivering content by posting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). ,T0072
Comment or Reply on Content,,Delivering content by replying or commenting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). ,T0073
Attract Traditional Media,,Deliver content by attracting the attention of traditional media (earned media).,T0074
Flooding the Information Space,,Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.,T0075
Amplify Existing Narrative,,An influence operation may amplify existing narratives that align with its narratives to support operation objectives. ,T0076
Cross-Posting,,"Cross-posting refers to posting the same message to multiple internet discussions, social media platforms or accounts, or news groups at one time. An influence operation may post content online in multiple communities and platforms to increase the chances of content exposure to the target audience. ",T0077
Incentivize Sharing,,"Incentivizing content sharing refers to actions that encourage users to share content themselves, reducing the need for the operation itself to post and promote its own content.",T0078
Manipulate Platform Algorithm,,"Manipulating a platform algorithm refers to conducting activity on a platform in a way that intentionally targets its underlying algorithm. After analyzing a platform’s algorithm (see: Select Platforms), an influence operation may use a platform in a way that increases its content exposure, avoids content removal, or otherwise benefits the operation’s strategy. For example, an influence operation may use bots to amplify its posts so that the platform’s algorithm recognizes engagement with operation content and further promotes the content on user timelines. ",T0079
Direct Users to Alternative Platforms,,"Direct users to alternative platforms refers to encouraging users to move from the platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage with content on alternate information channels, including separate social media channels and inauthentic websites. An operation may drive users to alternative platforms to diversify its information channels and ensure the target audience knows where to access operation content if the initial platform suspends, flags, or otherwise removes original operation assets and content. ",T0080
Harass,,"Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. ",T0081
Censor social media as a political force,,Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports).,T0082
Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations,,Controling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition messaging.,T0083
Suppress Opposition,,,T0084
Platform Filtering,,Platform filtering refers to the decontextualization of information as claims cross platforms (from Joan Donovan https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/disinformation-design-use-evidence-collages-and-platform-filtering-media-manipulation),T0085
Encourage Attendance at Events,,Operation encourages attendance at existing real world event.,T0086
Organize Events,,"Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives.",T0087
Conduct fundraising,,"Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services166 on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. ",T0088
Physical Violence,,"Physical violence refers to the use of force to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy. An influence operation may conduct or encourage physical violence to discourage opponents from promoting conflicting content or draw attention to operation narratives using shock value. ",T0089
Merchandising/ Advertising,,Merchandising/Advertising refers to getting the message or narrative into physical space in the offline world,T0090
Conceal People,,Conceal the identity or provenance of the account and people assets.,T0091
Conceal Operational Activity,,,T0092
Conceal Infrastructure,,,T0093
Exploit TOS/Content Moderation,,,T0094
Play the long game,,Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold 2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative.,T0095
Measure Performance,,,T0096
Measure Effectiveness,,,T0097
Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs),,,
1 DISARM Technique DISARM Subtechnique Description DISARM ID
2 Determine Target Audiences T0001
3 Determine Strategic Ends T0002
4 Dismiss Push back against criticism by dismissing your critics. This might be arguing that the critics use a different standard for you than with other actors or themselves; or arguing that their criticism is biased. T0003
5 Distort Twist the narrative. Take information, or artifacts like images, and change the framing around them. T0004
6 Distract Shift attention to a different narrative or actor, for instance by accusing critics of the same activity that they’ve accused you of (e.g. police brutality). T0005
7 Dismay Threaten the critic or narrator of events. For instance, threaten journalists or news outlets reporting on a story. T0006
8 Divide Create conflict between subgroups, to widen divisions in a community T0007
9 Degrade Adversary Plan to degrade an adversary’s image or ability to act. This could include preparation and use of harmful information about the adversary’s actions or reputation. T0008
10 Facilitate State Propaganda Organize citizens around pro-state messaging. Coordinate paid or volunteer groups to push state propaganda. T0009
11 Map Target Audience Information Environment Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience. Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging. T0010
12 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment. Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives. T0011
13 Segment Audiences Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. T0013
14 Develop New Narratives T0014
15 Leverage Existing Narratives Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consitent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplifiction practices. T0015
16 Develop Competing Narratives Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on. These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the "firehose of misinformation" approach. T0016
17 Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives "Conspiracy narratives" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the "firehose of falsehoods" model. T0017
18 Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative An influence operation may seek to exploit the preexisting weaknesses, fears, and enemies of the target audience for integration into the operation’s narratives and overall strategy. Integrating existing vulnerabilities into the operational approach conserves resources by exploiting already weak areas of the target information environment instead of forcing the operation to create new vulnerabilities in the environment. T0018
19 Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis Media attention on a story or event is heightened during a breaking news event, where unclear facts and incomplete information increase speculation, rumors, and conspiracy theories, which are all vulnerable to manipulation. T0019
20 Demand insurmountable proof Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the "firehose of misinformation". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of "questions" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof. T0020
21 Reuse Existing Content When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content. T0021
22 Develop Text-based Content T0022
23 Develop Image-based Content T0023
24 Develop Video-based Content T0024
25 Develop Audio-based Content T0025
26 Generate information pollution Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. "Nothing is true, but everything is possible." Akin to astroturfing campaign. T0026
27 Distort facts Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content T0027
28 Create hashtags and search artifacts Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag groups. Many incident-based campaigns will create hashtags to promote their fabricated event. Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: 1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only "real" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name!, and 2. Publicize the story more widely through trending lists and search behavior. Asset needed to direct/control/manage "conversation" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites). T0028
29 Obtain Private Documents T0029
30 Create Inauthentic Accounts T0030
31 Recruit bad actors T0031
32 Cultivate ignorant agents Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as "useful idiots" or "unwitting agents". T0032
33 Build Network T0033
34 Acquire/ recruit Network T0034
35 Infiltrate Existing Networks T0035
36 Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets. Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are. T0036
37 Create inauthentic websites Create media assets to support inauthentic organizations (e.g. think tank), people (e.g. experts) and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations. T0037
38 Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities Create or coopt broadcast capabilities (e.g. TV, radio etc). T0038
39 Develop Owned Media Assets An owned media asset refers to an agency or organization through which an influence operation may create, develop, and host content and narratives. Owned media assets include websites, blogs, social media pages, forums, and other platforms that facilitate the creation and organization of content. T0039
40 Prepare fundraising campaigns Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. T0040
41 Leverage Content Farm T0041
42 Compromise legitimate accounts Hack or take over legimate accounts to distribute misinformation or damaging content. T0042
43 Create fake experts Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself. T0043
44 Create personas T0044
45 Establish Inauthentic News Sites Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details. T0045
46 Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities. An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to confirm that the URL is correct. T0046
47 Co-opt Trusted Sources An influence operation may co-opt trusted sources by infiltrating or repurposing a source to reach a target audience through existing, previously reliable networks. Co-opted trusted sources may include: - National or local new outlets - Research or academic publications - Online blogs or websites T0047
48 Create Clickbait Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humor) required to drive traffic & engagement. This is a key asset. T0048
49 Purchase Targeted Advertisements Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations T0049
50 Create Localized Content Localized content refers to content that appeals to a specific community of individuals, often in defined geographic areas. An operation may create localized content using local language and dialects to resonate with its target audience and blend in with other local news and social media. Localized content may help an operation increase legitimacy, avoid detection, and complicate external attribution. T0050
51 Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles An echo chamber refers to an internet subgroup, often along ideological lines, where individuals only engage with “others with which they are already in agreement.” A filter bubble refers to an algorithm's placement of an individual in content that they agree with or regularly engage with, possibly entrapping the user into a bubble of their own making. An operation may create these isolated areas of the internet by match existing groups, or aggregating individuals into a single target audience based on shared interests, politics, values, demographics, and other characteristics. Echo chambers and filter bubbles help to reinforce similar biases and content to the same target audience members. T0051
52 Chat apps Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety. T0052
53 Livestream T0053
54 Social Networks T0054
55 Media Sharing Networks Media sharing networks refer to services whose primary function is the hosting and sharing of specific forms of media. Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, Youtube, SoundCloud. T0055
56 Discussion Forums Platforms for finding, discussing, and sharing information and opinions. Examples include Reddit, Quora, Digg, message boards, interest-based discussion forums, etc. T0056
57 Bookmarking and Content Curation Platforms for searching, sharing, and curating content and media. Examples include Pinterest, Flipboard, etc. T0057
58 Blogging and Publishing Networks Examples include WordPress, Blogger, Weebly, Tumblr, Medium, etc. T0058
59 Consumer Review Networks Platforms for finding, reviewing, and sharing information about brands, products, services, restaurants, travel destinations, etc. Examples include Yelp, TripAdvisor, etc. T0059
60 Online polls Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well T0060
61 Formal Diplomatic Channels T0061
62 Traditional Media Examples include TV, Newspaper, Radio, etc. T0062
63 Email T0063
64 Trial content Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content enagagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates T0064
65 Bait legitimate influencers Credibility in a social media environment is often a function of the size of a user's network. "Influencers" are so-called because of their reach, typically understood as: 1) the size of their network (i.e. the number of followers, perhaps weighted by their own influence); and 2) The rate at which their comments are re-circulated (these two metrics are related). Add traditional media players at all levels of credibility and professionalism to this, and the number of potential influencial carriers available for unwitting amplification becomes substantial. By targeting high-influence people and organizations in all types of media with narratives and content engineered to appeal their emotional or ideological drivers, influence campaigns are able to add perceived credibility to their messaging via saturation and adoption by trusted agents such as celebrities, journalists and local leaders. T0065
66 Seed Kernel of truth Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths. Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies. When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters. T0066
67 Seed distortions Try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event, to give a misleading account or impression. T0067
68 Use fake experts Use the fake experts that were set up during Establish Legitimacy. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give "credility" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias T0068
69 Use Search Engine Optimization Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka "Black-hat SEO" T0069
70 Employ Commercial Analytic Firms Commercial analytic firms collect data on target audience activities and evaluate the data to detect trends, such as content receiving high click-rates. An influence operation may employ commercial analytic firms to facilitate external collection on its target audience, complicating attribution efforts and better tailoring the content to audience preferences. T0070
71 Deliver Ads Delivering content via any form of paid media or advertising. T0071
72 Post Content Delivering content by posting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). T0072
73 Comment or Reply on Content Delivering content by replying or commenting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). T0073
74 Attract Traditional Media Deliver content by attracting the attention of traditional media (earned media). T0074
75 Flooding the Information Space Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect. T0075
76 Amplify Existing Narrative An influence operation may amplify existing narratives that align with its narratives to support operation objectives. T0076
77 Cross-Posting Cross-posting refers to posting the same message to multiple internet discussions, social media platforms or accounts, or news groups at one time. An influence operation may post content online in multiple communities and platforms to increase the chances of content exposure to the target audience. T0077
78 Incentivize Sharing Incentivizing content sharing refers to actions that encourage users to share content themselves, reducing the need for the operation itself to post and promote its own content. T0078
79 Manipulate Platform Algorithm Manipulating a platform algorithm refers to conducting activity on a platform in a way that intentionally targets its underlying algorithm. After analyzing a platform’s algorithm (see: Select Platforms), an influence operation may use a platform in a way that increases its content exposure, avoids content removal, or otherwise benefits the operation’s strategy. For example, an influence operation may use bots to amplify its posts so that the platform’s algorithm recognizes engagement with operation content and further promotes the content on user timelines. T0079
80 Direct Users to Alternative Platforms Direct users to alternative platforms refers to encouraging users to move from the platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage with content on alternate information channels, including separate social media channels and inauthentic websites. An operation may drive users to alternative platforms to diversify its information channels and ensure the target audience knows where to access operation content if the initial platform suspends, flags, or otherwise removes original operation assets and content. T0080
81 Harass Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content. T0081
82 Censor social media as a political force Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports). T0082
83 Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations Controling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition messaging. T0083
84 Suppress Opposition T0084
85 Platform Filtering Platform filtering refers to the decontextualization of information as claims cross platforms (from Joan Donovan https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/disinformation-design-use-evidence-collages-and-platform-filtering-media-manipulation) T0085
86 Encourage Attendance at Events Operation encourages attendance at existing real world event. T0086
87 Organize Events Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives. T0087
88 Conduct fundraising Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services166 on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities. T0088
89 Physical Violence Physical violence refers to the use of force to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy. An influence operation may conduct or encourage physical violence to discourage opponents from promoting conflicting content or draw attention to operation narratives using shock value. T0089
90 Merchandising/ Advertising Merchandising/Advertising refers to getting the message or narrative into physical space in the offline world T0090
91 Conceal People Conceal the identity or provenance of the account and people assets. T0091
92 Conceal Operational Activity T0092
93 Conceal Infrastructure T0093
94 Exploit TOS/Content Moderation T0094
95 Play the long game Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold 2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative. T0095
96 Measure Performance T0096
97 Measure Effectiveness T0097
98 Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)

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