Revisions to DISARM Framework

generated_pages/techniques/T0002.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0002: Determine Strategic Ends
+# Technique T0002: Facilitate State Propaganda
 
-* **Summary**: 
+* **Summary**: Organize citizens around pro-state messaging. Coordinate paid or volunteer groups to push state propaganda.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0003.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0003: Dismiss
+# Technique T0003: Leverage Existing Narratives
 
-* **Summary**: Push back against criticism by dismissing your critics. This might be arguing that the critics use a different standard for you than with other actors or themselves; or arguing that their criticism is biased.
+* **Summary**: Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consitent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplifiction practices. 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA14
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0004.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0004: Distort
+# Technique T0004: Develop Competing Narratives
 
-* **Summary**: Twist the narrative. Take information, or artifacts like images, and change the framing around them.
+* **Summary**: Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on. These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the "firehose of misinformation" approach.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA14
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0007.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0007: Divide
+# Technique T0007: Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups
 
-* **Summary**: Create conflict between subgroups, to widen divisions in a community
+* **Summary**: Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets. Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0009.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0009: Facilitate State Propaganda
+# Technique T0009: Create fake experts
 
-* **Summary**: Organize citizens around pro-state messaging. Coordinate paid or volunteer groups to push state propaganda.
+* **Summary**: Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself. 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0010.md

@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0010: Map Target Audience Information Environment
+# Technique T0010: Cultivate ignorant agents
 
-* **Summary**: Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself,  including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information  environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular  information channels to reach its target audience. 
-Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining  the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging.
+* **Summary**: Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as "useful idiots" or "unwitting agents".
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0011.md

@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0011: Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
+# Technique T0011: Compromise legitimate accounts
 
-* **Summary**: Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience  information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues,  weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment.  
-Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified  weaknesses to advance operation objectives. 
+* **Summary**: Hack or take over legimate accounts to distribute misinformation or damaging content.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0012.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0013.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0013: Develop New Narratives
+# Technique T0013: Create inauthentic websites
 
-* **Summary**: 
+* **Summary**: Create media assets to support inauthentic organizations (e.g. think tank), people (e.g. experts) and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0014.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0014: Leverage Existing Narratives
+# Technique T0014: Prepare fundraising campaigns
 
-* **Summary**: Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consitent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplifiction practices. 
+* **Summary**: Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial  support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote  operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged  in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation  may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to  promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities.  
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0015.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0015: Develop Competing Narratives
+# Technique T0015: Create hashtags and search artifacts
 
-* **Summary**: Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on. These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the "firehose of misinformation" approach.
+* **Summary**: Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag groups. Many incident-based campaigns will create hashtags to promote their fabricated event. Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: 1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only "real" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name!, and 2. Publicize the story more widely through trending lists and search behavior. Asset needed to direct/control/manage "conversation" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites). 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0016.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0016: Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
+# Technique T0016: Create Clickbait
 
-* **Summary**: "Conspiracy narratives" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the "firehose of falsehoods" model. 
+* **Summary**: Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humor) required to drive traffic & engagement. This is a key asset.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0017.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0017: Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative
+# Technique T0017: Conduct fundraising
 
-* **Summary**: An influence operation may seek to exploit the preexisting weaknesses, fears, and enemies of the  target audience for integration into the operation’s narratives and overall strategy. Integrating  existing vulnerabilities into the operational approach conserves resources by exploiting already  weak areas of the target information environment instead of forcing the operation to create new  vulnerabilities in the environment.
+* **Summary**: Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial  support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote  operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged  in crowdfunding services166 on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation  may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities.  
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0018.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0018: Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis
+# Technique T0018: Purchase Targeted Advertisements
 
-* **Summary**: Media attention on a story or event is heightened during a breaking news event, where unclear facts and incomplete information increase speculation, rumors, and conspiracy theories, which are all vulnerable to manipulation. 
+* **Summary**: Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0019.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0019: Demand insurmountable proof
+# Technique T0019: Generate information pollution
 
-* **Summary**: Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the "firehose of misinformation". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of "questions" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof.
+* **Summary**: Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. "Nothing is true, but everything is possible." Akin to astroturfing campaign.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0020.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0020: Reuse Existing Content
+# Technique T0020: Trial content
 
-* **Summary**: When an operation recycles content from its own previous  operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to  conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content. 
+* **Summary**: Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content enagagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0021.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0022.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0022: Develop Image-based Content
+# Technique T0022: Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
 
-* **Summary**: 
+* **Summary**: "Conspiracy narratives" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the "firehose of falsehoods" model. 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA14
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0023.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0023: Develop Video-based Content
+# Technique T0023: Distort facts
 
-* **Summary**: 
+* **Summary**: Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0024.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0025.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. "Nothing is true, but everything is possible." Akin to astroturfing campaign.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0026.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0027.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag groups. Many incident-based campaigns will create hashtags to promote their fabricated event. Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: 1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only "real" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name!, and 2. Publicize the story more widely through trending lists and search behavior. Asset needed to direct/control/manage "conversation" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites). 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0028.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0029.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0029: Create Inauthentic Accounts
+# Technique T0029: Online polls
 
-* **Summary**: 
+* **Summary**: Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0030.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0031.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as "useful idiots" or "unwitting agents".
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0032.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0033.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0034.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0035.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets. Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0036.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Create media assets to support inauthentic organizations (e.g. think tank), people (e.g. experts) and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0037.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Create or coopt broadcast capabilities (e.g. TV, radio etc).
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0038.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: An owned media asset refers to an agency or organization through which an influence operation  may create, develop, and host content and narratives. Owned media assets include websites,  blogs, social media pages, forums, and other platforms that facilitate the creation and  organization of content.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0039 .md

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Technique T0039 : Bait legitimate influencers
+
+* **Summary**: Credibility in a social media environment is often a function of the size of a user's network. "Influencers" are so-called because of their reach, typically understood as: 1) the size of their network (i.e. the number of followers, perhaps weighted by their own influence); and 2) The rate at which their comments are re-circulated (these two metrics are related). Add traditional media players at all levels of credibility and professionalism to this, and the number of potential influencial carriers available for unwitting amplification becomes substantial. By targeting high-influence people and organizations in all types of media with narratives and content engineered to appeal their emotional or ideological drivers, influence campaigns are able to add perceived credibility to their messaging via saturation and adoption by trusted agents such as celebrities, journalists and local leaders.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0039.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial  support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote  operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged  in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation  may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to  promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities.  
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0040.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0040: Leverage Content Farm
+# Technique T0040: Demand insurmountable proof
 
-* **Summary**: 
+* **Summary**: Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the "firehose of misinformation". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of "questions" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA14
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0041.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Hack or take over legimate accounts to distribute misinformation or damaging content.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0042.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0042: Create fake experts
+# Technique T0042: Seed Kernel of truth
 
-* **Summary**: Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself. 
+* **Summary**: Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths. Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies. When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0043.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-# Technique T0043: Create personas
+# Technique T0043: Chat apps
 
-* **Summary**: 
+* **Summary**: Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety.
 
 * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
 

generated_pages/techniques/T0044.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0044: Establish Inauthentic News Sites
+# Technique T0044: Seed distortions
 
-* **Summary**: Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details.
+* **Summary**: Try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event, to give a misleading account or impression. 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0045.md

@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0045: Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities
+# Technique T0045: Use fake experts
 
-* **Summary**: An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its  network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely  believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites.  Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state  entities.  
-An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate  entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a  domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional  typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation  of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to  confirm that the URL is correct.  
+* **Summary**: Use the fake experts that were set up during Establish Legitimacy. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give "credility" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0046.md

@@ -1,11 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0046: Co-opt Trusted Sources
+# Technique T0046: Use Search Engine Optimization
 
-* **Summary**: An influence operation may co-opt trusted sources by infiltrating or repurposing a source to  reach a target audience through existing, previously reliable networks. Co-opted trusted sources  may include:  
-- National or local new outlets  
-- Research or academic publications  
-- Online blogs or websites 
+* **Summary**: Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka "Black-hat SEO" 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0047.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0047: Create Clickbait
+# Technique T0047: Censor social media as a political force
 
-* **Summary**: Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humor) required to drive traffic & engagement. This is a key asset.
+* **Summary**: Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports).
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA18
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0048.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0048: Purchase Targeted Advertisements
+# Technique T0048: Harass
 
-* **Summary**: Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations
+* **Summary**: Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation  techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their  dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to  deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.  
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA18
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0049.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0049: Create Localized Content
+# Technique T0049: Flooding the Information Space
 
-* **Summary**: Localized content refers to content that appeals to a specific community of individuals, often in defined geographic areas. An operation may create localized content using local language and dialects to resonate with its target audience and blend in with other local news and social media. Localized content may help an operation increase legitimacy, avoid detection, and complicate external attribution.
+* **Summary**: Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA17
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0050.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: An echo chamber refers to an internet subgroup, often along ideological lines, where  individuals only engage with “others with which they are already in agreement.” A filter bubble refers to an algorithm's placement of an individual in content that they agree with or regularly  engage with, possibly entrapping the user into a bubble of their own making. An operation may  create these isolated areas of the internet by match existing groups, or aggregating individuals  into a single target audience based on shared interests, politics, values, demographics, and other  characteristics. Echo chambers and filter bubbles help to reinforce similar biases and content to  the same target audience members. 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0051.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0052.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0053.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0053:  Social Networks
+# Technique T0053: Social Networks
 
 * **Summary**: 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0054.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Media sharing networks refer to services whose primary function is the hosting and sharing of specific forms of media. Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, Youtube, SoundCloud.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0055.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Platforms for finding, discussing, and sharing information and opinions. Examples include Reddit, Quora, Digg, message boards, interest-based discussion forums, etc.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0056.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Platforms for searching, sharing, and curating content and media. Examples include Pinterest, Flipboard, etc.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0057.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0057: Blogging and Publishing Networks
+# Technique T0057: Organize Events
 
-* **Summary**: Examples include WordPress, Blogger, Weebly, Tumblr, Medium, etc. 
+* **Summary**: Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0058.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Platforms for finding, reviewing, and sharing information about brands, products, services, restaurants, travel destinations, etc.  Examples include Yelp, TripAdvisor, etc.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0059.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0059: Online polls
+# Technique T0059: Play the long game
 
-* **Summary**: Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well
+* **Summary**: Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold 2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA11
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0060.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0060: Formal Diplomatic Channels
+# Technique T0060: Continue to Amplify
 
-* **Summary**: 
+* **Summary**: continue narrative or message amplification after the main incident work has finished
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA11
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0061.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0061: Traditional Media
+# Technique T0061: Sell Merchandise
 
-* **Summary**: Examples include TV, Newspaper, Radio, etc.
+* **Summary**: Sell mechandise refers to getting the message or narrative into physical space in the offline world while making money
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0062.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0063.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content enagagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0064.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Credibility in a social media environment is often a function of the size of a user's network. "Influencers" are so-called because of their reach, typically understood as: 1) the size of their network (i.e. the number of followers, perhaps weighted by their own influence); and 2) The rate at which their comments are re-circulated (these two metrics are related). Add traditional media players at all levels of credibility and professionalism to this, and the number of potential influencial carriers available for unwitting amplification becomes substantial. By targeting high-influence people and organizations in all types of media with narratives and content engineered to appeal their emotional or ideological drivers, influence campaigns are able to add perceived credibility to their messaging via saturation and adoption by trusted agents such as celebrities, journalists and local leaders.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0065.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0065: Seed Kernel of truth
+# Technique T0065: Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities
 
-* **Summary**: Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths. Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies. When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters.
+* **Summary**: Create or coopt broadcast capabilities (e.g. TV, radio etc).
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0066.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0066: Seed distortions
+# Technique T0066: Degrade Adversary
 
-* **Summary**: Try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event, to give a misleading account or impression. 
+* **Summary**: Plan to degrade an adversary’s image or ability to act. This could include preparation and use of harmful information about the adversary’s actions or reputation.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0067.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Use the fake experts that were set up during Establish Legitimacy. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give "credility" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0068.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0068: Use Search Engine Optimization
+# Technique T0068: Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis
 
-* **Summary**: Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka "Black-hat SEO" 
+* **Summary**: Media attention on a story or event is heightened during a breaking news event, where unclear facts and incomplete information increase speculation, rumors, and conspiracy theories, which are all vulnerable to manipulation. 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA14
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0069.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Commercial analytic firms collect data on target audience activities and evaluate the data to  detect trends, such as content receiving high click-rates. An influence operation may employ  commercial analytic firms to facilitate external collection on its target audience, complicating attribution efforts and better tailoring the content to audience preferences.  
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0070.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Delivering content via any form of paid media or advertising.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA11
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0071.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Delivering content by posting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA11
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0072.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0072: Comment or Reply on Content
+# Technique T0072: Segment Audiences
 
-* **Summary**: Delivering content by replying or commenting via owned media (assets that the operator controls). 
+* **Summary**: Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics. 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA11
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0073.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0073: Attract Traditional Media
+# Technique T0073: Determine Target Audiences
 
-* **Summary**: Deliver content by attracting the attention of traditional media (earned media).
+* **Summary**: tbd
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA11
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0074.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0074: Flooding the Information Space
+# Technique T0074: Determine Strategic Ends
 
-* **Summary**: Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.
+* **Summary**: tbd
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA12
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0075.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0075: Amplify Existing Narrative
+# Technique T0075: Dismiss
 
-* **Summary**: An influence operation may amplify existing narratives that align with its narratives to support operation objectives. 
+* **Summary**: Push back against criticism by dismissing your critics. This might be arguing that the critics use a different standard for you than with other actors or themselves; or arguing that their criticism is biased.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA12
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0076.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0076: Cross-Posting
+# Technique T0076: Distort
 
-* **Summary**: Cross-posting refers to posting the same message to multiple internet discussions, social media platforms or accounts, or news groups at one time. An influence operation may post content  online in multiple communities and platforms to increase the chances of content exposure to the  target audience. 
+* **Summary**: Twist the narrative. Take information, or artifacts like images, and change the framing around them.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA12
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0077.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0077: Incentivize Sharing
+# Technique T0077: Distract
 
-* **Summary**: Incentivizing content sharing refers to actions that encourage users to share content themselves,  reducing the need for the operation itself to post and promote its own content.
+* **Summary**: Shift attention to a different narrative or actor, for instance by accusing critics of the same activity that they’ve accused you of (e.g. police brutality).
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA12
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0078.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0078: Manipulate Platform Algorithm
+# Technique T0078: Dismay
 
-* **Summary**: Manipulating a platform algorithm refers to conducting activity on a platform in a way that  intentionally targets its underlying algorithm. After analyzing a platform’s algorithm (see: Select  Platforms), an influence operation may use a platform in a way that increases its content  exposure, avoids content removal, or otherwise benefits the operation’s strategy. For example, an  influence operation may use bots to amplify its posts so that the platform’s algorithm recognizes  engagement with operation content and further promotes the content on user timelines.  
+* **Summary**: Threaten the critic or narrator of events. For instance, threaten journalists or news outlets reporting on a story.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA12
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0079.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0079: Direct Users to Alternative Platforms
+# Technique T0079: Divide
 
-* **Summary**: Direct users to alternative platforms refers to encouraging users to move from the  platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage with content on alternate  information channels, including separate social media channels and inauthentic websites. An  operation may drive users to alternative platforms to diversify its information channels and ensure the target audience knows where to access operation content if the initial  platform suspends, flags, or otherwise removes original operation assets and content.  
+* **Summary**: Create conflict between subgroups, to widen divisions in a community
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA12
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0080.md

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
-# Technique T0080: Harass
+# Technique T0080: Map Target Audience Information Environment
 
-* **Summary**: Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation  techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their  dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to  deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.  
+* **Summary**: Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself,  including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information  environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular  information channels to reach its target audience. 
+Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining  the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging.
 
 * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
 

generated_pages/techniques/T0081.md

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
-# Technique T0081: Censor social media as a political force
+# Technique T0081: Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
 
-* **Summary**: Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports).
+* **Summary**: Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience  information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues,  weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment.  
+Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified  weaknesses to advance operation objectives. 
 
 * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
 

generated_pages/techniques/T0082.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0082: Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations
+# Technique T0082: Develop New Narratives
 
-* **Summary**: Controling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of  content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition  messaging.
+* **Summary**: tbd
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA14
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0083.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0083: Suppress Opposition
+# Technique T0083: Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative
 
-* **Summary**: 
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may seek to exploit the preexisting weaknesses, fears, and enemies of the  target audience for integration into the operation’s narratives and overall strategy. Integrating  existing vulnerabilities into the operational approach conserves resources by exploiting already  weak areas of the target information environment instead of forcing the operation to create new  vulnerabilities in the environment.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA14
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0084.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0084: Platform Filtering
+# Technique T0084: Reuse Existing Content
 
-* **Summary**: Platform filtering refers to the decontextualization of information as claims cross platforms (from Joan Donovan https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/disinformation-design-use-evidence-collages-and-platform-filtering-media-manipulation)
+* **Summary**: When an operation recycles content from its own previous  operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to  conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content. 
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0085.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0085: Encourage Attendance at Events
+# Technique T0085: Develop Text-based Content
 
-* **Summary**: Operation encourages attendance at existing real world event.
+* **Summary**: tbd
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA14
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0086.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0086: Organize Events
+# Technique T0086: Develop Image-based Content
 
-* **Summary**: Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives.
+* **Summary**: tbd
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA14
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0087.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0087: Conduct fundraising
+# Technique T0087: Develop Video-based Content
 
-* **Summary**: Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial  support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote  operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged  in crowdfunding services166 on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation  may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities.  
+* **Summary**: tbd
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA14
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0088.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0088: Physical Violence
+# Technique T0088: Develop Audio-based Content
 
-* **Summary**: Physical violence refers to the use of force to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy. An influence operation may conduct or encourage physical violence to discourage opponents from promoting conflicting content or draw attention to operation narratives using shock value.  
+* **Summary**: tbd
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA14
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0089.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0089: Merchandising/ Advertising
+# Technique T0089: Obtain Private Documents
 
-* **Summary**: Merchandising/Advertising refers to getting the message or narrative into physical space in the offline world
+* **Summary**: tbd
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA14
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0090.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-# Technique T0090: Conceal People
+# Technique T0090: Create Inauthentic Accounts
 
-* **Summary**: Conceal the identity or provenance of the account and people assets.
+* **Summary**: tbd
 
 * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 

generated_pages/techniques/T0091.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-# Technique T0091: Conceal Operational Activity
+# Technique T0091: Recruit bad actors
 
-* **Summary**: 
+* **Summary**: tbd
 
 * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 

generated_pages/techniques/T0092.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-# Technique T0092: Conceal Infrastructure
+# Technique T0092: Build Network
 
-* **Summary**: 
+* **Summary**: tbd
 
 * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 

generated_pages/techniques/T0093.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-# Technique T0093: Exploit TOS/Content Moderation
+# Technique T0093: Acquire/ recruit Network
 
-* **Summary**: 
+* **Summary**: tbd
 
 * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 

generated_pages/techniques/T0094.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-# Technique T0094: Play the long game
+# Technique T0094: Infiltrate Existing Networks
 
-* **Summary**: Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold 2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative.
+* **Summary**: tbd
 
 * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 

generated_pages/techniques/T0095.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0095: Measure Performance
+# Technique T0095: Develop Owned Media Assets
 
-* **Summary**: 
+* **Summary**: An owned media asset refers to an agency or organization through which an influence operation  may create, develop, and host content and narratives. Owned media assets include websites,  blogs, social media pages, forums, and other platforms that facilitate the creation and  organization of content.
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0096.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-# Technique T0096: Measure Effectiveness
+# Technique T0096: Leverage Content Farm
 
-* **Summary**: 
+* **Summary**: tbd
 
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
 
 
 | Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-# Technique T0097: Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)
+# Technique T0097: Create personas
 
-* **Summary**: 
+* **Summary**: tbd
 
 * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
 

generated_pages/techniques/T0098.md

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Technique T0098: Establish Inauthentic News Sites
+
+* **Summary**: Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0099.md

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# Technique T0099: Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its  network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely  believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites.  Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state  entities.  
+An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate  entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a  domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional  typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation  of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to  confirm that the URL is correct.  
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0100.md

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Technique T0100: Co-opt Trusted Sources
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may co-opt trusted sources by infiltrating or repurposing a source to  reach a target audience through existing, previously reliable networks. Co-opted trusted sources  may include:  
+- National or local new outlets  
+- Research or academic publications  
+- Online blogs or websites 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0101.md

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Technique T0101: Create Localized Content
+
+* **Summary**: Localized content refers to content that appeals to a specific community of individuals, often in defined geographic areas. An operation may create localized content using local language and dialects to resonate with its target audience and blend in with other local news and social media. Localized content may help an operation increase legitimacy, avoid detection, and complicate external attribution.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0102.md

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Technique T0102: Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles
+
+* **Summary**: An echo chamber refers to an internet subgroup, often along ideological lines, where  individuals only engage with “others with which they are already in agreement.” A filter bubble refers to an algorithm's placement of an individual in content that they agree with or regularly  engage with, possibly entrapping the user into a bubble of their own making. An operation may  create these isolated areas of the internet by match existing groups, or aggregating individuals  into a single target audience based on shared interests, politics, values, demographics, and other  characteristics. Echo chambers and filter bubbles help to reinforce similar biases and content to  the same target audience members. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
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+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0103.md

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+# Technique T0103: Livestream
+
+* **Summary**: tbd
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW