Merge pull request #10 from DISARMFoundation/subtechnique_merge

add subtechniques markdown

generated_pages/techniques/T0009.001.md

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+# Technique T0009.001: Utilize Academic/Pseudoscientific Justifications
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0014.001.md

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+# Technique T0014.001: From bad actors
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0014.002.md

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+# Technique T0014.002: From ignorant agents
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0017.001.md

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+# Technique T0017.001: Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0019.001.md

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+# Technique T0019.001: Create fake research
+
+* **Summary**: Create fake academic research. Example: fake social science research is often aimed at hot-button social issues such as gender, race and sexuality. Fake science research can target Climate Science debate or pseudoscience like anti-vaxx
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0019.002.md

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+# Technique T0019.002: Hijack Hashtags
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0022.001.md

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+# Technique T0022.001: Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narrative
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA14
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0022.002.md

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+# Technique T0022.002: Develop Original Conspiracy Theory Narratives
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA14
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0023.001.md

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+# Technique T0023.001: Reframe Context
+
+* **Summary**: Reframing context refers to removing an event from its surrounding context to distort its  intended meaning. Rather than deny that an event occurred, reframing context frames an event in  a manner that may lead the target audience to draw a different conclusion about its intentions. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0023.002.md

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+# Technique T0023.002: Edit Open-Source Content
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may edit open-source content, such as collaborative blogs or  encyclopedias, to promote its narratives on outlets with existing credibility and audiences. Editing open-source content may allow an operation to post content on platforms without  dedicating resources to the creation and maintenance of its own assets. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0043.001.md

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+# Technique T0043.001: Use Encrypted Chat Apps
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0043.002.md

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+# Technique T0043.002: Use Unencrypted Chats Apps
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0048.001.md

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+# Technique T0048.001: Boycott/"Cancel" Opponents
+
+* **Summary**: Cancel culture refers to the phenomenon in which individuals collectively refrain from  supporting an individual, organization, business, or other entity, usually following a real or  falsified controversy. An influence operation may exploit cancel culture by emphasizing an  adversary’s problematic or disputed behavior and presenting its own content as an alternative. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA18
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0048.002.md

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+# Technique T0048.002: Harass People Based on Identities
+
+* **Summary**: Examples include social identities like gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, ability, nationality, etc. as well as roles and occupations like journalist or activist.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA18
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0048.003.md

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+# Technique T0048.003: Threaten to Dox
+
+* **Summary**: Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information  about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family  members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to  encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals  themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating  conflicting content. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA18
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0048.004.md

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+# Technique T0048.004: Dox
+
+* **Summary**: Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information  about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family  members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to  encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals  themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating  conflicting content. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA18
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0049.001.md

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+# Technique T0049.001: Trolls amplify and manipulate
+
+* **Summary**: Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue (issues that can/are be politicized).
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA17
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0049.002.md

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+# Technique T0049.002: Hijack existing hashtag
+
+* **Summary**: Take over an existing hashtag to drive exposure.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA17
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0049.003.md

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+# Technique T0049.003: Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting
+
+* **Summary**: Automated forwarding and reposting refer to the proliferation of operation content using  automated means, such as artificial intelligence or social media bots. An influence operation may  use automated activity to increase content exposure without dedicating the resources, including  personnel and time, traditionally required to forward and repost content. 
+Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more "popular" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA17
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0049.004.md

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+# Technique T0049.004: Utilize Spamoflauge
+
+* **Summary**: Spamoflauge refers to the practice of disguising spam messages as legitimate. Spam refers to  the use of electronic messaging systems to send out unrequested or unwanted messages in bulk.  Simple methods of spamoflauge include replacing letters with numbers to fool keyword-based  email spam filters, for example, "you've w0n our jackp0t!". Spamoflauge may extend to more complex techniques such as modifying the grammar or word choice of the language, casting  messages as images which spam detectors cannot automatically read, or encapsulating messages  in password protected attachments, such as .pdf or .zip files. Influence operations may use spamoflauge to avoid spam filtering systems and increase the likelihood of the target audience  receiving operation messaging. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA17
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0049.005.md

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+# Technique T0049.005: Conduct Swarming
+
+* **Summary**: Swarming refers to the coordinated use of accounts to overwhelm the information space with  operation content. Unlike information flooding, swarming centers exclusively around a specific  event or actor rather than a general narrative. Swarming relies on “horizontal communication”  between information assets rather than a top-down, vertical command-and-control approach. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA17
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0049.006.md

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+# Technique T0049.006: Conduct Keyword Squatting
+
+* **Summary**: Keyword squatting refers to the creation of online content, such as websites, articles, or social  media accounts, around a specific search engine-optimized term to overwhelm the search results  of that term. An influence may keyword squat to increase content exposure to target audience  members who query the exploited term in a search engine and manipulate the narrative around  the term.  
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA17
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0049.007.md

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+# Technique T0049.007: Inauthentic Sites Amplify News and Narratives
+
+* **Summary**: Inauthentic sites circulate cross-post stories and amplify narratives. Often these sites have no masthead, bylines or attribution.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA17
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0057.001.md

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+# Technique T0057.001: Pay for Physical Action
+
+* **Summary**: Paying for physical action occurs when an influence operation pays individuals to act in the  physical realm. An influence operation may pay for physical action to create specific situations  and frame them in a way that supports operation narratives, for example, paying a group of  people to burn a car to later post an image of the burning car and frame it as an act of protest. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0057.002.md

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+# Technique T0057.002: Conduct Symbolic Action
+
+* **Summary**: Symbolic action refers to activities specifically intended to advance an operation’s narrative by  signaling something to the audience, for example, a military parade supporting a state’s narrative  of military superiority. An influence operation may use symbolic action to create falsified  evidence supporting operation narratives in the physical information space.  
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0061.001.md

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+# Technique T0061.001: Sell Merchandise
+
+* **Summary**: Selling merchandise refers to the sale of often branded items to the target audience. An influence  operation may sell merchandise to raise funds and promote its messaging in the physical  information space, for example, by selling t-shirts with operational messaging displayed on the clothing. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0072.001.md

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+# Technique T0072.001: Geographic Segmentation
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may target populations in a specific geographic location, such as a  region, state, or city. An influence operation may use geographic segmentation to Create  Localized Content (see: Establish Legitimacy).  
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0072.002.md

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+# Technique T0072.002: Demographic Segmentation
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on demographic segmentation, including  age, gender, and income. Demographic segmentation may be useful for influence operations  aiming to change state policies that affect a specific population sector. For example, an influence  operation attempting to influence Medicare funding in the United States would likely target U.S.  voters over 65 years of age. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0072.003.md

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+# Technique T0072.003: Economic Segmentation
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on their income bracket, wealth, or other  financial or economic division. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0072.004.md

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+# Technique T0072.004: Psychographic Segmentation
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on psychographic segmentation, which uses  audience values and decision-making processes. An operation may individually gather  psychographic data with its own surveys or collection tools or externally purchase data from  social media companies or online surveys, such as personality quizzes.  
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0072.005.md

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+# Technique T0072.005: Political Segmentation
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on their political affiliations, especially  when aiming to manipulate voting or change policy.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0075.001.md

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+# Technique T0075.001: Discredit Credible Sources
+
+* **Summary**: Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and degrade public trust in reporting, by discrediting credible sources. This makes it easier to promote influence operation content.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0080.001.md

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+# Technique T0080.001: Monitor Social Media Analytics
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may use social media analytics to determine which factors will increase  the operation content’s exposure to its target audience on social media platforms, including  views, interactions, and sentiment relating to topics and content types. The social media platform  itself or a third-party tool may collect the metrics.  
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0080.002.md

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+# Technique T0080.002: Evaluate Media Surveys
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may evaluate its own or third-party media surveys to determine what type  of content appeals to its target audience. Media surveys may provide insight into an audience’s  political views, social class, general interests, or other indicators used to tailor operation messaging to its target audience.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0080.003.md

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+# Technique T0080.003: Identify Trending Topics/Hashtags
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may identify trending hashtags on social media platforms for later use in  boosting operation content. A hashtag40 refers to a word or phrase preceded by the hash symbol  (#) on social media used to identify messages and posts relating to a specific topic. All public  posts that use the same hashtag are aggregated onto a centralized page dedicated to the word or  phrase and sorted either chronologically or by popularity. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0080.004.md

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+# Technique T0080.004: Conduct Web Traffic Analysis
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may conduct web traffic analysis to determine which search engines,  keywords, websites, and advertisements gain the most traction with its target audience.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0080.005.md

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+# Technique T0080.005: Assess Degree/Type of Media Access
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may survey a target audience’s Internet availability and degree of media  freedom to determine which target audience members will have access to operation content and  on which platforms. An operation may face more difficulty targeting an information  environment with heavy restrictions and media control than an environment with independent  media, freedom of speech and of the press, and individual liberties. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0081.001.md

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+# Technique T0081.001: Find Echo Chambers
+
+* **Summary**: Find or plan to create areas (social media groups, search term groups, hashtag groups etc) where individuals only engage with people they agree with. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0081.002.md

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+# Technique T0081.002: Identify Data Voids
+
+* **Summary**: A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search  engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity  aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a  high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation  may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation.  
+A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news”  data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an  influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to  publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data  void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their  keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated  terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalizing on most search engines’ preferences for  recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas,  isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use  “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote  messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term.  
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0081.003.md

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+# Technique T0081.003: Identify Existing Prejudices
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may exploit existing racial, religious, demographic, or social prejudices to further polarize its target audience from the rest of the public.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0081.004.md

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+# Technique T0081.004: Identify Existing Fissures
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may identify existing fissures to pit target populations against one  another or facilitate a “divide-and-conquer" approach to tailor operation narratives along the  divides.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0081.005.md

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+# Technique T0081.005: Identify Existing Conspiracy Narratives/Suspicions
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may assess preexisting conspiracy theories or suspicions in a population  to identify existing narratives that support operational objectives.  
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0081.006.md

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+# Technique T0081.006: Identify Wedge Issues
+
+* **Summary**: A wedge issue is a divisive political issue, usually concerning a social phenomenon, that  divides individuals along a defined line. An influence operation may exploit wedge issues by  intentionally polarizing the public along the wedge issue line and encouraging opposition  between factions.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0081.007.md

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+# Technique T0081.007: Identify Target Audience Adversaries
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may identify or create a real or imaginary adversary to center operation  narratives against. A real adversary may include certain politicians or political parties while  imaginary adversaries may include falsified “deep state”62 actors that, according to conspiracies,  run the state behind public view. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0081.008.md

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+# Technique T0081.008: Identify Media System Vulnerabilities
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may exploit existing weaknesses in a target’s media system. These  weaknesses may include existing biases among media agencies, vulnerability to false news  agencies on social media, or existing distrust of traditional media sources. An existing distrust  among the public in the media system’s credibility holds high potential for exploitation by an  influence operation when establishing alternative news agencies to spread operation content. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0084.001.md

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+# Technique T0084.001: Use Copypasta
+
+* **Summary**: Copypasta refers to a piece of text that has been copied and pasted multiple times across various online platforms. A copypasta’s final form may differ from its original source text as users add, delete, or otherwise edit the content as they repost the text. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0084.002.md

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+# Technique T0084.002: Plagiarize Content
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0084.003.md

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+# Technique T0084.003: Deceptively Labeled or Translated
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0084.004.md

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+# Technique T0084.004: Appropriate Content
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0085.001.md

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+# Technique T0085.001: Develop AI-Generated Text
+
+* **Summary**: AI-generated texts refers to synthetic text composed by computers using text-generating AI  technology. Autonomous generation refers to content created by a bot without human  input, also known as bot-created content generation. Autonomous generation represents  the next step in automation after language generation and may lead to automated  journalism. An influence operation may use read fakes or autonomous generation to  quickly develop and distribute content to the target audience.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0085.002.md

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+# Technique T0085.002: Develop False or Altered Documents
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0085.003.md

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+# Technique T0085.003: Develop Inauthentic News Articles
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0086.001.md

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+# Technique T0086.001: Develop Memes
+
+* **Summary**: Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0086.002.md

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+# Technique T0086.002: Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes)
+
+* **Summary**: Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0086.003.md

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+# Technique T0086.003: Deceptively Edit Image (Cheap fakes)
+
+* **Summary**: Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0086.004.md

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+# Technique T0086.004: Aggregate Information into Evidence Collages
+
+* **Summary**: image files that aggregate positive evidence (Joan Donovan)
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0087.001.md

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+# Technique T0087.001: Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes)
+
+* **Summary**: Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0087.002.md

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+# Technique T0087.002: Deceptively Edit Video (Cheap fakes)
+
+* **Summary**: Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0088.001.md

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+# Technique T0088.001: Develop AI-Generated Audio (Deepfakes)
+
+* **Summary**: Deepfakes refer to AI-generated falsified photos, videos, or soundbites. An influence operation may use deepfakes to depict an inauthentic situation by synthetically recreating an individual’s face, body, voice, and physical gestures.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0088.002.md

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+# Technique T0088.002: Deceptively Edit Audio (Cheap fakes)
+
+* **Summary**: Cheap fakes utilize less sophisticated measures of altering an image, video, or audio for example, slowing, speeding, or cutting footage to create a false context surrounding an image or event.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0089.001.md

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+# Technique T0089.001: Leak Authentic Documents
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0089.002.md

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+# Technique T0089.002: Leak False Documents
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0089.003.md

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+# Technique T0089.003: Leak Altered Documents
+
+* **Summary**: Obtain documents (eg by theft or leak), then alter and release, possibly among factual documents/sources.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0090.001.md

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+# Technique T0090.001: Create Anonymous Accounts
+
+* **Summary**: Anonymous accounts or anonymous users refer to users that access network resources without  providing a username or password. An influence operation may use anonymous accounts to spread content without direct attribution to the operation. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0090.002.md

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+# Technique T0090.002: Create Cyborg Accounts
+
+* **Summary**: Cyborg accounts refer to partly manned, partly automated social media accounts. Cyborg  accounts primarily act as bots, but a human operator periodically takes control of the account to  engage with real social media users by responding to comments and posting original content.  Influence operations may use cyborg accounts to reduce the amount of direct human input  required to maintain a regular account but increase the apparent legitimacy of the cyborg account  by occasionally breaking its bot-like behavior with human interaction. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0090.003.md

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+# Technique T0090.003: Create Bot Accounts
+
+* **Summary**: Bots refer to autonomous internet users that interact with systems or other users while imitating  traditional human behavior. Bots use a variety of tools to stay active without direct human  operation, including artificial intelligence and big data analytics. For example, an individual may  program a Twitter bot to retweet a tweet every time it contains a certain keyword or hashtag. An  influence operation may use bots to increase its exposure and artificially promote its content  across the internet without dedicating additional time or human resources.  
+Amplifier bots promote operation content through reposts, shares, and likes to increase the  content’s online popularity. Hacker bots are traditionally covert bots running on computer  scripts that rarely engage with users and work primarily as agents of larger cyberattacks, such as  a Distributed Denial of Service attacks. Spammer bots are programmed to post content on  social media or in comment sections, usually as a supplementary tool. Impersonator bots102 pose as real people by mimicking human behavior, complicating their detection.  
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0090.004.md

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+# Technique T0090.004: Create Sockpuppet Accounts
+
+* **Summary**: Sockpuppet accounts refer to falsified accounts that either promote the influence operation’s  own material or attack critics of the material online. Individuals who control sockpuppet  accounts also man at least one other user account.67 Sockpuppet accounts help legitimize  operation narratives by providing an appearance of external support for the material and  discrediting opponents of the operation. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0091.001.md

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+# Technique T0091.001: Recruit Contractors
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0091.002.md

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+# Technique T0091.002: Recruit Partisans
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0091.003.md

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+# Technique T0091.003: Enlist Troll Accounts
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may hire trolls, or human operators of fake accounts that aim to provoke  others by posting and amplifying content about controversial issues. Trolls can serve to discredit  an influence operation’s opposition or bring attention to the operation’s cause through debate.  
+Classic trolls refer to regular people who troll for personal reasons, such as attention-seeking or  boredom. Classic trolls may advance operation narratives by coincidence but are not directly  affiliated with any larger operation. Conversely, hybrid trolls act on behalf of another institution, such as a state or financial organization, and post content with a specific ideological  goal. Hybrid trolls may be highly advanced and institutionalized or less organized and work for a  single individual. 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0092.001.md

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+# Technique T0092.001: Create Organizations
+
+* **Summary**: Influence operations may establish organizations with legitimate or falsified hierarchies, staff, and content to structure operation assets, provide a sense of legitimacy to the operation, or provide institutional backing to operation activities.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0092.002.md

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+# Technique T0092.002: Follow Trains
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0092.003.md

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+# Technique T0092.003: Create Community or Sub-group
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0093.001.md

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+# Technique T0093.001: Fund Proxies
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may fund proxies, or external entities that work for the operation. An  operation may recruit/train users with existing sympathies towards the operation’s narratives  and/or goals as proxies. Funding proxies serves various purposes including: 
+- Diversifying operation locations to complicate attribution  
+- Reducing the workload for direct operation assets  
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0093.002.md

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+# Technique T0093.002: Botnets
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0094.001.md

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+# Technique T0094.001: Identify susceptible targets in networks
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0094.002.md

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+# Technique T0094.002: Utilize Butterfly Attack
+
+* **Summary**: Butterfly attacks occur when operators pretend to be members of a certain social group, usually  a group that struggles for representation. An influence operation may mimic a group to insert  controversial statements into the discourse, encourage the spread of operation content, or promote harassment among group members. Unlike astroturfing, butterfly attacks aim to  infiltrate and discredit existing grassroots movements, organizations, and media campaigns.  
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0096.001.md

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+# Technique T0096.001: Create a Content Farm
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0096.002.md

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+# Technique T0096.002: Outsource Content Creation to External Organizations
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may outsource content creation to external companies to avoid  attribution, increase the rate of content creation, or improve content quality, i.e., by employing an organization that can create content in the target audience’s native language. Employed  organizations may include marketing companies for tailored advertisements or external content  farms for high volumes of targeted media.  
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0097.001.md

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+# Technique T0097.001: Backstop personas 
+
+* **Summary**: Create other assets/dossier/cover/fake relationships and/or connections or documents, sites, bylines, attributions, to establish/augment/inflate crediblity/believability
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0098.001.md

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+# Technique T0098.001: Create Inauthentic News Sites
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0098.002.md

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+# Technique T0098.002: Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites
+
+* **Summary**: An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its  network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely  believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites.  Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state  entities.  
+An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate  entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a  domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional  typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation  of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to  confirm that the URL is correct.  
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0099.001.md

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+# Technique T0099.001: Astroturfing
+
+* **Summary**: Astroturfing occurs when an influence operation disguises itself as grassroots movement or  organization that supports operation narratives. Unlike butterfly attacks, astroturfing aims to  increase the appearance of popular support for the operation cause and does not infiltrate existing  groups to discredit their objectives.  
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0099.002.md

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+# Technique T0099.002: Spoof/parody account/site
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0100.001.md

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+# Technique T0100.001: Co-Opt Trusted Individuals
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0100.002.md

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+# Technique T0100.002: Co-Opt Grassroots Groups
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0100.003.md

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+# Technique T0100.003: Co-opt Influencers
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0102.001.md

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+# Technique T0102.001: Use existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0102.002.md

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+# Technique T0102.002: Create Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0102.003.md

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+# Technique T0102.003: Exploit Data Voids
+
+* **Summary**: A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search  engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity  aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a  high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation  may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation.  
+A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news”  data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an  influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to  publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data  void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their  keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated  terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalizing on most search engines’ preferences for  recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas,  isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use  “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote  messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term.  
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0103.001.md

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+# Technique T0103.001: Video Livestream
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0103.002.md

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+# Technique T0103.002: Audio Livestream
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0104.001.md

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+# Technique T0104.001: Mainstream Social Networks
+
+* **Summary**: Examples include Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, VK, 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0104.002.md

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+# Technique T0104.002: Dating Apps
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0104.003.md

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+# Technique T0104.003: Private/Closed Social Networks
+
+* **Summary**: 
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0104.004.md

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+# Technique T0104.004: Interest-Based Networks
+
+* **Summary**: Examples include smaller and niche networks including Gettr, Truth Social, Parler, etc.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0104.005.md

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+# Technique T0104.005: Use hashtags
+
+* **Summary**: Use a dedicated, existing hashtag for the campaign/incident.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0104.006.md

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+# Technique T0104.006: Create dedicated hashtag
+
+* **Summary**: Create a campaign/incident specific hashtag.
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0105.001.md

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+# Technique T0105.001: Photo Sharing
+
+* **Summary**: Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, Flickr, etc
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW

generated_pages/techniques/T0105.002.md

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+# Technique T0105.002: Video Sharing
+
+* **Summary**: Examples include Youtube, TikTok, ShareChat, Rumble, etc
+
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
+
+
+| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
+| -------- | -------------------- |
+
+
+
+| Counters | Response types |
+| -------- | -------------- |
+
+
+DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW