* **Summary**: Threat actors have been observed following a template when filling their accounts’ online profiles. This may be done to enable account holders to quickly present themselves as a real person with a targeted persona.<br><br> For example, an actor may be instructed to create many fabricated local accounts for use in an operation using a template of “[flag emojis], [location], [personal quote], [political party] supporter” in their account’s description.<br><br><b>Associated Techniques and Sub-techniques</b><br><b>T0143.002: Fabricated Persona:</b> The use of a templated account biography in a collection of accounts may be an indicator that the personas have been fabricated.
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00080 Hundreds Of Propaganda Accounts Targeting Iran And Qatar Have Been Removed From Facebook](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00080.md) | <i>“One example of a fake reporter account targeting Americans is “Jenny Powell,” a self-described Washington-based journalist, volunteer, and environmental activist. At first glance, Powell’s Twitter timeline looks like it belongs to a young and eager reporter amplifying her interests. But her profile photo is a stock image, and many of her links go to the propaganda sites.<br><br> “Powell, who joined the platform just last month, shares links to stories from major US news media outlets, retweets local news about Washington, DC, and regularly promotes content from The Foreign Code and The Economy Club. Other fake journalist accounts behaved similarly to Powell and had generic descriptions. One of the accounts, for a fake Bruce Lopez in Louisiana, has a bio that describes him as a “Correspondent Traveler noun|linking verb|noun/verb/adjective|,” which appears to reveal the formula used to write Twitter bios for the accounts.”</i><br><br> The Jenny Powel account used in this influence operation presents as both a journalist and an activist (T0097.102: Journalist Persona, T0097.103: Activist Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona). This example shows how threat actors can easily follow a template to present a fabricated persona to their target audience (T0144.002: Persona Template). |
| [I00086 #WeAreNotSafe – Exposing How a Post-October 7th Disinformation Network Operates on Israeli Social Media](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00086.md) | In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”.<br><br><i>“A core component of the detection methodology was applying qualitative linguistic analysis. This involved checking the fingerprint of language, syntax, and style used in the comments and profile of the suspected account. Each account bio consistently incorporated a combination of specific elements: emojis, nationality, location, educational institution or occupation, age, and a personal quote, sports team or band. The recurrence of this specific formula across multiple accounts hinted at a standardized template for bio construction.”</i><br><br> This example shows how actors can follow a templated formula to present a persona on social media platforms (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0144.002: Persona Template). |
