<td>Include a paid-for privacy option, e.g. pay Facebook for an option of them not collecting your personal information. There are examples of this not working, e.g. most people don’t use proton mail etc. </td>
<td>Educate high profile influencers on best practices</td>
<td>Find online influencers. Provide training in the mechanisms of disinformation, how to spot campaigns, and/or how to contribute to responses by countermessaging, boosting information sites etc. </td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00010.md">C00010</a></td>
<td>Enhanced privacy regulation for social media</td>
<td>Implement stronger privacy standards, to reduce the ability to microtarget community members. </td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00011.md">C00011</a></td>
<td>Media literacy. Games to identify fake news</td>
<td>Create and use games to show people the mechanics of disinformation, and how to counter them. </td>
<td>Empower existing regulators to govern social media. Also covers Destroy. Includes: Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media. The U.S. approach will need to be carefully crafted to protect First Amendment principles, create needed transparency, ensure liability, and impose costs for noncompliance. Includes Create policy that makes social media police disinformation. Includes: Use fraud legislation to clean up social media</td>
<td>This is "strategic innoculation", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news. Example: journalistic ethics, or journalistic licensing body. Include full transcripts, link source, add items. </td>
<td>M006 - scoring</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00014.md">C00014</a></td>
<td>Real-time updates to fact-checking database</td>
<td>Alter and/or block the publication/dissemination of information controlled by disinformation creators. Not recommended. </td>
<td>M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00017.md">C00017</a></td>
<td>Repair broken social connections</td>
<td>For example, use a media campaign to promote in-group to out-group in person communication / activities . Technique could be in terms of forcing a reality-check by talking to people instead of reading about bogeymen. </td>
<td>M010 - countermessaging</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00019.md">C00019</a></td>
<td>Reduce effect of division-enablers</td>
<td>includes Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers, and Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers</td>
<td>M003 - daylight</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00021.md">C00021</a></td>
<td>Encourage in-person communication</td>
<td>Encourage offline communication</td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00022.md">C00022</a></td>
<td>Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety</td>
<td>Used to counter ability based and fear based attacks</td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00024.md">C00024</a></td>
<td>Promote healthy narratives</td>
<td>Includes promoting constructive narratives i.e. not polarising (e.g. pro-life, pro-choice, pro-USA). Includes promoting identity neutral narratives. </td>
<td>Messages about e.g. peace, freedom. And make it sexy. Includes Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft: Promote a narrative of transparency, truthfulness, liberal values, and democracy. Implement a compelling narrative via effective mechanisms of communication. Continually reassess messages, mechanisms, and audiences over time. Counteract efforts to manipulate media, undermine free markets, and suppress political freedoms via public diplomacy</td>
<td>This is passive. Includes promoting civility as an identity that people will defend. </td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00028.md">C00028</a></td>
<td>Make information provenance available</td>
<td>Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments. Use blockchain technology to require collaborative validation before posts or comments are submitted.
This could be used to adjust upvote weight via a trust factor of people and organisations you trust, or other criteria.</td>
<td>M011 - verification</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00029.md">C00029</a></td>
<td>Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise</td>
<td>Create websites in disinformation voids - spaces where people are looking for known disinformation. </td>
<td>M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00030.md">C00030</a></td>
<td>Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based)</td>
<td>Create competing narratives. Included "Facilitate State Propaganda" as diluting the narrative could have an effect on the pro-state narrative used by volunteers, or lower their involvement.</td>
<td>M009 - dilution</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00032.md">C00032</a></td>
<td>Hijack content and link to truth- based info</td>
<td>Think about the different levels: individual vs state-sponsored account. Includes “call them out” and “name and shame”. Identify social media accounts as sources of propaganda—“calling them out”— might be helpful to prevent the spread of their message to audiences that otherwise would consider them factual. Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target externally-based nonattributed social media accounts. Impact of and Dealing with Trolls - "Chatham House has observed that trolls also sometimes function as decoys, as a way of “keeping the infantry busy” that “aims to wear down the other side” (Lough et al., 2014). Another type of troll involves “false accounts posing as authoritative information sources on social media”.</td>
<td>Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts</td>
<td>remove or remove access to (e.g. stop the ability to update) old social media accounts, to reduce the pool of accounts available for takeover, botnets etc. </td>
<td>Legal action against for-profit engagement factories</td>
<td>Take legal action against for-profit "factories" creating misinformation. </td>
<td>M013 - targeting</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00062.md">C00062</a></td>
<td>Free open library sources worldwide</td>
<td>Open-source libraries could be created that aid in some way for each technique. Even for Strategic Planning, some open-source frameworks such as DISARM can be created to counter the adversarial efforts.</td>
T0008: A quick response to a proto-viral story will affect it's ability to spread and raise questions about their legitimacy.
Hashtag: Against the platform, by drowning the hashtag.
T0046 - Search Engine Optimization: Sub-optimal website performance affect its search engine rank, which I interpret as "blocking access to a platform".</td>
<td>M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00071.md">C00071</a></td>
<td>Block source of pollution</td>
<td>Block websites, accounts, groups etc connected to misinformation and other information pollution. </td>
<td>M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00072.md">C00072</a></td>
<td>Remove non-relevant content from special interest groups - not recommended</td>
<td>Check special-interest groups (e.g. medical, knitting) for unrelated and misinformation-linked content, and remove it. </td>
<td>M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00073.md">C00073</a></td>
<td>Inoculate populations through media literacy training</td>
<td>Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations. Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution. Build cultural resistance to false content, e.g. cultural resistance to bullshit. Influence literacy training, to inoculate against “cult” recruiting. Media literacy training: leverage librarians / library for media literacy training. Inoculate at language. Strategic planning included as inoculating population has strategic value. Concepts of media literacy to a mass audience that authorities launch a public information campaign that teaches the program will take time to develop and establish impact, recommends curriculum-based training. Covers detect, deny, and degrade. </td>
<td>Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content</td>
<td>Includes “change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists” and “Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite side”</td>
<td>M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00080.md">C00080</a></td>
<td>Create competing narrative</td>
<td>Create counternarratives, or narratives that compete in the same spaces as misinformation narratives. Could also be degrade</td>
<td>M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00081.md">C00081</a></td>
<td>Highlight flooding and noise, and explain motivations</td>
<td>Discredit by pointing out the "noise" and informing public that "flooding" is a technique of disinformation campaigns; point out intended objective of "noise"</td>
<td>M003 - daylight</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00082.md">C00082</a></td>
<td>Ground truthing as automated response to pollution</td>
<td>Modify disinformation narratives, and rebroadcast them</td>
<td>Includes “poison pill recasting of message” and “steal their truths”. Many techniques involve promotion which could be manipulated. For example, online fundings or rallies could be advertised, through compromised or fake channels, as being associated with "far-up/down/left/right" actors. "Long Game" narratives could be subjected in a similar way with negative connotations. Can also replay technique T0003. </td>
<td>M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00085.md">C00085</a></td>
<td>Mute content</td>
<td>Rate-limit disinformation content. Reduces its effects, whilst not running afoul of censorship concerns.
Online archives of content (archives of websites, social media profiles, media, copies of published advertisements; or archives of comments attributed to bad actors, as well as anonymized metadata about users who interacted with them and analysis of the effect) is useful for intelligence analysis and public transparency, but will need similar muting or tagging/ shaming as associated with bad actors.</td>
<td>M003 - daylight</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00086.md">C00086</a></td>
<td>Distract from noise with addictive content</td>
<td>Example: Interject addictive links or contents into discussions of disinformation materials and measure a "conversion rate" of users who engage with your content and away from the social media channel's "information bubble" around the disinformation item. Use bots to amplify and upvote the addictive content. </td>
<td>Create honeypots for misinformation creators to engage with, and reduce the resources they have available for misinformation campaigns. </td>
<td>M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA07 Channel Selection</td>
<td>D05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00091.md">C00091</a></td>
<td>Honeypot social community</td>
<td>Set honeypots, e.g. communities, in networks likely to be used for disinformation. </td>
<td>M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00092.md">C00092</a></td>
<td>Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers</td>
<td>Includes "Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers” and “Reputation scores for social media users”. Influencers are individuals or accounts with many followers. </td>
<td>Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages</td>
<td>Find communities likely to be targetted by misinformation campaigns, and send them countermessages or pointers to information sources. </td>
<td>M010 - countermessaging</td>
<td>TA08 Pump Priming</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00138.md">C00138</a></td>
<td>Spam domestic actors with lawsuits</td>
<td>File multiple lawsuits against known misinformation creators and posters, to distract them from disinformation creation. </td>
<td>M014 - reduce resources</td>
<td>TA11 Persistence</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00139.md">C00139</a></td>
<td>Weaponise youtube content matrices</td>
<td>God knows what this is. Keeping temporarily in case we work it out. </td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA11 Persistence</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00140.md">C00140</a></td>
<td>"Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls</td>
<td>Applies to most of the content used by exposure techniques except "T0055 - Use hashtag”. Applies to analytics</td>
<td>M008 - data pollution</td>
<td>TA12 Measure Effectiveness</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00142.md">C00142</a></td>
<td>Platform adds warning label and decision point when sharing content</td>
<td>Includes “this has been disproved: do you want to forward it”. Includes “"Hey this story is old" popup when messaging with old URL” - this assumes that this technique is based on visits to an URL shortener or a captured news site that can publish a message of our choice. Includes “mark clickbait visually”. </td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00143.md">C00143</a></td>
<td>(botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time</td>
<td>Use copyright infringement claims to remove videos etc. </td>
<td>M013 - targeting</td>
<td>TA11 Persistence</td>
<td>D04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00144.md">C00144</a></td>
<td>Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs</td>
<td>Degrade the infrastructure. Could e.g. pay to not act for 30 days. Not recommended</td>
<td>M014 - reduce resources</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00147.md">C00147</a></td>
<td>Make amplification of social media posts expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days)</td>
<td>Stop new community activity (likes, comments) on old social media posts. </td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA09 Exposure</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00148.md">C00148</a></td>
<td>Add random links to network graphs</td>
<td>If creators are using network analysis to determine how to attack networks, then adding random extra links to those networks might throw that analysis out enough to change attack outcomes. Unsure which DISARM techniques.</td>
<td>M008 - data pollution</td>
<td>TA12 Measure Effectiveness</td>
<td>D04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00149.md">C00149</a></td>
<td>Poison the monitoring & evaluation data</td>
<td>Includes Pollute the AB-testing data feeds: Polluting A/B testing requires knowledge of MOEs and MOPs. A/B testing must be caught early when there is relatively little data available so infiltration of TAs and understanding of how content is migrated from testing to larger audiences is fundamental.</td>
<td>M008 - data pollution</td>
<td>TA12 Measure Effectiveness</td>
<td>D04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00153.md">C00153</a></td>
<td>Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure</td>
<td>Align offensive cyber action with information operations and counter disinformation approaches, where appropriate.</td>
<td>M013 - targeting</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00154.md">C00154</a></td>
<td>Ask media not to report false information</td>
<td>Train media to spot and respond to misinformation, and ask them not to post or transmit misinformation they've found. </td>
<td>M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA08 Pump Priming</td>
<td>D02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00155.md">C00155</a></td>
<td>Ban incident actors from funding sites</td>
<td>Ban misinformation creators and posters from funding sites</td>
<td>Civil engagement activities conducted on the part of EFP forces. NATO should likewise provide support and training, where needed, to local public affairs and other communication personnel. Local government and military public affairs personnel can play their part in creating and disseminating entertaining and sharable content that supports the EFP mission. </td>
<td>e.g. Create a campaign plan and toolkit for competition short of armed conflict (this used to be called “the grey zone”). The campaign plan should account for own vulnerabilities and strengths, and not over-rely on any one tool of statecraft or line of effort. It will identify and employ a broad spectrum of national power to deter, compete, and counter (where necessary) other countries’ approaches, and will include understanding of own capabilities, capabilities of disinformation creators, and international standards of conduct to compete in, shrink the size, and ultimately deter use of competition short of armed conflict.</td>
<td>M007 - metatechnique</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00160.md">C00160</a></td>
<td>find and train influencers</td>
<td>Identify key influencers (e.g. use network analysis), then reach out to identified users and offer support, through either training or resources.</td>
<td>Coalition Building with stakeholders and Third-Party Inducements</td>
<td>Advance coalitions across borders and sectors, spanning public and private, as well as foreign and domestic, divides. Improve mechanisms to collaborate, share information, and develop coordinated approaches with the private sector at home and allies and partners abroad.</td>
<td>M007 - metatechnique</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00162.md">C00162</a></td>
<td>Unravel/target the Potemkin villages</td>
<td>Kremlin’s narrative spin extends through constellations of “civil society” organizations, political parties, churches, and other actors. Moscow leverages think tanks, human rights groups, election observers, Eurasianist integration groups, and orthodox groups. A collection of Russian civil society organizations, such as the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, together receive at least US$100 million per year, in addition to government-organized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), at least 150 of which are funded by Russian presidential grants totaling US$70 million per year.</td>
<td>protect the interests of this population and, more importantly, influence the population to support pro-Russia causes and effectively influence the politics of its neighbors</td>
<td>international donors will donate to a basket fund that will pay a committee of local experts who will, in turn, manage and distribute the money to Russian-language producers and broadcasters that pitch various projects.</td>
<td>elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft</td>
<td>Shift from reactive to proactive response, with priority on sharing relevant information with the public and mobilizing private-sector engagement. Recent advances in data-driven technologies have elevated information as a source of power to influence the political and economic environment, to foster economic growth, to enable a decision-making advantage over competitors, and to communicate securely and quickly.</td>
<td>M007 - metatechnique</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00172.md">C00172</a></td>
<td>social media source removal</td>
<td>Removing accounts, pages, groups, e.g. facebook page removal</td>
<td>Free and fair press: create bipartisan, patriotic commitment to press freedom. Note difference between news and editorialising. Build alternative news sources: create alternative local-language news sources to counter local-language propaganda outlets. Delegitimize the 24 hour news cycle. includes Provide an alternative to disinformation content by expanding and improving local content: Develop content that can displace geopolitically-motivated narratives in the entire media environment, both new and old media alike.</td>
<td>M007 - metatechnique, M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00176.md">C00176</a></td>
<td>Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private</td>
<td>Coordinated disinformation challenges are increasingly multidisciplinary, there are few organizations within the national security structures that are equipped with the broad-spectrum capability to effectively counter large-scale conflict short of war tactics in real-time. Institutional hurdles currently impede diverse subject matter experts, hailing from outside of the traditional national security and foreign policy disciplines (e.g., physical science, engineering, media, legal, and economics fields), from contributing to the direct development of national security countermeasures to emerging conflict short of war threat vectors. A Cognitive Security Action Group (CSAG), akin to the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), could drive interagency alignment across equivalents of DHS, DoS, DoD, Intelligence Community, and other implementing agencies, in areas including strategic narrative, and the nexus of cyber and information operations. </td>
<td>M007 - metatechnique</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00178.md">C00178</a></td>
<td>Fill information voids with non-disinformation content</td>
<td>1) Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!). 2) fill data voids with relevant information, e.g. increase Russian-language programming in areas subject to Russian disinformation. </td>
<td>Includes SEO influence. Includes promotion of a “higher standard of journalism”: journalism training “would be helpful, especially for the online community. Includes Strengthen local media: Improve effectiveness of local media outlets. </td>
<td>Ensure that platforms are taking down flagged accounts</td>
<td>Use ongoing analysis/monitoring of "flagged" profiles. Confirm whether platforms are actively removing flagged accounts, and raise pressure via e.g. government organizations to encourage removal</td>
<td>Government open engagement with civil society as an independent check on government action and messaging. Government seeks to coordinate and synchronize narrative themes with allies and partners while calibrating action in cases where elements in these countries may have been co-opted by competitor nations. Includes “fight in the light”: Use leadership in the arts, entertainment, and media to highlight and build on fundamental tenets of democracy.</td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00195.md">C00195</a></td>
<td>Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content </td>
<td>Use Google AdWords to identify instances in which people search Google about particular fake-news stories or propaganda themes. Includes Monetize centrist SEO by subsidizing the difference in greater clicks towards extremist content. </td>
<td>Standard reporting for false profiles (identity issues). Includes detecting hijacked accounts and reallocating them - if possible, back to original owners. </td>
<td>strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting</td>
<td>Increase civic resilience by partnering with business community to combat gray zone threats and ensuring adequate reporting and enforcement mechanisms. </td>
<td>M007 - metatechnique</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00207.md">C00207</a></td>
<td>Run a competing disinformation campaign - not recommended</td>
<td>build public resilience by making civil society more vibrant</td>
<td>Increase public service experience, and support wider civics and history education.</td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00216.md">C00216</a></td>
<td>Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors</td>
<td>Prevent ad revenue going to disinformation domains</td>
<td>M014 - reduce resources</td>
<td>TA05 Microtargeting</td>
<td>D02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00219.md">C00219</a></td>
<td>Add metadata to content that’s out of the control of disinformation creators</td>
<td>Steganography. Adding date, signatures etc to stop issue of photo relabelling etc. </td>
<td>M003 - daylight</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00220.md">C00220</a></td>
<td>Develop a monitoring and intelligence plan</td>
<td>Create a plan for misinformation and disinformation response, before it's needed. Include connections / contacts needed, expected counteremessages etc. </td>
<td>M007 - metatechnique</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00221.md">C00221</a></td>
<td>Run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors</td>
<td>Include PACE plans - Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency</td>
<td>M007 - metatechnique</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00222.md">C00222</a></td>
<td>Tabletop simulations</td>
<td>Simulate misinformation and disinformation campaigns, and responses to them, before campaigns happen. </td>
<td>M007 - metatechnique</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><ahref="counters/C00223.md">C00223</a></td>
<td>Strengthen Trust in social media platforms</td>
<td>Improve trust in the misinformation responses from social media and other platforms. Examples include creating greater transparancy on their actions and algorithms. </td>
