DISARMframeworks/generated_pages/tactics_index.md

112 lines
6.5 KiB
Markdown
Raw Normal View History

# DISARM Tactics:
<table border="1">
<tr>
<th>disarm_id</th>
<th>name</th>
<th>summary</th>
<th>phase_id</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="tactics/TA01.md">TA01</a></td>
2022-06-30 22:22:19 +00:00
<td>Plan Strategy</td>
<td>Define the desired end state, i.e. the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all objectives.</td>
<td>P01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="tactics/TA02.md">TA02</a></td>
2022-06-30 22:22:19 +00:00
<td>Plan Objectives</td>
<td>Set clearly defined, measurable, and achievable objectives. Achieving objectives ties execution of tactical tasks to reaching the desired end state. There are four primary considerations:
- Each desired effect should link directly to one or more objectives
- The effect should be measurable
- The objective statement should not specify the way and means of accomplishment
- The effect should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as another objective or task.</td>
<td>P01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="tactics/TA05.md">TA05</a></td>
2022-07-01 03:30:18 +00:00
<td>Microtarget</td>
<td>Target very specific populations of people</td>
<td>P02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="tactics/TA06.md">TA06</a></td>
2022-07-01 03:30:18 +00:00
<td>Develop Content</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>P02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="tactics/TA07.md">TA07</a></td>
2022-07-01 03:30:18 +00:00
<td>Select Channels and Affordances</td>
<td>Selecting platforms and affordances assesses which online or offline platforms and their associated affordances maximize an influence operations ability to reach its target audience. To select the most appropriate platform(s), an operation may assess the technological affordances including platform algorithms, terms of service, permitted content types, or other attributes that determine platform usability and accessibility. Selecting platforms includes both choosing platforms on which the operation will publish its own content and platforms on which the operation will attempt to restrict adversarial content.</td>
<td>P02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="tactics/TA08.md">TA08</a></td>
2022-07-01 03:30:18 +00:00
<td>Conduct Pump Priming</td>
<td>Release content on a targetted small scale, prior to general release, including releasing seed. Used for preparation before broader release, and as message honing. Used for preparation before broader release, and as message honing. </td>
<td>P03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="tactics/TA09.md">TA09</a></td>
2022-07-01 03:30:18 +00:00
<td>Deliver Content</td>
<td>Release content to general public or larger population</td>
<td>P03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="tactics/TA10.md">TA10</a></td>
2022-07-01 03:30:18 +00:00
<td>Drive Offline Activity</td>
<td>Move incident/campaign from online to offline. Encouraging users to move from the platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage in the physical information space or offline world. This may include operation-aligned rallies or protests, radio, newspaper, or billboards. An influence operation may drive to physical forums to diversify its information channels and facilitate spaces where the target audience can engage with both operation content and like-minded individuals offline. </td>
<td>P03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="tactics/TA11.md">TA11</a></td>
2022-07-01 03:30:18 +00:00
<td>Persist in the Information Environment</td>
<td>Persist in the Information Space refers to taking measures that allow an operation to maintain its presence and avoid takedown by an external entity. Techniques in Persist in the Information Space help campaigns operate without detection and appear legitimate to the target audience and platform monitoring services. Influence operations on social media often persist online by varying the type of information assets and platforms used throughout the campaign.</td>
<td>P03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="tactics/TA12.md">TA12</a></td>
2022-07-01 03:30:18 +00:00
<td>Assess Effectiveness</td>
<td>Assess effectiveness of action, for use in future plans </td>
<td>P04</td>
2022-06-30 22:22:19 +00:00
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="tactics/TA13.md">TA13</a></td>
2022-07-01 03:30:18 +00:00
<td>Target Audience Analysis</td>
<td>Identifying and analyzing the target audience examines target audience member locations, political affiliations, financial situations, and other attributes that an influence operation may incorporate into its messaging strategy. During this tactic, influence operations may also identify existing similarities and differences between target audience members to unite like groups and divide opposing groups. Identifying and analyzing target audience members allows influence operations to tailor operation strategy and content to their analysis. </td>
<td>P01</td>
2022-06-30 22:22:19 +00:00
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="tactics/TA14.md">TA14</a></td>
2022-07-01 03:30:18 +00:00
<td>Develop Narratives</td>
<td>The promotion of beneficial master narratives is perhaps the most effective method for achieving long-term strategic narrative dominance. From a ""whole of society"" perspective the promotion of the society's core master narratives should occupy a central strategic role. From a misinformation campaign / cognitive security perpectve the tactics around master narratives center more precisely on the day-to-day promotion and reinforcement of this messaging. In other words, beneficial, high-coverage master narratives are a central strategic goal and their promotion constitutes an ongoing tactical struggle carried out at a whole-of-society level. Tactically, their promotion covers a broad spectrum of activities both on- and offline.</td>
<td>P02</td>
2022-06-30 22:22:19 +00:00
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="tactics/TA15.md">TA15</a></td>
2022-07-01 03:30:18 +00:00
<td>Establish Social Assets</td>
<td>Establishing information assets generates messaging tools, including social media accounts, operation personnel, and organizations, including directly and indirectly managed assets. For assets under their direct control, the operation can add, change, or remove these assets at will.
Establishing information assets allows an influence operation to promote messaging directly to the target audience without navigating through external entities. Many online influence operations create or compromise social media accounts as a primary vector of information dissemination.</td>
<td>P02</td>
2022-06-30 22:22:19 +00:00
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="tactics/TA16.md">TA16</a></td>
2022-07-01 03:30:18 +00:00
<td>Establish Legitimacy</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>P02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="tactics/TA17.md">TA17</a></td>
<td>Maximize Exposure</td>
<td>Maximize exposure of the target audience to incident/campaign content via flooding, amplifying, and cross-posting.</td>
<td>P03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="tactics/TA18.md">TA18</a></td>
<td>Drive Online Harms</td>
<td>Actions taken by an influence operation to harm their opponents in online spaces through harassment, suppression, releasing private information, and controlling the information space through offensive cyberspace operations. </td>
<td>P03</td>
</tr>
</table>