DISARMframeworks/generated_pages/techniques/T0097.101.md

# Technique T0097.101: Local Persona

* **Summary**: A person with a local persona presents themselves as living in a particular geography or having local knowledge relevant to a narrative.<br><br>While presenting as a local is not an indication of inauthentic behaviour,  an influence operation may have its narratives amplified by people presenting as local to a target area. Threat actors can fabricate locals (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona, T0097.101: Local Persona) to add credibility to their narratives, or to misrepresent the real opinions of locals in the area.<br><br>People who are legitimate locals (T0143.001: Authentic Persona, T0097.101: Local Persona) can use their persona for malicious purposes, or be exploited by threat actors. For example, someone could take money for using their position as a local to provide legitimacy to a false narrative or be tricked into doing so without their knowledge.<br><br><b>Associated Techniques and Sub-techniques</b><br><b>T0097.201: Local Institution Persona:</b> Analysts should use this sub-technique to catalogue cases where an institution is presenting as a local, such as a local news organisation or local business.

* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16


| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00071 Russia-aligned hacktivists stir up anti-Ukrainian sentiments in Poland](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00071.md) | <i>“The August 17 [2022] Telegram post [which contained a falsified letter from the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs asking Poland to rename Belwederska Street in Warsaw — the location of the Russian embassy building — as Stepan Bandera Street, in honor of the far-right nationalist who led the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during WWII] also contained screenshots of Facebook posts that appeared on two Facebook accounts belonging to Polish nationals Piotr Górka, an expert in the history of the Polish Air Force, and Dariusz Walusiak, a Polish historian and documentary maker. The Górka post suggested that he fully supported the Polish government’s decision to change Belwederska Street to Stepan Bandera Street.<br><br> “In a statement to the DFRLab, Górka said his account was accessed without his consent. “This is not my post loaded to my Facebook page,” he explained. “My site was hacked, some days ago.” At the time of publishing, Piotr Górka’s post and his Facebook account were no longer accessible.<br><br> “The post on Górka’s Facebook page was shared by Dariusz Walusiak’s Facebook account; the account also reposted it on the Facebook walls of more than twenty other Facebook users, including Adam Kalita, currently working at Krakow branch of the Institute of National Remembrance; Jan Kasprzyk, head of the Office for War Veterans and Victims of Oppression; and Alicja Kondraciuk, a Polish public figure living in Krakow.<br><br> “Walusiak’s Facebook account is also no longer accessible. Given his work on Polish history and identity, it seems highly unlikely he would support the Bandera measure; the DFRLab has also reached out to him for comment.<br><br> “The fact that Joker DPR’s Telegram post included screenshots of their Facebook posts raises the strong possibility that both Facebook accounts were compromised, and that hackers planted false statements on their pages that would seem out of character for them in order to gain further attention to the forged documents.”</I><br><br> In this example, threat actors used compromised accounts (T0141.001: Acquire Compromised Account) of Polish historians who have enough relevant knowledge to plausibly weigh in on the forged letter’s narrative (T0143.003: Impersonated Persona, T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.108: Expert Persona). <br><br> This matches T0097.108: Expert Persona because the impersonation exploited Górka and Walusiak’s existing personas as experts in Polish history. |
| [I00076 Network of Social Media Accounts Impersonates U.S. Political Candidates, Leverages U.S. and Israeli Media in Support of Iranian Interests](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00076.md) | <i>“In addition to directly posting material on social media, we observed some personas in the network [of inauthentic accounts attributed to Iran] leverage legitimate print and online media outlets in the U.S. and Israel to promote Iranian interests via the submission of letters, guest columns, and blog posts that were then published. We also identified personas that we suspect were fabricated for the sole purpose of submitting such letters, but that do not appear to maintain accounts on social media. The personas claimed to be based in varying locations depending on the news outlets they were targeting for submission; for example, a persona that listed their location as Seattle, WA in a letter submitted to the Seattle Times subsequently claimed to be located in Baytown, TX in a letter submitted to The Baytown Sun. Other accounts in the network then posted links to some of these letters on social media.”</i><br><br> In this example actors fabricated individuals who lived in areas which were being targeted for influence through the use of letters to local papers (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona). |
| [I00078 Meta’s September 2020 Removal of Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00078.md) | <i>“[Meta has] removed one Page, five Facebook accounts, one Group and three Instagram accounts for foreign or government interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government entity. This small network originated in Russia and focused primarily on Turkey and Europe, and also on the United States.<br><br> “This operation relied on fake accounts — some of which had been already detected and removed by our automated systems — to manage their Page and their Group, and to drive people to their site purporting to be an independent think-tank based primarily in Turkey. These accounts posed as locals based in Turkey, Canada and the US. They also recruited people to write for their website. This network had almost no following on our platforms when we removed it.”</i><br><br> Meta identified that a network of accounts originating in Russia were driving people off platform to a site which presented itself as a think-tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona). Meta did not make an attribution about the authenticity of this off-site think tank, so neither T0143.001: Authentic Persona or T0143.002: Fabricated Persona are used here.<br><br> Meta had access to technical data for accounts on its platform, and asserted that they were fabricated individuals posing as locals who recruited targets to write content for their website (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0097.106: Recruiter Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona). |
| [I00081 Belarus KGB created fake accounts to criticize Poland during border crisis, Facebook parent company says](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00081.md) | <i>“Meta said it also removed 31 Facebook accounts, four groups, two events and four Instagram accounts that it believes originated in Poland and targeted Belarus and Iraq. Those allegedly fake accounts posed as Middle Eastern migrants posting about the border crisis. Meta did not link the accounts to a specific group.<br><br> ““These fake personas claimed to be sharing their own negative experiences of trying to get from Belarus to Poland and posted about migrants’ difficult lives in Europe,” Meta said. “They also posted about Poland’s strict anti-migrant policies and anti-migrant neo-Nazi activity in Poland. They also shared links to news articles criticizing the Belarusian government’s handling of the border crisis and off-platform videos alleging migrant abuse in Europe.””</i><br><br> In this example accounts falsely presented themselves as having local insight into the border crisis narrative (T0097.101: Local Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona). |
| [I00086 #WeAreNotSafe – Exposing How a Post-October 7th Disinformation Network Operates on Israeli Social Media](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00086.md) | Accounts which were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023” were presenting themselves as locals to Israel (T0097.101: Local Persona):<br><br><i>“Unlike usual low-effort fake accounts, these accounts meticulously mimic young Israelis. They stand out due to the extraordinary lengths taken to ensure their authenticity, from unique narratives to the content they produce to their seemingly authentic interactions.”<I>
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| [I00087 Challenging Truth and Trust: A Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00087.md) | <i>“Another actor operating in China is the American-based company Devumi. Most of the Twitter accounts managed by Devumi resemble real people, and some are even associated with a kind of large-scale social identity theft. At least 55,000 of the accounts use the names, profile pictures, hometowns and other personal details of real Twitter users, including minors, according to The New York Times (Confessore et al., 2018)).”</i><br><br>In this example accounts impersonated real locals while spreading operation narratives (T0143.003: Impersonated Persona, T0097.101: Local Persona). The impersonation included stealing the legitimate accounts’ profile pictures (T0145.001: Copy Account Imagery). |



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