

Proposed Changes to AMITT

Introduction	1
Proposed Changes to AMITT	1
TTP Changes	1
Incident changes	2
Remove attributions in example incidents	2
Add new incident examples	2
Structure Changes	2
AMITT Framework TTPs and Counter TTPs together	2
Hierarchical AMITT	3

Introduction

CogSecCollab proposes and receives many suggestions for modifications to the AMITT base model. This section contains the new things that we're considering.

Proposed Changes to AMITT

TTP Changes

Check that we've covered common techniques:

- Add in techniques from <https://mediamanipulation.org/definitions>
- Add from O'reilly's "4 short links", which had this neat bit on source hacking techniques, accompanied by definitions: [Source Hacking](#) — In this report, we identify four specific techniques of source hacking: 1. Viral Sloganeering: repackaging reactionary talking points for social media and press amplification; 2. Leak Forgery: prompting a media spectacle by sharing forged documents; 3. Evidence Collages: compiling information from multiple sources into a single, shareable document, usually as an image; 4. Keyword Squatting: the strategic domination of keywords and sockpuppet accounts to misrepresent groups or individuals These four tactics of source hacking work.
- Add from Rand Waltman's rumours series: <https://twitter.com/CogSec/status/1271758646485987329>
- Check against the UK Government's RESIST toolkit list of techniques <https://3x7ip91ron4ju9ehf2unqrm1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/RESIST-Counter-Disinformation-Toolkit.pdf>

Links to check

- <https://www.rand.org/research/projects/truth-decay/fighting-disinformation.html>
- <https://medium.com/@Exovera/tracking-media-narratives-275ce78d7303>
- Mention Kathleen Carley's work: "I would call the group's attention to the work of Dr. Kathleen Carley of Carnegie-Mellon. She has learned to characterize the specific "information maneuvers" of adversaries in terms of specific operational actions and desired intent, and the effects on target networks resulting from these maneuvers. She terms this field "social cybersecurity." "
<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/journals/military-review/english-edition-archives/mar-apr-2019/117-cybersecurity/>

We included a column, ethics, in the countermeasures tab, to reflect the different ethical constraints on countermeasures, e.g. offensive moves might be inaccessible to government agencies. We haven't populated it yet, so have removed it for now.

Incident changes

Remove attributions in example incidents

This is tidying-up work. The incident attributions, usually to countries, that we listed back in 2019 were used to ensure that we had variety in the set of examples we picked to seed AMITT.

Add new incident examples

CogSecCollab and the CTI League team produced AMITT coded data for multiple incidents in 2020. We should add these, and notes we have on TTPs that were missing from the base model, to the AMITT example incidents list.

Structure Changes

AMITT Framework TTPs and Counter TTPs together

The AdTac team reached out to the AMITT team about modelling each incident as a connected series of incident creator TTPs and counter TTPs. We'd been working on this for a while as part of our thinking on how to model incidents as multi-player games, and this pushed us to manage incident TTPs and counter TTPs together. We still have work to do on explaining each counter, and combining/ reducing the set of them as necessary.

Hierarchical AMITT

Strategic Planning 4 techniques	Objective Planning 2 techniques	Develop Persona 8 techniques	Develop Networks 12 techniques	Microtargeting 6 techniques	Develop Content 17 techniques	Channel Selection 25 techniques	Pump Priming 6 techniques	Exposure 12 techniques	Go Physical 10 techniques	Persistence 4 techniques	Measure Effectiveness 3 techniques
5Ds (0/5) II Competing Narratives Facilitate State Propaganda Leverage Existing Narratives	Center of Gravity Analysis (0/3) II Create Master Narratives	Backstop personas (0/6) II Defectors (0/3) II Experts (0/2) II News Sites (0/3) II Offline Agents Pundits Social Media Accounts (0/4) II Social Media Persona (0/2) II	Build Audience (0/5) II Channels (0/3) II Create funding campaigns Create hashtag (0/4) II Cultivate ignorant agents (0/3) II Front Groups (0/7) II Hijack legitimate account Hijack Legitimate Group (0/2) II Offline Groups Social Media Groups & Pages (0/4) II Use concealment Websites	Algorithmic Filter Bubble Clickbait Direct Messaging Paid targeted ads Promote online funding Search Engine Optimization	Adapt existing narratives Audio Cheap Fake (0/6) II Competing narratives Conspiracy narratives Deep Fake (0/7) II Distort facts (0/8) II Fake research Forgery (0/2) II Generate information pollution (0/5) II Images Leak Documents (0/4) II Memes (0/7) II Text (0/2) II Trial content (0/2) II Video Viral Sloganeering	Academia (0/3) II Advertisement Blog (0/1) II Business/Professional Network (0/1) II Darknet (0/4) II Email Film Forum Leak/Drop Site (0/2) II Microblog (0/1) II News (Print) News Syndicators Online Polls (0/2) II P2P Sharing (0/1) II Paste Site (0/1) II Photo Sharing (0/2) II Radio Self-published Media (0/4) II SMS & Messaging App (0/2) II Social Bookmarking (0/1) II Social Network (0/1) II Television Video Games (0/1) II Video Sharing (0/3) II Virtual World (0/1) II	Bait legitimate influencers (0/3) II Data Voids (0/3) II Direct Messaging Seed distortions Seed Narratives (0/3) II Teaser Campaign (0/2) II	Bots Amplify (0/4) II Censorship (0/4) II Cheerleading (0/2) II Content Laundering Cow online opinion leaders (0/2) II Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution Fabricate social media comment Flooding (0/2) II Influencers Amplify Tertiary sites amplify news Trolls Amplify Use hashtag (0/2) II	Iconoclasm Physical Advertisement Physical Media Provocateurs (0/1) II Public Speaking (0/3) II Rallies & Events (0/3) II Sabotage Sell merchandising Shills (0/1) II Vandalism	Continue to amplify Legacy web content (0/3) II Play the long game (0/2) II Support & Fund Actors	Behaviour Change Message Reach Social Media Engagement

Hierarchical version of AMITT

For most of 2020, we've had a version of AMITT that fits MITRE's new hierarchical version of ATT&CK. Each TTP in this model can have sub-techniques. The master copy of this model is available at <https://vvx7.github.io/amitt-navigator-subtechniques/> (click on "create new layer", then select "AMITT" to view it).

id	name	tactic	summary	deprecate
T0001	5Ds	TA01	Nimmo's "4Ds of propaganda": dismiss, distort, distract, dismay (MisinfosecWG added divide in 2019). Misinformation promotes an agenda by advancing narratives supportive of that agenda. This is most effective when the advanced narrative pre-dates the revelation of the specific misinformation content. But this is often not possible.	FALSE
T0001.001	Dismiss	TA01		FALSE
T0001.002	Distort	TA01		FALSE
T0001.003	Distract	TA01		FALSE
T0001.004	Dismay	TA01		FALSE
T0001.005	Divide	TA01		FALSE
T0002	Facilitate State Propaganda	TA01	Organize citizens around pro-state messaging. Paid or volunteer groups coordinated to push state propaganda (examples include 2016 Diba Facebook Expedition, coordinated to overcome China's Great Firewall to flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians and news agencies with a pro-PRC message).	FALSE

T0003	Leverage Existing Narratives	TA01	Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consistent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplification practices. Examples include midwesterners are generous, Russia is under attack from outside.	FALSE
T0004	Competing Narratives	TA01	<p>Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. MH17 (example) "Russian Foreign Ministry again claimed that "absolutely groundless accusations are put forward against the Russian side, which are aimed at discrediting Russia in the eyes of the international community" (deny); "The Dutch MH17 investigation is biased, anti-Russian and factually inaccurate" (dismiss).</p> <p>Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on.</p> <p>These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the "firehose of misinformation" approach.</p>	FALSE
T0005	Center of Gravity Analysis	TA02	Recon/research to identify "the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act." Thus, the center of gravity is usually seen as the "source of strength". Includes demographic and network analysis of communities	FALSE
T0005.001	A/B Testing of Messaging	TA02		FALSE
T0005.002	Audience Testing of Messaging	TA02		FALSE
T0005.003	Demographic Research	TA02		FALSE
T0006	Create Master Narratives	TA02	<p>The promotion of beneficial master narratives is perhaps the most effective method for achieving long-term strategic narrative dominance. From a "whole of society" perspective the promotion of the society's core master narratives should occupy a central strategic role. From a misinformation campaign / cognitive security perspective the tactics around master narratives center more precisely on the day-to-day promotion and reinforcement of this messaging. In other words, beneficial, high-coverage master narratives are a central strategic goal and their promotion constitutes an ongoing tactical struggle carried out at a whole-of-society level.</p> <p>By way of example, major powers are promoting master narratives such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * "Huawei is determined to build trustworthy networks" * "Russia is the victim of bullying by NATO powers" * "USA is guided by its founding principles of liberty and egalitarianism" 	FALSE

			Tactically, their promotion covers a broad spectrum of activities both on- and offline.	
T0007	Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups	TA03	<p>Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets.</p> <p>Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are.</p> <p>Examples: Ukraine elections (2019) circumvent Facebook’s new safeguards by paying Ukrainian citizens to give a Russian agent access to their personal pages. EU Elections (2019) Avaaz reported more than 500 suspicious pages and groups to Facebook related to the three-month investigation of Facebook disinformation networks in Europe. Mueller report (2016) The IRA was able to reach up to 126 million Americans on Facebook via a mixture of fraudulent accounts, groups, and advertisements, the report says. Twitter accounts it created were portrayed as real American voices by major news outlets. It was even able to hold real-life rallies, mobilizing hundreds of people at a time in major cities like Philadelphia and Miami.</p>	TRUE
T0008	Create fake or imposter news sites	TA03	<p>Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their ownership, reporting history and advertising details. A prominent case from the 2016 era was the _Denver Guardian_, which purported to be a local newspaper in Colorado and specialized in negative stories about Hillary Clinton.</p>	TRUE
T0009	Create fake experts	TA03	<p>Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself. For example, in the Jade Helm conspiracy theory promoted by SVR in 2015, a pair of experts--one of them naming himself a “Military Intelligence Analyst / Russian Regional CME” and the other a “Geopolitical Strategist, Journalist & Author”--pushed the story heavily on LinkedIn.</p>	TRUE
T0010	Cultivate ignorant agents	TA04	<p>Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as "useful idiots" or "unwitting agents".</p>	FALSE
T0010.001	Individuals	TA04	Individuals post or engage content online.	FALSE
T0010.002	Community Groups	TA04	Online groups collectively engage content such as Qanon fixation on Hillary Clinton and George Soros conspiracies.	FALSE
T0010.003	Activity-based	TA04	Hacker collectives, militias, and other groups, where the group identity is determined by a	FALSE

	Groups		collective activity/mission.	
T0011	Hijack legitimate account	TA04	Hack or take over legitimate accounts to distribute misinformation or damaging content. Examples include Syrian Electronic Army (2013) series of false tweets from a hijacked Associated Press Twitter account claiming that President Barack Obama had been injured in a series of explosions near the White House. The false report caused a temporary plunge of 143 points on the Dow Jones Industrial Average.	FALSE
T0012	Use concealment	TA04	Use anonymous social media profiles. Examples include page or group administrators, masked "whois" website directory data, no bylines connected to news article, no masthead connect to news websites. Example is 2016 @TEN_GOP profile where the actual Tennessee Republican Party tried unsuccessfully for months to get Twitter to shut it down, and 2019 Endless Mayfly is an Iran-aligned network of inauthentic personas and social media accounts that spreads falsehoods and amplifies narratives critical of Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel.	FALSE
T0013	Create fake websites	TA04	Create media assets to support fake organizations (e.g. think tank), people (e.g. experts) and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations.	TRUE
T0014	Create funding campaigns	TA04	Generate revenue through online funding campaigns. e.g. Gather data, advance credible persona via Gofundme; Patreon; or via fake website connecting via PayPal or Stripe. (Example 2016) #VaccinateUS Gofundme campaigns to pay for Targeted facebook ads (Larry Cook, targeting Washington State mothers, \$1,776 to boost posts over 9 months).	FALSE
T0015	Create hashtag	TA04	Many incident-based campaigns will create a hashtag to promote their fabricated event (e.g. #ColumbianChemicals to promote a fake story about a chemical spill in Louisiana). Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: 1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only "real" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name! 2. Publicize the story more widely through trending lists and search behavior Asset needed to direct/control/manage "conversation" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites ie: Twitter, LinkedIn)	FALSE
T0015.001	Content Identification	TA04	Hashtags which identify subject matter such as brands, pop culture.	FALSE
T0015.002	Group Identification	TA04	Hashtags which identify a group such as Anonymous.	FALSE
T0015.003	Location & Event Identification	TA04	Hashtags which identify locations such as OccupyWallstreet.	FALSE
T0015.003	Hashtag Campaign	TA04	Hashtags which identify narratives and campaigns. #WWG1WGA	FALSE
T0016	Clickbait	TA05	Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humor) required to drive traffic & engagement. (example 2016) "Pope Francis shocks world, endorses Donald Trump for president." (example 2016) "FBI director received millions from Clinton Foundation, his brother's law firm does Clinton's taxes". This is a key asset	FALSE
T0017	Promote online funding	TA05	Drive traffic/engagement to funding campaign sites; helps provide measurable metrics to assess conversion rates	FALSE

T0018	Paid targeted ads	TA05	Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations	FALSE
T0019	Generate information pollution	TA06	Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. "Nothing is true, but everything is possible." Akin to astroturfing campaign.	FALSE
T0019.001	Content Flooding	TA06	Content flooding dilutes adversarial messaging and/or amplifies disinformant messaging.	FALSE
T0019.002	Drive Traffic & Engagement to all Assets	TA06	Drive traffic to content which is not central to the community. Amplify shitposts and low quality content.	FALSE
T0019.003	Perception of Consensus	TA06	Falsely create the perception that the community is in support of an otherwise minority view.	FALSE
T0019.004	Perception of Polarization	TA06	Falsely create the perception that the community is in support of an otherwise controversial view.	FALSE
T0019.005	Amplify Engagement	TA06	Amplify engagement to give the impression of an active/engaged community.	FALSE
T0020	Trial content	TA06	Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content engagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates	FALSE
T0020.001	A/B Testing of Messaging	TA06		FALSE
T0020.002	Audience Testing of Messaging	TA06		FALSE
T0021	Memes	TA06	Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns.	FALSE
T0021.001	Image & Image Macro Meme	TA06	Memes to Movements – Xiao Mina	FALSE
T0021.002	Text Meme	TA06	Memes to Movements – Xiao Mina	FALSE
T0021.003	Video Meme	TA06	Memes to Movements – Xiao Mina	FALSE
T0021.004	Audio Meme	TA06	Memes to Movements – Xiao Mina	FALSE
T0021.005	Physical Meme	TA06	Memes to Movements – Xiao Mina	FALSE
T0021.006	Performative Meme	TA06	Memes to Movements – Xiao Mina	FALSE
T0021.007	Selfie	TA06	Memes to Movements – Xiao Mina	FALSE

T0022	Conspiracy narratives	TA06	"Conspiracy narratives appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of powerful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the "firehose of falsehoods" model. Example: QAnon: conspiracy theory is an explanation of an event or situation that invokes a conspiracy by sinister and powerful actors, often political in motivation, when other explanations are more probable "	FALSE
T0023	Distort facts	TA06	Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content	FALSE
T0023.001	Misquote or Misattribute	TA06	https://honestreporting.com/news-literacy-defining-bias-distortion-of-facts/	FALSE
T0023.002	Use Unreliable or Biased Sources	TA06	https://honestreporting.com/news-literacy-defining-bias-distortion-of-facts/	FALSE
T0023.003	Alter or Invent Facts	TA06	https://honestreporting.com/news-literacy-defining-bias-distortion-of-facts/	FALSE
T0023.004	Present Unconfirmed Reports/Rumors as Fact	TA06	https://honestreporting.com/news-literacy-defining-bias-distortion-of-facts/	FALSE
T0023.005	Mistranslate Words	TA06	https://honestreporting.com/news-literacy-defining-bias-distortion-of-facts/	FALSE
T0023.006	Digitally Alter Media	TA06	https://honestreporting.com/news-literacy-defining-bias-distortion-of-facts/	FALSE
T0023.007	Recontextualization	TA06		FALSE
T0023.008	Omission	TA06		FALSE
T0024	Fake videos and images	TA06	Create fake videos and/or images by manipulating existing content or generating new content (e.g. deepfakes). Examples include Pelosi video (making her appear drunk) and photoshopped shark on flooded streets of Houston TX.	TRUE
T0025	Forgery	TA06	Obtain documents (eg by theft or leak), then alter and release, possibly among factual documents/sources. Example (2019) DFRLab report "Secondary Infektion" highlights incident with key asset being a forged "letter" created by the operation to provide ammunition for far-right forces in Europe ahead of the election.	FALSE
T0025.001	Pure Fabrication	TA06	A document that is a complete work of fiction.	FALSE
T0025.002	Tainted Document	TA06	An authentic document altered to contain fictitious or inaccurate statements.	FALSE
T0026	Fake research	TA06	Create fake academic research. Example: fake social science research is often aimed at hot-button social issues such as gender, race and sexuality. Fake science research can target Climate Science debate or pseudoscience like anti-vaxx	FALSE

T0027	Adapt existing narratives	TA06	Adapting existing narratives to current operational goals is the tactical sweet-spot for an effective misinformation campaign. Leveraging existing narratives is not only more effective, it requires substantially less resourcing, as the promotion of new master narratives operates on a much larger scale, both time and scope. Fluid, dynamic & often interchangeable key master narratives can be ("The morally corrupt West") adapted to divisive (LGBT propaganda) or to distort (individuals working as CIA operatives). For Western audiences, different but equally powerful framings are available, such as "USA has a fraught history in race relations, especially in criminal justice areas."	FALSE
T0028	Competing narratives	TA06	<p>Misinformation promotes an agenda by advancing narratives supportive of that agenda. This is most effective when the advanced narrative pre-dates the revelation of the specific misinformation content. But this is often not possible.</p> <p>Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on.</p> <p>These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the *firehose of misinformation* approach.</p>	FALSE
T0029	Manipulate online polls	TA07	Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Examples: flooding FCC with comments; creating fake engagement metrics of Twitter/Facebook polls to manipulate perception of a given issue. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well	TRUE
T0030	Backstop personas	TA03	Create other assets/dossier/cover/fake relationships and/or connections or documents, sites, bylines, attributions, to establish/augment/inflate credibility/believability	FALSE
T0030.001	Create Assets	TA03		FALSE
T0030.002	Create Dossiers or Cover	TA03		FALSE
T0030.003	Create Connections & Relationships	TA03		FALSE
T0030.004	Create Posting History	TA03		FALSE
T0030.005	Create Documents	TA03		FALSE
T0030.006	Create Bylines, Attributions, and References	TA03		FALSE
T0031	Video Sharing	TA07	Use video sharing as a narrative dissemination channel	FALSE
T0031.001	YouTube	TA07	Use YouTube as a narrative dissemination channel	FALSE
T0031.002	Twitch	TA07	Use Twitch as a narrative dissemination channel	FALSE

T0031.002	LiveLeak	TA07	Use YouTube as a narrative dissemination channel	FALSE
T0032	Social Bookmarking	TA07	Use Reddit as a narrative dissemination channel	FALSE
T0032.001	Reddit	TA07	Use Reddit as a narrative dissemination channel	FALSE
T0033	Photo Sharing	TA07	Use Instagram as a narrative dissemination channel	FALSE
T0033.001	Instagram	TA07	Use Instagram as a narrative dissemination channel	FALSE
T0034	Business/Professional Network	TA07	Use business/professional networking sites as a narrative dissemination channel	FALSE
T0034.001	LinkedIn	TA07	Use LinkedIn as a narrative dissemination channel	FALSE
T0033.002	Pinterest	TA07	Use Pinterest as a narrative dissemination channel	FALSE
T0035	Blog	TA07	Use blogging services as a dissemination channel.	FALSE
T0035.001	Medium	TA07		FALSE
T0036	SMS & Messaging App	TA07	Use direct messaging apps as a narrative dissemination channel	FALSE
T0036.001	WhatsApp	TA07	Use WhatsApp as a narrative dissemination channel	FALSE
T0036.002	SMS	TA07	Use SMS as a narrative dissemination channel	FALSE
T0037	Social Network	TA07	Use social networks as a narrative dissemination channel	FALSE
T0037.001	Facebook	TA07	Use Facebook as a narrative dissemination channel	FALSE
T0038	Microblog	TA07	Use Twitter as a narrative dissemination channel	FALSE
T0038.001	Twitter	TA07	Use Twitter as a narrative dissemination channel	FALSE
T0039	Bait legitimate influencers	TA08	<p>Credibility in a social media environment is often a function of the size of a user's network. "Influencers" are so-called because of their reach, typically understood as: 1) the size of their network (i.e. the number of followers, perhaps weighted by their own influence); and 2) The rate at which their comments are re-circulated (these two metrics are related). Add traditional media players at all levels of credibility and professionalism to this, and the number of potential influential carriers available for unwitting amplification becomes substantial.</p> <p>By targeting high-influence people and organizations in all types of media with narratives and content engineered to appeal their emotional or ideological drivers, influence campaigns are able to add perceived credibility to their messaging via saturation and adoption by trusted agents such as celebrities, journalists and local leaders.</p>	FALSE
T0039.001	Endorsement	TA08	Influencer endorsements can be used to signal boost.	FALSE
T0039.002	Misappropriation	TA08	Bait influencers to respond to false/inaccurate quotes/events.	FALSE
T0039.003	Allegations	TA08	Bait influencers to respond to allegations.	FALSE

T0040	Demand unsurmountable proof	TA08	Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the "firehose of misinformation". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of "questions" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof.	TRUE
T0041	Deny involvement	TA08	Without "smoking gun" proof (and even with proof), incident creator can or will deny involvement. This technique also leverages the attacker advantages outlined in T0040 "Demand unsurmountable proof", specifically the asymmetric disadvantage for truth-tellers in a "firehose of misinformation" environment.	TRUE
T0042	Kernel of Truth	TA08	Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths. Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies. When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters.	TRUE
T0043	Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps	TA08	Direct messaging via encrypted app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety.	TRUE
T0044	Seed distortions	TA08	Incident creators often try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event in order to give a misleading account or impression. Examples: (2019) China formally arrests Canadians Spavor and Kovrig, accuses them of spying (in retaliation to detention of Huawei CFO). (2018) The Russian ministry of defence put out a press release, claiming that they had intelligence Syrian rebel forces were about to gas their own people in Idlib province as part of a "false flag" operation to frame the Syrian government.	FALSE
T0045	Use fake experts	TA08	Use the fake experts that were set up in T0009. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give "credibility" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias	TRUE
T0046	Search Engine Optimization	TA08	Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka "Black-hat SEO"	TRUE

T0047	Muzzle social media as a political force	TA09	Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transparency reports. (Example 20190 Singapore Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill would make it illegal to spread "false statements of fact" in Singapore, where that information is "prejudicial" to Singapore's security or "public tranquility." Or India/New Delhi has cut off services to Facebook and Twitter in Kashmir 28 times in the past five years, and in 2016, access was blocked for five months -- on the grounds that these platforms were being used for anti-social and "anti-national" purposes.	TRUE
T0048	Cow online opinion leaders	TA09	Intimidate, coerce, threaten critics/dissidents/journalists via trolling, doxing. Examples: Philippines, Maria Ressa and Rappler journalists targeted Duterte regime, lawsuits, trollings, banned from the presidential palace where press briefings take place; 2017 bot attack on five ProPublica Journalists.	FALSE
T0048.001	Deplatform Influencer	TA09		FALSE
T0048.002	Coerce Influencer	TA09		FALSE
T0049	Flooding	TA09	Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to achieve this effect. Example (2018): bots flood social media promoting messages which support Saudi Arabia with intent to cast doubt on allegations that the kingdom was involved in Khashoggi's death.	FALSE
T0049.001	Content Flooding	TA09	Content flooding describes the message volume.	FALSE
T0049.002	Mobbing	TA09	Mobbing describes the message volume and the messenger volume. See K-Pop stans and TikTok teens during 2020 US Presidential election.	FALSE
T0050	Cheerleading domestic social media ops	TA09	Deploy state-coordinated social media commenters and astroturfers. Both internal/domestic and external social media influence operations, popularized by China (50cent Army manage message inside the "Great Firewall") but also technique used by Chinese English-language social media influence operations are seeded by state-run media, which overwhelmingly present a positive, benign, and cooperative image of China.	TRUE
T0051	Fabricate social media comment	TA09	Use government-paid social media commenters, astroturfers, chat bots (programmed to reply to specific key words/hashtags) influence online conversations, product reviews, web-site comment forums. (2017 example) the FCC was inundated with nearly 22 million public comments on net neutrality (many from fake accounts)	FALSE
T0052	Tertiary sites amplify news	TA09	Create content/news/opinion web-sites to cross-post stories. Tertiary sites circulate and amplify narratives. Often these sites have no masthead, bylines or attribution. Examples of tertiary sites include Russia Insider, The Duran, geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca. Examples: (2019, Domestic news): Snopes reveals Star News Digital Media, Inc. may look like a media company that produces local news, but operates via undisclosed connections to political activism. (2018) FireEye reports on Iranian campaign that created between April 2018 and March 2019 sites used to spread inauthentic content from websites such as Liberty Front Press (LFP), US Journal, and Real Progressive Front during the 2018 US mid-terms.	FALSE

T0053	Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate	TA09	Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue (issues that can/are be politicized) e.g. BlackLivesMatter or MeToo	TRUE
T0054	Twitter bots amplify	TA09	Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more "popular" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive.(example 2019) #TrudeauMustGo	TRUE
T0055	Use hashtag	TA09	Use a dedicated hashtag for the incident (e.g. #PhosphorusDisaster) - either create a campaign/incident specific hashtag, or take over an existing hashtag.	FALSE
T0055.001	Hashtag Hijacking	TA09	Use a dedicated hashtag for the incident (e.g. #PhosphorusDisaster) - either create a campaign/incident specific hashtag, or take over an existing hashtag.	FALSE
T0055.002	Hashtag Campaign	TA09	Use a dedicated hashtag for the incident (e.g. #PhosphorusDisaster) - either create a campaign/incident specific hashtag, or take over an existing hashtag.	FALSE
T0056	Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution	TA09	Output information pollution (e.g. articles on an unreported false story/event) through channels controlled by or related to the incident creator. Examples include RT/Sputnik or antivax websites seeding stories.	FALSE
T0057	Organise remote rallies and events	TA10	Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives. Example: Facebook groups/pages coordinate/more divisive/polarizing groups and activities into the public space. (Example) Mueller's report, highlights, the IRA organized political rallies in the U.S. using social media starting in 2015 and continued to coordinate rallies after the 2016 election	TRUE
T0058	Legacy web content	TA11	Make incident content visible for a long time, e.g. by exploiting platform terms of service, or placing it where it's hard to remove or unlikely to be removed.	FALSE
T0058.001	Use Archiving Services	TA11	Make incident content visible for a long time, e.g. by exploiting platform terms of service, or placing it where it's hard to remove or unlikely to be removed.	FALSE
T0058.002	Use P2P Networks	TA11	Make incident content visible for a long time, e.g. by exploiting platform terms of service, or placing it where it's hard to remove or unlikely to be removed.	FALSE
T0058.003	I2P	TA11	Make incident content visible for a long time, e.g. by exploiting platform terms of service, or placing it where it's hard to remove or unlikely to be removed.	FALSE
T0059	Play the long game	TA11	Play the long game can mean a couple of things: 1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold (e.g. China and its constant messaging that Taiwan and Hong Kong are part of one China). 2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative.	FALSE

T0059.001	Low and Slow Messaging	TA11		FALSE
T0059.002	Combine Disconnected Narratives	TA11		FALSE
T0060	Continue to amplify	TA11	continue narrative or message amplification after the main incident work has finished	FALSE
T0061	Sell merchandising	TA10	Sell hats, t-shirts, flags and other branded content that's designed to be seen in the real world	FALSE
T0062	Defectors	TA03	Public defections are used to support an actor's credibility.	FALSE
T0062.001	Moral or Political Defector	TA03	Someone who sees a problem and defects because of it.	FALSE
T0062.002	Defector Escaping Prosecution	TA03	Someone who defects to avoid prosecution or persecution.	FALSE
T0062.003	Fake Defector	TA03	A fake persona used to validate a narrative of adversary defections.	FALSE
T0063	Offline Groups	TA04	Develop or infiltrate offline groups to advance narratives.	FALSE
T0064	Offline Agents	TA03	Develop offline persona in infiltrated groups or front groups.	FALSE
T0065	Social Media Persona	TA03	Account behaviours.	FALSE
T0065.001	In-group Persona	TA03	https://web.archive.org/web/20180813221652/https://medium.com/@timboucher/adversarial-social-media-tactics-e8e9857fede4	FALSE
T0065.002	Out-group Persona	TA03	https://web.archive.org/web/20180813221652/https://medium.com/@timboucher/adversarial-social-media-tactics-e8e9857fede4	FALSE
T0066	Politics	TA04		TRUE
T0066.001	Independent Political Party	TA04		TRUE
T0066.002	Political Action Committee	TA04		TRUE
T0067	Activist Groups	TA04		TRUE
T0067.001	Hacktivist Groups	TA04		TRUE
T0067.002	Social Justice Activist Groups	TA04		TRUE
T0068	Front Groups	TA04	Develop front groups.	FALSE
T0068.001	NGO	TA04	Non profits, philanthropy as seen in Double Deceit.	FALSE
T0068.002	Think Tank & Policy Centre	TA04	Think tanks and policy centres	FALSE
T0068.003	News Media & Entertainment	TA04	New organizations and entertainment outlets.	FALSE

T0068.004	Corporate & Finance	TA04	Business.	FALSE
T0068.005	Political Groups	TA04	Political groups.	FALSE
T0068.006	Academic Institutions	TA04	Academia.	FALSE
T0068.007	Religious Institutions	TA04		FALSE
T0069	Build Audience	TA04	Techniques for building an audience.	FALSE
T0069.001	Re-post Popular Content	TA04	copypasta	FALSE
T0069.002	Engage Community	TA04	likes, retweets, comments	FALSE
T0069.003	Mass Follow	TA04	Mass follow accounts to gain followers.	FALSE
T0069.004	Follow-back Schemes	TA04	Use follow back schemes to gain followers.	FALSE
T0069.005	Buy Followers	TA04	Buy followers.	FALSE
T0070	Algorithmic Filter Bubble	TA05	Identify filter bubbles and promote content within.	FALSE
T0071	Leak Documents	TA06	Leak documents.	FALSE
T0071.001	High Volume Leak	TA06	A leak containing a high volume of data such as Macron leaks. The timing of the leak immediately before the French election made it difficult to parse the documents enabling speculation on the content throughout the remainder of the election.	FALSE
T0071.002	Leak Sensitive Documents	TA06	A real document containing sensitive information, or any authentic documented leaked to amplify or corroborate existing narratives.	FALSE
T0071.003	Forged Leak	TA06	A 'leaked' document that is a work of fiction.	FALSE
T0071.004	Tainted Leak	TA06	A set of leaked documents, most of which are real, and some of which are works of fiction or are altered to contain fictitious or inaccurate statements.	FALSE
T0072	Images	TA06	Images	FALSE
T0073	Text	TA06	Text	FALSE
T0073.001	Blog Post	TA06	Blog Post	FALSE
T0073.002	News Article	TA06	News Article	FALSE
T0074	Video	TA06	Video	FALSE
T0075	Audio	TA06	Audio	FALSE

T0076	Viral Sloganeering	TA06	https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Source-Hacking_Hi-res.pdf	FALSE
T0077	Forum	TA07	Forum	FALSE
T0078	Video Games	TA07	Video Games	FALSE
T0078.001	World of Warcraft	TA07	World of Warcraft	FALSE
T0079	Virtual World	TA07	Virtual World	FALSE
T0079.001	Second Life	TA07	Second Life	FALSE
T0080	Leak/Drop Site	TA07	Leak/Drop Site	FALSE
T0080.001	WikiLeaks	TA07	WikiLeaks	FALSE
T0080.002	Distributed Denial of Secrets	TA07	Distributed Denial of Secrets	FALSE
T0081	Paste Site	TA07	Paste Site	FALSE
T0081.001	Pastebin	TA07	Pastebin	FALSE
T0082	P2P Sharing	TA07	P2P Sharing	FALSE
T0082.001	BitTorrent	TA07	BitTorrent	FALSE
T0083	Darknet	TA07	Darknet	FALSE
T0083.001	TOR	TA07	TOR	FALSE
T0083.002	I2P	TA07	I2P	FALSE
T0083.003	Freenet	TA07	Freenet	FALSE
T0083.004	IPFS	TA07	IPFS	FALSE
T0084	Self-published Media	TA07	Self-published Media	FALSE
T0084.001	Pamphlet	TA07	Pamphlet	FALSE
T0084.002	Zine	TA07	Zine	FALSE
T0084.003	Book	TA07	Book	FALSE
T0084.004	Comic	TA07	Comic	FALSE
T0085	Academia	TA07	Academia	FALSE
T0085.001	Conference	TA07	Conference	FALSE
T0085.002	Journal	TA07	Journal	FALSE
T0085.003	Class or lecture	TA07	Class or lecture	FALSE

T0086	Advertisement	TA07	Advertisement	FALSE
T0087	News (Print)	TA07	News (Print)	FALSE
T0088	Television	TA07	Television	FALSE
T0089	Radio	TA07	Radio	FALSE
T0090	Film	TA07	Film	FALSE
T0091	Data Voids	TA08	Data Voids	FALSE
T0091.001	Username Squatting	TA08	Username Squatting	FALSE
T0091.002	Domain Squatting	TA08	Domain Squatting	FALSE
T0091.003	Keyword Squatting	TA08	https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Source-Hacking_Hi-res.pdf	FALSE
T0092	Teaser Campaign	TA08	Release partial information or intent to act as a way of building interest.	FALSE
T0092.001	Announce Hack & Leak	TA08	Announce the intent to hack a target after it has already been compromised and exfiled.	FALSE
T0092.002	Announce Rally or Protest	TA08	Announce an event to build interest/engagement.	FALSE
T0093	Bots Amplify	TA09	Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more "popular" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive.(example 2019) #TrudeauMustGo	FALSE
T0093.001	Social Bots	TA09		FALSE
T0093.002	Chat Bots	TA09		FALSE
T0093.002	Spam Bots	TA09		FALSE
T0093.003	Engagement Pods	TA09	Engagement pods use bots to engage other group members content. This	FALSE
T0094	Trolls Amplify	TA09	Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue	FALSE

			(issues that can/are be politicized) e.g. BlackLivesMatter or MeToo	
T0095	Censorship	TA09	Censorship	FALSE
T0095.001	State Censorship	TA09	Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transparency reports. (Example 20190 Singapore Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill would make it illegal to spread "false statements of fact" in Singapore, where that information is "prejudicial" to Singapore's security or "public tranquility." Or India/New Delhi has cut off services to Facebook and Twitter in Kashmir 28 times in the past five years, and in 2016, access was blocked for five months -- on the grounds that these platforms were being used for anti-social and "anti-national" purposes.	FALSE
T0095.002	Platform Censorship	TA09	Platform self regulation.	FALSE
T0095.003	Take-down Requests	TA09	DMCA and similar take down.	FALSE
T0095.004	Social Pressure	TA09	Cancel culture, allegations, public shaming.	FALSE
T0096	Influencers Amplify	TA09	Amplification happens once the influencers take the bait.	FALSE
T0097	Mobbing	TA09	Mobbing is content exposure distributed across many individuals. Unlike	TRUE
T0098	Cross-platform Release	TA09	Coordinated release of content across multiple platforms.	TRUE
T0099	Provocateurs	TA10	Use of physical agents to accelerate protests.	FALSE
T0099.001	Calls for Violence	TA10	Actors call for violence against police, minorities, outgroups	FALSE
T0100	Public Speaking	TA10	Public speaking is used to amplify disinformation, or itself as an act of disinformation.	FALSE
T0100.001	Protest, Rally & Demonstrations	TA10	Speakers and animators present at rallies.	FALSE
T0100.002	Convention, Conference & Seminars	TA10	Disinformation in academia and professional conferences.	FALSE
T0100.002	Press Conference	TA10	Disinformation via press conference.	FALSE
T0101	Iconoclasm	TA10	Destroy statues, monuments, arts, books, religious/cultural iconography, etc. Seen frequently in 2020 US Presedential election where counter-protesters burned signage.	FALSE
T0102	Sabotage	TA10	Sabotage objects or systems to facilitate narratives.	FALSE

T0103	Rallies & Events	TA10	Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives. Example: Facebook groups/pages coordinate/more divisive/polarizing groups and activities into the public space. (Example) Mueller's report, highlights, the IRA organized political rallies in the U.S. using social media starting in 2015 and continued to coordinate rallies after the 2016 election	FALSE
T0103.001	Protest	TA10		FALSE
T0103.002	Counter-protest	TA10		FALSE
T0103.003	Other Real World Events	TA10		FALSE
T0104	Support & Fund Actors	TA11	Finance and support front groups, offline groups, and influencers.	FALSE
T0105	Social Media Groups & Pages	TA04	<p>Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets.</p> <p>Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are.</p> <p>Examples: Ukraine elections (2019) circumvent Facebook's new safeguards by paying Ukrainian citizens to give a Russian agent access to their personal pages. EU Elections (2019) Avaaz reported more than 500 suspicious pages and groups to Facebook related to the three-month investigation of Facebook disinformation networks in Europe. Mueller report (2016) The IRA was able to reach up to 126 million Americans on Facebook via a mixture of fraudulent accounts, groups, and advertisements, the report says. Twitter accounts it created were portrayed as real American voices by major news outlets. It was even able to hold real-life rallies, mobilizing hundreds of people at a time in major cities like Philadelphia and Miami.</p>	FALSE
T0105.001	Create Social Media Groups & Pages	TA04		FALSE
T0105.002	Buy Social Media Groups & Pages	TA04		FALSE
T0105.003	Rent Social Media Groups & Pages	TA04		FALSE
T0105.004	Compromise Social Media	TA04		FALSE

	Groups & Pages			
T0106	Social Media Accounts	TA03		FALSE
T0106.001	Create Social Media Accounts	TA03		FALSE
T0106.002	Buy Social Media Accounts	TA03		FALSE
T0106.003	Rent Social Media Accounts	TA03		FALSE
T0106.004	Compromise Social Media Accounts	TA03		FALSE
T0113	Experts	TA03	Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself. For example, in the Jade Helm conspiracy theory promoted by SVR in 2015, a pair of experts--one of them naming himself a "Military Intelligence Analyst / Russian Regional CME" and the other a "Geopolitical Strategist, Journalist & Author"--pushed the story heavily on LinkedIn.	FALSE
T0113.001	True Experts	TA03	Real experts promote false information.	FALSE
T0113.002	Fake Experts	TA03	Fake experts promote false information.	FALSE
T0114	News Sites	TA03	Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their ownership, reporting history and advertising details. A prominent case from the 2016 era was the _Denver Guardian_, which purported to be a local newspaper in Colorado and specialized in negative stories about Hillary Clinton.	FALSE
T0114.001	Fake News Sites	TA03		FALSE
T0114.002	Imposter News Sites	TA03		FALSE
T0114.003	Pink Slime	TA03		FALSE
T0115	Hijack Legitimate Group	TA04	Hack or take over legitimate accounts to distribute misinformation or damaging content. Examples include Syrian Electronic Army (2013) series of false tweets from a hijacked Associated Press Twitter account claiming that President Barack Obama had been injured in a series of explosions near the White House. The false report caused a temporary plunge of 143 points on the Dow Jones Industrial Average.	FALSE

T0115.001	Change In-group Messaging	TA04		FALSE
T0115.002	Change Out-group Messaging	TA04		FALSE
T0116	Websites	TA04	Create media assets to support fake organizations (e.g. think tank), people (e.g. experts) and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations.	FALSE
T0117	Behaviour Change	TA12		FALSE
T0118	Deep Fake	TA06	https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/DS_Deepfakes_Cheap_Fakes_Final-1-1.pdf	FALSE
T0118.001	Virtual Performance	TA06		FALSE
T0118.002	Voice Synthesis	TA06		FALSE
T0118.003	Video Synthesis	TA06		FALSE
T0118.004	Face Swapping	TA06		FALSE
T0118.005	Lip-syncing	TA06		FALSE
T0118.006	Audio Synthesis	TA06		FALSE
T0118.007	Text Generation	TA06	https://www.aspi.org.au/report/weaponised-deep-fakes	FALSE
T0119	Cheap Fake	TA06	https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/DS_Deepfakes_Cheap_Fakes_Final-1-1.pdf	FALSE
T0119.001	Face Swapping	TA06		FALSE
T0119.002	Speed Alteration	TA06		FALSE
T0119.003	Lookalikes	TA06		FALSE
T0119.004	Recontextualizing	TA06		FALSE
T0119.005	Selective Editing	TA06		FALSE
T0119.006	Digital Alteration	TA06		FALSE
T0120	Online Polls	TA07	Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Examples: flooding FCC with comments; creating fake engagement metrics of Twitter/Facebook polls to manipulate perception of given issue. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well	FALSE
T0120.001	Create Online Polls	TA07		FALSE

T0120.002	Manipulate Existing Polls	TA07		FALSE
T0121	Use Fake Experts	TA08	Use the fake experts that were set up in T0009. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give "credibility" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias	TRUE
T0122	Cheerleading	TA09	Deploy state-coordinated social media commenters and astroturfers. Both internal/domestic and external social media influence operations, popularized by China (50cent Army manage message inside the "Great Firewall") but also techniques used by Chinese English-language social media influence operations are seeded by state-run media, which overwhelmingly present a positive, benign, and cooperative image of China.	FALSE
T0122.001	Domestic Influence Ops	TA09		FALSE
T0122.002	Foreign Influence Ops	TA09		FALSE
T0123	Advertisement	TA10	Buy billboard ads, Brexit bus wraps, etc.	FALSE
T0124	Media	TA10	Books, newspapers, stickers.	FALSE
T0125	Seed Narratives	TA08		FALSE
T0125.001	Demand unsurmountable proof	TA08	Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the "firehose of misinformation". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of "questions" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof.	FALSE
T0125.002	Deny involvement	TA08	Without "smoking gun" proof (and even with proof), incident creator can or will deny involvement. This technique also leverages the attacker advantages outlined in T0040 "Demand unsurmountable proof", specifically the asymmetric disadvantage for truth-tellers in a "firehose of misinformation" environment.	FALSE

T0125.003	Kernel of Truth	TA08	<p>Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths.</p> <p>Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies.</p> <p>When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters.</p>	FALSE
T0126	Direct Messaging	TA08	Direct messaging via encrypted app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety.	FALSE
T0126	Direct Messaging	TA05		FALSE
T0128	Search Engine Optimization	TA05	Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka "Black-hat SEO"	FALSE
T0129	Email	TA07	Email.	FALSE
T0129	News Syndicators	TA07	Tertiary news sites host syndicated news from RT, Sputnik, etc.	FALSE
T0131	Message Reach	TA12		FALSE
T0132	Social Media Engagement	TA12		FALSE
T0133	Pundits	TA03	Develop political pundits to promote strategic talking points.	FALSE
T0134	Channels	TA04	Create channels to support influence operations and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations.	FALSE
T0134.001	Buy Channels	TA04		FALSE
T0134.002	Compromise Channels	TA04		FALSE
T0134.003	Create Channels	TA04		FALSE

T0135	Content Laundering	TA09	The original meaning of subversive content is diluted by exposing alternative meanings to the target audience. In China, the “Grass Mud Horse” appeared on Sina Weibo as “Choco Milk Alpaca” as an emoji after censoring the original meme. Xiao Mina - https://88-bar.com/2017/01/has-the-grass-mud-horse-been-defanged/	FALSE
T0136	Vandalism	TA10	Agents destroy property to facilitate the narrative of violent protesters as looters and rioters.	FALSE
T0137	Shills	TA10	A person paid to help an organization without publicly disclosing their financial relationship.	FALSE
T0137.001	Inauthentic Crowds	TA10	Actors paid to participate in a protest, rally or event.	FALSE
T0137.001	Performance Artists	TA10	Actors paid to perform acts that support a narrative. During the 2016 US Presidential election, the IRA paid an American actor to depict Hillary Clinton in a prison uniform. See: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-factbox/factbox-effort-to-sway-election-included-clinton-in-prison-garb-indictment-idUSKCN1G02CN	FALSE