# DISARM

P01 Plan | P01 Plan | P02 Prepare | P02 Prepare | P02 Prepare | P03 Execute | P03 Execute | P03 Execute | P03 Execute | P04 Assess | P01 Plan | P02 Prepare | P02 Prepare | P02 Prepare | P03 Execute | P03 Execute

TA01 Plan Strategy

TA02 Plan Objectives

TA05 Microtarget

TA06 Develop Content

TA07 Select Channels and Affordances

TA08 Conduct Pump Priming

TA09 Deliver Content

TA10 Drive Offline Activity

TA11 Persist in the Information Environment

TA12 Assess Effectiveness

TA13 Target Audience Analysis

TA14 Develop Narratives

TA15 Establish Social Assets

TA16 Establish Legitimacy

TA17 Maximize Exposure

TA18 Drive Online Harms

C00006 Charge for social media

C00009 Educate high profile influencers on best practices

C00065 Reduce political targeting

C00014 Real-time updates to fact-checking database

C00090 Fake engagement system

C00100 Hashtag jacking

C00109 Dampen Emotional Reaction

C00131 Seize and analyse botnet servers

C00140 "Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls

C00034 Create more friction at account creation

C00008 Create shared fact-checking database

C00011 Media literacy. Games to identify fake news

C00066 Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back)

C00032 Hijack content and link to truth- based info

C00097 Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment

C00112 "Prove they are not an op!"

C00122 Content moderation

C00138 Spam domestic actors with lawsuits

C00148 Add random links to network graphs

C00036 Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide)

C00010 Enhanced privacy regulation for social media

C00028 Make information provenance available

C00130 Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously.

C00071 Block source of pollution

C00098 Revocation of allowlisted or "verified" status

C00113 Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials.

C00123 Remove or rate limit botnets

C00139 Weaponise youtube content matrices

C00149 Poison the monitoring & evaluation data

C00040 third party verification for people

C00012 Platform regulation

C00029 Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise

C00178 Fill information voids with non-disinformation content

C00072 Remove non-relevant content from special interest groups - not recommended

C00099 Strengthen verification methods

C00114 Don't engage with payloads

C00124 Don't feed the trolls

C00143 (botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time

C00042 Address truth contained in narratives

C00013 Rating framework for news

C00030 Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based)

C00216 Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors

C00074 Identify and delete or rate limit identical content

C00101 Create friction by rate-limiting engagement

C00115 Expose actor and intentions

C00125 Prebunking

C00044 Keep people from posting to social media immediately

C00016 Censorship | C00031 Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify |  | C00075 normalise language | C00103 Create a bot that engages / distract trolls | C00116 Provide proof of involvement | C00126 Social media amber alert |  |  |  |  |  | C00046 Marginalise and discredit extremist groups |  |  |

C00017 Repair broken social connections

C00060 Legal action against for-profit engagement factories

C00076 Prohibit images in political discourse channels

C00105 Buy more advertising than misinformation creators

C00117 Downgrade / de-amplify so message is seen by fewer people

C00128 Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other "decelerants"

C00047 Honeypot with coordinated inauthentics

C00019 Reduce effect of division-enablers | C00070 Block access to disinformation resources |  | C00078 Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content | C00195 Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content | C00118 Repurpose images with new text | C00129 Use banking to cut off access |  |  |  |  |  | C00048 Name and Shame Influencers |  |  |
C00021 Encourage in-person communication | C00092 Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers |  | C00080 Create competing narrative |  | C00119 Engage payload and debunk. | C00147 Make amplification of social media posts expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days) |  |  |  |  |  | C00051 Counter social engineering training |  |  |
C00022 Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety | C00144 Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs |  | C00081 Highlight flooding and noise, and explain motivations |  | C00120 Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes | C00182 Redirection / malware detection/ remediation |  |  |  |  |  | C00052 Infiltrate platforms |  |  |
C00024 Promote healthy narratives | C00156 Better tell your country or organization story |  | C00082 Ground truthing as automated response to pollution |  | C00121 Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow. | C00200 Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo |  |  |  |  |  | C00053 Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts |  |  |
C00026 Shore up democracy based messages | C00164 compatriot policy |  | C00084 Modify disinformation narratives, and rebroadcast them |  | C00136 Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages | C00211 Use humorous counter-narratives |  |  |  |  |  | C00056 Encourage people to leave social media |  |  |
C00027 Create culture of civility | C00169 develop a creative content hub |  | C00085 Mute content |  | C00154 Ask media not to report false information |  |  |  |  |  |  | C00058 Report crowdfunder as violator |  |  |
C00073 Inoculate populations through media literacy training | C00207 Run a competing disinformation campaign - not recommended |  | C00086 Distract from noise with addictive content |  | C00184 Media exposure |  |  |  |  |  |  | C00059 Verification of project before posting fund requests |  |  |
C00096 Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers | C00222 Tabletop simulations |  | C00087 Make more noise than the disinformation |  | C00188 Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves |  |  |  |  |  |  | C00062 Free open library sources worldwide |  |  |
C00111 Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views |  |  | C00091 Honeypot social community |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | C00067 Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding) |  |  |
C00153 Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure |  |  | C00094 Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | C00077 Active defence: run TA15 "develop people” - not recommended |  |  |
C00159 Have a disinformation response plan |  |  | C00106 Click-bait centrist content |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | C00093 Influencer code of conduct |  |  |
C00161 Coalition Building with stakeholders and Third-Party Inducements |  |  | C00107 Content moderation |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | C00133 Deplatform Account* |  |  |
C00170 elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft |  |  | C00142 Platform adds warning label and decision point when sharing content |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | C00135 Deplatform message groups and/or message boards |  |  |
C00174 Create a healthier news environment |  |  | C00165 Ensure integrity of official documents |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | C00155 Ban incident actors from funding sites |  |  |
C00176 Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private |  |  | C00202 Set data 'honeytraps' |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | C00160 find and train influencers |  |  |
C00190 open engagement with civil society |  |  | C00219 Add metadata to content that’s out of the control of disinformation creators |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | C00162 Unravel/target the Potemkin villages |  |  |
C00205 strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | C00172 social media source removal |  |  |
C00212 build public resilience by making civil society more vibrant |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | C00189 Ensure that platforms are taking down flagged accounts |  |  |
C00220 Develop a monitoring and intelligence plan |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | C00197 remove suspicious accounts |  |  |
C00221 Run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | C00203 Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets |  |  |
C00223 Strengthen Trust in social media platforms |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

- C00006: Charge for social media
- C00009: Educate high profile influencers on best practices
- C00065: Reduce political targeting
- C00014: Real-time updates to fact-checking database
- C00090: Fake engagement system
- C00100: Hashtag jacking
- C00109: Dampen Emotional Reaction
- C00131: Seize and analyse botnet servers
- C00140: "Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls
- C00034: Create more friction at account creation
- C00008: Create shared fact-checking database
- C00011: Media literacy. Games to identify fake news
- C00066: Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back)
- C00032: Hijack content and link to truth- based info
- C00097: Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment
- C00112: "Prove they are not an op!"
- C00122: Content moderation
- C00138: Spam domestic actors with lawsuits
- C00148: Add random links to network graphs
- C00036: Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide)
- C00010: Enhanced privacy regulation for social media
- C00028: Make information provenance available
- C00130: Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously.
- C00071: Block source of pollution
- C00098: Revocation of allowlisted or "verified" status
- C00113: Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials.
- C00123: Remove or rate limit botnets
- C00139: Weaponise youtube content matrices
- C00149: Poison the monitoring & evaluation data
- C00040: third party verification for people
- C00012: Platform regulation
- C00029: Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise
- C00178: Fill information voids with non-disinformation content
- C00072: Remove non-relevant content from special interest groups - not recommended
- C00099: Strengthen verification methods
- C00114: Don't engage with payloads
- C00124: Don't feed the trolls
- C00143: (botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time
- C00042: Address truth contained in narratives
- C00013: Rating framework for news
- C00030: Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based)
- C00216: Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors
- C00074: Identify and delete or rate limit identical content
- C00101: Create friction by rate-limiting engagement
- C00115: Expose actor and intentions
- C00125: Prebunking
- C00044: Keep people from posting to social media immediately
- C00016: Censorship
- C00031: Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify
- C00075: normalise language
- C00103: Create a bot that engages / distract trolls
- C00116: Provide proof of involvement
- C00126: Social media amber alert
- C00046: Marginalise and discredit extremist groups
- C00017: Repair broken social connections
- C00060: Legal action against for-profit engagement factories
- C00076: Prohibit images in political discourse channels
- C00105: Buy more advertising than misinformation creators
- C00117: Downgrade / de-amplify so message is seen by fewer people
- C00128: Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other "decelerants"
- C00047: Honeypot with coordinated inauthentics
- C00019: Reduce effect of division-enablers
- C00070: Block access to disinformation resources
- C00078: Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content
- C00195: Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content
- C00118: Repurpose images with new text
- C00129: Use banking to cut off access
- C00048: Name and Shame Influencers
- C00021: Encourage in-person communication
- C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers
- C00080: Create competing narrative
- C00119: Engage payload and debunk.
- C00147: Make amplification of social media posts expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days)
- C00051: Counter social engineering training
- C00022: Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety
- C00144: Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs
- C00081: Highlight flooding and noise, and explain motivations
- C00120: Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes
- C00182: Redirection / malware detection/ remediation
- C00052: Infiltrate platforms
- C00024: Promote healthy narratives
- C00156: Better tell your country or organization story
- C00082: Ground truthing as automated response to pollution
- C00121: Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow.
- C00200: Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo
- C00053: Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts
- C00026: Shore up democracy based messages
- C00164: compatriot policy
- C00084: Modify disinformation narratives, and rebroadcast them
- C00136: Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages
- C00211: Use humorous counter-narratives
- C00056: Encourage people to leave social media
- C00027: Create culture of civility
- C00169: develop a creative content hub
- C00085: Mute content
- C00154: Ask media not to report false information
- C00058: Report crowdfunder as violator
- C00073: Inoculate populations through media literacy training
- C00207: Run a competing disinformation campaign - not recommended
- C00086: Distract from noise with addictive content
- C00184: Media exposure
- C00059: Verification of project before posting fund requests
- C00096: Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers
- C00222: Tabletop simulations
- C00087: Make more noise than the disinformation
- C00188: Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves
- C00062: Free open library sources worldwide
- C00111: Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views
- C00091: Honeypot social community
- C00067: Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding)
- C00153: Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure
- C00094: Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research
- C00077: Active defence: run TA15 "develop people” - not recommended
- C00159: Have a disinformation response plan
- C00106: Click-bait centrist content
- C00093: Influencer code of conduct
- C00161: Coalition Building with stakeholders and Third-Party Inducements
- C00107: Content moderation
- C00133: Deplatform Account*
- C00170: elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft
- C00142: Platform adds warning label and decision point when sharing content
- C00135: Deplatform message groups and/or message boards
- C00174: Create a healthier news environment
- C00165: Ensure integrity of official documents
- C00155: Ban incident actors from funding sites
- C00176: Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private
- C00202: Set data 'honeytraps'
- C00160: find and train influencers
- C00190: open engagement with civil society
- C00219: Add metadata to content that’s out of the control of disinformation creators
- C00162: Unravel/target the Potemkin villages
- C00205: strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting
- C00172: social media source removal
- C00212: build public resilience by making civil society more vibrant
- C00189: Ensure that platforms are taking down flagged accounts
- C00220: Develop a monitoring and intelligence plan
- C00197: remove suspicious accounts
- C00221: Run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors
- C00203: Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets
- C00223: Strengthen Trust in social media platforms