SMS, Opt-Out Caller ID and Public Lists, Restarts

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@ -193,13 +193,15 @@ SMS texting and traditional phone calls are not secure, so it's important to avo
**Only install Apps from official source** | Recommended | Applications on Apple App Store and Google Play Store are scanned and cryptographically signed, making them less likely to be malicious. Avoid downloading .apk or .ipa files from unverified source. Also check the reviews before downloading a new application.
**Only Charge your Device from a Trusted Source** | Recommended | When you charge your device via USB in a public space, it is possible for malicious actors to gain full access to your device, via [AT Commands](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hayes_command_set). You can read more about this at https://atcommands.org/ or from [this seminar](https://www.usenix.org/node/217625). To protect yourself, either only charge your phone from trusted sources, or use a [USB Data Blocker](https://amzn.to/30amhja). A Data blocker allows your phone to charge, while blocking the data transfer wires, blocking this exploit or any file transfers to run. ([PortaPow](https://portablepowersupplies.co.uk/) is recommended, since it still allows for fast-charge.) Available in both [USB-A](https://amzn.to/309kPh3) and [USB-C](https://amzn.to/39Wh5nJ).
**Set up a mobile carrier PIN** | Recommended | [SIM hijacking](https://securelist.com/large-scale-sim-swap-fraud/90353/) is when a hacker is able to get your mobile number transferred to their sim (often through social engineering your mobile carrier). This then allows them to receive 2FA SMS codes (enabling them to access your secure accounts, such as banking), or to pose as you. The easiest way to protect against this is to set up a PIN through your mobile provider, thus disallowing anyone without this PIN to make any changes to your account. The PIN should not be easily guessable, and it is important that you remember it, or store is somewhere secure. Using a non-SMS based 2FA method will reduce the damage that can be done if someone is able to take control of your SIM. [Read more](https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-mobile-sim-swap-fraud.html) about the sim swap scam.
**Opt-out of personal ads** | Optional | In order for ads to be personalized, Google collects data about you, you can slightly reduce the amount they collect by opting-out of seeing personalized ads. See [this guide](https://www.androidguys.com/tips-tools/how-to-disable-personalized-ads-on-android/), for Android instructions.
**Opt-out of Caller ID Listings** | Optional | When one of your friends or colleagues has your number in their contacts, and also has a caller ID app (such as TrueCaller, CallApp and Caller ID), then your Name, Phone Number and any other saved contact details will be uploaded. To keep your name and number private, you can unlit it here: [TrueCaller](https://www.truecaller.com/unlisting), [CallApp](https://callapp.com/how-to/unlist-phone-number), [SyncMe](https://sync.me/optout), [cia-app](https://cia-app.com/self-service/delist-number), [Hiya](https://hiyahelp.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/requests/new?ticket_form_id=824667). It's possible to opt-out, even before your number has been added, and this will prevent your details being uploaded in the future.
**Opt-out of personalized ads** | Optional | In order for ads to be personalized, Google collects data about you, you can slightly reduce the amount they collect by opting-out of seeing personalized ads. See [this guide](https://www.androidguys.com/tips-tools/how-to-disable-personalized-ads-on-android/), for Android instructions.
**Erase after too many login attempts** | Optional | To protect against an attacker brute forcing your pin, if you lose your phone, set your device to erase after too many failed login attempts. See [this iPhone guide](https://www.howtogeek.com/264369/how-to-erase-your-ios-device-after-too-many-failed-passcode-attempts/). You can also do this via Find my Phone, but this increased security comes at a cost of decreased privacy.
**Monitor Trackers** | Optional | A tracker is a piece of software meant to collect data about you or your usages. [εxodus](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/) is a great service which lets you search for any app, by its name, and see which trackers are embedded in it. They also have [an app](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.eu.exodus_privacy.exodusprivacy) which shows trackers and permissions for all your installed apps.
**Install a Firewall** | Optional | To prevent applications from leaking privacy-sensitive data, you can install a firewall app. This will make it easier to see and control which apps are making network requests in the background, and allow you to block specific apps from roaming when the screen is turned off. For Android, check out [NetGuard](https://www.netguard.me/), and for iOS there is [LockDown](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/lockdown-apps/id1469783711), both of which are open source. Alternatively there is [NoRootFirewall](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.greyshirts.firewall) *Android*, [XPrivacy](https://github.com/M66B/XPrivacy) *Android (root required)*, [Fyde](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/fyde-mobile-security-access/) *iOS* and [Guardian Firewall](https://guardianapp.com/) *iOS*.
**Use secure, privacy-respecting apps** | Optional | Mainstream apps have a reputation for not respecting the privacy of their users, and they're usually closed-source meaning vulnerabilities can be hidden. [Prism-Break](https://prism-break.org) maintains a list of better alternatives, see [Android](https://prism-break.org/en/categories/android/) and [iOS](https://prism-break.org/en/categories/ios/).
**Avoid Custom Virtual Keyboards** | Optional | Android and iOS allow you to download and use third-party keyboard apps. These apps will be able to access everything that you type on your phone/ tablet: passwords, messages, search terms etc. It is recommended to stick with your devices stock keyboard. If you choose to use one of these apps, ensure it is reputable, block internet access (can be done with a [firewall app](/5_Privacy_Respecting_Software.md#firewalls)), don't grant it permissions it does not need, and turn off analytics or other invasive features in it's settings. [This article](https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security) by Lenny Zelster explains things further
**Use Signal, instead of SMS** | Optional | SMS may be convenient, but it's [not secure](https://www.fortherecordmag.com/archives/0315p25.shtml). [Signal](https://signal.org) is both the most secure and private option. [Silence](https://silence.im/) (encrypted SMS), [Threema](https://threema.ch), [Wire](https://wire.com/en/)(enterprise) and [Riot](https://about.riot.im/) are also encrypted.[iMessage](https://techcrunch.com/2014/02/27/apple-explains-exactly-how-secure-imessage-really-is/) and [WhatsApp](https://www.whatsapp.com) do claim to be [end-to-end-encrypted](https://signal.org/blog/whatsapp-complete/), but since they are not open source, verifying this is harder, and the private companies which own them (Apple and Facebook), have a questionable reputation when it comes to protecting users privacy. Keep in mind that although the transmission may be secured, messages can still be read if your or your recipients' devices have been compromised.
**Restart Device Regularly** | Optional | Over the years there have vulnerabilities relating to memory exploits (such as [CVE-2015-6639](https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6639) + [CVE-2016-2431](https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2431)). Restarting your phone at least once a week will clear the app state cached in memory. A side benefit is that your device may run more smoothly after a restart.
**Avoid SMS** | Optional | SMS may be convenient, but it's [not particularly secure](https://www.fortherecordmag.com/archives/0315p25.shtml). It is susceptible to many threats, including interception, sim swapping (see [this article](https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2020/01/21/the-surprising-truth-about-sms-security)), manipulation and malware (see [this article](https://www.securitynewspaper.com/2019/09/13/hack-any-mobile-phone-with-just-a-sms)). SMS should not be used to receive 2FA codes, (as demonstrated in the video in [this article](https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/18/16328172/sms-two-factor-authentication-hack-password-bitcoin)), instead use an [authenticator app](/5_Privacy_Respecting_Software.md#2-factor-authentication). SMS should not be used for communication, instead use an [encrypted messaging app](/5_Privacy_Respecting_Software.md#encrypted-messaging), such as [Signal](https://signal.org)
**Avoid using your real phone number when signing up for an account or service** | Optional | Where possible, avoid giving out your real phone number while creating accounts online. You can create phone numbers using services such as [Google Voice](https://voice.google.com) or [Skype](https://www.skype.com/en/features/online-number/). For temporary usage you can use a service like [iNumbr](https://www.inumbr.com) that generates a phone number that forwards messages and calls to your main number.
**Watch out for Stalkerware** | Optional | This is a malware that is installed directly onto your device by someone you know (partner, parent, boss etc.). It allows them to see your location, messages and other app data remotely. The app likely won't show up in your app draw, (but may visible in Settings --> Applications --> View All). Sometimes they can be disguised as a non-conspicuous app (such as a game, flashlight or calculator) which initially don't appear suspicious at all. Look out for unusual battery usage, network requests or high device temperature. If you suspect that stalkerware is on your device, the best way to get rid of it is through a factory reset. See [this guide](https://blog.malwarebytes.com/stalkerware/2019/10/how-to-protect-against-stalkerware-a-murky-but-dangerous-mobile-threat/) for more details.
**Sandbox Mobile Apps** | Advanced | Prevent permission-hungry apps from accessing your private data with [Island](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.oasisfeng.island). It is a sandbox environment to clone selected apps and isolate them from accessing your personal data outside the sandbox (including call logs, contacts, photos and etc.) even if related permissions are granted.
@ -300,6 +302,7 @@ Many data breaches, hacks and attacks are caused by human error. The following l
**Do not assume a site is secure, just because it is `HTTPS`** | Recommended | Unlike HTTP, data sent over HTTPS is encrypted. However that does not mean you should trust that website by default. HTTPS Certificates can be obtained by anybody, so a cloned or scam site may have a valid certificate (as denoted by the padlock icon). Always check the URL, and don't enter any personal details unless you are certain a website is legitimate. Avoid entering data on any site that is not HTTPS
**Use Credit Cards, or Virtual Cards when paying online** | Optional | There are risks involved in entering your card details on any website. Credit cards have better consumer protection, compared to debit or bank cards, meaning you are more likely to be recompensated for fraudulent transactions. Better still, paying with a virtual, 1-time card will mean that even if those credentials are compromised a hacker will not be able to lift any of your money. [Privacy.com](https://privacy.com/join/VW7WC) offer virtual payment cards for that you can use anywhere on the internet, as does [Revolut Premium](revolut.ngih.net/Q9jdx)
**Review application permissions** | Optional | Ensure that no app have unnecessary access to your photos, camera, location, contacts, microphone, call logs etc. See these guides for how to manage app permissions on [Android](https://www.howtogeek.com/230683/how-to-manage-app-permissions-on-android-6.0) and [iOS](https://www.howtogeek.com/211623/how-to-manage-app-permissions-on-your-iphone-or-ipad). On Android, there is a great app called [Exodus Privacy](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.eu.exodus_privacy.exodusprivacy), that displays all permissions, and trackers for each of your installed apps
**Opt-out of public lists** | Optional | In many countries there are public databases that include citizens names, addresses, contact numbers and more. This can often result in unwanted contact from marketing companies, but in some cases used for harassment, stalking and fraud. [This guide](https://www.worldprivacyforum.org/2015/08/consumer-tips-top-ten-opt-outs) from The World Privacy Forum provides good instructions for how to approach this. This includes opting out of: Marketing, Financial Institution Listings, Mail Spam, FERPA Education Listings, Data Brokers and Advertising, as well as joining the National Do Not Call Registry
**Opt-out of data sharing** | Optional | Many apps and services automatically opt you in for data collection and sharing. Often this data is sold onto third-parties, who buy customer logs from many companies, and are therefore able to combine them together and easily deduce your identity, and combine it with your habits, purchases, personal details, location etc. For instructions on how to opt-out, see [Simple Opt Out](https://simpleoptout.com)
**Review and update social media privacy** | Optional | Companies regularly update their terms, and that often leads to you being opted back. Check you Facebook, Twitter, Google etc. activity and privacy settings. See also [re-consent](https://github.com/cliqz-oss/re-consent) and [Jumbo](https://www.jumboprivacy.com) which are tools aimed at making this clearer and easier
**Compartmentalize** | Advanced | [Compartmentalization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compartmentalization_(information_security)) is where to keep several categories of digital activity and files totally separate from each other. It means that if one area is breached, then an attacker will only have a proportion of your data, and the rest will still be safe. For example, store your work and personal files on separate devices, or use different web browsers for different types of activity, or even run certain tasks in a contained VM or on a separate device (such as having a work phone, and personal phone, or using a separate browser for social media/ chat rooms, or even running a VM for using specialist software)