Protection from Keyloggers

Adds:
- Avoid 3rd-party sofware keyboards on Android & iOS
- Watch out for keylogging malware
- Recognize hardware keyloggers

README.md

@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ SMS texting and traditional phone calls are not secure, so it's important to avo
 **Monitor Trackers** | Optional | A tracker is a piece of software meant to collect data about you or your usages. [εxodus](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/) is a great service which lets you search for any app, by its name, and see which trackers are embedded in it. They also have [an app](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.eu.exodus_privacy.exodusprivacy) which shows trackers and permissions for all your installed apps.
 **Install a Firewall** | Optional | To prevent applications from leaking privacy-sensitive data, you can install a firewall app. This will make it easier to see and control which apps are making network requests in the background, and allow you to block specific apps from roaming when the screen is turned off. For Android, check out [NetGuard](https://www.netguard.me/), and for iOS there is [LockDown](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/lockdown-apps/id1469783711), both of which are open source. Alternatively there is [NoRootFirewall](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.greyshirts.firewall) *Android*, [XPrivacy](https://github.com/M66B/XPrivacy) *Android (root required)*, [Fyde](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/fyde-mobile-security-access/) *iOS* and [Guardian Firewall](https://guardianapp.com/) *iOS*.
 **Use secure, privacy-respecting apps** | Optional | Mainstream apps have a reputation for not respecting the privacy of their users, and they're usually closed-source meaning vulnerabilities can be hidden. [Prism-Break](https://prism-break.org) maintains a list of better alternatives, see [Android](https://prism-break.org/en/categories/android/) and [iOS](https://prism-break.org/en/categories/ios/).
+**Avoid Custom Virtual Keyboards** | Optional | Android and iOS allow you to download and use third-party keyboard apps. These apps will be able to access everything that you type on your phone/ tablet: passwords, messages, search terms etc. It is recommended to stick with your devices stock keyboard. If you choose to use one of these apps, ensure it is reputable, block internet access (can be done with a [firewall app](/5_Privacy_Respecting_Software.md#firewalls)), don't grant it permissions it does not need, and turn off analytics or other invasive features in it's settings. [This article](https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security) by Lenny Zelster explains things further
 **Use Signal, instead of SMS** | Optional | SMS may be convenient, but it's [not secure](https://www.fortherecordmag.com/archives/0315p25.shtml). [Signal](https://signal.org) is both the most secure and private option. [Silence](https://silence.im/) (encrypted SMS), [Threema](https://threema.ch), [Wire](https://wire.com/en/)(enterprise) and [Riot](https://about.riot.im/) are also encrypted.[iMessage](https://techcrunch.com/2014/02/27/apple-explains-exactly-how-secure-imessage-really-is/) and [WhatsApp](https://www.whatsapp.com) do claim to be [end-to-end-encrypted](https://signal.org/blog/whatsapp-complete/), but since they are not open source, verifying this is harder, and the private companies which own them (Apple and Facebook), have a questionable reputation when it comes to protecting users privacy. Keep in mind that although the transmission may be secured, messages can still be read if your or your recipients' devices have been compromised.
 **Avoid using your real phone number when signing up for an account or service** | Optional | Where possible, avoid giving out your real phone number while creating accounts online. You can create phone numbers using services such as [Google Voice](https://voice.google.com) or [Skype](https://www.skype.com/en/features/online-number/). For temporary usage you can use a service like [iNumbr](https://www.inumbr.com) that generates a phone number that forwards messages and calls to your main number.
 **Watch out for Stalkerware** | Optional | This is a malware that is installed directly onto your device by someone you know (partner, parent, boss etc.). It allows them to see your location, messages and other app data remotely. The app likely won't show up in your app draw, (but may visible in Settings --> Applications --> View All). Sometimes they can be disguised as a non-conspicuous app (such as a game, flashlight or calculator) which initially don't appear suspicious at all. Look out for unusual battery usage, network requests or high device temperature. If you suspect that stalkerware is on your device, the best way to get rid of it is through a factory reset. See [this guide](https://blog.malwarebytes.com/stalkerware/2019/10/how-to-protect-against-stalkerware-a-murky-but-dangerous-mobile-threat/) for more details.
@@ -221,6 +222,8 @@ Although Windows and OS X are easy to use and convenient, they both are far from
 **Don't charge unknown mobile devices from your PC** | Optional | If friends or colleagues want to charge their devices via USB, do not do this through your computers ports (unless you have a data blocker). By default the phone will want to sync to the host computer, but there is also specially crafted malware which takes advantage of the face that computers naturally trust connected USB devices. The owner of the phone may not even realize their device is infected
 **Encrypt and Backup Important Files** | Optional | Backing up your phone can help keep your important data safe, if your device is lost, stolen or broken. But if you put your backup encrypted in the cloud, cloud providers will have access to it (if you don't pay for the service, then you are the product!). <br>[Cryptomator](https://cryptomator.org/) is an open source tool that makes this easy. It also works alongside [MountainDuck](https://mountainduck.io/) for mounting your remote drives on Windows and Mac. Other non-open-source options are [BoxCrypter](https://www.boxcryptor.com/), [Encrypto](https://macpaw.com/encrypto) and [odrive](https://www.odrive.com/).
 **Uninstall Adobe Acrobat** | Optional | Adobe Acrobat was designed in a different age, before the Internet. Acrobat has had vulnerabilities that allowed specially crafted PDFs to load malware onto your system for the last two decades. Undoubtedly more vulnerabilities remain. You can use your browser to view PDFs, and browser-based software for editing
+**Detect/ Remove Software Keyloggers** | Optional | A software keylogger is a malicious application running in the background that logs (and usually relays to a server) every key you press, aka all data that you type (passwords, emails, search terms, financial details etc). The best way to stay protected it, to be careful when downloading software from the internet, keep Windows defender or your anti-virus enabled and up-to-date, and run scans regularly. Another option to prevent this, is a key stroke encryption tool. [GhostPress](https://schiffer.tech/ghostpress.html) (developed by Schiffer) or [KeyScrambler](https://www.qfxsoftware.com) (developed by Qian Wang) work by encrypting your keystrokes at the keyboard driver level, and then decrypting them at the application level, meaning any software keylogger would just receive encrypted junk data. Most software keyloggers can be detected using [rootkit-revealer](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/rootkit-revealer), and then removed with a rootkit removal tools (such as [Malwarebytes anti-rootkit](https://www.malwarebytes.com/antirootkit) or [SpyShelter Anti-Keylogger Free](https://www.spyshelter.com)).
+**Check Keyboard Connection** | Optional | Check your keyboards USB cable before using, bring your own keyboard to work and watch out for sighns that it may have been tampered with. A hardware keylogger is a physical device that either sits between your keyboard and the USB connection into your PC, or is implanted into your keyboard. It intercepts and stores keystrokes, and in some cases can remotely upload them. Unlike a software logger, they can not be detected from your PC, but also they can not intercept data from virtual keyboards (like [OSK](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/10762/windows-use-on-screen-keyboard)), clipboard or auto-fill password managers.
 **Consider Switching to Linux** | Optional | Linux is considerably [more secure](https://www.pcworld.com/article/202452/why_linux_is_more_secure_than_windows.html) than both OSX and Windows. Some distros are still more secure than others, so it’s worth choosing the right one to get a balance between security and convenience.
 **Avoid PC Apps that are not secure** | Optional | Mainstream apps have a reputation for not respecting the privacy of their users, and they're usually closed-source meaning vulnerabilities can be hidden. See here for compiled list of secure PC apps for [Windows](https://prism-break.org/en/categories/windows/), [OSX](https://prism-break.org/en/categories/macos/) and [Linux](https://prism-break.org/en/categories/gnu-linux/).
 **Use a Security-Focused Distro** | Advanced | [QubeOS](https://www.qubes-os.org/) is based on “security by compartmentalization”, where each app is sandboxed. [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org/) is based on Tor, so 100% of your traffic will go through the onion router. [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) is specifically designed to be run on a USB key and is ideal if you don’t want to leave a trace on the device your booting from. [Subgraph](https://subgraph.com/) is an “adversary resistant computing platform”, but also surprisingly easy to use