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cleanup blockquote
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> ● Key management for peer-based DID methods\
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> ● Key management for peer-based DID methods\
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> ● Fully autonomous decentralized key management with Key Event Receipt Infrastructure (KERI)
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> ● Fully autonomous decentralized key management with Key Event Receipt Infrastructure (KERI)
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* [UNIVERSAL IDENTIFIER THEORY](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/master/whitepapers/IdentifierTheory_web.pdf)
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* [UNIVERSAL IDENTIFIER THEORY](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/master/whitepapers/IdentifierTheory_web.pdf)
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> Abstract—A universal theory for identifiers is presented. This theory is based on a unified model of identifiers that include cryptographic autonomic identifiers (AIDs) and legitimized (autho- rized) human meaningful identifiers (LIDs). This model provides truly decentralized trust bases each derived from the cryptographic root-of-trust of a given AID. An AID is based on a self-cer- tifying identifier (SCID) prefix. Self certifying identifiers are not human meaningful but have strong cryptographic properties. The associated self-certifying trust basis gives rise to a trust do- main for associated cryptographically verifiable non-repudiable statements. Every other type of identifier including human meaningful identifiers may then be secured in this resultant trust do- main via an end-verifiable authorization. This authorization legitimizes that human meaningful identifier as an LID though its association with an AID. The result is a secured trust domain spe- cific identifier couplet of aid|lid. AIDs are provided by the open standard key event receipt infra- structure (KERI) [42]. This unified model provides a systematic methodology for the design and implementation of secure decentralized identifier systems that underpin decentralized trust bases and their associated ecosystems of interactions.
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> Abstract—A universal theory for identifiers is presented. This theory is based on a unified model of identifiers that include cryptographic autonomic identifiers (AIDs) and legitimized (authorized) human meaningful identifiers (LIDs). This model provides truly decentralized trust bases each derived from the cryptographic root-of-trust of a given AID. An AID is based on a self-certifying identifier (SCID) prefix. Self certifying identifiers are not human meaningful but have strong cryptographic properties. The associated self-certifying trust basis gives rise to a trust do- main for associated cryptographically verifiable non-repudiable statements. Every other type of identifier including human meaningful identifiers may then be secured in this resultant trust do- main via an end-verifiable authorization. This authorization legitimizes that human meaningful identifier as an LID though its association with an AID. The result is a secured trust domain specific identifier couplet of aid|lid. AIDs are provided by the open standard key event receipt infrastructure (KERI). This unified model provides a systematic methodology for the design and implementation of secure decentralized identifier systems that underpin decentralized trust bases and their associated ecosystems of interactions.
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* [Key Event Receipt Infrastructure (KERI): A secure identifier overlay for the internet – Sam Smith – Webinar 58](https://ssimeetup.org/key-event-receipt-infrastructure-keri-secure-identifier-overlay-internet-sam-smith-webinar-58/) SSI-Meetup
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* [Key Event Receipt Infrastructure (KERI): A secure identifier overlay for the internet – Sam Smith – Webinar 58](https://ssimeetup.org/key-event-receipt-infrastructure-keri-secure-identifier-overlay-internet-sam-smith-webinar-58/) SSI-Meetup
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{% include video id="izNZ20XSXR0" provider="youtube" %}
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{% include video id="izNZ20XSXR0" provider="youtube" %}
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