From 4d964cba8fe507682a1d383d68f10e7295eeacf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 11:00:19 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 01/68] add block syncing and fix the network bug --- src/js/Readme.md | 2 +- src/js/block.js | 2 +- src/js/blockchain.js | 274 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- src/js/message.js | 8 +- src/js/network.js | 8 ++ src/js/test/sync.js | 41 +++++++ 6 files changed, 236 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/js/test/sync.js diff --git a/src/js/Readme.md b/src/js/Readme.md index 642e3c0..dd119a3 100644 --- a/src/js/Readme.md +++ b/src/js/Readme.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Basic implementation for blockchain in node.js, supporting pow, pos, pbft, dpos Persistence is on top of leveldb. -Support UTXO transactions. +Support UTXO transactions and block syncing. Tests passed on Ubuntu and MAC. diff --git a/src/js/block.js b/src/js/block.js index 593c470..49b3c7d 100644 --- a/src/js/block.js +++ b/src/js/block.js @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ class Block extends EventEmitter { } while (hashes.length > 1) { var tmp = []; - for (var i = 0; i < hashes.length / 2; ++i) { + for (i = 0; i < hashes.length / 2; ++i) { let data = hashes[i * 2] + hashes[i * 2 + 1]; tmp.push(Crypto.calc_hash(data)); } diff --git a/src/js/blockchain.js b/src/js/blockchain.js index 6886ce2..af42552 100644 --- a/src/js/blockchain.js +++ b/src/js/blockchain.js @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ class BlockChain { // todo this.pending_block_ = {}; this.tx_pool = {}; - this.chain_ = []; + // this.chain_ = []; this.is_bad_ = is_bad; this.pbft_ = new Pbft(this); @@ -74,22 +74,24 @@ class BlockChain { cb(); } - async save_last_block() { + async save_block(block) { + if (!block) + block = this.last_block_; // query from db via hash // if not exist, write into db, else do nothing - if (this.pending_block_[this.last_block_.hash]) { - delete this.pending_block_[this.last_block_.hash]; + if (this.pending_block_[block.hash]) { + delete this.pending_block_[block.hash]; } - await this.db_.put(this.last_block_.hash, JSON.stringify(this.last_block_)); - await this.db_.put("last_block", JSON.stringify(this.last_block_)); - // console.log(`save block: ${this.last_block_.hash} to db`); + await this.db_.put(block.hash, JSON.stringify(block)); + await this.db_.put("last_block", JSON.stringify(block)); + // console.log(`save block: ${block.hash} to db`); // tx - if (!this.last_block_.transactions) { + if (!block.transactions) { return; } - for (var i = 0; i < this.last_block_.transactions.length; ++i) { - let tx = this.last_block_.transactions[i]; + for (var i = 0; i < block.transactions.length; ++i) { + let tx = block.transactions[i]; if (this.tx_pool[tx.id]) { delete this.tx_pool[tx.id]; // console.log(`node ${this.get_account_id()} delete tx ${tx.id}`); @@ -97,6 +99,10 @@ class BlockChain { await this.db_.put(tx.id, JSON.stringify(tx)); } } + async save_last_block() { + await this.save_block(); + } + generate_block(keypair, cb) { // load transactions var tx = [this.create_coinbase()]; @@ -117,7 +123,8 @@ class BlockChain { // make proof of the block/mine let self = this; block.on('block completed', (data) => { - if (data.height == self.last_block_.height + 1) { + if (data.previous_hash == self.last_block_.hash && + data.height == self.last_block_.height + 1) { // console.log("block completed"); self.commit_block(data); @@ -125,11 +132,8 @@ class BlockChain { if (cb) cb(); } else { - // fork or store into tmp - console.log('fork'); - // todo - self.pending_block_[data.hash] = data; - + // [fork] + self.process_fork(data); } }); } @@ -199,19 +203,28 @@ class BlockChain { get_public_key() { return this.get_account_keypair().publicKey.toString('hex'); } + send_msg(socket, data) { + this.node_.send(socket, data); + } broadcast(data) { this.node_.broadcast(data); } list_peers() { return this.node_.list_peers(); } + sync() { + let peers = this.list_peers(); + let index = Math.floor(Math.random() * peers.length); + let id = peers[index]; + this.send_msg(parseInt(id), Msg.sync({ "id": this.get_account_id() })); + } async verify_transaction(tx) { let input_amount = 0; for (var i = 0; i < tx.input.length; ++i) { let input = tx.input[i]; // coinbase if (input.id == null) { - // todo check milestone + // check milestone if (tx.output[0].amount == 50) { return true; } else { @@ -250,18 +263,42 @@ class BlockChain { if (!Block.verify_signature(block)) return false; // verify consensus - if (!this.consensus_.verify(block)) + if (!this.consensus_.verify(block)) { + // [fork] slot + this.save_block(block); return false; + } // verify transactions let tx = block.transactions; if (tx) { for (var i = 0; i < tx.length; ++i) { + try { + if (await this.db_.get(tx[i].id)) { + // [fork] transaction exists + return false; + } + } catch (err) { + // nothing + } if (!await this.verify_transaction(tx[i])) return false; } } return true; } + process_fork(block) { + if (block.previous_hash != this.last_block_.hash && + block.height == this.last_block_.height + 1) { + // [fork] right height and different previous block + this.save_block(block); + + } else if (block.previous_hash == this.last_block_.hash && + block.height == this.last_block_.height && + block.hash != this.last_block_.hash) { + // [fork] same height and same previous block, but different block id + this.save_block(block); + } + } async on_data(msg) { switch (msg.type) { case MessageType.Block: @@ -283,14 +320,14 @@ class BlockChain { this.pending_block_[block.hash] = block; // add to chain - if (block.height == this.last_block_.height + 1) { + if (block.previous_hash == this.last_block_.hash && + block.height == this.last_block_.height + 1) { // console.log("on block data"); this.commit_block(block); // console.log("----------add block"); } else { - // fork or store into tmp - // console.log('fork'); - // todo + // [fork] + this.process_fork(block); } // broadcast this.broadcast(msg); @@ -317,88 +354,135 @@ class BlockChain { this.broadcast(msg); } break; + case MessageType.Sync: + { + console.log(`${this.get_account_id()} receive sync info`); + let data = msg.data; + let id = data.id; + if (data.hash) { + let block = await this.get_from_db(data.hash); + this.send_msg(id, Msg.sync_block({ "id": this.get_account_id(), "block": block })); + console.log(`---> ${this.get_account_id()} send sync block: ${block.height}`); + + } else { + this.send_msg(id, Msg.sync_block({ "id": this.get_account_id(), "last_block": this.last_block_ })); + console.log(`---> ${this.get_account_id()} send sync last block: ${this.last_block_.height}`); + } + } + break; + case MessageType.SyncBlock: + { + let data = msg.data; + let id = data.id; + let block = null; + if (data.hasOwnProperty("last_block")) { + block = data.last_block; + this.last_block_ = block; + console.log(`++++ ${this.get_account_id()} change last block: ${block.height}`); + } else { + block = data.block; + } + console.log(`<--- ${this.get_account_id()} receive sync block: ${block.height}\n`); + + this.save_block(block); + let hash = block.previous_hash; + let res = null; + if (hash) { + res = await this.get_from_db(hash); + } + if (!res) { + console.log(`---> ${this.get_account_id()} continue sync hash: ${hash}`); + this.send_msg(id, Msg.sync({ "id": this.get_account_id(), "hash": hash })); + } else { + console.log(`==== ${this.get_account_id()} complete syning!`); + } + } + break; default: if (pbft && !this.is_bad_) { this.pbft_.processMessage(msg); + } else { + console.log("unkown msg"); + console.log(msg); } break; } } - print() { - // todo chain_ - let output = ''; - for (var i = 0; i < this.chain_.length; ++i) { - let height = this.chain_[i].height; - let hash = this.chain_[i].hash.substr(0, 6); - let generator_id = this.chain_[i].consensus_data.generator_id; - if (generator_id == undefined) generator_id = null; - output += `(${height}:${hash}:${generator_id}) -> `; - } - console.log(`node: ${this.get_account_id()} ${output}`); - } - async fork() { - console.log('----------fork----------'); - // load transactions - var tx1 = [{ - amount: 1000, - recipient: 'bob', - sender: 'alice' - }]; - // create block - let block1 = new Block({ - "keypair": this.get_account_keypair(), - "previous_block": this.last_block_, - "transactions": tx1 - }, this.consensus_); - // make proof of the block/mine - let self = this; - let block_data1 = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => { - block1.on('block completed', (data) => { - if (data.height == self.last_block_.height + 1) { - resolve(data); - } else { - reject('block1 failed'); - } - }); - }); + // print() { + // // todo chain_ + // let output = ''; + // for (var i = 0; i < this.chain_.length; ++i) { + // let height = this.chain_[i].height; + // let hash = this.chain_[i].hash.substr(0, 6); + // let generator_id = this.chain_[i].consensus_data.generator_id; + // if (generator_id == undefined) generator_id = null; + // output += `(${height}:${hash}:${generator_id}) -> `; + // } + // console.log(`node: ${this.get_account_id()} ${output}`); + // } + // async fork() { + // console.log('----------fork----------'); + // // load transactions + // var tx1 = [{ + // amount: 1000, + // recipient: 'bob', + // sender: 'alice' + // }]; + // // create block + // let block1 = new Block({ + // "keypair": this.get_account_keypair(), + // "previous_block": this.last_block_, + // "transactions": tx1 + // }, this.consensus_); + // // make proof of the block/mine + // let self = this; + // let block_data1 = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => { + // block1.on('block completed', (data) => { + // if (data.height == self.last_block_.height + 1) { + // resolve(data); + // } else { + // reject('block1 failed'); + // } + // }); + // }); - // load transactions - var tx2 = [{ - amount: 1000, - recipient: 'cracker', - sender: 'alice' - }]; - // create block - let block2 = new Block({ - "keypair": this.get_account_keypair(), - "previous_block": this.last_block_, - "transactions": tx2 - }, this.consensus_); - let block_data2 = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => { - block2.on('block completed', (data) => { - if (data.height == self.last_block_.height + 1) { - resolve(data); - } else { - reject('block2 failed'); - } - }); - }); + // // load transactions + // var tx2 = [{ + // amount: 1000, + // recipient: 'cracker', + // sender: 'alice' + // }]; + // // create block + // let block2 = new Block({ + // "keypair": this.get_account_keypair(), + // "previous_block": this.last_block_, + // "transactions": tx2 + // }, this.consensus_); + // let block_data2 = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => { + // block2.on('block completed', (data) => { + // if (data.height == self.last_block_.height + 1) { + // resolve(data); + // } else { + // reject('block2 failed'); + // } + // }); + // }); - var i = 0; - for (var id in this.node_.peers_) { - let socket = this.node_.peers_[id]; - if (i % 2 == 0) { - var msg1 = Msg.block(block_data1); - this.node_.send(socket, msg1); - } else { - var msg2 = Msg.block(block_data2); - this.node_.send(socket, msg2); - } - i++; - } - console.log("fork"); - this.commit_block(block_data1); - } + // var i = 0; + // for (var id in this.node_.peers_) { + // let socket = this.node_.peers_[id]; + // if (i % 2 == 0) { + // var msg1 = Msg.block(block_data1); + // this.node_.send(socket, msg1); + // } else { + // var msg2 = Msg.block(block_data2); + // this.node_.send(socket, msg2); + // } + // i++; + // } + // console.log("fork"); + // this.commit_block(block_data1); + // } create_coinbase() { let input = new TxInput(null, -1, `${new Date()} node: ${this.get_account_id()} coinbase tx`); let output = new TxOutput(50, this.get_public_key()); diff --git a/src/js/message.js b/src/js/message.js index 96ca6eb..a07e41c 100644 --- a/src/js/message.js +++ b/src/js/message.js @@ -6,7 +6,9 @@ var MessageType = { Transaction: 2, PrePrepare: 3, Prepare: 4, - Commit: 5 + Commit: 5, + Sync: 6, + SyncBlock: 7 }; module.exports = { @@ -16,5 +18,7 @@ module.exports = { preprepare: (data) => { return { type: MessageType.PrePrepare, data: data }; }, prepare: (data) => { return { type: MessageType.Prepare, data: data }; }, commit: (data) => { return { type: MessageType.Commit, data: data }; }, - transaction: (data)=>{return { type: MessageType.Transaction, data: data }; } + transaction: (data) => { return { type: MessageType.Transaction, data: data }; }, + sync: (data) => { return { type: MessageType.Sync, data: data }; }, + sync_block: (data) => { return { type: MessageType.SyncBlock, data: data }; } }; \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/src/js/network.js b/src/js/network.js index 128dcaf..e6a69e1 100644 --- a/src/js/network.js +++ b/src/js/network.js @@ -33,6 +33,11 @@ class Node extends EventEmitter { socket.on('connect', () => { resolve(); }); + socket.on('error', function (e) { + resolve(); + }); + socket.setEncoding('utf8'); + socket.on('data', (data) => { self.on_data(data, socket); }); }); // console.log(`id: ${self.id_} connected to remote_id: ${remote_id}`); let data = Msg.connection(self.id_); @@ -72,6 +77,9 @@ class Node extends EventEmitter { } send(socket, data) { + if (typeof socket === 'number') { + socket = this.peers_[socket]; + } if (typeof data === 'object') { data = JSON.stringify(data); } diff --git a/src/js/test/sync.js b/src/js/test/sync.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000..51f263a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/js/test/sync.js @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +'use strict'; + +var crypto = require('crypto'); +var ed = require('ed25519'); +var BlockChain = require("../blockchain"); +var Consensus = require("../consensus/dpos"); + + +let blockchains = []; +for (var i = 0; i < 20; ++i) { + + var password = `I am tester ${i}!`; + var hash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(password).digest(); + var keypair = ed.MakeKeypair(hash); + console.log(`node ${i} address: ${keypair.publicKey.toString('hex')}`); + + let blockchain = new BlockChain(Consensus, keypair, i); + blockchain.start(); + blockchains.push(blockchain); +} + +setTimeout(() => { + for (var i = 0; i < blockchains.length; ++i) { + console.log(`${i} --> ${blockchains[i].list_peers()}`); + } +}, 3000); + + +setTimeout(() => { + blockchains[19].sync(); +}, 3000); + + +// async function get_balance() { +// let amount = await blockchains[0].get_balance(); +// console.log(`node 0 balance: ${amount}`); +// amount = await blockchains[6].get_balance(); +// console.log(`node 6 balance: ${amount}`); +// } + +// setInterval(get_balance, 10000); From e602064a31fcc243f89335b0f99a59a065bda2ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 11:10:09 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 02/68] Create CONTRIBUTING.md --- CONTRIBUTING.md | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) create mode 100644 CONTRIBUTING.md diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING.md b/CONTRIBUTING.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..deaaddb --- /dev/null +++ b/CONTRIBUTING.md @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +Contributions welcome! + +1. Fork it (https://github.com/yjjnls/awesome-blockchain/fork) +2. Clone it (git clone https://github.com/yjjnls/awesome-blockchain) +3. Create your feature branch (git checkout -b your_branch_name) +4. Commit your changes (git commit -m 'Description of a commit') +5. Push to the branch (git push origin your_branch_name) +6. Create a new Pull Request + +If you found this resource helpful, give it a 🌟 otherwise contribute to it and give it a ⭐️. From b0f7b3307f755e076e2fa30305beffe5e444363c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 17:20:28 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 03/68] add Ethereum Design Rationale --- README.md | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 0233c36..1b76d7b 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo - [Ethereum white paper](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper) / [Chinese version](./Ethereum/white%20paper.md) - [Mastering Ethereum](https://github.com/ethereumbook/ethereumbook) / [Chinese version](https://github.com/inoutcode/ethereum_book) - [Ethereum wiki](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki) + - [Ethereum Design Rationale](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Design-Rationale) / [Chinese version](https://ethfans.org/posts/510) - [Ethereum problems](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Problems) - [Sharding roadmap](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Sharding-roadmap) - [**Ethereum flavored WebAssembly (ewasm)**](https://github.com/ewasm) From 51008f5ea1aa20282177caf1704e1406f9aac8d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 18:58:01 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 04/68] add ethereum info --- README.md | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 1b76d7b..e7dc210 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -210,11 +210,16 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo - [Ethereum white paper](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper) / [Chinese version](./Ethereum/white%20paper.md) - [Mastering Ethereum](https://github.com/ethereumbook/ethereumbook) / [Chinese version](https://github.com/inoutcode/ethereum_book) +- [Ethereum Yellow Paper](https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf) - [Ethereum wiki](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki) - [Ethereum Design Rationale](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Design-Rationale) / [Chinese version](https://ethfans.org/posts/510) - [Ethereum problems](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Problems) - [Sharding roadmap](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Sharding-roadmap) - [**Ethereum flavored WebAssembly (ewasm)**](https://github.com/ewasm) + - [ÐΞVp2p Wire Protocol](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/%C3%90%CE%9EVp2p-Wire-Protocol) + - [EVM-Awesome-List](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Ethereum-Virtual-Machine-(EVM)-Awesome-List) + - [Patricia Tree](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Patricia-Tree) + - [Ethash](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Ethash) - [Accounts, Transactions, Gas, and Block Gas Limits in Ethereum](https://hudsonjameson.com/2017-06-27-accounts-transactions-gas-ethereum/) From 28e878ad8a163211445fca2ae6b9efe1e28164ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Sun, 17 Mar 2019 17:29:53 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 05/68] add ethereum security info --- README.md | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index e7dc210..00049c1 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -221,6 +221,12 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo - [Patricia Tree](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Patricia-Tree) - [Ethash](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Ethash) - [Accounts, Transactions, Gas, and Block Gas Limits in Ethereum](https://hudsonjameson.com/2017-06-27-accounts-transactions-gas-ethereum/) +- Security + - [Ethereum Smart Contract Security Best Practices](https://consensys.github.io/smart-contract-best-practices/) / [Chinese version](https://github.com/ConsenSys/smart-contract-best-practices/blob/master/README-zh.md) + - [Onward with Ethereum Smart Contract Security](https://blog.zeppelin.solutions/onward-with-ethereum-smart-contract-security-97a827e47702) + - [The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Smart Contracts in Ethereum](https://blog.zeppelin.solutions/the-hitchhikers-guide-to-smart-contracts-in-ethereum-848f08001f05) + - [**OpenZeppelin**](https://openzeppelin.org/) + - [**ZeppelinOS**](https://zeppelinos.org/) + [Ethereum Blockchain Explorer](https://etherscan.io/) From 17b38d9e7188d9039caedaa66f819751b140db59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Sun, 17 Mar 2019 18:07:19 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 06/68] add ethash related info --- README.md | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 00049c1..a55c064 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -219,14 +219,26 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo - [ÐΞVp2p Wire Protocol](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/%C3%90%CE%9EVp2p-Wire-Protocol) - [EVM-Awesome-List](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Ethereum-Virtual-Machine-(EVM)-Awesome-List) - [Patricia Tree](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Patricia-Tree) - - [Ethash](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Ethash) + - Consensus + - [Ethash](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Ethash) + - [Ethash-DAG](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Ethash-DAG) + - [Ethash Specification](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Ethash) + - [Mining Ethash DAG](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Mining#ethash-dag) + - [Dagger-Hashimoto Algorithm](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/blob/master/Dagger-Hashimoto.md) + - [DAG Explanation and Images](https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/questions/1993/what-actually-is-a-dag) + - [Ethash in Ethereum Yellowpaper](https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf#appendix.J) + - [Ethash C API Example Usage](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Ethash-C-API) - [Accounts, Transactions, Gas, and Block Gas Limits in Ethereum](https://hudsonjameson.com/2017-06-27-accounts-transactions-gas-ethereum/) +- [Ethereum Improvement Proposals](https://eips.ethereum.org/) +- [Important EIPs and ERCs](https://github.com/ethereumbook/ethereumbook/blob/develop/appdx-standards-eip-erc.asciidoc#table-of-most-important-eips-and-ercs) - Security - [Ethereum Smart Contract Security Best Practices](https://consensys.github.io/smart-contract-best-practices/) / [Chinese version](https://github.com/ConsenSys/smart-contract-best-practices/blob/master/README-zh.md) - [Onward with Ethereum Smart Contract Security](https://blog.zeppelin.solutions/onward-with-ethereum-smart-contract-security-97a827e47702) - [The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Smart Contracts in Ethereum](https://blog.zeppelin.solutions/the-hitchhikers-guide-to-smart-contracts-in-ethereum-848f08001f05) - [**OpenZeppelin**](https://openzeppelin.org/) - [**ZeppelinOS**](https://zeppelinos.org/) +- Token + - [ERC20](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-20.md) + [Ethereum Blockchain Explorer](https://etherscan.io/) From 98f7331920b860d86179575118824df82b82b566 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 21:08:21 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 07/68] update info --- src/js/Readme.md | 23 ++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/js/Readme.md b/src/js/Readme.md index dd119a3..12618e0 100644 --- a/src/js/Readme.md +++ b/src/js/Readme.md @@ -1,15 +1,20 @@ # BlockChain for Node.js -Basic implementation for blockchain in node.js, supporting pow, pos, pbft, dpos and pbft+dpos. +Basic implementation for blockchain in node.js -Persistence is on top of leveldb. +- [x] Block structure +- [x] Blockchain structure +- [x] Consensus + - [x] PoW + - [x] PoS + - [x] DPoS + - [x] Pbft + - [x] DPoS + Pbft +- [x] Network +- [x] Persistence +- [x] Transaction UTXO +- [x] Sync -Support UTXO transactions and block syncing. +Tests on Ubuntu and MAC. -Tests passed on Ubuntu and MAC. -``` -npm install - -node test/xxx.js -``` \ No newline at end of file From 5aab3a43cd868530c5861d936dde3206b18e500a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 21:22:10 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 08/68] update info --- README.md | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index a55c064..393da20 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -58,53 +58,45 @@ The blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions that A: A blockchain is a distributed database with a list (that is, chain) of records (that is, blocks) linked and secured by digital fingerprints (that is, crypto hashes). -Example from [`blockchain.rb`](https://github.com/openblockchains/awesome-blockchains/blob/master/blockchain.rb/blockchain.rb): +Example from [`genesis_block.json`](https://github.com/yjjnls/awesome-blockchain/tree/master/src/js/genesis_block.json): -```ruby -[#, - #, - #, - ... +```js +{ + "version": 0, + "height": 1, + "previous_hash": null, + "timestamp": 1550049140488, + "merkle_hash": null, + "generator_publickey": "18941c80a77f2150107cdde99486ba672b5279ddd469eeefed308540fbd46983", + "hash": "d611edb9fd86ee234cdc08d9bf382330d6ccc721cd5e59cf2a01b0a2a8decfff", + "block_signature": "603b61b14348fb7eb087fe3267e28abacadf3932f0e33958fb016ab60f825e3124bfe6c7198d38f8c91b0a3b1f928919190680e44fbe7289a4202039ffbb2109", + "consensus_data": {}, + "transactions": [] +} ``` ![](Basic/img/blockchain-jesus.png) **Q: What's a Hash? What's a (One-Way) Crypto(graphic) Hash Digest Checksum**? -A: A hash e.g. `eb8ecbf6d5870763ae246e37539d82e37052cb32f88bb8c59971f9978e437743` +A: A hash e.g. `d611edb9fd86ee234cdc08d9bf382330d6ccc721cd5e59cf2a01b0a2a8decfff` is a small digest checksum calculated with a one-way crypto(graphic) hash digest checksum function e.g. SHA256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 256 Bits) -from the data. Example from [`blockchain.rb`](blockchain.rb/blockchain.rb): +from the data. Example from [`crypto.js`](https://github.com/yjjnls/awesome-blockchain/blob/master/src/js/crypto.js): -```ruby -def calc_hash - sha = Digest::SHA256.new - sha.update( @timestamp.to_s + @previous_hash + @data ) - sha.hexdigest ## returns "eb8ecbf6d5870763ae246e37539d82e37052cb32f88bb8c59971f9978e437743" -end +```js +function calc_hash(data) { + return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(data).digest('hex'); +} ``` A blockchain uses -- the block timestamp (e.g. `1637-09-15 20:52:38`) and -- the hash from the previous block (e.g. `edbd4e11e69bc399a9ccd8faaea44fb27410fe8e3023bb9462450a0a9c4caa1b`) and finally +- the block header (e.g. `Version`, `TimeStamp`, `Previous Hash...` )and - the block data (e.g. `Transaction Data...`) -to calculate the new hash digest checksum, that is, the hash -e.g. `be50017ee4bbcb33844b3dc2b7c4e476d46569b5df5762d14ceba9355f0a85f4`. +to calculate the new hash digest checksum. **Q: What's a Merkle Tree?** From bac9a96c4677a72b89f885683c60b6d13c635a5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 02:59:17 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 09/68] add doc for web3 --- README.md | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 393da20..2bdddf2 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -266,6 +266,7 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo ### truffle ### web3.js +- [doc](https://web3js.readthedocs.io/en/1.0/) --- ## Projects and Applications From 4ca29118f3c48d644946ceffcfe7a80b9410d0e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Sat, 4 May 2019 18:33:43 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 10/68] add white paper version --- README.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 2bdddf2..36000c2 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo **IOTA** is the missing puzzle piece for **the Machine Economy** to fully emerge and reach its desired potential. We envision IOTA to be the public, permissionless backbone for the Internet of Things that enables true interoperability between all devices. - [IOTA](https://iota.org) - Next Generation Blockchain -- [Whitepaper](https://iota.org/IOTA_Whitepaper.pdf) - The Tangle +- [Whitepaper](https://iota.org/IOTA_Whitepaper.pdf) - The Tangle / [Chinese version](http://www.iotachina.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2016112902003453.pdf) - [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IOTA_(Distributed_Ledger_Technology)) - [A Primer on IOTA](https://blog.iota.org/a-primer-on-iota-with-presentation-e0a6eb2cc621) - A Primer on IOTA (with Presentation) - [IOTA China](http://iotachina.com/) - IOTA China 首页 @@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo **IPFS** is becoming a new major subsystem of the internet. If built right, it could complement or replace HTTP. It could complement or replace even more. It sounds crazy. It _is_ crazy. -- [Papers](papers) - Academic papers on IPFS +- [White Paper](https://github.com/ipfs/papers/raw/master/ipfs-cap2pfs/ipfs-p2p-file-system.pdf) - Academic papers on IPFS / [Chinese version](https://gguoss.github.io/2017/05/28/ipfs/) - [Specs](https://github.com/ipfs/specs) - Specifications on the IPFS protocol - [Notes](https://github.com/ipfs/notes) - Various relevant notes and discussions (that do not fit elsewhere) [](https://github.com/ipfs) From ea72090b942f688dd2f6dd00088a33a293bbdef2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Sat, 4 May 2019 18:44:55 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 11/68] add doc for hyperledger --- README.md | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 36000c2..dde0247 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -257,6 +257,8 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo [](https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/fabric) +[doc](https://hyperledger-fabric-docs-zh-cn.readthedocs.io/zh_CN/latest/) + #### [FISCO-BCOS](https://github.com/FISCO-BCOS/Wiki) ## Releated Tools From bf7fe6f0e8d7337144ad6f7349bf60f992491a7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Sat, 4 May 2019 18:51:21 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 12/68] add decentralized db --- README.md | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index dde0247..0a603b5 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ The blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions that - [IOTA](#iota) - [EOS](#eos) - [IFPS](#ifps) + - [Filecoin](#filecoin) + - [BigchainDB](#bigchaindb) - [Further Extension](#further-extension) - [Books](#books) - [Applications](#applications-1) @@ -360,6 +362,11 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo + [**Roadmap**](https://github.com/ipfs/roadmap) + [**More resouces**](./Extension/ipfs.md) +#### [Filecoin](https://filecoin.io/) +- [White paper](https://filecoin.io/filecoin.pdf) / [Chinese version](http://chainx.org/paper/index/index/id/13.html) + +#### [BigchainDB](https://www.bigchaindb.com/) +- [White paper](https://www.bigchaindb.com/whitepaper) / [Chinese version](http://blog.csdn.net/fengqing79/article/details/70154076) --- ## Further Extension From de2f88982b23264e1a85ae0b5eafcfe6d5154ea6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Sat, 4 May 2019 20:43:11 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 13/68] add bitshares --- README.md | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 0a603b5..7ef2f95 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ The blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions that - [IFPS](#ifps) - [Filecoin](#filecoin) - [BigchainDB](#bigchaindb) + - [BitShares](#bitshares) - [Further Extension](#further-extension) - [Books](#books) - [Applications](#applications-1) @@ -368,6 +369,9 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo #### [BigchainDB](https://www.bigchaindb.com/) - [White paper](https://www.bigchaindb.com/whitepaper) / [Chinese version](http://blog.csdn.net/fengqing79/article/details/70154076) +### BitShares +- [White paper]() / [Chinese version](https://www.8btc.com/article/3369) + --- ## Further Extension From 5b8b8d34edba6c95bd6429e33d5e19715a7e261e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Fri, 10 May 2019 15:10:09 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 14/68] add blockchain implementation in different langs --- README.md | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 7ef2f95..e074203 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ The blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions that - [Solidity](#solidity) - [truffle](#truffle) - [web3.js](#web3js) + - [Implementation of Blockchain](#implementation-of-blockchain) - [Projects and Applications](#projects-and-applications) - [Monero](#monero) - [IOTA](#iota) @@ -229,7 +230,7 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo - Security - [Ethereum Smart Contract Security Best Practices](https://consensys.github.io/smart-contract-best-practices/) / [Chinese version](https://github.com/ConsenSys/smart-contract-best-practices/blob/master/README-zh.md) - [Onward with Ethereum Smart Contract Security](https://blog.zeppelin.solutions/onward-with-ethereum-smart-contract-security-97a827e47702) - - [The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Smart Contracts in Ethereum](https://blog.zeppelin.solutions/the-hitchhikers-guide-to-smart-contracts-in-ethereum-848f08001f05) + - [The Hitchhiker's Guide to Smart Contracts in Ethereum](https://blog.zeppelin.solutions/the-hitchhikers-guide-to-smart-contracts-in-ethereum-848f08001f05) - [**OpenZeppelin**](https://openzeppelin.org/) - [**ZeppelinOS**](https://zeppelinos.org/) - Token @@ -260,19 +261,78 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo [](https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/fabric) -[doc](https://hyperledger-fabric-docs-zh-cn.readthedocs.io/zh_CN/latest/) +- [doc](https://hyperledger-fabric-docs-zh-cn.readthedocs.io/zh_CN/latest/) #### [FISCO-BCOS](https://github.com/FISCO-BCOS/Wiki) ## Releated Tools ### Solidity +- [doc](https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/develop/index.html) / [Chinese version](https://solidity-cn.readthedocs.io/zh/develop/) ### truffle ### web3.js - [doc](https://web3js.readthedocs.io/en/1.0/) +## Implementation of Blockchain +- [**ATS**: _Functional Blockchain_](https://beta.observablehq.com/@galletti94/functional-blockchain) +- [**C#**: _Programming The Blockchain in C#_](https://programmingblockchain.gitbooks.io/programmingblockchain/) +- [**Crystal**: _Write your own blockchain and PoW algorithm using Crystal_](https://medium.com/@bradford_hamilton/write-your-own-blockchain-and-pow-algorithm-using-crystal-d53d5d9d0c52) +- [**C++**: _Blockchain from Scratch_](https://github.com/openblockchains/awesome-blockchains/tree/master/blockchain.cpp) +- [**Go: _Building Blockchain in Go_**](https://github.com/Jeiwan/blockchain_go) / [Chinese version 1](https://github.com/liuchengxu/blockchain-tutorial/blob/master/content/part-1/basic-prototype.md) / [Chinese version 2](https://zhangli1.gitbooks.io/dummies-for-blockchain/content/) + - [_Part 1: Basic Prototype_](https://jeiwan.cc/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-1/) + - [_Part 2: Proof-of-Work_](https://jeiwan.cc/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-2/) + - [_Part 3: Persistence and CLI_](https://jeiwan.cc/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-3/) + - [_Part 4: Transactions 1_](https://jeiwan.cc/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-4/) + - [_Part 5: Addresses_](https://jeiwan.cc/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-5/) + - [_Part 6: Transactions 2_](https://jeiwan.cc/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-6/) + - [_Part 7: Network_](https://jeiwan.cc/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-7/) +- [**Go**: _Building A Simple Blockchain with Go_](https://www.codementor.io/codehakase/building-a-simple-blockchain-with-go-k7crur06v) +- [**Go**: _Code your own blockchain in less than 200 lines of Go_](https://medium.com/@mycoralhealth/code-your-own-blockchain-in-less-than-200-lines-of-go-e296282bcffc) +- [**Go**: _Code your own blockchain mining algorithm in Go_](https://medium.com/@mycoralhealth/code-your-own-blockchain-mining-algorithm-in-go-82c6a71aba1f) +- [**Go**: _GoCoin - A full Bitcoin solution written in Go language (golang)_](https://github.com/piotrnar/gocoin) +- [**Go**: _GoChain - A basic implementation of blockchain in go_](https://github.com/crisadamo/gochain) +- [**Go**: _Having fun implementing a blockchain using Golang_](https://github.com/izqui/blockchain) +- [**Go**: _NaiveChain - A naive and simple implementation of blockchains_](https://github.com/kofj/naivechain) +- [**Java**: _Creating Your First Blockchain with Java_](https://medium.com/programmers-blockchain/create-simple-blockchain-java-tutorial-from-scratch-6eeed3cb03fa) +- [**Java**: _Write a blockchain with java_](https://www.jianshu.com/p/afd8c465c91a) +- [**JavaScript**: _A cryptocurrency implementation in less than 1500 lines of code_](https://github.com/conradoqg/naivecoin) +- [**JavaScript**: _A web-based demonstration of blockchain concepts_](https://github.com/anders94/blockchain-demo/) +- [**JavaScript**: _Build your own Blockchain in JavaScript_](https://github.com/nambrot/blockchain-in-js) +- [**JavaScript**: _Code for Blockchain Demo_](https://github.com/seanjameshan/blockchain) +- [**JavaScript**: _Creating a blockchain with JavaScript_](https://github.com/SavjeeTutorials/SavjeeCoin) +- [**JavaScript**: _How To Launch Your Own Production-Ready Cryptocurrency_](https://hackernoon.com/how-to-launch-your-own-production-ready-cryptocurrency-ab97cb773371) +- [**JavaScript**: _Learn & Build a JavaScript Blockchain_](https://medium.com/digital-alchemy-holdings/learn-build-a-javascript-blockchain-part-1-ca61c285821e) +- [**JavaScript**: _Node.js Blockchain Imlementation: BrewChain: Chain+WebSockets+HTTP Server_](http://www.darrenbeck.co.uk/blockchain/nodejs/nodejscrypto/) +- [**JavaScript**: _Writing a tiny blockchain in JavaScript_](https://www.savjee.be/2017/07/Writing-tiny-blockchain-in-JavaScript/) + - [_Part 1: Implementing a basic blockchain_](https://www.savjee.be/2017/07/Writing-tiny-blockchain-in-JavaScript/) + - [_Part 2: Implementing proof-of-work_](https://www.savjee.be/2017/09/Implementing-proof-of-work-javascript-blockchain/) + - [_Part 3: Transactions & mining rewards_](https://www.savjee.be/2018/02/Transactions-and-mining-rewards/) + - [_Part 4: Signing transactions_](https://www.savjee.be/2018/10/Signing-transactions-blockchain-javascript/) +- [**Kotlin**: _Let’s implement a cryptocurrency in Kotlin_](https://medium.com/@vasilyf/lets-implement-a-cryptocurrency-in-kotlin-part-1-blockchain-8704069f8580) +- [**Python**: _A Practical Introduction to Blockchain with Python_](http://adilmoujahid.com/posts/2018/03/intro-blockchain-bitcoin-python/) +- [**Python**: _Build your own blockchain: a Python tutorial_](http://ecomunsing.com/build-your-own-blockchain) +- [**Python**: _Learn Blockchains by Building One_](https://hackernoon.com/learn-blockchains-by-building-one-117428612f46) +- [**Python**: _Let’s Build the Tiniest Blockchain_](https://medium.com/crypto-currently/lets-build-the-tiniest-blockchain-e70965a248b) +- [**Python: _write-your-own-blockchain_**](https://bigishdata.com/2017/10/17/write-your-own-blockchain-part-1-creating-storing-syncing-displaying-mining-and-proving-work/) + - [_Part 1 — Creating, Storing, Syncing, Displaying, Mining, and Proving Work_](https://bigishdata.com/2017/10/17/write-your-own-blockchain-part-1-creating-storing-syncing-displaying-mining-and-proving-work/) + - [_Part 2 — Syncing Chains From Different Nodes_](https://bigishdata.com/2017/10/27/build-your-own-blockchain-part-2-syncing-chains-from-different-nodes/) + - [_Part 3 — Nodes that Mine_](https://bigishdata.com/2017/11/02/build-your-own-blockchain-part-3-writing-nodes-that-mine/) + - [_Part 4.1 — Bitcoin Proof of Work Difficulty Explained_](https://bigishdata.com/2017/11/13/how-to-build-a-blockchain-part-4-1-bitcoin-proof-of-work-difficulty-explained/) + - [_Part 4.2 — Ethereum Proof of Work Difficulty Explained_](https://bigishdata.com/2017/11/21/how-to-build-your-own-blockchain-part-4-2-ethereum-proof-of-work-difficulty-explained/) +- [**Ruby**: _lets-build-a-blockchain_](https://github.com/Haseeb-Qureshi/lets-build-a-blockchain) +- [**Ruby**: _Programming Blockchains Step-by-Step (Manuscripts Book Edition)_](https://github.com/yukimotopress/programming-blockchains-step-by-step) +- [**Scala**: _How to build a simple actor-based blockchain_](https://medium.freecodecamp.org/how-to-build-a-simple-actor-based-blockchain-aac1e996c177) +- [**TypeScript**: _Naivecoin: a tutorial for building a cryptocurrency_](https://lhartikk.github.io/) + - [_Minimal working blockchain_](https://lhartikk.github.io/jekyll/update/2017/07/14/chapter1.html) + - [_Proof of Work_](https://lhartikk.github.io/jekyll/update/2017/07/13/chapter2.html) + - [_Transactions_](https://lhartikk.github.io/jekyll/update/2017/07/12/chapter3.html) + - [_Wallet_](https://lhartikk.github.io/jekyll/update/2017/07/11/chapter4.html) + - [_Transaction relaying_](https://lhartikk.github.io/jekyll/update/2017/07/10/chapter5.html) + - [_Wallet UI and blockchain explorer_](https://lhartikk.github.io/jekyll/update/2017/07/09/chapter6.html) +- [**TypeScript**: _NaivecoinStake: a tutorial for building a cryptocurrency with the Proof of Stake consensus_](https://naivecoinstake.learn.uno/) + --- ## Projects and Applications From 4022253d906a1f0b2ef677b9988b0c72cdeb1916 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Fri, 10 May 2019 16:08:16 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 15/68] update basic concept link --- Basic/account.md | 170 ---------------- Basic/application.md | 146 -------------- Basic/crypto.md | 302 ----------------------------- Basic/merkle_tree_in_blockchain.md | 264 ------------------------- README.md | 13 +- 5 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 886 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 Basic/account.md delete mode 100644 Basic/application.md delete mode 100644 Basic/crypto.md delete mode 100644 Basic/merkle_tree_in_blockchain.md diff --git a/Basic/account.md b/Basic/account.md deleted file mode 100644 index 96b52fe..0000000 --- a/Basic/account.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,170 +0,0 @@ -# UTXO与普通账户模型 -- [UTXO与普通账户模型](#utxo%E4%B8%8E%E6%99%AE%E9%80%9A%E8%B4%A6%E6%88%B7%E6%A8%A1%E5%9E%8B) - - [普通账户模型](#%E6%99%AE%E9%80%9A%E8%B4%A6%E6%88%B7%E6%A8%A1%E5%9E%8B) - - [UTXO 模型](#utxo-%E6%A8%A1%E5%9E%8B) - - [账户余额模型与 UTXO 的比较](#%E8%B4%A6%E6%88%B7%E4%BD%99%E9%A2%9D%E6%A8%A1%E5%9E%8B%E4%B8%8E-utxo-%E7%9A%84%E6%AF%94%E8%BE%83) - - [区块链中的 UTXO 模型](#%E5%8C%BA%E5%9D%97%E9%93%BE%E4%B8%AD%E7%9A%84-utxo-%E6%A8%A1%E5%9E%8B) - - [UTXO 的特性及缺点](#utxo-%E7%9A%84%E7%89%B9%E6%80%A7%E5%8F%8A%E7%BC%BA%E7%82%B9) - -区块链网络中有两种记账模式，除了 UTXO 模型还有 Account Based 结构，也就是普通账户模型，也叫账户余额模型，**前者在比特币系的数字货币中被广泛使用，后者更多是用在智能合约型的区块链上**。 - -## 普通账户模型 -我们先从传统的账户模型出发来聊聊是如何记账的，假设我们现在有一个支付系统，在这个支付系统中有Alice和Bob两个账户，Alice账户里有 100 万，现在要转账给Bob 10 万，这其中涉及的操作是这样的： -1. 检查Alice的账户余额是否大于 10 万； -2. 把Alice的账户扣除 10 万变成 90 万，然后发送一笔转账消息给Bob的账户； -3. Bob的账户接受到转账消息，将Bob的账户余额加 10 万。 - -我们可以发现，无论是Alice还是Bob，都具有一个余额作为状态，即当前余额是记录在某个地方的，只需要读出来即可，这种设计我们叫做账户余额模型。 - -**如果以上三个步骤是在一个中心化系统中，甚至在同一个数据库中，那将非常简单，会直接退化成一个事务**，我们见到的银行账户、信用卡系统、证券交易系统、各种电商类应用，理财类应用基本都是一个中心化系统中的，最多也就是跨表跨数据库。 - -如果以上的步骤中，Alice和Bob的账户分属两个不同的系统，例如从 A 银行到 B 银行，就需要经过人民银行支付系统，即可信任的中心化第三方来做中介。 - -你可能发现了，在跨行转账的这种情况下，是没有办法做事务的，所以 **1 和 3 是不同步的，如果 3 操作失败，还需要从 2 倒退到 1 的状态，这个情况叫做冲正交易**。 - -**`普通账户模型具有自定义数据类型的优点，但是却需要自己设计事务机制，就是上述所说的冲正交易`**。 - ->其实不管是普通账户模型还是UTXO模型，都需要保证其各节点数据一致性，只不过UTXO常用于数字货币，通过区块链共识机制来保证一致性。而普通账户模型不一定用于区块链，此时就要自行设计分布式事务，而若用于区块链中，依然是依靠共识机制来保证一致性。所以个人认为两者差距并非通过分布式事务或共识机制来体现，主要还是体现在数据模型上。 - -## UTXO 模型 -UTXO 全称是：“Unspent Transaction Output”，这指的是：未花费的交易输出。这里面三个单词分别表示 “未花费的”“交易”“输出”，接下来我来详细讲解一下 UTXO 的含义。 - -**UTXO 的核心设计思路是无状态，它记录的是交易事件，而不记录最终状态**，也就是说只记录变更事件，用户需要根据历史记录自行计算余额。 - -有点像MySQL 中的 Binlog，主从模式的情况下，按照 Binlog 来更新数据，Redis 的 AOF 模式备份模式也是如此，UTXO 也是类似的思路。 - -下面我们按照按照普通账户中的例子来重新讲解一遍。 - -如果要记录交易本身，那么我们可以构造一笔交易，这笔交易中Alice转账 10 万给Bob的同时，90 万转给自己。 - -如下所示： -``` -　Alice　100 万 --> Bob　10 万 　 -　　　　　　　 --> Alice　90 万 -``` -这里其实有三条子记录，左边一条，右边两条，左边叫做输入，右边叫做输出。 - -输入和输出组成了交易，输入和输入需要满足一些约束条件： - -1. 任意一个交易必须至少一个输入、一个输出； -2. 输入必须全部移动，不能只使用部分，所以才产生了第二个输出指向Alice自己； -3. 输入金额 = 输出金额之和 + 交易手续费，这里必须是等式。 -对于Alice来说，首先构造交易的输入输出，满足上述条件，然后广播到全网，接收方自行判断交易是否属于自己。这里满足约束条件构成的交易模型，也就是Alice记录的三条转账事件就是 UTXO 模型。 - -## 账户余额模型与 UTXO 的比较 -我们可以归纳出 UTXO 与普通账户模型的一些区别。 - -1. 存储空间，**UTXO 占用空间比账户模型高**，因为账户模型只记录最终状态； -2. 易用性，UTXO 比较难处理，账户模型简单容易理解。例如 UTXO 在使用上，还需要配合高效的 UTXO 组装算法，这个算法要求尽可能降低输入输出的个数，还要让“零钱“归整，算法的复杂度相比账户余额无疑要高。 -3. 安全性，UTXO 比账户模型要高，**UTXO本身具备 ACID 的记账机制，每个操作都是原子的，而账户模型需要自行处理**，例如重放攻击； - -**普通账户模型具有较高的自由度，可以让智能合约有更好的发挥空间**，并且它避免了 UTXO 的复杂组装逻辑，精度控制上也更为得心应手。 - -UTXO 似乎天然是为数字货币设计的，具有 **较高频次跨账户转移** 场景都使用 UTXO 会比较好，考虑到智能合约的普适性，UTXO 与智能合约并不能很好地兼容，但是这也对开发者的自身水平提出了更高的要求。 - -## 区块链中的 UTXO 模型 -我们借用比特币开发者文档中 UTXO 模型的图示，来看看 UTXO 实际的构造形式。 - -![](https://github.com/yjjnls/blockchain-tutorial-cn/blob/master/img/16.1.png) - -上图中，所有的交易都可以找到前向交易，例如 TX5 的前向交易是 TX2，TX2 中的 Output1 作为 TX5 中的 Input0。 - -意思就是 TX2 中的付款人使用了 Output1 中指向的比特币转移给 TX5 中的收款人，接着 TX5 中的人又把收到的比特币转移给了 TX6 中的收款人，成为了 TX6 中 Output0。 - -我们也可以发现，TX6 中的收款人还没有产生 TX7 交易，也就是说 Output0 还没有被花费， - -这时候我们终于得到了 UTXO 的真正语义：Unspent Transaction Output，未花费的交易输出。 - -我们这时候可以发现 UTXO 也同样能表示余额，不过是重演计算的方式，它用不同的方式表达了余额，**我们把一个地址上所有的 UTXO 全部找出来，就是这个地址总的余额了**。 - -我们还可以发现，**无论是 TX5 还是 TX2，都已经成为历史交易，它们都忠实客观地记录了两笔交易，这两笔交易代表的是事件**，而不是余额状态转移，这是我们看到的最直观的区别。 - -我们再来看看一个真实的交易例子。 - -![](https://github.com/yjjnls/blockchain-tutorial-cn/blob/master/img/16.2.png) - -这是区块链上一笔真实交易的例子，它记录了一笔 450ETP 的转账记录。 - -左边是输入，右边是两笔输出，其中第二个输出是给自己的账户，这和我们Alice转账给Bob的例子是一样的。 - -下图是交易解码为 JSON 格式的样子，可以看到 Previous_output 是放到 Inputs 数组里的，意思就是前向输出作为本次的输入。 - -```python -{ -"hash" : "89e80e14db07c4904a57e2c1efb689bccbbf43942103c1a92166d5c0f27ea3d2", -"height" : 1093399, -"inputs" : -[ - { - "address" : "MLWtmjwCtmK44FMwJMSfAkHaEvnnb2N6HX", - "previous_output" : - { - "hash" : "770a72f35d3e3a78bd468949bad649f03b241cf7e2a84cc2d6fdabacdcc47f06", - "index" : 0 - }, - "script" : "[ 304402202b21d7a79276985dc99777b70fd5095796dad58f35e29a019d2cb6cca5df481802205ffab088a6047f5b6382ba02a0eed4e78ab7950fe264d3774e8b0b357a7593d101 ] [ 03ea3462dc01e7b5569e89737211887035f8f1e99e1fe4332181d83daccaa6d917 ]", - "sequence" : 4294967295 - } -], -"lock_time" : "0", -"outputs" : -[ - { - "address" : "MGz9yjLLn4AqyraRjSpiP2GmTWKnT3yfiL", - "attachment" : - { - "type" : "etp" - }, - "index" : 0, - "locked_height_range" : 0, - "script" : "dup hash160 [ 63ab0013d183f2592e4b46a358df01e88a09c0b8 ] equalverify checksig", - "value" : 45000000000 - }, - { - "address" : "MLWtmjwCtmK44FMwJMSfAkHaEvnnb2N6HX", - "attachment" : - { - "type" : "etp" - }, - "index" : 1, - "locked_height_range" : 0, - "script" : "dup hash160 [ 8a63941b392771c40f1c15e4374808f6bb464cba ] equalverify checksig", - "value" : 118082150283 - } -], -"version" : "2" -} -``` - -我们再看看比特币上的例子： - -![](https://github.com/yjjnls/blockchain-tutorial-cn/blob/master/img/16.3.png) - -这一笔比特币交易包含 6 个输入，几十个输出，交易一共 3.5kb，交易的输入输出会影响交易大小，比特币的交易费是根据[字节收费](https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/38479785)的，交易尺寸越大越贵，而交易尺寸主要和输入输出的个数有关，也就是说，**算法上并不规定输入输出的个数，而只有区块尺寸限制**。 - -在比特币中将小于 100kb 的交易称为标准交易，超过 100kb 的称为非标准交易。它的前向 input 以及生成一个 out 约占用 161~250 bytes 。**所以在比特币中，大约的 inputs/ouputs 的最大数目限制为 100KB/161B ~= 600 个**。 - -## UTXO 的特性及缺点 - -从计算的角度来说，**UTXO 具有非常好的并行支付能力，也就是说如果没有尺寸限制，一笔交易可以包含任意笔输入输出，同时也没有次序要求**，在一笔交易中哪一个 UTXO 在前，哪个在后面不影响最终结果。 - -从存储的角度来说，UTXO 具有较好的可裁剪特性，可裁剪性指的是 UTXO 类型的交易，如果从最老的那一笔 UTXO 开始截断数据库，那么之前的数据可以删除掉了。 - -如果想进一步压缩数据尺寸，可以在任意位置截断，记录 UTXO 对应的交易哈希即可，然后从其他节点获取并校验 UTXO，这也是 SPV 轻钱包工作的基础之一。 - -以太坊中并没有使用比特币的这种 UTXO 设计，这与以太坊的宗旨有关，以太坊的目标是构建通用计算，而比特币是数字货币，需求不同导致设计的不同。 - -V 神指出了 UTXO 的缺陷，一共有三类。 - -1. 可表达的状态少 -UTXO 只能是已花费或者未花费状态，这就没有给需要任何其它内部状态的多阶段合约或者脚本留出生存空间，这也意味着 UTXO 只能用于建立简单的、一次性的合约，UTXO 更像是一种二进制控制位。 - -2. 区块链盲点（Blockchain-blindness） -UTXO 的脚本只能看不到自己这条历史轨迹，**无法看到区块链的数据的全貌**，这导致了 **功能性扩展受到了限制**，我们在花费比特币的过程中需要小心翼翼的组合 UTXO，这也导致了系统状态逻辑复杂，**不适合设计成智能合约的基础结构（Fabric和Ethereum都是普通账户模型）**。 - -3. 价值盲点（Value-blindness） -UTXO 脚本不能提供非常精细的金额控制，基于账户模型的余额在花费过程中，可以任意的按值存取，它仅取决于程序能表示的最小精度。 - -**而 UTXO 要求必须全部移动，如果要满足一个目标值金额，对组合 UTXO 算法的要求会比较高，采用许多有不同面值的 UTXO，一方面要求尽可能地精确，另一方面又要求输入输出的数量尽可能的小。** - -UTXO 是比特币上的原生设计，在区块链以前是没有这种逻辑数据结构，UTXO 的出现给了人们看待数据转移的不同视角，但 **UTXO 不是所有区块链所必需的，公链开发过程中的是否选用 UTXO 模型可以根据业务场景进行判断**。 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/Basic/application.md b/Basic/application.md deleted file mode 100644 index 45bf0d4..0000000 --- a/Basic/application.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,146 +0,0 @@ -# 区块链不能做什么 -但凡提到区块链的文章，都会强调“去中心化”、“不可篡改”等特(xue)性(tou)来吸人眼球。仿佛用区块链就能在不久的将来构建一个理想的乌托邦，但是拥有这么多特性的区块链到底怎么来构建这个乌托邦，却没人能说得清楚。毕竟现在的行业还处于初期探索，大部分注意力都集中在技术层面，技术尚未成熟大家就想要抢占市场，难免会不愿意承认“看不到方向”。若非要回答这个问题，总有人能说出一些看似合理的应用场景，但大多数经不起推敲，更没有验证。诚然，落地这事不能一味地钻研技术，应用场景、发展方向、经营管理模式等都是需要考虑的方向。这里就目前区块链的一些应用场景展开一些讨论，并非说区块链不能在这些领域有所应用，更多地是指出一些很多人不愿意提但又绕不开的问题。 - -![](https://github.com/yjjnls/awesome-blockchain/blob/master/Basic/img/blockchain-jesus.png) - -首先我们需要弄清楚一个容易被混淆的问题：[基于区块链开发的应用真的能“去中心化”、“防篡改”如此这般安全么？](https://www.zhihu.com/question/270698341) - -比特币、以太坊等数字货币为什么能实现所谓的“去中心化”与“不可篡改”呢？其实这里可以从区块链的本质来看， **`区块链的本质和基础是分布式账本以及确保所有结点都彼此充分一致的安全机制。`** 也就是人人都持有账本，才能防止个别人的篡改，这就是去中心化。 **所以可说去中心化、不可篡改、安全等特性都是关联在一起的，一个特性不能满足，其余特性也就被攻破了。** 那么是不是大家都持有账本，就是真的防止篡改了呢？显然不是，以比特币为例，其能做到防篡改是因为 - -1. 挖矿的算力和实体电力成本挂钩，即使是51%攻击，也会无利可图，这是利用经济学上的博弈来牵制作弊篡改行为； -2. 比特币系统（注意这里不是指比特币）由无数的结点构成，这些结点大部分都是矿机，而且是24小时不停地工作。 - -我们来详细分析一下，第一点是因为中本聪设计比特币时采用了POW共识，并且制订了一系列的奇葩规定，使得挖矿难度大，成本高，这点可以归结为区块链的设计，要提高作弊成本，使得作弊无利可图。而第二点看似无关紧要，其实是比较关键的，试想一下，如果大家有账本，但是都不去记账，比如某一时刻大部分矿机坏了，这时全网算力就会大大下降，那么作弊所需要的算力成本也就大大下降，超过了博弈平衡，那么作弊行为变得有利可图，也就无法收场了。再举个简单的例子，比如你根据网上的教程开发了一个区块链应用，调试的时候其实就你本地一个结点，结果中途发现了bug或者崩溃了，那么就得改了重来，这其实就是一种篡改，因为在你本地篡改的成本很低。所以第二点要保证有大量在线结点，且要设计合理的 **共识机制**进行经济制约。 - -简单地说区块链防篡改，那肯定是不对的，要依据其具体设计与实现来判断。而且分叉作为一种链上治理的手段，和篡改行为在本质上是相同的，只是执行方不一样，就像孔乙己说： - ->读书人的事能叫偷吗？ - -我们再来看看区块链的去中心化，**区块链能提供信任机制的本质是将数据内容的所有权分散给用户，且在一定程度上不能篡改（这也是基于数据权利分散的特性）。** 这通常适用于小型团体或者不同机构之间来建立信任机制，如果由单一有背书的大公司来提供服务，未必需要区块链。这些数据可以是金融数据或者社交数据或者其他。 - -而数据分散的形式其实有两种，第一种是比特币和以太坊为代表的区块链1.0和2.0技术，所有用户都可以无门槛地加入结点，结点用户分布于全球每个角落，权利分散到每一个用户手中，从这一点上来看，这确实是名副其实的“全面去中心化”。但是其缺点也显而易见，那就是全球的用户都达成共识，所需要的时间非常长，作为公链来说，TPS非常低，无法进行商业应用。 - -| | BTC | ETH | EOS | MIOTA | BTS | Cardano | -| :------------ | --: | :--: | -------- | -------- | ---- | ------- | -| 共识机制 | POW | POW | DPOS+BFT | MCMC+POW | DPOS | POS | -| 每秒事务处理量/TPS | 5~7 | 7~14 | 1M (理论上) | 1000+ | 3300 | unknown | -| 总供应量/Millions | 21 | 可定增 | 1000 | 2780 | 3600 | 45000 | - - -第二种是区块链3.0技术（比如EOS）和联盟链，EOS在全球有21个超级结点，只有这21个超级结点进行记账。与比特币和以太坊的结点数量相比，21个结点达成共识所需的时间可以做到非常短，链的TPS也可以做到很高。联盟链用于不同企业和机构之间的账本同步，结点数量也是有限的，所以TPS才能提高。区块链3.0和联盟链的模型是一致的，只不过一个是公链，一个是联盟链，另外共识协议和细节处理也不同。他们的特点都是链的结点数量有限，而且要达到一定的门槛才能成为结点，所以这种“去中心化”又被称为 **“弱中心化”**。 - -同时，我们再进一步看，EOS在全球有21个超级结点，这和一个大公司在全球部署21个结点进行数据同步，从模型上来看没有多大区别，只是EOS的结点属于不同的结构。所以从这一点来看，**目前能够进行商业应用的区块链技术更多地是基于传统分布式技术的一些升级，`并不具有革命性`；而真正理想化的“全面去中心化”、点对点交易的理念，很难很难实现**（比特币其实也是中心化的，被五大矿池操纵，普通用户虽然可以参与，但是基本不起作用）。 - -同样，区块链作为一种数据库，去中心化一定是比中心化低效的，这也导致 **要达到同样的商用效果，区块链比传统分布式技术的成本更高**。只有在去中心化所带来的价值提升远大于效率的牺牲和成本的增加，才是有意义的，但在不用区块链也能很好运作的一些领域，加上区块链是否真的有必要，值得思考！ - -明白了上面这些，再来看具体领域的应用，分析起来路就会更加清晰。 - -## 公示公证 - -> 区块链世界目前还是现实世界的「平行宇宙」版本。 - -区块链可以保证链上数据的真实、透明、不可篡改，这里的“真实”指的是数据是原始的，没有被篡改过；但是如何保证上链数据在现实生活中的真实合法性呢？ - -比如现在流行的食品溯源，如何保证一只鸡是纯天然散养的？如何保证没有喂养激素？如果最后购买的是宰杀后的鸡，那宰杀过程的卫生如何保障？ - -现有做法是将喂养记录上链，那如何保证记录的真实性呢？还有运输、宰杀过程如何生成有效的数据上链呢？ -如果换做是蔬菜呢？每只鸡都可以有记录，难道每棵菜也有自己的编号？ -再比如一些加工食品，包装上都会有检验合格的信息，区块链可以保证每一步的加工检验数据上链后不会被篡改，但无法保证上链的这些记录都是真的。 - -这些数据的共同特点是数据源都在线下，而无法保证上链数据真实有效的根本原因在于 **参与者的信息化程度过低**。 - -假设我们可以实时监控供应链上所有的货物处理过程，甚至账款的流转，那不管用不用区块链，都可以由某个第三方，如银行对供应商进行授信。但如果没有，那 **首先要解决的问题是信息化**，比如食品供应链的每个环节用互联网工具去记录，保证真实数据，还要打通整个行业的信息系统。这才是需要解决的核心问题，解决了核心问题，区块链才能真正地发挥作用。 - -## 通证经济 - -Token（通证）作为一种权益，代表资本市场的运作方式。Token可以分为基础设施型、金融型、商业垂直生态型等，其本质都代表了债券和股权。但不管是债权还是股权都有 **一个“不破产”的先决条件，就是发行经济主体的“有用”，而不是稀缺性（如总量限定，资本管制）决定了 Token 的价值，是有了价值才稀缺**。 - -比如在国外非常流行的REITs，它与房产挂钩，且有大型机构和企业做背书，这保障了其稳定与流通性。而且REITs也没有用区块链实现，大多数ICO项目只是希望首次发行Token获得融资来维持项目运转或者套现跑路。 - -另一方面，除了金融型Token，其余类型的Token都会与实物资产对应，那么就只有在数字版和实物版之间有明确的联系时，智能合约才能发挥作用。比如说房子，在房子的数字版所有权发生变化时，房子实物版的所有权也必须跟着改变。我们需要让数字世界“了解”实物世界，这被称为“神谕问题（Oracle problem）”。 -在 A 把房子交给 B 时，智能合约需要知道他是真的把房子交给 B 了。实现方式很多，但本质上都是一样的，都需要在实物世界中找一个可信的第三方验证这些事件。 - -比如说，这个房子在以太坊中被表示成了一个不可替代的代币Token。A 可以在一个原子交换中用房子跟 B 换一些以太币。那么问题来了，B 需要相信那个代币真的代表那个房子。这需要靠某种神谕来保证，将代表房子的代币交给他后，真的可以表示那个房子在法律上是属于他的。 - -进一步说，**即便政府机构承认那个代币真的可以代表那个房子，如果这个代币被偷了怎么办？房子属于那个偷代币的贼吗？如果代币丢了怎么办？房子就没法再卖了吗？还能再重新发一个代币给这个房子吗？如果可以，由谁来发呢？** - -按照全面去中心化的思想，你资产的唯一凭证就是你的秘钥，秘钥丢失意味着资产归零，而且不可篡改，不可逆；但这显然是大部分人无法接受的，任何试图挽回损失的措施都是与去中心化背道而驰的，这是十分矛盾的行为，可以参考以太坊的硬分叉。 - -不管是水果、汽车还是房子，要将数字资产与实物资产连接起来都是个难题，至少在去中心化的上下文中特别不好实现。**实物资产是由你所在的司法系统监管的，除了你创建的智能合约之外，他们还相信别的一些东西。也就是说智能合约中的所有权不一定能代表实物世界中的所有权，它跟普通合约一样存在信任问题。需要信任第三方的智能合约失去了自己最大的优势，不再是去信任化的合约。** - -即便是电子书、医疗记录或电影这样的数字资产，也会遇到同样的问题。对这些数字资产的“权益”最终都是由某个权威机构决定的，而我们需要信任他们的神谕。 - -就此而言，神谕只是简化版的法官。所以实际上你得到并不是只有机器执行的合约和简化的约束，而是掺杂了主观认识和人为判断风险的代码，而且这些代码要实现所有可能的情况，很复杂。换句话说，为了让合约变得“智能”，编写代码的复杂性急剧升高，**但你还是没办法摆脱对某个人的信任。** - - -## 版权保护 - -版权保护是区块链被吹捧的另一个应用领域，模式通常为： - -> 利用区块链做一个自有版权的平台（内容可以是音乐、文字、视频等），原创者可以直接发布其作品，用户支付相应的费用浏览内容，所支付的费用直接转给原创者，不经过中心化的平台；而且利用区块链技术可以溯源防伪…… - -与上面提到的公示公证不同的是，通过在线平台发布的作品直接完成了作品 **信息化**，并保证了作品的 **有效性**（信息源在线上而非线下）。所以通过区块链，可以保障每个作品都是有效且无法被篡改的，但是要实现作品的版权保护，又会有一些新的问题。 - -这种模式解决的痛点为： -1\. 用区块链不可篡改的特性进行溯源防伪 -2\. 原创者与用户点对点对接，跳过中心化平台的抽成，保障原创者的权益 - -出发点很好，但是我们细细分析还是有些问题的。版权其实分为署名权和分发权（信息网络传播权）两方面，而这两方面正好对应上述两点。 - -### 署名权 - -对于第一点署名权，区块链的不可篡改性确实可以用来保护版权 - -> 当一个作品在区块链平台上发布时，它就有了区块链上的标识（这个标识就是身份识别信息，包含加密密钥、原文件地址等、付费信息、使用次数、作者等等信息），这个标识不会因被拷贝而丢失（反而会记录拷贝这个行为）；当这个拷贝文件被放置在另外一个平台时，一旦文件被使用，有以下两个情况：1、这个平台不支持区块链，所以无法识别该文件（就是无法播放）。在这个过程中，该文件会自动寻找原区块链平台，向使用者发出询问，输入这个产品的个人密钥，是否要付费使用该文件（或向这个平台授权等）。但该平台有可能屏蔽这个过程，也就是，该平台会认为这是一个病毒文件，根本就不让打开；2、如果这个平台支持区块链，这个标识就会走识别能不能授权播放（也就是需不需要付费使用）的流程。 - -但这里有个问题，比如对于文字资料，某个用户直接将文章的文字内容拷贝下来，或者记录下来（不是拷贝文件而是直接拷贝内容），然后用普通文稿的形式发布到另一个普通的平台上。对于这种行为，除非通过用户举报，否则是无法发现的。当然这些例子有些极端，但也说明区块链的版权保护也不是万能的；而且用现有技术也能重复内容比对，防拷贝等。也就是说 **区块链能做到的，现有技术也能做到，现有技术做不到的，区块链也做不到** ，并且如前面所说，用区块链来做版权保护，其实成本更高。 - -### 分发权 - -在大部分人眼中，版权=署名权，反而忽视了问题更大的分发权。举个例子，现在流行的短视频平台抖音，抖音上面的用户发的视频都有自己ID的水印，这是抹不掉的，相当于署名权完全在原创用户手中，但是你在抖音上面看到什么样的短视频，这完全由其推荐算法决定。这也是现在流行的信息流，这个地方就很有趣了，你相当于把作品的分发权交给了平台，那么这样做有什么后果呢？或者说平台可以怎么利用你的分发权来赚钱呢？ - -1. 流量入口的转移 - 以往用户看到一个好的作品需要去关注原创者（比如某个原创歌手），然后从该歌手那里才能获得后续的更新，这时候流量入口在原创者那里，有了流量就有收益，而且流量也涉及到原创者的发展方向。但现在用户只需要打开APP，就可以看到关注歌手的更新、动态资讯等，用户要只需要浏览平台APP给你推荐的内容就可以了。 - - 这个时候用户由依赖原创者转变为依赖平台，流量入口转移到了平台那里，收益自然也转移了。原创者虽然也有分成，但是大头利润被平台赚取，且原创者的发展受制于平台，平台算法推荐的少，该原创者的关注度自然就下降了。 - - 而且单个原创者的作品有限，但是平台聚合了大量的原创者，利用他们作品的分发权，可以产生更大的流量，让你沉迷其中。想想你每天沉迷的是头条，是抖音还是里面的某几个大V？ - -2. 流量干扰 - 因为机器推荐算法是单向的，当你习惯了沉迷在每日的推送中时，你会默认接受其中的内容，除非引起强烈不适。而**流量干扰，则是平台可以在推荐给你的信息流中夹杂一些其他东西**，比如广告，比如一些低质量的内容，或者一些花钱上位的内容。只要推送主体还是你喜欢的，对于这些流量干扰，你是不会介意的。而这些流量干扰有一个fashion的名字叫做信息流广告，经常出现在各大公司的财报中，目前是很多公司的主要利润和利润增长来源。 - - 由于流量入口的转移，原本可以附加于原创者的增值内容也都转移到了平台上，留给原创者的只是少得可怜的分成。 - -再举个例子，实体书店也会有推荐、促销活动，那和依赖推荐算法的平台有什么区别？ - -**区别在于实体书店你除了能看到推荐书籍，其余书都能看到；但是推荐算法是把它认为你喜欢的书硬塞给你，请你一条一条浏览，其余的呢？没有其余的！你“只能”看他推荐给你的，算法甚至可以将每本书里的内容单独抽出来，然后整合在一起推荐给你，这样就更进一步模糊作品的归属，将用户的注意力转移到平台的推荐内容。** - -从上面的分析我们可以看到，现有技术可以保障署名权，但是无法保障涉及利益的分发权，而且区块链也做不到。 - -或许你可以说用区块链做一个没有推荐算法的版权保护平台不就行了？可那不是回到了各平台早期没有推荐算法比较落后的模式了？ - -你又可以说用智能合约做一个透明的纯粹的推荐算法，但这个平台怎么盈利呢？一个行业只有有持续的利润才能不断地发展，而马克思说过： - -> 为了100%的利润,资本就敢践踏一切人间法律。 - -版权保护的痛点在于发展模式和经营模式，这些其实和技术没有太大关系。 - -### 升华 - -我们进一步分析，平台通过信息流广告霸占了巨额利润么？剥削了原创者么？ - -分析过程可能会颠覆某些人的三观，在此省略，我们只看结论： - -短期来看，确实是这样。但是从长期来看， - -> 各行各业都有平均利润率，利润太高会导致竞争对手加入，并摊薄利润。 - -由于竞争，信息流所带来的暴利不会持续太久，竞争的结果是把利润返回给了消费用户。 - -> 消费者剩余，是属于消费者的。 - -结局是低质量原创者剥削了高质量原创者。 - -Ref -1. [恶的土壤，结不出善的头条](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/UX0J7uN08-ASuVnijKSijQ) -2. [携程提价，该不该谴责](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/32FdhFbkJ-hEtGIec8UdkA) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/Basic/crypto.md b/Basic/crypto.md deleted file mode 100644 index 7f51526..0000000 --- a/Basic/crypto.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,302 +0,0 @@ -# 数字加密相关知识 - -- [数字加密相关知识](#数字加密相关知识) - - [非对称加密](#非对称加密) - - [椭圆曲线加密](#椭圆曲线加密) - - [公钥与私钥](#公钥与私钥) - - [数字签名](#数字签名) - - [数字证书](#数字证书) - - [Merkle Tree](#merkle-tree) - - [数字签名扩展](#数字签名扩展) - - [数字签名算法](#数字签名算法) - - [RSA数字签名算法](#rsa数字签名算法) - - [DSA数字签名算法](#dsa数字签名算法) - - [ECDSA椭圆曲线数字签名算法](#ecdsa椭圆曲线数字签名算法) - - [盲签名](#盲签名) - - [多重签名](#多重签名) - - [群签名](#群签名) - - [环签名](#环签名) - - [环签名满足的性质](#环签名满足的性质) - - [环签名实现](#环签名实现) - - [环签名和群签名的比较](#环签名和群签名的比较) - - [算法实现](#算法实现) -- [Reference](#reference) - -## 非对称加密 - -`对称加密`指加密和解密使用`相同密钥`的加密算法。它要求发送方和接收方在安全通信之前，商定一个密钥，泄漏密钥就意味着任何人都可以对他们发送或接收的消息解密。 - -每对用户每次使用对称加密算法时，都需要使用其他人不知道的惟一钥匙，这会使得发收信双方所拥有的钥匙数量呈几何级数增长，密钥管理成为用户的负担。同时，对称加密算法能够提供加密和认证却缺乏了签名功能，使得使用范围有所缩小。 - -具体算法：DES算法，3DES算法，TDEA算法，Blowfish算法，RC5算法，IDEA算法。 - -而`非对称加密`指加解密密钥不相关，典型如RSA、EIGamal、椭圆曲线算法。 - -### 椭圆曲线加密 - -公开密钥算法总是要基于一个数学上的难题。比如RSA 依据的是：给定两个素数p、q 很容易相乘得到n，而对n进行因式分解却相对困难。那椭圆曲线上有什么难题呢？ - -![Trapdoor function](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/8f/Trapdoor_permutation.svg/300px-Trapdoor_permutation.svg.png) - -考虑如下等式： - - K=kG [其中 K,G为Ep(a,b)上的点，k为小于n（n是点G的阶）的整数] - -`不难发现，给定k和G，根据加法法则，计算K很容易；但给定K和G，求k就相对困难了。` -这就是椭圆曲线加密算法采用的难题，我们把点G称为基点（base point）。 - -现在我们描述一个利用椭圆曲线进行加密通信的过程： - -1. 用户A选定一条椭圆曲线Ep(a,b)，并取椭圆曲线上一点，作为基点G。 -2. 用户A选择一个私有密钥k，并生成`公开密钥K=kG`。 -3. 用户A将Ep(a,b)和点K，G传给用户B。 -4. 用户B接到信息后 ，将待传输的明文编码到Ep(a,b)上一点M（编码方法很多，这里不作讨论），并产生一个随机整数r -5. 用户B计算点C1=M+rK；C2=rG。 -6. 用户B将C1、C2传给用户A。 -7. 用户A接到信息后，计算C1-kC2，结果就是点M。因为 - C1-kC2=M+rK-k(rG)=M+rK-r(kG)=M - 再对点M进行解码就可以得到明文。 - -在这个加密通信中，如果有一个偷窥者H，他只能看到Ep(a,b)、K、G、C1、C2，`而通过K、G 求k 或通过C2、G求r 都是相对困难的`。因此，H无法得到A、B间传送的明文信息。 - -## 公钥与私钥 - -公开密钥与私有密钥是一对，如果用公开密钥对数据进行加密，只有用对应的私有密钥才能解密;如果用私有密钥对数据进行加密，那么只有用对应的公开密钥才能解密。 -通过公钥是无法（或极其困难）推算出私钥的。**注意这里公钥与私钥都可以用来加密，只是私钥是自己保存，而公钥是公开的。** - -比如A发信息给B，就用B的公钥加密信息，然后发给B，B用自己的私钥解密，就可以看到信息内容。 - -## 数字签名 - -A把要加密的内容用hash函数生成摘要digest，再用自己的私钥对digest加密，生成数字签名signature。连同加密的内容一起发给B。 - -B收到后，对**摘要digest（用A的公钥解密）**和**内容（用自己的私钥解密）** 都解密，再对内容使用相同hash，看得到的digest是否相同，相同，说明发送的内容没有被修改。 - -> 但是如果这里用B的公钥来加密摘要digest，B收到后用自己的私钥解密，这不是也可以验证内容是否被篡改么？ - -如果仅仅从防篡改的角度来讲确实可以，但是这样无法验证这些内容是谁发来的！**所以用A的私钥来加密摘要digest，相当于A用自己的私钥给这个摘要digest进行签名，B收到后用A的公钥对digest进行解密还能验证这是不是A发来的内容**。 - -但是这里有个`潜在的问题`。 - -> **如果B存储的A的公钥被C替换成了C的公钥，那么C就可以冒充A和B进行通信，而B却完全不知道。** - -## 数字证书 - -证书中心用自己的私钥对`A的公钥和一些相关信息`一起加密，形成`数字证书`。 -A在发送内容的同时，在数字签名后再附上数字证书。 -B收到后，先用CA的公钥解密数字证书，得到A真正的公钥，再用A的公钥来验证签名是否是A的签名。 - -B可以每次都到CA的网站上（或者什么别的官方途径）获得CA的公钥。 - -这么做的目的是为了验证： -1. 确认该信息确实是A所发； -2. 确认A发出的信息是完整的。 - -- **公钥防泄漏,私钥防篡改、防假冒** - _ B收到后，只有用B自己的私钥才能解密内容，别人是无法解密的。`防泄漏` - _ 再用上述数字证书来验证数字签名是否来自A，发送内容有没有被篡改。`防篡改` - 数字证书一般挂靠在可信任的机构，无法篡改和伪造。 - -## Merkle Tree - -默克尔树，又叫哈希树，由**一个**root节点，**一组**中间节点和**一组**叶节点组成。 -叶节点包含存储数据或者其哈希值，中间节点和root节点都是其孩子的hash值。 - -![markle tree](https://github.com/yjjnls/Notes/blob/master/block%20chain/Basic/img/markle%20tree.jpg) - -应用： -1. 快速比较数据，两个默克尔树的根节点相同，那么其所代表的数据必然相同 -2. 快速定位修改，比如上面D1数据被修改，可通过root->N4->N1，快速定位到发生改变的D1 -3. 零知识证明，比如要证明某个数据中包含D0，那就构造一个默克尔树，公开root、N4、N1、N0，D0拥有者可以检测到D0存在，但不知道其他内容。（D0拥有者可以看到hash值，但看不到完整的数据内容）（比如用户可以查找自己的money是否在交易所的总备用金中，而不必知道其余用户的money信息；或者p2p下载中，文件切片成小块，下载一个分支后就可以验证该分支的数据是否正确，定位错误数据块重新下载或者继续下载下一个分支数据。） - -## 数字签名扩展 - -### 数字签名算法 - -常见的数字签名算法主要有RSA、DSA、ECDSA三种。 - -#### RSA数字签名算法 - -RSA是目前计算机密码学中最经典算法，也是目前为止使用最广泛的数字签名算法，RSA数字签名算法的密钥实现与RSA的加密算法是一样的，算法的名称都叫RSA。密钥的产生和转换都是一样的，包括在售的所有SSL数字证书、代码签名证书、文档签名以及邮件签名大多都采用RSA算法进行加密。 - -RSA数字签名算法主要包括MD和SHA两种算法，例如我们熟知的MD5和SHA-256即是这两种算法中的一类。 - -#### DSA数字签名算法 - -DSA全称Digital Signature Algorithm，DSA只是一种算法，和RSA不同之处在于它不能用作加密和解密，也不能进行密钥交换，只用于签名，所以它比RSA要快很多，其安全性与RSA相比差不多。DSA的一个重要特点是两个素数公开，这样，当使用别人的p和q时，即使不知道私钥，你也能确认它们是否是随机产生的，还是作了手脚。RSA算法却做不到。 - -DSA的整个签名算法流程如下： - -1. 发送方使用SHA-1和SHA-2编码将发送内容加密产生数字摘要； -2. 发送方用自己的专用密钥对摘要进行再次加密得到数字签名； -3. 发送方将原文和加密后的摘要传给接收方； -4. 接收方使用发送方提供的密钥对进行解密 ，同时对收到的内容用SHA-1/SHA-2编码加密产生同样的摘要； -5. 接收方再将解密后的摘要和4步骤中加密产生的摘要进行比对，如果两者一至，则说明传输过程的信息没有被破坏和篡改，否则传输信息则不安全。 - -#### ECDSA椭圆曲线数字签名算法 - -ECDSA是用于数字签名，是ECC与DSA的结合，整个签名过程与DSA类似，**所不一样的是签名中采取的算法为ECC**，最后签名出来的值也是分为r,s。而ECC（全称Elliptic Curves Cryptography）是一种椭圆曲线密码编码学。 - -ECDH每次用一个固定的DH key，导致不能向前保密（forward secrecy），所以一般都是用ECDHE（ephemeral）或其他版本的ECDH算法。ECDH则是基于ECC的DH（Diffie-Hellman）密钥交换算法。 - -ECC与RSA 相比，有以下的优点： - -1. 相同密钥长度下，安全性能更高，如160位ECC已经与1024位RSA、DSA有相同的安全强度。 -2. 计算量小，处理速度快，在私钥的处理速度上（解密和签名），ECC远 比RSA、DSA快得多。 -3. 存储空间占用小 ECC的密钥尺寸和系统参数与RSA、DSA相比要小得多， 所以占用的存储空间小得多。 -4. 带宽要求低使得ECC具有广泛得应用前景。 - -### 盲签名 - -前文说到了数字签名，但如果A想要B来对消息签名，但是又不想让B知道该消息的内容，该如何做呢？这里就需要用到盲签名了。 - -盲签名具有以下特点： -1. 签名者对其所签署的消息是不可见的，即签名者不知道他所签署消息的具体内容。 -2. 签名消息不可追踪，即当签名消息被公布后，签名者无法知道这是他哪次的签署的。 - -传统RSA加解密的结局方案为： - -1. 加密: ![](http://upload-images.jianshu.io/upload_images/11336404-be53f4cdd8eff0f1.png?imageMogr2/auto-orient/strip%7CimageView2/2/w/1240) - -2. 解密: ![](http://upload-images.jianshu.io/upload_images/11336404-0c87f6ebf1f4b7b8.png?imageMogr2/auto-orient/strip%7CimageView2/2/w/1240) - -而盲签名则按照如下步骤来进行： -1. 接收者首先将待签数据进行盲变换，把变换后的盲数据发给签名者。 -![](http://upload-images.jianshu.io/upload_images/11336404-c22f3f330c202a4d.png?imageMogr2/auto-orient/strip%7CimageView2/2/w/1240) -这里一般用对称加密，所以： -![](http://upload-images.jianshu.io/upload_images/11336404-e2f7a82497d99ebf.png?imageMogr2/auto-orient/strip%7CimageView2/2/w/1240) - -2. 经签名者签名后再发给接收者。 - ![](http://upload-images.jianshu.io/upload_images/11336404-e858b0db3ba78057.png?imageMogr2/auto-orient/strip%7CimageView2/2/w/1240) - -3. 接收者对签名再作去盲变换，得出的便是签名者对原数据的盲签名。 - ![](http://upload-images.jianshu.io/upload_images/11336404-717c9c59aaf9e53a.png?imageMogr2/auto-orient/strip%7CimageView2/2/w/1240) - ![](http://upload-images.jianshu.io/upload_images/11336404-074b0968d84944d8.png?imageMogr2/auto-orient/strip%7CimageView2/2/w/1240) - -流程如下： -![](http://upload-images.jianshu.io/upload_images/11336404-1c5466a4f060888b.png?imageMogr2/auto-orient/strip%7CimageView2/2/w/1240) - -在这个过程中，B无法得知MSG是什么，B也不知道自己什么时候对MSG做了签名，即若B进行了多次签名，当公布出某一具体的MSG-signature时，B并不知道这个签名是自己在那一次进行签署的。 - -背景： -一般的签名，签名者对自己发出的签名，必须是记得的，比如，在何时何地对谁发的，他自己可以记下来。但是，如果把签名看作是电子现金的话，就涉及到一个匿名性的问题用实际钞票的时候，钞票上有没有写你的名字？当然没有。那我也不希望，银行通过追踪自己发出签名，来获得用户的消费情况。于是就设计出盲签名。 - -### 多重签名 - -多重签名技术（multisig）就是多个用户同时对一个数字资产进行签名才有效。 - -如果一个地址只能由一个私钥签名和支付，表现形式就是1/1；而多重签名的表现形式是m/n，也就是说一共n个私钥可以给一个账户签名，而当m个地址签名时，就可以支付一笔交易。所以，m一定是小于等于n的。 - -### 群签名 - -在一个群签名方案中，一个群体中的任意一个成员可以以匿名的方式代表整个群体对消息进行签名。与其他数字签名一样，群签名是可以公开验证的，而且可以只用单个群公钥来验证。 - -流程： -1. 初始化：群管理者建立群资源，生成对应的群公钥（Group Public Key）和群私钥（Group Private Key）群公钥对整个系统中的所有用户公开，比如群成员、验证者等。 -2. 成员加入：在用户加入群的时候，群管理者颁发群证书（Group Certificate）给群成员。 -3. 签名：群成员利用获得的群证书签署文件，生成群签名. -4. 验证：同时验证者利用**群公钥**仅可以验证所得群签名的正确性，但不能确定群中的正式签署者。 -5. 打开：**群管理者利用群私钥可以对群用户生成的群签名进行追踪，并暴露签署者身份**。 - -### 环签名 - -是一种简化的群签名，只有环成员没有管理者，不需要环成员间的合作。环签名方案中签名者首先选定一个临时的签名者集合,集合中包括签名者。然后签名者利用自己的私钥和签名集合中其他人的公钥就可以独立的产生签名,而无需他人的帮助。签名者集合中的成员可能并不知道自己被包含在其中。 - -#### 环签名满足的性质 - -1. 无条件匿名性: 攻击者无法确定签名是由环中哪个成员生成,即使在获得环成员私钥的情况下,概率也不超过1/n。 -2. 正确性: 签名必需能被所有其他人验证。 -3. 不可伪造性: 环中其他成员不能伪造真实签名者签名,外部攻击者即使在获得某个有效环签名的基础上,也不能为消息m伪造一个签名。 - -#### 环签名实现 - -1. 密钥生成： 为环中每个成员产生一个密钥对(公钥PKi,私钥SKi)。 -2. 签名： 签名者用自己的私钥和任意n个环成员(包括自己)的公钥为消息m生成签名a。 -3. 签名验证： 验证者根据环签名和消息m,验证签名是否为环中成员所签,如果有效就接收,否则丢弃。 - -#### 环签名和群签名的比较 - -1. 匿名性：都是一种个体代表群体签名的体制，验证者能验证签名为群体中某个成员所签，但并不能知道为哪个成员，以达到签名者匿名的作用。 -2. 可追踪性：**群签名中，群管理员的存在保证了签名的可追踪性**。群管理员可以撤销签名，揭露真正的签名者。环签名本身无法揭示签名者,除非签名者本身想暴露或者在签名中添加额外的信息。提出了一个可验证的环签名方案,方案中真实签名者希望验证者知道自己的身份,此时真实签名者可以通过透露自己掌握的秘密信息来证实自己的身份。 -3. 管理系统：群签名由群管理员管理，环签名不需要管理，签名者只有选择一个可能的签名者集合，获得其公钥，然后公布这个集合即可，所有成员平等。 - -#### 算法实现 - -```python -import os, hashlib, random, Crypto.PublicKey.RSA - -class ring: - def __init__(self, k, L=1024): - self.k = k - self.l = L - self.n = len(k) - self.q = 1 << (L - 1) - - def sign(self, m, z): - self.permut(m) - s = [None] * self.n - u = random.randint(0, self.q) - c = v = self.E(u) - for i in (range(z+1, self.n) + range(z)): - s[i] = random.randint(0, self.q) - e = self.g(s[i], self.k[i].e, self.k[i].n) - v = self.E(v^e) - if (i+1) % self.n == 0: - c = v - s[z] = self.g(v^u, self.k[z].d, self.k[z].n) - return [c] + s - - def verify(self, m, X): - self.permut(m) - def _f(i): - return self.g(X[i+1], self.k[i].e, self.k[i].n) - y = map(_f, range(len(X)-1)) - def _g(x, i): - return self.E(x^y[i]) - r = reduce(_g, range(self.n), X[0]) - return r == X[0] - - def permut(self, m): - self.p = int(hashlib.sha1('%s' % m).hexdigest(),16) - - def E(self, x): - msg = '%s%s' % (x, self.p) - return int(hashlib.sha1(msg).hexdigest(), 16) - - def g(self, x, e, n): - q, r = divmod(x, n) - if ((q + 1) * n) <= ((1 << self.l) - 1): - rslt = q * n + pow(r, e, n) - else: - rslt = x - return rslt -``` - -签名并验证两个由4个用户组成的环签名消息： - -```python -size = 4 -msg1, msg2 = 'hello', 'world!' - -def _rn(_): - return Crypto.PublicKey.RSA.generate(1024, os.urandom) - -key = map(_rn, range(size)) -r = ring(key) -for i in range(size): - s1 = r.sign(msg1, i) - s2 = r.sign(msg2, i) - assert r.verify(msg1, s1) and r.verify(msg2, s2) and not r.verify(msg1, s2) -``` - -# Reference - -1. [数字签名是什么？](http://www.ruanyifeng.com/blog/2011/08/what_is_a_digital_signature.html) -2. [Digital Signatures](http://learnmeabitcoin.com/guide/digital_signatures) -3. [比特币背后的密码学原理](https://www.jianshu.com/p/225ff9439132) -4. [《区块链原理设计与应用》第5章：密码学与安全技术](https://github.com/yjjnls/books/blob/master/block%20chain/%E5%8C%BA%E5%9D%97%E9%93%BE%E5%8E%9F%E7%90%86%E3%80%81%E8%AE%BE%E8%AE%A1%E4%B8%8E%E5%BA%94%E7%94%A8.pdf) -5. [Secure Hash Algorithms](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Hash_Algorithms) -6. [Digital Signature Algorithm](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_Signature_Algorithm) -7. [用实例给新手讲解RSA加密算法](https://www.cnblogs.com/jiftle/p/7903762.html) -8. [用Go语言实现环签名的签名和验证（一）](https://blog.csdn.net/qq_38200023/article/details/79902049) -9. [用Go语言实现环签名的签名和验证（二）](https://blog.csdn.net/qq_38200023/article/details/79912530) diff --git a/Basic/merkle_tree_in_blockchain.md b/Basic/merkle_tree_in_blockchain.md deleted file mode 100644 index eb725e4..0000000 --- a/Basic/merkle_tree_in_blockchain.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,264 +0,0 @@ -# Merkle tree in blockchain -- [Merkle tree in blockchain](#merkle-tree-in-blockchain) - - [区块链节点中的数据都存在哪里](#区块链节点中的数据都存在哪里) - - [比特币中的区块结构是怎样的](#比特币中的区块结构是怎样的) - - [什么是 Merkle Tree 和 Merkle Proof](#什么是-merkle-tree-和-merkle-proof) - - [以太坊中的 merkle tree](#以太坊中的-merkle-tree) - - [Merkle Patricia tree](#merkle-patricia-tree) - - [更深入的 Merkle Patricia tree](#更深入的-merkle-patricia-tree) - - [Transaction trie](#transaction-trie) - - [State Trie](#state-trie) - - [Storage trie](#storage-trie) - - -## 区块链节点中的数据都存在哪里 - -在持久化方面，区块链数据可以直接存储在一个扁平的文件中，也可以存储在简单的数据库系统中，比特币和以太坊都区块链数据存储在 google的 LevelDb中。 - -## 比特币中的区块结构是怎样的 - -![](http://upload-images.jianshu.io/upload_images/11336404-713157d70bdf8b6a?imageMogr2/auto-orient/strip%7CimageView2/2/w/1240) - -Version: 用于区分软件版本号Previous Block Hash：是指向前一个区块头的 hash。在比特币中，区块头的 hash一般都是临时算出，并没有包含在本区块头或者区块中，但在持久化的时候可以作为索引存储以提高性能 - -Nonce、Difficulty Target和 Timestamp : 用在 pow共识算法中。 - -Merkle Root： 是区块中所有交易的指纹，merkle tree的树根。交易在区块链节点之间传播，所有节点都按相同的算法（merkle tree）将交易组合起来，如此可以判断交易是否完全一致,此外也用于轻量钱包中快速验证一个交易是否存在于一个区块中。 - -## 什么是 Merkle Tree 和 Merkle Proof - -![](http://upload-images.jianshu.io/upload_images/11336404-e83df55bc68ea283?imageMogr2/auto-orient/strip%7CimageView2/2/w/1240) - -如上图，merkle Tree是一颗平衡树，树根也就是 Merkle Root存在区块头中。树的构建过程是递归地的计算 Hash的过程，如：先是 Hash交易 a得到 Ha，Hash交易 b得到 Hb，再 Hash前两个 Hash（也就是 Ha和 Hb）得到 Hab，其他节点也是同理递归，最终得到 Merkle Root。 - -Merkle tree在区块链中有两个作用： - -1. 仅仅看 merkle root就可以知道区块中的所有交易是不是一样的 - -2. 对于轻量节点来说（不存储所有的交易信息，只同步区块头）提供了快速验证一个交易是否存在交易中的方法。 - -merkle proof从某处出发向上遍历，算出 merkle Root的所需要经过的路径节点。在上图的例子中，如果轻量钱包要验证 Txb（红色方框）是否已经包含在区块中，可以向全量节点请求 merkle Proof，用于证明 Txb的存在，过程为： - -1. 全量节点只要返回黄色部分的节点信息（Ha与 Hcd） - -2. 轻量节点执行计算 Hash(Txb)=Hb à Hash(Ha + Hb)=Hab à Hash(Hab + Hcd)=Habcd，计算出来的 merkleRoot(也就是 Habcd)跟已知区块头中的 merkleRoot比较，如果一样则认为交易确实已经入块。 - -在上图的区块中，仅仅存在少量的区块。如果区块所包含的交易很多，merkle proof仅仅需要带 log2(N)个节点，此时 merkle proof的优势就会变得非常明显。 - -## 以太坊中的 merkle tree - -在比特币中，系统底层不维护每个账户的余额，只有 UTXO（Unspent Transaction Outputs）。账户之间的转账通过交易完成，确切地说，比特币用户将 UTXO作为交易的输入，可以花掉一个或者多个 UTXO。 - -一个 UTXO像一张现金纸币，要么不使用，要么全部使用，而不能只花一部分。举个例子来说，一个用户有一个价值 1比特币的 UTXO，如果他想转账 0.5给某人，那他可以创建一个交易，以这个价值 1比特币的 UTXO为输入，另外产生 0.5比特币的 OTXO作为这个交易的输出（找零给自己）。 - -比特币这个公开底层系统本身不单独维护每个账户的余额，不过比特币钱包可以记录每个用户所拥有的 UTXO，这样计算出用户的余额。 - -以太坊相比比特币，额外引入了账号状态数据，比如 nonce、余额 balance和合约数据，这些是区块链的关键数据，具有以下特性： - -随着交易的入块需要不断高效地更新，所有的这些数据在不同节点之间能够高效地验证是一致的，状态数据不断更新的过程中，历史版本的数据数据需要保留。 - -系统中的每个节点执行完相同区块和交易后，那么这些节点中对应的所有账户数据都是一样的，账户列表相同，账户对应的余额等数据也相同。总的来说，这些账户数据就像状态机的状态，每个节点执行相同区块后，达到的状态应该是完全一致的。但是，这个状态并不是直接写到区块里面，因为这些数据都是可以由区块和交易重新产生的，如果写到区块里面会增加区块的大小，加重区块同步的负担。 - -![](http://upload-images.jianshu.io/upload_images/11336404-080b75ab1e7c9261?imageMogr2/auto-orient/strip%7CimageView2/2/w/1240) - -如上所示，区块头中保存了三个 merkle tree的 root: - -tansaction root: 跟比特币中的 Merkle Root作用相同，相当于区块中交易的指纹，用于快速验   证交易是否相同以及证明某个交易的存在。 - -state root: 这颗树是账户状态（余额和 nonce等）存放的地方，除此之外，还保存着 storage root，也就是合约数据保存的地方。receipts root:区块中合约相关的交易输出的事件。 - -## Merkle Patricia tree - -在 Transaction Root中，用类似比特币的二进制 merkle tree是能够解决问题的，因为它更适用于处理队列数据，一旦建好就不再修改。但是对于 state tree，情况就复杂多了，本质上来说，状态数据更像一个 map，包含着账号和账号状态的映射关系。除此之外，state tree还需要经常更新，经常插入或者删除，这样重新计算 Root的性能就显得尤其重要。 - -Trie是一种字典树，用于存储文本字符，并利用了单词之间共享前缀的特点，所以也叫做前缀树。Trie树在有些时候是比较浪费空间的，如下所示，即使这颗树只有两个词，如果这两个词很长，那么这颗树的节点也会变得非常多，无论是对于存储还是对于 cpu来说都是不可接受的。如下所示： - -![](http://upload-images.jianshu.io/upload_images/11336404-d1e60c3f5bab8680?imageMogr2/auto-orient/strip%7CimageView2/2/w/1240) - -相比 Trie树，Patricia Trie将那些公共的的路径压缩以节省空间和提高效率，如下所示： - -![](http://upload-images.jianshu.io/upload_images/11336404-e70174b908356ec8?imageMogr2/auto-orient/strip%7CimageView2/2/w/1240) - -以太坊中的 Merkle Patricia trie，顾名思义，它是 Patricia trie和 Merkle Tree的结合，即具有 merkle tree的特性，也具有 Patricia Trie的特征： - -1.密码学安全，每个节点都都是按 hash引用，hash用来在 LevelDb中找对应的存储数据； - -2.像 Patricia trie树一样，这些可以根据 Path来找对应的节点以找到 value； - -3.引入了多种节点类型： - -a.空节点 (比如说当一颗树刚刚创建为空的时候) - -b.叶子节点，最普通的 [key, value] - -c.扩展节点，跟叶子节点类似，不过值变成了指向别的节点的 hash,[key, hash] - -d.分支节点，是一个长度为 17的列表，前 16元素为可能的十六进制字符，最后一个元素为 value(如果这是 path的终点的话) - -举个例子： - -![](http://upload-images.jianshu.io/upload_images/11336404-18ee531a20343340?imageMogr2/auto-orient/strip%7CimageView2/2/w/1240) - -在上图中的 trie包含了 4对 key value，需要注意的是，key是按照 16进制来显示的，也就是 a7占用一个字节，11占用一个字节等等 - -1.第一层的 Node是扩展节点，4个 Key都有公有的前缀 a7,next node指向一个分支节点 - -2.第二层是一个分支节点，由于 key转换成了十六进制，每个 branch最多有 16个分支。下标也作为 path的一部分用于 path查找。比如说下标为 1的元素中指向最左边的叶子节点（key-end为 1355）,到叶子节点就完成了 key搜索：扩展节点中 a7 + 分支节点下标 1 + 叶子节点 1355 = a711355 - -3.叶子节点和扩展节点的区分。正如上面提到的，叶子节点和扩展节点都是两个字段的节点，也就是 [key，value]，存储中没有专门字段用来标识类型。为了区分这两种节点类型并节省空间，在 key中加入了 4bits（1 nibble）的 flags的前缀，用 flags的倒数第二低的位指示是叶子节点还是扩展节点。此外，加入了 4bits之后，key的长度还有可能不是偶数个 nibble（存储中只能按字节存储），为此，如果 key是奇数个 nibble，在 flags nibble之后再添加一个空的 nibble，并且用 flags的最低位表示是否有添加，详见上图左下角。 - -## 更深入的 Merkle Patricia tree - -更详细的字段关系如下图所示： - -![](http://upload-images.jianshu.io/upload_images/11336404-eddd4da7b467b169?imageMogr2/auto-orient/strip%7CimageView2/2/w/1240) - -下面将通过代码片段的形式，逐一验证各个 trie的结构（前提条件是先在本地搭建起以太坊私有链）。 - -### Transaction trie -如下所示，在本地环境发送交易并使之入块，查看区块的交易列表，TransactionsRoot和 RawTransaction： - -``` -> eth.getBlock(49).transactions -["0xdf648e4ce9bed9d3b0b35d969056ac496207692f96bd13327807e920e97a1b2f"] -> eth.getBlock(49).transactionsRoot -"0x1a65885367afcc561411fe68ed870e4952b11477ad5314de1ae8f26d48a03724" ->eth.getRawTransaction("0xdf648e4ce9bed9d3b0b35d969056ac496207692f96bd13327807e920e97a1b2f") -"0xf86505850430e2340083015f90947b04e3fe46e1cd9939bf572307fdc076478b5252018042a0e9893deacc678345ea700e714b84ce31ffe4a50267c324436fab2c48906871ada03704497c029452a1b19b1f4876e958ec7e873600408d89a8bf46e53c6e5f921e" -``` - -在 trie包中写单测函数，key为交易在区块中的 index，RLP编码，value为签名过的原始交易 RawTransaction： - -``` -func TestMyTrieCalculateTxTree(t *testing.T) { -    var trie Trie -    keybuf := new(bytes.Buffer) -    rlp.Encode(keybuf, uint(0)) -    valueBytes, _ := -        hexutil.Decode("0xf86505850430e2340083015f90947b04e3fe46e1cd9939bf572307fdc076478b5252018042a0e9893deacc678345ea700e714b84ce31ffe4a50267c324436fab2c48906871ada03704497c029452a1b19b1f4876e958ec7e873600408d89a8bf46e53c6e5f921e") -   trie.Update(keybuf.Bytes(), valueBytes) -    t.Logf("Got Root:%s", trie.Hash().String()) -} -``` - -运行输出得到的 Hash，也即 transactionsRoot为： - -``` -0x1a65885367afcc561411fe68ed870e4952b11477ad5314de1ae8f26d48a03724，跟 eth.getBlock(49).transactionsRoot得到的是一致的。 -$ go test -v -run TestMyTrieCalculateTxTree -=== RUN  TestMyTrieCalculateTxTree ---- PASS: TestMyTrieCalculateTxTree (0.00s) -    my_trie_test.go:18: Got Root:0x1a65885367afcc561411fe68ed870e4952b11477ad5314de1ae8f26d48a03724 -PASS -ok     github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/trie    0.036s -``` - -### State Trie - -获取最新的区块的 stateRoot，以及打印出账号 0x08e5f4cc4d1b04c450d00693c95ae58825f6a307的余额 - -``` -> eth.getBlock(eth.blockNumber).stateRoot -"0xccc450ac770b0a644b81a8c0729733cf06d19f177e04fe664e1562dc3a620d60" -> eth.getBalance("0x08e5f4cc4d1b04c450d00693c95ae58825f6a307") -2.3229575729235784806170618e+25 -``` - -在 state包中写单测函数，state trie的数据以 trie节点 hash为 key存在 leveldb中，所以整个 state trie的入口 key就是 stateRoot。state tree中存储数据的 path为 account的 hash，value为 RLP编码过的结构体数据。为了简单起见和节省篇幅，这里省去了错误检查。 - -``` -func TestMyTrieCalculateStateTree(t *testing.T) { -    ldb, _ := ethdb.NewLDBDatabase("/Users/peace/ethereum/geth/chaindata", 0, 0) -    tr, _ := trie.New(common.HexToHash("0xccc450ac770b0a644b81a8c0729733cf06d19f177e04fe664e1562dc3a620d60"), -        trie.NewDatabase(ldb)) - -    accBytes, _ := hexutil.Decode("0x08e5f4cc4d1b04c450d00693c95ae58825f6a307") -    keyBytes := crypto.Keccak256Hash(accBytes).Bytes() -    valueBytes, _ := tr.TryGet(keyBytes) - -    var acc Account -    rlp.DecodeBytes(valueBytes, &acc) -    t.Logf("balance:%d", acc.Balance) -} -``` - -运行输出得到 0x08e5f4cc4d1b04c450d00693c95ae58825f6a307的余额，跟 eth.getBalance接口得到的结果是一致的。 - -``` -peaces-MacBook-Air:state peace$ go test -v -run TestMyTrieCalculateStateTree -=== RUN  TestMyTrieCalculateStateTree ---- PASS: TestMyTrieCalculateStateTree (0.01s) -    my_state_test.go:25: balance:23229575729235784806170618 -PASS -ok     github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/core/state  0.051s -``` - -### Storage trie - -如下合约，为了简单起见，合约中省去了构造函数等不相关的内容，部署后地址为： - -``` -0x9ea9b9eeac924fd784b064dabf174a55113c4064。 -pragma solidity ^0.4.0; -contract testStorage { -   uint storeduint = 2018; -   string storedstring = 'Onething, OneWorld!'; -} -``` - -获取到当前最新块的 stateRoot为 0x86bce3794034cddb3126ec488d38cb3ee840eeff4e64c3afe0ec5a5ca8b5f6ed。 - -```sh -> eth.getBlock(eth.blockNumber).stateRoot -"0x86bce3794034cddb3126ec488d38cb3ee840eeff4e64c3afe0ec5a5ca8b5f6ed" -``` - -在 state包中写单测函数，首先获以 0x86bce3794034cddb3126ec488d38cb3ee840eeff4e64c3afe0ec5a5ca8b5f6ed创建 trie，取获取合约账号 0x9ea9b9eeac924fd784b064dabf174a55113c4064的 storageRoot,之后再以这个 storageRoot创建 trie。在取合约内部数据时，key为 hash过的 32字节 index，value为 RLP编码过的值。 - -``` -func TestMyTrieGetStorageData(t *testing.T) { -    ldb, _ := ethdb.NewLDBDatabase("/Users/peace/ethereum/geth/chaindata", 0, 0) -    statTr, _ := -        trie.New(common.HexToHash("0x86bce3794034cddb3126ec488d38cb3ee840eeff4e64c3afe0ec5a5ca8b5f6ed"), -            trie.NewDatabase(ldb)) - -    accBytes, _ := hexutil.Decode("0x9ea9b9eeac924fd784b064dabf174a55113c4064") -    accKeyBytes := crypto.Keccak256Hash(accBytes).Bytes() -    accValueBytes, _ := statTr.TryGet(accKeyBytes) - -    var acc Account -    rlp.DecodeBytes(accValueBytes, &acc) -    t.Logf("storageRoot:%s", acc.Root.String()) - -    storageTr, _ := trie.New(common.HexToHash(acc.Root.String()), -        trie.NewDatabase(ldb)) -    index0KeyBytes, _ := hexutil.Decode("0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000") -    index0ValuesBytes, _ := storageTr.TryGet(crypto.Keccak256Hash(index0KeyBytes).Bytes()) -    var storedUint uint -    rlp.DecodeBytes(index0ValuesBytes, &storedUint) -    t.Logf("storedUint: %d", storedUint) - -    index1KeyBytes, _ := hexutil.Decode("0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001") -    index1ValuesBytes, _ := storageTr.TryGet(crypto.Keccak256Hash(index1KeyBytes).Bytes()) -    t.Logf("raw bytes: %s", hexutil.Encode(index1ValuesBytes)) -    var storedString string -    rlp.DecodeBytes(index1ValuesBytes, &storedString) -    t.Logf("storedString: %s", storedString) -} -``` - -运行输出以下数据 storedUint为 2018，跟合约里的数据是一致的。值得注意的是 storedString的数据后面多了一个十六进制的 26(十进制为 38)，是字符串长度 (19)的两倍，更多的细节请参见 http://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/miscellaneous.html#layout-of-state-variables-in-storage。 - -同时，更复杂的数据结构如变长数组、map等规则会更加复杂，同时这里也忽略了一些字段打包存储等细节，但是都围绕着 storageTrie，基本原理没有改变。 - -``` -go test -v -run TestMyTrieGetStorageData -=== RUN  TestMyTrieGetStorageData ---- PASS: TestMyTrieGetStorageData (0.01s) -    my_state_test.go:41: storageRoot:0x3fa426aa67fff5c38788fe04e4f9815652d0b259a44efed794c309577ddc2057 -    my_state_test.go:49: storedUint: 2018 -    my_state_test.go:53: raw bytes: 0xa04f6e657468696e672c204f6e65576f726c642100000000000000000000000026 -    my_state_test.go:56: storedString: Onething, OneWorld!& -PASS -ok     github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/core/state  0.047s -``` diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index e074203..784a9db 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -134,22 +134,27 @@ The "classic" Satoshi-blockchain is like a git repo with a single master branch --> - **Encryption knowledge** - * [Basic concepts](./Basic/crypto.md#%E6%95%B0%E5%AD%97%E5%8A%A0%E5%AF%86%E7%9B%B8%E5%85%B3%E7%9F%A5%E8%AF%86) - Asymmetric encryption, Digital signature, Certificate - * [Digital signature extension](./Basic/crypto.md#%E6%95%B0%E5%AD%97%E7%AD%BE%E5%90%8D%E6%89%A9%E5%B1%95) - Multi-signature, Blind signature, Group signature, Ring signature - * [Merkle tree](./Basic/crypto.md#merkle-tree) - * [Merkle tree in blockchain](./Basic/merkle_tree_in_blockchain.md) + * [Basic concepts](https://www.jianshu.com/p/a044b303f7d5) - Asymmetric encryption, Digital signature, Certificate + * [Digital signature extension](https://www.jianshu.com/p/410e77ec23fa) - Multi-signature, Blind signature, Group signature, Ring signature + * [Merkle tree](https://www.jianshu.com/p/a044b303f7d5) + * [Merkle DAG](http://www.sohu.com/a/247540268_100222281) * [**CryptoNote v2.0**](https://cryptonote.org/whitepaper.pdf) - Untraceable Transactions and Egalitarian Proof-of-work - **Consensus** + * [Proof of Work](https://www.jianshu.com/p/3462f2ed74d7) + * [Proof of Stake](https://www.jianshu.com/p/2fd3bce523b0) * [Proof of Stake FAQs](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Proof-of-Stake-FAQs) / [Chinese version](https://ethfans.org/posts/Proof-of-Stake-FAQ-new-2018-3-15) + * [Delegated Proof of Stake](https://www.jianshu.com/p/ccc3fff7a60d) + * [Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance](https://www.jianshu.com/p/e991c1385f9f) - **Account and transaction model** + * [UTXO model](https://www.jianshu.com/p/2f4e75dbc2e4) From b417813ed9b9afe13193f7794a2c92794b8f4b14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Mon, 13 May 2019 16:23:22 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 16/68] add eth yellow paper cn --- README.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 784a9db..56a44b0 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo - [Ethereum white paper](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper) / [Chinese version](./Ethereum/white%20paper.md) - [Mastering Ethereum](https://github.com/ethereumbook/ethereumbook) / [Chinese version](https://github.com/inoutcode/ethereum_book) -- [Ethereum Yellow Paper](https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf) +- [Ethereum Yellow Paper](https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf) / [Chinese version](https://github.com/yuange1024/ethereum_yellowpaper) - [Ethereum wiki](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki) - [Ethereum Design Rationale](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Design-Rationale) / [Chinese version](https://ethfans.org/posts/510) - [Ethereum problems](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Problems) @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo ### truffle ### web3.js -- [doc](https://web3js.readthedocs.io/en/1.0/) +- [doc](https://web3js.readthedocs.io/en/1.0/) / [Chinese version](http://web3.tryblockchain.org/Web3.js-api-refrence.html) ## Implementation of Blockchain - [**ATS**: _Functional Blockchain_](https://beta.observablehq.com/@galletti94/functional-blockchain) From e93887165b817b12630aba40a5bcd48bf2ba6b79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 13:27:47 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 17/68] fix misspelling --- README.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 56a44b0..6ee222e 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ The blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions that - [Monero](#monero) - [IOTA](#iota) - [EOS](#eos) - - [IFPS](#ifps) + - [IPFS](#ipfs) - [Filecoin](#filecoin) - [BigchainDB](#bigchaindb) - [BitShares](#bitshares) @@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo [](https://github.com/ipfs) -### IFPS +### IPFS **IPFS** ([the InterPlanetary File System](https://github.com/ipfs/faq/issues/76)) is a new hypermedia distribution protocol, addressed by content and identities. IPFS enables the creation of completely distributed applications. It aims to make the web faster, safer, and more open. **IPFS** is a distributed file system that seeks to connect all computing devices with the same system of files. In some ways, this is similar to the original aims of the Web, but IPFS is actually more similar to a single bittorrent swarm exchanging git objects. You can read more about its origins in the paper [IPFS - Content Addressed, Versioned, P2P File System](https://github.com/ipfs/ipfs/blob/master/papers/ipfs-cap2pfs/ipfs-p2p-file-system.pdf?raw=true). From d7120b7b8768fab12ffc1c732946a43ebbdb5712 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 17:07:33 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 18/68] add erc20 and modify basic chain folder --- src/.gitignore | 3 +- src/ERC20/contracts/Migrations.sol | 23 ++ src/ERC20/contracts/erc20/ERC20.sol | 73 ++++++ src/ERC20/contracts/erc20/ERC20Interface.sol | 50 ++++ src/ERC20/migrations/1_initial_migration.js | 5 + src/ERC20/migrations/2_deploy_tokens.js | 5 + src/ERC20/test/erc20.js | 221 ++++++++++++++++++ src/ERC20/truffle-config.js | 100 ++++++++ src/{ => basic_chain}/js/Readme.md | 2 +- src/{ => basic_chain}/js/account.js | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/block.js | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/blockchain.js | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/consensus/dpos.js | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/consensus/pbft.js | 0 .../js/consensus/peercoin.cc | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/consensus/pos.js | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/consensus/pow.js | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/consensus/slot.js | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/crypto.js | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/genesis_block.json | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/message.js | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/network.js | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/package.json | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/test/create_block.js | 0 .../js/test/create_genesis.js | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/test/db.js | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/test/dpos.js | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/test/dpos_pbft.js | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/test/network.js | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/test/pow.js | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/test/sync.js | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/test/transaction.js | 0 src/{ => basic_chain}/js/transaction.js | 0 33 files changed, 480 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/ERC20/contracts/Migrations.sol create mode 100644 src/ERC20/contracts/erc20/ERC20.sol create mode 100644 src/ERC20/contracts/erc20/ERC20Interface.sol create mode 100644 src/ERC20/migrations/1_initial_migration.js create mode 100644 src/ERC20/migrations/2_deploy_tokens.js create mode 100644 src/ERC20/test/erc20.js create mode 100644 src/ERC20/truffle-config.js rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/Readme.md (79%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/account.js (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/block.js (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/blockchain.js (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/consensus/dpos.js (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/consensus/pbft.js (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/consensus/peercoin.cc (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/consensus/pos.js (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/consensus/pow.js (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/consensus/slot.js (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/crypto.js (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/genesis_block.json (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/message.js (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/network.js (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/package.json (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/test/create_block.js (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/test/create_genesis.js (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/test/db.js (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/test/dpos.js (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/test/dpos_pbft.js (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/test/network.js (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/test/pow.js (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/test/sync.js (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/test/transaction.js (100%) rename src/{ => basic_chain}/js/transaction.js (100%) diff --git a/src/.gitignore b/src/.gitignore index 074ab52..8ef3c88 100644 --- a/src/.gitignore +++ b/src/.gitignore @@ -1,2 +1,3 @@ package-lock.json -node_modules \ No newline at end of file +node_modules +build \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/src/ERC20/contracts/Migrations.sol b/src/ERC20/contracts/Migrations.sol new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c378ffb --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ERC20/contracts/Migrations.sol @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +pragma solidity >=0.4.21 <0.6.0; + +contract Migrations { + address public owner; + uint public last_completed_migration; + + constructor() public { + owner = msg.sender; + } + + modifier restricted() { + if (msg.sender == owner) _; + } + + function setCompleted(uint completed) public restricted { + last_completed_migration = completed; + } + + function upgrade(address new_address) public restricted { + Migrations upgraded = Migrations(new_address); + upgraded.setCompleted(last_completed_migration); + } +} diff --git a/src/ERC20/contracts/erc20/ERC20.sol b/src/ERC20/contracts/erc20/ERC20.sol new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ace5169 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ERC20/contracts/erc20/ERC20.sol @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* +Implements EIP20 token standard: https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-20.md +.*/ + + +pragma solidity ^0.5.0; + +import "./ERC20Interface.sol"; + + +contract ERC20 is ERC20Interface { + + uint256 constant private MAX_UINT256 = 2**256 - 1; + mapping (address => uint256) public balances; + mapping (address => mapping (address => uint256)) public allowed; + /* + NOTE: + The following variables are OPTIONAL vanities. One does not have to include them. + They allow one to customise the token contract & in no way influences the core functionality. + Some wallets/interfaces might not even bother to look at this information. + */ + string public name; //fancy name: eg Simon Bucks + uint8 public decimals; //How many decimals to show. + string public symbol; //An identifier: eg SBX + uint256 public totalSupply; + + constructor( + uint256 _initialAmount, + string memory _tokenName, + uint8 _decimalUnits, + string memory _tokenSymbol + ) public { + balances[msg.sender] = _initialAmount; // Give the creator all initial tokens + totalSupply = _initialAmount; // Update total supply + name = _tokenName; // Set the name for display purposes + decimals = _decimalUnits; // Amount of decimals for display purposes + symbol = _tokenSymbol; // Set the symbol for display purposes + } + + function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (bool success) { + require(balances[msg.sender] >= _value); + balances[msg.sender] -= _value; + balances[_to] += _value; + emit Transfer(msg.sender, _to, _value); //solhint-disable-line indent, no-unused-vars + return true; + } + + function transferFrom(address _from, address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (bool success) { + uint256 allowance = allowed[_from][msg.sender]; + require(balances[_from] >= _value && allowance >= _value); + balances[_to] += _value; + balances[_from] -= _value; + if (allowance < MAX_UINT256) { + allowed[_from][msg.sender] -= _value; + } + emit Transfer(_from, _to, _value); //solhint-disable-line indent, no-unused-vars + return true; + } + + function balanceOf(address _owner) public view returns (uint256 balance) { + return balances[_owner]; + } + + function approve(address _spender, uint256 _value) public returns (bool success) { + allowed[msg.sender][_spender] = _value; + emit Approval(msg.sender, _spender, _value); //solhint-disable-line indent, no-unused-vars + return true; + } + + function allowance(address _owner, address _spender) public view returns (uint256 remaining) { + return allowed[_owner][_spender]; + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/src/ERC20/contracts/erc20/ERC20Interface.sol b/src/ERC20/contracts/erc20/ERC20Interface.sol new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8951a25 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ERC20/contracts/erc20/ERC20Interface.sol @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +// Abstract contract for the full ERC 20 Token standard +// https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-20.md +pragma solidity ^0.5.0; + + +contract ERC20Interface { + /* This is a slight change to the ERC20 base standard. + function totalSupply() constant returns (uint256 supply); + is replaced with: + uint256 public totalSupply; + This automatically creates a getter function for the totalSupply. + This is moved to the base contract since public getter functions are not + currently recognised as an implementation of the matching abstract + function by the compiler. + */ + /// total amount of tokens + uint256 public totalSupply; + + /// @param _owner The address from which the balance will be retrieved + /// @return The balance + function balanceOf(address _owner) public view returns (uint256 balance); + + /// @notice send `_value` token to `_to` from `msg.sender` + /// @param _to The address of the recipient + /// @param _value The amount of token to be transferred + /// @return Whether the transfer was successful or not + function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (bool success); + + /// @notice send `_value` token to `_to` from `_from` on the condition it is approved by `_from` + /// @param _from The address of the sender + /// @param _to The address of the recipient + /// @param _value The amount of token to be transferred + /// @return Whether the transfer was successful or not + function transferFrom(address _from, address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (bool success); + + /// @notice `msg.sender` approves `_spender` to spend `_value` tokens + /// @param _spender The address of the account able to transfer the tokens + /// @param _value The amount of tokens to be approved for transfer + /// @return Whether the approval was successful or not + function approve(address _spender, uint256 _value) public returns (bool success); + + /// @param _owner The address of the account owning tokens + /// @param _spender The address of the account able to transfer the tokens + /// @return Amount of remaining tokens allowed to spent + function allowance(address _owner, address _spender) public view returns (uint256 remaining); + + // solhint-disable-next-line no-simple-event-func-name + event Transfer(address indexed _from, address indexed _to, uint256 _value); + event Approval(address indexed _owner, address indexed _spender, uint256 _value); +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/src/ERC20/migrations/1_initial_migration.js b/src/ERC20/migrations/1_initial_migration.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000..145cfb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ERC20/migrations/1_initial_migration.js @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +const Migrations = artifacts.require("Migrations"); + +module.exports = function (deployer) { + deployer.deploy(Migrations); +}; diff --git a/src/ERC20/migrations/2_deploy_tokens.js b/src/ERC20/migrations/2_deploy_tokens.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0b1fcb7 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ERC20/migrations/2_deploy_tokens.js @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +const ERC20 = artifacts.require("ERC20"); + +module.exports = (deployer) => { + deployer.deploy(ERC20, 10000, 'Simon Bucks', 1, 'SBX'); +}; diff --git a/src/ERC20/test/erc20.js b/src/ERC20/test/erc20.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b8fefba --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ERC20/test/erc20.js @@ -0,0 +1,221 @@ +"use strict"; + +let assertRevert = async (promise) => { + try { + await promise; + } catch (error) { + const revertFound = error.message.search('revert') >= 0; + assert(revertFound, `Expected "revert", got ${error} instead`); + return; + } + assert.fail('Expected revert not received'); +}; + +const ERC20Abstraction = artifacts.require('ERC20'); +let HST; + +contract('ERC20', (accounts) => { + beforeEach(async () => { + HST = await ERC20Abstraction.new(10000, 'Simon Bucks', 1, 'SBX', { from: accounts[0] }); + }); + + it('creation: should create an initial balance of 10000 for the creator', async () => { + const balance = await HST.balanceOf.call(accounts[0]); + assert.strictEqual(balance.toNumber(), 10000); + }); + + it('creation: test correct setting of vanity information', async () => { + const name = await HST.name.call(); + assert.strictEqual(name, 'Simon Bucks'); + + const decimals = await HST.decimals.call(); + assert.strictEqual(decimals.toNumber(), 1); + + const symbol = await HST.symbol.call(); + assert.strictEqual(symbol, 'SBX'); + }); + + it.skip('creation: should succeed in creating over 2^256 - 1 (max) tokens', async () => { + // 2^256 - 1 + const HST2 = await ERC20Abstraction.new('115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935', 'Simon Bucks', 1, 'SBX', { from: accounts[0] }); + const totalSupply = await HST2.totalSupply(); + const match = totalSupply.equals('1.15792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935e+77'); + assert(match, 'result is not correct'); + }); + + // TRANSERS + // normal transfers without approvals + it('transfers: ether transfer should be reversed.', async () => { + const balanceBefore = await HST.balanceOf.call(accounts[0]); + assert.strictEqual(balanceBefore.toNumber(), 10000); + + await assertRevert(new Promise((resolve, reject) => { + web3.eth.sendTransaction({ from: accounts[0], to: HST.address, value: web3.utils.toWei('10', 'Ether') }, (err, res) => { + if (err) { reject(err); } + resolve(res); + }); + })); + + const balanceAfter = await HST.balanceOf.call(accounts[0]); + assert.strictEqual(balanceAfter.toNumber(), 10000); + }); + + it('transfers: should transfer 10000 to accounts[1] with accounts[0] having 10000', async () => { + await HST.transfer(accounts[1], 10000, { from: accounts[0] }); + const balance = await HST.balanceOf.call(accounts[1]); + assert.strictEqual(balance.toNumber(), 10000); + }); + + it('transfers: should fail when trying to transfer 10001 to accounts[1] with accounts[0] having 10000', async () => { + await assertRevert(HST.transfer.call(accounts[1], 10001, { from: accounts[0] })); + }); + + it('transfers: should handle zero-transfers normally', async () => { + assert(await HST.transfer.call(accounts[1], 0, { from: accounts[0] }), 'zero-transfer has failed'); + }); + + // NOTE: testing uint256 wrapping is impossible since you can't supply > 2^256 -1 + // todo: transfer max amounts + + // APPROVALS + it('approvals: msg.sender should approve 100 to accounts[1]', async () => { + await HST.approve(accounts[1], 100, { from: accounts[0] }); + const allowance = await HST.allowance.call(accounts[0], accounts[1]); + assert.strictEqual(allowance.toNumber(), 100); + }); + + // bit overkill. But is for testing a bug + it('approvals: msg.sender approves accounts[1] of 100 & withdraws 20 once.', async () => { + const balance0 = await HST.balanceOf.call(accounts[0]); + assert.strictEqual(balance0.toNumber(), 10000); + + await HST.approve(accounts[1], 100, { from: accounts[0] }); // 100 + const balance2 = await HST.balanceOf.call(accounts[2]); + assert.strictEqual(balance2.toNumber(), 0, 'balance2 not correct'); + + await HST.transferFrom.call(accounts[0], accounts[2], 20, { from: accounts[1] }); + await HST.allowance.call(accounts[0], accounts[1]); + await HST.transferFrom(accounts[0], accounts[2], 20, { from: accounts[1] }); // -20 + const allowance01 = await HST.allowance.call(accounts[0], accounts[1]); + assert.strictEqual(allowance01.toNumber(), 80); // =80 + + const balance22 = await HST.balanceOf.call(accounts[2]); + assert.strictEqual(balance22.toNumber(), 20); + + const balance02 = await HST.balanceOf.call(accounts[0]); + assert.strictEqual(balance02.toNumber(), 9980); + }); + + // should approve 100 of msg.sender & withdraw 50, twice. (should succeed) + it('approvals: msg.sender approves accounts[1] of 100 & withdraws 20 twice.', async () => { + await HST.approve(accounts[1], 100, { from: accounts[0] }); + const allowance01 = await HST.allowance.call(accounts[0], accounts[1]); + assert.strictEqual(allowance01.toNumber(), 100); + + await HST.transferFrom(accounts[0], accounts[2], 20, { from: accounts[1] }); + const allowance012 = await HST.allowance.call(accounts[0], accounts[1]); + assert.strictEqual(allowance012.toNumber(), 80); + + const balance2 = await HST.balanceOf.call(accounts[2]); + assert.strictEqual(balance2.toNumber(), 20); + + const balance0 = await HST.balanceOf.call(accounts[0]); + assert.strictEqual(balance0.toNumber(), 9980); + + // FIRST tx done. + // onto next. + await HST.transferFrom(accounts[0], accounts[2], 20, { from: accounts[1] }); + const allowance013 = await HST.allowance.call(accounts[0], accounts[1]); + assert.strictEqual(allowance013.toNumber(), 60); + + const balance22 = await HST.balanceOf.call(accounts[2]); + assert.strictEqual(balance22.toNumber(), 40); + + const balance02 = await HST.balanceOf.call(accounts[0]); + assert.strictEqual(balance02.toNumber(), 9960); + }); + + // should approve 100 of msg.sender & withdraw 50 & 60 (should fail). + it('approvals: msg.sender approves accounts[1] of 100 & withdraws 50 & 60 (2nd tx should fail)', async () => { + await HST.approve(accounts[1], 100, { from: accounts[0] }); + const allowance01 = await HST.allowance.call(accounts[0], accounts[1]); + assert.strictEqual(allowance01.toNumber(), 100); + + await HST.transferFrom(accounts[0], accounts[2], 50, { from: accounts[1] }); + const allowance012 = await HST.allowance.call(accounts[0], accounts[1]); + assert.strictEqual(allowance012.toNumber(), 50); + + const balance2 = await HST.balanceOf.call(accounts[2]); + assert.strictEqual(balance2.toNumber(), 50); + + const balance0 = await HST.balanceOf.call(accounts[0]); + assert.strictEqual(balance0.toNumber(), 9950); + + // FIRST tx done. + // onto next. + await assertRevert(HST.transferFrom.call(accounts[0], accounts[2], 60, { from: accounts[1] })); + }); + + it('approvals: attempt withdrawal from account with no allowance (should fail)', async () => { + await assertRevert(HST.transferFrom.call(accounts[0], accounts[2], 60, { from: accounts[1] })); + }); + + it('approvals: allow accounts[1] 100 to withdraw from accounts[0]. Withdraw 60 and then approve 0 & attempt transfer.', async () => { + await HST.approve(accounts[1], 100, { from: accounts[0] }); + await HST.transferFrom(accounts[0], accounts[2], 60, { from: accounts[1] }); + await HST.approve(accounts[1], 0, { from: accounts[0] }); + await assertRevert(HST.transferFrom.call(accounts[0], accounts[2], 10, { from: accounts[1] })); + }); + + it.skip('approvals: approve max (2^256 - 1)', async () => { + await HST.approve(accounts[1], '115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935', { from: accounts[0] }); + const allowance = await HST.allowance(accounts[0], accounts[1]); + assert(allowance.equals('1.15792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935e+77')); + }); + + // should approve max of msg.sender & withdraw 20 without changing allowance (should succeed). + it.skip('approvals: msg.sender approves accounts[1] of max (2^256 - 1) & withdraws 20', async () => { + const balance0 = await HST.balanceOf.call(accounts[0]); + assert.strictEqual(balance0.toNumber(), 10000); + + const max = '1.15792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935e+77'; + await HST.approve(accounts[1], max, { from: accounts[0] }); + const balance2 = await HST.balanceOf.call(accounts[2]); + assert.strictEqual(balance2.toNumber(), 0, 'balance2 not correct'); + + await HST.transferFrom(accounts[0], accounts[2], 20, { from: accounts[1] }); + const allowance01 = await HST.allowance.call(accounts[0], accounts[1]); + assert(allowance01.equals(max)); + + const balance22 = await HST.balanceOf.call(accounts[2]); + assert.strictEqual(balance22.toNumber(), 20); + + const balance02 = await HST.balanceOf.call(accounts[0]); + assert.strictEqual(balance02.toNumber(), 9980); + }); + + /* eslint-disable no-underscore-dangle */ + it('events: should fire Transfer event properly', async () => { + const res = await HST.transfer(accounts[1], '2666', { from: accounts[0] }); + const transferLog = res.logs.find(element => element.event.match('Transfer')); + assert.strictEqual(transferLog.args._from, accounts[0]); + assert.strictEqual(transferLog.args._to, accounts[1]); + assert.strictEqual(transferLog.args._value.toString(), '2666'); + }); + + it('events: should fire Transfer event normally on a zero transfer', async () => { + const res = await HST.transfer(accounts[1], '0', { from: accounts[0] }); + const transferLog = res.logs.find(element => element.event.match('Transfer')); + assert.strictEqual(transferLog.args._from, accounts[0]); + assert.strictEqual(transferLog.args._to, accounts[1]); + assert.strictEqual(transferLog.args._value.toString(), '0'); + }); + + it('events: should fire Approval event properly', async () => { + const res = await HST.approve(accounts[1], '2666', { from: accounts[0] }); + const approvalLog = res.logs.find(element => element.event.match('Approval')); + assert.strictEqual(approvalLog.args._owner, accounts[0]); + assert.strictEqual(approvalLog.args._spender, accounts[1]); + assert.strictEqual(approvalLog.args._value.toString(), '2666'); + }); +}); diff --git a/src/ERC20/truffle-config.js b/src/ERC20/truffle-config.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eacef21 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ERC20/truffle-config.js @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +/** + * Use this file to configure your truffle project. It's seeded with some + * common settings for different networks and features like migrations, + * compilation and testing. Uncomment the ones you need or modify + * them to suit your project as necessary. + * + * More information about configuration can be found at: + * + * truffleframework.com/docs/advanced/configuration + * + * To deploy via Infura you'll need a wallet provider (like truffle-hdwallet-provider) + * to sign your transactions before they're sent to a remote public node. Infura accounts + * are available for free at: infura.io/register. + * + * You'll also need a mnemonic - the twelve word phrase the wallet uses to generate + * public/private key pairs. If you're publishing your code to GitHub make sure you load this + * phrase from a file you've .gitignored so it doesn't accidentally become public. + * + */ + +// const HDWalletProvider = require('truffle-hdwallet-provider'); +// const infuraKey = "fj4jll3k....."; +// +// const fs = require('fs'); +// const mnemonic = fs.readFileSync(".secret").toString().trim(); + +module.exports = { + + /** + * Networks define how you connect to your ethereum client and let you set the + * defaults web3 uses to send transactions. If you don't specify one truffle + * will spin up a development blockchain for you on port 9545 when you + * run `develop` or `test`. You can ask a truffle command to use a specific + * network from the command line, e.g + * + * $ truffle test --network + */ + + networks: { + // Useful for testing. The `development` name is special - truffle uses it by default + // if it's defined here and no other network is specified at the command line. + // You should run a client (like ganache-cli, geth or parity) in a separate terminal + // tab if you use this network and you must also set the `host`, `port` and `network_id` + // options below to some value. + // + development: { + host: "127.0.0.1", // Localhost (default: none) + port: 8545, // Standard Ethereum port (default: none) + network_id: "*", // Any network (default: none) + }, + + // Another network with more advanced options... + // advanced: { + // port: 8777, // Custom port + // network_id: 1342, // Custom network + // gas: 8500000, // Gas sent with each transaction (default: ~6700000) + // gasPrice: 20000000000, // 20 gwei (in wei) (default: 100 gwei) + // from:
, // Account to send txs from (default: accounts[0]) + // websockets: true // Enable EventEmitter interface for web3 (default: false) + // }, + + // Useful for deploying to a public network. + // NB: It's important to wrap the provider as a function. + // ropsten: { + // provider: () => new HDWalletProvider(mnemonic, `https://ropsten.infura.io/v3/YOUR-PROJECT-ID`), + // network_id: 3, // Ropsten's id + // gas: 5500000, // Ropsten has a lower block limit than mainnet + // confirmations: 2, // # of confs to wait between deployments. (default: 0) + // timeoutBlocks: 200, // # of blocks before a deployment times out (minimum/default: 50) + // skipDryRun: true // Skip dry run before migrations? (default: false for public nets ) + // }, + + // Useful for private networks + // private: { + // provider: () => new HDWalletProvider(mnemonic, `https://network.io`), + // network_id: 2111, // This network is yours, in the cloud. + // production: true // Treats this network as if it was a public net. (default: false) + // } + }, + + // Set default mocha options here, use special reporters etc. + mocha: { + // timeout: 100000 + }, + + // Configure your compilers + compilers: { + solc: { + // version: "0.5.1", // Fetch exact version from solc-bin (default: truffle's version) + // docker: true, // Use "0.5.1" you've installed locally with docker (default: false) + // settings: { // See the solidity docs for advice about optimization and evmVersion + // optimizer: { + // enabled: false, + // runs: 200 + // }, + // evmVersion: "byzantium" + // } + } + } +}; diff --git a/src/js/Readme.md b/src/basic_chain/js/Readme.md similarity index 79% rename from src/js/Readme.md rename to src/basic_chain/js/Readme.md index 12618e0..eecbda1 100644 --- a/src/js/Readme.md +++ b/src/basic_chain/js/Readme.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # BlockChain for Node.js -Basic implementation for blockchain in node.js +Basic implementation for blockchain in Node.js - [x] Block structure - [x] Blockchain structure diff --git a/src/js/account.js b/src/basic_chain/js/account.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/account.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/account.js diff --git a/src/js/block.js b/src/basic_chain/js/block.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/block.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/block.js diff --git a/src/js/blockchain.js b/src/basic_chain/js/blockchain.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/blockchain.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/blockchain.js diff --git a/src/js/consensus/dpos.js b/src/basic_chain/js/consensus/dpos.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/consensus/dpos.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/consensus/dpos.js diff --git a/src/js/consensus/pbft.js b/src/basic_chain/js/consensus/pbft.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/consensus/pbft.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/consensus/pbft.js diff --git a/src/js/consensus/peercoin.cc b/src/basic_chain/js/consensus/peercoin.cc similarity index 100% rename from src/js/consensus/peercoin.cc rename to src/basic_chain/js/consensus/peercoin.cc diff --git a/src/js/consensus/pos.js b/src/basic_chain/js/consensus/pos.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/consensus/pos.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/consensus/pos.js diff --git a/src/js/consensus/pow.js b/src/basic_chain/js/consensus/pow.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/consensus/pow.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/consensus/pow.js diff --git a/src/js/consensus/slot.js b/src/basic_chain/js/consensus/slot.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/consensus/slot.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/consensus/slot.js diff --git a/src/js/crypto.js b/src/basic_chain/js/crypto.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/crypto.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/crypto.js diff --git a/src/js/genesis_block.json b/src/basic_chain/js/genesis_block.json similarity index 100% rename from src/js/genesis_block.json rename to src/basic_chain/js/genesis_block.json diff --git a/src/js/message.js b/src/basic_chain/js/message.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/message.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/message.js diff --git a/src/js/network.js b/src/basic_chain/js/network.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/network.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/network.js diff --git a/src/js/package.json b/src/basic_chain/js/package.json similarity index 100% rename from src/js/package.json rename to src/basic_chain/js/package.json diff --git a/src/js/test/create_block.js b/src/basic_chain/js/test/create_block.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/test/create_block.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/test/create_block.js diff --git a/src/js/test/create_genesis.js b/src/basic_chain/js/test/create_genesis.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/test/create_genesis.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/test/create_genesis.js diff --git a/src/js/test/db.js b/src/basic_chain/js/test/db.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/test/db.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/test/db.js diff --git a/src/js/test/dpos.js b/src/basic_chain/js/test/dpos.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/test/dpos.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/test/dpos.js diff --git a/src/js/test/dpos_pbft.js b/src/basic_chain/js/test/dpos_pbft.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/test/dpos_pbft.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/test/dpos_pbft.js diff --git a/src/js/test/network.js b/src/basic_chain/js/test/network.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/test/network.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/test/network.js diff --git a/src/js/test/pow.js b/src/basic_chain/js/test/pow.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/test/pow.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/test/pow.js diff --git a/src/js/test/sync.js b/src/basic_chain/js/test/sync.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/test/sync.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/test/sync.js diff --git a/src/js/test/transaction.js b/src/basic_chain/js/test/transaction.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/test/transaction.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/test/transaction.js diff --git a/src/js/transaction.js b/src/basic_chain/js/transaction.js similarity index 100% rename from src/js/transaction.js rename to src/basic_chain/js/transaction.js From 51fdccafe46dc75de2a4d117aa0e52e6d9c6dc27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 20:44:18 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 19/68] fix --- src/ERC20/contracts/erc20/ERC20.sol | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/ERC20/contracts/erc20/ERC20.sol b/src/ERC20/contracts/erc20/ERC20.sol index ace5169..a18e7ca 100644 --- a/src/ERC20/contracts/erc20/ERC20.sol +++ b/src/ERC20/contracts/erc20/ERC20.sol @@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ contract ERC20 is ERC20Interface { string public name; //fancy name: eg Simon Bucks uint8 public decimals; //How many decimals to show. string public symbol; //An identifier: eg SBX - uint256 public totalSupply; constructor( uint256 _initialAmount, From 8f2e1f50dde15018f6a33fa74da793f0d49bc9bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yuanjunjie Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 23:18:03 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 20/68] add EEA concept --- README.md | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 6ee222e..1b80dcb 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -241,11 +241,21 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo - Token - [ERC20](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-20.md) ++ Utils + + [Ethereum Blockchain Explorer](https://etherscan.io/) + + [Eth Gas Station](https://ethgasstation.info/) + + [Eth Network Status](https://ethstats.net/) -+ [Ethereum Blockchain Explorer](https://etherscan.io/) -+ [Eth Gas Station](https://ethgasstation.info/) -+ [Eth Network Status](https://ethstats.net/) +- [**EEA** - Enterprise Ethereum: Private Blockchain For Enterprises](https://101blockchains.com/enterprise-ethereum/) + - [What Is Enterprise Ethereum?](https://101blockchains.com/enterprise-ethereum/#1) + - [What is The Enterprise Ethereum alliance?](https://101blockchains.com/enterprise-ethereum/#2) + - [Benefits of Enterprise Ethereum](https://101blockchains.com/enterprise-ethereum/#3) + - [Architecture Stack of the Enterprise Ethereum Blockchain](https://101blockchains.com/enterprise-ethereum/#4) + - [What Are The Possible Enterprise Ethereum Use Cases?](https://101blockchains.com/enterprise-ethereum/#5) + - [Ethereum Blockchain as a Service Providers](https://101blockchains.com/enterprise-ethereum/#6) + - [Real-World Companies Using Enterprise Ethereum](https://101blockchains.com/enterprise-ethereum/#7) + - [Final Words](https://101blockchains.com/enterprise-ethereum/#8) ### Consortium Blockchain * **Theory** From abf56dee0a67a676a1731a30c88b2fedb2d37779 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yuanjunjie Date: Sat, 25 May 2019 10:15:21 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 21/68] add Quorum --- README.md | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 1b80dcb..189d5e8 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ The blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions that - [web3.js](#web3js) - [Implementation of Blockchain](#implementation-of-blockchain) - [Projects and Applications](#projects-and-applications) + - [Quorum](#quorum) - [Monero](#monero) - [IOTA](#iota) - [EOS](#eos) @@ -350,6 +351,22 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo --- ## Projects and Applications +[](https://github.com/jpmorganchase/quorum) +### Quorum + +**Quorum** is an Ethereum-based distributed ledger protocol with transaction/contract privacy and new consensus mechanisms. + +**Quorum** is a fork of [go-ethereum](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum) and is updated in line with go-ethereum releases. + +Key enhancements over go-ethereum: + +* **Privacy** - Quorum supports private transactions and private contracts through public/private state separation, and utilises peer-to-peer encrypted message exchanges (see [Constellation](https://github.com/jpmorganchase/constellation) and [Tessera](https://github.com/jpmorganchase/tessera)) for directed transfer of private data to network participants +* **Alternative** Consensus Mechanisms - with no need for POW/POS in a permissioned network, Quorum instead offers multiple consensus mechanisms that are more appropriate for consortium chains: + * **Raft-based Consensus** - a consensus model for faster blocktimes, transaction finality, and on-demand block creation + * **Istanbul BFT** - a PBFT-inspired consensus algorithm with transaction finality, by AMIS. +* **Peer Permissioning** - node/peer permissioning using smart contracts, ensuring only known parties can join the network +* **Higher Performance** - Quorum offers significantly higher performance than public geth + [](https://github.com/monero-project/monero) ### Monero From b2c4b4b9aed4b87ce4e6511b1f23b9cb8b1e72e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: von-latinski <47537191+von-latinski@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 15:23:31 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 22/68] added Blockchain in Action to books list --- README.md | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 189d5e8..a028680 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -604,7 +604,15 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: Block format • Genesis block ++ References_ - + + - [**Blockchain in Action**](https://www.manning.com/books/blockchain-in-action) by Bina Ramamurthy, early access -- + _Learn how blockchain differs from other distributed systems ++ + Smart contract development with Ethereum and the Solidity language ++ + Web UI for decentralized apps ++ + Identity, privacy and security techniques ++ + On-chain and off-chain data storage_ + + ### Applications #### Identity Applications From 8eda55ccbf82aa04765dc56d4722a79ecb599714 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: von-latinski <47537191+von-latinski@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 15:24:40 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 23/68] added Blockchain in Action to books list --- README.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index a028680..5f1bd90 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: Genesis block ++ References_ - - [**Blockchain in Action**](https://www.manning.com/books/blockchain-in-action) by Bina Ramamurthy, early access -- +- [**Blockchain in Action**](https://www.manning.com/books/blockchain-in-action) by Bina Ramamurthy, early access -- _Learn how blockchain differs from other distributed systems ++ Smart contract development with Ethereum and the Solidity language ++ Web UI for decentralized apps ++ From da92f231b34a15265953b1db4852e2d4a2bafc94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 16:47:33 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 24/68] add blockchain papers --- README.md | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 5f1bd90..1bad201 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -11,49 +11,50 @@ The blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions that ## Contents
Click to expand -- [Awesome Blockchain](#awesome-blockchain) - - [Contents](#contents) - - [Frequently Asked Questions (F.A.Q.s) & Answers](#frequently-asked-questions-faqs--answers) - - [Basic Introduction](#basic-introduction) - - [Encryption knowledge](#encryption-knowledge) - - [Consensus](#consensus) - - [Account and transaction model](#account-and-transaction-model) - - [Exchange](#exchange) - - [Applications](#applications) - - [Governance](#governance) - - [Digital currency ranking](#digital-currency-ranking) - - [Development Tutorial](#development-tutorial) - - [BitCoin](#bitcoin) - - [Ethereum](#ethereum) - - [Consortium Blockchain](#consortium-blockchain) - - [Fabric](#fabric) - - [FISCO-BCOS](#fisco-bcos) - - [Releated Tools](#releated-tools) - - [Solidity](#solidity) +- [Awesome Blockchain](#Awesome-Blockchain) + - [Contents](#Contents) + - [Frequently Asked Questions (F.A.Q.s) & Answers](#Frequently-Asked-Questions-FAQs--Answers) + - [Basic Introduction](#Basic-Introduction) + - [Encryption knowledge](#Encryption-knowledge) + - [Consensus](#Consensus) + - [Account and transaction model](#Account-and-transaction-model) + - [Exchange](#Exchange) + - [Applications](#Applications) + - [Governance](#Governance) + - [Digital currency ranking](#Digital-currency-ranking) + - [Development Tutorial](#Development-Tutorial) + - [BitCoin](#BitCoin) + - [Ethereum](#Ethereum) + - [Consortium Blockchain](#Consortium-Blockchain) + - [Fabric](#Fabric) + - [FISCO-BCOS](#FISCO-BCOS) + - [Releated Tools](#Releated-Tools) + - [Solidity](#Solidity) - [truffle](#truffle) - [web3.js](#web3js) - - [Implementation of Blockchain](#implementation-of-blockchain) - - [Projects and Applications](#projects-and-applications) - - [Quorum](#quorum) - - [Monero](#monero) - - [IOTA](#iota) - - [EOS](#eos) - - [IPFS](#ipfs) - - [Filecoin](#filecoin) - - [BigchainDB](#bigchaindb) - - [BitShares](#bitshares) - - [Further Extension](#further-extension) - - [Books](#books) - - [Applications](#applications-1) - - [Identity Applications](#identity-applications) - - [Public Blockchain Identity](#public-blockchain-identity) - - [Blockchain as a collateral](#blockchain-as-a-collateral) - - [Unclear](#unclear) - - [Guidance](#guidance) - - [Internet of Things Applications](#internet-of-things-applications) - - [Energy Applications](#energy-applications) - - [Media and Journalism](#media-and-journalism) - - [Contribute](#contribute) + - [Implementation of Blockchain](#Implementation-of-Blockchain) + - [Projects and Applications](#Projects-and-Applications) + - [Quorum](#Quorum) + - [Monero](#Monero) + - [IOTA](#IOTA) + - [EOS](#EOS) + - [IPFS](#IPFS) + - [Filecoin](#Filecoin) + - [BigchainDB](#BigchainDB) + - [BitShares](#BitShares) + - [Further Extension](#Further-Extension) + - [Papers](#Papers) + - [Books](#Books) + - [Applications](#Applications-1) + - [Identity Applications](#Identity-Applications) + - [Public Blockchain Identity](#Public-Blockchain-Identity) + - [Blockchain as a collateral](#Blockchain-as-a-collateral) + - [Unclear](#Unclear) + - [Guidance](#Guidance) + - [Internet of Things Applications](#Internet-of-Things-Applications) + - [Energy Applications](#Energy-Applications) + - [Media and Journalism](#Media-and-Journalism) + - [Contribute](#Contribute)
@@ -466,6 +467,7 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: --- ## Further Extension +### [Papers](https://github.com/decrypto-org/blockchain-papers) ### Books From e7ae1245d0bb8c544920b3e6cad5a99c21d6ce0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: mithileshtipkari Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 21:21:19 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 25/68] Added Annotated white paper links for Bitcoin and Ethereum --- README.md | 34 +++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 1bad201..1c7b2f9 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ The blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions that can be programmed to record not just financial transactions but virtually everything of value (by [Don Tapscott](https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/whats-next-generation-internet-surprise-its-all-don-tapscott)). -**This is not a simple collection of Internet resources, but verified and organized data ensuring it's really suitable for your learning process and useful for your development and application.** +**This is not a simple collection of Internet resources, but verified and organized data ensuring it's really suitable for your learning process and useful for your development and application.** ## Contents
Click to expand @@ -157,17 +157,17 @@ The "classic" Satoshi-blockchain is like a git repo with a single master branch --> - **Account and transaction model** * [UTXO model](https://www.jianshu.com/p/2f4e75dbc2e4) - - **Exchange** - - **Applications** * [Do You Need a Blockchain?](https://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/networks/do-you-need-a-blockchain) * [What can't blockchain do?](https://www.jianshu.com/p/70f6a29a6296) - * [More](./Extension/application.md) + * [More](./Extension/application.md) @@ -188,9 +188,9 @@ The "classic" Satoshi-blockchain is like a git repo with a single master branch [](https://bitcoincore.org) -**Bitcoin** is an experimental digital currency that enables instant payments to anyone, anywhere in the world. Bitcoin uses **peer-to-peer** technology to **operate with no central authority**: managing transactions and issuing money are carried out collectively by the network. +**Bitcoin** is an experimental digital currency that enables instant payments to anyone, anywhere in the world. Bitcoin uses **peer-to-peer** technology to **operate with no central authority**: managing transactions and issuing money are carried out collectively by the network. -- [BitCoin white paper: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System](https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf) / [Chinese version](BitCoin/white%20paper.md) +- [BitCoin white paper: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System](https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf) / [Chinese version](BitCoin/white%20paper.md) / [Annotated BitCoin white paper](https://fermatslibrary.com/s/bitcoin) - [Mastering BitCoin](https://github.com/bitcoinbook/bitcoinbook) / [Chinese version](http://book.8btc.com/books/6/masterbitcoin2cn/_book/) / [pdf download](http://book.8btc.com/master_bitcoin?export=pdf) - [Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIPs)](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/) @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ The "classic" Satoshi-blockchain is like a git repo with a single master branch + [Libraries](./BitCoin/awesome.md#libraries) - C++, JavaScript, PHP, Ruby, Python, Java, .Net + [Web services](./BitCoin/awesome.md#blockchain-api-and-web-services) + [Full nodes](./BitCoin/awesome.md#full-nodes) -+ [More](./BitCoin/awesome.md) ++ [More](./BitCoin/awesome.md) ### [Ethereum](https://github.com/ethereum) @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ The "classic" Satoshi-blockchain is like a git repo with a single master branch These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared global infrastructure that can move value around and represent the ownership of property.** -- [Ethereum white paper](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper) / [Chinese version](./Ethereum/white%20paper.md) +- [Ethereum white paper](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper) / [Chinese version](./Ethereum/white%20paper.md) / [Annotated Ethereum white paper](https://fermatslibrary.com/s/ethereum-a-next-generation-smart-contract-and-decentralized-application-platform) - [Mastering Ethereum](https://github.com/ethereumbook/ethereumbook) / [Chinese version](https://github.com/inoutcode/ethereum_book) - [Ethereum Yellow Paper](https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf) / [Chinese version](https://github.com/yuange1024/ethereum_yellowpaper) - [Ethereum wiki](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki) @@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo - [**Java**: _Creating Your First Blockchain with Java_](https://medium.com/programmers-blockchain/create-simple-blockchain-java-tutorial-from-scratch-6eeed3cb03fa) - [**Java**: _Write a blockchain with java_](https://www.jianshu.com/p/afd8c465c91a) - [**JavaScript**: _A cryptocurrency implementation in less than 1500 lines of code_](https://github.com/conradoqg/naivecoin) -- [**JavaScript**: _A web-based demonstration of blockchain concepts_](https://github.com/anders94/blockchain-demo/) +- [**JavaScript**: _A web-based demonstration of blockchain concepts_](https://github.com/anders94/blockchain-demo/) - [**JavaScript**: _Build your own Blockchain in JavaScript_](https://github.com/nambrot/blockchain-in-js) - [**JavaScript**: _Code for Blockchain Demo_](https://github.com/seanjameshan/blockchain) - [**JavaScript**: _Creating a blockchain with JavaScript_](https://github.com/SavjeeTutorials/SavjeeCoin) @@ -593,12 +593,12 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: Best design and security practice_ -- [**Best of Bitcoin Maximalist - Scammers, Morons, Clowns, Shills & BagHODLers - Inside The New New Crypto Ponzi Economics**](https://github.com/bitsblocks/bitcoin-maximalist), 2018 - FREE +- [**Best of Bitcoin Maximalist - Scammers, Morons, Clowns, Shills & BagHODLers - Inside The New New Crypto Ponzi Economics**](https://github.com/bitsblocks/bitcoin-maximalist), 2018 - FREE -- [**Crypto Facts - Decentralize Payments - Efficient, Low Cost, Fair, Clean - True or False?**](https://github.com/bitsblocks/crypto-facts), 2018 - FREE +- [**Crypto Facts - Decentralize Payments - Efficient, Low Cost, Fair, Clean - True or False?**](https://github.com/bitsblocks/crypto-facts), 2018 - FREE - [**IslandCoin White Paper - A Pen and Paper Cash System - How to Run a Blockchain on a Deserted Island**](https://github.com/bitsblocks/islandcoin-whitepaper) - by Tal Kol -- + by Tal Kol -- _Motivation ++ Consensus ++ Transaction and Block Specification - @@ -606,15 +606,15 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: Block format • Genesis block ++ References_ - + - [**Blockchain in Action**](https://www.manning.com/books/blockchain-in-action) by Bina Ramamurthy, early access -- _Learn how blockchain differs from other distributed systems ++ Smart contract development with Ethereum and the Solidity language ++ Web UI for decentralized apps ++ Identity, privacy and security techniques ++ On-chain and off-chain data storage_ - - + + ### Applications #### Identity Applications @@ -672,12 +672,12 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: - [Steem](https://steem.io) - Decentralized social network which incentivises content creation and curation. - [PopChest](https://popchest.com) - Incentivized distributed video platform. -- [Civil](https://joincivil.com) - Decentralized newsmaking platform. +- [Civil](https://joincivil.com) - Decentralized newsmaking platform. --- ## Contribute -Contributions welcome! +Contributions welcome! 1. Fork it () 2. Clone it (`git clone https://github.com/yjjnls/awesome-blockchain`) From 534a17379c538546cc0bb1cec3b86f74a807391b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Sun, 21 Jul 2019 22:13:08 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 26/68] add impl of bulletproofs and pedersen commitment --- src/.gitignore | 3 +- src/ConfidentialTx/README.md | 12 + .../byteconversion/conversion.go | 122 + .../byteconversion/conversion_test.go | 186 + src/ConfidentialTx/byteconversion/parse.go | 68 + .../byteconversion/parse_test.go | 316 + src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/bn256.go | 531 ++ src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/bn256_test.go | 304 + src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/constants.go | 44 + src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/curve.go | 286 + src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp12.go | 200 + src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp2.go | 227 + src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp6.go | 296 + src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/main_test.go | 71 + src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/optate.go | 397 ++ src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/twist.go | 249 + src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/curve.go | 316 + src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/ext.h | 245 + .../crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/Makefile.am | 207 + .../build-aux/m4/ax_jni_include_dir.m4 | 145 + .../libsecp256k1/build-aux/m4/bitcoin_secp.m4 | 68 + .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/configure.ac | 618 ++ .../libsecp256k1/contrib/lax_der_parsing.h | 91 + .../contrib/lax_der_privatekey_parsing.h | 90 + .../libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1.h | 654 +++ .../include/secp256k1_bulletproofs.h | 176 + .../include/secp256k1_commitment.h | 164 + .../libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_ecdh.h | 31 + .../include/secp256k1_generator.h | 102 + .../include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h | 144 + .../libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_recovery.h | 110 + .../include/secp256k1_surjectionproof.h | 212 + .../include/secp256k1_whitelist.h | 152 + .../libsecp256k1/sage/group_prover.sage | 322 + .../sage/shallue_van_de_woestijne.sage | 51 + .../libsecp256k1/src/asm/field_10x26_arm.s | 919 +++ .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/basic-config.h | 33 + .../crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench.h | 82 + .../libsecp256k1/src/bench_bulletproof.c | 243 + .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_ecdh.c | 54 + .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_ecmult.c | 196 + .../libsecp256k1/src/bench_generator.c | 59 + .../libsecp256k1/src/bench_internal.c | 367 ++ .../libsecp256k1/src/bench_rangeproof.c | 64 + .../libsecp256k1/src/bench_recover.c | 60 + .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_sign.c | 56 + .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_verify.c | 112 + .../libsecp256k1/src/bench_whitelist.c | 104 + .../crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecdsa.h | 21 + .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecdsa_impl.h | 313 + .../crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/eckey.h | 25 + .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/eckey_impl.h | 100 + .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult.h | 47 + .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_const.h | 17 + .../libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_const_impl.h | 257 + .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen.h | 43 + .../libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h | 210 + .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_impl.h | 1027 ++++ .../crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field.h | 132 + .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_10x26.h | 48 + .../libsecp256k1/src/field_10x26_impl.h | 1161 ++++ .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52.h | 47 + .../libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_asm_impl.h | 502 ++ .../libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_impl.h | 496 ++ .../libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_int128_impl.h | 277 + .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_impl.h | 315 + .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/gen_context.c | 74 + .../crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/group.h | 147 + .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/group_impl.h | 706 +++ .../crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/hash.h | 41 + .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/hash_impl.h | 282 + .../src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1.java | 446 ++ .../java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Test.java | 226 + .../java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Util.java | 45 + .../java/org/bitcoin/Secp256k1Context.java | 51 + 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.../crypto/secp256k1/panic_cb.go | 33 + .../crypto/secp256k1/secp256.go | 172 + .../crypto/secp256k1/secp256_test.go | 263 + src/ConfidentialTx/main.go | 67 + src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bb.go | 104 + src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bb_test.go | 33 + src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bn.go | 75 + src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bn_test.go | 129 + src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bulletproofs.go | 1358 +++++ .../zkproofs/bulletproofs_test.go | 355 ++ src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/ccs08.go | 426 ++ src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/ccs08_test.go | 190 + src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/p256.go | 249 + src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/p256_test.go | 82 + src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/util.go | 117 + src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/util_test.go | 18 + 165 files changed, 37909 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/README.md create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/byteconversion/conversion.go create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/byteconversion/conversion_test.go create mode 100644 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src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/build-aux/m4/ax_jni_include_dir.m4 create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/build-aux/m4/bitcoin_secp.m4 create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/configure.ac create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/contrib/lax_der_parsing.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/contrib/lax_der_privatekey_parsing.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_bulletproofs.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_commitment.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_ecdh.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_generator.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_recovery.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_surjectionproof.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_whitelist.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/sage/group_prover.sage create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/sage/shallue_van_de_woestijne.sage create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/asm/field_10x26_arm.s create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/basic-config.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_bulletproof.c create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_ecdh.c create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_ecmult.c create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_generator.c create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_internal.c create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_rangeproof.c create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_recover.c create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_sign.c create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_verify.c create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_whitelist.c create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecdsa.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecdsa_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/eckey.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/eckey_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_const.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_const_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_10x26.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_10x26_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_asm_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_int128_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/gen_context.c create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/group.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/group_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/hash.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/hash_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1.java create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Test.java create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Util.java create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/Secp256k1Context.java create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.c create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.c create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/.inner_product_impl.h.swp create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/.main_impl.h.swp create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/.rangeproof_impl.h.swo create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/.rangeproof_impl.h.swp create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/.tests_impl.h.swp create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/.util.h.swp create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/Makefile.am.include create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/inner_product_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/main_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/rangeproof_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/tests_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/util.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/.main_impl.h.swp create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/Makefile.am.include create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/main_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/pedersen_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/tests_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/Makefile.am.include create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/main_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/tests_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/generator/.main_impl.h.swp create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/generator/.tests_impl.h.swp create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/generator/Makefile.am.include create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/generator/main_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/generator/tests_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/.borromean.h.swp create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/.borromean_impl.h.swp create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/.main_impl.h.swp create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/.tests_impl.h.swp create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/Makefile.am.include create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/borromean.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/borromean_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/main_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/rangeproof.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/rangeproof_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/tests_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/Makefile.am.include create mode 100755 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/tests_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/Makefile.am.include create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/main_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection.md create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/tests_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/Makefile.am.include create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/main_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/tests_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/whitelist.md create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/whitelist_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_gmp.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_gmp_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_4x64.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_4x64_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_8x32.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_8x32_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_low.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_low_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scratch.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scratch_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/secp256k1.c create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/testrand.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/testrand_impl.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/tests.c create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/tests_exhaustive.c create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/util.h create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/panic_cb.go create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/secp256.go create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/secp256_test.go create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/main.go create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bb.go create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bb_test.go create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bn.go create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bn_test.go create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bulletproofs.go create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bulletproofs_test.go create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/ccs08.go create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/ccs08_test.go create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/p256.go create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/p256_test.go create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/util.go create mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/util_test.go diff --git a/src/.gitignore b/src/.gitignore index 8ef3c88..b6ca0d0 100644 --- a/src/.gitignore +++ b/src/.gitignore @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ package-lock.json node_modules -build \ No newline at end of file +build +.DS_Store \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/README.md b/src/ConfidentialTx/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dc0ae7f --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +# Confidential Transaction +This package is a Zero Knowledge Proof implementation in Golang, based on [zkproofs](https://github.com/ing-bank/zkproofs). + +It contains bulletproofs and perdersen commitment, which could be used for confidential transaction. + +To test the local version, you could run the cmd: + +```shell +go run main.go +``` + +And the package could be embadded in geth, it will support the feature later and give details. diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/byteconversion/conversion.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/byteconversion/conversion.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..efae822 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/byteconversion/conversion.go @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +// Copyright 2017 ING Bank N.V. +// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. +// +// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +// (at your option) any later version. +// +// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +// +// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . + +package byteconversion + +import ( + "errors" + "math/big" +) + +/** + * Returns the big.Int based on the passed byte-array assuming the byte-array contains + * the two's-complement representation of this big.Int. The byte array will be in big-endian byte-order: + * the most significant byte is in the zeroth element. The array will contain the minimum number of bytes + * required to represent this BigInteger, including at least one sign bit, which is (ceil((this.bitLength() + 1)/8)). + */ +func FromByteArray(bytesIn [] byte) (*big.Int, error) { + + const MINUS_ONE = -1 + + if len(bytesIn) == 0 { + err := errors.New("Cannot convert empty array to big.Int.") + return nil, err + } + + highestByte := bytesIn[0] + isNegative := (highestByte & 128) !=0 + var convertedBytes []byte + + if isNegative { + + tmpInt := new(big.Int).SetBytes(bytesIn) + tmpInt = tmpInt.Sub(tmpInt, big.NewInt(1)) + tmpBytes := tmpInt.Bytes() + + if tmpBytes[0] == 255 { + convertedBytes = FlipBytes(tmpBytes)[1:] + } else { + convertedBytes = tmpBytes + copy(convertedBytes, FlipBytes(tmpBytes)) + } + tmp := new(big.Int).SetBytes(convertedBytes) + return tmp.Mul(tmp, big.NewInt(MINUS_ONE)), nil + } else { + // if positive leave unchanged (additional 0-bytes will be ignored) + return new(big.Int).SetBytes(bytesIn), nil + } +} + +/** + * Returns a byte array containing the two's-complement representation of this big.Int. + * The byte array will be in big-endian byte-order: the most significant byte is in the + * zeroth element. The array will contain the minimum number of bytes required to represent + * this BigInteger, including at least one sign bit, which is (ceil((this.bitLength() + 1)/8)). + */ +func ToByteArray(in *big.Int) []byte { + + isNegative := in.Cmp(new(big.Int).SetInt64(0)) < 0 + + bytes := in.Bytes() + length := len(bytes) + + if length == 0 { + return []byte { 0 }; + } + + highestByte := bytes[0] + var convertedBytes []byte + + if !isNegative { + if (highestByte & 128) !=0 { + + convertedBytes = make([]byte, length + 1) + convertedBytes[0] = 0 + copy(convertedBytes[1:], bytes) + return convertedBytes + } else { + return bytes + } + } else { + if (highestByte & 128) !=0 { + + convertedBytes = make([]byte, length + 1) + convertedBytes[0] = 255 + copy(convertedBytes[1:], FlipBytes(bytes)) + } else { + convertedBytes = FlipBytes(bytes) + } + + convertedInt := new(big.Int).SetBytes(convertedBytes) + convertedInt.Add(convertedInt, big.NewInt(1)) + return convertedInt.Bytes() + } +} + +/** + * Flips all bytes in each of the array's elements. + * Returns the flipped elements. + */ +func FlipBytes(bytesIn [] byte) []byte { + + length := len(bytesIn) + flippedBytes := make([]byte, length) + + for i := 0; i < length; i++ { + flippedBytes[i] = bytesIn[i] ^ 255; + } + return flippedBytes +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/byteconversion/conversion_test.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/byteconversion/conversion_test.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..79344c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/byteconversion/conversion_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,186 @@ +// Copyright 2017 ING Bank N.V. +// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. +// +// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +// (at your option) any later version. +// +// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +// +// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . + +package byteconversion + +import ( + "testing" + "math/big" + "reflect" +) + + +func TestFromBytes127(t *testing.T) { + + bytesIn := []byte{127} + actualInt, err := FromByteArray(bytesIn) + expectedInt := big.NewInt(127) + + if err != nil { + t.Errorf("Unexpected error.") + } + + if actualInt.Cmp(expectedInt) != 0 { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: incorrect value: ", actualInt) + } +} + +func TestFromBytesNegLarge(t *testing.T) { + + bytesIn := []byte{228, 20, 131, 38, 208, 100, 246, 105, 110, 11, 247, 198, + 54, 252, 188, 185, 163, 179, 13, 6, 144, 164, 44, 232, 184, + 135, 147, 140, 88, 87, 191, 46, 22, 23, 252, 216, 72, 25, + 5, 124, 29, 81, 56, 242, 199, 0, 68, 132, 102, 246, 34, + 203, 122, 8, 7, 44, 237, 1, 181, 36} + + actualInt, err := FromByteArray(bytesIn) + + if err != nil { + t.Errorf("Unexpected error.") + } + + expectedInt := new(big.Int) + s := "-34046416216309720507914088123716811131285777464224028073691261328351974060" + s += "2415131562281745277658128038564338505868351008385659638777486107364060" + expectedInt.SetString(s, 10) + + if (actualInt.Cmp(expectedInt) != 0) { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: incorrect value: ", actualInt) + } +} + +func TestToBytesNeg1(t *testing.T) { + + expectedBytes := []byte{255} + actualBytes := ToByteArray(big.NewInt(-1)) + + if !reflect.DeepEqual(expectedBytes, actualBytes) { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: incorrect byte-array: ", actualBytes) + } +} + +func TestToBytesZero(t *testing.T) { + + expectedBytes := []byte{0} + actualBytes := ToByteArray(big.NewInt(0)) + + if !reflect.DeepEqual(expectedBytes, actualBytes) { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: incorrect byte-array: ", actualBytes) + } +} + +func TestToBytesPos127(t *testing.T) { + + expectedBytes := []byte{127} + actualBytes := ToByteArray(big.NewInt(127)) + + if !reflect.DeepEqual(expectedBytes, actualBytes) { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: incorrect byte-array: ", actualBytes) + } +} + + +func TestToBytesPos128(t *testing.T) { + + expectedBytes := []byte{0, 128} + actualBytes := ToByteArray(big.NewInt(128)) + + if !reflect.DeepEqual(expectedBytes, actualBytes) { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: incorrect byte-array: ", actualBytes) + } +} + +func TestToBytesNegLarge(t *testing.T) { + + expectedBytes := []byte{228, 20, 131, 38, 208, 100, 246, 105, 110, 11, 247, 198, + 54, 252, 188, 185, 163, 179, 13, 6, 144, 164, 44, 232, 184, + 135, 147, 140, 88, 87, 191, 46, 22, 23, 252, 216, 72, 25, + 5, 124, 29, 81, 56, 242, 199, 0, 68, 132, 102, 246, 34, + 203, 122, 8, 7, 44, 237, 1, 181, 36} + + c := new(big.Int) + s := "-34046416216309720507914088123716811131285777464224028073691261328351974060" + s += "2415131562281745277658128038564338505868351008385659638777486107364060" + + c.SetString(s, 10) + actualBytes := ToByteArray(c) + + if !reflect.DeepEqual(expectedBytes, actualBytes) { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: incorrect byte-array:", actualBytes) + } +} + +func TestToBytesPosLarge(t *testing.T) { + + expectedBytes := []byte{25, 165, 147, 207, 93, 105, 151, 6, 97, 172, 17, 104, 255, + 15, 255, 106, 246, 80, 123, 85, 231, 140, 213, 98, 148, 126, + 243, 177, 33, 73, 55, 165, 160, 240, 79, 198, 55, 253, 14, + 55, 32, 177, 71, 135, 142, 229, 100, 102, 171, 66, 115, 74, + 137, 135, 74, 20, 127, 132, 155, 6, 126, 202, 57, 173, 72, + 172, 226, 124, 34, 57, 156, 232, 3, 188, 209, 157, 156, 145, + 127, 253, 208, 219, 188, 171, 157, 155, 121, 59, 97, 242, + 121, 187, 52, 222, 168, 83, 10, 89, 57, 83, 109, 245, 248, + 143, 16, 106, 224, 68, 176, 175, 132, 118, 253, 177, 20, 77, + 123, 204, 224, 204, 16, 203, 207, 33, 129, 105, 196, 100, + 140, 179, 5, 167, 73, 146, 98, 210, 60, 247, 253, 95, 19, + 210, 189, 122, 157, 89, 42, 65, 26, 4, 123, 86, 255, 118, + 188, 109, 65, 90, 164, 231, 37, 144, 52, 20, 123, 16, 24, + 18, 139, 147, 149, 145, 241, 82, 242, 163, 254, 236, 26, + 205, 162, 208, 161, 145, 227, 15, 105, 61, 208, 29, 103, 4, + 218, 177, 143, 148, 155, 160, 183, 116, 93, 232, 140, 47, + 48, 61, 167, 130, 135, 160, 67, 69, 13, 156, 78, 212, 45, + 205, 139, 232, 173, 241, 235, 67, 201, 117, 187, 231, 40, + 246, 57, 235, 157, 45, 229, 218, 104, 4, 175, 202, 30, 9, + 118, 237, 41, 227, 44, 60, 33, 29, 66, 125, 181, 117, 249, + 209, 154, 13, 92, 216, 249, 18, 150, 214, 108, 211, 214, + 59, 34, 52, 63, 150, 67, 215, 35, 217, 152, 26, 173, 129, + 242, 101, 184, 80, 194, 17, 176, 100, 24, 211, 54, 2, 159, + 254, 31, 137, 86, 185, 234, 126, 108, 147, 241, 239, 80, + 34, 146, 2, 184, 200, 238, 38, 34, 65, 208, 117, 124, 76, + 120, 41, 18, 66, 174, 207, 163, 163, 58, 70, 37, 1, 214, + 52, 211, 66, 17, 226, 55, 205, 83, 147, 237, 76, 46, 224, + 93, 80, 200, 233, 101, 137, 19, 229, 70, 0, 89, 160, 174, + 33, 120, 9, 151, 214, 187, 219, 171, 155, 233, 110, 236, + 165, 232, 19, 233, 129, 194, 89, 196, 79, 183, 137, 113, + 31, 170, 107, 65, 45, 20, 29, 80, 177, 233, 186, 201, 208, + 153, 137, 123, 18, 161, 116, 55, 163, 29, 81, 160, 9, 86, + 70, 168, 226, 79, 145, 40, 242, 140, 145, 65, 129, 140, + 161, 173, 95, 240, 240, 179, 43, 56, 108, 86, 222, 221, + 121, 246, 154, 181, 96, 231, 173, 252, 87, 40, 46, 46, 226, + 162, 158, 70, 148, 48, 147, 235, 118, 139, 25, 232, 67, 233, + 118, 68, 181, 196, 195, 39, 193, 65, 141, 97, 163, 204, 186, + 57, 124, 96, 89, 123, 30, 120, 210, 196, 89, 114, 43, 35, 39, + 201, 210, 81, 93, 14, 53, 184, 55, 77, 239, 40, 15, 174, 50, + 175, 84, 57, 222, 239, 120, 197, 20, 84, 23, 192, 248, 65, 32} + + c := new(big.Int) + c.SetString("104629761028213599805480925925790425959567049134816086059352755190570739745518666205937735343498567571920655134925379760277594103917074168324328020614304601458655903777672976689775490077688338107235672544860350622774919412889869264967814894367526323662860621314829844532302923598163101691161809563689257119439517772642328497948311622477782095358615210758790515715457810324166800501005841394919183757519983518882638580018812501425864890227616096353048530301822817514776417452329353267096156269934135291712469590753885382455774960306786815780130886957965944086429085979982216274733117683220681240533762036024585652327095570558251184159582343561742487484870623990453783273002077229085268928493917134578545501339771123831252046790356292192853434440371050718893013786884617886032764594150932952606679129922556451438850853950795322470594816924482063623508100143990257521028260138831741855201480669520432545573066469798604777686564518950203058887546628141972672996503838284845932369286957158959203830688307302165544372812778767992596780236523180938001711578036548650984477439658901737951530184210064832275649697658679190072031726344089085533172632374570201218311185378464524281671726449877984821159571188587422006373681926621549415758315808", 10) + actualBytes := ToByteArray(c) + + if !reflect.DeepEqual(expectedBytes, actualBytes) { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: incorrect byte-array:", actualBytes) + } +} + +func TestToBytesPos39568(t *testing.T) { + + expectedBytes := []byte{0, 154, 144} + actualBytes := ToByteArray(big.NewInt(39568)) + + if !reflect.DeepEqual(expectedBytes, actualBytes) { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: incorrect byte-array:", actualBytes) + } +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/byteconversion/parse.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/byteconversion/parse.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f9f59a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/byteconversion/parse.go @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +// Copyright 2017 ING Bank N.V. +// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. +// +// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +// (at your option) any later version. +// +// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +// +// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . + +package byteconversion + +import ( + "math/big" + "errors" +) + +var ( + errInvalidBigInteger = errors.New("invalid ASCII for big integer") +) + +// Decodes a byte array (ASCII encoding of comma-separated integers) into an array of big integers +func ParseInput(in []byte) ([]*big.Int, error) { + + prevIndex := 0 + var output[] *big.Int + + for index, element := range in { + + if element == 44 { + newInt, err := ConvertToBigInt(in[prevIndex:index]) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + output = append(output, newInt) + prevIndex = index + 1 + } + } + + newInt, err := ConvertToBigInt(in[prevIndex:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return append(output, newInt), nil +} + +// Decodes a byte array (ASCII encoding of a signed integer) into a big integer +func ConvertToBigInt(in []byte) (*big.Int, error) { + + // Validate + for index, element := range in { + if !((element >= 48 && element <= 57) || (index == 0 && element == 45)) { + return nil, errInvalidBigInteger + } + } + + s := string(in) + i := new(big.Int) + i.SetString(s, 10) + return i, nil +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/byteconversion/parse_test.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/byteconversion/parse_test.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4aa6024 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/byteconversion/parse_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,316 @@ +// Copyright 2017 ING Bank N.V. +// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. +// +// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +// (at your option) any later version. +// +// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +// +// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . + +package byteconversion + +import ( + "testing" + "math/big" + //"fmt" + +) + +func TestConvertToBigIntEmpty( t * testing.T) { + bytesIn := []byte{} + actualInt, err := ConvertToBigInt(bytesIn) + expectedInt := big.NewInt(0) + + if (err != nil) { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: unexpected error") + } else if (actualInt.Cmp(expectedInt) != 0) { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: incorrect value: ", actualInt) + } +} + + +func TestConvertToBigInt( t * testing.T) { + bytesIn := []byte{0x39, 0x38, 0x37, 0x36, 0x35, 0x34, 0x33, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30} + actualInt, err := ConvertToBigInt(bytesIn) + expectedInt := big.NewInt(9876543210) + + if (err != nil) { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: unexpected error") + } else if (actualInt.Cmp(expectedInt) != 0) { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: incorrect value: ", actualInt) + } +} + +func TestConvertToBigIntSmall( t * testing.T) { + bytesIn := []byte{0x31} + actualInt, err := ConvertToBigInt(bytesIn) + expectedInt := big.NewInt(1) + + if (err != nil) { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: unexpected error") + } else if (actualInt.Cmp(expectedInt) != 0) { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: incorrect value: ", actualInt) + } +} + +func TestConvertToBigIntNegative( t * testing.T) { + bytesIn := []byte{0x2d, 0x39, 0x30} + actualInt, err := ConvertToBigInt(bytesIn) + expectedInt := big.NewInt(-90) + + if (err != nil) { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: unexpected error") + } else if (actualInt.Cmp(expectedInt) != 0) { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: incorrect value: ", actualInt) + } +} + +func TestConvertToBigIntInvalid( t * testing.T) { + bytesIn := []byte{0x2d, 0x38, 0x29} + _, err := ConvertToBigInt(bytesIn) + + if (err == nil) { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected an error") + } +} + +func TestConvertToBigIntInvalid2( t * testing.T) { + bytesIn := []byte{0x38, 0x3a} + _, err := ConvertToBigInt(bytesIn) + + if (err == nil) { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected an error") + } +} + +func TestConvertToBigIntInvalidMinus( t * testing.T) { + bytesIn := []byte{0x2d, 0x2d, 0x38} + _, err := ConvertToBigInt(bytesIn) + + if (err == nil) { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected an error") + } +} + +func TestParse(t * testing.T) { + + + // modulo /* prime or p or N */ := GetBigInt("24438318939269646197369831075022895598474800319649841283435175935063104478381811048242168843199715479920185869621976756607925547283845744315893807095064311533179399971046089897352239707734901929208042550571853355766149726709562705423612214211837227622251215177488298274514716903154077158799286344858085000470306926642484216710451551427659775430892486149597424181059756894890473561673886470553232547826291909761420650745449280138363018935597204877989649574718665616546455506013224347622274575709345206610596281243115691889016342559043818784960742306505551068418113466192025039742476086469729656238677242048035501492867") + // byteArray := ToByteArray(modulo) + // fmt.Println("byteArray: ", byteArray) + + ParseInput(GetInput()); +} + + + +func GetInput() []byte { + + return []byte { + 53, 55, 49, 49, 57, 49, 50, 48, 55, 52, 55, 54, 51, 57, 51, 56, 57, 50, 48, 56, 52, 52, 48, 50, 48, 55, 54, 56, 56, 50, 48, 56, 50, 55, 48, 49, 54, 57, 49, 56, 54, + 51, 56, 53, 56, 56, 55, 55, 54, 48, 57, 51, 55, 56, 54, 54, 57, 49, 51, 50, 52, 56, 51, 48, 57, 51, 55, 57, 54, 53, 55, 49, 48, 53, 54, 50, 54, 54, 57, 57, 57, 56, + 49, 48, 50, 57, 54, 57, 54, 48, 55, 55, 53, 52, 50, 49, 54, 56, 56, 49, 53, 51, 51, 49, 48, 49, 55, 53, 51, 53, 48, 57, 53, 50, 50, 54, 54, 49, 49, 56, 49, 57, 51, + 53, 54, 55, 57, 55, 54, 56, 49, 51, 55, 53, 53, 51, 50, 53, 49, 54, 57, 54, 52, 50, 55, 56, 57, 53, 48, 48, 49, 51, 48, 56, 50, 49, 48, 48, 52, 51, 57, 53, 56, 49, + 54, 50, 51, 54, 50, 52, 55, 52, 52, 53, 52, 57, 49, 53, 49, 49, 56, 51, 48, 55, 54, 54, 49, 48, 50, 49, 52, 48, 54, 57, 57, 55, 57, 56, 57, 53, 54, 48, 48, 52, 55, + 55, 53, 53, 50, 48, 49, 51, 52, 51, 54, 49, 55, 52, 55, 48, 50, 56, 56, 54, 49, 57, 48, 51, 48, 55, 56, 52, 57, 56, 55, 49, 57, 56, 53, 49, 49, 55, 55, 50, 56, 52, + 48, 52, 57, 56, 51, 53, 52, 51, 56, 48, 54, 51, 50, 52, 55, 52, 54, 54, 52, 52, 53, 55, 52, 50, 57, 48, 48, 51, 53, 49, 48, 50, 48, 55, 51, 49, 48, 51, 52, 55, 49, + 55, 57, 56, 56, 52, 48, 56, 48, 48, 48, 48, 50, 57, 52, 51, 48, 49, 53, 48, 50, 51, 50, 53, 49, 48, 51, 53, 50, 55, 51, 49, 50, 55, 56, 48, 53, 57, 57, 57, 49, 51, + 48, 53, 51, 50, 52, 51, 54, 50, 55, 49, 53, 54, 55, 48, 53, 52, 49, 55, 56, 55, 53, 49, 55, 50, 55, 53, 54, 55, 54, 57, 53, 56, 53, 56, 48, 55, 54, 57, 49, 53, 53, + 56, 54, 56, 48, 48, 55, 57, 55, 52, 49, 49, 52, 57, 49, 54, 54, 54, 55, 55, 52, 52, 50, 50, 54, 55, 56, 53, 49, 52, 57, 50, 52, 55, 51, 54, 55, 48, 49, 56, 52, 48, + 55, 49, 49, 57, 57, 55, 50, 53, 50, 49, 51, 57, 49, 50, 50, 54, 52, 51, 55, 51, 50, 49, 52, 57, 56, 48, 49, 55, 55, 56, 48, 52, 48, 49, 48, 53, 54, 49, 53, 52, 51, + 56, 48, 55, 57, 54, 57, 51, 48, 57, 50, 50, 51, 52, 48, 53, 50, 57, 49, 50, 52, 48, 56, 55, 54, 56, 56, 56, 55, 48, 50, 49, 57, 55, 49, 50, 54, 55, 48, 57, 56, 54, + 49, 55, 50, 54, 48, 50, 51, 49, 52, 52, 50, 54, 48, 52, 56, 55, 48, 52, 52, 51, 51, 57, 55, 48, 56, 56, 49, 54, 50, 55, 56, 49, 56, 50, 51, 57, 54, 52, 56, 54, 57, + 53, 55, 52, 51, 55, 50, 53, 54, 48, 54, 57, 49, 57, 52, 52, 51, 56, 48, 52, 55, 57, 50, 50, 54, 55, 57, 54, 54, 53, 53, 51, 54, 48, 54, 48, 53, 57, 50, 53, 52, 53, + 52, 53, 55, 52, 52, 56, 51, 55, 57, 53, 56, 57, 56, 57, 51, 52, 50, 56, 52, 50, 57, 52, 52, 53, 51, 55, 56, 52, 54, 54, 52, 49, 52, 55, 51, 49, 51, 50, 52, 52, 48, + 55, 44, 49, 51, 54, 54, 55, 48, 50, 54, 51, 49, 54, 56, 55, 50, 55, 50, 56, 49, 54, 48, 54, 54, 56, 50, 51, 57, 50, 52, 48, 51, 56, 54, 54, 48, 49, 50, 50, 52, 48, + 56, 51, 57, 48, 53, 51, 53, 56, 57, 52, 48, 49, 54, 54, 54, 52, 56, 52, 51, 52, 56, 54, 49, 54, 48, 54, 52, 52, 49, 53, 48, 54, 53, 49, 53, 53, 56, 55, 53, 50, 48, + 50, 50, 51, 51, 49, 55, 56, 51, 49, 50, 51, 48, 54, 48, 54, 56, 53, 52, 54, 52, 50, 54, 55, 56, 55, 57, 48, 52, 48, 52, 55, 56, 50, 49, 48, 50, 54, 51, 57, 54, 49, + 56, 51, 54, 48, 56, 51, 55, 56, 48, 48, 57, 54, 54, 53, 56, 49, 57, 56, 48, 50, 53, 48, 48, 52, 55, 54, 51, 54, 48, 53, 57, 48, 52, 48, 48, 57, 52, 57, 57, 57, 50, + 54, 51, 50, 52, 54, 57, 57, 53, 48, 57, 52, 48, 51, 51, 55, 49, 52, 53, 51, 51, 49, 53, 50, 51, 53, 49, 55, 55, 57, 56, 51, 52, 51, 53, 57, 53, 50, 50, 48, 50, 48, + 50, 48, 48, 49, 55, 49, 49, 48, 49, 48, 50, 54, 53, 53, 52, 51, 52, 55, 50, 49, 57, 51, 48, 57, 51, 51, 57, 57, 54, 48, 56, 51, 54, 51, 49, 54, 52, 52, 50, 56, 54, + 54, 53, 48, 50, 56, 53, 49, 55, 52, 55, 56, 52, 53, 57, 57, 49, 48, 48, 52, 48, 54, 56, 48, 53, 57, 50, 50, 49, 51, 53, 56, 57, 50, 57, 49, 53, 54, 50, 52, 49, 55, + 57, 57, 55, 53, 57, 52, 55, 52, 51, 50, 55, 52, 55, 51, 56, 49, 52, 49, 50, 53, 52, 53, 48, 52, 48, 55, 54, 53, 55, 55, 49, 53, 51, 54, 56, 52, 51, 56, 49, 54, 50, + 48, 50, 54, 55, 54, 51, 55, 54, 50, 55, 54, 53, 54, 51, 48, 52, 53, 56, 54, 49, 53, 54, 56, 55, 51, 52, 55, 55, 50, 57, 52, 49, 56, 53, 54, 56, 49, 50, 50, 57, 52, + 50, 50, 48, 49, 55, 48, 56, 57, 53, 56, 53, 56, 57, 57, 51, 49, 56, 51, 49, 57, 48, 51, 53, 51, 52, 57, 55, 48, 57, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 56, 50, 57, 48, 50, 53, 54, + 50, 52, 52, 48, 48, 53, 51, 49, 50, 48, 56, 51, 56, 48, 56, 48, 49, 48, 48, 48, 51, 56, 54, 57, 50, 51, 55, 53, 48, 48, 54, 54, 52, 57, 49, 57, 55, 57, 48, 53, 52, + 56, 53, 55, 49, 52, 49, 56, 53, 57, 52, 48, 51, 53, 49, 57, 57, 53, 50, 54, 54, 56, 53, 51, 53, 57, 57, 48, 48, 51, 52, 57, 50, 52, 52, 52, 50, 57, 52, 53, 54, 50, + 55, 49, 49, 51, 52, 49, 54, 55, 52, 51, 52, 48, 54, 55, 50, 52, 50, 56, 53, 54, 49, 57, 51, 54, 57, 48, 57, 57, 49, 56, 49, 50, 54, 49, 48, 49, 51, 55, 50, 52, 55, + 50, 54, 54, 52, 50, 49, 51, 55, 53, 50, 56, 48, 50, 57, 48, 48, 51, 55, 48, 50, 55, 54, 49, 54, 53, 55, 57, 56, 53, 54, 56, 48, 50, 57, 53, 50, 57, 48, 50, 52, 53, + 55, 49, 50, 54, 57, 48, 49, 54, 48, 55, 57, 50, 53, 49, 49, 53, 51, 52, 53, 52, 52, 49, 52, 54, 55, 54, 49, 56, 56, 56, 48, 55, 56, 49, 54, 56, 51, 51, 54, 48, 53, + 55, 48, 50, 56, 44, 51, 48, 53, 51, 56, 49, 56, 49, 49, 49, 51, 49, 55, 54, 48, 55, 57, 56, 57, 48, 48, 48, 50, 53, 53, 49, 54, 51, 53, 48, 54, 53, 54, 50, 49, 56, + 54, 52, 56, 50, 54, 52, 55, 54, 56, 51, 49, 49, 57, 52, 57, 56, 57, 55, 53, 49, 51, 53, 54, 53, 53, 50, 55, 51, 54, 52, 50, 48, 48, 57, 55, 52, 50, 50, 55, 56, 54, + 57, 57, 56, 56, 52, 50, 53, 54, 55, 49, 49, 49, 53, 50, 56, 55, 55, 50, 57, 51, 49, 53, 49, 50, 57, 54, 53, 51, 56, 51, 48, 55, 54, 54, 54, 51, 53, 55, 50, 56, 56, + 55, 54, 51, 50, 56, 49, 48, 48, 56, 55, 50, 53, 48, 49, 54, 56, 49, 56, 52, 50, 50, 55, 53, 54, 49, 54, 54, 55, 52, 54, 57, 56, 53, 49, 51, 48, 49, 50, 53, 51, 52, + 48, 51, 57, 50, 49, 54, 49, 57, 55, 50, 48, 57, 56, 55, 57, 54, 52, 50, 52, 49, 48, 57, 55, 56, 50, 51, 49, 52, 55, 57, 49, 55, 49, 55, 50, 56, 53, 53, 50, 56, 52, + 49, 54, 54, 52, 50, 53, 49, 52, 54, 53, 49, 56, 50, 56, 52, 56, 54, 51, 52, 49, 54, 55, 50, 53, 49, 56, 51, 49, 48, 49, 52, 50, 52, 51, 55, 54, 52, 55, 54, 56, 55, + 51, 53, 52, 53, 51, 56, 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50, 54, 57, 57, 54, 56, 48, 53, 49, 51, 53, 53, 50, 52, 51, 55, 53, 49, 56, 49, 57, 48, 57, 52, 55, 53, 57, 54, 54, 57, 53, 51, 57, 48, 55, 53, 56, 52, 49, 57, 57, 49, 54, 51, 51, 52, 50, 53, 51, 54, 50, 55, 57, 53, 53, 55, 48, 53, 57, 48, 53, 48, 55, 57, 53, 57, 56, 50, 50, 48, 52, 55, 48, 50, 50, 52, 57, 55, 53, 48, 48, 50, 57, 50, 56, 56, 48, 55, 51, 52, 48, 50, 56, 51, 52, 55, 50, 55, 51, 51, 53, 53, 56, 52, 55, 57, 56, 53, 57, 48, 52, 57, 57, 50, 50, 51, 53, 48, 51, 51, 54, 53, 57, 57, 51, 49, 54, 55, 57, 50, 53, 52, 55, 52, 50, 57, 48, 50, 57, 55, 55, 53, 48, 50, 56, 57, 48, 56, 56, 51, 52, 50, 54, 53, 53, 49, 57, 54, 48, 52, 48, 51, 52, 53, 48, 57, 51, 55, 54, 54, 53, 55, 53, 48, 51, 56, 54, 53, 48, 49, 50, 50, 56, 49, 52, 50, 48, 57, 57, 50, 54, 54, 56, 50, 52, 48, 50, 56, 52, 56, 56, 56, 54, 50, 57, 53, 57, 54, 50, 54, 52, 54, 51, 57, 52, 56, 56, 50, 50, 49, 56, 49, 51, 55, 54, 54, 49, 55, 49, 50, 56, 54, 50, 56, 51, 53, 55, 44, 56, 54, 54, 56, 54, 56, 53, 55, 51, 53, 54, 51, 52, 57, 53, 56, 57, 48, 52, 56, 55, 49, 48, 53, 56, 48, 52, 55, 54, 53, 53, 53, 50, 52, 57, 55, 56, 57, 52, 55, 56, 48, 48, 54, 57, 52, 49, 57, 54, 56, 57, 48, 54, 53, 54, 51, 51, 48, 53, 53, 52, 56, 50, 48, 52, 53, 54, 54, 49, 57, 51, 57, 57, 56, 52, 50, 57, 49, 52, 56, 49, 54, 57, 56, 51, 57, 50, 49, 52, 49, 57, 52, 48, 48, 57, 49, 54, 55, 52, 55, 55, 56, 51, 50, 48, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 51, 55, 48, 54, 52, 57, 50, 55, 53, 55, 54, 50, 52, 51, 57, 50, 50, 48, 55, 52, 57, 48, 57, 55, 53, 57, 53, 50, 51, 50, 49, 55, 54, 53, 56, 57, 53, 53, 50, 48, 52, 51, 52, 52, 50, 56, 56, 56, 57, 48, 50, 56, 50, 52, 56, 56, 50, 49, 56, 48, 53, 56, 55, 51, 52, 52, 48, 57, 53, 55, 55, 54, 53, 49, 48, 48, 57, 54, 52, 50, 53, 57, 57, 51, 56, 52, 50, 54, 51, 48, 49, 57, 54, 57, 52, 55, 49, 49, 49, 54, 54, 48, 54, 54, 54, 55, 49, 57, 52, 54, 55, 54, 56, 54, 50, 54, 48, 54, 53, 53, 55, 53, 55, 57, 55, 56, 51, 54, 50, 55, 48, 52, 56, 54, 52, 49, 52, 54, 54, 50, 52, 53, 56, 56, 53, 52, 50, 56, 51, 52, 50, 54, 57, 54, 56, 54, 48, 52, 51, 50, 53, 51, 48, 57, 52, 55, 55, 49, 50, 51, 52, 56, 49, 48, 53, 48, 50, 54, 53, 55, 48, 57, 55, 56, 54, 52, 53, 50, 49, 48, 49, 52, 57, 54, 56, 53, 56, 56, 50, 53, 53, 57, 48, 51, 57, 49, 52, 49, 54, 51, 52, 51, 50, 50, 53, 56, 49, 54, 52, 48, 48, 49, 55, 51, 55, 48, 50, 57, 48, 50, 52, 51, 50, 55, 51, 53, 57, 54, 48, 57, 48, 50, 56, 57, 54, 53, 56, 56, 57, 53, 49, 54, 50, 55, 48, 51, 56, 56, 50, 55, 54, 53, 49, 52, 56, 49, 49, 56, 49, 51, 53, 52, 55, 56, 50, 55, 54, 55, 48, 55, 53, 48, 49, 53, 57, 48, 56, 49, 51, 51, 55, 52, 52, 48, 49, 54, 50, 54, 57, 51, 56, 54, 50, 56, 48, 52, 53, 51, 53, 55, 51, 52, 54, 53, 52, 52, 50, 57, 54, 55, 51, 57, 53, 48, 56, 57, 50, 52, 51, 57, 51, 51, 53, 56, 49, 54, 51, 55, 55, 49, 49, 48, 52, 57, 51, 51, 51, 50, 53, 55, 50, 57, 52, 54, 50, 57, 55, 52, 50, 55, 53, 52, 51, 54, 51, 49, 54, 56, 51, 54, 53, 50, 55, 51, 51, 57, 48, 55, 52, 49, 57, 49, 55, 51, 56, 51, 52, 55, 56, 51, 49, 51, 53, 48, 54, 53, 50, 53, 49, 52, 52, 48, 52, 53, 51, 56, 57, 54, 57, 50, 53, 52, 55, 50, 56, 49, 54, 50, 52, 54, 48, 54, 55, 48, 51, 51, 48, 52, 51, 53, 49, 53, 56, 53, 48, 54, 52, 51, 51, 54, 50, 55, 53, 51, 49, 55, 57, 55, 57, 48, 49, 57, 49, 52, 54, 53, 53, 53, 48, 49, 56, 52, 49, 50, 56, 53, 49, 55, 53, 55, 56, 52, 50, 48, 52, 55, 52, 50, 49, 56, 57, 49, 55, 48, 52, 48, 53, 53, 56, 51, 56, 52, 51, 48, 53, 49, 53, 52, 52, 48, 51, 48, 48, 48, + + // from here + 44, 50, 52, 52, 51, 56, 51, 49, 56, 57, 51, 57, 50, 54, 57, 54, 52, 54, 49, 57, 55, 51, 54, 57, 56, 51, 49, 48, 55, 53, 48, 50, 50, 56, 57, 53, 53, 57, 56, 52, 55, + 52, 56, 48, 48, 51, 49, 57, 54, 52, 57, 56, 52, 49, 50, 56, 51, 52, 51, 53, 49, 55, 53, 57, 51, 53, 48, 54, 51, 49, 48, 52, 52, 55, 56, 51, 56, 49, 56, 49, 49, 48, + 52, 56, 50, 52, 50, 49, 54, 56, 56, 52, 51, 49, 57, 57, 55, 49, 53, 52, 55, 57, 57, 50, 48, 49, 56, 53, 56, 54, 57, 54, 50, 49, 57, 55, 54, 55, 53, 54, 54, 48, 55, + 57, 50, 53, 53, 52, 55, 50, 56, 51, 56, 52, 53, 55, 52, 52, 51, 49, 53, 56, 57, 51, 56, 48, 55, 48, 57, 53, 48, 54, 52, 51, 49, 49, 53, 51, 51, 49, 55, 57, 51, 57, + 57, 57, 55, 49, 48, 52, 54, 48, 56, 57, 56, 57, 55, 51, 53, 50, 50, 51, 57, 55, 48, 55, 55, 51, 52, 57, 48, 49, 57, 50, 57, 50, 48, 56, 48, 52, 50, 53, 53, 48, 53, + 55, 49, 56, 53, 51, 51, 53, 53, 55, 54, 54, 49, 52, 57, 55, 50, 54, 55, 48, 57, 53, 54, 50, 55, 48, 53, 52, 50, 51, 54, 49, 50, 50, 49, 52, 50, 49, 49, 56, 51, 55, + 50, 50, 55, 54, 50, 50, 50, 53, 49, 50, 49, 53, 49, 55, 55, 52, 56, 56, 50, 57, 56, 50, 55, 52, 53, 49, 52, 55, 49, 54, 57, 48, 51, 49, 53, 52, 48, 55, 55, 49, 53, + 56, 55, 57, 57, 50, 56, 54, 51, 52, 52, 56, 53, 56, 48, 56, 53, 48, 48, 48, 52, 55, 48, 51, 48, 54, 57, 50, 54, 54, 52, 50, 52, 56, 52, 50, 49, 54, 55, 49, 48, 52, + 53, 49, 53, 53, 49, 52, 50, 55, 54, 53, 57, 55, 55, 53, 52, 51, 48, 56, 57, 50, 52, 56, 54, 49, 52, 57, 53, 57, 55, 52, 50, 52, 49, 56, 49, 48, 53, 57, 55, 53, 54, + 56, 57, 52, 56, 57, 48, 52, 55, 51, 53, 54, 49, 54, 55, 51, 56, 56, 54, 52, 55, 48, 53, 53, 51, 50, 51, 50, 53, 52, 55, 56, 50, 54, 50, 57, 49, 57, 48, 57, 55, 54, + 49, 52, 50, 48, 54, 53, 48, 55, 52, 53, 52, 52, 57, 50, 56, 48, 49, 51, 56, 51, 54, 51, 48, 49, 56, 57, 51, 53, 53, 57, 55, 50, 48, 52, 56, 55, 55, 57, 56, 57, 54, + 52, 57, 53, 55, 52, 55, 49, 56, 54, 54, 53, 54, 49, 54, 53, 52, 54, 52, 53, 53, 53, 48, 54, 48, 49, 51, 50, 50, 52, 51, 52, 55, 54, 50, 50, + + + 50, 55, 52, 53, 55, 53, 55, 48, 57, 51, 52, 53, 50, 48, 54, 54, 49, 48, 53, 57, 54, 50, 56, 49, 50, 52, 51, 49, 49, 53, 54, 57, 49, 56, 56, 57, 48, 49, 54, 51, 52, + 50, 53, 53, 57, 48, 52, 51, 56, 49, 56, 55, 56, 52, 57, 54, 48, 55, 52, 50, 51, 48, 54, 53, 48, 53, 53, 53, 49, 48, 54, 56, 52, 49, 56, 49, 49, 51, 52, 54, 54, 49, + 57, 50, 48, 50, 53, 48, 51, 57, 55, 52, 50, 52, 55, 54, 48, 56, 54, 52, 54, 57, 55, 50, 57, 54, 53, 54, 50, 51, 56, 54, 55, 55, 50, 52, 50, 48, 52, 56, 48, 51, 53, + 53, 48, 49, 52, 57, 50, 56, 54, 55} +} + diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/bn256.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/bn256.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6af1c19 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/bn256.go @@ -0,0 +1,531 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package bn256 implements a particular bilinear group at the 128-bit security level. +// +// Bilinear groups are the basis of many of the new cryptographic protocols +// that have been proposed over the past decade. They consist of a triplet of +// groups (G₁, G₂ and GT) such that there exists a function e(g₁ˣ,g₂ʸ)=gTˣʸ +// (where gₓ is a generator of the respective group). That function is called +// a pairing function. +// +// This package specifically implements the Optimal Ate pairing over a 256-bit +// Barreto-Naehrig curve as described in +// http://cryptojedi.org/papers/dclxvi-20100714.pdf. Its output is compatible +// with the implementation described in that paper. +package bn256 + +import ( + "crypto/rand" + "io" + "math/big" +) + +// BUG(agl): this implementation is not constant time. +// TODO(agl): keep GF(p²) elements in Mongomery form. + +// G1 is an abstract cyclic group. The zero value is suitable for use as the +// output of an operation, but cannot be used as an input. +type G1 struct { + p *curvePoint +} + +// RandomG1 returns x and g₁ˣ where x is a random, non-zero number read from r. +func RandomG1(r io.Reader) (*big.Int, *G1, error) { + var k *big.Int + var err error + + for { + k, err = rand.Int(r, Order) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + if k.Sign() > 0 { + break + } + } + + return k, new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(k), nil +} + +func (g *G1) String() string { + return "bn256.G1" + g.p.String() +} + +// CurvePoints returns p's curve points in big integer +func (e *G1) CurvePoints() (*big.Int, *big.Int, *big.Int, *big.Int) { + return e.p.x, e.p.y, e.p.z, e.p.t +} + +// Set to identity element on the group. +func (e *G1) SetInfinity() *G1 { + e.p = newCurvePoint(new(bnPool)) + e.p.SetInfinity() + return e +} + +// ScalarBaseMult sets e to g*k where g is the generator of the group and +// then returns e. +// This method was updated to deal with negative numbers. +func (e *G1) ScalarBaseMult(k *big.Int) *G1 { + if e.p == nil { + e.p = newCurvePoint(nil) + } + cmp := k.Cmp(big.NewInt(0)) + if cmp >=0 { + if cmp == 0 { + e.p.SetInfinity() + } else { + e.p.Mul(curveGen, k, new(bnPool)) + } + } else { + e.p.Negative(e.p.Mul(curveGen, new(big.Int).Abs(k), new(bnPool))) + } + return e +} + +// ScalarMult sets e to a*k and then returns e. +// This method was updated to deal with negative numbers. +func (e *G1) ScalarMult(a *G1, k *big.Int) *G1 { + if e.p == nil { + e.p = newCurvePoint(nil) + } + cmp := k.Cmp(big.NewInt(0)) + if cmp >=0 { + if cmp == 0 { + e.p.SetInfinity() + } else { + e.p.Mul(a.p, k, new(bnPool)) + } + } else { + e.p.Negative(e.p.Mul(a.p, new(big.Int).Abs(k), new(bnPool))) + } + return e +} + +// Add sets e to a+b and then returns e. +// BUG(agl): this function is not complete: a==b fails. +func (e *G1) Add(a, b *G1) *G1 { + if e.p == nil { + e.p = newCurvePoint(nil) + } + e.p.Add(a.p, b.p, new(bnPool)) + return e +} + +// Neg sets e to -a and then returns e. +func (e *G1) Neg(a *G1) *G1 { + if e.p == nil { + e.p = newCurvePoint(nil) + } + e.p.Negative(a.p) + return e +} + +// Marshal converts n to a byte slice. +func (n *G1) Marshal() []byte { + n.p.MakeAffine(nil) + + xBytes := new(big.Int).Mod(n.p.x, P).Bytes() + yBytes := new(big.Int).Mod(n.p.y, P).Bytes() + + // Each value is a 256-bit number. + const numBytes = 256 / 8 + + ret := make([]byte, numBytes*2) + copy(ret[1*numBytes-len(xBytes):], xBytes) + copy(ret[2*numBytes-len(yBytes):], yBytes) + + return ret +} + +// Unmarshal sets e to the result of converting the output of Marshal back into +// a group element and then returns e. +func (e *G1) Unmarshal(m []byte) (*G1, bool) { + // Each value is a 256-bit number. + const numBytes = 256 / 8 + + if len(m) != 2*numBytes { + return nil, false + } + + if e.p == nil { + e.p = newCurvePoint(nil) + } + + e.p.x.SetBytes(m[0*numBytes : 1*numBytes]) + e.p.y.SetBytes(m[1*numBytes : 2*numBytes]) + + if e.p.x.Sign() == 0 && e.p.y.Sign() == 0 { + // This is the point at infinity. + e.p.y.SetInt64(1) + e.p.z.SetInt64(0) + e.p.t.SetInt64(0) + } else { + e.p.z.SetInt64(1) + e.p.t.SetInt64(1) + + if !e.p.IsOnCurve() { + return nil, false + } + } + + return e, true +} + +// G2 is an abstract cyclic group. The zero value is suitable for use as the +// output of an operation, but cannot be used as an input. +type G2 struct { + p *twistPoint +} + +// RandomG1 returns x and g₂ˣ where x is a random, non-zero number read from r. +func RandomG2(r io.Reader) (*big.Int, *G2, error) { + var k *big.Int + var err error + + for { + k, err = rand.Int(r, Order) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + if k.Sign() > 0 { + break + } + } + + return k, new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(k), nil +} + +func (g *G2) String() string { + return "bn256.G2" + g.p.String() +} + +// CurvePoints returns the curve points of p which includes the real +// and imaginary parts of the curve point. +func (e *G2) CurvePoints() (*gfP2, *gfP2, *gfP2, *gfP2) { + return e.p.x, e.p.y, e.p.z, e.p.t +} + +// Set to identity element on the group. +func (e *G2) SetInfinity() *G2 { + e.p = newTwistPoint(new(bnPool)) + e.p.SetInfinity() + return e +} + +// ScalarBaseMult sets e to g*k where g is the generator of the group and +// then returns out. +// This method was updated to deal with negative numbers. +func (e *G2) ScalarBaseMult(k *big.Int) *G2 { + if e.p == nil { + e.p = newTwistPoint(nil) + } + if k.Cmp(big.NewInt(0)) >=0 { + e.p.Mul(twistGen, k, new(bnPool)) + } else { + e.p.Negative(e.p.Mul(twistGen, new(big.Int).Abs(k), new(bnPool)), new(bnPool)) + } + return e +} + +// ScalarMult sets e to a*k and then returns e. +// This method was updated to deal with negative numbers. +func (e *G2) ScalarMult(a *G2, k *big.Int) *G2 { + if e.p == nil { + e.p = newTwistPoint(nil) + } + if k.Cmp(big.NewInt(0)) >=0 { + e.p.Mul(a.p, k, new(bnPool)) + } else { + e.p.Negative(e.p.Mul(a.p, new(big.Int).Abs(k), new(bnPool)), new(bnPool)) + } + return e +} + +// Add sets e to a+b and then returns e. +// BUG(agl): this function is not complete: a==b fails. +func (e *G2) Add(a, b *G2) *G2 { + if e.p == nil { + e.p = newTwistPoint(nil) + } + e.p.Add(a.p, b.p, new(bnPool)) + return e +} + +// Neg sets e to -a and then returns e. +func (e *G2) Neg(a *G2) *G2 { + if e.p == nil { + e.p = newTwistPoint(nil) + } + e.p.Negative(a.p, new(bnPool)) + return e +} + +// Marshal converts n into a byte slice. +func (n *G2) Marshal() []byte { + n.p.MakeAffine(nil) + + xxBytes := new(big.Int).Mod(n.p.x.x, P).Bytes() + xyBytes := new(big.Int).Mod(n.p.x.y, P).Bytes() + yxBytes := new(big.Int).Mod(n.p.y.x, P).Bytes() + yyBytes := new(big.Int).Mod(n.p.y.y, P).Bytes() + + // Each value is a 256-bit number. + const numBytes = 256 / 8 + + ret := make([]byte, numBytes*4) + copy(ret[1*numBytes-len(xxBytes):], xxBytes) + copy(ret[2*numBytes-len(xyBytes):], xyBytes) + copy(ret[3*numBytes-len(yxBytes):], yxBytes) + copy(ret[4*numBytes-len(yyBytes):], yyBytes) + + return ret +} + +// Unmarshal sets e to the result of converting the output of Marshal back into +// a group element and then returns e. +func (e *G2) Unmarshal(m []byte) (*G2, bool) { + // Each value is a 256-bit number. + const numBytes = 256 / 8 + + if len(m) != 4*numBytes { + return nil, false + } + + if e.p == nil { + e.p = newTwistPoint(nil) + } + + e.p.x.x.SetBytes(m[0*numBytes : 1*numBytes]) + e.p.x.y.SetBytes(m[1*numBytes : 2*numBytes]) + e.p.y.x.SetBytes(m[2*numBytes : 3*numBytes]) + e.p.y.y.SetBytes(m[3*numBytes : 4*numBytes]) + + if e.p.x.x.Sign() == 0 && + e.p.x.y.Sign() == 0 && + e.p.y.x.Sign() == 0 && + e.p.y.y.Sign() == 0 { + // This is the point at infinity. + e.p.y.SetOne() + e.p.z.SetZero() + e.p.t.SetZero() + } else { + e.p.z.SetOne() + e.p.t.SetOne() + + if !e.p.IsOnCurve() { + return nil, false + } + } + + return e, true +} + +// GT is an abstract cyclic group. The zero value is suitable for use as the +// output of an operation, but cannot be used as an input. +type GT struct { + p *gfP12 +} + +func (g *GT) String() string { + return "bn256.GT" + g.p.String() +} + +// ScalarMult sets e to a*k and then returns e. +func (e *GT) ScalarMult(a *GT, k *big.Int) *GT { + if e.p == nil { + e.p = newGFp12(nil) + } + e.p.Exp(a.p, k, new(bnPool)) + return e +} + +func (e *GT) Exp(a *GT, k *big.Int) *GT { + var returnValue *GT + if k.Cmp(big.NewInt(0)) >=0 { + returnValue = a.ScalarMult(a, k) + } else { + returnValue = a.Invert(a.ScalarMult(a, new(big.Int).Abs(k))) + } + return returnValue +} + +func (e *GT) Invert(a *GT) *GT { + if e.p == nil { + e.p = newGFp12(nil) + } + e.p.Invert(a.p, new(bnPool)) + return e +} + +// SetZero returns true iff a = 0. +func (e *G1) SetZero() { + e.p.SetInfinity() +} + +// IsZero returns true iff a = 0. +func (e *G1) IsZero() bool { + return e.p.IsInfinity() +} + +// IsZero returns true iff a = 0. +func (e *G2) IsZero() bool { + return e.p.IsInfinity() +} + +// IsZero returns true iff a = 0. +func (e *GT) IsZero() bool { + return e.p.IsZero() +} + +// IsOne returns true iff a = 0. +func (e *GT) IsOne() bool { + return e.p.IsOne() +} + +// Add sets e to a+b and then returns e. +func (e *GT) Add(a, b *GT) *GT { + if e.p == nil { + e.p = newGFp12(nil) + } + e.p.Mul(a.p, b.p, new(bnPool)) + return e +} + +// Neg sets e to -a and then returns e. +func (e *GT) Neg(a *GT) *GT { + if e.p == nil { + e.p = newGFp12(nil) + } + e.p.Invert(a.p, new(bnPool)) + return e +} + + +// Marshal converts n into a byte slice. +func (n *GT) Marshal() []byte { + n.p.Minimal() + + xxxBytes := n.p.x.x.x.Bytes() + xxyBytes := n.p.x.x.y.Bytes() + xyxBytes := n.p.x.y.x.Bytes() + xyyBytes := n.p.x.y.y.Bytes() + xzxBytes := n.p.x.z.x.Bytes() + xzyBytes := n.p.x.z.y.Bytes() + yxxBytes := n.p.y.x.x.Bytes() + yxyBytes := n.p.y.x.y.Bytes() + yyxBytes := n.p.y.y.x.Bytes() + yyyBytes := n.p.y.y.y.Bytes() + yzxBytes := n.p.y.z.x.Bytes() + yzyBytes := n.p.y.z.y.Bytes() + + // Each value is a 256-bit number. + const numBytes = 256 / 8 + + ret := make([]byte, numBytes*12) + copy(ret[1*numBytes-len(xxxBytes):], xxxBytes) + copy(ret[2*numBytes-len(xxyBytes):], xxyBytes) + copy(ret[3*numBytes-len(xyxBytes):], xyxBytes) + copy(ret[4*numBytes-len(xyyBytes):], xyyBytes) + copy(ret[5*numBytes-len(xzxBytes):], xzxBytes) + copy(ret[6*numBytes-len(xzyBytes):], xzyBytes) + copy(ret[7*numBytes-len(yxxBytes):], yxxBytes) + copy(ret[8*numBytes-len(yxyBytes):], yxyBytes) + copy(ret[9*numBytes-len(yyxBytes):], yyxBytes) + copy(ret[10*numBytes-len(yyyBytes):], yyyBytes) + copy(ret[11*numBytes-len(yzxBytes):], yzxBytes) + copy(ret[12*numBytes-len(yzyBytes):], yzyBytes) + + return ret +} + +// Unmarshal sets e to the result of converting the output of Marshal back into +// a group element and then returns e. +func (e *GT) Unmarshal(m []byte) (*GT, bool) { + // Each value is a 256-bit number. + const numBytes = 256 / 8 + + if len(m) != 12*numBytes { + return nil, false + } + + if e.p == nil { + e.p = newGFp12(nil) + } + + e.p.x.x.x.SetBytes(m[0*numBytes : 1*numBytes]) + e.p.x.x.y.SetBytes(m[1*numBytes : 2*numBytes]) + e.p.x.y.x.SetBytes(m[2*numBytes : 3*numBytes]) + e.p.x.y.y.SetBytes(m[3*numBytes : 4*numBytes]) + e.p.x.z.x.SetBytes(m[4*numBytes : 5*numBytes]) + e.p.x.z.y.SetBytes(m[5*numBytes : 6*numBytes]) + e.p.y.x.x.SetBytes(m[6*numBytes : 7*numBytes]) + e.p.y.x.y.SetBytes(m[7*numBytes : 8*numBytes]) + e.p.y.y.x.SetBytes(m[8*numBytes : 9*numBytes]) + e.p.y.y.y.SetBytes(m[9*numBytes : 10*numBytes]) + e.p.y.z.x.SetBytes(m[10*numBytes : 11*numBytes]) + e.p.y.z.y.SetBytes(m[11*numBytes : 12*numBytes]) + + return e, true +} + +// Pair calculates an Optimal Ate pairing. +func Pair(g1 *G1, g2 *G2) *GT { + return >{optimalAte(g2.p, g1.p, new(bnPool))} +} + +// PairingCheck calculates the Optimal Ate pairing for a set of points. +func PairingCheck(a []*G1, b []*G2) bool { + pool := new(bnPool) + + acc := newGFp12(pool) + acc.SetOne() + + for i := 0; i < len(a); i++ { + if a[i].p.IsInfinity() || b[i].p.IsInfinity() { + continue + } + acc.Mul(acc, miller(b[i].p, a[i].p, pool), pool) + } + ret := finalExponentiation(acc, pool) + acc.Put(pool) + + return ret.IsOne() +} + +// bnPool implements a tiny cache of *big.Int objects that's used to reduce the +// number of allocations made during processing. +type bnPool struct { + bns []*big.Int + count int +} + +func (pool *bnPool) Get() *big.Int { + if pool == nil { + return new(big.Int) + } + + pool.count++ + l := len(pool.bns) + if l == 0 { + return new(big.Int) + } + + bn := pool.bns[l-1] + pool.bns = pool.bns[:l-1] + return bn +} + +func (pool *bnPool) Put(bn *big.Int) { + if pool == nil { + return + } + pool.bns = append(pool.bns, bn) + pool.count-- +} + +func (pool *bnPool) Count() int { + return pool.count +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/bn256_test.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/bn256_test.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..866065d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/bn256_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,304 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package bn256 + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto/rand" + "math/big" + "testing" +) + +func TestGFp2Invert(t *testing.T) { + pool := new(bnPool) + + a := newGFp2(pool) + a.x.SetString("23423492374", 10) + a.y.SetString("12934872398472394827398470", 10) + + inv := newGFp2(pool) + inv.Invert(a, pool) + + b := newGFp2(pool).Mul(inv, a, pool) + if b.x.Int64() != 0 || b.y.Int64() != 1 { + t.Fatalf("bad result for a^-1*a: %s %s", b.x, b.y) + } + + a.Put(pool) + b.Put(pool) + inv.Put(pool) + + if c := pool.Count(); c > 0 { + t.Errorf("Pool count non-zero: %d\n", c) + } +} + +func isZero(n *big.Int) bool { + return new(big.Int).Mod(n, P).Int64() == 0 +} + +func isOne(n *big.Int) bool { + return new(big.Int).Mod(n, P).Int64() == 1 +} + +func TestGFp6Invert(t *testing.T) { + pool := new(bnPool) + + a := newGFp6(pool) + a.x.x.SetString("239487238491", 10) + a.x.y.SetString("2356249827341", 10) + a.y.x.SetString("082659782", 10) + a.y.y.SetString("182703523765", 10) + a.z.x.SetString("978236549263", 10) + a.z.y.SetString("64893242", 10) + + inv := newGFp6(pool) + inv.Invert(a, pool) + + b := newGFp6(pool).Mul(inv, a, pool) + if !isZero(b.x.x) || + !isZero(b.x.y) || + !isZero(b.y.x) || + !isZero(b.y.y) || + !isZero(b.z.x) || + !isOne(b.z.y) { + t.Fatalf("bad result for a^-1*a: %s", b) + } + + a.Put(pool) + b.Put(pool) + inv.Put(pool) + + if c := pool.Count(); c > 0 { + t.Errorf("Pool count non-zero: %d\n", c) + } +} + +func TestGFp12Invert(t *testing.T) { + pool := new(bnPool) + + a := newGFp12(pool) + a.x.x.x.SetString("239846234862342323958623", 10) + a.x.x.y.SetString("2359862352529835623", 10) + a.x.y.x.SetString("928836523", 10) + a.x.y.y.SetString("9856234", 10) + a.x.z.x.SetString("235635286", 10) + a.x.z.y.SetString("5628392833", 10) + a.y.x.x.SetString("252936598265329856238956532167968", 10) + a.y.x.y.SetString("23596239865236954178968", 10) + a.y.y.x.SetString("95421692834", 10) + a.y.y.y.SetString("236548", 10) + a.y.z.x.SetString("924523", 10) + a.y.z.y.SetString("12954623", 10) + + inv := newGFp12(pool) + inv.Invert(a, pool) + + b := newGFp12(pool).Mul(inv, a, pool) + if !isZero(b.x.x.x) || + !isZero(b.x.x.y) || + !isZero(b.x.y.x) || + !isZero(b.x.y.y) || + !isZero(b.x.z.x) || + !isZero(b.x.z.y) || + !isZero(b.y.x.x) || + !isZero(b.y.x.y) || + !isZero(b.y.y.x) || + !isZero(b.y.y.y) || + !isZero(b.y.z.x) || + !isOne(b.y.z.y) { + t.Fatalf("bad result for a^-1*a: %s", b) + } + + a.Put(pool) + b.Put(pool) + inv.Put(pool) + + if c := pool.Count(); c > 0 { + t.Errorf("Pool count non-zero: %d\n", c) + } +} + +func TestCurveImpl(t *testing.T) { + pool := new(bnPool) + + g := &curvePoint{ + pool.Get().SetInt64(1), + pool.Get().SetInt64(-2), + pool.Get().SetInt64(1), + pool.Get().SetInt64(0), + } + + x := pool.Get().SetInt64(32498273234) + X := newCurvePoint(pool).Mul(g, x, pool) + + y := pool.Get().SetInt64(98732423523) + Y := newCurvePoint(pool).Mul(g, y, pool) + + s1 := newCurvePoint(pool).Mul(X, y, pool).MakeAffine(pool) + s2 := newCurvePoint(pool).Mul(Y, x, pool).MakeAffine(pool) + + if s1.x.Cmp(s2.x) != 0 || + s2.x.Cmp(s1.x) != 0 { + t.Errorf("DH points don't match: (%s, %s) (%s, %s)", s1.x, s1.y, s2.x, s2.y) + } + + pool.Put(x) + X.Put(pool) + pool.Put(y) + Y.Put(pool) + s1.Put(pool) + s2.Put(pool) + g.Put(pool) + + if c := pool.Count(); c > 0 { + t.Errorf("Pool count non-zero: %d\n", c) + } +} + +func TestOrderG1(t *testing.T) { + g := new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(Order) + if !g.p.IsInfinity() { + t.Error("G1 has incorrect order") + } + + one := new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(new(big.Int).SetInt64(1)) + g.Add(g, one) + g.p.MakeAffine(nil) + if g.p.x.Cmp(one.p.x) != 0 || g.p.y.Cmp(one.p.y) != 0 { + t.Errorf("1+0 != 1 in G1") + } +} + +func TestOrderG2(t *testing.T) { + g := new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(Order) + if !g.p.IsInfinity() { + t.Error("G2 has incorrect order") + } + + one := new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(new(big.Int).SetInt64(1)) + g.Add(g, one) + g.p.MakeAffine(nil) + if g.p.x.x.Cmp(one.p.x.x) != 0 || + g.p.x.y.Cmp(one.p.x.y) != 0 || + g.p.y.x.Cmp(one.p.y.x) != 0 || + g.p.y.y.Cmp(one.p.y.y) != 0 { + t.Errorf("1+0 != 1 in G2") + } +} + +func TestOrderGT(t *testing.T) { + gt := Pair(&G1{curveGen}, &G2{twistGen}) + g := new(GT).ScalarMult(gt, Order) + if !g.p.IsOne() { + t.Error("GT has incorrect order") + } +} + +func TestBilinearity(t *testing.T) { + for i := 0; i < 2; i++ { + a, p1, _ := RandomG1(rand.Reader) + b, p2, _ := RandomG2(rand.Reader) + e1 := Pair(p1, p2) + + e2 := Pair(&G1{curveGen}, &G2{twistGen}) + e2.ScalarMult(e2, a) + e2.ScalarMult(e2, b) + + minusE2 := new(GT).Neg(e2) + e1.Add(e1, minusE2) + + if !e1.p.IsOne() { + t.Fatalf("bad pairing result: %s", e1) + } + } +} + +func TestG1Marshal(t *testing.T) { + g := new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(new(big.Int).SetInt64(1)) + form := g.Marshal() + _, ok := new(G1).Unmarshal(form) + if !ok { + t.Fatalf("failed to unmarshal") + } + + g.ScalarBaseMult(Order) + form = g.Marshal() + g2, ok := new(G1).Unmarshal(form) + if !ok { + t.Fatalf("failed to unmarshal ∞") + } + if !g2.p.IsInfinity() { + t.Fatalf("∞ unmarshaled incorrectly") + } +} + +func TestG2Marshal(t *testing.T) { + g := new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(new(big.Int).SetInt64(1)) + form := g.Marshal() + _, ok := new(G2).Unmarshal(form) + if !ok { + t.Fatalf("failed to unmarshal") + } + + g.ScalarBaseMult(Order) + form = g.Marshal() + g2, ok := new(G2).Unmarshal(form) + if !ok { + t.Fatalf("failed to unmarshal ∞") + } + if !g2.p.IsInfinity() { + t.Fatalf("∞ unmarshaled incorrectly") + } +} + +func TestG1Identity(t *testing.T) { + g := new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(new(big.Int).SetInt64(0)) + if !g.p.IsInfinity() { + t.Error("failure") + } +} + +func TestG2Identity(t *testing.T) { + g := new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(new(big.Int).SetInt64(0)) + if !g.p.IsInfinity() { + t.Error("failure") + } +} + +func TestTripartiteDiffieHellman(t *testing.T) { + a, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, Order) + b, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, Order) + c, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, Order) + + pa, _ := new(G1).Unmarshal(new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(a).Marshal()) + qa, _ := new(G2).Unmarshal(new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(a).Marshal()) + pb, _ := new(G1).Unmarshal(new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(b).Marshal()) + qb, _ := new(G2).Unmarshal(new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(b).Marshal()) + pc, _ := new(G1).Unmarshal(new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(c).Marshal()) + qc, _ := new(G2).Unmarshal(new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(c).Marshal()) + + k1 := Pair(pb, qc) + k1.ScalarMult(k1, a) + k1Bytes := k1.Marshal() + + k2 := Pair(pc, qa) + k2.ScalarMult(k2, b) + k2Bytes := k2.Marshal() + + k3 := Pair(pa, qb) + k3.ScalarMult(k3, c) + k3Bytes := k3.Marshal() + + if !bytes.Equal(k1Bytes, k2Bytes) || !bytes.Equal(k2Bytes, k3Bytes) { + t.Errorf("keys didn't agree") + } +} + +func BenchmarkPairing(b *testing.B) { + for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ { + Pair(&G1{curveGen}, &G2{twistGen}) + } +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/constants.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/constants.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ab649d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/constants.go @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package bn256 + +import ( + "math/big" +) + +func bigFromBase10(s string) *big.Int { + n, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(s, 10) + return n +} + +// u is the BN parameter that determines the prime: 1868033³. +var u = bigFromBase10("4965661367192848881") + +// p is a prime over which we form a basic field: 36u⁴+36u³+24u²+6u+1. +var P = bigFromBase10("21888242871839275222246405745257275088696311157297823662689037894645226208583") + +// Order is the number of elements in both G₁ and G₂: 36u⁴+36u³+18u²+6u+1. +var Order = bigFromBase10("21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698204186575808495617") + +// xiToPMinus1Over6 is ξ^((p-1)/6) where ξ = i+9. +var xiToPMinus1Over6 = &gfP2{bigFromBase10("16469823323077808223889137241176536799009286646108169935659301613961712198316"), bigFromBase10("8376118865763821496583973867626364092589906065868298776909617916018768340080")} + +// xiToPMinus1Over3 is ξ^((p-1)/3) where ξ = i+9. +var xiToPMinus1Over3 = &gfP2{bigFromBase10("10307601595873709700152284273816112264069230130616436755625194854815875713954"), bigFromBase10("21575463638280843010398324269430826099269044274347216827212613867836435027261")} + +// xiToPMinus1Over2 is ξ^((p-1)/2) where ξ = i+9. +var xiToPMinus1Over2 = &gfP2{bigFromBase10("3505843767911556378687030309984248845540243509899259641013678093033130930403"), bigFromBase10("2821565182194536844548159561693502659359617185244120367078079554186484126554")} + +// xiToPSquaredMinus1Over3 is ξ^((p²-1)/3) where ξ = i+9. +var xiToPSquaredMinus1Over3 = bigFromBase10("21888242871839275220042445260109153167277707414472061641714758635765020556616") + +// xiTo2PSquaredMinus2Over3 is ξ^((2p²-2)/3) where ξ = i+9 (a cubic root of unity, mod p). +var xiTo2PSquaredMinus2Over3 = bigFromBase10("2203960485148121921418603742825762020974279258880205651966") + +// xiToPSquaredMinus1Over6 is ξ^((1p²-1)/6) where ξ = i+9 (a cubic root of -1, mod p). +var xiToPSquaredMinus1Over6 = bigFromBase10("21888242871839275220042445260109153167277707414472061641714758635765020556617") + +// xiTo2PMinus2Over3 is ξ^((2p-2)/3) where ξ = i+9. +var xiTo2PMinus2Over3 = &gfP2{bigFromBase10("19937756971775647987995932169929341994314640652964949448313374472400716661030"), bigFromBase10("2581911344467009335267311115468803099551665605076196740867805258568234346338")} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/curve.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/curve.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f7594e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/curve.go @@ -0,0 +1,286 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package bn256 + +import ( + "math/big" +) + +// curvePoint implements the elliptic curve y²=x³+3. Points are kept in +// Jacobian form and t=z² when valid. G₁ is the set of points of this curve on +// GF(p). +type curvePoint struct { + x, y, z, t *big.Int +} + +var curveB = new(big.Int).SetInt64(3) + +// curveGen is the generator of G₁. +var curveGen = &curvePoint{ + new(big.Int).SetInt64(1), + new(big.Int).SetInt64(-2), + new(big.Int).SetInt64(1), + new(big.Int).SetInt64(1), +} + +func newCurvePoint(pool *bnPool) *curvePoint { + return &curvePoint{ + pool.Get(), + pool.Get(), + pool.Get(), + pool.Get(), + } +} + +func (c *curvePoint) String() string { + c.MakeAffine(new(bnPool)) + return "(" + c.x.String() + ", " + c.y.String() + ")" +} + +func (c *curvePoint) Put(pool *bnPool) { + pool.Put(c.x) + pool.Put(c.y) + pool.Put(c.z) + pool.Put(c.t) +} + +func (c *curvePoint) Set(a *curvePoint) { + c.x.Set(a.x) + c.y.Set(a.y) + c.z.Set(a.z) + c.t.Set(a.t) +} + +// IsOnCurve returns true iff c is on the curve where c must be in affine form. +func (c *curvePoint) IsOnCurve() bool { + yy := new(big.Int).Mul(c.y, c.y) + xxx := new(big.Int).Mul(c.x, c.x) + xxx.Mul(xxx, c.x) + yy.Sub(yy, xxx) + yy.Sub(yy, curveB) + if yy.Sign() < 0 || yy.Cmp(P) >= 0 { + yy.Mod(yy, P) + } + return yy.Sign() == 0 +} + +func (c *curvePoint) SetInfinity() { + c.z.SetInt64(0) +} + +func (c *curvePoint) IsInfinity() bool { + return c.z.Sign() == 0 +} + +func (c *curvePoint) Add(a, b *curvePoint, pool *bnPool) { + if a.IsInfinity() { + c.Set(b) + return + } + if b.IsInfinity() { + c.Set(a) + return + } + + // See http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-code/shortw/jacobian-0/addition/add-2007-bl.op3 + + // Normalize the points by replacing a = [x1:y1:z1] and b = [x2:y2:z2] + // by [u1:s1:z1·z2] and [u2:s2:z1·z2] + // where u1 = x1·z2², s1 = y1·z2³ and u1 = x2·z1², s2 = y2·z1³ + z1z1 := pool.Get().Mul(a.z, a.z) + z1z1.Mod(z1z1, P) + z2z2 := pool.Get().Mul(b.z, b.z) + z2z2.Mod(z2z2, P) + u1 := pool.Get().Mul(a.x, z2z2) + u1.Mod(u1, P) + u2 := pool.Get().Mul(b.x, z1z1) + u2.Mod(u2, P) + + t := pool.Get().Mul(b.z, z2z2) + t.Mod(t, P) + s1 := pool.Get().Mul(a.y, t) + s1.Mod(s1, P) + + t.Mul(a.z, z1z1) + t.Mod(t, P) + s2 := pool.Get().Mul(b.y, t) + s2.Mod(s2, P) + + // Compute x = (2h)²(s²-u1-u2) + // where s = (s2-s1)/(u2-u1) is the slope of the line through + // (u1,s1) and (u2,s2). The extra factor 2h = 2(u2-u1) comes from the value of z below. + // This is also: + // 4(s2-s1)² - 4h²(u1+u2) = 4(s2-s1)² - 4h³ - 4h²(2u1) + // = r² - j - 2v + // with the notations below. + h := pool.Get().Sub(u2, u1) + xEqual := h.Sign() == 0 + + t.Add(h, h) + // i = 4h² + i := pool.Get().Mul(t, t) + i.Mod(i, P) + // j = 4h³ + j := pool.Get().Mul(h, i) + j.Mod(j, P) + + t.Sub(s2, s1) + yEqual := t.Sign() == 0 + if xEqual && yEqual { + c.Double(a, pool) + return + } + r := pool.Get().Add(t, t) + + v := pool.Get().Mul(u1, i) + v.Mod(v, P) + + // t4 = 4(s2-s1)² + t4 := pool.Get().Mul(r, r) + t4.Mod(t4, P) + t.Add(v, v) + t6 := pool.Get().Sub(t4, j) + c.x.Sub(t6, t) + + // Set y = -(2h)³(s1 + s*(x/4h²-u1)) + // This is also + // y = - 2·s1·j - (s2-s1)(2x - 2i·u1) = r(v-x) - 2·s1·j + t.Sub(v, c.x) // t7 + t4.Mul(s1, j) // t8 + t4.Mod(t4, P) + t6.Add(t4, t4) // t9 + t4.Mul(r, t) // t10 + t4.Mod(t4, P) + c.y.Sub(t4, t6) + + // Set z = 2(u2-u1)·z1·z2 = 2h·z1·z2 + t.Add(a.z, b.z) // t11 + t4.Mul(t, t) // t12 + t4.Mod(t4, P) + t.Sub(t4, z1z1) // t13 + t4.Sub(t, z2z2) // t14 + c.z.Mul(t4, h) + c.z.Mod(c.z, P) + + pool.Put(z1z1) + pool.Put(z2z2) + pool.Put(u1) + pool.Put(u2) + pool.Put(t) + pool.Put(s1) + pool.Put(s2) + pool.Put(h) + pool.Put(i) + pool.Put(j) + pool.Put(r) + pool.Put(v) + pool.Put(t4) + pool.Put(t6) +} + +func (c *curvePoint) Double(a *curvePoint, pool *bnPool) { + // See http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-code/shortw/jacobian-0/doubling/dbl-2009-l.op3 + A := pool.Get().Mul(a.x, a.x) + A.Mod(A, P) + B := pool.Get().Mul(a.y, a.y) + B.Mod(B, P) + C_ := pool.Get().Mul(B, B) + C_.Mod(C_, P) + + t := pool.Get().Add(a.x, B) + t2 := pool.Get().Mul(t, t) + t2.Mod(t2, P) + t.Sub(t2, A) + t2.Sub(t, C_) + d := pool.Get().Add(t2, t2) + t.Add(A, A) + e := pool.Get().Add(t, A) + f := pool.Get().Mul(e, e) + f.Mod(f, P) + + t.Add(d, d) + c.x.Sub(f, t) + + t.Add(C_, C_) + t2.Add(t, t) + t.Add(t2, t2) + c.y.Sub(d, c.x) + t2.Mul(e, c.y) + t2.Mod(t2, P) + c.y.Sub(t2, t) + + t.Mul(a.y, a.z) + t.Mod(t, P) + c.z.Add(t, t) + + pool.Put(A) + pool.Put(B) + pool.Put(C_) + pool.Put(t) + pool.Put(t2) + pool.Put(d) + pool.Put(e) + pool.Put(f) +} + +func (c *curvePoint) Mul(a *curvePoint, scalar *big.Int, pool *bnPool) *curvePoint { + sum := newCurvePoint(pool) + sum.SetInfinity() + t := newCurvePoint(pool) + + for i := scalar.BitLen(); i >= 0; i-- { + t.Double(sum, pool) + if scalar.Bit(i) != 0 { + sum.Add(t, a, pool) + } else { + sum.Set(t) + } + } + + c.Set(sum) + sum.Put(pool) + t.Put(pool) + return c +} + +func (c *curvePoint) MakeAffine(pool *bnPool) *curvePoint { + if words := c.z.Bits(); len(words) == 1 && words[0] == 1 { + return c + } + + if c.IsInfinity() { + c.x.SetInt64(0) + c.y.SetInt64(1) + c.z.SetInt64(0) + c.t.SetInt64(0) + return c + } + + zInv := pool.Get().ModInverse(c.z, P) + t := pool.Get().Mul(c.y, zInv) + t.Mod(t, P) + zInv2 := pool.Get().Mul(zInv, zInv) + zInv2.Mod(zInv2, P) + c.y.Mul(t, zInv2) + c.y.Mod(c.y, P) + t.Mul(c.x, zInv2) + t.Mod(t, P) + c.x.Set(t) + c.z.SetInt64(1) + c.t.SetInt64(1) + + pool.Put(zInv) + pool.Put(t) + pool.Put(zInv2) + + return c +} + +func (c *curvePoint) Negative(a *curvePoint) { + c.x.Set(a.x) + c.y.Neg(a.y) + c.z.Set(a.z) + c.t.SetInt64(0) +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp12.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp12.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f084edd --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp12.go @@ -0,0 +1,200 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package bn256 + +// For details of the algorithms used, see "Multiplication and Squaring on +// Pairing-Friendly Fields, Devegili et al. +// http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/471.pdf. + +import ( + "math/big" +) + +// gfP12 implements the field of size p¹² as a quadratic extension of gfP6 +// where ω²=τ. +type gfP12 struct { + x, y *gfP6 // value is xω + y +} + +func newGFp12(pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { + return &gfP12{newGFp6(pool), newGFp6(pool)} +} + +func (e *gfP12) String() string { + return "(" + e.x.String() + "," + e.y.String() + ")" +} + +func (e *gfP12) Put(pool *bnPool) { + e.x.Put(pool) + e.y.Put(pool) +} + +func (e *gfP12) Set(a *gfP12) *gfP12 { + e.x.Set(a.x) + e.y.Set(a.y) + return e +} + +func (e *gfP12) SetZero() *gfP12 { + e.x.SetZero() + e.y.SetZero() + return e +} + +func (e *gfP12) SetOne() *gfP12 { + e.x.SetZero() + e.y.SetOne() + return e +} + +func (e *gfP12) Minimal() { + e.x.Minimal() + e.y.Minimal() +} + +func (e *gfP12) IsZero() bool { + e.Minimal() + return e.x.IsZero() && e.y.IsZero() +} + +func (e *gfP12) IsOne() bool { + e.Minimal() + return e.x.IsZero() && e.y.IsOne() +} + +func (e *gfP12) Conjugate(a *gfP12) *gfP12 { + e.x.Negative(a.x) + e.y.Set(a.y) + return a +} + +func (e *gfP12) Negative(a *gfP12) *gfP12 { + e.x.Negative(a.x) + e.y.Negative(a.y) + return e +} + +// Frobenius computes (xω+y)^p = x^p ω·ξ^((p-1)/6) + y^p +func (e *gfP12) Frobenius(a *gfP12, pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { + e.x.Frobenius(a.x, pool) + e.y.Frobenius(a.y, pool) + e.x.MulScalar(e.x, xiToPMinus1Over6, pool) + return e +} + +// FrobeniusP2 computes (xω+y)^p² = x^p² ω·ξ^((p²-1)/6) + y^p² +func (e *gfP12) FrobeniusP2(a *gfP12, pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { + e.x.FrobeniusP2(a.x) + e.x.MulGFP(e.x, xiToPSquaredMinus1Over6) + e.y.FrobeniusP2(a.y) + return e +} + +func (e *gfP12) Add(a, b *gfP12) *gfP12 { + e.x.Add(a.x, b.x) + e.y.Add(a.y, b.y) + return e +} + +func (e *gfP12) Sub(a, b *gfP12) *gfP12 { + e.x.Sub(a.x, b.x) + e.y.Sub(a.y, b.y) + return e +} + +func (e *gfP12) Mul(a, b *gfP12, pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { + tx := newGFp6(pool) + tx.Mul(a.x, b.y, pool) + t := newGFp6(pool) + t.Mul(b.x, a.y, pool) + tx.Add(tx, t) + + ty := newGFp6(pool) + ty.Mul(a.y, b.y, pool) + t.Mul(a.x, b.x, pool) + t.MulTau(t, pool) + e.y.Add(ty, t) + e.x.Set(tx) + + tx.Put(pool) + ty.Put(pool) + t.Put(pool) + return e +} + +func (e *gfP12) MulScalar(a *gfP12, b *gfP6, pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { + e.x.Mul(e.x, b, pool) + e.y.Mul(e.y, b, pool) + return e +} + +func (c *gfP12) Exp(a *gfP12, power *big.Int, pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { + sum := newGFp12(pool) + sum.SetOne() + t := newGFp12(pool) + + for i := power.BitLen() - 1; i >= 0; i-- { + t.Square(sum, pool) + if power.Bit(i) != 0 { + sum.Mul(t, a, pool) + } else { + sum.Set(t) + } + } + + c.Set(sum) + + sum.Put(pool) + t.Put(pool) + + return c +} + +func (e *gfP12) Square(a *gfP12, pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { + // Complex squaring algorithm + v0 := newGFp6(pool) + v0.Mul(a.x, a.y, pool) + + t := newGFp6(pool) + t.MulTau(a.x, pool) + t.Add(a.y, t) + ty := newGFp6(pool) + ty.Add(a.x, a.y) + ty.Mul(ty, t, pool) + ty.Sub(ty, v0) + t.MulTau(v0, pool) + ty.Sub(ty, t) + + e.y.Set(ty) + e.x.Double(v0) + + v0.Put(pool) + t.Put(pool) + ty.Put(pool) + + return e +} + +func (e *gfP12) Invert(a *gfP12, pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { + // See "Implementing cryptographic pairings", M. Scott, section 3.2. + // ftp://136.206.11.249/pub/crypto/pairings.pdf + t1 := newGFp6(pool) + t2 := newGFp6(pool) + + t1.Square(a.x, pool) + t2.Square(a.y, pool) + t1.MulTau(t1, pool) + t1.Sub(t2, t1) + t2.Invert(t1, pool) + + e.x.Negative(a.x) + e.y.Set(a.y) + e.MulScalar(e, t2, pool) + + t1.Put(pool) + t2.Put(pool) + + return e +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp2.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp2.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3981f6c --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp2.go @@ -0,0 +1,227 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package bn256 + +// For details of the algorithms used, see "Multiplication and Squaring on +// Pairing-Friendly Fields, Devegili et al. +// http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/471.pdf. + +import ( + "math/big" +) + +// gfP2 implements a field of size p² as a quadratic extension of the base +// field where i²=-1. +type gfP2 struct { + x, y *big.Int // value is xi+y. +} + +func newGFp2(pool *bnPool) *gfP2 { + return &gfP2{pool.Get(), pool.Get()} +} + +func (e *gfP2) String() string { + x := new(big.Int).Mod(e.x, P) + y := new(big.Int).Mod(e.y, P) + return "(" + x.String() + "," + y.String() + ")" +} + +func (e *gfP2) Put(pool *bnPool) { + pool.Put(e.x) + pool.Put(e.y) +} + +func (e *gfP2) Set(a *gfP2) *gfP2 { + e.x.Set(a.x) + e.y.Set(a.y) + return e +} + +func (e *gfP2) SetZero() *gfP2 { + e.x.SetInt64(0) + e.y.SetInt64(0) + return e +} + +func (e *gfP2) SetOne() *gfP2 { + e.x.SetInt64(0) + e.y.SetInt64(1) + return e +} + +func (e *gfP2) Minimal() { + if e.x.Sign() < 0 || e.x.Cmp(P) >= 0 { + e.x.Mod(e.x, P) + } + if e.y.Sign() < 0 || e.y.Cmp(P) >= 0 { + e.y.Mod(e.y, P) + } +} + +func (e *gfP2) IsZero() bool { + return e.x.Sign() == 0 && e.y.Sign() == 0 +} + +func (e *gfP2) IsOne() bool { + if e.x.Sign() != 0 { + return false + } + words := e.y.Bits() + return len(words) == 1 && words[0] == 1 +} + +func (e *gfP2) Conjugate(a *gfP2) *gfP2 { + e.y.Set(a.y) + e.x.Neg(a.x) + return e +} + +func (e *gfP2) Negative(a *gfP2) *gfP2 { + e.x.Neg(a.x) + e.y.Neg(a.y) + return e +} + +func (e *gfP2) Add(a, b *gfP2) *gfP2 { + e.x.Add(a.x, b.x) + e.y.Add(a.y, b.y) + return e +} + +func (e *gfP2) Sub(a, b *gfP2) *gfP2 { + e.x.Sub(a.x, b.x) + e.y.Sub(a.y, b.y) + return e +} + +func (e *gfP2) Double(a *gfP2) *gfP2 { + e.x.Lsh(a.x, 1) + e.y.Lsh(a.y, 1) + return e +} + +func (c *gfP2) Exp(a *gfP2, power *big.Int, pool *bnPool) *gfP2 { + sum := newGFp2(pool) + sum.SetOne() + t := newGFp2(pool) + + for i := power.BitLen() - 1; i >= 0; i-- { + t.Square(sum, pool) + if power.Bit(i) != 0 { + sum.Mul(t, a, pool) + } else { + sum.Set(t) + } + } + + c.Set(sum) + + sum.Put(pool) + t.Put(pool) + + return c +} + +// See "Multiplication and Squaring in Pairing-Friendly Fields", +// http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/471.pdf +func (e *gfP2) Mul(a, b *gfP2, pool *bnPool) *gfP2 { + tx := pool.Get().Mul(a.x, b.y) + t := pool.Get().Mul(b.x, a.y) + tx.Add(tx, t) + tx.Mod(tx, P) + + ty := pool.Get().Mul(a.y, b.y) + t.Mul(a.x, b.x) + ty.Sub(ty, t) + e.y.Mod(ty, P) + e.x.Set(tx) + + pool.Put(tx) + pool.Put(ty) + pool.Put(t) + + return e +} + +func (e *gfP2) MulScalar(a *gfP2, b *big.Int) *gfP2 { + e.x.Mul(a.x, b) + e.y.Mul(a.y, b) + return e +} + +// MulXi sets e=ξa where ξ=i+9 and then returns e. +func (e *gfP2) MulXi(a *gfP2, pool *bnPool) *gfP2 { + // (xi+y)(i+3) = (9x+y)i+(9y-x) + tx := pool.Get().Lsh(a.x, 3) + tx.Add(tx, a.x) + tx.Add(tx, a.y) + + ty := pool.Get().Lsh(a.y, 3) + ty.Add(ty, a.y) + ty.Sub(ty, a.x) + + e.x.Set(tx) + e.y.Set(ty) + + pool.Put(tx) + pool.Put(ty) + + return e +} + +func (e *gfP2) Square(a *gfP2, pool *bnPool) *gfP2 { + // Complex squaring algorithm: + // (xi+b)² = (x+y)(y-x) + 2*i*x*y + t1 := pool.Get().Sub(a.y, a.x) + t2 := pool.Get().Add(a.x, a.y) + ty := pool.Get().Mul(t1, t2) + ty.Mod(ty, P) + + t1.Mul(a.x, a.y) + t1.Lsh(t1, 1) + + e.x.Mod(t1, P) + e.y.Set(ty) + + pool.Put(t1) + pool.Put(t2) + pool.Put(ty) + + return e +} + +func (e *gfP2) Invert(a *gfP2, pool *bnPool) *gfP2 { + // See "Implementing cryptographic pairings", M. Scott, section 3.2. + // ftp://136.206.11.249/pub/crypto/pairings.pdf + t := pool.Get() + t.Mul(a.y, a.y) + t2 := pool.Get() + t2.Mul(a.x, a.x) + t.Add(t, t2) + + inv := pool.Get() + inv.ModInverse(t, P) + + e.x.Neg(a.x) + e.x.Mul(e.x, inv) + e.x.Mod(e.x, P) + + e.y.Mul(a.y, inv) + e.y.Mod(e.y, P) + + pool.Put(t) + pool.Put(t2) + pool.Put(inv) + + return e +} + +func (e *gfP2) Real() *big.Int { + return e.x +} + +func (e *gfP2) Imag() *big.Int { + return e.y +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp6.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp6.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2188566 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp6.go @@ -0,0 +1,296 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package bn256 + +// For details of the algorithms used, see "Multiplication and Squaring on +// Pairing-Friendly Fields, Devegili et al. +// http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/471.pdf. + +import ( + "math/big" +) + +// gfP6 implements the field of size p⁶ as a cubic extension of gfP2 where τ³=ξ +// and ξ=i+9. +type gfP6 struct { + x, y, z *gfP2 // value is xτ² + yτ + z +} + +func newGFp6(pool *bnPool) *gfP6 { + return &gfP6{newGFp2(pool), newGFp2(pool), newGFp2(pool)} +} + +func (e *gfP6) String() string { + return "(" + e.x.String() + "," + e.y.String() + "," + e.z.String() + ")" +} + +func (e *gfP6) Put(pool *bnPool) { + e.x.Put(pool) + e.y.Put(pool) + e.z.Put(pool) +} + +func (e *gfP6) Set(a *gfP6) *gfP6 { + e.x.Set(a.x) + e.y.Set(a.y) + e.z.Set(a.z) + return e +} + +func (e *gfP6) SetZero() *gfP6 { + e.x.SetZero() + e.y.SetZero() + e.z.SetZero() + return e +} + +func (e *gfP6) SetOne() *gfP6 { + e.x.SetZero() + e.y.SetZero() + e.z.SetOne() + return e +} + +func (e *gfP6) Minimal() { + e.x.Minimal() + e.y.Minimal() + e.z.Minimal() +} + +func (e *gfP6) IsZero() bool { + return e.x.IsZero() && e.y.IsZero() && e.z.IsZero() +} + +func (e *gfP6) IsOne() bool { + return e.x.IsZero() && e.y.IsZero() && e.z.IsOne() +} + +func (e *gfP6) Negative(a *gfP6) *gfP6 { + e.x.Negative(a.x) + e.y.Negative(a.y) + e.z.Negative(a.z) + return e +} + +func (e *gfP6) Frobenius(a *gfP6, pool *bnPool) *gfP6 { + e.x.Conjugate(a.x) + e.y.Conjugate(a.y) + e.z.Conjugate(a.z) + + e.x.Mul(e.x, xiTo2PMinus2Over3, pool) + e.y.Mul(e.y, xiToPMinus1Over3, pool) + return e +} + +// FrobeniusP2 computes (xτ²+yτ+z)^(p²) = xτ^(2p²) + yτ^(p²) + z +func (e *gfP6) FrobeniusP2(a *gfP6) *gfP6 { + // τ^(2p²) = τ²τ^(2p²-2) = τ²ξ^((2p²-2)/3) + e.x.MulScalar(a.x, xiTo2PSquaredMinus2Over3) + // τ^(p²) = ττ^(p²-1) = τξ^((p²-1)/3) + e.y.MulScalar(a.y, xiToPSquaredMinus1Over3) + e.z.Set(a.z) + return e +} + +func (e *gfP6) Add(a, b *gfP6) *gfP6 { + e.x.Add(a.x, b.x) + e.y.Add(a.y, b.y) + e.z.Add(a.z, b.z) + return e +} + +func (e *gfP6) Sub(a, b *gfP6) *gfP6 { + e.x.Sub(a.x, b.x) + e.y.Sub(a.y, b.y) + e.z.Sub(a.z, b.z) + return e +} + +func (e *gfP6) Double(a *gfP6) *gfP6 { + e.x.Double(a.x) + e.y.Double(a.y) + e.z.Double(a.z) + return e +} + +func (e *gfP6) Mul(a, b *gfP6, pool *bnPool) *gfP6 { + // "Multiplication and Squaring on Pairing-Friendly Fields" + // Section 4, Karatsuba method. + // http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/471.pdf + + v0 := newGFp2(pool) + v0.Mul(a.z, b.z, pool) + v1 := newGFp2(pool) + v1.Mul(a.y, b.y, pool) + v2 := newGFp2(pool) + v2.Mul(a.x, b.x, pool) + + t0 := newGFp2(pool) + t0.Add(a.x, a.y) + t1 := newGFp2(pool) + t1.Add(b.x, b.y) + tz := newGFp2(pool) + tz.Mul(t0, t1, pool) + + tz.Sub(tz, v1) + tz.Sub(tz, v2) + tz.MulXi(tz, pool) + tz.Add(tz, v0) + + t0.Add(a.y, a.z) + t1.Add(b.y, b.z) + ty := newGFp2(pool) + ty.Mul(t0, t1, pool) + ty.Sub(ty, v0) + ty.Sub(ty, v1) + t0.MulXi(v2, pool) + ty.Add(ty, t0) + + t0.Add(a.x, a.z) + t1.Add(b.x, b.z) + tx := newGFp2(pool) + tx.Mul(t0, t1, pool) + tx.Sub(tx, v0) + tx.Add(tx, v1) + tx.Sub(tx, v2) + + e.x.Set(tx) + e.y.Set(ty) + e.z.Set(tz) + + t0.Put(pool) + t1.Put(pool) + tx.Put(pool) + ty.Put(pool) + tz.Put(pool) + v0.Put(pool) + v1.Put(pool) + v2.Put(pool) + return e +} + +func (e *gfP6) MulScalar(a *gfP6, b *gfP2, pool *bnPool) *gfP6 { + e.x.Mul(a.x, b, pool) + e.y.Mul(a.y, b, pool) + e.z.Mul(a.z, b, pool) + return e +} + +func (e *gfP6) MulGFP(a *gfP6, b *big.Int) *gfP6 { + e.x.MulScalar(a.x, b) + e.y.MulScalar(a.y, b) + e.z.MulScalar(a.z, b) + return e +} + +// MulTau computes τ·(aτ²+bτ+c) = bτ²+cτ+aξ +func (e *gfP6) MulTau(a *gfP6, pool *bnPool) { + tz := newGFp2(pool) + tz.MulXi(a.x, pool) + ty := newGFp2(pool) + ty.Set(a.y) + e.y.Set(a.z) + e.x.Set(ty) + e.z.Set(tz) + tz.Put(pool) + ty.Put(pool) +} + +func (e *gfP6) Square(a *gfP6, pool *bnPool) *gfP6 { + v0 := newGFp2(pool).Square(a.z, pool) + v1 := newGFp2(pool).Square(a.y, pool) + v2 := newGFp2(pool).Square(a.x, pool) + + c0 := newGFp2(pool).Add(a.x, a.y) + c0.Square(c0, pool) + c0.Sub(c0, v1) + c0.Sub(c0, v2) + c0.MulXi(c0, pool) + c0.Add(c0, v0) + + c1 := newGFp2(pool).Add(a.y, a.z) + c1.Square(c1, pool) + c1.Sub(c1, v0) + c1.Sub(c1, v1) + xiV2 := newGFp2(pool).MulXi(v2, pool) + c1.Add(c1, xiV2) + + c2 := newGFp2(pool).Add(a.x, a.z) + c2.Square(c2, pool) + c2.Sub(c2, v0) + c2.Add(c2, v1) + c2.Sub(c2, v2) + + e.x.Set(c2) + e.y.Set(c1) + e.z.Set(c0) + + v0.Put(pool) + v1.Put(pool) + v2.Put(pool) + c0.Put(pool) + c1.Put(pool) + c2.Put(pool) + xiV2.Put(pool) + + return e +} + +func (e *gfP6) Invert(a *gfP6, pool *bnPool) *gfP6 { + // See "Implementing cryptographic pairings", M. Scott, section 3.2. + // ftp://136.206.11.249/pub/crypto/pairings.pdf + + // Here we can give a short explanation of how it works: let j be a cubic root of + // unity in GF(p²) so that 1+j+j²=0. + // Then (xτ² + yτ + z)(xj²τ² + yjτ + z)(xjτ² + yj²τ + z) + // = (xτ² + yτ + z)(Cτ²+Bτ+A) + // = (x³ξ²+y³ξ+z³-3ξxyz) = F is an element of the base field (the norm). + // + // On the other hand (xj²τ² + yjτ + z)(xjτ² + yj²τ + z) + // = τ²(y²-ξxz) + τ(ξx²-yz) + (z²-ξxy) + // + // So that's why A = (z²-ξxy), B = (ξx²-yz), C = (y²-ξxz) + t1 := newGFp2(pool) + + A := newGFp2(pool) + A.Square(a.z, pool) + t1.Mul(a.x, a.y, pool) + t1.MulXi(t1, pool) + A.Sub(A, t1) + + B := newGFp2(pool) + B.Square(a.x, pool) + B.MulXi(B, pool) + t1.Mul(a.y, a.z, pool) + B.Sub(B, t1) + + C_ := newGFp2(pool) + C_.Square(a.y, pool) + t1.Mul(a.x, a.z, pool) + C_.Sub(C_, t1) + + F := newGFp2(pool) + F.Mul(C_, a.y, pool) + F.MulXi(F, pool) + t1.Mul(A, a.z, pool) + F.Add(F, t1) + t1.Mul(B, a.x, pool) + t1.MulXi(t1, pool) + F.Add(F, t1) + + F.Invert(F, pool) + + e.x.Mul(C_, F, pool) + e.y.Mul(B, F, pool) + e.z.Mul(A, F, pool) + + t1.Put(pool) + A.Put(pool) + B.Put(pool) + C_.Put(pool) + F.Put(pool) + + return e +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/main_test.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/main_test.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0230f1b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/main_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +package bn256 + +import ( + "testing" + + "crypto/rand" +) + +func TestRandomG2Marshal(t *testing.T) { + for i := 0; i < 10; i++ { + n, g2, err := RandomG2(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + t.Error(err) + continue + } + t.Logf("%d: %x\n", n, g2.Marshal()) + } +} + +func TestPairings(t *testing.T) { + a1 := new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(bigFromBase10("1")) + a2 := new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(bigFromBase10("2")) + a37 := new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(bigFromBase10("37")) + an1 := new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(bigFromBase10("21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698204186575808495616")) + + b0 := new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(bigFromBase10("0")) + b1 := new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(bigFromBase10("1")) + b2 := new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(bigFromBase10("2")) + b27 := new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(bigFromBase10("27")) + b999 := new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(bigFromBase10("999")) + bn1 := new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(bigFromBase10("21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698204186575808495616")) + + p1 := Pair(a1, b1) + pn1 := Pair(a1, bn1) + np1 := Pair(an1, b1) + if pn1.String() != np1.String() { + t.Error("Pairing mismatch: e(a, -b) != e(-a, b)") + } + if !PairingCheck([]*G1{a1, an1}, []*G2{b1, b1}) { + t.Error("MultiAte check gave false negative!") + } + p0 := new(GT).Add(p1, pn1) + p0_2 := Pair(a1, b0) + if p0.String() != p0_2.String() { + t.Error("Pairing mismatch: e(a, b) * e(a, -b) != 1") + } + p0_3 := new(GT).ScalarMult(p1, bigFromBase10("21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698204186575808495617")) + if p0.String() != p0_3.String() { + t.Error("Pairing mismatch: e(a, b) has wrong order") + } + p2 := Pair(a2, b1) + p2_2 := Pair(a1, b2) + p2_3 := new(GT).ScalarMult(p1, bigFromBase10("2")) + if p2.String() != p2_2.String() { + t.Error("Pairing mismatch: e(a, b * 2) != e(a * 2, b)") + } + if p2.String() != p2_3.String() { + t.Error("Pairing mismatch: e(a, b * 2) != e(a, b) ** 2") + } + if p2.String() == p1.String() { + t.Error("Pairing is degenerate!") + } + if PairingCheck([]*G1{a1, a1}, []*G2{b1, b1}) { + t.Error("MultiAte check gave false positive!") + } + p999 := Pair(a37, b27) + p999_2 := Pair(a1, b999) + if p999.String() != p999_2.String() { + t.Error("Pairing mismatch: e(a * 37, b * 27) != e(a, b * 999)") + } +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/optate.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/optate.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9d69570 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/optate.go @@ -0,0 +1,397 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package bn256 + +func lineFunctionAdd(r, p *twistPoint, q *curvePoint, r2 *gfP2, pool *bnPool) (a, b, c *gfP2, rOut *twistPoint) { + // See the mixed addition algorithm from "Faster Computation of the + // Tate Pairing", http://arxiv.org/pdf/0904.0854v3.pdf + + B := newGFp2(pool).Mul(p.x, r.t, pool) + + D := newGFp2(pool).Add(p.y, r.z) + D.Square(D, pool) + D.Sub(D, r2) + D.Sub(D, r.t) + D.Mul(D, r.t, pool) + + H := newGFp2(pool).Sub(B, r.x) + I := newGFp2(pool).Square(H, pool) + + E := newGFp2(pool).Add(I, I) + E.Add(E, E) + + J := newGFp2(pool).Mul(H, E, pool) + + L1 := newGFp2(pool).Sub(D, r.y) + L1.Sub(L1, r.y) + + V := newGFp2(pool).Mul(r.x, E, pool) + + rOut = newTwistPoint(pool) + rOut.x.Square(L1, pool) + rOut.x.Sub(rOut.x, J) + rOut.x.Sub(rOut.x, V) + rOut.x.Sub(rOut.x, V) + + rOut.z.Add(r.z, H) + rOut.z.Square(rOut.z, pool) + rOut.z.Sub(rOut.z, r.t) + rOut.z.Sub(rOut.z, I) + + t := newGFp2(pool).Sub(V, rOut.x) + t.Mul(t, L1, pool) + t2 := newGFp2(pool).Mul(r.y, J, pool) + t2.Add(t2, t2) + rOut.y.Sub(t, t2) + + rOut.t.Square(rOut.z, pool) + + t.Add(p.y, rOut.z) + t.Square(t, pool) + t.Sub(t, r2) + t.Sub(t, rOut.t) + + t2.Mul(L1, p.x, pool) + t2.Add(t2, t2) + a = newGFp2(pool) + a.Sub(t2, t) + + c = newGFp2(pool) + c.MulScalar(rOut.z, q.y) + c.Add(c, c) + + b = newGFp2(pool) + b.SetZero() + b.Sub(b, L1) + b.MulScalar(b, q.x) + b.Add(b, b) + + B.Put(pool) + D.Put(pool) + H.Put(pool) + I.Put(pool) + E.Put(pool) + J.Put(pool) + L1.Put(pool) + V.Put(pool) + t.Put(pool) + t2.Put(pool) + + return +} + +func lineFunctionDouble(r *twistPoint, q *curvePoint, pool *bnPool) (a, b, c *gfP2, rOut *twistPoint) { + // See the doubling algorithm for a=0 from "Faster Computation of the + // Tate Pairing", http://arxiv.org/pdf/0904.0854v3.pdf + + A := newGFp2(pool).Square(r.x, pool) + B := newGFp2(pool).Square(r.y, pool) + C_ := newGFp2(pool).Square(B, pool) + + D := newGFp2(pool).Add(r.x, B) + D.Square(D, pool) + D.Sub(D, A) + D.Sub(D, C_) + D.Add(D, D) + + E := newGFp2(pool).Add(A, A) + E.Add(E, A) + + G := newGFp2(pool).Square(E, pool) + + rOut = newTwistPoint(pool) + rOut.x.Sub(G, D) + rOut.x.Sub(rOut.x, D) + + rOut.z.Add(r.y, r.z) + rOut.z.Square(rOut.z, pool) + rOut.z.Sub(rOut.z, B) + rOut.z.Sub(rOut.z, r.t) + + rOut.y.Sub(D, rOut.x) + rOut.y.Mul(rOut.y, E, pool) + t := newGFp2(pool).Add(C_, C_) + t.Add(t, t) + t.Add(t, t) + rOut.y.Sub(rOut.y, t) + + rOut.t.Square(rOut.z, pool) + + t.Mul(E, r.t, pool) + t.Add(t, t) + b = newGFp2(pool) + b.SetZero() + b.Sub(b, t) + b.MulScalar(b, q.x) + + a = newGFp2(pool) + a.Add(r.x, E) + a.Square(a, pool) + a.Sub(a, A) + a.Sub(a, G) + t.Add(B, B) + t.Add(t, t) + a.Sub(a, t) + + c = newGFp2(pool) + c.Mul(rOut.z, r.t, pool) + c.Add(c, c) + c.MulScalar(c, q.y) + + A.Put(pool) + B.Put(pool) + C_.Put(pool) + D.Put(pool) + E.Put(pool) + G.Put(pool) + t.Put(pool) + + return +} + +func mulLine(ret *gfP12, a, b, c *gfP2, pool *bnPool) { + a2 := newGFp6(pool) + a2.x.SetZero() + a2.y.Set(a) + a2.z.Set(b) + a2.Mul(a2, ret.x, pool) + t3 := newGFp6(pool).MulScalar(ret.y, c, pool) + + t := newGFp2(pool) + t.Add(b, c) + t2 := newGFp6(pool) + t2.x.SetZero() + t2.y.Set(a) + t2.z.Set(t) + ret.x.Add(ret.x, ret.y) + + ret.y.Set(t3) + + ret.x.Mul(ret.x, t2, pool) + ret.x.Sub(ret.x, a2) + ret.x.Sub(ret.x, ret.y) + a2.MulTau(a2, pool) + ret.y.Add(ret.y, a2) + + a2.Put(pool) + t3.Put(pool) + t2.Put(pool) + t.Put(pool) +} + +// sixuPlus2NAF is 6u+2 in non-adjacent form. +var sixuPlus2NAF = []int8{0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, -1, 0, 0, 1, -1, 0, 0, 1, 0, + 0, 1, 1, 0, -1, 0, 0, 1, 0, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, + 1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, 1, + 1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, -1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1} + +// miller implements the Miller loop for calculating the Optimal Ate pairing. +// See algorithm 1 from http://cryptojedi.org/papers/dclxvi-20100714.pdf +func miller(q *twistPoint, p *curvePoint, pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { + ret := newGFp12(pool) + ret.SetOne() + + aAffine := newTwistPoint(pool) + aAffine.Set(q) + aAffine.MakeAffine(pool) + + bAffine := newCurvePoint(pool) + bAffine.Set(p) + bAffine.MakeAffine(pool) + + minusA := newTwistPoint(pool) + minusA.Negative(aAffine, pool) + + r := newTwistPoint(pool) + r.Set(aAffine) + + r2 := newGFp2(pool) + r2.Square(aAffine.y, pool) + + for i := len(sixuPlus2NAF) - 1; i > 0; i-- { + a, b, c, newR := lineFunctionDouble(r, bAffine, pool) + if i != len(sixuPlus2NAF)-1 { + ret.Square(ret, pool) + } + + mulLine(ret, a, b, c, pool) + a.Put(pool) + b.Put(pool) + c.Put(pool) + r.Put(pool) + r = newR + + switch sixuPlus2NAF[i-1] { + case 1: + a, b, c, newR = lineFunctionAdd(r, aAffine, bAffine, r2, pool) + case -1: + a, b, c, newR = lineFunctionAdd(r, minusA, bAffine, r2, pool) + default: + continue + } + + mulLine(ret, a, b, c, pool) + a.Put(pool) + b.Put(pool) + c.Put(pool) + r.Put(pool) + r = newR + } + + // In order to calculate Q1 we have to convert q from the sextic twist + // to the full GF(p^12) group, apply the Frobenius there, and convert + // back. + // + // The twist isomorphism is (x', y') -> (xω², yω³). If we consider just + // x for a moment, then after applying the Frobenius, we have x̄ω^(2p) + // where x̄ is the conjugate of x. If we are going to apply the inverse + // isomorphism we need a value with a single coefficient of ω² so we + // rewrite this as x̄ω^(2p-2)ω². ξ⁶ = ω and, due to the construction of + // p, 2p-2 is a multiple of six. Therefore we can rewrite as + // x̄ξ^((p-1)/3)ω² and applying the inverse isomorphism eliminates the + // ω². + // + // A similar argument can be made for the y value. + + q1 := newTwistPoint(pool) + q1.x.Conjugate(aAffine.x) + q1.x.Mul(q1.x, xiToPMinus1Over3, pool) + q1.y.Conjugate(aAffine.y) + q1.y.Mul(q1.y, xiToPMinus1Over2, pool) + q1.z.SetOne() + q1.t.SetOne() + + // For Q2 we are applying the p² Frobenius. The two conjugations cancel + // out and we are left only with the factors from the isomorphism. In + // the case of x, we end up with a pure number which is why + // xiToPSquaredMinus1Over3 is ∈ GF(p). With y we get a factor of -1. We + // ignore this to end up with -Q2. + + minusQ2 := newTwistPoint(pool) + minusQ2.x.MulScalar(aAffine.x, xiToPSquaredMinus1Over3) + minusQ2.y.Set(aAffine.y) + minusQ2.z.SetOne() + minusQ2.t.SetOne() + + r2.Square(q1.y, pool) + a, b, c, newR := lineFunctionAdd(r, q1, bAffine, r2, pool) + mulLine(ret, a, b, c, pool) + a.Put(pool) + b.Put(pool) + c.Put(pool) + r.Put(pool) + r = newR + + r2.Square(minusQ2.y, pool) + a, b, c, newR = lineFunctionAdd(r, minusQ2, bAffine, r2, pool) + mulLine(ret, a, b, c, pool) + a.Put(pool) + b.Put(pool) + c.Put(pool) + r.Put(pool) + r = newR + + aAffine.Put(pool) + bAffine.Put(pool) + minusA.Put(pool) + r.Put(pool) + r2.Put(pool) + + return ret +} + +// finalExponentiation computes the (p¹²-1)/Order-th power of an element of +// GF(p¹²) to obtain an element of GT (steps 13-15 of algorithm 1 from +// http://cryptojedi.org/papers/dclxvi-20100714.pdf) +func finalExponentiation(in *gfP12, pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { + t1 := newGFp12(pool) + + // This is the p^6-Frobenius + t1.x.Negative(in.x) + t1.y.Set(in.y) + + inv := newGFp12(pool) + inv.Invert(in, pool) + t1.Mul(t1, inv, pool) + + t2 := newGFp12(pool).FrobeniusP2(t1, pool) + t1.Mul(t1, t2, pool) + + fp := newGFp12(pool).Frobenius(t1, pool) + fp2 := newGFp12(pool).FrobeniusP2(t1, pool) + fp3 := newGFp12(pool).Frobenius(fp2, pool) + + fu, fu2, fu3 := newGFp12(pool), newGFp12(pool), newGFp12(pool) + fu.Exp(t1, u, pool) + fu2.Exp(fu, u, pool) + fu3.Exp(fu2, u, pool) + + y3 := newGFp12(pool).Frobenius(fu, pool) + fu2p := newGFp12(pool).Frobenius(fu2, pool) + fu3p := newGFp12(pool).Frobenius(fu3, pool) + y2 := newGFp12(pool).FrobeniusP2(fu2, pool) + + y0 := newGFp12(pool) + y0.Mul(fp, fp2, pool) + y0.Mul(y0, fp3, pool) + + y1, y4, y5 := newGFp12(pool), newGFp12(pool), newGFp12(pool) + y1.Conjugate(t1) + y5.Conjugate(fu2) + y3.Conjugate(y3) + y4.Mul(fu, fu2p, pool) + y4.Conjugate(y4) + + y6 := newGFp12(pool) + y6.Mul(fu3, fu3p, pool) + y6.Conjugate(y6) + + t0 := newGFp12(pool) + t0.Square(y6, pool) + t0.Mul(t0, y4, pool) + t0.Mul(t0, y5, pool) + t1.Mul(y3, y5, pool) + t1.Mul(t1, t0, pool) + t0.Mul(t0, y2, pool) + t1.Square(t1, pool) + t1.Mul(t1, t0, pool) + t1.Square(t1, pool) + t0.Mul(t1, y1, pool) + t1.Mul(t1, y0, pool) + t0.Square(t0, pool) + t0.Mul(t0, t1, pool) + + inv.Put(pool) + t1.Put(pool) + t2.Put(pool) + fp.Put(pool) + fp2.Put(pool) + fp3.Put(pool) + fu.Put(pool) + fu2.Put(pool) + fu3.Put(pool) + fu2p.Put(pool) + fu3p.Put(pool) + y0.Put(pool) + y1.Put(pool) + y2.Put(pool) + y3.Put(pool) + y4.Put(pool) + y5.Put(pool) + y6.Put(pool) + + return t0 +} + +func optimalAte(a *twistPoint, b *curvePoint, pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { + e := miller(a, b, pool) + ret := finalExponentiation(e, pool) + e.Put(pool) + + if a.IsInfinity() || b.IsInfinity() { + ret.SetOne() + } + return ret +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/twist.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/twist.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..95b966e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/twist.go @@ -0,0 +1,249 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package bn256 + +import ( + "math/big" +) + +// twistPoint implements the elliptic curve y²=x³+3/ξ over GF(p²). Points are +// kept in Jacobian form and t=z² when valid. The group G₂ is the set of +// n-torsion points of this curve over GF(p²) (where n = Order) +type twistPoint struct { + x, y, z, t *gfP2 +} + +var twistB = &gfP2{ + bigFromBase10("266929791119991161246907387137283842545076965332900288569378510910307636690"), + bigFromBase10("19485874751759354771024239261021720505790618469301721065564631296452457478373"), +} + +// twistGen is the generator of group G₂. +var twistGen = &twistPoint{ + &gfP2{ + bigFromBase10("11559732032986387107991004021392285783925812861821192530917403151452391805634"), + bigFromBase10("10857046999023057135944570762232829481370756359578518086990519993285655852781"), + }, + &gfP2{ + bigFromBase10("4082367875863433681332203403145435568316851327593401208105741076214120093531"), + bigFromBase10("8495653923123431417604973247489272438418190587263600148770280649306958101930"), + }, + &gfP2{ + bigFromBase10("0"), + bigFromBase10("1"), + }, + &gfP2{ + bigFromBase10("0"), + bigFromBase10("1"), + }, +} + +func newTwistPoint(pool *bnPool) *twistPoint { + return &twistPoint{ + newGFp2(pool), + newGFp2(pool), + newGFp2(pool), + newGFp2(pool), + } +} + +func (c *twistPoint) String() string { + return "(" + c.x.String() + ", " + c.y.String() + ", " + c.z.String() + ")" +} + +func (c *twistPoint) Put(pool *bnPool) { + c.x.Put(pool) + c.y.Put(pool) + c.z.Put(pool) + c.t.Put(pool) +} + +func (c *twistPoint) Set(a *twistPoint) { + c.x.Set(a.x) + c.y.Set(a.y) + c.z.Set(a.z) + c.t.Set(a.t) +} + +// IsOnCurve returns true iff c is on the curve where c must be in affine form. +func (c *twistPoint) IsOnCurve() bool { + pool := new(bnPool) + yy := newGFp2(pool).Square(c.y, pool) + xxx := newGFp2(pool).Square(c.x, pool) + xxx.Mul(xxx, c.x, pool) + yy.Sub(yy, xxx) + yy.Sub(yy, twistB) + yy.Minimal() + return yy.x.Sign() == 0 && yy.y.Sign() == 0 +} + +func (c *twistPoint) SetInfinity() { + c.z.SetZero() +} + +func (c *twistPoint) IsInfinity() bool { + return c.z.IsZero() +} + +func (c *twistPoint) Add(a, b *twistPoint, pool *bnPool) { + // For additional comments, see the same function in curve.go. + + if a.IsInfinity() { + c.Set(b) + return + } + if b.IsInfinity() { + c.Set(a) + return + } + + // See http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-code/shortw/jacobian-0/addition/add-2007-bl.op3 + z1z1 := newGFp2(pool).Square(a.z, pool) + z2z2 := newGFp2(pool).Square(b.z, pool) + u1 := newGFp2(pool).Mul(a.x, z2z2, pool) + u2 := newGFp2(pool).Mul(b.x, z1z1, pool) + + t := newGFp2(pool).Mul(b.z, z2z2, pool) + s1 := newGFp2(pool).Mul(a.y, t, pool) + + t.Mul(a.z, z1z1, pool) + s2 := newGFp2(pool).Mul(b.y, t, pool) + + h := newGFp2(pool).Sub(u2, u1) + xEqual := h.IsZero() + + t.Add(h, h) + i := newGFp2(pool).Square(t, pool) + j := newGFp2(pool).Mul(h, i, pool) + + t.Sub(s2, s1) + yEqual := t.IsZero() + if xEqual && yEqual { + c.Double(a, pool) + return + } + r := newGFp2(pool).Add(t, t) + + v := newGFp2(pool).Mul(u1, i, pool) + + t4 := newGFp2(pool).Square(r, pool) + t.Add(v, v) + t6 := newGFp2(pool).Sub(t4, j) + c.x.Sub(t6, t) + + t.Sub(v, c.x) // t7 + t4.Mul(s1, j, pool) // t8 + t6.Add(t4, t4) // t9 + t4.Mul(r, t, pool) // t10 + c.y.Sub(t4, t6) + + t.Add(a.z, b.z) // t11 + t4.Square(t, pool) // t12 + t.Sub(t4, z1z1) // t13 + t4.Sub(t, z2z2) // t14 + c.z.Mul(t4, h, pool) + + z1z1.Put(pool) + z2z2.Put(pool) + u1.Put(pool) + u2.Put(pool) + t.Put(pool) + s1.Put(pool) + s2.Put(pool) + h.Put(pool) + i.Put(pool) + j.Put(pool) + r.Put(pool) + v.Put(pool) + t4.Put(pool) + t6.Put(pool) +} + +func (c *twistPoint) Double(a *twistPoint, pool *bnPool) { + // See http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-code/shortw/jacobian-0/doubling/dbl-2009-l.op3 + A := newGFp2(pool).Square(a.x, pool) + B := newGFp2(pool).Square(a.y, pool) + C_ := newGFp2(pool).Square(B, pool) + + t := newGFp2(pool).Add(a.x, B) + t2 := newGFp2(pool).Square(t, pool) + t.Sub(t2, A) + t2.Sub(t, C_) + d := newGFp2(pool).Add(t2, t2) + t.Add(A, A) + e := newGFp2(pool).Add(t, A) + f := newGFp2(pool).Square(e, pool) + + t.Add(d, d) + c.x.Sub(f, t) + + t.Add(C_, C_) + t2.Add(t, t) + t.Add(t2, t2) + c.y.Sub(d, c.x) + t2.Mul(e, c.y, pool) + c.y.Sub(t2, t) + + t.Mul(a.y, a.z, pool) + c.z.Add(t, t) + + A.Put(pool) + B.Put(pool) + C_.Put(pool) + t.Put(pool) + t2.Put(pool) + d.Put(pool) + e.Put(pool) + f.Put(pool) +} + +func (c *twistPoint) Mul(a *twistPoint, scalar *big.Int, pool *bnPool) *twistPoint { + sum := newTwistPoint(pool) + sum.SetInfinity() + t := newTwistPoint(pool) + + for i := scalar.BitLen(); i >= 0; i-- { + t.Double(sum, pool) + if scalar.Bit(i) != 0 { + sum.Add(t, a, pool) + } else { + sum.Set(t) + } + } + + c.Set(sum) + sum.Put(pool) + t.Put(pool) + return c +} + +func (c *twistPoint) MakeAffine(pool *bnPool) *twistPoint { + if c.z.IsOne() { + return c + } + + zInv := newGFp2(pool).Invert(c.z, pool) + t := newGFp2(pool).Mul(c.y, zInv, pool) + zInv2 := newGFp2(pool).Square(zInv, pool) + c.y.Mul(t, zInv2, pool) + t.Mul(c.x, zInv2, pool) + c.x.Set(t) + c.z.SetOne() + c.t.SetOne() + + zInv.Put(pool) + t.Put(pool) + zInv2.Put(pool) + + return c +} + +func (c *twistPoint) Negative(a *twistPoint, pool *bnPool) { + c.x.Set(a.x) + c.y.SetZero() + c.y.Sub(c.y, a.y) + c.z.Set(a.z) + c.t.SetZero() +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/curve.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/curve.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fa54bf6 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/curve.go @@ -0,0 +1,316 @@ +// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Copyright 2011 ThePiachu. All rights reserved. +// +// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are +// met: +// +// * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +// notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +// * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above +// copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer +// in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the +// distribution. +// * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its +// contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from +// this software without specific prior written permission. +// * The name of ThePiachu may not be used to endorse or promote products +// derived from this software without specific prior written permission. +// +// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS +// "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT +// LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR +// A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT +// OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT +// LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +// DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +// THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +// (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE +// OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +package secp256k1 + +import ( + "crypto/elliptic" + "math/big" + "sync" + "unsafe" + + "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common/math" +) + +/* +#include "libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1.h" +extern int secp256k1_pubkey_scalar_mul(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const unsigned char *point, const unsigned char *scalar); +*/ +import "C" + +// This code is from https://github.com/ThePiachu/GoBit and implements +// several Koblitz elliptic curves over prime fields. +// +// The curve methods, internally, on Jacobian coordinates. For a given +// (x, y) position on the curve, the Jacobian coordinates are (x1, y1, +// z1) where x = x1/z1² and y = y1/z1³. The greatest speedups come +// when the whole calculation can be performed within the transform +// (as in ScalarMult and ScalarBaseMult). But even for Add and Double, +// it's faster to apply and reverse the transform than to operate in +// affine coordinates. + +// A BitCurve represents a Koblitz Curve with a=0. +// See http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw.html +type BitCurve struct { + P *big.Int // the order of the underlying field + N *big.Int // the order of the base point + B *big.Int // the constant of the BitCurve equation + Gx, Gy *big.Int // (x,y) of the base point + BitSize int // the size of the underlying field +} + +func (BitCurve *BitCurve) Params() *elliptic.CurveParams { + return &elliptic.CurveParams{ + P: BitCurve.P, + N: BitCurve.N, + B: BitCurve.B, + Gx: BitCurve.Gx, + Gy: BitCurve.Gy, + BitSize: BitCurve.BitSize, + } +} + +// IsOnBitCurve returns true if the given (x,y) lies on the BitCurve. +func (BitCurve *BitCurve) IsOnCurve(x, y *big.Int) bool { + // y² = x³ + b + y2 := new(big.Int).Mul(y, y) //y² + y2.Mod(y2, BitCurve.P) //y²%P + + x3 := new(big.Int).Mul(x, x) //x² + x3.Mul(x3, x) //x³ + + x3.Add(x3, BitCurve.B) //x³+B + x3.Mod(x3, BitCurve.P) //(x³+B)%P + + return x3.Cmp(y2) == 0 +} + +//TODO: double check if the function is okay +// affineFromJacobian reverses the Jacobian transform. See the comment at the +// top of the file. +func (BitCurve *BitCurve) affineFromJacobian(x, y, z *big.Int) (xOut, yOut *big.Int) { + if z.Sign() == 0 { + return new(big.Int), new(big.Int) + } + + zinv := new(big.Int).ModInverse(z, BitCurve.P) + zinvsq := new(big.Int).Mul(zinv, zinv) + + xOut = new(big.Int).Mul(x, zinvsq) + xOut.Mod(xOut, BitCurve.P) + zinvsq.Mul(zinvsq, zinv) + yOut = new(big.Int).Mul(y, zinvsq) + yOut.Mod(yOut, BitCurve.P) + return +} + +// Add returns the sum of (x1,y1) and (x2,y2) +func (BitCurve *BitCurve) Add(x1, y1, x2, y2 *big.Int) (*big.Int, *big.Int) { + z := new(big.Int).SetInt64(1) + return BitCurve.affineFromJacobian(BitCurve.addJacobian(x1, y1, z, x2, y2, z)) +} + +// addJacobian takes two points in Jacobian coordinates, (x1, y1, z1) and +// (x2, y2, z2) and returns their sum, also in Jacobian form. +func (BitCurve *BitCurve) addJacobian(x1, y1, z1, x2, y2, z2 *big.Int) (*big.Int, *big.Int, *big.Int) { + // See http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-0.html#addition-add-2007-bl + z1z1 := new(big.Int).Mul(z1, z1) + z1z1.Mod(z1z1, BitCurve.P) + z2z2 := new(big.Int).Mul(z2, z2) + z2z2.Mod(z2z2, BitCurve.P) + + u1 := new(big.Int).Mul(x1, z2z2) + u1.Mod(u1, BitCurve.P) + u2 := new(big.Int).Mul(x2, z1z1) + u2.Mod(u2, BitCurve.P) + h := new(big.Int).Sub(u2, u1) + if h.Sign() == -1 { + h.Add(h, BitCurve.P) + } + i := new(big.Int).Lsh(h, 1) + i.Mul(i, i) + j := new(big.Int).Mul(h, i) + + s1 := new(big.Int).Mul(y1, z2) + s1.Mul(s1, z2z2) + s1.Mod(s1, BitCurve.P) + s2 := new(big.Int).Mul(y2, z1) + s2.Mul(s2, z1z1) + s2.Mod(s2, BitCurve.P) + r := new(big.Int).Sub(s2, s1) + if r.Sign() == -1 { + r.Add(r, BitCurve.P) + } + r.Lsh(r, 1) + v := new(big.Int).Mul(u1, i) + + x3 := new(big.Int).Set(r) + x3.Mul(x3, x3) + x3.Sub(x3, j) + x3.Sub(x3, v) + x3.Sub(x3, v) + x3.Mod(x3, BitCurve.P) + + y3 := new(big.Int).Set(r) + v.Sub(v, x3) + y3.Mul(y3, v) + s1.Mul(s1, j) + s1.Lsh(s1, 1) + y3.Sub(y3, s1) + y3.Mod(y3, BitCurve.P) + + z3 := new(big.Int).Add(z1, z2) + z3.Mul(z3, z3) + z3.Sub(z3, z1z1) + if z3.Sign() == -1 { + z3.Add(z3, BitCurve.P) + } + z3.Sub(z3, z2z2) + if z3.Sign() == -1 { + z3.Add(z3, BitCurve.P) + } + z3.Mul(z3, h) + z3.Mod(z3, BitCurve.P) + + return x3, y3, z3 +} + +// Double returns 2*(x,y) +func (BitCurve *BitCurve) Double(x1, y1 *big.Int) (*big.Int, *big.Int) { + z1 := new(big.Int).SetInt64(1) + return BitCurve.affineFromJacobian(BitCurve.doubleJacobian(x1, y1, z1)) +} + +// doubleJacobian takes a point in Jacobian coordinates, (x, y, z), and +// returns its double, also in Jacobian form. +func (BitCurve *BitCurve) doubleJacobian(x, y, z *big.Int) (*big.Int, *big.Int, *big.Int) { + // See http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-0.html#doubling-dbl-2009-l + + a := new(big.Int).Mul(x, x) //X1² + b := new(big.Int).Mul(y, y) //Y1² + c := new(big.Int).Mul(b, b) //B² + + d := new(big.Int).Add(x, b) //X1+B + d.Mul(d, d) //(X1+B)² + d.Sub(d, a) //(X1+B)²-A + d.Sub(d, c) //(X1+B)²-A-C + d.Mul(d, big.NewInt(2)) //2*((X1+B)²-A-C) + + e := new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(3), a) //3*A + f := new(big.Int).Mul(e, e) //E² + + x3 := new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(2), d) //2*D + x3.Sub(f, x3) //F-2*D + x3.Mod(x3, BitCurve.P) + + y3 := new(big.Int).Sub(d, x3) //D-X3 + y3.Mul(e, y3) //E*(D-X3) + y3.Sub(y3, new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(8), c)) //E*(D-X3)-8*C + y3.Mod(y3, BitCurve.P) + + z3 := new(big.Int).Mul(y, z) //Y1*Z1 + z3.Mul(big.NewInt(2), z3) //3*Y1*Z1 + z3.Mod(z3, BitCurve.P) + + return x3, y3, z3 +} + +func (BitCurve *BitCurve) ScalarMult(Bx, By *big.Int, scalar []byte) (*big.Int, *big.Int) { + // Ensure scalar is exactly 32 bytes. We pad always, even if + // scalar is 32 bytes long, to avoid a timing side channel. + if len(scalar) > 32 { + panic("can't handle scalars > 256 bits") + } + // NOTE: potential timing issue + padded := make([]byte, 32) + copy(padded[32-len(scalar):], scalar) + scalar = padded + + // Do the multiplication in C, updating point. + point := make([]byte, 64) + math.ReadBits(Bx, point[:32]) + math.ReadBits(By, point[32:]) + pointPtr := (*C.uchar)(unsafe.Pointer(&point[0])) + scalarPtr := (*C.uchar)(unsafe.Pointer(&scalar[0])) + res := C.secp256k1_pubkey_scalar_mul(context, pointPtr, scalarPtr) + + // Unpack the result and clear temporaries. + x := new(big.Int).SetBytes(point[:32]) + y := new(big.Int).SetBytes(point[32:]) + for i := range point { + point[i] = 0 + } + for i := range padded { + scalar[i] = 0 + } + if res != 1 { + return nil, nil + } + return x, y +} + +// ScalarBaseMult returns k*G, where G is the base point of the group and k is +// an integer in big-endian form. +func (BitCurve *BitCurve) ScalarBaseMult(k []byte) (*big.Int, *big.Int) { + return BitCurve.ScalarMult(BitCurve.Gx, BitCurve.Gy, k) +} + +// Marshal converts a point into the form specified in section 4.3.6 of ANSI +// X9.62. +func (BitCurve *BitCurve) Marshal(x, y *big.Int) []byte { + byteLen := (BitCurve.BitSize + 7) >> 3 + + ret := make([]byte, 1+2*byteLen) + ret[0] = 4 // uncompressed point + + xBytes := x.Bytes() + copy(ret[1+byteLen-len(xBytes):], xBytes) + yBytes := y.Bytes() + copy(ret[1+2*byteLen-len(yBytes):], yBytes) + return ret +} + +// Unmarshal converts a point, serialised by Marshal, into an x, y pair. On +// error, x = nil. +func (BitCurve *BitCurve) Unmarshal(data []byte) (x, y *big.Int) { + byteLen := (BitCurve.BitSize + 7) >> 3 + if len(data) != 1+2*byteLen { + return + } + if data[0] != 4 { // uncompressed form + return + } + x = new(big.Int).SetBytes(data[1 : 1+byteLen]) + y = new(big.Int).SetBytes(data[1+byteLen:]) + return +} + +var ( + initonce sync.Once + theCurve *BitCurve +) + +// S256 returns a BitCurve which implements secp256k1 (see SEC 2 section 2.7.1) +func S256() *BitCurve { + initonce.Do(func() { + // See SEC 2 section 2.7.1 + // curve parameters taken from: + // http://www.secg.org/collateral/sec2_final.pdf + theCurve = new(BitCurve) + theCurve.P, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFC2F", 16) + theCurve.N, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEBAAEDCE6AF48A03BBFD25E8CD0364141", 16) + theCurve.B, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007", 16) + theCurve.Gx, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("79BE667EF9DCBBAC55A06295CE870B07029BFCDB2DCE28D959F2815B16F81798", 16) + theCurve.Gy, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("483ADA7726A3C4655DA4FBFC0E1108A8FD17B448A68554199C47D08FFB10D4B8", 16) + theCurve.BitSize = 256 + }) + return theCurve +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/ext.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/ext.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c28de21 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/ext.h @@ -0,0 +1,245 @@ +// Copyright 2015 The go-ethereum Authors +// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. +// +// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +// (at your option) any later version. +// +// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +// +// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . + +// secp256k1_context_create_sign_verify creates a context for signing and signature verification. +static secp256k1_context* secp256k1_context_create_sign_verify() { + return secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); +} + +// secp256k1_ecdsa_recover_pubkey recovers the public key of an encoded compact signature. +// +// Returns: 1: recovery was successful +// 0: recovery was not successful +// Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) +// Out: pubkey_out: the serialized 65-byte public key of the signer (cannot be NULL) +// In: sigdata: pointer to a 65-byte signature with the recovery id at the end (cannot be NULL) +// msgdata: pointer to a 32-byte message (cannot be NULL) +static int secp256k1_ecdsa_recover_pubkey( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *pubkey_out, + const unsigned char *sigdata, + const unsigned char *msgdata +) { + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature sig; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; + + if (!secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &sig, sigdata, (int)sigdata[64])) { + return 0; + } + if (!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &pubkey, &sig, msgdata)) { + return 0; + } + size_t outputlen = 65; + return secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, pubkey_out, &outputlen, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED); +} + +// secp256k1_pubkey_scalar_mul multiplies a point by a scalar in constant time. +// +// Returns: 1: multiplication was successful +// 0: scalar was invalid (zero or overflow) +// Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) +// Out: point: the multiplied point (usually secret) +// In: point: pointer to a 64-byte public point, +// encoded as two 256bit big-endian numbers. +// scalar: a 32-byte scalar with which to multiply the point +int secp256k1_pubkey_scalar_mul(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *point, const unsigned char *scalar) { + int ret = 0; + int overflow = 0; + secp256k1_fe feX, feY; + secp256k1_gej res; + secp256k1_ge ge; + secp256k1_scalar s; + ARG_CHECK(point != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(scalar != NULL); + (void)ctx; + + secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&feX, point); + secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&feY, point+32); + secp256k1_ge_set_xy(&ge, &feX, &feY); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s, scalar, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s)) { + ret = 0; + } else { + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&res, &ge, &s, 256); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&ge, &res); + /* Note: can't use secp256k1_pubkey_save here because it is not constant time. */ + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&ge.x); + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&ge.y); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(point, &ge.x); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(point+32, &ge.y); + ret = 1; + } + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&s); + return ret; +} + +void test_rangeproof() { + size_t nbits, n_commits; + //bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t *data; + ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + bench_bulletproof_t odata; + bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t rp_data; + + odata.blind_gen = secp256k1_generator_const_g; + odata.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + odata.scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(odata.ctx, 1024 * 1024 * 1024); + odata.generators = secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_create(odata.ctx, &odata.blind_gen, 64 * 1024); + + rp_data.common = &odata; + + //run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 8, 1); + ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + nbits = 8; + n_commits = 1; + ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + char str[64]; + + (&rp_data)->nbits = nbits; + (&rp_data)->n_commits = n_commits; + (&rp_data)->common->iters = 100; + + (&rp_data)->common->n_proofs = 1; + sprintf(str, "bulletproof_prove, %i, %i, 0, ", (int)nbits, (int) n_commits); + + //run_benchmark(str, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown, (void *)&rp_data, 5, 25); + ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + if (bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup != NULL) { + bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup(&rp_data); + } + bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(&rp_data); + if (bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown != NULL) { + bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown(&rp_data); + } + ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + if (bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup != NULL) { + bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup(&rp_data); + } + bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(&rp_data); + if (bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown != NULL) { + bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown(&rp_data); + } + ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +} + +static void counting_illegal_callback_fn(const char* str, void* data) { + int32_t *p; + (void)str; + p = data; + (*p)++; +} + +typedef struct { + size_t nbits; + secp256k1_context *ctx_none; + secp256k1_context *ctx_both; + secp256k1_scratch *scratch; + secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens; + unsigned char *proof; + size_t plen; + uint64_t value; + const unsigned char **blind_ptr; + secp256k1_generator *value_gen; + const unsigned char *blind; + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *pcommit; +} zkrp_t; + +void myprint(char *message, zkrp_t *dt) { + int i, len; + len = (int) dt->plen; + printf("================== %s =================\n", message); + printf("DT: %p\n", dt); + printf("DT->nbits: %zd\n", dt->nbits); + printf("DT->ctx_none: %p\n", dt->ctx_none); + printf("DT->ctx_both: %p\n", dt->ctx_both); + printf("DT->scratch: %p\n", dt->scratch); + printf("DT->gens: %p\n", dt->gens); + printf("DT->proof: %p\n", dt->proof); + printf("DT->proof:\n"); + printf("["); + for (i=0; iproof[i]); + } + printf("]\n"); + printf("DT->plen: %zd\n", dt->plen); + printf("DT->value: %lu\n", dt->value); + printf("DT->blind: %p\n", dt->blind); + printf("DT->pcommit: %p\n", dt->pcommit); +} + + +// setup should receive as input the range [A,B) +// and output a set of parameters +// - nbits means the interval is given by [0,2^nbits) +// - for now nbits must be in dt +void setup_rangeproof(zkrp_t *dt) { + secp256k1_context *none = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); + secp256k1_context *both = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + secp256k1_scratch *scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(both, 1024 * 1024); + secp256k1_generator *value_gen = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_generator)); + unsigned char blind[32] = " i am not a blinding factor "; + + dt->ctx_none = none; + dt->ctx_both = both; + dt->scratch = scratch; + dt->value_gen = value_gen; + + dt->blind = (unsigned char*)malloc(sizeof(unsigned char) * 32); + strncpy(blind, dt->blind, 32); + + dt->blind_ptr = malloc(sizeof(unsigned char*)); + dt->blind_ptr[0] = dt->blind; + + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate(dt->ctx_both, dt->value_gen, dt->blind) != 0); +} + +void deallocate_memory(zkrp_t *dt) { + // TODO realloc everything.... +} + + +// prove should receive as input parameters and the commitment +// and output the proof +void prove_rangeproof(zkrp_t *dt) { + printf("Prove result: %d\n", (secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(dt->ctx_both, dt->scratch, dt->gens, dt->proof, &(dt->plen), &(dt->value), NULL, dt->blind_ptr, 1, dt->value_gen, dt->nbits, dt->blind, NULL, 0) == 1)); +} + +// verify should receive as input parameters and proof +// and output true or false +int verify_rangeproof(zkrp_t *dt) { + printf("Verification result: %d\n", (secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(dt->ctx_both, dt->scratch, dt->gens, dt->proof, dt->plen, NULL, dt->pcommit, 1, dt->nbits, dt->value_gen, NULL, 0) == 1)); + return 1; +} + +// commit should receive parameters and value as input +// and output the commitment +void commit_rangeproof(zkrp_t *dt) { + secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens; + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *pcommit = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_pedersen_commitment)); + // TODO: value as input + uint64_t value = 255; + + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(dt->ctx_both, pcommit, dt->blind, value, dt->value_gen, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); + + gens = secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_create(dt->ctx_none, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, 256); + CHECK(gens != NULL); + + dt->gens = gens; + dt->proof = (unsigned char*)malloc(2000); + dt->plen = 2000; + dt->value = value; + dt->pcommit = pcommit; +} + diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/Makefile.am b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9d914c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,207 @@ +ACLOCAL_AMFLAGS = -I build-aux/m4 + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libsecp256k1.la +if USE_JNI +JNI_LIB = libsecp256k1_jni.la +noinst_LTLIBRARIES = $(JNI_LIB) +else +JNI_LIB = +endif +include_HEADERS = include/secp256k1.h +noinst_HEADERS = +noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_4x64.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_8x32.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_low.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_4x64_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_8x32_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_low_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/group.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/group_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/num_gmp.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/num_gmp_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/ecdsa.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/ecdsa_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/eckey.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/eckey_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult_const.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult_const_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult_gen.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult_gen_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/num.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/num_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/field_10x26.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/field_10x26_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/field_5x52.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/field_5x52_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/field_5x52_int128_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/field_5x52_asm_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/java/org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/util.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/scratch.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/scratch_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/testrand.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/testrand_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/hash.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/hash_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/field.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/field_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/bench.h +noinst_HEADERS += contrib/lax_der_parsing.h +noinst_HEADERS += contrib/lax_der_parsing.c +noinst_HEADERS += contrib/lax_der_privatekey_parsing.h +noinst_HEADERS += contrib/lax_der_privatekey_parsing.c + +if USE_EXTERNAL_ASM +COMMON_LIB = libsecp256k1_common.la +noinst_LTLIBRARIES = $(COMMON_LIB) +else +COMMON_LIB = +endif + +pkgconfigdir = $(libdir)/pkgconfig +pkgconfig_DATA = libsecp256k1.pc + +if USE_EXTERNAL_ASM +if USE_ASM_ARM +libsecp256k1_common_la_SOURCES = src/asm/field_10x26_arm.s +endif +endif + +libsecp256k1_la_SOURCES = src/secp256k1.c +libsecp256k1_la_CPPFLAGS = -DSECP256K1_BUILD -I$(top_srcdir)/include -I$(top_srcdir)/src $(SECP_INCLUDES) +libsecp256k1_la_LIBADD = $(JNI_LIB) $(SECP_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) + +libsecp256k1_jni_la_SOURCES = src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.c src/java/org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.c +libsecp256k1_jni_la_CPPFLAGS = -DSECP256K1_BUILD $(JNI_INCLUDES) + +noinst_PROGRAMS = +if USE_BENCHMARK +noinst_PROGRAMS += bench_verify bench_sign bench_internal bench_ecmult +bench_verify_SOURCES = src/bench_verify.c +bench_verify_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) $(SECP_TEST_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) +bench_sign_SOURCES = src/bench_sign.c +bench_sign_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) $(SECP_TEST_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) +bench_internal_SOURCES = src/bench_internal.c +bench_internal_LDADD = $(SECP_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) +bench_internal_CPPFLAGS = -DSECP256K1_BUILD $(SECP_INCLUDES) +bench_ecmult_SOURCES = src/bench_ecmult.c +bench_ecmult_LDADD = $(SECP_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) +bench_ecmult_CPPFLAGS = -DSECP256K1_BUILD $(SECP_INCLUDES) +endif + +TESTS = +if USE_TESTS +noinst_PROGRAMS += tests +tests_SOURCES = src/tests.c +tests_CPPFLAGS = -DSECP256K1_BUILD -I$(top_srcdir)/src -I$(top_srcdir)/include $(SECP_INCLUDES) $(SECP_TEST_INCLUDES) +if !ENABLE_COVERAGE +tests_CPPFLAGS += -DVERIFY +endif +tests_LDADD = $(SECP_LIBS) $(SECP_TEST_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) +tests_LDFLAGS = -static +TESTS += tests +endif + +if USE_EXHAUSTIVE_TESTS +noinst_PROGRAMS += exhaustive_tests +exhaustive_tests_SOURCES = src/tests_exhaustive.c +exhaustive_tests_CPPFLAGS = -DSECP256K1_BUILD -I$(top_srcdir)/src $(SECP_INCLUDES) +if !ENABLE_COVERAGE +exhaustive_tests_CPPFLAGS += -DVERIFY +endif +exhaustive_tests_LDADD = $(SECP_LIBS) +exhaustive_tests_LDFLAGS = -static +TESTS += exhaustive_tests +endif + +JAVAROOT=src/java +JAVAORG=org/bitcoin +JAVA_GUAVA=$(srcdir)/$(JAVAROOT)/guava/guava-18.0.jar +CLASSPATH_ENV=CLASSPATH=$(JAVA_GUAVA) +JAVA_FILES= \ + $(JAVAROOT)/$(JAVAORG)/NativeSecp256k1.java \ + $(JAVAROOT)/$(JAVAORG)/NativeSecp256k1Test.java \ + $(JAVAROOT)/$(JAVAORG)/NativeSecp256k1Util.java \ + $(JAVAROOT)/$(JAVAORG)/Secp256k1Context.java + +if USE_JNI + +$(JAVA_GUAVA): + @echo Guava is missing. Fetch it via: \ + wget https://search.maven.org/remotecontent?filepath=com/google/guava/guava/18.0/guava-18.0.jar -O $(@) + @false + +.stamp-java: $(JAVA_FILES) + @echo Compiling $^ + $(AM_V_at)$(CLASSPATH_ENV) javac $^ + @touch $@ + +if USE_TESTS + +check-java: libsecp256k1.la $(JAVA_GUAVA) .stamp-java + $(AM_V_at)java -Djava.library.path="./:./src:./src/.libs:.libs/" -cp "$(JAVA_GUAVA):$(JAVAROOT)" $(JAVAORG)/NativeSecp256k1Test + +endif +endif + +if USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION +CPPFLAGS_FOR_BUILD +=-I$(top_srcdir) +CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD += -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-function + +gen_context_OBJECTS = gen_context.o +gen_context_BIN = gen_context$(BUILD_EXEEXT) +gen_%.o: src/gen_%.c + $(CC_FOR_BUILD) $(CPPFLAGS_FOR_BUILD) $(CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD) -c $< -o $@ + +$(gen_context_BIN): $(gen_context_OBJECTS) + $(CC_FOR_BUILD) $^ -o $@ + +$(libsecp256k1_la_OBJECTS): src/ecmult_static_context.h +$(tests_OBJECTS): src/ecmult_static_context.h +$(bench_internal_OBJECTS): src/ecmult_static_context.h +$(bench_ecmult_OBJECTS): src/ecmult_static_context.h + +src/ecmult_static_context.h: $(gen_context_BIN) + ./$(gen_context_BIN) + +CLEANFILES = $(gen_context_BIN) src/ecmult_static_context.h $(JAVAROOT)/$(JAVAORG)/*.class .stamp-java +endif + +EXTRA_DIST = autogen.sh src/gen_context.c src/basic-config.h $(JAVA_FILES) + +if ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH +include src/modules/ecdh/Makefile.am.include +endif + +if ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY +include src/modules/recovery/Makefile.am.include +endif + +if ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR +include src/modules/generator/Makefile.am.include +endif + +if ENABLE_MODULE_COMMITMENT +include src/modules/commitment/Makefile.am.include +endif + +if ENABLE_MODULE_RANGEPROOF +include src/modules/rangeproof/Makefile.am.include +endif + +if ENABLE_MODULE_BULLETPROOF +include src/modules/bulletproofs/Makefile.am.include +endif + +if ENABLE_MODULE_WHITELIST +include src/modules/whitelist/Makefile.am.include +endif + +if ENABLE_MODULE_SURJECTIONPROOF +include src/modules/surjection/Makefile.am.include +endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/build-aux/m4/ax_jni_include_dir.m4 b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/build-aux/m4/ax_jni_include_dir.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cdc78d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/build-aux/m4/ax_jni_include_dir.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +# =========================================================================== +# https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf-archive/ax_jni_include_dir.html +# =========================================================================== +# +# SYNOPSIS +# +# AX_JNI_INCLUDE_DIR +# +# DESCRIPTION +# +# AX_JNI_INCLUDE_DIR finds include directories needed for compiling +# programs using the JNI interface. +# +# JNI include directories are usually in the Java distribution. This is +# deduced from the value of $JAVA_HOME, $JAVAC, or the path to "javac", in +# that order. When this macro completes, a list of directories is left in +# the variable JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS. +# +# Example usage follows: +# +# AX_JNI_INCLUDE_DIR +# +# for JNI_INCLUDE_DIR in $JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS +# do +# CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I$JNI_INCLUDE_DIR" +# done +# +# If you want to force a specific compiler: +# +# - at the configure.in level, set JAVAC=yourcompiler before calling +# AX_JNI_INCLUDE_DIR +# +# - at the configure level, setenv JAVAC +# +# Note: This macro can work with the autoconf M4 macros for Java programs. +# This particular macro is not part of the original set of macros. +# +# LICENSE +# +# Copyright (c) 2008 Don Anderson +# +# Copying and distribution of this file, with or without modification, are +# permitted in any medium without royalty provided the copyright notice +# and this notice are preserved. This file is offered as-is, without any +# warranty. + +#serial 14 + +AU_ALIAS([AC_JNI_INCLUDE_DIR], [AX_JNI_INCLUDE_DIR]) +AC_DEFUN([AX_JNI_INCLUDE_DIR],[ + +JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS="" + +if test "x$JAVA_HOME" != x; then + _JTOPDIR="$JAVA_HOME" +else + if test "x$JAVAC" = x; then + JAVAC=javac + fi + AC_PATH_PROG([_ACJNI_JAVAC], [$JAVAC], [no]) + if test "x$_ACJNI_JAVAC" = xno; then + AC_MSG_WARN([cannot find JDK; try setting \$JAVAC or \$JAVA_HOME]) + fi + _ACJNI_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS("$_ACJNI_JAVAC") + _JTOPDIR=`echo "$_ACJNI_FOLLOWED" | sed -e 's://*:/:g' -e 's:/[[^/]]*$::'` +fi + +case "$host_os" in + darwin*) # Apple Java headers are inside the Xcode bundle. + macos_version=$(sw_vers -productVersion | sed -n -e 's/^@<:@0-9@:>@*.\(@<:@0-9@:>@*\).@<:@0-9@:>@*/\1/p') + if @<:@ "$macos_version" -gt "7" @:>@; then + _JTOPDIR="$(xcrun --show-sdk-path)/System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework" + _JINC="$_JTOPDIR/Headers" + else + _JTOPDIR="/System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework" + _JINC="$_JTOPDIR/Headers" + fi + ;; + *) _JINC="$_JTOPDIR/include";; +esac +_AS_ECHO_LOG([_JTOPDIR=$_JTOPDIR]) +_AS_ECHO_LOG([_JINC=$_JINC]) + +# On Mac OS X 10.6.4, jni.h is a symlink: +# /System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework/Versions/Current/Headers/jni.h +# -> ../../CurrentJDK/Headers/jni.h. +AC_CACHE_CHECK(jni headers, ac_cv_jni_header_path, +[ + if test -f "$_JINC/jni.h"; then + ac_cv_jni_header_path="$_JINC" + JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS="$JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS $ac_cv_jni_header_path" + else + _JTOPDIR=`echo "$_JTOPDIR" | sed -e 's:/[[^/]]*$::'` + if test -f "$_JTOPDIR/include/jni.h"; then + ac_cv_jni_header_path="$_JTOPDIR/include" + JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS="$JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS $ac_cv_jni_header_path" + else + ac_cv_jni_header_path=none + fi + fi +]) + +# get the likely subdirectories for system specific java includes +case "$host_os" in +bsdi*) _JNI_INC_SUBDIRS="bsdos";; +freebsd*) _JNI_INC_SUBDIRS="freebsd";; +darwin*) _JNI_INC_SUBDIRS="darwin";; +linux*) _JNI_INC_SUBDIRS="linux genunix";; +osf*) _JNI_INC_SUBDIRS="alpha";; +solaris*) _JNI_INC_SUBDIRS="solaris";; +mingw*) _JNI_INC_SUBDIRS="win32";; +cygwin*) _JNI_INC_SUBDIRS="win32";; +*) _JNI_INC_SUBDIRS="genunix";; +esac + +if test "x$ac_cv_jni_header_path" != "xnone"; then + # add any subdirectories that are present + for JINCSUBDIR in $_JNI_INC_SUBDIRS + do + if test -d "$_JTOPDIR/include/$JINCSUBDIR"; then + JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS="$JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS $_JTOPDIR/include/$JINCSUBDIR" + fi + done +fi +]) + +# _ACJNI_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS +# Follows symbolic links on , +# finally setting variable _ACJNI_FOLLOWED +# ---------------------------------------- +AC_DEFUN([_ACJNI_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS],[ +# find the include directory relative to the javac executable +_cur="$1" +while ls -ld "$_cur" 2>/dev/null | grep " -> " >/dev/null; do + AC_MSG_CHECKING([symlink for $_cur]) + _slink=`ls -ld "$_cur" | sed 's/.* -> //'` + case "$_slink" in + /*) _cur="$_slink";; + # 'X' avoids triggering unwanted echo options. + *) _cur=`echo "X$_cur" | sed -e 's/^X//' -e 's:[[^/]]*$::'`"$_slink";; + esac + AC_MSG_RESULT([$_cur]) +done +_ACJNI_FOLLOWED="$_cur" +])# _ACJNI diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/build-aux/m4/bitcoin_secp.m4 b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/build-aux/m4/bitcoin_secp.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3b3975c --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/build-aux/m4/bitcoin_secp.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +dnl libsecp25k1 helper checks +AC_DEFUN([SECP_INT128_CHECK],[ +has_int128=$ac_cv_type___int128 +]) + +dnl escape "$0x" below using the m4 quadrigaph @S|@, and escape it again with a \ for the shell. +AC_DEFUN([SECP_64BIT_ASM_CHECK],[ +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for x86_64 assembly availability) +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ + #include ]],[[ + uint64_t a = 11, tmp; + __asm__ __volatile__("movq \@S|@0x100000000,%1; mulq %%rsi" : "+a"(a) : "S"(tmp) : "cc", "%rdx"); + ]])],[has_64bit_asm=yes],[has_64bit_asm=no]) +AC_MSG_RESULT([$has_64bit_asm]) +]) + +dnl +AC_DEFUN([SECP_OPENSSL_CHECK],[ + has_libcrypto=no + m4_ifdef([PKG_CHECK_MODULES],[ + PKG_CHECK_MODULES([CRYPTO], [libcrypto], [has_libcrypto=yes],[has_libcrypto=no]) + if test x"$has_libcrypto" = x"yes"; then + TEMP_LIBS="$LIBS" + LIBS="$LIBS $CRYPTO_LIBS" + AC_CHECK_LIB(crypto, main,[AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRYPTO,1,[Define this symbol if libcrypto is installed])],[has_libcrypto=no]) + LIBS="$TEMP_LIBS" + fi + ]) + if test x$has_libcrypto = xno; then + AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/crypto.h,[ + AC_CHECK_LIB(crypto, main,[ + has_libcrypto=yes + CRYPTO_LIBS=-lcrypto + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRYPTO,1,[Define this symbol if libcrypto is installed]) + ]) + ]) + LIBS= + fi +if test x"$has_libcrypto" = x"yes" && test x"$has_openssl_ec" = x; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING(for EC functions in libcrypto) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ + #include + #include + #include ]],[[ + EC_KEY *eckey = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp256k1); + ECDSA_sign(0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, eckey); + ECDSA_verify(0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, eckey); + EC_KEY_free(eckey); + ECDSA_SIG *sig_openssl; + sig_openssl = ECDSA_SIG_new(); + ECDSA_SIG_free(sig_openssl); + ]])],[has_openssl_ec=yes],[has_openssl_ec=no]) + AC_MSG_RESULT([$has_openssl_ec]) +fi +]) + +dnl +AC_DEFUN([SECP_GMP_CHECK],[ +if test x"$has_gmp" != x"yes"; then + CPPFLAGS_TEMP="$CPPFLAGS" + CPPFLAGS="$GMP_CPPFLAGS $CPPFLAGS" + LIBS_TEMP="$LIBS" + LIBS="$GMP_LIBS $LIBS" + AC_CHECK_HEADER(gmp.h,[AC_CHECK_LIB(gmp, __gmpz_init,[has_gmp=yes; GMP_LIBS="$GMP_LIBS -lgmp"; AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBGMP,1,[Define this symbol if libgmp is installed])])]) + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS_TEMP" + LIBS="$LIBS_TEMP" +fi +]) diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/configure.ac b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/configure.ac new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d430f8f --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/configure.ac @@ -0,0 +1,618 @@ +AC_PREREQ([2.60]) +AC_INIT([libsecp256k1],[0.1]) +AC_CONFIG_AUX_DIR([build-aux]) +AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([build-aux/m4]) +AC_CANONICAL_HOST +AH_TOP([#ifndef LIBSECP256K1_CONFIG_H]) +AH_TOP([#define LIBSECP256K1_CONFIG_H]) +AH_BOTTOM([#endif /*LIBSECP256K1_CONFIG_H*/]) +AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([foreign subdir-objects]) +LT_INIT + +dnl make the compilation flags quiet unless V=1 is used +m4_ifdef([AM_SILENT_RULES], [AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])]) + +PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG + +AC_PATH_TOOL(AR, ar) +AC_PATH_TOOL(RANLIB, ranlib) +AC_PATH_TOOL(STRIP, strip) +AX_PROG_CC_FOR_BUILD + +if test "x$CFLAGS" = "x"; then + CFLAGS="-g" +fi + +AM_PROG_CC_C_O + +AC_PROG_CC_C89 +if test x"$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" = x"no"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([c89 compiler support required]) +fi +AM_PROG_AS + +case $host_os in + *darwin*) + if test x$cross_compiling != xyes; then + AC_PATH_PROG([BREW],brew,) + if test x$BREW != x; then + dnl These Homebrew packages may be keg-only, meaning that they won't be found + dnl in expected paths because they may conflict with system files. Ask + dnl Homebrew where each one is located, then adjust paths accordingly. + + openssl_prefix=`$BREW --prefix openssl 2>/dev/null` + gmp_prefix=`$BREW --prefix gmp 2>/dev/null` + if test x$openssl_prefix != x; then + PKG_CONFIG_PATH="$openssl_prefix/lib/pkgconfig:$PKG_CONFIG_PATH" + export PKG_CONFIG_PATH + fi + if test x$gmp_prefix != x; then + GMP_CPPFLAGS="-I$gmp_prefix/include" + GMP_LIBS="-L$gmp_prefix/lib" + fi + else + AC_PATH_PROG([PORT],port,) + dnl if homebrew isn't installed and macports is, add the macports default paths + dnl as a last resort. + if test x$PORT != x; then + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -isystem /opt/local/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/opt/local/lib" + fi + fi + fi + ;; +esac + +CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -W" + +warn_CFLAGS="-std=c89 -pedantic -Wall -Wextra -Wcast-align -Wnested-externs -Wshadow -Wstrict-prototypes -Wno-unused-function -Wno-long-long -Wno-overlength-strings" +saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $warn_CFLAGS" +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if ${CC} supports ${warn_CFLAGS}]) +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[char foo;]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + ]) + +saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fvisibility=hidden" +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if ${CC} supports -fvisibility=hidden]) +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[char foo;]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + ]) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(benchmark, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-benchmark],[compile benchmark (default is yes)]), + [use_benchmark=$enableval], + [use_benchmark=yes]) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(coverage, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-coverage],[enable compiler flags to support kcov coverage analysis]), + [enable_coverage=$enableval], + [enable_coverage=no]) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(tests, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-tests],[compile tests (default is yes)]), + [use_tests=$enableval], + [use_tests=yes]) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(openssl_tests, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-openssl-tests],[enable OpenSSL tests, if OpenSSL is available (default is auto)]), + [enable_openssl_tests=$enableval], + [enable_openssl_tests=auto]) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(experimental, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-experimental],[allow experimental configure options (default is no)]), + [use_experimental=$enableval], + [use_experimental=no]) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(exhaustive_tests, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-exhaustive-tests],[compile exhaustive tests (default is yes)]), + [use_exhaustive_tests=$enableval], + [use_exhaustive_tests=yes]) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(endomorphism, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-endomorphism],[enable endomorphism (default is no)]), + [use_endomorphism=$enableval], + [use_endomorphism=no]) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(ecmult_static_precomputation, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-ecmult-static-precomputation],[enable precomputed ecmult table for signing (default is yes)]), + [use_ecmult_static_precomputation=$enableval], + [use_ecmult_static_precomputation=auto]) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_ecdh, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-ecdh],[enable ECDH shared secret computation (experimental)]), + [enable_module_ecdh=$enableval], + [enable_module_ecdh=no]) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_recovery, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-recovery],[enable ECDSA pubkey recovery module (default is no)]), + [enable_module_recovery=$enableval], + [enable_module_recovery=no]) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_generator, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-generator],[enable NUMS generator module (default is no)]), + [enable_module_generator=$enableval], + [enable_module_generator=no]) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_commitment, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-commitment],[enable Pedersen commitments module (default is no)]), + [enable_module_commitment=$enableval], + [enable_module_commitment=no]) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_rangeproof, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-rangeproof],[enable zero-knowledge range proofs module (default is no)]), + [enable_module_rangeproof=$enableval], + [enable_module_rangeproof=no]) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_bulletproof, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-bulletproof],[enable Pedersen / zero-knowledge bulletproofs module (default is no)]), + [enable_module_bulletproof=$enableval], + [enable_module_bulletproof=no]) + + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_whitelist, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-whitelist],[enable key whitelisting module (default is no)]), + [enable_module_whitelist=$enableval], + [enable_module_whitelist=no]) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(jni, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-jni],[enable libsecp256k1_jni (default is no)]), + [use_jni=$enableval], + [use_jni=no]) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_surjectionproof, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-surjectionproof],[enable surjection proof module (default is no)]), + [enable_module_surjectionproof=$enableval], + [enable_module_surjectionproof=no]) + +AC_ARG_WITH([field], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-field=64bit|32bit|auto], +[Specify Field Implementation. Default is auto])],[req_field=$withval], [req_field=auto]) + +AC_ARG_WITH([bignum], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-bignum=gmp|no|auto], +[Specify Bignum Implementation. Default is auto])],[req_bignum=$withval], [req_bignum=auto]) + +AC_ARG_WITH([scalar], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-scalar=64bit|32bit|auto], +[Specify scalar implementation. Default is auto])],[req_scalar=$withval], [req_scalar=auto]) + +AC_ARG_WITH([asm], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-asm=x86_64|arm|no|auto] +[Specify assembly optimizations to use. Default is auto (experimental: arm)])],[req_asm=$withval], [req_asm=auto]) + +AC_CHECK_TYPES([__int128]) + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for __builtin_expect]) +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[void myfunc() {__builtin_expect(0,0);}]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]);AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BUILTIN_EXPECT,1,[Define this symbol if __builtin_expect is available]) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ]) + +if test x"$enable_coverage" = x"yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(COVERAGE, 1, [Define this symbol to compile out all VERIFY code]) + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -O0 --coverage" + LDFLAGS="--coverage" +else + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -O3" +fi + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for __builtin_popcount]) +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[void myfunc() {__builtin_popcount(0);}]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]);AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BUILTIN_POPCOUNT,1,[Define this symbol if __builtin_popcount is available]) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ]) + +if test x"$use_ecmult_static_precomputation" != x"no"; then + save_cross_compiling=$cross_compiling + cross_compiling=no + TEMP_CC="$CC" + CC="$CC_FOR_BUILD" + AC_MSG_CHECKING([native compiler: ${CC_FOR_BUILD}]) + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([], [return 0])], + [working_native_cc=yes], + [working_native_cc=no],[dnl]) + CC="$TEMP_CC" + cross_compiling=$save_cross_compiling + + if test x"$working_native_cc" = x"no"; then + set_precomp=no + if test x"$use_ecmult_static_precomputation" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([${CC_FOR_BUILD} does not produce working binaries. Please set CC_FOR_BUILD]) + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([${CC_FOR_BUILD} does not produce working binaries. Please set CC_FOR_BUILD]) + fi + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([ok]) + set_precomp=yes + fi +else + set_precomp=no +fi + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for __builtin_clzll]) +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[void myfunc() { __builtin_clzll(1);}]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]);AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BUILTIN_CLZLL,1,[Define this symbol if __builtin_clzll is available]) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ]) + +if test x"$req_asm" = x"auto"; then + SECP_64BIT_ASM_CHECK + if test x"$has_64bit_asm" = x"yes"; then + set_asm=x86_64 + fi + if test x"$set_asm" = x; then + set_asm=no + fi +else + set_asm=$req_asm + case $set_asm in + x86_64) + SECP_64BIT_ASM_CHECK + if test x"$has_64bit_asm" != x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([x86_64 assembly optimization requested but not available]) + fi + ;; + arm) + ;; + no) + ;; + *) + AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid assembly optimization selection]) + ;; + esac +fi + +if test x"$req_field" = x"auto"; then + if test x"set_asm" = x"x86_64"; then + set_field=64bit + fi + if test x"$set_field" = x; then + SECP_INT128_CHECK + if test x"$has_int128" = x"yes"; then + set_field=64bit + fi + fi + if test x"$set_field" = x; then + set_field=32bit + fi +else + set_field=$req_field + case $set_field in + 64bit) + if test x"$set_asm" != x"x86_64"; then + SECP_INT128_CHECK + if test x"$has_int128" != x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([64bit field explicitly requested but neither __int128 support or x86_64 assembly available]) + fi + fi + ;; + 32bit) + ;; + *) + AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid field implementation selection]) + ;; + esac +fi + +if test x"$req_scalar" = x"auto"; then + SECP_INT128_CHECK + if test x"$has_int128" = x"yes"; then + set_scalar=64bit + fi + if test x"$set_scalar" = x; then + set_scalar=32bit + fi +else + set_scalar=$req_scalar + case $set_scalar in + 64bit) + SECP_INT128_CHECK + if test x"$has_int128" != x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([64bit scalar explicitly requested but __int128 support not available]) + fi + ;; + 32bit) + ;; + *) + AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid scalar implementation selected]) + ;; + esac +fi + +if test x"$req_bignum" = x"auto"; then + SECP_GMP_CHECK + if test x"$has_gmp" = x"yes"; then + set_bignum=gmp + fi + + if test x"$set_bignum" = x; then + set_bignum=no + fi +else + set_bignum=$req_bignum + case $set_bignum in + gmp) + SECP_GMP_CHECK + if test x"$has_gmp" != x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([gmp bignum explicitly requested but libgmp not available]) + fi + ;; + no) + ;; + *) + AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid bignum implementation selection]) + ;; + esac +fi + +# select assembly optimization +use_external_asm=no + +case $set_asm in +x86_64) + AC_DEFINE(USE_ASM_X86_64, 1, [Define this symbol to enable x86_64 assembly optimizations]) + ;; +arm) + use_external_asm=yes + ;; +no) + ;; +*) + AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid assembly optimizations]) + ;; +esac + +# select field implementation +case $set_field in +64bit) + AC_DEFINE(USE_FIELD_5X52, 1, [Define this symbol to use the FIELD_5X52 implementation]) + ;; +32bit) + AC_DEFINE(USE_FIELD_10X26, 1, [Define this symbol to use the FIELD_10X26 implementation]) + ;; +*) + AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid field implementation]) + ;; +esac + +# select bignum implementation +case $set_bignum in +gmp) + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBGMP, 1, [Define this symbol if libgmp is installed]) + AC_DEFINE(USE_NUM_GMP, 1, [Define this symbol to use the gmp implementation for num]) + AC_DEFINE(USE_FIELD_INV_NUM, 1, [Define this symbol to use the num-based field inverse implementation]) + AC_DEFINE(USE_SCALAR_INV_NUM, 1, [Define this symbol to use the num-based scalar inverse implementation]) + ;; +no) + AC_DEFINE(USE_NUM_NONE, 1, [Define this symbol to use no num implementation]) + AC_DEFINE(USE_FIELD_INV_BUILTIN, 1, [Define this symbol to use the native field inverse implementation]) + AC_DEFINE(USE_SCALAR_INV_BUILTIN, 1, [Define this symbol to use the native scalar inverse implementation]) + ;; +*) + AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid bignum implementation]) + ;; +esac + +#select scalar implementation +case $set_scalar in +64bit) + AC_DEFINE(USE_SCALAR_4X64, 1, [Define this symbol to use the 4x64 scalar implementation]) + ;; +32bit) + AC_DEFINE(USE_SCALAR_8X32, 1, [Define this symbol to use the 8x32 scalar implementation]) + ;; +*) + AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid scalar implementation]) + ;; +esac + +if test x"$use_tests" = x"yes"; then + SECP_OPENSSL_CHECK + if test x"$has_openssl_ec" = x"yes"; then + if test x"$enable_openssl_tests" != x"no"; then + AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS, 1, [Define this symbol if OpenSSL EC functions are available]) + SECP_TEST_INCLUDES="$SSL_CFLAGS $CRYPTO_CFLAGS" + SECP_TEST_LIBS="$CRYPTO_LIBS" + + case $host in + *mingw*) + SECP_TEST_LIBS="$SECP_TEST_LIBS -lgdi32" + ;; + esac + fi + else + if test x"$enable_openssl_tests" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL tests requested but OpenSSL with EC support is not available]) + fi + fi +else + if test x"$enable_openssl_tests" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL tests requested but tests are not enabled]) + fi +fi + +if test x"$use_jni" != x"no"; then + AX_JNI_INCLUDE_DIR + have_jni_dependencies=yes + if test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"no"; then + have_jni_dependencies=no + fi + if test "x$JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS" = "x"; then + have_jni_dependencies=no + fi + if test "x$have_jni_dependencies" = "xno"; then + if test x"$use_jni" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([jni support explicitly requested but headers/dependencies were not found. Enable ECDH and try again.]) + fi + AC_MSG_WARN([jni headers/dependencies not found. jni support disabled]) + use_jni=no + else + use_jni=yes + for JNI_INCLUDE_DIR in $JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS; do + JNI_INCLUDES="$JNI_INCLUDES -I$JNI_INCLUDE_DIR" + done + fi +fi + +if test x"$set_bignum" = x"gmp"; then + SECP_LIBS="$SECP_LIBS $GMP_LIBS" + SECP_INCLUDES="$SECP_INCLUDES $GMP_CPPFLAGS" +fi + +if test x"$use_endomorphism" = x"yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(USE_ENDOMORPHISM, 1, [Define this symbol to use endomorphism optimization]) +fi + +if test x"$set_precomp" = x"yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION, 1, [Define this symbol to use a statically generated ecmult table]) +fi + +if test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the ECDH module]) +fi + +if test x"$enable_module_recovery" = x"yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the ECDSA pubkey recovery module]) +fi + +if test x"$enable_module_generator" = x"yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the NUMS generator module]) +fi + +if test x"$enable_module_commitment" = x"yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_COMMITMENT, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the Pedersen commitment module]) +fi + +if test x"$enable_module_rangeproof" = x"yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_RANGEPROOF, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the zero knowledge range proof module]) +fi + +if test x"$enable_module_bulletproof" = x"yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_BULLETPROOF, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the Pedersen / zero knowledge bulletproof module]) +fi + +if test x"$enable_module_whitelist" = x"yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_WHITELIST, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the key whitelisting module]) +fi + +if test x"$enable_module_surjectionproof" = x"yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_SURJECTIONPROOF, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the surjection proof module]) +fi + +AC_C_BIGENDIAN() + +if test x"$use_external_asm" = x"yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(USE_EXTERNAL_ASM, 1, [Define this symbol if an external (non-inline) assembly implementation is used]) +fi + +AC_MSG_NOTICE([Using static precomputation: $set_precomp]) +AC_MSG_NOTICE([Using assembly optimizations: $set_asm]) +AC_MSG_NOTICE([Using field implementation: $set_field]) +AC_MSG_NOTICE([Using bignum implementation: $set_bignum]) +AC_MSG_NOTICE([Using scalar implementation: $set_scalar]) +AC_MSG_NOTICE([Using endomorphism optimizations: $use_endomorphism]) +AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building benchmarks: $use_benchmark]) +AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building for coverage analysis: $enable_coverage]) +AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building ECDH module: $enable_module_ecdh]) +AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building ECDSA pubkey recovery module: $enable_module_recovery]) +AC_MSG_NOTICE([Using jni: $use_jni]) + +if test x"$enable_experimental" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_NOTICE([******]) + AC_MSG_NOTICE([WARNING: experimental build]) + AC_MSG_NOTICE([Experimental features do not have stable APIs or properties, and may not be safe for production use.]) + AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building ECDH module: $enable_module_ecdh]) + AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building NUMS generator module: $enable_module_generator]) + AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building Pedersen commitment module: $enable_module_commitment]) + AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building range proof module: $enable_module_rangeproof]) + AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building bulletproof module: $enable_module_bulletproof]) + AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building key whitelisting module: $enable_module_whitelist]) + AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building surjection proof module: $enable_module_surjectionproof]) + AC_MSG_NOTICE([******]) + + if test x"$enable_module_generator" != x"yes"; then + if test x"$enable_module_commitment" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Commitment module requires the generator module. Use --enable-module-generator to allow.]) + fi + if test x"$enable_module_bulletproof" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Bulletproof module requires the generator module. Use --enable-module-generator to allow.]) + fi + fi + + if test x"$enable_module_commitment" != x"yes"; then + if test x"$enable_module_rangeproof" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Rangeproof module requires the commitment module. Use --enable-module-commitment to allow.]) + fi + if test x"$enable_module_bulletproof" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Bulletproof module requires the commitment module. Use --enable-module-commitment to allow.]) + fi + fi + + if test x"$enable_module_rangeproof" != x"yes"; then + if test x"$enable_module_whitelist" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Whitelist module requires the rangeproof module. Use --enable-module-rangeproof to allow.]) + fi + if test x"$enable_module_surjectionproof" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Surjection proof module requires the rangeproof module. Use --enable-module-rangeproof to allow.]) + fi + fi +else + if test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([ECDH module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) + fi + if test x"$set_asm" = x"arm"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([ARM assembly optimization is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) + fi + if test x"$enable_module_generator" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([NUMS generator module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) + fi + if test x"$enable_module_commitment" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Pedersen commitment module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) + fi + if test x"$enable_module_rangeproof" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Range proof module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) + fi + if test x"$enable_module_bulletproof" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Bulletproof module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) + fi + if test x"$enable_module_whitelist" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Key whitelisting module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) + fi + if test x"$enable_module_surjectionproof" = x"yes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Surjection proof module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) + fi +fi + +AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([src/libsecp256k1-config.h]) +AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile libsecp256k1.pc]) +AC_SUBST(JNI_INCLUDES) +AC_SUBST(SECP_INCLUDES) +AC_SUBST(SECP_LIBS) +AC_SUBST(SECP_TEST_LIBS) +AC_SUBST(SECP_TEST_INCLUDES) +AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_COVERAGE], [test x"$enable_coverage" = x"yes"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_TESTS], [test x"$use_tests" != x"no"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_EXHAUSTIVE_TESTS], [test x"$use_exhaustive_tests" != x"no"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_BENCHMARK], [test x"$use_benchmark" = x"yes"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION], [test x"$set_precomp" = x"yes"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH], [test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"yes"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY], [test x"$enable_module_recovery" = x"yes"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR], [test x"$enable_module_generator" = x"yes"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_COMMITMENT], [test x"$enable_module_commitment" = x"yes"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_RANGEPROOF], [test x"$enable_module_rangeproof" = x"yes"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_BULLETPROOF], [test x"$enable_module_bulletproof" = x"yes"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_WHITELIST], [test x"$enable_module_whitelist" = x"yes"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_JNI], [test x"$use_jni" == x"yes"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_EXTERNAL_ASM], [test x"$use_external_asm" = x"yes"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_ASM_ARM], [test x"$set_asm" = x"arm"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_SURJECTIONPROOF], [test x"$enable_module_surjectionproof" = x"yes"]) + +dnl make sure nothing new is exported so that we don't break the cache +PKGCONFIG_PATH_TEMP="$PKG_CONFIG_PATH" +unset PKG_CONFIG_PATH +PKG_CONFIG_PATH="$PKGCONFIG_PATH_TEMP" + +AC_OUTPUT diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/contrib/lax_der_parsing.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/contrib/lax_der_parsing.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7eaf63b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/contrib/lax_der_parsing.h @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2015 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +/**** + * Please do not link this file directly. It is not part of the libsecp256k1 + * project and does not promise any stability in its API, functionality or + * presence. Projects which use this code should instead copy this header + * and its accompanying .c file directly into their codebase. + ****/ + +/* This file defines a function that parses DER with various errors and + * violations. This is not a part of the library itself, because the allowed + * violations are chosen arbitrarily and do not follow or establish any + * standard. + * + * In many places it matters that different implementations do not only accept + * the same set of valid signatures, but also reject the same set of signatures. + * The only means to accomplish that is by strictly obeying a standard, and not + * accepting anything else. + * + * Nonetheless, sometimes there is a need for compatibility with systems that + * use signatures which do not strictly obey DER. The snippet below shows how + * certain violations are easily supported. You may need to adapt it. + * + * Do not use this for new systems. Use well-defined DER or compact signatures + * instead if you have the choice (see secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der and + * secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact). + * + * The supported violations are: + * - All numbers are parsed as nonnegative integers, even though X.609-0207 + * section 8.3.3 specifies that integers are always encoded as two's + * complement. + * - Integers can have length 0, even though section 8.3.1 says they can't. + * - Integers with overly long padding are accepted, violation section + * 8.3.2. + * - 127-byte long length descriptors are accepted, even though section + * 8.1.3.5.c says that they are not. + * - Trailing garbage data inside or after the signature is ignored. + * - The length descriptor of the sequence is ignored. + * + * Compared to for example OpenSSL, many violations are NOT supported: + * - Using overly long tag descriptors for the sequence or integers inside, + * violating section 8.1.2.2. + * - Encoding primitive integers as constructed values, violating section + * 8.3.1. + */ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_CONTRIB_LAX_DER_PARSING_H +#define SECP256K1_CONTRIB_LAX_DER_PARSING_H + +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** Parse a signature in "lax DER" format + * + * Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object + * Out: sig: a pointer to a signature object + * In: input: a pointer to the signature to be parsed + * inputlen: the length of the array pointed to be input + * + * This function will accept any valid DER encoded signature, even if the + * encoded numbers are out of range. In addition, it will accept signatures + * which violate the DER spec in various ways. Its purpose is to allow + * validation of the Bitcoin blockchain, which includes non-DER signatures + * from before the network rules were updated to enforce DER. Note that + * the set of supported violations is a strict subset of what OpenSSL will + * accept. + * + * After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or the + * encoded numbers are out of range, signature validation with it is + * guaranteed to fail for every message and public key. + */ +int ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t inputlen +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* SECP256K1_CONTRIB_LAX_DER_PARSING_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/contrib/lax_der_privatekey_parsing.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/contrib/lax_der_privatekey_parsing.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fece261 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/contrib/lax_der_privatekey_parsing.h @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2014, 2015 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +/**** + * Please do not link this file directly. It is not part of the libsecp256k1 + * project and does not promise any stability in its API, functionality or + * presence. Projects which use this code should instead copy this header + * and its accompanying .c file directly into their codebase. + ****/ + +/* This file contains code snippets that parse DER private keys with + * various errors and violations. This is not a part of the library + * itself, because the allowed violations are chosen arbitrarily and + * do not follow or establish any standard. + * + * It also contains code to serialize private keys in a compatible + * manner. + * + * These functions are meant for compatibility with applications + * that require BER encoded keys. When working with secp256k1-specific + * code, the simple 32-byte private keys normally used by the + * library are sufficient. + */ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_CONTRIB_BER_PRIVATEKEY_H +#define SECP256K1_CONTRIB_BER_PRIVATEKEY_H + +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** Export a private key in DER format. + * + * Returns: 1 if the private key was valid. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot + * be NULL) + * Out: privkey: pointer to an array for storing the private key in BER. + * Should have space for 279 bytes, and cannot be NULL. + * privkeylen: Pointer to an int where the length of the private key in + * privkey will be stored. + * In: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key to export. + * compressed: 1 if the key should be exported in + * compressed format, 0 otherwise + * + * This function is purely meant for compatibility with applications that + * require BER encoded keys. When working with secp256k1-specific code, the + * simple 32-byte private keys are sufficient. + * + * Note that this function does not guarantee correct DER output. It is + * guaranteed to be parsable by secp256k1_ec_privkey_import_der + */ +SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int ec_privkey_export_der( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *privkey, + size_t *privkeylen, + const unsigned char *seckey, + int compressed +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Import a private key in DER format. + * Returns: 1 if a private key was extracted. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL). + * Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte array for storing the private key. + * (cannot be NULL). + * In: privkey: pointer to a private key in DER format (cannot be NULL). + * privkeylen: length of the DER private key pointed to be privkey. + * + * This function will accept more than just strict DER, and even allow some BER + * violations. The public key stored inside the DER-encoded private key is not + * verified for correctness, nor are the curve parameters. Use this function + * only if you know in advance it is supposed to contain a secp256k1 private + * key. + */ +SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int ec_privkey_import_der( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *seckey, + const unsigned char *privkey, + size_t privkeylen +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* SECP256K1_CONTRIB_BER_PRIVATEKEY_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3c4a311 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1.h @@ -0,0 +1,654 @@ +#ifndef SECP256K1_H +#define SECP256K1_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#include + +/* These rules specify the order of arguments in API calls: + * + * 1. Context pointers go first, followed by output arguments, combined + * output/input arguments, and finally input-only arguments. + * 2. Array lengths always immediately the follow the argument whose length + * they describe, even if this violates rule 1. + * 3. Within the OUT/OUTIN/IN groups, pointers to data that is typically generated + * later go first. This means: signatures, public nonces, private nonces, + * messages, public keys, secret keys, tweaks. + * 4. Arguments that are not data pointers go last, from more complex to less + * complex: function pointers, algorithm names, messages, void pointers, + * counts, flags, booleans. + * 5. Opaque data pointers follow the function pointer they are to be passed to. + */ + +/** Opaque data structure that holds context information (precomputed tables etc.). + * + * The purpose of context structures is to cache large precomputed data tables + * that are expensive to construct, and also to maintain the randomization data + * for blinding. + * + * Do not create a new context object for each operation, as construction is + * far slower than all other API calls (~100 times slower than an ECDSA + * verification). + * + * A constructed context can safely be used from multiple threads + * simultaneously, but API call that take a non-const pointer to a context + * need exclusive access to it. In particular this is the case for + * secp256k1_context_destroy and secp256k1_context_randomize. + * + * Regarding randomization, either do it once at creation time (in which case + * you do not need any locking for the other calls), or use a read-write lock. + */ +typedef struct secp256k1_context_struct secp256k1_context; + +/** Opaque data structure that holds rewriteable "scratch space" + * + * The purpose of this structure is to replace dynamic memory allocations, + * because we target architectures where this may not be available. It is + * essentially a resizable (within specified parameters) block of bytes, + * which is initially created either by memory allocation or TODO as a pointer + * into some fixed rewritable space. + * + * Unlike the context object, this cannot safely be shared between threads + * without additional synchronization logic. + */ +typedef struct secp256k1_scratch_space_struct secp256k1_scratch_space; + +/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed and valid public key. + * + * The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not + * guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is + * however guaranteed to be 64 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved. + * If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage, transmission, or + * comparison, use secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize and secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse. + */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char data[64]; +} secp256k1_pubkey; + +/** Opaque data structured that holds a parsed ECDSA signature. + * + * The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not + * guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is + * however guaranteed to be 64 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved. + * If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage, transmission, or + * comparison, use the secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_* and + * secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_* functions. + */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char data[64]; +} secp256k1_ecdsa_signature; + +/** A pointer to a function to deterministically generate a nonce. + * + * Returns: 1 if a nonce was successfully generated. 0 will cause signing to fail. + * Out: nonce32: pointer to a 32-byte array to be filled by the function. + * In: msg32: the 32-byte message hash being verified (will not be NULL) + * key32: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (will not be NULL) + * algo16: pointer to a 16-byte array describing the signature + * algorithm (will be NULL for ECDSA for compatibility). + * data: Arbitrary data pointer that is passed through. + * attempt: how many iterations we have tried to find a nonce. + * This will almost always be 0, but different attempt values + * are required to result in a different nonce. + * + * Except for test cases, this function should compute some cryptographic hash of + * the message, the algorithm, the key and the attempt. + */ +typedef int (*secp256k1_nonce_function)( + unsigned char *nonce32, + const unsigned char *msg32, + const unsigned char *key32, + const unsigned char *algo16, + void *data, + unsigned int attempt +); + +# if !defined(SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ) +# if defined(__GNUC__)&&defined(__GNUC_MINOR__) +# define SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(_maj,_min) \ + ((__GNUC__<<16)+__GNUC_MINOR__>=((_maj)<<16)+(_min)) +# else +# define SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(_maj,_min) 0 +# endif +# endif + +# if (!defined(__STDC_VERSION__) || (__STDC_VERSION__ < 199901L) ) +# if SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(2,7) +# define SECP256K1_INLINE __inline__ +# elif (defined(_MSC_VER)) +# define SECP256K1_INLINE __inline +# else +# define SECP256K1_INLINE +# endif +# else +# define SECP256K1_INLINE inline +# endif + +#ifndef SECP256K1_API +# if defined(_WIN32) +# ifdef SECP256K1_BUILD +# define SECP256K1_API __declspec(dllexport) +# else +# define SECP256K1_API +# endif +# elif defined(__GNUC__) && defined(SECP256K1_BUILD) +# define SECP256K1_API __attribute__ ((visibility ("default"))) +# else +# define SECP256K1_API +# endif +#endif + +/**Warning attributes + * NONNULL is not used if SECP256K1_BUILD is set to avoid the compiler optimizing out + * some paranoid null checks. */ +# if defined(__GNUC__) && SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 4) +# define SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT __attribute__ ((__warn_unused_result__)) +# else +# define SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT +# endif +# if !defined(SECP256K1_BUILD) && defined(__GNUC__) && SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 4) +# define SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(_x) __attribute__ ((__nonnull__(_x))) +# else +# define SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(_x) +# endif + +/** All flags' lower 8 bits indicate what they're for. Do not use directly. */ +#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_MASK ((1 << 8) - 1) +#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT (1 << 0) +#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION (1 << 1) +/** The higher bits contain the actual data. Do not use directly. */ +#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY (1 << 8) +#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN (1 << 9) +#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION (1 << 8) + +/** Flags to pass to secp256k1_context_create. */ +#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY) +#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN) +#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT) + +/** Flag to pass to secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize and secp256k1_ec_privkey_export. */ +#define SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION) +#define SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION) + +/** Prefix byte used to tag various encoded curvepoints for specific purposes */ +#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_EVEN 0x02 +#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_ODD 0x03 +#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_UNCOMPRESSED 0x04 +#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_HYBRID_EVEN 0x06 +#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_HYBRID_ODD 0x07 + +/** Create a secp256k1 context object. + * + * Returns: a newly created context object. + * In: flags: which parts of the context to initialize. + * + * See also secp256k1_context_randomize. + */ +SECP256K1_API secp256k1_context* secp256k1_context_create( + unsigned int flags +) SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; + +/** Copies a secp256k1 context object. + * + * Returns: a newly created context object. + * Args: ctx: an existing context to copy (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API secp256k1_context* secp256k1_context_clone( + const secp256k1_context* ctx +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; + +/** Destroy a secp256k1 context object. + * + * The context pointer may not be used afterwards. + * Args: ctx: an existing context to destroy (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_destroy( + secp256k1_context* ctx +); + +/** Set a callback function to be called when an illegal argument is passed to + * an API call. It will only trigger for violations that are mentioned + * explicitly in the header. + * + * The philosophy is that these shouldn't be dealt with through a + * specific return value, as calling code should not have branches to deal with + * the case that this code itself is broken. + * + * On the other hand, during debug stage, one would want to be informed about + * such mistakes, and the default (crashing) may be inadvisable. + * When this callback is triggered, the API function called is guaranteed not + * to cause a crash, though its return value and output arguments are + * undefined. + * + * Args: ctx: an existing context object (cannot be NULL) + * In: fun: a pointer to a function to call when an illegal argument is + * passed to the API, taking a message and an opaque pointer + * (NULL restores a default handler that calls abort). + * data: the opaque pointer to pass to fun above. + */ +SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback( + secp256k1_context* ctx, + void (*fun)(const char* message, void* data), + const void* data +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1); + +/** Set a callback function to be called when an internal consistency check + * fails. The default is crashing. + * + * This can only trigger in case of a hardware failure, miscompilation, + * memory corruption, serious bug in the library, or other error would can + * otherwise result in undefined behaviour. It will not trigger due to mere + * incorrect usage of the API (see secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback + * for that). After this callback returns, anything may happen, including + * crashing. + * + * Args: ctx: an existing context object (cannot be NULL) + * In: fun: a pointer to a function to call when an internal error occurs, + * taking a message and an opaque pointer (NULL restores a default + * handler that calls abort). + * data: the opaque pointer to pass to fun above. + */ +SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_set_error_callback( + secp256k1_context* ctx, + void (*fun)(const char* message, void* data), + const void* data +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1); + +/** Create a secp256k1 scratch space object. + * + * Returns: a newly created scratch space. + * Args: ctx: an existing context object (cannot be NULL) + * In: max_size: maximum amount of memory to allocate + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT secp256k1_scratch_space* secp256k1_scratch_space_create( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + size_t max_size +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1); + +/** Destroy a secp256k1 scratch space. + * + * The pointer may not be used afterwards. + * Args: scratch: space to destroy + */ +SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy( + secp256k1_scratch_space* scratch +); + +/** Parse a variable-length public key into the pubkey object. + * + * Returns: 1 if the public key was fully valid. + * 0 if the public key could not be parsed or is invalid. + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object. + * Out: pubkey: pointer to a pubkey object. If 1 is returned, it is set to a + * parsed version of input. If not, its value is undefined. + * In: input: pointer to a serialized public key + * inputlen: length of the array pointed to by input + * + * This function supports parsing compressed (33 bytes, header byte 0x02 or + * 0x03), uncompressed (65 bytes, header byte 0x04), or hybrid (65 bytes, header + * byte 0x06 or 0x07) format public keys. + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t inputlen +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Serialize a pubkey object into a serialized byte sequence. + * + * Returns: 1 always. + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object. + * Out: output: a pointer to a 65-byte (if compressed==0) or 33-byte (if + * compressed==1) byte array to place the serialized key + * in. + * In/Out: outputlen: a pointer to an integer which is initially set to the + * size of output, and is overwritten with the written + * size. + * In: pubkey: a pointer to a secp256k1_pubkey containing an + * initialized public key. + * flags: SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED if serialization should be in + * compressed format, otherwise SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED. + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *output, + size_t *outputlen, + const secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey, + unsigned int flags +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Parse an ECDSA signature in compact (64 bytes) format. + * + * Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object + * Out: sig: a pointer to a signature object + * In: input64: a pointer to the 64-byte array to parse + * + * The signature must consist of a 32-byte big endian R value, followed by a + * 32-byte big endian S value. If R or S fall outside of [0..order-1], the + * encoding is invalid. R and S with value 0 are allowed in the encoding. + * + * After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or R or + * S are zero, the resulting sig value is guaranteed to fail validation for any + * message and public key. + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig, + const unsigned char *input64 +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Parse a DER ECDSA signature. + * + * Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object + * Out: sig: a pointer to a signature object + * In: input: a pointer to the signature to be parsed + * inputlen: the length of the array pointed to be input + * + * This function will accept any valid DER encoded signature, even if the + * encoded numbers are out of range. + * + * After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or the + * encoded numbers are out of range, signature validation with it is + * guaranteed to fail for every message and public key. + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t inputlen +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Serialize an ECDSA signature in DER format. + * + * Returns: 1 if enough space was available to serialize, 0 otherwise + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object + * Out: output: a pointer to an array to store the DER serialization + * In/Out: outputlen: a pointer to a length integer. Initially, this integer + * should be set to the length of output. After the call + * it will be set to the length of the serialization (even + * if 0 was returned). + * In: sig: a pointer to an initialized signature object + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *output, + size_t *outputlen, + const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Serialize an ECDSA signature in compact (64 byte) format. + * + * Returns: 1 + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object + * Out: output64: a pointer to a 64-byte array to store the compact serialization + * In: sig: a pointer to an initialized signature object + * + * See secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact for details about the encoding. + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *output64, + const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Verify an ECDSA signature. + * + * Returns: 1: correct signature + * 0: incorrect or unparseable signature + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object, initialized for verification. + * In: sig: the signature being verified (cannot be NULL) + * msg32: the 32-byte message hash being verified (cannot be NULL) + * pubkey: pointer to an initialized public key to verify with (cannot be NULL) + * + * To avoid accepting malleable signatures, only ECDSA signatures in lower-S + * form are accepted. + * + * If you need to accept ECDSA signatures from sources that do not obey this + * rule, apply secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize to the signature prior to + * validation, but be aware that doing so results in malleable signatures. + * + * For details, see the comments for that function. + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ecdsa_verify( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig, + const unsigned char *msg32, + const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Convert a signature to a normalized lower-S form. + * + * Returns: 1 if sigin was not normalized, 0 if it already was. + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object + * Out: sigout: a pointer to a signature to fill with the normalized form, + * or copy if the input was already normalized. (can be NULL if + * you're only interested in whether the input was already + * normalized). + * In: sigin: a pointer to a signature to check/normalize (cannot be NULL, + * can be identical to sigout) + * + * With ECDSA a third-party can forge a second distinct signature of the same + * message, given a single initial signature, but without knowing the key. This + * is done by negating the S value modulo the order of the curve, 'flipping' + * the sign of the random point R which is not included in the signature. + * + * Forgery of the same message isn't universally problematic, but in systems + * where message malleability or uniqueness of signatures is important this can + * cause issues. This forgery can be blocked by all verifiers forcing signers + * to use a normalized form. + * + * The lower-S form reduces the size of signatures slightly on average when + * variable length encodings (such as DER) are used and is cheap to verify, + * making it a good choice. Security of always using lower-S is assured because + * anyone can trivially modify a signature after the fact to enforce this + * property anyway. + * + * The lower S value is always between 0x1 and + * 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF5D576E7357A4501DDFE92F46681B20A0, + * inclusive. + * + * No other forms of ECDSA malleability are known and none seem likely, but + * there is no formal proof that ECDSA, even with this additional restriction, + * is free of other malleability. Commonly used serialization schemes will also + * accept various non-unique encodings, so care should be taken when this + * property is required for an application. + * + * The secp256k1_ecdsa_sign function will by default create signatures in the + * lower-S form, and secp256k1_ecdsa_verify will not accept others. In case + * signatures come from a system that cannot enforce this property, + * secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize must be called before verification. + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigout, + const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigin +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** An implementation of RFC6979 (using HMAC-SHA256) as nonce generation function. + * If a data pointer is passed, it is assumed to be a pointer to 32 bytes of + * extra entropy. + */ +SECP256K1_API extern const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979; + +/** A default safe nonce generation function (currently equal to secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979). */ +SECP256K1_API extern const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_default; + +/** Create an ECDSA signature. + * + * Returns: 1: signature created + * 0: the nonce generation function failed, or the private key was invalid. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot be NULL) + * Out: sig: pointer to an array where the signature will be placed (cannot be NULL) + * In: msg32: the 32-byte message hash being signed (cannot be NULL) + * seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (cannot be NULL) + * noncefp:pointer to a nonce generation function. If NULL, secp256k1_nonce_function_default is used + * ndata: pointer to arbitrary data used by the nonce generation function (can be NULL) + * + * The created signature is always in lower-S form. See + * secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize for more details. + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig, + const unsigned char *msg32, + const unsigned char *seckey, + secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, + const void *ndata +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Verify an ECDSA secret key. + * + * Returns: 1: secret key is valid + * 0: secret key is invalid + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) + * In: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + const unsigned char *seckey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2); + +/** Compute the public key for a secret key. + * + * Returns: 1: secret was valid, public key stores + * 0: secret was invalid, try again + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot be NULL) + * Out: pubkey: pointer to the created public key (cannot be NULL) + * In: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte private key (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, + const unsigned char *seckey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Negates a private key in place. + * + * Returns: 1 always + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object + * In/Out: seckey: pointer to the 32-byte private key to be negated (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_negate( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *seckey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2); + +/** Negates a public key in place. + * + * Returns: 1 always + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object + * In/Out: pubkey: pointer to the public key to be negated (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2); + +/** Tweak a private key by adding tweak to it. + * Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for + * uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or if the resulting private key + * would be invalid (only when the tweak is the complement of the + * private key). 1 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL). + * In/Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte private key. + * In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *seckey, + const unsigned char *tweak +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Tweak a public key by adding tweak times the generator to it. + * Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for + * uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or if the resulting public key + * would be invalid (only when the tweak is the complement of the + * corresponding private key). 1 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for validation + * (cannot be NULL). + * In/Out: pubkey: pointer to a public key object. + * In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, + const unsigned char *tweak +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Tweak a private key by multiplying it by a tweak. + * Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for + * uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or equal to zero. 1 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL). + * In/Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte private key. + * In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *seckey, + const unsigned char *tweak +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Tweak a public key by multiplying it by a tweak value. + * Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for + * uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or equal to zero. 1 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for validation + * (cannot be NULL). + * In/Out: pubkey: pointer to a public key obkect. + * In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, + const unsigned char *tweak +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Updates the context randomization to protect against side-channel leakage. + * Returns: 1: randomization successfully updated + * 0: error + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) + * In: seed32: pointer to a 32-byte random seed (NULL resets to initial state) + * + * While secp256k1 code is written to be constant-time no matter what secret + * values are, it's possible that a future compiler may output code which isn't, + * and also that the CPU may not emit the same radio frequencies or draw the same + * amount power for all values. + * + * This function provides a seed which is combined into the blinding value: that + * blinding value is added before each multiplication (and removed afterwards) so + * that it does not affect function results, but shields against attacks which + * rely on any input-dependent behaviour. + * + * You should call this after secp256k1_context_create or + * secp256k1_context_clone, and may call this repeatedly afterwards. + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_context_randomize( + secp256k1_context* ctx, + const unsigned char *seed32 +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1); + +/** Add a number of public keys together. + * Returns: 1: the sum of the public keys is valid. + * 0: the sum of the public keys is not valid. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object + * Out: out: pointer to a public key object for placing the resulting public key + * (cannot be NULL) + * In: ins: pointer to array of pointers to public keys (cannot be NULL) + * n: the number of public keys to add together (must be at least 1) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_pubkey *out, + const secp256k1_pubkey * const * ins, + size_t n +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* SECP256K1_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_bulletproofs.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_bulletproofs.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..46df2b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_bulletproofs.h @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +#ifndef _SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_ +# define _SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_ + +# include "secp256k1.h" +# include "secp256k1_generator.h" +# include "secp256k1_rangeproof.h" + +# ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +# endif + +/** Opaque structure representing a large number of NUMS generators */ +typedef struct secp256k1_bulletproof_generators secp256k1_bulletproof_generators; + +/* Maximum depth of 31 lets us validate an aggregate of 2^25 64-bit proofs */ +#define SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_DEPTH 31 + +/* Size of a hypothetical 31-depth rangeproof, in bytes */ +#define SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_PROOF (160 + 36*32 + 7) + +/** Allocates and initializes a list of NUMS generators, along with precomputation data + * Returns a list of generators, or NULL if allocation failed. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) + * In: blinding_gen: generator that blinding factors will be multiplied by (cannot be NULL) + * n: number of NUMS generators to produce + */ +SECP256K1_API secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_create( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + const secp256k1_generator *blinding_gen, + size_t n +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1); + +/** Destroys a list of NUMS generators, freeing allocated memory + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) + * gen: pointer to the generator set to be destroyed + */ +SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_destroy( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gen +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1); + +/** Verifies a single bulletproof (aggregate) rangeproof + * Returns: 1: rangeproof was valid + * 0: rangeproof was invalid, or out of memory + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for verification (cannot be NULL) + * scratch: scratch space with enough memory for verification (cannot be NULL) + * gens: generator set with at least 2*nbits*n_commits many generators (cannot be NULL) + * In: proof: byte-serialized rangeproof (cannot be NULL) + * plen: length of the proof + * min_value: array of minimum values to prove ranges above, or NULL for all-zeroes + * commit: array of pedersen commitment that this rangeproof is over (cannot be NULL) + * n_commits: number of commitments in the above array (cannot be 0) + * nbits: number of bits proven for each range + * value_gen: generator multiplied by value in pedersen commitments (cannot be NULL) + * extra_commit: additonal data committed to by the rangeproof (may be NULL if `extra_commit_len` is 0) + * extra_commit_len: length of additional data + */ +SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_scratch_space* scratch, + const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, + const unsigned char* proof, + size_t plen, + const uint64_t* min_value, + const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* commit, + size_t n_commits, + size_t nbits, + const secp256k1_generator* value_gen, + const unsigned char* extra_commit, + size_t extra_commit_len +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(7) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(10); + +/** Batch-verifies multiple bulletproof (aggregate) rangeproofs of the same size using same generator + * Returns: 1: all rangeproofs were valid + * 0: some rangeproof was invalid, or out of memory + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for verification (cannot be NULL) + * scratch: scratch space with enough memory for verification (cannot be NULL) + * gens: generator set with at least 2*nbits*n_commits many generators (cannot be NULL) + * In: proof: array of byte-serialized rangeproofs (cannot be NULL) + * n_proofs: number of proofs in the above array, and number of arrays in the `commit` array + * plen: length of every individual proof + * min_value: array of arrays of minimum values to prove ranges above, or NULL for all-zeroes + * commit: array of arrays of pedersen commitment that the rangeproofs is over (cannot be NULL) + * n_commits: number of commitments in each element of the above array (cannot be 0) + * nbits: number of bits in each proof + * value_gen: generator multiplied by value in pedersen commitments (cannot be NULL) + * extra_commit: additonal data committed to by the rangeproof (may be NULL if `extra_commit_len` is 0) + * extra_commit_len: array of lengths of additional data + */ +SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_scratch_space* scratch, + const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, + const unsigned char* const* proof, + size_t n_proofs, + size_t plen, + const uint64_t* const* min_value, + const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* const* commit, + size_t n_commits, + size_t nbits, + const secp256k1_generator* value_gen, + const unsigned char* const* extra_commit, + size_t *extra_commit_len +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(8); + +/** Extracts the value and blinding factor from a single-commit rangeproof given a secret nonce + * Returns: 1: value and blinding factor were extracted and matched the input commit + * 0: one of the above was not true, extraction failed + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) + * gens: generator set used to make original proof (cannot be NULL) + * Out: value: pointer to value that will be extracted + * blind: pointer to 32-byte array for blinding factor to be extracted + * In: proof: byte-serialized rangeproof (cannot be NULL) + * plen: length of every individual proof + * min_value: minimum value that the proof ranges over + * commit: pedersen commitment that the rangeproof is over (cannot be NULL) + * value_gen: generator multiplied by value in pedersen commitments (cannot be NULL) + * nonce: random 32-byte seed used to derive blinding factors (cannot be NULL) + * extra_commit: additonal data committed to by the rangeproof + * extra_commit_len: length of additional data + */ +SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators* gens, + uint64_t* value, + unsigned char* blind, + const unsigned char* proof, + size_t plen, + uint64_t min_value, + const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* commit, + const secp256k1_generator* value_gen, + const unsigned char* nonce, + const unsigned char* extra_commit, + size_t extra_commit_len +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(8) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(9); + +/** Produces an aggregate Bulletproof rangeproof for a set of Pedersen commitments + * Returns: 1: rangeproof was successfully created + * 0: rangeproof could not be created, or out of memory + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for signing and verification (cannot be NULL) + * scratch: scratch space with enough memory for verification (cannot be NULL) + * gens: generator set with at least 2*nbits*n_commits many generators (cannot be NULL) + * Out: proof: byte-serialized rangeproof (cannot be NULL) + * In/out: plen: pointer to size of `proof`, to be replaced with actual length of proof (cannot be NULL) + * In: value: array of values committed by the Pedersen commitments (cannot be NULL) + * min_value: array of minimum values to prove ranges above, or NULL for all-zeroes + * blind: array of blinding factors of the Pedersen commitments (cannot be NULL) + * n_commits: number of entries in the `value` and `blind` arrays + * value_gen: generator multiplied by value in pedersen commitments (cannot be NULL) + * nbits: number of bits proven for each range + * nonce: random 32-byte seed used to derive blinding factors (cannot be NULL) + * extra_commit: additonal data committed to by the rangeproof + * extra_commit_len: length of additional data + */ +SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_scratch_space* scratch, + const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, + unsigned char* proof, + size_t* plen, + const uint64_t *value, + const uint64_t *min_value, + const unsigned char* const* blind, + size_t n_commits, + const secp256k1_generator* value_gen, + size_t nbits, + const unsigned char* nonce, + const unsigned char* extra_commit, + size_t extra_commit_len +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(6) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(8) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(10) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(12); + +# ifdef __cplusplus +} +# endif + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_commitment.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_commitment.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..83b7116 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_commitment.h @@ -0,0 +1,164 @@ +#ifndef _SECP256K1_COMMITMENT_ +# define _SECP256K1_COMMITMENT_ + +# include "secp256k1.h" +# include "secp256k1_generator.h" + +# ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +# endif + +#include + +/** Opaque data structure that stores a Pedersen commitment + * + * The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not + * guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is + * however guaranteed to be 33 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved. + * If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage or transmission, use + * secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_serialize and secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_parse. + */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char data[33]; +} secp256k1_pedersen_commitment; + +/** Parse a 33-byte commitment into a commitment object. + * + * Returns: 1 if input contains a valid commitment. + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object. + * Out: commit: pointer to the output commitment object + * In: input: pointer to a 33-byte serialized commitment key + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_parse( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* commit, + const unsigned char *input +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Serialize a commitment object into a serialized byte sequence. + * + * Returns: 1 always. + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object. + * Out: output: a pointer to a 33-byte byte array + * In: commit: a pointer to a secp256k1_pedersen_commitment containing an + * initialized commitment + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_serialize( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *output, + const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* commit +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Initialize a context for usage with Pedersen commitments. */ +void secp256k1_pedersen_context_initialize(secp256k1_context* ctx); + +/** Generate a Pedersen commitment. + * Returns 1: Commitment successfully created. + * 0: Error. The blinding factor is larger than the group order + * (probability for random 32 byte number < 2^-127) or results in the + * point at infinity. Retry with a different factor. + * In: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) + * blind: pointer to a 32-byte blinding factor (cannot be NULL) + * value: unsigned 64-bit integer value to commit to. + * value_gen: value generator 'h' + * blind_gen: blinding factor generator 'g' + * Out: commit: pointer to the commitment (cannot be NULL) + * + * Blinding factors can be generated and verified in the same way as secp256k1 private keys for ECDSA. + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_pedersen_commit( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *commit, + const unsigned char *blind, + uint64_t value, + const secp256k1_generator *value_gen, + const secp256k1_generator *blind_gen +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(6); + +/** Computes the sum of multiple positive and negative blinding factors. + * Returns 1: Sum successfully computed. + * 0: Error. A blinding factor is larger than the group order + * (probability for random 32 byte number < 2^-127). Retry with + * different factors. + * In: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) + * blinds: pointer to pointers to 32-byte character arrays for blinding factors. (cannot be NULL) + * n: number of factors pointed to by blinds. + * npositive: how many of the input factors should be treated with a positive sign. + * Out: blind_out: pointer to a 32-byte array for the sum (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_pedersen_blind_sum( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *blind_out, + const unsigned char * const *blinds, + size_t n, + size_t npositive +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Verify a tally of Pedersen commitments + * Returns 1: commitments successfully sum to zero. + * 0: Commitments do not sum to zero or other error. + * In: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) + * pos: pointer to array of pointers to the commitments. (cannot be NULL if `n_pos` is non-zero) + * n_pos: number of commitments pointed to by `pos`. + * neg: pointer to array of pointers to the negative commitments. (cannot be NULL if `n_neg` is non-zero) + * n_neg: number of commitments pointed to by `neg`. + * + * This computes sum(pos[0..n_pos)) - sum(neg[0..n_neg)) == 0. + * + * A Pedersen commitment is xG + vA where G and A are generators for the secp256k1 group and x is a blinding factor, + * while v is the committed value. For a collection of commitments to sum to zero, for each distinct generator + * A all blinding factors and all values must sum to zero. + * + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment * const* pos, + size_t n_pos, + const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment * const* neg, + size_t n_neg +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Sets the final Pedersen blinding factor correctly when the generators themselves + * have blinding factors. + * + * Consider a generator of the form A' = A + rG, where A is the "real" generator + * but A' is the generator provided to verifiers. Then a Pedersen commitment + * P = vA' + r'G really has the form vA + (vr + r')G. To get all these (vr + r') + * to sum to zero for multiple commitments, we take three arrays consisting of + * the `v`s, `r`s, and `r'`s, respectively called `value`s, `generator_blind`s + * and `blinding_factor`s, and sum them. + * + * The function then subtracts the sum of all (vr + r') from the last element + * of the `blinding_factor` array, setting the total sum to zero. + * + * Returns 1: Blinding factor successfully computed. + * 0: Error. A blinding_factor or generator_blind are larger than the group + * order (probability for random 32 byte number < 2^-127). Retry with + * different values. + * + * In: ctx: pointer to a context object + * value: array of asset values, `v` in the above paragraph. + * May not be NULL unless `n_total` is 0. + * generator_blind: array of asset blinding factors, `r` in the above paragraph + * May not be NULL unless `n_total` is 0. + * n_total: Total size of the above arrays + * n_inputs: How many of the initial array elements represent commitments that + * will be negated in the final sum + * In/Out: blinding_factor: array of commitment blinding factors, `r'` in the above paragraph + * May not be NULL unless `n_total` is 0. + * the last value will be modified to get the total sum to zero. + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + const uint64_t *value, + const unsigned char* const* generator_blind, + unsigned char* const* blinding_factor, + size_t n_total, + size_t n_inputs +); + +# ifdef __cplusplus +} +# endif + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_ecdh.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_ecdh.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..88492dc --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_ecdh.h @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +#ifndef SECP256K1_ECDH_H +#define SECP256K1_ECDH_H + +#include "secp256k1.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** Compute an EC Diffie-Hellman secret in constant time + * Returns: 1: exponentiation was successful + * 0: scalar was invalid (zero or overflow) + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) + * Out: result: a 32-byte array which will be populated by an ECDH + * secret computed from the point and scalar + * In: pubkey: a pointer to a secp256k1_pubkey containing an + * initialized public key + * privkey: a 32-byte scalar with which to multiply the point + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ecdh( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *result, + const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, + const unsigned char *privkey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* SECP256K1_ECDH_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_generator.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_generator.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f2baf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_generator.h @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +#ifndef _SECP256K1_GENERATOR_ +# define _SECP256K1_GENERATOR_ + +# include "secp256k1.h" + +# ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +# endif + +#include + +/** Opaque data structure that stores a base point + * + * The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not + * guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is + * however guaranteed to be 33 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved. + * If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage or transmission, use + * the secp256k1_generator_serialize_*. + * + * Furthermore, it is guaranteed to identical points will have identical + * representation, so they can be memcmp'ed. + */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char data[33]; +} secp256k1_generator; + +/** Standard secp256k1 generator G */ +extern const secp256k1_generator secp256k1_generator_const_g; + +/** Alternate secp256k1 generator from Elements Alpha */ +extern const secp256k1_generator secp256k1_generator_const_h; + +/** Parse a 33-byte generator byte sequence into a generator object. + * + * Returns: 1 if input contains a valid generator. + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object. + * Out: commit: pointer to the output generator object + * In: input: pointer to a 33-byte serialized generator + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_generator_parse( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_generator* commit, + const unsigned char *input +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Serialize a 33-byte generator into a serialized byte sequence. + * + * Returns: 1 always. + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object. + * Out: output: a pointer to a 33-byte byte array + * In: commit: a pointer to a generator + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_generator_serialize( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *output, + const secp256k1_generator* commit +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Generate a generator for the curve. + * + * Returns: 0 in the highly unlikely case the seed is not acceptable, + * 1 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object + * Out: gen: a generator object + * In: seed32: a 32-byte seed + * + * If succesful, a valid generator will be placed in gen. The produced + * generators are distributed uniformly over the curve, and will not have a + * known dicrete logarithm with respect to any other generator produced, + * or to the base generator G. + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_generator_generate( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_generator* gen, + const unsigned char *seed32 +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Generate a blinded generator for the curve. + * + * Returns: 0 in the highly unlikely case the seed is not acceptable or when + * blind is out of range. 1 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object, initialized for signing + * Out: gen: a generator object + * In: seed32: a 32-byte seed + * blind32: a 32-byte secret value to blind the generator with. + * + * The result is equivalent to first calling secp256k1_generator_generate, + * converting the result to a public key, calling secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add, + * and then converting back to generator form. + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_generator* gen, + const unsigned char *key32, + const unsigned char *blind32 +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +# ifdef __cplusplus +} +# endif + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..be8d0df --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +#ifndef _SECP256K1_RANGEPROOF_ +# define _SECP256K1_RANGEPROOF_ + +# include "secp256k1.h" +# include "secp256k1_generator.h" +# include "secp256k1_commitment.h" + +# ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +# endif + +#include + +/** Verify a proof that a committed value is within a range. + * Returns 1: Value is within the range [0..2^64), the specifically proven range is in the min/max value outputs. + * 0: Proof failed or other error. + * In: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for range-proof and commitment (cannot be NULL) + * commit: the commitment being proved. (cannot be NULL) + * proof: pointer to character array with the proof. (cannot be NULL) + * plen: length of proof in bytes. + * extra_commit: additional data covered in rangeproof signature + * extra_commit_len: length of extra_commit byte array (0 if NULL) + * gen: additional generator 'h' + * Out: min_value: pointer to a unsigned int64 which will be updated with the minimum value that commit could have. (cannot be NULL) + * max_value: pointer to a unsigned int64 which will be updated with the maximum value that commit could have. (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_rangeproof_verify( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + uint64_t *min_value, + uint64_t *max_value, + const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *commit, + const unsigned char *proof, + size_t plen, + const unsigned char *extra_commit, + size_t extra_commit_len, + const secp256k1_generator* gen +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(9); + +/** Verify a range proof proof and rewind the proof to recover information sent by its author. + * Returns 1: Value is within the range [0..2^64), the specifically proven range is in the min/max value outputs, and the value and blinding were recovered. + * 0: Proof failed, rewind failed, or other error. + * In: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for range-proof and Pedersen commitment (cannot be NULL) + * commit: the commitment being proved. (cannot be NULL) + * proof: pointer to character array with the proof. (cannot be NULL) + * plen: length of proof in bytes. + * nonce: 32-byte secret nonce used by the prover (cannot be NULL) + * extra_commit: additional data covered in rangeproof signature + * extra_commit_len: length of extra_commit byte array (0 if NULL) + * gen: additional generator 'h' + * In/Out: blind_out: storage for the 32-byte blinding factor used for the commitment + * value_out: pointer to an unsigned int64 which has the exact value of the commitment. + * message_out: pointer to a 4096 byte character array to receive message data from the proof author. + * outlen: length of message data written to message_out. + * min_value: pointer to an unsigned int64 which will be updated with the minimum value that commit could have. (cannot be NULL) + * max_value: pointer to an unsigned int64 which will be updated with the maximum value that commit could have. (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *blind_out, + uint64_t *value_out, + unsigned char *message_out, + size_t *outlen, + const unsigned char *nonce, + uint64_t *min_value, + uint64_t *max_value, + const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *commit, + const unsigned char *proof, + size_t plen, + const unsigned char *extra_commit, + size_t extra_commit_len, + const secp256k1_generator *gen +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(6) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(7) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(8) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(9) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(10) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(14); + +/** Author a proof that a committed value is within a range. + * Returns 1: Proof successfully created. + * 0: Error + * In: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for range-proof, signing, and Pedersen commitment (cannot be NULL) + * proof: pointer to array to receive the proof, can be up to 5134 bytes. (cannot be NULL) + * min_value: constructs a proof where the verifer can tell the minimum value is at least the specified amount. + * commit: the commitment being proved. + * blind: 32-byte blinding factor used by commit. + * nonce: 32-byte secret nonce used to initialize the proof (value can be reverse-engineered out of the proof if this secret is known.) + * exp: Base-10 exponent. Digits below above will be made public, but the proof will be made smaller. Allowed range is -1 to 18. + * (-1 is a special case that makes the value public. 0 is the most private.) + * min_bits: Number of bits of the value to keep private. (0 = auto/minimal, - 64). + * value: Actual value of the commitment. + * message: pointer to a byte array of data to be embedded in the rangeproof that can be recovered by rewinding the proof + * msg_len: size of the message to be embedded in the rangeproof + * extra_commit: additional data to be covered in rangeproof signature + * extra_commit_len: length of extra_commit byte array (0 if NULL) + * gen: additional generator 'h' + * In/out: plen: point to an integer with the size of the proof buffer and the size of the constructed proof. + * + * If min_value or exp is non-zero then the value must be on the range [0, 2^63) to prevent the proof range from spanning past 2^64. + * + * If exp is -1 the value is revealed by the proof (e.g. it proves that the proof is a blinding of a specific value, without revealing the blinding key.) + * + * This can randomly fail with probability around one in 2^100. If this happens, buy a lottery ticket and retry with a different nonce or blinding. + * + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_rangeproof_sign( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *proof, + size_t *plen, + uint64_t min_value, + const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *commit, + const unsigned char *blind, + const unsigned char *nonce, + int exp, + int min_bits, + uint64_t value, + const unsigned char *message, + size_t msg_len, + const unsigned char *extra_commit, + size_t extra_commit_len, + const secp256k1_generator *gen +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(6) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(7) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(15); + +/** Extract some basic information from a range-proof. + * Returns 1: Information successfully extracted. + * 0: Decode failed. + * In: ctx: pointer to a context object + * proof: pointer to character array with the proof. + * plen: length of proof in bytes. + * Out: exp: Exponent used in the proof (-1 means the value isn't private). + * mantissa: Number of bits covered by the proof. + * min_value: pointer to an unsigned int64 which will be updated with the minimum value that commit could have. (cannot be NULL) + * max_value: pointer to an unsigned int64 which will be updated with the maximum value that commit could have. (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_rangeproof_info( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + int *exp, + int *mantissa, + uint64_t *min_value, + uint64_t *max_value, + const unsigned char *proof, + size_t plen +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5); + +# ifdef __cplusplus +} +# endif + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_recovery.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_recovery.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cf6c5ed --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_recovery.h @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +#ifndef SECP256K1_RECOVERY_H +#define SECP256K1_RECOVERY_H + +#include "secp256k1.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** Opaque data structured that holds a parsed ECDSA signature, + * supporting pubkey recovery. + * + * The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not + * guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is + * however guaranteed to be 65 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved. + * If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage or transmission, use + * the secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_* and + * secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_* functions. + * + * Furthermore, it is guaranteed that identical signatures (including their + * recoverability) will have identical representation, so they can be + * memcmp'ed. + */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char data[65]; +} secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature; + +/** Parse a compact ECDSA signature (64 bytes + recovery id). + * + * Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object + * Out: sig: a pointer to a signature object + * In: input64: a pointer to a 64-byte compact signature + * recid: the recovery id (0, 1, 2 or 3) + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature* sig, + const unsigned char *input64, + int recid +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Convert a recoverable signature into a normal signature. + * + * Returns: 1 + * Out: sig: a pointer to a normal signature (cannot be NULL). + * In: sigin: a pointer to a recoverable signature (cannot be NULL). + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig, + const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature* sigin +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Serialize an ECDSA signature in compact format (64 bytes + recovery id). + * + * Returns: 1 + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object + * Out: output64: a pointer to a 64-byte array of the compact signature (cannot be NULL) + * recid: a pointer to an integer to hold the recovery id (can be NULL). + * In: sig: a pointer to an initialized signature object (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *output64, + int *recid, + const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature* sig +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Create a recoverable ECDSA signature. + * + * Returns: 1: signature created + * 0: the nonce generation function failed, or the private key was invalid. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot be NULL) + * Out: sig: pointer to an array where the signature will be placed (cannot be NULL) + * In: msg32: the 32-byte message hash being signed (cannot be NULL) + * seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (cannot be NULL) + * noncefp:pointer to a nonce generation function. If NULL, secp256k1_nonce_function_default is used + * ndata: pointer to arbitrary data used by the nonce generation function (can be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *sig, + const unsigned char *msg32, + const unsigned char *seckey, + secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, + const void *ndata +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Recover an ECDSA public key from a signature. + * + * Returns: 1: public key successfully recovered (which guarantees a correct signature). + * 0: otherwise. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for verification (cannot be NULL) + * Out: pubkey: pointer to the recovered public key (cannot be NULL) + * In: sig: pointer to initialized signature that supports pubkey recovery (cannot be NULL) + * msg32: the 32-byte message hash assumed to be signed (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ecdsa_recover( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, + const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *sig, + const unsigned char *msg32 +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* SECP256K1_RECOVERY_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_surjectionproof.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_surjectionproof.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..57f2afb --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_surjectionproof.h @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +#ifndef _SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_ +#define _SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_ + +#include "secp256k1.h" +#include "secp256k1_rangeproof.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** Maximum number of inputs that may be given in a surjection proof */ +#define SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS 256 + +/** Number of bytes a serialized surjection proof requires given the + * number of inputs and the number of used inputs. + */ +#define SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_SERIALIZATION_BYTES(n_inputs, n_used_inputs) \ + (2 + (n_inputs + 7)/8 + 32 * (1 + (n_used_inputs))) + +/** Maximum number of bytes a serialized surjection proof requires. */ +#define SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_SERIALIZATION_BYTES_MAX \ + SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_SERIALIZATION_BYTES(SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS, SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS) + +/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed surjection proof + * + * The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not + * guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. Nor is + * it guaranteed to have any particular size, nor that identical proofs + * will have identical representation. (That is, memcmp may return nonzero + * even for identical proofs.) + * + * To obtain these properties, instead use secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse + * and secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize to encode/decode proofs into a + * well-defined format. + * + * The representation is exposed to allow creation of these objects on the + * stack; please *do not* use these internals directly. + */ +typedef struct { +#ifdef VERIFY + /** Mark whether this proof has gone through `secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize` */ + int initialized; +#endif + /** Total number of input asset tags */ + size_t n_inputs; + /** Bitmap of which input tags are used in the surjection proof */ + unsigned char used_inputs[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS / 8]; + /** Borromean signature: e0, scalars */ + unsigned char data[32 * (1 + SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS)]; +} secp256k1_surjectionproof; + +/** Parse a surjection proof + * + * Returns: 1 when the proof could be parsed, 0 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object + * Out: proof: a pointer to a proof object + * In: input: a pointer to the array to parse + * inputlen: length of the array pointed to by input + * + * The proof must consist of: + * - A 2-byte little-endian total input count `n` + * - A ceil(n/8)-byte bitmap indicating which inputs are used. + * - A big-endian 32-byte borromean signature e0 value + * - `m` big-endian 32-byte borromean signature s values, where `m` + * is the number of set bits in the bitmap + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_surjectionproof *proof, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t inputlen +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Serialize a surjection proof + * + * Returns: 1 if enough space was available to serialize, 0 otherwise + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object + * Out: output: a pointer to an array to store the serialization + * In/Out: outputlen: a pointer to an integer which is initially set to the + * size of output, and is overwritten with the written + * size. + * In: proof: a pointer to an initialized proof object + * + * See secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse for details about the encoding. + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *output, + size_t *outputlen, + const secp256k1_surjectionproof *proof +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Data structure that holds a fixed asset tag. + * + * This data type is *not* opaque. It will always be 32 bytes of whatever + * data the API user wants to use as an asset tag. Its contents have no + * semantic meaning to libsecp whatsoever. + */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char data[32]; +} secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag; + +/** Returns the total number of inputs a proof expects to be over. + * + * Returns: the number of inputs for the given proof + * In: ctx: pointer to a context object + * proof: a pointer to a proof object + */ +SECP256K1_API size_t secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_total_inputs( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + const secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2); + +/** Returns the actual number of inputs that a proof uses + * + * Returns: the number of inputs for the given proof + * In: ctx: pointer to a context object + * proof: a pointer to a proof object + */ +SECP256K1_API size_t secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_used_inputs( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + const secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2); + +/** Returns the total size this proof would take, in bytes, when serialized + * + * Returns: the total size + * In: ctx: pointer to a context object + * proof: a pointer to a proof object + */ +SECP256K1_API size_t secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialized_size( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + const secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2); + +/** Surjection proof initialization function; decides on inputs to use + * Returns 0: inputs could not be selected + * n: inputs were selected after n iterations of random selection + * + * In: ctx: pointer to a context object + * fixed_input_tags: fixed input tags `A_i` for all inputs. (If the fixed tag is not known, + * e.g. in a coinjoin with others' inputs, an ephemeral tag can be given; + * this won't match the output tag but might be used in the anonymity set.) + * n_input_tags: the number of entries in the fixed_input_tags array + * n_input_tags_to_use: the number of inputs to select randomly to put in the anonymity set + * fixed_output_tag: fixed output tag + * max_n_iterations: the maximum number of iterations to do before giving up + * random_seed32: a random seed to be used for input selection + * Out: proof: The proof whose bitvector will be initialized. In case of failure, + * the state of the proof is undefined. + * input_index: The index of the actual input that is secretly mapped to the output + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof, + size_t *input_index, + const secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag* fixed_input_tags, + const size_t n_input_tags, + const size_t n_input_tags_to_use, + const secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag* fixed_output_tag, + const size_t n_max_iterations, + const unsigned char *random_seed32 +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(7); + +/** Surjection proof generation function + * Returns 0: proof could not be created + * 1: proof was successfully created + * + * In: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing and verification + * ephemeral_input_tags: the ephemeral asset tag of all inputs + * n_ephemeral_input_tags: the number of entries in the ephemeral_input_tags array + * ephemeral_output_tag: the ephemeral asset tag of the output + * input_index: the index of the input that actually maps to the output + * input_blinding_key: the blinding key of the input + * output_blinding_key: the blinding key of the output + * In/Out: proof: The produced surjection proof. Must have already gone through `secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize` + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof, + const secp256k1_generator* ephemeral_input_tags, + size_t n_ephemeral_input_tags, + const secp256k1_generator* ephemeral_output_tag, + size_t input_index, + const unsigned char *input_blinding_key, + const unsigned char *output_blinding_key +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(7) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(8); + + +/** Surjection proof verification function + * Returns 0: proof was invalid + * 1: proof was valid + * + * In: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing and verification + * proof: proof to be verified + * ephemeral_input_tags: the ephemeral asset tag of all inputs + * n_ephemeral_input_tags: the number of entries in the ephemeral_input_tags array + * ephemeral_output_tag: the ephemeral asset tag of the output + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + const secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof, + const secp256k1_generator* ephemeral_input_tags, + size_t n_ephemeral_input_tags, + const secp256k1_generator* ephemeral_output_tag +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_whitelist.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_whitelist.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c536c11 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_whitelist.h @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2016 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef _SECP256K1_WHITELIST_ +#define _SECP256K1_WHITELIST_ + +#include "secp256k1.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define SECP256K1_WHITELIST_MAX_N_KEYS 256 + +/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed whitelist proof + * + * The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not + * guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. Nor is + * it guaranteed to have any particular size, nor that identical signatures + * will have identical representation. (That is, memcmp may return nonzero + * even for identical signatures.) + * + * To obtain these properties, instead use secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse + * and secp256k1_whitelist_signature_serialize to encode/decode signatures + * into a well-defined format. + * + * The representation is exposed to allow creation of these objects on the + * stack; please *do not* use these internals directly. To learn the number + * of keys for a signature, use `secp256k1_whitelist_signature_n_keys`. + */ +typedef struct { + size_t n_keys; + /* e0, scalars */ + unsigned char data[32 * (1 + SECP256K1_WHITELIST_MAX_N_KEYS)]; +} secp256k1_whitelist_signature; + +/** Parse a whitelist signature + * + * Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object + * Out: sig: a pointer to a signature object + * In: input: a pointer to the array to parse + * input_len: the length of the above array + * + * The signature must consist of a 1-byte n_keys value, followed by a 32-byte + * big endian e0 value, followed by n_keys many 32-byte big endian s values. + * If n_keys falls outside of [0..SECP256K1_WHITELIST_MAX_N_KEYS] the encoding + * is invalid. + * + * The total length of the input array must therefore be 33 + 32 * n_keys. + * If the length `input_len` does not match this value, parsing will fail. + * + * After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or any + * scalar values overflow or are zero, the resulting sig value is guaranteed + * to fail validation for any set of keys. + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_whitelist_signature *sig, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_len +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Returns the number of keys a signature expects to have. + * + * Returns: the number of keys for the given signature + * In: sig: a pointer to a signature object + */ +SECP256K1_API size_t secp256k1_whitelist_signature_n_keys( + const secp256k1_whitelist_signature *sig +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1); + +/** Serialize a whitelist signature + * + * Returns: 1 + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object + * Out: output64: a pointer to an array to store the serialization + * In/Out: output_len: length of the above array, updated with the actual serialized length + * In: sig: a pointer to an initialized signature object + * + * See secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse for details about the encoding. + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_whitelist_signature_serialize( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *output, + size_t *output_len, + const secp256k1_whitelist_signature *sig +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Compute a whitelist signature + * Returns 1: signature was successfully created + * 0: signature was not successfully created + * In: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing and verification + * online_pubkeys: list of all online pubkeys + * offline_pubkeys: list of all offline pubkeys + * n_keys: the number of entries in each of the above two arrays + * sub_pubkey: the key to be whitelisted + * online_seckey: the secret key to the signer's online pubkey + * summed_seckey: the secret key to the sum of (whitelisted key, signer's offline pubkey) + * index: the signer's index in the lists of keys + * noncefp:pointer to a nonce generation function. If NULL, secp256k1_nonce_function_default is used + * ndata: pointer to arbitrary data used by the nonce generation function (can be NULL) + * Out: sig: The produced signature. + * + * The signatures are of the list of all passed pubkeys in the order + * ( whitelist, online_1, offline_1, online_2, offline_2, ... ) + * The verification key list consists of + * online_i + H(offline_i + whitelist)(offline_i + whitelist) + * for each public key pair (offline_i, offline_i). Here H means sha256 of the + * compressed serialization of the key. + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_whitelist_sign( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_whitelist_signature *sig, + const secp256k1_pubkey *online_pubkeys, + const secp256k1_pubkey *offline_pubkeys, + const size_t n_keys, + const secp256k1_pubkey *sub_pubkey, + const unsigned char *online_seckey, + const unsigned char *summed_seckey, + const size_t index, + secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, + const void *noncedata +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(6) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(7) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(8); + +/** Verify a whitelist signature + * Returns 1: signature is valid + * 0: signature is not valid + * In: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing and verification + * sig: the signature to be verified + * online_pubkeys: list of all online pubkeys + * offline_pubkeys: list of all offline pubkeys + * n_keys: the number of entries in each of the above two arrays + * sub_pubkey: the key to be whitelisted + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_whitelist_verify( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + const secp256k1_whitelist_signature *sig, + const secp256k1_pubkey *online_pubkeys, + const secp256k1_pubkey *offline_pubkeys, + const size_t n_keys, + const secp256k1_pubkey *sub_pubkey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(6); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/sage/group_prover.sage b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/sage/group_prover.sage new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8521f07 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/sage/group_prover.sage @@ -0,0 +1,322 @@ +# This code supports verifying group implementations which have branches +# or conditional statements (like cmovs), by allowing each execution path +# to independently set assumptions on input or intermediary variables. +# +# The general approach is: +# * A constraint is a tuple of two sets of symbolic expressions: +# the first of which are required to evaluate to zero, the second of which +# are required to evaluate to nonzero. +# - A constraint is said to be conflicting if any of its nonzero expressions +# is in the ideal with basis the zero expressions (in other words: when the +# zero expressions imply that one of the nonzero expressions are zero). +# * There is a list of laws that describe the intended behaviour, including +# laws for addition and doubling. Each law is called with the symbolic point +# coordinates as arguments, and returns: +# - A constraint describing the assumptions under which it is applicable, +# called "assumeLaw" +# - A constraint describing the requirements of the law, called "require" +# * Implementations are transliterated into functions that operate as well on +# algebraic input points, and are called once per combination of branches +# executed. Each execution returns: +# - A constraint describing the assumptions this implementation requires +# (such as Z1=1), called "assumeFormula" +# - A constraint describing the assumptions this specific branch requires, +# but which is by construction guaranteed to cover the entire space by +# merging the results from all branches, called "assumeBranch" +# - The result of the computation +# * All combinations of laws with implementation branches are tried, and: +# - If the combination of assumeLaw, assumeFormula, and assumeBranch results +# in a conflict, it means this law does not apply to this branch, and it is +# skipped. +# - For others, we try to prove the require constraints hold, assuming the +# information in assumeLaw + assumeFormula + assumeBranch, and if this does +# not succeed, we fail. +# + To prove an expression is zero, we check whether it belongs to the +# ideal with the assumed zero expressions as basis. This test is exact. +# + To prove an expression is nonzero, we check whether each of its +# factors is contained in the set of nonzero assumptions' factors. +# This test is not exact, so various combinations of original and +# reduced expressions' factors are tried. +# - If we succeed, we print out the assumptions from assumeFormula that +# weren't implied by assumeLaw already. Those from assumeBranch are skipped, +# as we assume that all constraints in it are complementary with each other. +# +# Based on the sage verification scripts used in the Explicit-Formulas Database +# by Tanja Lange and others, see http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD + +class fastfrac: + """Fractions over rings.""" + + def __init__(self,R,top,bot=1): + """Construct a fractional, given a ring, a numerator, and denominator.""" + self.R = R + if parent(top) == ZZ or parent(top) == R: + self.top = R(top) + self.bot = R(bot) + elif top.__class__ == fastfrac: + self.top = top.top + self.bot = top.bot * bot + else: + self.top = R(numerator(top)) + self.bot = R(denominator(top)) * bot + + def iszero(self,I): + """Return whether this fraction is zero given an ideal.""" + return self.top in I and self.bot not in I + + def reduce(self,assumeZero): + zero = self.R.ideal(map(numerator, assumeZero)) + return fastfrac(self.R, zero.reduce(self.top)) / fastfrac(self.R, zero.reduce(self.bot)) + + def __add__(self,other): + """Add two fractions.""" + if parent(other) == ZZ: + return fastfrac(self.R,self.top + self.bot * other,self.bot) + if other.__class__ == fastfrac: + return fastfrac(self.R,self.top * other.bot + self.bot * other.top,self.bot * other.bot) + return NotImplemented + + def __sub__(self,other): + """Subtract two fractions.""" + if parent(other) == ZZ: + return fastfrac(self.R,self.top - self.bot * other,self.bot) + if other.__class__ == fastfrac: + return fastfrac(self.R,self.top * other.bot - self.bot * other.top,self.bot * other.bot) + return NotImplemented + + def __neg__(self): + """Return the negation of a fraction.""" + return fastfrac(self.R,-self.top,self.bot) + + def __mul__(self,other): + """Multiply two fractions.""" + if parent(other) == ZZ: + return fastfrac(self.R,self.top * other,self.bot) + if other.__class__ == fastfrac: + return fastfrac(self.R,self.top * other.top,self.bot * other.bot) + return NotImplemented + + def __rmul__(self,other): + """Multiply something else with a fraction.""" + return self.__mul__(other) + + def __div__(self,other): + """Divide two fractions.""" + if parent(other) == ZZ: + return fastfrac(self.R,self.top,self.bot * other) + if other.__class__ == fastfrac: + return fastfrac(self.R,self.top * other.bot,self.bot * other.top) + return NotImplemented + + def __pow__(self,other): + """Compute a power of a fraction.""" + if parent(other) == ZZ: + if other < 0: + # Negative powers require flipping top and bottom + return fastfrac(self.R,self.bot ^ (-other),self.top ^ (-other)) + else: + return fastfrac(self.R,self.top ^ other,self.bot ^ other) + return NotImplemented + + def __str__(self): + return "fastfrac((" + str(self.top) + ") / (" + str(self.bot) + "))" + def __repr__(self): + return "%s" % self + + def numerator(self): + return self.top + +class constraints: + """A set of constraints, consisting of zero and nonzero expressions. + + Constraints can either be used to express knowledge or a requirement. + + Both the fields zero and nonzero are maps from expressions to description + strings. The expressions that are the keys in zero are required to be zero, + and the expressions that are the keys in nonzero are required to be nonzero. + + Note that (a != 0) and (b != 0) is the same as (a*b != 0), so all keys in + nonzero could be multiplied into a single key. This is often much less + efficient to work with though, so we keep them separate inside the + constraints. This allows higher-level code to do fast checks on the individual + nonzero elements, or combine them if needed for stronger checks. + + We can't multiply the different zero elements, as it would suffice for one of + the factors to be zero, instead of all of them. Instead, the zero elements are + typically combined into an ideal first. + """ + + def __init__(self, **kwargs): + if 'zero' in kwargs: + self.zero = dict(kwargs['zero']) + else: + self.zero = dict() + if 'nonzero' in kwargs: + self.nonzero = dict(kwargs['nonzero']) + else: + self.nonzero = dict() + + def negate(self): + return constraints(zero=self.nonzero, nonzero=self.zero) + + def __add__(self, other): + zero = self.zero.copy() + zero.update(other.zero) + nonzero = self.nonzero.copy() + nonzero.update(other.nonzero) + return constraints(zero=zero, nonzero=nonzero) + + def __str__(self): + return "constraints(zero=%s,nonzero=%s)" % (self.zero, self.nonzero) + + def __repr__(self): + return "%s" % self + + +def conflicts(R, con): + """Check whether any of the passed non-zero assumptions is implied by the zero assumptions""" + zero = R.ideal(map(numerator, con.zero)) + if 1 in zero: + return True + # First a cheap check whether any of the individual nonzero terms conflict on + # their own. + for nonzero in con.nonzero: + if nonzero.iszero(zero): + return True + # It can be the case that entries in the nonzero set do not individually + # conflict with the zero set, but their combination does. For example, knowing + # that either x or y is zero is equivalent to having x*y in the zero set. + # Having x or y individually in the nonzero set is not a conflict, but both + # simultaneously is, so that is the right thing to check for. + if reduce(lambda a,b: a * b, con.nonzero, fastfrac(R, 1)).iszero(zero): + return True + return False + + +def get_nonzero_set(R, assume): + """Calculate a simple set of nonzero expressions""" + zero = R.ideal(map(numerator, assume.zero)) + nonzero = set() + for nz in map(numerator, assume.nonzero): + for (f,n) in nz.factor(): + nonzero.add(f) + rnz = zero.reduce(nz) + for (f,n) in rnz.factor(): + nonzero.add(f) + return nonzero + + +def prove_nonzero(R, exprs, assume): + """Check whether an expression is provably nonzero, given assumptions""" + zero = R.ideal(map(numerator, assume.zero)) + nonzero = get_nonzero_set(R, assume) + expl = set() + ok = True + for expr in exprs: + if numerator(expr) in zero: + return (False, [exprs[expr]]) + allexprs = reduce(lambda a,b: numerator(a)*numerator(b), exprs, 1) + for (f, n) in allexprs.factor(): + if f not in nonzero: + ok = False + if ok: + return (True, None) + ok = True + for (f, n) in zero.reduce(numerator(allexprs)).factor(): + if f not in nonzero: + ok = False + if ok: + return (True, None) + ok = True + for expr in exprs: + for (f,n) in numerator(expr).factor(): + if f not in nonzero: + ok = False + if ok: + return (True, None) + ok = True + for expr in exprs: + for (f,n) in zero.reduce(numerator(expr)).factor(): + if f not in nonzero: + expl.add(exprs[expr]) + if expl: + return (False, list(expl)) + else: + return (True, None) + + +def prove_zero(R, exprs, assume): + """Check whether all of the passed expressions are provably zero, given assumptions""" + r, e = prove_nonzero(R, dict(map(lambda x: (fastfrac(R, x.bot, 1), exprs[x]), exprs)), assume) + if not r: + return (False, map(lambda x: "Possibly zero denominator: %s" % x, e)) + zero = R.ideal(map(numerator, assume.zero)) + nonzero = prod(x for x in assume.nonzero) + expl = [] + for expr in exprs: + if not expr.iszero(zero): + expl.append(exprs[expr]) + if not expl: + return (True, None) + return (False, expl) + + +def describe_extra(R, assume, assumeExtra): + """Describe what assumptions are added, given existing assumptions""" + zerox = assume.zero.copy() + zerox.update(assumeExtra.zero) + zero = R.ideal(map(numerator, assume.zero)) + zeroextra = R.ideal(map(numerator, zerox)) + nonzero = get_nonzero_set(R, assume) + ret = set() + # Iterate over the extra zero expressions + for base in assumeExtra.zero: + if base not in zero: + add = [] + for (f, n) in numerator(base).factor(): + if f not in nonzero: + add += ["%s" % f] + if add: + ret.add((" * ".join(add)) + " = 0 [%s]" % assumeExtra.zero[base]) + # Iterate over the extra nonzero expressions + for nz in assumeExtra.nonzero: + nzr = zeroextra.reduce(numerator(nz)) + if nzr not in zeroextra: + for (f,n) in nzr.factor(): + if zeroextra.reduce(f) not in nonzero: + ret.add("%s != 0" % zeroextra.reduce(f)) + return ", ".join(x for x in ret) + + +def check_symbolic(R, assumeLaw, assumeAssert, assumeBranch, require): + """Check a set of zero and nonzero requirements, given a set of zero and nonzero assumptions""" + assume = assumeLaw + assumeAssert + assumeBranch + + if conflicts(R, assume): + # This formula does not apply + return None + + describe = describe_extra(R, assumeLaw + assumeBranch, assumeAssert) + + ok, msg = prove_zero(R, require.zero, assume) + if not ok: + return "FAIL, %s fails (assuming %s)" % (str(msg), describe) + + res, expl = prove_nonzero(R, require.nonzero, assume) + if not res: + return "FAIL, %s fails (assuming %s)" % (str(expl), describe) + + if describe != "": + return "OK (assuming %s)" % describe + else: + return "OK" + + +def concrete_verify(c): + for k in c.zero: + if k != 0: + return (False, c.zero[k]) + for k in c.nonzero: + if k == 0: + return (False, c.nonzero[k]) + return (True, None) diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/sage/shallue_van_de_woestijne.sage b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/sage/shallue_van_de_woestijne.sage new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1cc97b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/sage/shallue_van_de_woestijne.sage @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ + +### http://www.di.ens.fr/~fouque/pub/latincrypt12.pdf + +# Parameters for secp256k1 +p = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFC2F +a = 0 +b = 7 +F = FiniteField (p) +C = EllipticCurve ([F(a), F(b)]) + +def svdw(t): + sqrt_neg_3 = F(-3).nth_root(2) + + ## Compute candidate x values + w = sqrt_neg_3 * t / (1 + b + t^2) + x = [ F(0), F(0), F(0) ] + x[0] = (-1 + sqrt_neg_3) / 2 - t * w + x[1] = -1 - x[0] + x[2] = 1 + 1 / w^2 + + print + print "On %2d" % t + print " x1 %064x" % x[0] + print " x2 %064x" % x[1] + print " x3 %064x" % x[2] + + ## Select which to use + alph = jacobi_symbol(x[0]^3 + b, p) + beta = jacobi_symbol(x[1]^3 + b, p) + if alph == 1 and beta == 1: + i = 0 + elif alph == 1 and beta == -1: + i = 0 + elif alph == -1 and beta == 1: + i = 1 + elif alph == -1 and beta == -1: + i = 2 + else: + print "Help! I don't understand Python!" + + ## Expand to full point + sign = 1 - 2 * (int(F(t)) % 2) + ret_x = x[i] + ret_y = sign * F(x[i]^3 + b).nth_root(2) + return C.point((ret_x, ret_y)) + + +## main +for i in range(1, 11): + res = svdw(i) + print "Result: %064x %064x" % res.xy() diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/asm/field_10x26_arm.s b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/asm/field_10x26_arm.s new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a9cc3f --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/asm/field_10x26_arm.s @@ -0,0 +1,919 @@ +@ vim: set tabstop=8 softtabstop=8 shiftwidth=8 noexpandtab syntax=armasm: +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2014 Wladimir J. van der Laan * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ +/* +ARM implementation of field_10x26 inner loops. + +Note: + +- To avoid unnecessary loads and make use of available registers, two + 'passes' have every time been interleaved, with the odd passes accumulating c' and d' + which will be added to c and d respectively in the even passes + +*/ + + .syntax unified + .arch armv7-a + @ eabi attributes - see readelf -A + .eabi_attribute 8, 1 @ Tag_ARM_ISA_use = yes + .eabi_attribute 9, 0 @ Tag_Thumb_ISA_use = no + .eabi_attribute 10, 0 @ Tag_FP_arch = none + .eabi_attribute 24, 1 @ Tag_ABI_align_needed = 8-byte + .eabi_attribute 25, 1 @ Tag_ABI_align_preserved = 8-byte, except leaf SP + .eabi_attribute 30, 2 @ Tag_ABI_optimization_goals = Aggressive Speed + .eabi_attribute 34, 1 @ Tag_CPU_unaligned_access = v6 + .text + + @ Field constants + .set field_R0, 0x3d10 + .set field_R1, 0x400 + .set field_not_M, 0xfc000000 @ ~M = ~0x3ffffff + + .align 2 + .global secp256k1_fe_mul_inner + .type secp256k1_fe_mul_inner, %function + @ Arguments: + @ r0 r Restrict: can overlap with a, not with b + @ r1 a + @ r2 b + @ Stack (total 4+10*4 = 44) + @ sp + #0 saved 'r' pointer + @ sp + #4 + 4*X t0,t1,t2,t3,t4,t5,t6,t7,u8,t9 +secp256k1_fe_mul_inner: + stmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10, r11, r14} + sub sp, sp, #48 @ frame=44 + alignment + str r0, [sp, #0] @ save result address, we need it only at the end + + /****************************************** + * Main computation code. + ****************************************** + + Allocation: + r0,r14,r7,r8 scratch + r1 a (pointer) + r2 b (pointer) + r3:r4 c + r5:r6 d + r11:r12 c' + r9:r10 d' + + Note: do not write to r[] here, it may overlap with a[] + */ + + /* A - interleaved with B */ + ldr r7, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0] + ldr r8, [r2, #9*4] @ b[9] + ldr r0, [r1, #1*4] @ a[1] + umull r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d = a[0] * b[9] + ldr r14, [r2, #8*4] @ b[8] + umull r9, r10, r0, r8 @ d' = a[1] * b[9] + ldr r7, [r1, #2*4] @ a[2] + umlal r5, r6, r0, r14 @ d += a[1] * b[8] + ldr r8, [r2, #7*4] @ b[7] + umlal r9, r10, r7, r14 @ d' += a[2] * b[8] + ldr r0, [r1, #3*4] @ a[3] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[2] * b[7] + ldr r14, [r2, #6*4] @ b[6] + umlal r9, r10, r0, r8 @ d' += a[3] * b[7] + ldr r7, [r1, #4*4] @ a[4] + umlal r5, r6, r0, r14 @ d += a[3] * b[6] + ldr r8, [r2, #5*4] @ b[5] + umlal r9, r10, r7, r14 @ d' += a[4] * b[6] + ldr r0, [r1, #5*4] @ a[5] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[4] * b[5] + ldr r14, [r2, #4*4] @ b[4] + umlal r9, r10, r0, r8 @ d' += a[5] * b[5] + ldr r7, [r1, #6*4] @ a[6] + umlal r5, r6, r0, r14 @ d += a[5] * b[4] + ldr r8, [r2, #3*4] @ b[3] + umlal r9, r10, r7, r14 @ d' += a[6] * b[4] + ldr r0, [r1, #7*4] @ a[7] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[6] * b[3] + ldr r14, [r2, #2*4] @ b[2] + umlal r9, r10, r0, r8 @ d' += a[7] * b[3] + ldr r7, [r1, #8*4] @ a[8] + umlal r5, r6, r0, r14 @ d += a[7] * b[2] + ldr r8, [r2, #1*4] @ b[1] + umlal r9, r10, r7, r14 @ d' += a[8] * b[2] + ldr r0, [r1, #9*4] @ a[9] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[8] * b[1] + ldr r14, [r2, #0*4] @ b[0] + umlal r9, r10, r0, r8 @ d' += a[9] * b[1] + ldr r7, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0] + umlal r5, r6, r0, r14 @ d += a[9] * b[0] + @ r7,r14 used in B + + bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ t9 = d & M + str r0, [sp, #4 + 4*9] + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + + /* B */ + umull r3, r4, r7, r14 @ c = a[0] * b[0] + adds r5, r5, r9 @ d += d' + adc r6, r6, r10 + + bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u0 = d & M + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u0 * R0 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t0 = c & M + str r14, [sp, #4 + 0*4] + mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 + orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 + mov r4, r4, lsr #26 + mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u0 * R1 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + /* C - interleaved with D */ + ldr r7, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0] + ldr r8, [r2, #2*4] @ b[2] + ldr r14, [r2, #1*4] @ b[1] + umull r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' = a[0] * b[2] + ldr r0, [r1, #1*4] @ a[1] + umlal r3, r4, r7, r14 @ c += a[0] * b[1] + ldr r8, [r2, #0*4] @ b[0] + umlal r11, r12, r0, r14 @ c' += a[1] * b[1] + ldr r7, [r1, #2*4] @ a[2] + umlal r3, r4, r0, r8 @ c += a[1] * b[0] + ldr r14, [r2, #9*4] @ b[9] + umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[2] * b[0] + ldr r0, [r1, #3*4] @ a[3] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[2] * b[9] + ldr r8, [r2, #8*4] @ b[8] + umull r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' = a[3] * b[9] + ldr r7, [r1, #4*4] @ a[4] + umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[3] * b[8] + ldr r14, [r2, #7*4] @ b[7] + umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[4] * b[8] + ldr r0, [r1, #5*4] @ a[5] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[4] * b[7] + ldr r8, [r2, #6*4] @ b[6] + umlal r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' += a[5] * b[7] + ldr r7, [r1, #6*4] @ a[6] + umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[5] * b[6] + ldr r14, [r2, #5*4] @ b[5] + umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[6] * b[6] + ldr r0, [r1, #7*4] @ a[7] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[6] * b[5] + ldr r8, [r2, #4*4] @ b[4] + umlal r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' += a[7] * b[5] + ldr r7, [r1, #8*4] @ a[8] + umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[7] * b[4] + ldr r14, [r2, #3*4] @ b[3] + umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[8] * b[4] + ldr r0, [r1, #9*4] @ a[9] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[8] * b[3] + ldr r8, [r2, #2*4] @ b[2] + umlal r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' += a[9] * b[3] + umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[9] * b[2] + + bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u1 = d & M + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u1 * R0 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t1 = c & M + str r14, [sp, #4 + 1*4] + mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 + orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 + mov r4, r4, lsr #26 + mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u1 * R1 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + /* D */ + adds r3, r3, r11 @ c += c' + adc r4, r4, r12 + adds r5, r5, r9 @ d += d' + adc r6, r6, r10 + + bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u2 = d & M + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u2 * R0 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t2 = c & M + str r14, [sp, #4 + 2*4] + mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 + orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 + mov r4, r4, lsr #26 + mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u2 * R1 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + /* E - interleaved with F */ + ldr r7, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0] + ldr r8, [r2, #4*4] @ b[4] + umull r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' = a[0] * b[4] + ldr r8, [r2, #3*4] @ b[3] + umlal r3, r4, r7, r8 @ c += a[0] * b[3] + ldr r7, [r1, #1*4] @ a[1] + umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[1] * b[3] + ldr r8, [r2, #2*4] @ b[2] + umlal r3, r4, r7, r8 @ c += a[1] * b[2] + ldr r7, [r1, #2*4] @ a[2] + umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[2] * b[2] + ldr r8, [r2, #1*4] @ b[1] + umlal r3, r4, r7, r8 @ c += a[2] * b[1] + ldr r7, [r1, #3*4] @ a[3] + umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[3] * b[1] + ldr r8, [r2, #0*4] @ b[0] + umlal r3, r4, r7, r8 @ c += a[3] * b[0] + ldr r7, [r1, #4*4] @ a[4] + umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[4] * b[0] + ldr r8, [r2, #9*4] @ b[9] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[4] * b[9] + ldr r7, [r1, #5*4] @ a[5] + umull r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' = a[5] * b[9] + ldr r8, [r2, #8*4] @ b[8] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[5] * b[8] + ldr r7, [r1, #6*4] @ a[6] + umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[6] * b[8] + ldr r8, [r2, #7*4] @ b[7] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[6] * b[7] + ldr r7, [r1, #7*4] @ a[7] + umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[7] * b[7] + ldr r8, [r2, #6*4] @ b[6] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[7] * b[6] + ldr r7, [r1, #8*4] @ a[8] + umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[8] * b[6] + ldr r8, [r2, #5*4] @ b[5] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[8] * b[5] + ldr r7, [r1, #9*4] @ a[9] + umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[9] * b[5] + ldr r8, [r2, #4*4] @ b[4] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[9] * b[4] + + bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u3 = d & M + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u3 * R0 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t3 = c & M + str r14, [sp, #4 + 3*4] + mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 + orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 + mov r4, r4, lsr #26 + mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u3 * R1 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + /* F */ + adds r3, r3, r11 @ c += c' + adc r4, r4, r12 + adds r5, r5, r9 @ d += d' + adc r6, r6, r10 + + bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u4 = d & M + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u4 * R0 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t4 = c & M + str r14, [sp, #4 + 4*4] + mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 + orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 + mov r4, r4, lsr #26 + mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u4 * R1 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + /* G - interleaved with H */ + ldr r7, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0] + ldr r8, [r2, #6*4] @ b[6] + ldr r14, [r2, #5*4] @ b[5] + umull r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' = a[0] * b[6] + ldr r0, [r1, #1*4] @ a[1] + umlal r3, r4, r7, r14 @ c += a[0] * b[5] + ldr r8, [r2, #4*4] @ b[4] + umlal r11, r12, r0, r14 @ c' += a[1] * b[5] + ldr r7, [r1, #2*4] @ a[2] + umlal r3, r4, r0, r8 @ c += a[1] * b[4] + ldr r14, [r2, #3*4] @ b[3] + umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[2] * b[4] + ldr r0, [r1, #3*4] @ a[3] + umlal r3, r4, r7, r14 @ c += a[2] * b[3] + ldr r8, [r2, #2*4] @ b[2] + umlal r11, r12, r0, r14 @ c' += a[3] * b[3] + ldr r7, [r1, #4*4] @ a[4] + umlal r3, r4, r0, r8 @ c += a[3] * b[2] + ldr r14, [r2, #1*4] @ b[1] + umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[4] * b[2] + ldr r0, [r1, #5*4] @ a[5] + umlal r3, r4, r7, r14 @ c += a[4] * b[1] + ldr r8, [r2, #0*4] @ b[0] + umlal r11, r12, r0, r14 @ c' += a[5] * b[1] + ldr r7, [r1, #6*4] @ a[6] + umlal r3, r4, r0, r8 @ c += a[5] * b[0] + ldr r14, [r2, #9*4] @ b[9] + umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[6] * b[0] + ldr r0, [r1, #7*4] @ a[7] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[6] * b[9] + ldr r8, [r2, #8*4] @ b[8] + umull r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' = a[7] * b[9] + ldr r7, [r1, #8*4] @ a[8] + umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[7] * b[8] + ldr r14, [r2, #7*4] @ b[7] + umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[8] * b[8] + ldr r0, [r1, #9*4] @ a[9] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[8] * b[7] + ldr r8, [r2, #6*4] @ b[6] + umlal r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' += a[9] * b[7] + umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[9] * b[6] + + bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u5 = d & M + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u5 * R0 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t5 = c & M + str r14, [sp, #4 + 5*4] + mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 + orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 + mov r4, r4, lsr #26 + mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u5 * R1 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + /* H */ + adds r3, r3, r11 @ c += c' + adc r4, r4, r12 + adds r5, r5, r9 @ d += d' + adc r6, r6, r10 + + bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u6 = d & M + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u6 * R0 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t6 = c & M + str r14, [sp, #4 + 6*4] + mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 + orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 + mov r4, r4, lsr #26 + mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u6 * R1 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + /* I - interleaved with J */ + ldr r8, [r2, #8*4] @ b[8] + ldr r7, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0] + ldr r14, [r2, #7*4] @ b[7] + umull r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' = a[0] * b[8] + ldr r0, [r1, #1*4] @ a[1] + umlal r3, r4, r7, r14 @ c += a[0] * b[7] + ldr r8, [r2, #6*4] @ b[6] + umlal r11, r12, r0, r14 @ c' += a[1] * b[7] + ldr r7, [r1, #2*4] @ a[2] + umlal r3, r4, r0, r8 @ c += a[1] * b[6] + ldr r14, [r2, #5*4] @ b[5] + umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[2] * b[6] + ldr r0, [r1, #3*4] @ a[3] + umlal r3, r4, r7, r14 @ c += a[2] * b[5] + ldr r8, [r2, #4*4] @ b[4] + umlal r11, r12, r0, r14 @ c' += a[3] * b[5] + ldr r7, [r1, #4*4] @ a[4] + umlal r3, r4, r0, r8 @ c += a[3] * b[4] + ldr r14, [r2, #3*4] @ b[3] + umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[4] * b[4] + ldr r0, [r1, #5*4] @ a[5] + umlal r3, r4, r7, r14 @ c += a[4] * b[3] + ldr r8, [r2, #2*4] @ b[2] + umlal r11, r12, r0, r14 @ c' += a[5] * b[3] + ldr r7, [r1, #6*4] @ a[6] + umlal r3, r4, r0, r8 @ c += a[5] * b[2] + ldr r14, [r2, #1*4] @ b[1] + umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[6] * b[2] + ldr r0, [r1, #7*4] @ a[7] + umlal r3, r4, r7, r14 @ c += a[6] * b[1] + ldr r8, [r2, #0*4] @ b[0] + umlal r11, r12, r0, r14 @ c' += a[7] * b[1] + ldr r7, [r1, #8*4] @ a[8] + umlal r3, r4, r0, r8 @ c += a[7] * b[0] + ldr r14, [r2, #9*4] @ b[9] + umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[8] * b[0] + ldr r0, [r1, #9*4] @ a[9] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[8] * b[9] + ldr r8, [r2, #8*4] @ b[8] + umull r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' = a[9] * b[9] + umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[9] * b[8] + + bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u7 = d & M + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u7 * R0 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t7 = c & M + str r14, [sp, #4 + 7*4] + mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 + orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 + mov r4, r4, lsr #26 + mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u7 * R1 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + /* J */ + adds r3, r3, r11 @ c += c' + adc r4, r4, r12 + adds r5, r5, r9 @ d += d' + adc r6, r6, r10 + + bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u8 = d & M + str r0, [sp, #4 + 8*4] + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u8 * R0 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + /****************************************** + * compute and write back result + ****************************************** + Allocation: + r0 r + r3:r4 c + r5:r6 d + r7 t0 + r8 t1 + r9 t2 + r11 u8 + r12 t9 + r1,r2,r10,r14 scratch + + Note: do not read from a[] after here, it may overlap with r[] + */ + ldr r0, [sp, #0] + add r1, sp, #4 + 3*4 @ r[3..7] = t3..7, r11=u8, r12=t9 + ldmia r1, {r2,r7,r8,r9,r10,r11,r12} + add r1, r0, #3*4 + stmia r1, {r2,r7,r8,r9,r10} + + bic r2, r3, field_not_M @ r[8] = c & M + str r2, [r0, #8*4] + mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 + orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 + mov r4, r4, lsr #26 + mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u8 * R1 + umlal r3, r4, r11, r14 + movw r14, field_R0 @ c += d * R0 + umlal r3, r4, r5, r14 + adds r3, r3, r12 @ c += t9 + adc r4, r4, #0 + + add r1, sp, #4 + 0*4 @ r7,r8,r9 = t0,t1,t2 + ldmia r1, {r7,r8,r9} + + ubfx r2, r3, #0, #22 @ r[9] = c & (M >> 4) + str r2, [r0, #9*4] + mov r3, r3, lsr #22 @ c >>= 22 + orr r3, r3, r4, asl #10 + mov r4, r4, lsr #22 + movw r14, field_R1 << 4 @ c += d * (R1 << 4) + umlal r3, r4, r5, r14 + + movw r14, field_R0 >> 4 @ d = c * (R0 >> 4) + t0 (64x64 multiply+add) + umull r5, r6, r3, r14 @ d = c.lo * (R0 >> 4) + adds r5, r5, r7 @ d.lo += t0 + mla r6, r14, r4, r6 @ d.hi += c.hi * (R0 >> 4) + adc r6, r6, 0 @ d.hi += carry + + bic r2, r5, field_not_M @ r[0] = d & M + str r2, [r0, #0*4] + + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + + movw r14, field_R1 >> 4 @ d += c * (R1 >> 4) + t1 (64x64 multiply+add) + umull r1, r2, r3, r14 @ tmp = c.lo * (R1 >> 4) + adds r5, r5, r8 @ d.lo += t1 + adc r6, r6, #0 @ d.hi += carry + adds r5, r5, r1 @ d.lo += tmp.lo + mla r2, r14, r4, r2 @ tmp.hi += c.hi * (R1 >> 4) + adc r6, r6, r2 @ d.hi += carry + tmp.hi + + bic r2, r5, field_not_M @ r[1] = d & M + str r2, [r0, #1*4] + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 (ignore hi) + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + + add r5, r5, r9 @ d += t2 + str r5, [r0, #2*4] @ r[2] = d + + add sp, sp, #48 + ldmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10, r11, pc} + .size secp256k1_fe_mul_inner, .-secp256k1_fe_mul_inner + + .align 2 + .global secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner + .type secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner, %function + @ Arguments: + @ r0 r Can overlap with a + @ r1 a + @ Stack (total 4+10*4 = 44) + @ sp + #0 saved 'r' pointer + @ sp + #4 + 4*X t0,t1,t2,t3,t4,t5,t6,t7,u8,t9 +secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner: + stmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10, r11, r14} + sub sp, sp, #48 @ frame=44 + alignment + str r0, [sp, #0] @ save result address, we need it only at the end + /****************************************** + * Main computation code. + ****************************************** + + Allocation: + r0,r14,r2,r7,r8 scratch + r1 a (pointer) + r3:r4 c + r5:r6 d + r11:r12 c' + r9:r10 d' + + Note: do not write to r[] here, it may overlap with a[] + */ + /* A interleaved with B */ + ldr r0, [r1, #1*4] @ a[1]*2 + ldr r7, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0] + mov r0, r0, asl #1 + ldr r14, [r1, #9*4] @ a[9] + umull r3, r4, r7, r7 @ c = a[0] * a[0] + ldr r8, [r1, #8*4] @ a[8] + mov r7, r7, asl #1 + umull r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d = a[0]*2 * a[9] + ldr r7, [r1, #2*4] @ a[2]*2 + umull r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' = a[1]*2 * a[9] + ldr r14, [r1, #7*4] @ a[7] + umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[1]*2 * a[8] + mov r7, r7, asl #1 + ldr r0, [r1, #3*4] @ a[3]*2 + umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[2]*2 * a[8] + ldr r8, [r1, #6*4] @ a[6] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[2]*2 * a[7] + mov r0, r0, asl #1 + ldr r7, [r1, #4*4] @ a[4]*2 + umlal r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' += a[3]*2 * a[7] + ldr r14, [r1, #5*4] @ a[5] + mov r7, r7, asl #1 + umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[3]*2 * a[6] + umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[4]*2 * a[6] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[4]*2 * a[5] + umlal r9, r10, r14, r14 @ d' += a[5] * a[5] + + bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ t9 = d & M + str r0, [sp, #4 + 9*4] + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + + /* B */ + adds r5, r5, r9 @ d += d' + adc r6, r6, r10 + + bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u0 = d & M + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u0 * R0 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t0 = c & M + str r14, [sp, #4 + 0*4] + mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 + orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 + mov r4, r4, lsr #26 + mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u0 * R1 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + /* C interleaved with D */ + ldr r0, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0]*2 + ldr r14, [r1, #1*4] @ a[1] + mov r0, r0, asl #1 + ldr r8, [r1, #2*4] @ a[2] + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 @ c += a[0]*2 * a[1] + mov r7, r8, asl #1 @ a[2]*2 + umull r11, r12, r14, r14 @ c' = a[1] * a[1] + ldr r14, [r1, #9*4] @ a[9] + umlal r11, r12, r0, r8 @ c' += a[0]*2 * a[2] + ldr r0, [r1, #3*4] @ a[3]*2 + ldr r8, [r1, #8*4] @ a[8] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[2]*2 * a[9] + mov r0, r0, asl #1 + ldr r7, [r1, #4*4] @ a[4]*2 + umull r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' = a[3]*2 * a[9] + ldr r14, [r1, #7*4] @ a[7] + umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[3]*2 * a[8] + mov r7, r7, asl #1 + ldr r0, [r1, #5*4] @ a[5]*2 + umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[4]*2 * a[8] + ldr r8, [r1, #6*4] @ a[6] + mov r0, r0, asl #1 + umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[4]*2 * a[7] + umlal r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' += a[5]*2 * a[7] + umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[5]*2 * a[6] + umlal r9, r10, r8, r8 @ d' += a[6] * a[6] + + bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u1 = d & M + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u1 * R0 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t1 = c & M + str r14, [sp, #4 + 1*4] + mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 + orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 + mov r4, r4, lsr #26 + mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u1 * R1 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + /* D */ + adds r3, r3, r11 @ c += c' + adc r4, r4, r12 + adds r5, r5, r9 @ d += d' + adc r6, r6, r10 + + bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u2 = d & M + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u2 * R0 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t2 = c & M + str r14, [sp, #4 + 2*4] + mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 + orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 + mov r4, r4, lsr #26 + mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u2 * R1 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + /* E interleaved with F */ + ldr r7, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0]*2 + ldr r0, [r1, #1*4] @ a[1]*2 + ldr r14, [r1, #2*4] @ a[2] + mov r7, r7, asl #1 + ldr r8, [r1, #3*4] @ a[3] + ldr r2, [r1, #4*4] + umlal r3, r4, r7, r8 @ c += a[0]*2 * a[3] + mov r0, r0, asl #1 + umull r11, r12, r7, r2 @ c' = a[0]*2 * a[4] + mov r2, r2, asl #1 @ a[4]*2 + umlal r11, r12, r0, r8 @ c' += a[1]*2 * a[3] + ldr r8, [r1, #9*4] @ a[9] + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 @ c += a[1]*2 * a[2] + ldr r0, [r1, #5*4] @ a[5]*2 + umlal r11, r12, r14, r14 @ c' += a[2] * a[2] + ldr r14, [r1, #8*4] @ a[8] + mov r0, r0, asl #1 + umlal r5, r6, r2, r8 @ d += a[4]*2 * a[9] + ldr r7, [r1, #6*4] @ a[6]*2 + umull r9, r10, r0, r8 @ d' = a[5]*2 * a[9] + mov r7, r7, asl #1 + ldr r8, [r1, #7*4] @ a[7] + umlal r5, r6, r0, r14 @ d += a[5]*2 * a[8] + umlal r9, r10, r7, r14 @ d' += a[6]*2 * a[8] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[6]*2 * a[7] + umlal r9, r10, r8, r8 @ d' += a[7] * a[7] + + bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u3 = d & M + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u3 * R0 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t3 = c & M + str r14, [sp, #4 + 3*4] + mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 + orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 + mov r4, r4, lsr #26 + mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u3 * R1 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + /* F */ + adds r3, r3, r11 @ c += c' + adc r4, r4, r12 + adds r5, r5, r9 @ d += d' + adc r6, r6, r10 + + bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u4 = d & M + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u4 * R0 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t4 = c & M + str r14, [sp, #4 + 4*4] + mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 + orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 + mov r4, r4, lsr #26 + mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u4 * R1 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + /* G interleaved with H */ + ldr r7, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0]*2 + ldr r0, [r1, #1*4] @ a[1]*2 + mov r7, r7, asl #1 + ldr r8, [r1, #5*4] @ a[5] + ldr r2, [r1, #6*4] @ a[6] + umlal r3, r4, r7, r8 @ c += a[0]*2 * a[5] + ldr r14, [r1, #4*4] @ a[4] + mov r0, r0, asl #1 + umull r11, r12, r7, r2 @ c' = a[0]*2 * a[6] + ldr r7, [r1, #2*4] @ a[2]*2 + umlal r11, r12, r0, r8 @ c' += a[1]*2 * a[5] + mov r7, r7, asl #1 + ldr r8, [r1, #3*4] @ a[3] + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 @ c += a[1]*2 * a[4] + mov r0, r2, asl #1 @ a[6]*2 + umlal r11, r12, r7, r14 @ c' += a[2]*2 * a[4] + ldr r14, [r1, #9*4] @ a[9] + umlal r3, r4, r7, r8 @ c += a[2]*2 * a[3] + ldr r7, [r1, #7*4] @ a[7]*2 + umlal r11, r12, r8, r8 @ c' += a[3] * a[3] + mov r7, r7, asl #1 + ldr r8, [r1, #8*4] @ a[8] + umlal r5, r6, r0, r14 @ d += a[6]*2 * a[9] + umull r9, r10, r7, r14 @ d' = a[7]*2 * a[9] + umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[7]*2 * a[8] + umlal r9, r10, r8, r8 @ d' += a[8] * a[8] + + bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u5 = d & M + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u5 * R0 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t5 = c & M + str r14, [sp, #4 + 5*4] + mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 + orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 + mov r4, r4, lsr #26 + mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u5 * R1 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + /* H */ + adds r3, r3, r11 @ c += c' + adc r4, r4, r12 + adds r5, r5, r9 @ d += d' + adc r6, r6, r10 + + bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u6 = d & M + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u6 * R0 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t6 = c & M + str r14, [sp, #4 + 6*4] + mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 + orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 + mov r4, r4, lsr #26 + mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u6 * R1 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + /* I interleaved with J */ + ldr r7, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0]*2 + ldr r0, [r1, #1*4] @ a[1]*2 + mov r7, r7, asl #1 + ldr r8, [r1, #7*4] @ a[7] + ldr r2, [r1, #8*4] @ a[8] + umlal r3, r4, r7, r8 @ c += a[0]*2 * a[7] + ldr r14, [r1, #6*4] @ a[6] + mov r0, r0, asl #1 + umull r11, r12, r7, r2 @ c' = a[0]*2 * a[8] + ldr r7, [r1, #2*4] @ a[2]*2 + umlal r11, r12, r0, r8 @ c' += a[1]*2 * a[7] + ldr r8, [r1, #5*4] @ a[5] + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 @ c += a[1]*2 * a[6] + ldr r0, [r1, #3*4] @ a[3]*2 + mov r7, r7, asl #1 + umlal r11, r12, r7, r14 @ c' += a[2]*2 * a[6] + ldr r14, [r1, #4*4] @ a[4] + mov r0, r0, asl #1 + umlal r3, r4, r7, r8 @ c += a[2]*2 * a[5] + mov r2, r2, asl #1 @ a[8]*2 + umlal r11, r12, r0, r8 @ c' += a[3]*2 * a[5] + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 @ c += a[3]*2 * a[4] + umlal r11, r12, r14, r14 @ c' += a[4] * a[4] + ldr r8, [r1, #9*4] @ a[9] + umlal r5, r6, r2, r8 @ d += a[8]*2 * a[9] + @ r8 will be used in J + + bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u7 = d & M + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u7 * R0 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t7 = c & M + str r14, [sp, #4 + 7*4] + mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 + orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 + mov r4, r4, lsr #26 + mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u7 * R1 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + /* J */ + adds r3, r3, r11 @ c += c' + adc r4, r4, r12 + umlal r5, r6, r8, r8 @ d += a[9] * a[9] + + bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u8 = d & M + str r0, [sp, #4 + 8*4] + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u8 * R0 + umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 + + /****************************************** + * compute and write back result + ****************************************** + Allocation: + r0 r + r3:r4 c + r5:r6 d + r7 t0 + r8 t1 + r9 t2 + r11 u8 + r12 t9 + r1,r2,r10,r14 scratch + + Note: do not read from a[] after here, it may overlap with r[] + */ + ldr r0, [sp, #0] + add r1, sp, #4 + 3*4 @ r[3..7] = t3..7, r11=u8, r12=t9 + ldmia r1, {r2,r7,r8,r9,r10,r11,r12} + add r1, r0, #3*4 + stmia r1, {r2,r7,r8,r9,r10} + + bic r2, r3, field_not_M @ r[8] = c & M + str r2, [r0, #8*4] + mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 + orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 + mov r4, r4, lsr #26 + mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u8 * R1 + umlal r3, r4, r11, r14 + movw r14, field_R0 @ c += d * R0 + umlal r3, r4, r5, r14 + adds r3, r3, r12 @ c += t9 + adc r4, r4, #0 + + add r1, sp, #4 + 0*4 @ r7,r8,r9 = t0,t1,t2 + ldmia r1, {r7,r8,r9} + + ubfx r2, r3, #0, #22 @ r[9] = c & (M >> 4) + str r2, [r0, #9*4] + mov r3, r3, lsr #22 @ c >>= 22 + orr r3, r3, r4, asl #10 + mov r4, r4, lsr #22 + movw r14, field_R1 << 4 @ c += d * (R1 << 4) + umlal r3, r4, r5, r14 + + movw r14, field_R0 >> 4 @ d = c * (R0 >> 4) + t0 (64x64 multiply+add) + umull r5, r6, r3, r14 @ d = c.lo * (R0 >> 4) + adds r5, r5, r7 @ d.lo += t0 + mla r6, r14, r4, r6 @ d.hi += c.hi * (R0 >> 4) + adc r6, r6, 0 @ d.hi += carry + + bic r2, r5, field_not_M @ r[0] = d & M + str r2, [r0, #0*4] + + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + mov r6, r6, lsr #26 + + movw r14, field_R1 >> 4 @ d += c * (R1 >> 4) + t1 (64x64 multiply+add) + umull r1, r2, r3, r14 @ tmp = c.lo * (R1 >> 4) + adds r5, r5, r8 @ d.lo += t1 + adc r6, r6, #0 @ d.hi += carry + adds r5, r5, r1 @ d.lo += tmp.lo + mla r2, r14, r4, r2 @ tmp.hi += c.hi * (R1 >> 4) + adc r6, r6, r2 @ d.hi += carry + tmp.hi + + bic r2, r5, field_not_M @ r[1] = d & M + str r2, [r0, #1*4] + mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 (ignore hi) + orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 + + add r5, r5, r9 @ d += t2 + str r5, [r0, #2*4] @ r[2] = d + + add sp, sp, #48 + ldmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10, r11, pc} + .size secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner, .-secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner + diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/basic-config.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/basic-config.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fc58806 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/basic-config.h @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_BASIC_CONFIG_H +#define SECP256K1_BASIC_CONFIG_H + +#ifdef USE_BASIC_CONFIG + +#undef USE_ASM_X86_64 +#undef USE_ENDOMORPHISM +#undef USE_FIELD_10X26 +#undef USE_FIELD_5X52 +#undef USE_FIELD_INV_BUILTIN +#undef USE_FIELD_INV_NUM +#undef USE_NUM_GMP +#undef USE_NUM_NONE +#undef USE_SCALAR_4X64 +#undef USE_SCALAR_8X32 +#undef USE_SCALAR_INV_BUILTIN +#undef USE_SCALAR_INV_NUM + +#define USE_NUM_NONE 1 +#define USE_FIELD_INV_BUILTIN 1 +#define USE_SCALAR_INV_BUILTIN 1 +#define USE_FIELD_10X26 1 +#define USE_SCALAR_8X32 1 + +#endif /* USE_BASIC_CONFIG */ + +#endif /* SECP256K1_BASIC_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5b59783 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench.h @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_BENCH_H +#define SECP256K1_BENCH_H + +#include +#include +#include +#include "sys/time.h" + +static double gettimedouble(void) { + struct timeval tv; + gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); + return tv.tv_usec * 0.000001 + tv.tv_sec; +} + +void print_number(double x) { + double y = x; + int c = 0; + if (y < 0.0) { + y = -y; + } + while (y > 0 && y < 100.0) { + y *= 10.0; + c++; + } + printf("%.*f", c, x); +} + +void run_benchmark(char *name, void (*benchmark)(void*), void (*setup)(void*), void (*teardown)(void*), void* data, int count, int iter) { + int i; + double min = HUGE_VAL; + double sum = 0.0; + double max = 0.0; + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + double begin, total; + if (setup != NULL) { + setup(data); + } + begin = gettimedouble(); + benchmark(data); + total = gettimedouble() - begin; + if (teardown != NULL) { + teardown(data); + } + if (total < min) { + min = total; + } + if (total > max) { + max = total; + } + sum += total; + } + printf("%s: min ", name); + print_number(min * 1000000.0 / iter); + printf("us / avg "); + print_number((sum / count) * 1000000.0 / iter); + printf("us / max "); + print_number(max * 1000000.0 / iter); + printf("us\n"); +} + +int have_flag(int argc, char** argv, char *flag) { + char** argm = argv + argc; + argv++; + if (argv == argm) { + return 1; + } + while (argv != NULL && argv != argm) { + if (strcmp(*argv, flag) == 0) { + return 1; + } + argv++; + } + return 0; +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_BENCH_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_bulletproof.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_bulletproof.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..896bd09 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_bulletproof.c @@ -0,0 +1,243 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2017 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include "include/secp256k1_generator.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_commitment.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_bulletproofs.h" +#include "util.h" +#include "bench.h" + +#define MAX_PROOF_SIZE 2000 + +typedef struct { + secp256k1_context *ctx; + secp256k1_scratch_space *scratch; + unsigned char nonce[32]; + unsigned char **proof; + secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *generators; + secp256k1_generator *value_gen; + secp256k1_generator blind_gen; + size_t n_proofs; + size_t plen; + size_t iters; +} bench_bulletproof_t; + +typedef struct { + bench_bulletproof_t *common; + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment **commit; + const unsigned char **blind; + size_t *value; + size_t n_commits; + size_t nbits; +} bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t; + +static void bench_bulletproof_common_setup(bench_bulletproof_t *data) { + size_t i; + const unsigned char nonce[32] = "my kingdom for some randomness!!"; + const unsigned char genbd[32] = "yet more blinding, for the asset"; + + memcpy(data->nonce, nonce, 32); + data->proof = (unsigned char **)malloc(data->n_proofs * sizeof(*data->proof)); + data->value_gen = (secp256k1_generator *)malloc(data->n_proofs * sizeof(*data->value_gen)); + for (i = 0; i < data->n_proofs; i++) { + data->proof[i] = (unsigned char *)malloc(MAX_PROOF_SIZE); + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate(data->ctx, &data->value_gen[i], genbd)); + } + data->plen = MAX_PROOF_SIZE; +} + +static void bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup(void* arg) { + bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t *data = (bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t*)arg; + size_t i; + size_t v; + + unsigned char blind[32] = "and my kingdom too for a blinder"; + + bench_bulletproof_common_setup (data->common); + + data->commit = (secp256k1_pedersen_commitment **)malloc(data->common->n_proofs * sizeof(*data->commit)); + data->blind = (const unsigned char **)malloc(data->n_commits * sizeof(*data->blind)); + data->value = (size_t *)malloc(data->n_commits * sizeof(*data->commit)); + + for (i = 0; i < data->common->n_proofs; i++) { + data->commit[i] = (secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *)malloc(data->n_commits * sizeof(*data->commit[i])); + } + + for (i = 0; i < data->n_commits; i++) { + data->blind[i] = malloc(32); + blind[0] = i; + blind[1] = i >> 8; + memcpy((unsigned char*) data->blind[i], blind, 32); + data->value[i] = i * 17; + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(data->common->ctx, &data->commit[0][i], data->blind[i], data->value[i], &data->common->value_gen[0], &data->common->blind_gen)); + } + for (i = 1; i < data->common->n_proofs; i++) { + memcpy(data->commit[i], data->commit[0], data->n_commits * sizeof(*data->commit[0])); + } + + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(data->common->ctx, data->common->scratch, data->common->generators, data->common->proof[0], &data->common->plen, data->value, NULL, data->blind, data->n_commits, data->common->value_gen, data->nbits, data->common->nonce, NULL, 0) == 1); + for (i = 1; i < data->common->n_proofs; i++) { + memcpy(data->common->proof[i], data->common->proof[0], data->common->plen); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(data->common->ctx, data->common->scratch, data->common->generators, data->common->proof[i], data->common->plen, NULL, data->commit[i], data->n_commits, data->nbits, &data->common->value_gen[0], NULL, 0) == 1); + } + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(data->common->ctx, data->common->scratch, data->common->generators, data->common->proof[0], data->common->plen, NULL, data->commit[0], data->n_commits, data->nbits, data->common->value_gen, NULL, 0) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(data->common->ctx, data->common->scratch, data->common->generators, (const unsigned char **) data->common->proof, data->common->n_proofs, data->common->plen, NULL, (const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment **) data->commit, data->n_commits, data->nbits, data->common->value_gen, NULL, 0) == 1); + if (data->n_commits == 1) { + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(data->common->ctx, data->common->generators, &v, blind, data->common->proof[0], data->common->plen, 0, data->commit[0], &data->common->value_gen[0], data->common->nonce, NULL, 0) == 1); + } +} + +static void bench_bulletproof_common_teardown(bench_bulletproof_t *data) { + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < data->n_proofs; i++) { + free(data->proof[i]); + } + free(data->proof); + free(data->value_gen); +} + +static void bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown(void* arg) { + bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t *data = (bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t*)arg; + size_t i; + + if (data->blind != NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < data->n_commits; i++) { + free((unsigned char*) data->blind[i]); + } + } + if (data->commit != NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < data->common->n_proofs; i++) { + free(data->commit[i]); + } + free(data->commit); + } + free(data->blind); + free(data->value); + + bench_bulletproof_common_teardown(data->common); +} + +static void bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(void* arg) { + bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t *data = (bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t*)arg; + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < 25; i++) { + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(data->common->ctx, data->common->scratch, data->common->generators, data->common->proof[0], &data->common->plen, data->value, NULL, data->blind, data->n_commits, data->common->value_gen, data->nbits, data->common->nonce, NULL, 0) == 1); + } +} + +static void bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(void* arg) { + size_t i; + bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t *data = (bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < data->common->iters; i++) { + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(data->common->ctx, data->common->scratch, data->common->generators, (const unsigned char **) data->common->proof, data->common->n_proofs, data->common->plen, NULL, (const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment **) data->commit, data->n_commits, data->nbits, data->common->value_gen, NULL, 0) == 1); + } +} + +static void bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind_succeed(void* arg) { + size_t i; + size_t v; + unsigned char blind[32]; + bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t *data = (bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < data->common->iters; i++) { + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(data->common->ctx, data->common->generators, &v, blind, data->common->proof[0], data->common->plen, 0, data->commit[0], &data->common->value_gen[0], data->common->nonce, NULL, 0) == 1); + } +} + +static void bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind_fail(void* arg) { + size_t i; + size_t v; + unsigned char blind[32]; + bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t *data = (bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t*)arg; + + data->common->nonce[0] ^= 1; + for (i = 0; i < data->common->iters; i++) { + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(data->common->ctx, data->common->generators, &v, blind, data->common->proof[0], data->common->plen, 0, data->commit[0], &data->common->value_gen[0], data->common->nonce, NULL, 0) == 0); + } + data->common->nonce[0] ^= 1; +} + +static void run_rangeproof_test(bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t *data, size_t nbits, size_t n_commits) { + char str[64]; + + data->nbits = nbits; + data->n_commits = n_commits; + data->common->iters = 100; + + data->common->n_proofs = 1; + sprintf(str, "bulletproof_prove, %i, %i, 0, ", (int)nbits, (int) n_commits); + run_benchmark(str, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown, (void *)data, 5, 25); + + data->common->n_proofs = 1; + sprintf(str, "bulletproof_verify, %i, %i, 1, ", (int)nbits, (int) n_commits); + run_benchmark(str, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown, (void *)data, 5, data->common->iters); + + if (n_commits == 1) { + sprintf(str, "bulletproof_rewind_succeed, %i, ", (int)nbits); + run_benchmark(str, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind_succeed, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown, (void *)data, 5, data->common->iters); + sprintf(str, "bulletproof_rewind_fail, %i, ", (int)nbits); + run_benchmark(str, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind_fail, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown, (void *)data, 5, data->common->iters); + } + + data->common->n_proofs = 2; + sprintf(str, "bulletproof_verify, %i, %i, 2, ", (int)nbits, (int) n_commits); + run_benchmark(str, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown, (void *)data, 5, data->common->iters); + + data->common->iters = 10; + data->common->n_proofs = 50; + sprintf(str, "bulletproof_verify, %i, %i, 50, ", (int)nbits, (int) n_commits); + run_benchmark(str, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown, (void *)data, 5, data->common->iters); + + data->common->iters = 1; + data->common->n_proofs = 100; + sprintf(str, "bulletproof_verify, %i, %i, 100, ", (int)nbits, (int) n_commits); + run_benchmark(str, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown, (void *)data, 5, data->common->iters); + + data->common->n_proofs = 500; + sprintf(str, "bulletproof_verify, %i, %i, 500, ", (int)nbits, (int) n_commits); + run_benchmark(str, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown, (void *)data, 5, data->common->iters); + + data->common->n_proofs = 1000; + sprintf(str, "bulletproof_verify, %i, %i, 1000, ", (int)nbits, (int) n_commits); + run_benchmark(str, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown, (void *)data, 5, data->common->iters); +} + +/*int main(void) { + bench_bulletproof_t data; + bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t rp_data; + + data.blind_gen = secp256k1_generator_const_g; + data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + data.scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(data.ctx, 1024 * 1024 * 1024); + data.generators = secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_create(data.ctx, &data.blind_gen, 64 * 1024); + + rp_data.common = &data; + + run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 8, 1); + run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 16, 1); + run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 32, 1); + + run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 64, 1); + run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 64, 2); + run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 64, 4); + run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 64, 8); + run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 64, 16); + run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 64, 32); + run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 64, 64); + run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 64, 128); + run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 64, 256); + run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 64, 512); + // to add more, increase the number of generators above in `data.generators = ...` + + secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_destroy(data.ctx, data.generators); + secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy(data.scratch); + secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); + return 0; +}*/ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_ecdh.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_ecdh.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5837f4e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_ecdh.c @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2015 Pieter Wuille, Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_ecdh.h" +#include "util.h" +#include "bench.h" + +typedef struct { + secp256k1_context *ctx; + secp256k1_pubkey point; + unsigned char scalar[32]; +} bench_ecdh_data; + +static void bench_ecdh_setup(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_ecdh_data *data = (bench_ecdh_data*)arg; + const unsigned char point[] = { + 0x03, + 0x54, 0x94, 0xc1, 0x5d, 0x32, 0x09, 0x97, 0x06, + 0xc2, 0x39, 0x5f, 0x94, 0x34, 0x87, 0x45, 0xfd, + 0x75, 0x7c, 0xe3, 0x0e, 0x4e, 0x8c, 0x90, 0xfb, + 0xa2, 0xba, 0xd1, 0x84, 0xf8, 0x83, 0xc6, 0x9f + }; + + /* create a context with no capabilities */ + data->ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT); + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { + data->scalar[i] = i + 1; + } + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(data->ctx, &data->point, point, sizeof(point)) == 1); +} + +static void bench_ecdh(void* arg) { + int i; + unsigned char res[32]; + bench_ecdh_data *data = (bench_ecdh_data*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(data->ctx, res, &data->point, data->scalar) == 1); + } +} + +int main(void) { + bench_ecdh_data data; + + run_benchmark("ecdh", bench_ecdh, bench_ecdh_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + return 0; +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_ecmult.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_ecmult.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..52d0476 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_ecmult.c @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2017 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ +#include + +#include "include/secp256k1.h" + +#include "util.h" +#include "hash_impl.h" +#include "num_impl.h" +#include "field_impl.h" +#include "group_impl.h" +#include "scalar_impl.h" +#include "ecmult_impl.h" +#include "bench.h" +#include "secp256k1.c" + +#define POINTS 32768 +#define ITERS 10000 + +typedef struct { + /* Setup once in advance */ + secp256k1_context* ctx; + secp256k1_scratch_space* scratch; + secp256k1_scalar* scalars; + secp256k1_ge* pubkeys; + secp256k1_scalar* seckeys; + secp256k1_gej* expected_output; + secp256k1_ecmult_multi_func ecmult_multi; + + /* Changes per test */ + size_t count; + int includes_g; + + /* Changes per test iteration */ + size_t offset1; + size_t offset2; + + /* Test output. */ + secp256k1_gej* output; +} bench_data; + +static int bench_callback(secp256k1_scalar* sc, secp256k1_ge* ge, size_t idx, void* arg) { + bench_data* data = (bench_data*)arg; + if (data->includes_g) ++idx; + if (idx == 0) { + *sc = data->scalars[data->offset1]; + *ge = secp256k1_ge_const_g; + } else { + *sc = data->scalars[(data->offset1 + idx) % POINTS]; + *ge = data->pubkeys[(data->offset2 + idx - 1) % POINTS]; + } + return 1; +} + +static void bench_ecmult(void* arg) { + bench_data* data = (bench_data*)arg; + + size_t count = data->count; + int includes_g = data->includes_g; + size_t iters = 1 + ITERS / count; + size_t iter; + + for (iter = 0; iter < iters; ++iter) { + data->ecmult_multi(&data->ctx->ecmult_ctx, data->scratch, &data->output[iter], data->includes_g ? &data->scalars[data->offset1] : NULL, bench_callback, arg, count - includes_g); + data->offset1 = (data->offset1 + count) % POINTS; + data->offset2 = (data->offset2 + count - 1) % POINTS; + } +} + +static void bench_ecmult_setup(void* arg) { + bench_data* data = (bench_data*)arg; + data->offset1 = (data->count * 0x537b7f6f + 0x8f66a481) % POINTS; + data->offset2 = (data->count * 0x7f6f537b + 0x6a1a8f49) % POINTS; +} + +static void bench_ecmult_teardown(void* arg) { + bench_data* data = (bench_data*)arg; + size_t iters = 1 + ITERS / data->count; + size_t iter; + /* Verify the results in teardown, to avoid doing comparisons while benchmarking. */ + for (iter = 0; iter < iters; ++iter) { + secp256k1_gej tmp; + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&tmp, &data->output[iter], &data->expected_output[iter], NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&tmp)); + } +} + +static void generate_scalar(uint32_t num, secp256k1_scalar* scalar) { + secp256k1_sha256 sha256; + unsigned char c[11] = {'e', 'c', 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 0, 0, 0, 0}; + unsigned char buf[32]; + int overflow = 0; + c[6] = num; + c[7] = num >> 8; + c[8] = num >> 16; + c[9] = num >> 24; + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, c, sizeof(c)); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, buf); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(scalar, buf, &overflow); + CHECK(!overflow); +} + +static void run_test(bench_data* data, size_t count, int includes_g) { + char str[32]; + static const secp256k1_scalar zero = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + size_t iters = 1 + ITERS / count; + size_t iter; + + data->count = count; + data->includes_g = includes_g; + + /* Compute (the negation of) the expected results directly. */ + data->offset1 = (data->count * 0x537b7f6f + 0x8f66a481) % POINTS; + data->offset2 = (data->count * 0x7f6f537b + 0x6a1a8f49) % POINTS; + for (iter = 0; iter < iters; ++iter) { + secp256k1_scalar tmp; + secp256k1_scalar total = data->scalars[(data->offset1++) % POINTS]; + size_t i = 0; + for (i = 0; i + 1 < count; ++i) { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tmp, &data->seckeys[(data->offset2++) % POINTS], &data->scalars[(data->offset1++) % POINTS]); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&total, &total, &tmp); + } + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&total, &total); + secp256k1_ecmult(&data->ctx->ecmult_ctx, &data->expected_output[iter], NULL, &zero, &total); + } + + /* Run the benchmark. */ + sprintf(str, includes_g ? "ecmult_%ig" : "ecmult_%i", (int)count); + run_benchmark(str, bench_ecmult, bench_ecmult_setup, bench_ecmult_teardown, data, 10, count * (1 + ITERS / count)); +} + +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + bench_data data; + int i, p; + secp256k1_gej* pubkeys_gej; + size_t scratch_size; + + if (argc > 1) { + if(have_flag(argc, argv, "pippenger_wnaf")) { + printf("Using pippenger_wnaf:\n"); + data.ecmult_multi = secp256k1_ecmult_pippenger_batch_single; + } else if(have_flag(argc, argv, "strauss_wnaf")) { + printf("Using strauss_wnaf:\n"); + data.ecmult_multi = secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_batch_single; + } + } else { + data.ecmult_multi = secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var; + } + + /* Allocate stuff */ + data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + scratch_size = secp256k1_strauss_scratch_size(POINTS) + STRAUSS_SCRATCH_OBJECTS*16; + data.scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(data.ctx, scratch_size); + data.scalars = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) * POINTS); + data.seckeys = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) * POINTS); + data.pubkeys = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_ge) * POINTS); + data.expected_output = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_gej) * (ITERS + 1)); + data.output = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_gej) * (ITERS + 1)); + + /* Generate a set of scalars, and private/public keypairs. */ + pubkeys_gej = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_gej) * POINTS); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pubkeys_gej[0], &secp256k1_ge_const_g); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&data.seckeys[0], 1); + for (i = 0; i < POINTS; ++i) { + generate_scalar(i, &data.scalars[i]); + if (i) { + secp256k1_gej_double_var(&pubkeys_gej[i], &pubkeys_gej[i - 1], NULL); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&data.seckeys[i], &data.seckeys[i - 1], &data.seckeys[i - 1]); + } + } + secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(data.pubkeys, pubkeys_gej, POINTS, &data.ctx->error_callback); + free(pubkeys_gej); + + for (i = 1; i <= 8; ++i) { + run_test(&data, i, 1); + } + + for (p = 0; p <= 11; ++p) { + for (i = 9; i <= 16; ++i) { + run_test(&data, i << p, 1); + } + } + secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); + secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy(data.scratch); + free(data.scalars); + free(data.pubkeys); + free(data.seckeys); + free(data.output); + free(data.expected_output); + + return(0); +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_generator.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_generator.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7d7bb4d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_generator.c @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2016 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +#include "include/secp256k1_generator.h" +#include "util.h" +#include "bench.h" + +typedef struct { + secp256k1_context* ctx; + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char blind[32]; +} bench_generator_t; + +static void bench_generator_setup(void* arg) { + bench_generator_t *data = (bench_generator_t*)arg; + memset(data->key, 0x31, 32); + memset(data->blind, 0x13, 32); +} + +static void bench_generator_generate(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_generator_t *data = (bench_generator_t*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + secp256k1_generator gen; + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate(data->ctx, &gen, data->key)); + data->key[i & 31]++; + } +} + +static void bench_generator_generate_blinded(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_generator_t *data = (bench_generator_t*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + secp256k1_generator gen; + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(data->ctx, &gen, data->key, data->blind)); + data->key[1 + (i & 30)]++; + data->blind[1 + (i & 30)]++; + } +} + +int main(void) { + bench_generator_t data; + + data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + + run_benchmark("generator_generate", bench_generator_generate, bench_generator_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + run_benchmark("generator_generate_blinded", bench_generator_generate_blinded, bench_generator_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + + secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); + return 0; +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_internal.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_internal.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9c0a07f --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_internal.c @@ -0,0 +1,367 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ +#include + +#include "include/secp256k1.h" + +#include "util.h" +#include "hash_impl.h" +#include "num_impl.h" +#include "field_impl.h" +#include "group_impl.h" +#include "scalar_impl.h" +#include "ecmult_const_impl.h" +#include "ecmult_impl.h" +#include "bench.h" +#include "secp256k1.c" + +typedef struct { + secp256k1_scalar scalar_x, scalar_y; + secp256k1_fe fe_x, fe_y; + secp256k1_ge ge_x, ge_y; + secp256k1_gej gej_x, gej_y; + unsigned char data[64]; + int wnaf[256]; +} bench_inv; + +void bench_setup(void* arg) { + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + static const unsigned char init_x[32] = { + 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x07, 0x0b, 0x0d, 0x11, 0x13, + 0x17, 0x1d, 0x1f, 0x25, 0x29, 0x2b, 0x2f, 0x35, + 0x3b, 0x3d, 0x43, 0x47, 0x49, 0x4f, 0x53, 0x59, + 0x61, 0x65, 0x67, 0x6b, 0x6d, 0x71, 0x7f, 0x83 + }; + + static const unsigned char init_y[32] = { + 0x82, 0x83, 0x85, 0x87, 0x8b, 0x8d, 0x81, 0x83, + 0x97, 0xad, 0xaf, 0xb5, 0xb9, 0xbb, 0xbf, 0xc5, + 0xdb, 0xdd, 0xe3, 0xe7, 0xe9, 0xef, 0xf3, 0xf9, + 0x11, 0x15, 0x17, 0x1b, 0x1d, 0xb1, 0xbf, 0xd3 + }; + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&data->scalar_x, init_x, NULL); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&data->scalar_y, init_y, NULL); + secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&data->fe_x, init_x); + secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&data->fe_y, init_y); + CHECK(secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&data->ge_x, &data->fe_x, 0)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&data->ge_y, &data->fe_y, 1)); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&data->gej_x, &data->ge_x); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&data->gej_y, &data->ge_y); + memcpy(data->data, init_x, 32); + memcpy(data->data + 32, init_y, 32); +} + +void bench_scalar_add(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 2000000; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + } +} + +void bench_scalar_negate(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 2000000; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x); + } +} + +void bench_scalar_sqr(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x); + } +} + +void bench_scalar_mul(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + } +} + +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM +void bench_scalar_split(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar l, r; + secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(&l, &r, &data->scalar_x); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + } +} +#endif + +void bench_scalar_inverse(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 2000; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_inverse(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + } +} + +void bench_scalar_inverse_var(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 2000; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + } +} + +void bench_field_normalize(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 2000000; i++) { + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&data->fe_x); + } +} + +void bench_field_normalize_weak(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 2000000; i++) { + secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&data->fe_x); + } +} + +void bench_field_mul(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { + secp256k1_fe_mul(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_x, &data->fe_y); + } +} + +void bench_field_sqr(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_x); + } +} + +void bench_field_inverse(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + secp256k1_fe_inv(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_x); + secp256k1_fe_add(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_y); + } +} + +void bench_field_inverse_var(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_x); + secp256k1_fe_add(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_y); + } +} + +void bench_field_sqrt(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_x); + secp256k1_fe_add(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_y); + } +} + +void bench_group_double_var(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { + secp256k1_gej_double_var(&data->gej_x, &data->gej_x, NULL); + } +} + +void bench_group_add_var(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&data->gej_x, &data->gej_x, &data->gej_y, NULL); + } +} + +void bench_group_add_affine(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&data->gej_x, &data->gej_x, &data->ge_y); + } +} + +void bench_group_add_affine_var(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&data->gej_x, &data->gej_x, &data->ge_y, NULL); + } +} + +void bench_group_jacobi_var(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(&data->gej_x); + } +} + +void bench_ecmult_wnaf(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(data->wnaf, 256, &data->scalar_x, WINDOW_A); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + } +} + +void bench_wnaf_const(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + secp256k1_wnaf_const(data->wnaf, data->scalar_x, WINDOW_A, 256); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); + } +} + + +void bench_sha256(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + secp256k1_sha256 sha; + + for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, data->data, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, data->data); + } +} + +void bench_hmac_sha256(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + secp256k1_hmac_sha256 hmac; + + for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hmac, data->data, 32); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, data->data, 32); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hmac, data->data); + } +} + +void bench_rfc6979_hmac_sha256(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 rng; + + for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, data->data, 64); + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, data->data, 32); + } +} + +void bench_context_verify(void* arg) { + int i; + (void)arg; + for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { + secp256k1_context_destroy(secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY)); + } +} + +void bench_context_sign(void* arg) { + int i; + (void)arg; + for (i = 0; i < 200; i++) { + secp256k1_context_destroy(secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN)); + } +} + +#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE +void bench_num_jacobi(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; + secp256k1_num nx, norder; + + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&nx, &data->scalar_x); + secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(&norder); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&norder, &data->scalar_y); + + for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { + secp256k1_num_jacobi(&nx, &norder); + } +} +#endif + +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + bench_inv data; + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "add")) run_benchmark("scalar_add", bench_scalar_add, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 2000000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "negate")) run_benchmark("scalar_negate", bench_scalar_negate, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 2000000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "sqr")) run_benchmark("scalar_sqr", bench_scalar_sqr, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "mul")) run_benchmark("scalar_mul", bench_scalar_mul, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "split")) run_benchmark("scalar_split", bench_scalar_split, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); +#endif + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "inverse")) run_benchmark("scalar_inverse", bench_scalar_inverse, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 2000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "inverse")) run_benchmark("scalar_inverse_var", bench_scalar_inverse_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 2000); + + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "normalize")) run_benchmark("field_normalize", bench_field_normalize, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 2000000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "normalize")) run_benchmark("field_normalize_weak", bench_field_normalize_weak, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 2000000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "sqr")) run_benchmark("field_sqr", bench_field_sqr, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "mul")) run_benchmark("field_mul", bench_field_mul, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "inverse")) run_benchmark("field_inverse", bench_field_inverse, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "inverse")) run_benchmark("field_inverse_var", bench_field_inverse_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "sqrt")) run_benchmark("field_sqrt", bench_field_sqrt, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "double")) run_benchmark("group_double_var", bench_group_double_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "add")) run_benchmark("group_add_var", bench_group_add_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "add")) run_benchmark("group_add_affine", bench_group_add_affine, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "add")) run_benchmark("group_add_affine_var", bench_group_add_affine_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "jacobi")) run_benchmark("group_jacobi_var", bench_group_jacobi_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "ecmult") || have_flag(argc, argv, "wnaf")) run_benchmark("wnaf_const", bench_wnaf_const, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "ecmult") || have_flag(argc, argv, "wnaf")) run_benchmark("ecmult_wnaf", bench_ecmult_wnaf, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "hash") || have_flag(argc, argv, "sha256")) run_benchmark("hash_sha256", bench_sha256, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "hash") || have_flag(argc, argv, "hmac")) run_benchmark("hash_hmac_sha256", bench_hmac_sha256, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "hash") || have_flag(argc, argv, "rng6979")) run_benchmark("hash_rfc6979_hmac_sha256", bench_rfc6979_hmac_sha256, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "context") || have_flag(argc, argv, "verify")) run_benchmark("context_verify", bench_context_verify, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20); + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "context") || have_flag(argc, argv, "sign")) run_benchmark("context_sign", bench_context_sign, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200); + +#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE + if (have_flag(argc, argv, "num") || have_flag(argc, argv, "jacobi")) run_benchmark("num_jacobi", bench_num_jacobi, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); +#endif + return 0; +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_rangeproof.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_rangeproof.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..67a987c --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_rangeproof.c @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2014, 2015 Pieter Wuille, Gregory Maxwell * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#include + +#include "include/secp256k1_commitment.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h" +#include "util.h" +#include "bench.h" + +typedef struct { + secp256k1_context* ctx; + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment commit; + unsigned char proof[5134]; + unsigned char blind[32]; + size_t len; + int min_bits; + uint64_t v; +} bench_rangeproof_t; + +static void bench_rangeproof_setup(void* arg) { + int i; + uint64_t minv; + uint64_t maxv; + bench_rangeproof_t *data = (bench_rangeproof_t*)arg; + + data->v = 0; + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) data->blind[i] = i + 1; + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(data->ctx, &data->commit, data->blind, data->v, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g)); + data->len = 5134; + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(data->ctx, data->proof, &data->len, 0, &data->commit, data->blind, (const unsigned char*)&data->commit, 0, data->min_bits, data->v, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(data->ctx, &minv, &maxv, &data->commit, data->proof, data->len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); +} + +static void bench_rangeproof(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_rangeproof_t *data = (bench_rangeproof_t*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { + int j; + uint64_t minv; + uint64_t maxv; + j = secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(data->ctx, &minv, &maxv, &data->commit, data->proof, data->len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h); + for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { + data->proof[j + 2 + 32 *((data->min_bits + 1) >> 1) - 4] = (i >> 8)&255; + } + } +} + +int main(void) { + bench_rangeproof_t data; + + data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + + data.min_bits = 32; + + run_benchmark("rangeproof_verify_bit", bench_rangeproof, bench_rangeproof_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 1000 * data.min_bits); + + secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); + return 0; +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_recover.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_recover.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b806eed --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_recover.c @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_recovery.h" +#include "util.h" +#include "bench.h" + +typedef struct { + secp256k1_context *ctx; + unsigned char msg[32]; + unsigned char sig[64]; +} bench_recover_data; + +void bench_recover(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_recover_data *data = (bench_recover_data*)arg; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; + unsigned char pubkeyc[33]; + + for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + int j; + size_t pubkeylen = 33; + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature sig; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(data->ctx, &sig, data->sig, i % 2)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(data->ctx, &pubkey, &sig, data->msg)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(data->ctx, pubkeyc, &pubkeylen, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED)); + for (j = 0; j < 32; j++) { + data->sig[j + 32] = data->msg[j]; /* Move former message to S. */ + data->msg[j] = data->sig[j]; /* Move former R to message. */ + data->sig[j] = pubkeyc[j + 1]; /* Move recovered pubkey X coordinate to R (which must be a valid X coordinate). */ + } + } +} + +void bench_recover_setup(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_recover_data *data = (bench_recover_data*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { + data->msg[i] = 1 + i; + } + for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { + data->sig[i] = 65 + i; + } +} + +int main(void) { + bench_recover_data data; + + data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + + run_benchmark("ecdsa_recover", bench_recover, bench_recover_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + + secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); + return 0; +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_sign.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_sign.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..544b439 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_sign.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "util.h" +#include "bench.h" + +typedef struct { + secp256k1_context* ctx; + unsigned char msg[32]; + unsigned char key[32]; +} bench_sign; + +static void bench_sign_setup(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_sign *data = (bench_sign*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { + data->msg[i] = i + 1; + } + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { + data->key[i] = i + 65; + } +} + +static void bench_sign_run(void* arg) { + int i; + bench_sign *data = (bench_sign*)arg; + + unsigned char sig[74]; + for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + size_t siglen = 74; + int j; + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature signature; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(data->ctx, &signature, data->msg, data->key, NULL, NULL)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(data->ctx, sig, &siglen, &signature)); + for (j = 0; j < 32; j++) { + data->msg[j] = sig[j]; + data->key[j] = sig[j + 32]; + } + } +} + +int main(void) { + bench_sign data; + + data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); + + run_benchmark("ecdsa_sign", bench_sign_run, bench_sign_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + + secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); + return 0; +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_verify.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_verify.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..418defa --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_verify.c @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#include +#include + +#include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "util.h" +#include "bench.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS +#include +#include +#include +#endif + +typedef struct { + secp256k1_context *ctx; + unsigned char msg[32]; + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char sig[72]; + size_t siglen; + unsigned char pubkey[33]; + size_t pubkeylen; +#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS + EC_GROUP* ec_group; +#endif +} benchmark_verify_t; + +static void benchmark_verify(void* arg) { + int i; + benchmark_verify_t* data = (benchmark_verify_t*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; + data->sig[data->siglen - 1] ^= (i & 0xFF); + data->sig[data->siglen - 2] ^= ((i >> 8) & 0xFF); + data->sig[data->siglen - 3] ^= ((i >> 16) & 0xFF); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(data->ctx, &pubkey, data->pubkey, data->pubkeylen) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(data->ctx, &sig, data->sig, data->siglen) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(data->ctx, &sig, data->msg, &pubkey) == (i == 0)); + data->sig[data->siglen - 1] ^= (i & 0xFF); + data->sig[data->siglen - 2] ^= ((i >> 8) & 0xFF); + data->sig[data->siglen - 3] ^= ((i >> 16) & 0xFF); + } +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS +static void benchmark_verify_openssl(void* arg) { + int i; + benchmark_verify_t* data = (benchmark_verify_t*)arg; + + for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { + data->sig[data->siglen - 1] ^= (i & 0xFF); + data->sig[data->siglen - 2] ^= ((i >> 8) & 0xFF); + data->sig[data->siglen - 3] ^= ((i >> 16) & 0xFF); + { + EC_KEY *pkey = EC_KEY_new(); + const unsigned char *pubkey = &data->pubkey[0]; + int result; + + CHECK(pkey != NULL); + result = EC_KEY_set_group(pkey, data->ec_group); + CHECK(result); + result = (o2i_ECPublicKey(&pkey, &pubkey, data->pubkeylen)) != NULL; + CHECK(result); + result = ECDSA_verify(0, &data->msg[0], sizeof(data->msg), &data->sig[0], data->siglen, pkey) == (i == 0); + CHECK(result); + EC_KEY_free(pkey); + } + data->sig[data->siglen - 1] ^= (i & 0xFF); + data->sig[data->siglen - 2] ^= ((i >> 8) & 0xFF); + data->sig[data->siglen - 3] ^= ((i >> 16) & 0xFF); + } +} +#endif + +int main(void) { + int i; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; + benchmark_verify_t data; + + data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { + data.msg[i] = 1 + i; + } + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { + data.key[i] = 33 + i; + } + data.siglen = 72; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(data.ctx, &sig, data.msg, data.key, NULL, NULL)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(data.ctx, data.sig, &data.siglen, &sig)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(data.ctx, &pubkey, data.key)); + data.pubkeylen = 33; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(data.ctx, data.pubkey, &data.pubkeylen, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); + + run_benchmark("ecdsa_verify", benchmark_verify, NULL, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); +#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS + data.ec_group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp256k1); + run_benchmark("ecdsa_verify_openssl", benchmark_verify_openssl, NULL, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); + EC_GROUP_free(data.ec_group); +#endif + + secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); + return 0; +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_whitelist.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_whitelist.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d011e92 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_whitelist.c @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2017 Jonas Nick * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ +#include + +#include "include/secp256k1.h" + +#include "include/secp256k1_whitelist.h" +#include "bench.h" +#include "util.h" +#include "hash_impl.h" +#include "num_impl.h" +#include "scalar_impl.h" +#include "testrand_impl.h" + +#define MAX_N_KEYS 30 + +typedef struct { + secp256k1_context* ctx; + unsigned char online_seckey[MAX_N_KEYS][32]; + unsigned char summed_seckey[MAX_N_KEYS][32]; + secp256k1_pubkey online_pubkeys[MAX_N_KEYS]; + secp256k1_pubkey offline_pubkeys[MAX_N_KEYS]; + unsigned char csub[32]; + secp256k1_pubkey sub_pubkey; + secp256k1_whitelist_signature sig; + size_t n_keys; +} bench_data; + +static void bench_whitelist(void* arg) { + bench_data* data = (bench_data*)arg; + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_verify(data->ctx, &data->sig, data->online_pubkeys, data->offline_pubkeys, data->n_keys, &data->sub_pubkey) == 1); +} + +static void bench_whitelist_setup(void* arg) { + bench_data* data = (bench_data*)arg; + int i = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_sign(data->ctx, &data->sig, data->online_pubkeys, data->offline_pubkeys, data->n_keys, &data->sub_pubkey, data->online_seckey[i], data->summed_seckey[i], i, NULL, NULL)); +} + +static void run_test(bench_data* data) { + char str[32]; + sprintf(str, "whitelist_%i", (int)data->n_keys); + run_benchmark(str, bench_whitelist, bench_whitelist_setup, NULL, data, 100, 1); +} + +void random_scalar_order(secp256k1_scalar *num) { + do { + unsigned char b32[32]; + int overflow = 0; + secp256k1_rand256(b32); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(num, b32, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(num)) { + continue; + } + break; + } while(1); +} + +int main(void) { + bench_data data; + size_t i; + size_t n_keys = 30; + secp256k1_scalar ssub; + + data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + + /* Start with subkey */ + random_scalar_order(&ssub); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(data.csub, &ssub); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(data.ctx, data.csub) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(data.ctx, &data.sub_pubkey, data.csub) == 1); + /* Then offline and online whitelist keys */ + for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar son, soff; + + /* Create two keys */ + random_scalar_order(&son); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(data.online_seckey[i], &son); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(data.ctx, data.online_seckey[i]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(data.ctx, &data.online_pubkeys[i], data.online_seckey[i]) == 1); + + random_scalar_order(&soff); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(data.summed_seckey[i], &soff); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(data.ctx, data.summed_seckey[i]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(data.ctx, &data.offline_pubkeys[i], data.summed_seckey[i]) == 1); + + /* Make summed_seckey correspond to the sum of offline_pubkey and sub_pubkey */ + secp256k1_scalar_add(&soff, &soff, &ssub); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(data.summed_seckey[i], &soff); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(data.ctx, data.summed_seckey[i]) == 1); + } + + /* Run test */ + for (i = 1; i <= n_keys; ++i) { + data.n_keys = i; + run_test(&data); + } + + secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); + return(0); +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecdsa.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecdsa.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..80590c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecdsa.h @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_ECDSA_H +#define SECP256K1_ECDSA_H + +#include + +#include "scalar.h" +#include "group.h" +#include "ecmult.h" + +static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_parse(secp256k1_scalar *r, secp256k1_scalar *s, const unsigned char *sig, size_t size); +static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_serialize(unsigned char *sig, size_t *size, const secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *s); +static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, const secp256k1_scalar* r, const secp256k1_scalar* s, const secp256k1_ge *pubkey, const secp256k1_scalar *message); +static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, secp256k1_scalar* r, secp256k1_scalar* s, const secp256k1_scalar *seckey, const secp256k1_scalar *message, const secp256k1_scalar *nonce, int *recid); + +#endif /* SECP256K1_ECDSA_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecdsa_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecdsa_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c340004 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecdsa_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,313 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013-2015 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + + +#ifndef SECP256K1_ECDSA_IMPL_H +#define SECP256K1_ECDSA_IMPL_H + +#include "scalar.h" +#include "field.h" +#include "group.h" +#include "ecmult.h" +#include "ecmult_gen.h" +#include "ecdsa.h" + +/** Group order for secp256k1 defined as 'n' in "Standards for Efficient Cryptography" (SEC2) 2.7.1 + * sage: for t in xrange(1023, -1, -1): + * .. p = 2**256 - 2**32 - t + * .. if p.is_prime(): + * .. print '%x'%p + * .. break + * 'fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffefffffc2f' + * sage: a = 0 + * sage: b = 7 + * sage: F = FiniteField (p) + * sage: '%x' % (EllipticCurve ([F (a), F (b)]).order()) + * 'fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffebaaedce6af48a03bbfd25e8cd0364141' + */ +static const secp256k1_fe secp256k1_ecdsa_const_order_as_fe = SECP256K1_FE_CONST( + 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFEUL, + 0xBAAEDCE6UL, 0xAF48A03BUL, 0xBFD25E8CUL, 0xD0364141UL +); + +/** Difference between field and order, values 'p' and 'n' values defined in + * "Standards for Efficient Cryptography" (SEC2) 2.7.1. + * sage: p = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFC2F + * sage: a = 0 + * sage: b = 7 + * sage: F = FiniteField (p) + * sage: '%x' % (p - EllipticCurve ([F (a), F (b)]).order()) + * '14551231950b75fc4402da1722fc9baee' + */ +static const secp256k1_fe secp256k1_ecdsa_const_p_minus_order = SECP256K1_FE_CONST( + 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x45512319UL, 0x50B75FC4UL, 0x402DA172UL, 0x2FC9BAEEUL +); + +static int secp256k1_der_read_len(const unsigned char **sigp, const unsigned char *sigend) { + int lenleft, b1; + size_t ret = 0; + if (*sigp >= sigend) { + return -1; + } + b1 = *((*sigp)++); + if (b1 == 0xFF) { + /* X.690-0207 8.1.3.5.c the value 0xFF shall not be used. */ + return -1; + } + if ((b1 & 0x80) == 0) { + /* X.690-0207 8.1.3.4 short form length octets */ + return b1; + } + if (b1 == 0x80) { + /* Indefinite length is not allowed in DER. */ + return -1; + } + /* X.690-207 8.1.3.5 long form length octets */ + lenleft = b1 & 0x7F; + if (lenleft > sigend - *sigp) { + return -1; + } + if (**sigp == 0) { + /* Not the shortest possible length encoding. */ + return -1; + } + if ((size_t)lenleft > sizeof(size_t)) { + /* The resulting length would exceed the range of a size_t, so + * certainly longer than the passed array size. + */ + return -1; + } + while (lenleft > 0) { + ret = (ret << 8) | **sigp; + if (ret + lenleft > (size_t)(sigend - *sigp)) { + /* Result exceeds the length of the passed array. */ + return -1; + } + (*sigp)++; + lenleft--; + } + if (ret < 128) { + /* Not the shortest possible length encoding. */ + return -1; + } + return ret; +} + +static int secp256k1_der_parse_integer(secp256k1_scalar *r, const unsigned char **sig, const unsigned char *sigend) { + int overflow = 0; + unsigned char ra[32] = {0}; + int rlen; + + if (*sig == sigend || **sig != 0x02) { + /* Not a primitive integer (X.690-0207 8.3.1). */ + return 0; + } + (*sig)++; + rlen = secp256k1_der_read_len(sig, sigend); + if (rlen <= 0 || (*sig) + rlen > sigend) { + /* Exceeds bounds or not at least length 1 (X.690-0207 8.3.1). */ + return 0; + } + if (**sig == 0x00 && rlen > 1 && (((*sig)[1]) & 0x80) == 0x00) { + /* Excessive 0x00 padding. */ + return 0; + } + if (**sig == 0xFF && rlen > 1 && (((*sig)[1]) & 0x80) == 0x80) { + /* Excessive 0xFF padding. */ + return 0; + } + if ((**sig & 0x80) == 0x80) { + /* Negative. */ + overflow = 1; + } + while (rlen > 0 && **sig == 0) { + /* Skip leading zero bytes */ + rlen--; + (*sig)++; + } + if (rlen > 32) { + overflow = 1; + } + if (!overflow) { + memcpy(ra + 32 - rlen, *sig, rlen); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(r, ra, &overflow); + } + if (overflow) { + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(r, 0); + } + (*sig) += rlen; + return 1; +} + +static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_parse(secp256k1_scalar *rr, secp256k1_scalar *rs, const unsigned char *sig, size_t size) { + const unsigned char *sigend = sig + size; + int rlen; + if (sig == sigend || *(sig++) != 0x30) { + /* The encoding doesn't start with a constructed sequence (X.690-0207 8.9.1). */ + return 0; + } + rlen = secp256k1_der_read_len(&sig, sigend); + if (rlen < 0 || sig + rlen > sigend) { + /* Tuple exceeds bounds */ + return 0; + } + if (sig + rlen != sigend) { + /* Garbage after tuple. */ + return 0; + } + + if (!secp256k1_der_parse_integer(rr, &sig, sigend)) { + return 0; + } + if (!secp256k1_der_parse_integer(rs, &sig, sigend)) { + return 0; + } + + if (sig != sigend) { + /* Trailing garbage inside tuple. */ + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_serialize(unsigned char *sig, size_t *size, const secp256k1_scalar* ar, const secp256k1_scalar* as) { + unsigned char r[33] = {0}, s[33] = {0}; + unsigned char *rp = r, *sp = s; + size_t lenR = 33, lenS = 33; + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&r[1], ar); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&s[1], as); + while (lenR > 1 && rp[0] == 0 && rp[1] < 0x80) { lenR--; rp++; } + while (lenS > 1 && sp[0] == 0 && sp[1] < 0x80) { lenS--; sp++; } + if (*size < 6+lenS+lenR) { + *size = 6 + lenS + lenR; + return 0; + } + *size = 6 + lenS + lenR; + sig[0] = 0x30; + sig[1] = 4 + lenS + lenR; + sig[2] = 0x02; + sig[3] = lenR; + memcpy(sig+4, rp, lenR); + sig[4+lenR] = 0x02; + sig[5+lenR] = lenS; + memcpy(sig+lenR+6, sp, lenS); + return 1; +} + +static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, const secp256k1_scalar *sigr, const secp256k1_scalar *sigs, const secp256k1_ge *pubkey, const secp256k1_scalar *message) { + unsigned char c[32]; + secp256k1_scalar sn, u1, u2; +#if !defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) + secp256k1_fe xr; +#endif + secp256k1_gej pubkeyj; + secp256k1_gej pr; + + if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigr) || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigs)) { + return 0; + } + + secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&sn, sigs); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&u1, &sn, message); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&u2, &sn, sigr); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pubkeyj, pubkey); + secp256k1_ecmult(ctx, &pr, &pubkeyj, &u2, &u1); + if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&pr)) { + return 0; + } + +#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) +{ + secp256k1_scalar computed_r; + secp256k1_ge pr_ge; + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&pr_ge, &pr); + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pr_ge.x); + + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(c, &pr_ge.x); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&computed_r, c, NULL); + return secp256k1_scalar_eq(sigr, &computed_r); +} +#else + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(c, sigr); + secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&xr, c); + + /** We now have the recomputed R point in pr, and its claimed x coordinate (modulo n) + * in xr. Naively, we would extract the x coordinate from pr (requiring a inversion modulo p), + * compute the remainder modulo n, and compare it to xr. However: + * + * xr == X(pr) mod n + * <=> exists h. (xr + h * n < p && xr + h * n == X(pr)) + * [Since 2 * n > p, h can only be 0 or 1] + * <=> (xr == X(pr)) || (xr + n < p && xr + n == X(pr)) + * [In Jacobian coordinates, X(pr) is pr.x / pr.z^2 mod p] + * <=> (xr == pr.x / pr.z^2 mod p) || (xr + n < p && xr + n == pr.x / pr.z^2 mod p) + * [Multiplying both sides of the equations by pr.z^2 mod p] + * <=> (xr * pr.z^2 mod p == pr.x) || (xr + n < p && (xr + n) * pr.z^2 mod p == pr.x) + * + * Thus, we can avoid the inversion, but we have to check both cases separately. + * secp256k1_gej_eq_x implements the (xr * pr.z^2 mod p == pr.x) test. + */ + if (secp256k1_gej_eq_x_var(&xr, &pr)) { + /* xr * pr.z^2 mod p == pr.x, so the signature is valid. */ + return 1; + } + if (secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(&xr, &secp256k1_ecdsa_const_p_minus_order) >= 0) { + /* xr + n >= p, so we can skip testing the second case. */ + return 0; + } + secp256k1_fe_add(&xr, &secp256k1_ecdsa_const_order_as_fe); + if (secp256k1_gej_eq_x_var(&xr, &pr)) { + /* (xr + n) * pr.z^2 mod p == pr.x, so the signature is valid. */ + return 1; + } + return 0; +#endif +} + +static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, secp256k1_scalar *sigr, secp256k1_scalar *sigs, const secp256k1_scalar *seckey, const secp256k1_scalar *message, const secp256k1_scalar *nonce, int *recid) { + unsigned char b[32]; + secp256k1_gej rp; + secp256k1_ge r; + secp256k1_scalar n; + int overflow = 0; + + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(ctx, &rp, nonce); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&r, &rp); + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&r.x); + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&r.y); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(b, &r.x); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(sigr, b, &overflow); + /* These two conditions should be checked before calling */ + VERIFY_CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigr)); + VERIFY_CHECK(overflow == 0); + + if (recid) { + /* The overflow condition is cryptographically unreachable as hitting it requires finding the discrete log + * of some P where P.x >= order, and only 1 in about 2^127 points meet this criteria. + */ + *recid = (overflow ? 2 : 0) | (secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r.y) ? 1 : 0); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&n, sigr, seckey); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&n, &n, message); + secp256k1_scalar_inverse(sigs, nonce); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sigs, sigs, &n); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&n); + secp256k1_gej_clear(&rp); + secp256k1_ge_clear(&r); + if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigs)) { + return 0; + } + if (secp256k1_scalar_is_high(sigs)) { + secp256k1_scalar_negate(sigs, sigs); + if (recid) { + *recid ^= 1; + } + } + return 1; +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_ECDSA_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/eckey.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/eckey.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b621f1e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/eckey.h @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_ECKEY_H +#define SECP256K1_ECKEY_H + +#include + +#include "group.h" +#include "scalar.h" +#include "ecmult.h" +#include "ecmult_gen.h" + +static int secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(secp256k1_ge *elem, const unsigned char *pub, size_t size); +static int secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(secp256k1_ge *elem, unsigned char *pub, size_t *size, int compressed); + +static int secp256k1_eckey_privkey_tweak_add(secp256k1_scalar *key, const secp256k1_scalar *tweak); +static int secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_add(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_ge *key, const secp256k1_scalar *tweak); +static int secp256k1_eckey_privkey_tweak_mul(secp256k1_scalar *key, const secp256k1_scalar *tweak); +static int secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_mul(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_ge *key, const secp256k1_scalar *tweak); + +#endif /* SECP256K1_ECKEY_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/eckey_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/eckey_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ab9a68 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/eckey_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_ECKEY_IMPL_H +#define SECP256K1_ECKEY_IMPL_H + +#include "eckey.h" + +#include "scalar.h" +#include "field.h" +#include "group.h" +#include "ecmult_gen.h" + +static int secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(secp256k1_ge *elem, const unsigned char *pub, size_t size) { + if (size == 33 && (pub[0] == SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_EVEN || pub[0] == SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_ODD)) { + secp256k1_fe x; + return secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&x, pub+1) && secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(elem, &x, pub[0] == SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_ODD); + } else if (size == 65 && (pub[0] == 0x04 || pub[0] == 0x06 || pub[0] == 0x07)) { + secp256k1_fe x, y; + if (!secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&x, pub+1) || !secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&y, pub+33)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_ge_set_xy(elem, &x, &y); + if ((pub[0] == SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_HYBRID_EVEN || pub[0] == SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_HYBRID_ODD) && + secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&y) != (pub[0] == SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_HYBRID_ODD)) { + return 0; + } + return secp256k1_ge_is_valid_var(elem); + } else { + return 0; + } +} + +static int secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(secp256k1_ge *elem, unsigned char *pub, size_t *size, int compressed) { + if (secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(elem)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&elem->x); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&elem->y); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(&pub[1], &elem->x); + if (compressed) { + *size = 33; + pub[0] = secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&elem->y) ? SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_ODD : SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_EVEN; + } else { + *size = 65; + pub[0] = SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_UNCOMPRESSED; + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(&pub[33], &elem->y); + } + return 1; +} + +static int secp256k1_eckey_privkey_tweak_add(secp256k1_scalar *key, const secp256k1_scalar *tweak) { + secp256k1_scalar_add(key, key, tweak); + if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(key)) { + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static int secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_add(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_ge *key, const secp256k1_scalar *tweak) { + secp256k1_gej pt; + secp256k1_scalar one; + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pt, key); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&one, 1); + secp256k1_ecmult(ctx, &pt, &pt, &one, tweak); + + if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&pt)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(key, &pt); + return 1; +} + +static int secp256k1_eckey_privkey_tweak_mul(secp256k1_scalar *key, const secp256k1_scalar *tweak) { + if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(tweak)) { + return 0; + } + + secp256k1_scalar_mul(key, key, tweak); + return 1; +} + +static int secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_mul(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_ge *key, const secp256k1_scalar *tweak) { + secp256k1_scalar zero; + secp256k1_gej pt; + if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(tweak)) { + return 0; + } + + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&zero, 0); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pt, key); + secp256k1_ecmult(ctx, &pt, &pt, tweak, &zero); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(key, &pt); + return 1; +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_ECKEY_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ea1cd8a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult.h @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014, 2017 Pieter Wuille, Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_ECMULT_H +#define SECP256K1_ECMULT_H + +#include "num.h" +#include "group.h" +#include "scalar.h" +#include "scratch.h" + +typedef struct { + /* For accelerating the computation of a*P + b*G: */ + secp256k1_ge_storage (*pre_g)[]; /* odd multiples of the generator */ +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + secp256k1_ge_storage (*pre_g_128)[]; /* odd multiples of 2^128*generator */ +#endif +} secp256k1_ecmult_context; + +static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_init(secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx); +static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_build(secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, const secp256k1_callback *cb); +static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_clone(secp256k1_ecmult_context *dst, + const secp256k1_ecmult_context *src, const secp256k1_callback *cb); +static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_clear(secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx); +static int secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx); + +/** Double multiply: R = na*A + ng*G */ +static void secp256k1_ecmult(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_scalar *na, const secp256k1_scalar *ng); + +typedef int (secp256k1_ecmult_multi_callback)(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *data); + +/** + * Multi-multiply: R = inp_g_sc * G + sum_i ni * Ai. + * Chooses the right algorithm for a given number of points and scratch space + * size. Resets and overwrites the given scratch space. If the points do not + * fit in the scratch space the algorithm is repeatedly run with batches of + * points. + * Returns: 1 on success (including when inp_g_sc is NULL and n is 0) + * 0 if there is not enough scratch space for a single point or + * callback returns 0 + */ +static int secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_scratch *scratch, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_scalar *inp_g_sc, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_callback cb, void *cbdata, size_t n); + +#endif /* SECP256K1_ECMULT_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_const.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_const.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d4804b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_const.h @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2015 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_H +#define SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_H + +#include "scalar.h" +#include "group.h" + +/* Here `bits` should be set to the maximum bitlength of the _absolute value_ of `q`, plus + * one because we internally sometimes add 2 to the number during the WNAF conversion. */ +static void secp256k1_ecmult_const(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_scalar *q, int bits); + +#endif /* SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_const_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_const_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8411752 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_const_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,257 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2015 Pieter Wuille, Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_IMPL_H +#define SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_IMPL_H + +#include "scalar.h" +#include "group.h" +#include "ecmult_const.h" +#include "ecmult_impl.h" + +/* This is like `ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE` but is constant time */ +#define ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(r,pre,n,w) do { \ + int m; \ + int abs_n = (n) * (((n) > 0) * 2 - 1); \ + int idx_n = abs_n / 2; \ + secp256k1_fe neg_y; \ + VERIFY_CHECK(((n) & 1) == 1); \ + VERIFY_CHECK((n) >= -((1 << ((w)-1)) - 1)); \ + VERIFY_CHECK((n) <= ((1 << ((w)-1)) - 1)); \ + VERIFY_SETUP(secp256k1_fe_clear(&(r)->x)); \ + VERIFY_SETUP(secp256k1_fe_clear(&(r)->y)); \ + for (m = 0; m < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(w); m++) { \ + /* This loop is used to avoid secret data in array indices. See + * the comment in ecmult_gen_impl.h for rationale. */ \ + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&(r)->x, &(pre)[m].x, m == idx_n); \ + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&(r)->y, &(pre)[m].y, m == idx_n); \ + } \ + (r)->infinity = 0; \ + secp256k1_fe_negate(&neg_y, &(r)->y, 1); \ + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&(r)->y, &neg_y, (n) != abs_n); \ +} while(0) + + +/** Convert a number to WNAF notation. + * The number becomes represented by sum(2^{wi} * wnaf[i], i=0..WNAF_SIZE(w)+1) - return_val. + * It has the following guarantees: + * - each wnaf[i] an odd integer between -(1 << w) and (1 << w) + * - each wnaf[i] is nonzero + * - the number of words set is always WNAF_SIZE(w) + 1 + * + * Adapted from `The Width-w NAF Method Provides Small Memory and Fast Elliptic Scalar + * Multiplications Secure against Side Channel Attacks`, Okeya and Tagaki. M. Joye (Ed.) + * CT-RSA 2003, LNCS 2612, pp. 328-443, 2003. Springer-Verlagy Berlin Heidelberg 2003 + * + * Numbers reference steps of `Algorithm SPA-resistant Width-w NAF with Odd Scalar` on pp. 335 + */ +static int secp256k1_wnaf_const(int *wnaf, secp256k1_scalar s, int w, int size) { + int global_sign; + int skew = 0; + int word = 0; + + /* 1 2 3 */ + int u_last; + int u; + + int flip; + int bit; + secp256k1_scalar neg_s; + int not_neg_one; + /* Note that we cannot handle even numbers by negating them to be odd, as is + * done in other implementations, since if our scalars were specified to have + * width < 256 for performance reasons, their negations would have width 256 + * and we'd lose any performance benefit. Instead, we use a technique from + * Section 4.2 of the Okeya/Tagaki paper, which is to add either 1 (for even) + * or 2 (for odd) to the number we are encoding, returning a skew value indicating + * this, and having the caller compensate after doing the multiplication. + * + * In fact, we _do_ want to negate numbers to minimize their bit-lengths (and in + * particular, to ensure that the outputs from the endomorphism-split fit into + * 128 bits). If we negate, the parity of our number flips, inverting which of + * {1, 2} we want to add to the scalar when ensuring that it's odd. Further + * complicating things, -1 interacts badly with `secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit` and + * we need to special-case it in this logic. */ + flip = secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s); + /* We add 1 to even numbers, 2 to odd ones, noting that negation flips parity */ + bit = flip ^ !secp256k1_scalar_is_even(&s); + /* We check for negative one, since adding 2 to it will cause an overflow */ + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&neg_s, &s); + not_neg_one = !secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&neg_s); + secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(&s, bit, not_neg_one); + /* If we had negative one, flip == 1, s.d[0] == 0, bit == 1, so caller expects + * that we added two to it and flipped it. In fact for -1 these operations are + * identical. We only flipped, but since skewing is required (in the sense that + * the skew must be 1 or 2, never zero) and flipping is not, we need to change + * our flags to claim that we only skewed. */ + global_sign = secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&s, flip); + global_sign *= not_neg_one * 2 - 1; + skew = 1 << bit; + + /* 4 */ + u_last = secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&s, w); + while (word * w < size) { + int sign; + int even; + + /* 4.1 4.4 */ + u = secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&s, w); + /* 4.2 */ + even = ((u & 1) == 0); + sign = 2 * (u_last > 0) - 1; + u += sign * even; + u_last -= sign * even * (1 << w); + + /* 4.3, adapted for global sign change */ + wnaf[word++] = u_last * global_sign; + + u_last = u; + } + wnaf[word] = u * global_sign; + + VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s)); + VERIFY_CHECK(word == WNAF_SIZE_BITS(size, w)); + return skew; +} + +static void secp256k1_ecmult_const(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_scalar *scalar, int size) { + secp256k1_ge pre_a[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; + secp256k1_ge tmpa; + secp256k1_fe Z; + + int skew_1; +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + secp256k1_ge pre_a_lam[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; + int wnaf_lam[1 + WNAF_SIZE(WINDOW_A - 1)]; + int skew_lam; + secp256k1_scalar q_1, q_lam; +#endif + int wnaf_1[1 + WNAF_SIZE(WINDOW_A - 1)]; + + int i; + secp256k1_scalar sc = *scalar; + + /* build wnaf representation for q. */ + int rsize = size; +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + if (size > 128) { + rsize = 128; + /* split q into q_1 and q_lam (where q = q_1 + q_lam*lambda, and q_1 and q_lam are ~128 bit) */ + secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(&q_1, &q_lam, &sc); + skew_1 = secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf_1, q_1, WINDOW_A - 1, 128); + skew_lam = secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf_lam, q_lam, WINDOW_A - 1, 128); + } else +#endif + { + skew_1 = secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf_1, sc, WINDOW_A - 1, size); +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + skew_lam = 0; +#endif + } + + /* Calculate odd multiples of a. + * All multiples are brought to the same Z 'denominator', which is stored + * in Z. Due to secp256k1' isomorphism we can do all operations pretending + * that the Z coordinate was 1, use affine addition formulae, and correct + * the Z coordinate of the result once at the end. + */ + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(r, a); + secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_globalz_windowa(pre_a, &Z, r); + for (i = 0; i < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A); i++) { + secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&pre_a[i].y); + } +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + if (size > 128) { + for (i = 0; i < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A); i++) { + secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&pre_a_lam[i], &pre_a[i]); + } + } +#endif + + /* first loop iteration (separated out so we can directly set r, rather + * than having it start at infinity, get doubled several times, then have + * its new value added to it) */ + i = wnaf_1[WNAF_SIZE_BITS(rsize, WINDOW_A - 1)]; + VERIFY_CHECK(i != 0); + ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, pre_a, i, WINDOW_A); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(r, &tmpa); +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + if (size > 128) { + i = wnaf_lam[WNAF_SIZE_BITS(rsize, WINDOW_A - 1)]; + VERIFY_CHECK(i != 0); + ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, pre_a_lam, i, WINDOW_A); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &tmpa); + } +#endif + /* remaining loop iterations */ + for (i = WNAF_SIZE_BITS(rsize, WINDOW_A - 1) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + int n; + int j; + for (j = 0; j < WINDOW_A - 1; ++j) { + secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(r, r, NULL); + } + + n = wnaf_1[i]; + ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, pre_a, n, WINDOW_A); + VERIFY_CHECK(n != 0); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &tmpa); +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + if (size > 128) { + n = wnaf_lam[i]; + ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, pre_a_lam, n, WINDOW_A); + VERIFY_CHECK(n != 0); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &tmpa); + } +#endif + } + + secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &r->z, &Z); + + { + /* Correct for wNAF skew */ + secp256k1_ge correction = *a; + secp256k1_ge_storage correction_1_stor; +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + secp256k1_ge_storage correction_lam_stor; +#endif + secp256k1_ge_storage a2_stor; + secp256k1_gej tmpj; + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&tmpj, &correction); + secp256k1_gej_double_var(&tmpj, &tmpj, NULL); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&correction, &tmpj); + secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&correction_1_stor, a); +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + if (size > 128) { + secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&correction_lam_stor, a); + } +#endif + secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&a2_stor, &correction); + + /* For odd numbers this is 2a (so replace it), for even ones a (so no-op) */ + secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&correction_1_stor, &a2_stor, skew_1 == 2); +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + if (size > 128) { + secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&correction_lam_stor, &a2_stor, skew_lam == 2); + } +#endif + + /* Apply the correction */ + secp256k1_ge_from_storage(&correction, &correction_1_stor); + secp256k1_ge_neg(&correction, &correction); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &correction); + +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + if (size > 128) { + secp256k1_ge_from_storage(&correction, &correction_lam_stor); + secp256k1_ge_neg(&correction, &correction); + secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&correction, &correction); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &correction); + } +#endif + } +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7564b70 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen.h @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_H +#define SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_H + +#include "scalar.h" +#include "group.h" + +typedef struct { + /* For accelerating the computation of a*G: + * To harden against timing attacks, use the following mechanism: + * * Break up the multiplicand into groups of 4 bits, called n_0, n_1, n_2, ..., n_63. + * * Compute sum(n_i * 16^i * G + U_i, i=0..63), where: + * * U_i = U * 2^i (for i=0..62) + * * U_i = U * (1-2^63) (for i=63) + * where U is a point with no known corresponding scalar. Note that sum(U_i, i=0..63) = 0. + * For each i, and each of the 16 possible values of n_i, (n_i * 16^i * G + U_i) is + * precomputed (call it prec(i, n_i)). The formula now becomes sum(prec(i, n_i), i=0..63). + * None of the resulting prec group elements have a known scalar, and neither do any of + * the intermediate sums while computing a*G. + */ + secp256k1_ge_storage (*prec)[64][16]; /* prec[j][i] = 16^j * i * G + U_i */ + secp256k1_scalar blind; + secp256k1_gej initial; +} secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context; + +static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_init(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx); +static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_build(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx, const secp256k1_callback* cb); +static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_clone(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *dst, + const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* src, const secp256k1_callback* cb); +static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_clear(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx); +static int secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx); + +/** Multiply with the generator: R = a*G */ +static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a); + +static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, const unsigned char *seed32); + +#endif /* SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..714f02e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014, 2015 Pieter Wuille, Gregory Maxwell * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_IMPL_H +#define SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_IMPL_H + +#include "scalar.h" +#include "group.h" +#include "ecmult_gen.h" +#include "hash_impl.h" +#ifdef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION +#include "ecmult_static_context.h" +#endif +static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_init(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx) { + ctx->prec = NULL; +} + +static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_build(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, const secp256k1_callback* cb) { +#ifndef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION + secp256k1_ge prec[1024]; + secp256k1_gej gj; + secp256k1_gej nums_gej; + int i, j; +#endif + + if (ctx->prec != NULL) { + return; + } +#ifndef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION + ctx->prec = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[64][16])checked_malloc(cb, sizeof(*ctx->prec)); + + /* get the generator */ + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&gj, &secp256k1_ge_const_g); + + /* Construct a group element with no known corresponding scalar (nothing up my sleeve). */ + { + static const unsigned char nums_b32[33] = "The scalar for this x is unknown"; + secp256k1_fe nums_x; + secp256k1_ge nums_ge; + int r; + r = secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&nums_x, nums_b32); + (void)r; + VERIFY_CHECK(r); + r = secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&nums_ge, &nums_x, 0); + (void)r; + VERIFY_CHECK(r); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&nums_gej, &nums_ge); + /* Add G to make the bits in x uniformly distributed. */ + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&nums_gej, &nums_gej, &secp256k1_ge_const_g, NULL); + } + + /* compute prec. */ + { + secp256k1_gej precj[1024]; /* Jacobian versions of prec. */ + secp256k1_gej gbase; + secp256k1_gej numsbase; + gbase = gj; /* 16^j * G */ + numsbase = nums_gej; /* 2^j * nums. */ + for (j = 0; j < 64; j++) { + /* Set precj[j*16 .. j*16+15] to (numsbase, numsbase + gbase, ..., numsbase + 15*gbase). */ + precj[j*16] = numsbase; + for (i = 1; i < 16; i++) { + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&precj[j*16 + i], &precj[j*16 + i - 1], &gbase, NULL); + } + /* Multiply gbase by 16. */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + secp256k1_gej_double_var(&gbase, &gbase, NULL); + } + /* Multiply numbase by 2. */ + secp256k1_gej_double_var(&numsbase, &numsbase, NULL); + if (j == 62) { + /* In the last iteration, numsbase is (1 - 2^j) * nums instead. */ + secp256k1_gej_neg(&numsbase, &numsbase); + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&numsbase, &numsbase, &nums_gej, NULL); + } + } + secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(prec, precj, 1024, cb); + } + for (j = 0; j < 64; j++) { + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&(*ctx->prec)[j][i], &prec[j*16 + i]); + } + } +#else + (void)cb; + ctx->prec = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[64][16])secp256k1_ecmult_static_context; +#endif + secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(ctx, NULL); +} + +static int secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx) { + return ctx->prec != NULL; +} + +static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_clone(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *dst, + const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *src, const secp256k1_callback* cb) { + if (src->prec == NULL) { + dst->prec = NULL; + } else { +#ifndef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION + dst->prec = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[64][16])checked_malloc(cb, sizeof(*dst->prec)); + memcpy(dst->prec, src->prec, sizeof(*dst->prec)); +#else + (void)cb; + dst->prec = src->prec; +#endif + dst->initial = src->initial; + dst->blind = src->blind; + } +} + +static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_clear(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx) { +#ifndef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION + free(ctx->prec); +#endif + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&ctx->blind); + secp256k1_gej_clear(&ctx->initial); + ctx->prec = NULL; +} + +static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_scalar *gn) { + secp256k1_ge add; + secp256k1_ge_storage adds; + secp256k1_scalar gnb; + int bits; + int i, j; + memset(&adds, 0, sizeof(adds)); + *r = ctx->initial; + /* Blind scalar/point multiplication by computing (n-b)G + bG instead of nG. */ + secp256k1_scalar_add(&gnb, gn, &ctx->blind); + add.infinity = 0; + for (j = 0; j < 64; j++) { + bits = secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(&gnb, j * 4, 4); + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + /** This uses a conditional move to avoid any secret data in array indexes. + * _Any_ use of secret indexes has been demonstrated to result in timing + * sidechannels, even when the cache-line access patterns are uniform. + * See also: + * "A word of warning", CHES 2013 Rump Session, by Daniel J. Bernstein and Peter Schwabe + * (https://cryptojedi.org/peter/data/chesrump-20130822.pdf) and + * "Cache Attacks and Countermeasures: the Case of AES", RSA 2006, + * by Dag Arne Osvik, Adi Shamir, and Eran Tromer + * (http://www.tau.ac.il/~tromer/papers/cache.pdf) + */ + secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&adds, &(*ctx->prec)[j][i], i == bits); + } + secp256k1_ge_from_storage(&add, &adds); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &add); + } + bits = 0; + secp256k1_ge_clear(&add); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&gnb); +} + +/* Setup blinding values for secp256k1_ecmult_gen. */ +static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, const unsigned char *seed32) { + secp256k1_scalar b; + secp256k1_gej gb; + secp256k1_fe s; + unsigned char nonce32[32]; + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 rng; + int retry; + unsigned char keydata[64] = {0}; + if (seed32 == NULL) { + /* When seed is NULL, reset the initial point and blinding value. */ + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&ctx->initial, &secp256k1_ge_const_g); + secp256k1_gej_neg(&ctx->initial, &ctx->initial); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ctx->blind, 1); + } + /* The prior blinding value (if not reset) is chained forward by including it in the hash. */ + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(nonce32, &ctx->blind); + /** Using a CSPRNG allows a failure free interface, avoids needing large amounts of random data, + * and guards against weak or adversarial seeds. This is a simpler and safer interface than + * asking the caller for blinding values directly and expecting them to retry on failure. + */ + memcpy(keydata, nonce32, 32); + if (seed32 != NULL) { + memcpy(keydata + 32, seed32, 32); + } + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, keydata, seed32 ? 64 : 32); + memset(keydata, 0, sizeof(keydata)); + /* Retry for out of range results to achieve uniformity. */ + do { + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, nonce32, 32); + retry = !secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&s, nonce32); + retry |= secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&s); + } while (retry); /* This branch true is cryptographically unreachable. Requires sha256_hmac output > Fp. */ + /* Randomize the projection to defend against multiplier sidechannels. */ + secp256k1_gej_rescale(&ctx->initial, &s); + secp256k1_fe_clear(&s); + do { + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, nonce32, 32); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&b, nonce32, &retry); + /* A blinding value of 0 works, but would undermine the projection hardening. */ + retry |= secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&b); + } while (retry); /* This branch true is cryptographically unreachable. Requires sha256_hmac output > order. */ + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(&rng); + memset(nonce32, 0, 32); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(ctx, &gb, &b); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&b, &b); + ctx->blind = b; + ctx->initial = gb; + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&b); + secp256k1_gej_clear(&gb); +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d5fb6c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,1027 @@ +/***************************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014, 2017 Pieter Wuille, Andrew Poelstra, Jonas Nick * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php. * + *****************************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_ECMULT_IMPL_H +#define SECP256K1_ECMULT_IMPL_H + +#include +#include + +#include "group.h" +#include "scalar.h" +#include "ecmult.h" + +#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) +/* We need to lower these values for exhaustive tests because + * the tables cannot have infinities in them (this breaks the + * affine-isomorphism stuff which tracks z-ratios) */ +# if EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER > 128 +# define WINDOW_A 5 +# define WINDOW_G 8 +# elif EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER > 8 +# define WINDOW_A 4 +# define WINDOW_G 4 +# else +# define WINDOW_A 2 +# define WINDOW_G 2 +# endif +#else +/* optimal for 128-bit and 256-bit exponents. */ +#define WINDOW_A 5 +/** larger numbers may result in slightly better performance, at the cost of + exponentially larger precomputed tables. */ +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM +/** Two tables for window size 15: 1.375 MiB. */ +#define WINDOW_G 15 +#else +/** One table for window size 16: 1.375 MiB. */ +#define WINDOW_G 16 +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + #define WNAF_BITS 128 +#else + #define WNAF_BITS 256 +#endif +#define WNAF_SIZE_BITS(bits, w) (((bits) + (w) - 1) / (w)) +#define WNAF_SIZE(w) WNAF_SIZE_BITS(WNAF_BITS, w) + +/** The number of entries a table with precomputed multiples needs to have. */ +#define ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(w) (1 << ((w)-2)) + +/* The number of objects allocated on the scratch space for ecmult_multi algorithms */ +#define PIPPENGER_SCRATCH_OBJECTS 6 +#define STRAUSS_SCRATCH_OBJECTS 6 + +#define PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW 12 + +/* Minimum number of points for which pippenger_wnaf is faster than strauss wnaf */ +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + #define ECMULT_PIPPENGER_THRESHOLD 88 +#else + #define ECMULT_PIPPENGER_THRESHOLD 160 +#endif + +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + #define ECMULT_MAX_POINTS_PER_BATCH 5000000 +#else + #define ECMULT_MAX_POINTS_PER_BATCH 10000000 +#endif + +/** Fill a table 'prej' with precomputed odd multiples of a. Prej will contain + * the values [1*a,3*a,...,(2*n-1)*a], so it space for n values. zr[0] will + * contain prej[0].z / a.z. The other zr[i] values = prej[i].z / prej[i-1].z. + * Prej's Z values are undefined, except for the last value. + */ +static void secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table(int n, secp256k1_gej *prej, secp256k1_fe *zr, const secp256k1_gej *a) { + secp256k1_gej d; + secp256k1_ge a_ge, d_ge; + int i; + + VERIFY_CHECK(!a->infinity); + + secp256k1_gej_double_var(&d, a, NULL); + + /* + * Perform the additions on an isomorphism where 'd' is affine: drop the z coordinate + * of 'd', and scale the 1P starting value's x/y coordinates without changing its z. + */ + d_ge.x = d.x; + d_ge.y = d.y; + d_ge.infinity = 0; + + secp256k1_ge_set_gej_zinv(&a_ge, a, &d.z); + prej[0].x = a_ge.x; + prej[0].y = a_ge.y; + prej[0].z = a->z; + prej[0].infinity = 0; + + zr[0] = d.z; + for (i = 1; i < n; i++) { + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&prej[i], &prej[i-1], &d_ge, &zr[i]); + } + + /* + * Each point in 'prej' has a z coordinate too small by a factor of 'd.z'. Only + * the final point's z coordinate is actually used though, so just update that. + */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&prej[n-1].z, &prej[n-1].z, &d.z); +} + +/** Fill a table 'pre' with precomputed odd multiples of a. + * + * There are two versions of this function: + * - secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_globalz_windowa which brings its + * resulting point set to a single constant Z denominator, stores the X and Y + * coordinates as ge_storage points in pre, and stores the global Z in rz. + * It only operates on tables sized for WINDOW_A wnaf multiples. + * - secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_storage_var, which converts its + * resulting point set to actually affine points, and stores those in pre. + * It operates on tables of any size, but uses heap-allocated temporaries. + * + * To compute a*P + b*G, we compute a table for P using the first function, + * and for G using the second (which requires an inverse, but it only needs to + * happen once). + */ +static void secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_globalz_windowa(secp256k1_ge *pre, secp256k1_fe *globalz, const secp256k1_gej *a) { + secp256k1_gej prej[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; + secp256k1_fe zr[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; + + /* Compute the odd multiples in Jacobian form. */ + secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table(ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), prej, zr, a); + /* Bring them to the same Z denominator. */ + secp256k1_ge_globalz_set_table_gej(ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), pre, globalz, prej, zr); +} + +static void secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_storage_var(int n, secp256k1_ge_storage *pre, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_callback *cb) { + secp256k1_gej *prej = (secp256k1_gej*)checked_malloc(cb, sizeof(secp256k1_gej) * n); + secp256k1_ge *prea = (secp256k1_ge*)checked_malloc(cb, sizeof(secp256k1_ge) * n); + secp256k1_fe *zr = (secp256k1_fe*)checked_malloc(cb, sizeof(secp256k1_fe) * n); + int i; + + /* Compute the odd multiples in Jacobian form. */ + secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table(n, prej, zr, a); + /* Convert them in batch to affine coordinates. */ + secp256k1_ge_set_table_gej_var(prea, prej, zr, n); + /* Convert them to compact storage form. */ + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&pre[i], &prea[i]); + } + + free(prea); + free(prej); + free(zr); +} + +/** The following two macro retrieves a particular odd multiple from a table + * of precomputed multiples. */ +#define ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE(r,pre,n,w) do { \ + VERIFY_CHECK(((n) & 1) == 1); \ + VERIFY_CHECK((n) >= -((1 << ((w)-1)) - 1)); \ + VERIFY_CHECK((n) <= ((1 << ((w)-1)) - 1)); \ + if ((n) > 0) { \ + *(r) = (pre)[((n)-1)/2]; \ + } else { \ + secp256k1_ge_neg((r), &(pre)[(-(n)-1)/2]); \ + } \ +} while(0) + +#define ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE_STORAGE(r,pre,n,w) do { \ + VERIFY_CHECK(((n) & 1) == 1); \ + VERIFY_CHECK((n) >= -((1 << ((w)-1)) - 1)); \ + VERIFY_CHECK((n) <= ((1 << ((w)-1)) - 1)); \ + if ((n) > 0) { \ + secp256k1_ge_from_storage((r), &(pre)[((n)-1)/2]); \ + } else { \ + secp256k1_ge_from_storage((r), &(pre)[(-(n)-1)/2]); \ + secp256k1_ge_neg((r), (r)); \ + } \ +} while(0) + +static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_init(secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx) { + ctx->pre_g = NULL; +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + ctx->pre_g_128 = NULL; +#endif +} + +static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_build(secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, const secp256k1_callback *cb) { + secp256k1_gej gj; + + if (ctx->pre_g != NULL) { + return; + } + + /* get the generator */ + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&gj, &secp256k1_ge_const_g); + + ctx->pre_g = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[])checked_malloc(cb, sizeof((*ctx->pre_g)[0]) * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_G)); + + /* precompute the tables with odd multiples */ + secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_storage_var(ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_G), *ctx->pre_g, &gj, cb); + +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + { + secp256k1_gej g_128j; + int i; + + ctx->pre_g_128 = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[])checked_malloc(cb, sizeof((*ctx->pre_g_128)[0]) * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_G)); + + /* calculate 2^128*generator */ + g_128j = gj; + for (i = 0; i < 128; i++) { + secp256k1_gej_double_var(&g_128j, &g_128j, NULL); + } + secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_storage_var(ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_G), *ctx->pre_g_128, &g_128j, cb); + } +#endif +} + +static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_clone(secp256k1_ecmult_context *dst, + const secp256k1_ecmult_context *src, const secp256k1_callback *cb) { + if (src->pre_g == NULL) { + dst->pre_g = NULL; + } else { + size_t size = sizeof((*dst->pre_g)[0]) * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_G); + dst->pre_g = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[])checked_malloc(cb, size); + memcpy(dst->pre_g, src->pre_g, size); + } +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + if (src->pre_g_128 == NULL) { + dst->pre_g_128 = NULL; + } else { + size_t size = sizeof((*dst->pre_g_128)[0]) * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_G); + dst->pre_g_128 = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[])checked_malloc(cb, size); + memcpy(dst->pre_g_128, src->pre_g_128, size); + } +#endif +} + +static int secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx) { + return ctx->pre_g != NULL; +} + +static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_clear(secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx) { + free(ctx->pre_g); +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + free(ctx->pre_g_128); +#endif + secp256k1_ecmult_context_init(ctx); +} + +/** Convert a number to WNAF notation. The number becomes represented by sum(2^i * wnaf[i], i=0..bits), + * with the following guarantees: + * - each wnaf[i] is either 0, or an odd integer between -(1<<(w-1) - 1) and (1<<(w-1) - 1) + * - two non-zero entries in wnaf are separated by at least w-1 zeroes. + * - the number of set values in wnaf is returned. This number is at most 256, and at most one more + * than the number of bits in the (absolute value) of the input. + */ +static int secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(int *wnaf, int len, const secp256k1_scalar *a, int w) { + secp256k1_scalar s = *a; + int last_set_bit = -1; + int bit = 0; + int sign = 1; + int carry = 0; + + VERIFY_CHECK(wnaf != NULL); + VERIFY_CHECK(0 <= len && len <= 256); + VERIFY_CHECK(a != NULL); + VERIFY_CHECK(2 <= w && w <= 31); + + memset(wnaf, 0, len * sizeof(wnaf[0])); + + if (secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(&s, 255, 1)) { + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s, &s); + sign = -1; + } + + while (bit < len) { + int now; + int word; + if (secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(&s, bit, 1) == (unsigned int)carry) { + bit++; + continue; + } + + now = w; + if (now > len - bit) { + now = len - bit; + } + + word = secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(&s, bit, now) + carry; + + carry = (word >> (w-1)) & 1; + word -= carry << w; + + wnaf[bit] = sign * word; + last_set_bit = bit; + + bit += now; + } +#ifdef VERIFY + CHECK(carry == 0); + while (bit < 256) { + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(&s, bit++, 1) == 0); + } +#endif + return last_set_bit + 1; +} + +struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state { +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + secp256k1_scalar na_1, na_lam; + int wnaf_na_1[130]; + int wnaf_na_lam[130]; + int bits_na_1; + int bits_na_lam; +#else + int wnaf_na[256]; + int bits_na; +#endif + size_t input_pos; +}; + +struct secp256k1_strauss_state { + secp256k1_gej* prej; + secp256k1_fe* zr; + secp256k1_ge* pre_a; +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + secp256k1_ge* pre_a_lam; +#endif + struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state* ps; +}; + +static void secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_wnaf(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, const struct secp256k1_strauss_state *state, secp256k1_gej *r, int num, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_scalar *na, const secp256k1_scalar *ng) { + secp256k1_ge tmpa; + secp256k1_fe Z; +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + /* Splitted G factors. */ + secp256k1_scalar ng_1, ng_128; + int wnaf_ng_1[129]; + int bits_ng_1 = 0; + int wnaf_ng_128[129]; + int bits_ng_128 = 0; +#else + int wnaf_ng[256]; + int bits_ng = 0; +#endif + int i; + int bits = 0; + int np; + int no = 0; + + for (np = 0; np < num; ++np) { + if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&na[np]) || secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&a[np])) { + continue; + } + state->ps[no].input_pos = np; +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + /* split na into na_1 and na_lam (where na = na_1 + na_lam*lambda, and na_1 and na_lam are ~128 bit) */ + secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(&state->ps[no].na_1, &state->ps[no].na_lam, &na[np]); + + /* build wnaf representation for na_1 and na_lam. */ + state->ps[no].bits_na_1 = secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(state->ps[no].wnaf_na_1, 130, &state->ps[no].na_1, WINDOW_A); + state->ps[no].bits_na_lam = secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(state->ps[no].wnaf_na_lam, 130, &state->ps[no].na_lam, WINDOW_A); + VERIFY_CHECK(state->ps[no].bits_na_1 <= 130); + VERIFY_CHECK(state->ps[no].bits_na_lam <= 130); + if (state->ps[no].bits_na_1 > bits) { + bits = state->ps[no].bits_na_1; + } + if (state->ps[no].bits_na_lam > bits) { + bits = state->ps[no].bits_na_lam; + } +#else + /* build wnaf representation for na. */ + state->ps[no].bits_na = secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(state->ps[no].wnaf_na, 256, &na[np], WINDOW_A); + if (state->ps[no].bits_na > bits) { + bits = state->ps[no].bits_na; + } +#endif + ++no; + } + + /* Calculate odd multiples of a. + * All multiples are brought to the same Z 'denominator', which is stored + * in Z. Due to secp256k1' isomorphism we can do all operations pretending + * that the Z coordinate was 1, use affine addition formulae, and correct + * the Z coordinate of the result once at the end. + * The exception is the precomputed G table points, which are actually + * affine. Compared to the base used for other points, they have a Z ratio + * of 1/Z, so we can use secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var, which uses the same + * isomorphism to efficiently add with a known Z inverse. + */ + if (no > 0) { + /* Compute the odd multiples in Jacobian form. */ + secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table(ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), state->prej, state->zr, &a[state->ps[0].input_pos]); + for (np = 1; np < no; ++np) { + secp256k1_gej tmp = a[state->ps[np].input_pos]; +#ifdef VERIFY + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&(state->prej[(np - 1) * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) + ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) - 1].z)); +#endif + secp256k1_gej_rescale(&tmp, &(state->prej[(np - 1) * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) + ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) - 1].z)); + secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table(ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), state->prej + np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), state->zr + np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), &tmp); + secp256k1_fe_mul(state->zr + np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), state->zr + np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), &(a[state->ps[np].input_pos].z)); + } + /* Bring them to the same Z denominator. */ + secp256k1_ge_globalz_set_table_gej(ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) * no, state->pre_a, &Z, state->prej, state->zr); + } else { + secp256k1_fe_set_int(&Z, 1); + } + +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + for (np = 0; np < no; ++np) { + for (i = 0; i < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A); i++) { + secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&state->pre_a_lam[np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) + i], &state->pre_a[np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) + i]); + } + } + + if (ng) { + /* split ng into ng_1 and ng_128 (where gn = gn_1 + gn_128*2^128, and gn_1 and gn_128 are ~128 bit) */ + secp256k1_scalar_split_128(&ng_1, &ng_128, ng); + + /* Build wnaf representation for ng_1 and ng_128 */ + bits_ng_1 = secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(wnaf_ng_1, 129, &ng_1, WINDOW_G); + bits_ng_128 = secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(wnaf_ng_128, 129, &ng_128, WINDOW_G); + if (bits_ng_1 > bits) { + bits = bits_ng_1; + } + if (bits_ng_128 > bits) { + bits = bits_ng_128; + } + } +#else + if (ng) { + bits_ng = secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(wnaf_ng, 256, ng, WINDOW_G); + if (bits_ng > bits) { + bits = bits_ng; + } + } +#endif + + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(r); + + for (i = bits - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + int n; + secp256k1_gej_double_var(r, r, NULL); +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + for (np = 0; np < no; ++np) { + if (i < state->ps[np].bits_na_1 && (n = state->ps[np].wnaf_na_1[i])) { + ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, state->pre_a + np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), n, WINDOW_A); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(r, r, &tmpa, NULL); + } + if (i < state->ps[np].bits_na_lam && (n = state->ps[np].wnaf_na_lam[i])) { + ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, state->pre_a_lam + np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), n, WINDOW_A); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(r, r, &tmpa, NULL); + } + } + if (i < bits_ng_1 && (n = wnaf_ng_1[i])) { + ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE_STORAGE(&tmpa, *ctx->pre_g, n, WINDOW_G); + secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(r, r, &tmpa, &Z); + } + if (i < bits_ng_128 && (n = wnaf_ng_128[i])) { + ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE_STORAGE(&tmpa, *ctx->pre_g_128, n, WINDOW_G); + secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(r, r, &tmpa, &Z); + } +#else + for (np = 0; np < no; ++np) { + if (i < state->ps[np].bits_na && (n = state->ps[np].wnaf_na[i])) { + ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, state->pre_a + np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), n, WINDOW_A); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(r, r, &tmpa, NULL); + } + } + if (i < bits_ng && (n = wnaf_ng[i])) { + ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE_STORAGE(&tmpa, *ctx->pre_g, n, WINDOW_G); + secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(r, r, &tmpa, &Z); + } +#endif + } + + if (!r->infinity) { + secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &r->z, &Z); + } +} + +static void secp256k1_ecmult(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_scalar *na, const secp256k1_scalar *ng) { + secp256k1_gej prej[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; + secp256k1_fe zr[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; + secp256k1_ge pre_a[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; + struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state ps[1]; +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + secp256k1_ge pre_a_lam[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; +#endif + struct secp256k1_strauss_state state; + + state.prej = prej; + state.zr = zr; + state.pre_a = pre_a; +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + state.pre_a_lam = pre_a_lam; +#endif + state.ps = ps; + secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_wnaf(ctx, &state, r, 1, a, na, ng); +} + +static size_t secp256k1_strauss_scratch_size(size_t n_points) { +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + static const size_t point_size = (2 * sizeof(secp256k1_ge) + sizeof(secp256k1_gej) + sizeof(secp256k1_fe)) * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) + sizeof(struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state) + sizeof(secp256k1_gej) + sizeof(secp256k1_scalar); +#else + static const size_t point_size = (sizeof(secp256k1_ge) + sizeof(secp256k1_gej) + sizeof(secp256k1_fe)) * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) + sizeof(struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state) + sizeof(secp256k1_gej) + sizeof(secp256k1_scalar); +#endif + return n_points*point_size; +} + +static int secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_batch(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_scratch *scratch, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_scalar *inp_g_sc, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_callback cb, void *cbdata, size_t n_points, size_t cb_offset) { + secp256k1_gej* points; + secp256k1_scalar* scalars; + struct secp256k1_strauss_state state; + size_t i; + + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(r); + if (inp_g_sc == NULL && n_points == 0) { + return 1; + } + + if (!secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(scratch, secp256k1_strauss_scratch_size(n_points), STRAUSS_SCRATCH_OBJECTS)) { + return 0; + } + points = (secp256k1_gej*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_points * sizeof(secp256k1_gej)); + scalars = (secp256k1_scalar*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_points * sizeof(secp256k1_scalar)); + state.prej = (secp256k1_gej*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_points * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) * sizeof(secp256k1_gej)); + state.zr = (secp256k1_fe*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_points * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) * sizeof(secp256k1_fe)); +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + state.pre_a = (secp256k1_ge*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_points * 2 * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) * sizeof(secp256k1_ge)); + state.pre_a_lam = state.pre_a + n_points * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A); +#else + state.pre_a = (secp256k1_ge*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_points * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) * sizeof(secp256k1_ge)); +#endif + state.ps = (struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_points * sizeof(struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state)); + + for (i = 0; i < n_points; i++) { + secp256k1_ge point; + if (!cb(&scalars[i], &point, i+cb_offset, cbdata)) { + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return 0; + } + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&points[i], &point); + } + secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_wnaf(ctx, &state, r, n_points, points, scalars, inp_g_sc); + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return 1; +} + +/* Wrapper for secp256k1_ecmult_multi_func interface */ +static int secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_batch_single(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *actx, secp256k1_scratch *scratch, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_scalar *inp_g_sc, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_callback cb, void *cbdata, size_t n) { + return secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_batch(actx, scratch, r, inp_g_sc, cb, cbdata, n, 0); +} + +static size_t secp256k1_strauss_max_points(secp256k1_scratch *scratch) { + return secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(scratch, STRAUSS_SCRATCH_OBJECTS) / secp256k1_strauss_scratch_size(1); +} + +/** Convert a number to WNAF notation. + * The number becomes represented by sum(2^{wi} * wnaf[i], i=0..WNAF_SIZE(w)+1) - return_val. + * It has the following guarantees: + * - each wnaf[i] is either 0 or an odd integer between -(1 << w) and (1 << w) + * - the number of words set is always WNAF_SIZE(w) + * - the returned skew is 0 or 1 + */ +static int secp256k1_wnaf_fixed(int *wnaf, const secp256k1_scalar *s, int w) { + int skew = 0; + int pos; + int max_pos; + int last_w; + const secp256k1_scalar *work = s; + + if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(s)) { + for (pos = 0; pos < WNAF_SIZE(w); pos++) { + wnaf[pos] = 0; + } + return 0; + } + + if (secp256k1_scalar_is_even(s)) { + skew = 1; + } + + wnaf[0] = secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(work, 0, w) + skew; + /* Compute last window size. Relevant when window size doesn't divide the + * number of bits in the scalar */ + last_w = WNAF_BITS - (WNAF_SIZE(w) - 1) * w; + + /* Store the position of the first nonzero word in max_pos to allow + * skipping leading zeros when calculating the wnaf. */ + for (pos = WNAF_SIZE(w) - 1; pos > 0; pos--) { + int val = secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(work, pos * w, pos == WNAF_SIZE(w)-1 ? last_w : w); + if(val != 0) { + break; + } + wnaf[pos] = 0; + } + max_pos = pos; + pos = 1; + + while (pos <= max_pos) { + int val = secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(work, pos * w, pos == WNAF_SIZE(w)-1 ? last_w : w); + if ((val & 1) == 0) { + wnaf[pos - 1] -= (1 << w); + wnaf[pos] = (val + 1); + } else { + wnaf[pos] = val; + } + /* Set a coefficient to zero if it is 1 or -1 and the proceeding digit + * is strictly negative or strictly positive respectively. Only change + * coefficients at previous positions because above code assumes that + * wnaf[pos - 1] is odd. + */ + if (pos >= 2 && ((wnaf[pos - 1] == 1 && wnaf[pos - 2] < 0) || (wnaf[pos - 1] == -1 && wnaf[pos - 2] > 0))) { + if (wnaf[pos - 1] == 1) { + wnaf[pos - 2] += 1 << w; + } else { + wnaf[pos - 2] -= 1 << w; + } + wnaf[pos - 1] = 0; + } + ++pos; + } + + return skew; +} + +struct secp256k1_pippenger_point_state { + int skew_na; + size_t input_pos; +}; + +struct secp256k1_pippenger_state { + int *wnaf_na; + struct secp256k1_pippenger_point_state* ps; +}; + +/* + * pippenger_wnaf computes the result of a multi-point multiplication as + * follows: The scalars are brought into wnaf with n_wnaf elements each. Then + * for every i < n_wnaf, first each point is added to a "bucket" corresponding + * to the point's wnaf[i]. Second, the buckets are added together such that + * r += 1*bucket[0] + 3*bucket[1] + 5*bucket[2] + ... + */ +static int secp256k1_ecmult_pippenger_wnaf(secp256k1_gej *buckets, int bucket_window, struct secp256k1_pippenger_state *state, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_scalar *sc, const secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t num) { + size_t n_wnaf = WNAF_SIZE(bucket_window+1); + size_t np; + size_t no = 0; + int i; + int j; + + for (np = 0; np < num; ++np) { + if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sc[np]) || secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&pt[np])) { + continue; + } + state->ps[no].input_pos = np; + state->ps[no].skew_na = secp256k1_wnaf_fixed(&state->wnaf_na[no*n_wnaf], &sc[np], bucket_window+1); + no++; + } + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(r); + + if (no == 0) { + return 1; + } + + for (i = n_wnaf - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + secp256k1_gej running_sum; + + for(j = 0; j < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(bucket_window+2); j++) { + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&buckets[j]); + } + + for (np = 0; np < no; ++np) { + int n = state->wnaf_na[np*n_wnaf + i]; + struct secp256k1_pippenger_point_state point_state = state->ps[np]; + secp256k1_ge tmp; + int idx; + + if (i == 0) { + /* correct for wnaf skew */ + int skew = point_state.skew_na; + if (skew) { + secp256k1_ge_neg(&tmp, &pt[point_state.input_pos]); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&buckets[0], &buckets[0], &tmp, NULL); + } + } + if (n > 0) { + idx = (n - 1)/2; + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&buckets[idx], &buckets[idx], &pt[point_state.input_pos], NULL); + } else if (n < 0) { + idx = -(n + 1)/2; + secp256k1_ge_neg(&tmp, &pt[point_state.input_pos]); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&buckets[idx], &buckets[idx], &tmp, NULL); + } + } + + for(j = 0; j < bucket_window; j++) { + secp256k1_gej_double_var(r, r, NULL); + } + + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&running_sum); + /* Accumulate the sum: bucket[0] + 3*bucket[1] + 5*bucket[2] + 7*bucket[3] + ... + * = bucket[0] + bucket[1] + bucket[2] + bucket[3] + ... + * + 2 * (bucket[1] + 2*bucket[2] + 3*bucket[3] + ...) + * using an intermediate running sum: + * running_sum = bucket[0] + bucket[1] + bucket[2] + ... + * + * The doubling is done implicitly by deferring the final window doubling (of 'r'). + */ + for(j = ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(bucket_window+2) - 1; j > 0; j--) { + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&running_sum, &running_sum, &buckets[j], NULL); + secp256k1_gej_add_var(r, r, &running_sum, NULL); + } + + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&running_sum, &running_sum, &buckets[0], NULL); + secp256k1_gej_double_var(r, r, NULL); + secp256k1_gej_add_var(r, r, &running_sum, NULL); + } + return 1; +} + +/** + * Returns optimal bucket_window (number of bits of a scalar represented by a + * set of buckets) for a given number of points. + */ +static int secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window(size_t n) { +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + if (n <= 1) { + return 1; + } else if (n <= 4) { + return 2; + } else if (n <= 20) { + return 3; + } else if (n <= 57) { + return 4; + } else if (n <= 136) { + return 5; + } else if (n <= 235) { + return 6; + } else if (n <= 1260) { + return 7; + } else if (n <= 4420) { + return 9; + } else if (n <= 7880) { + return 10; + } else if (n <= 16050) { + return 11; + } else { + return PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW; + } +#else + if (n <= 1) { + return 1; + } else if (n <= 11) { + return 2; + } else if (n <= 45) { + return 3; + } else if (n <= 100) { + return 4; + } else if (n <= 275) { + return 5; + } else if (n <= 625) { + return 6; + } else if (n <= 1850) { + return 7; + } else if (n <= 3400) { + return 8; + } else if (n <= 9630) { + return 9; + } else if (n <= 17900) { + return 10; + } else if (n <= 32800) { + return 11; + } else { + return PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW; + } +#endif +} + +/** + * Returns the maximum optimal number of points for a bucket_window. + */ +static size_t secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(int bucket_window) { + switch(bucket_window) { +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + case 1: return 1; + case 2: return 4; + case 3: return 20; + case 4: return 57; + case 5: return 136; + case 6: return 235; + case 7: return 1260; + case 8: return 1260; + case 9: return 4420; + case 10: return 7880; + case 11: return 16050; + case PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW: return SIZE_MAX; +#else + case 1: return 1; + case 2: return 11; + case 3: return 45; + case 4: return 100; + case 5: return 275; + case 6: return 625; + case 7: return 1850; + case 8: return 3400; + case 9: return 9630; + case 10: return 17900; + case 11: return 32800; + case PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW: return SIZE_MAX; +#endif + } + return 0; +} + + +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_ecmult_endo_split(secp256k1_scalar *s1, secp256k1_scalar *s2, secp256k1_ge *p1, secp256k1_ge *p2) { + secp256k1_scalar tmp = *s1; + secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(s1, s2, &tmp); + secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(p2, p1); + + if (secp256k1_scalar_is_high(s1)) { + secp256k1_scalar_negate(s1, s1); + secp256k1_ge_neg(p1, p1); + } + if (secp256k1_scalar_is_high(s2)) { + secp256k1_scalar_negate(s2, s2); + secp256k1_ge_neg(p2, p2); + } +} +#endif + +/** + * Returns the scratch size required for a given number of points (excluding + * base point G) without considering alignment. + */ +static size_t secp256k1_pippenger_scratch_size(size_t n_points, int bucket_window) { +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + size_t entries = 2*n_points + 2; +#else + size_t entries = n_points + 1; +#endif + size_t entry_size = sizeof(secp256k1_ge) + sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) + sizeof(struct secp256k1_pippenger_point_state) + (WNAF_SIZE(bucket_window+1)+1)*sizeof(int); + return ((1<ps = (struct secp256k1_pippenger_point_state *) secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, entries * sizeof(*state_space->ps)); + state_space->wnaf_na = (int *) secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, entries*(WNAF_SIZE(bucket_window+1)) * sizeof(int)); + buckets = (secp256k1_gej *) secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, (1<ps[i].skew_na = 0; + for(j = 0; j < WNAF_SIZE(bucket_window+1); j++) { + state_space->wnaf_na[i * WNAF_SIZE(bucket_window+1) + j] = 0; + } + } + for(i = 0; i < 1< max_alloc) { + break; + } + space_for_points = max_alloc - space_overhead; + + n_points = space_for_points/entry_size; + n_points = n_points > max_points ? max_points : n_points; + if (n_points > res) { + res = n_points; + } + if (n_points < max_points) { + /* A larger bucket_window may support even more points. But if we + * would choose that then the caller couldn't safely use any number + * smaller than what this function returns */ + break; + } + } + return res; +} + +typedef int (*secp256k1_ecmult_multi_func)(const secp256k1_ecmult_context*, secp256k1_scratch*, secp256k1_gej*, const secp256k1_scalar*, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_callback cb, void*, size_t); +static int secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_scratch *scratch, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_scalar *inp_g_sc, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_callback cb, void *cbdata, size_t n) { + size_t i; + + int (*f)(const secp256k1_ecmult_context*, secp256k1_scratch*, secp256k1_gej*, const secp256k1_scalar*, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_callback cb, void*, size_t, size_t); + size_t max_points; + size_t n_batches; + size_t n_batch_points; + + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(r); + if (inp_g_sc == NULL && n == 0) { + return 1; + } else if (n == 0) { + secp256k1_scalar szero; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&szero, 0); + secp256k1_ecmult(ctx, r, r, &szero, inp_g_sc); + return 1; + } + + max_points = secp256k1_pippenger_max_points(scratch); + if (max_points == 0) { + return 0; + } else if (max_points > ECMULT_MAX_POINTS_PER_BATCH) { + max_points = ECMULT_MAX_POINTS_PER_BATCH; + } + n_batches = (n+max_points-1)/max_points; + n_batch_points = (n+n_batches-1)/n_batches; + + if (n_batch_points >= ECMULT_PIPPENGER_THRESHOLD) { + f = secp256k1_ecmult_pippenger_batch; + } else { + max_points = secp256k1_strauss_max_points(scratch); + if (max_points == 0) { + return 0; + } + n_batches = (n+max_points-1)/max_points; + n_batch_points = (n+n_batches-1)/n_batches; + f = secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_batch; + } + for(i = 0; i < n_batches; i++) { + size_t nbp = n < n_batch_points ? n : n_batch_points; + size_t offset = n_batch_points*i; + secp256k1_gej tmp; + if (!f(ctx, scratch, &tmp, i == 0 ? inp_g_sc : NULL, cb, cbdata, nbp, offset)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_gej_add_var(r, r, &tmp, NULL); + n -= nbp; + } + return 1; +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_ECMULT_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bb6692a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field.h @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_FIELD_H +#define SECP256K1_FIELD_H + +/** Field element module. + * + * Field elements can be represented in several ways, but code accessing + * it (and implementations) need to take certain properties into account: + * - Each field element can be normalized or not. + * - Each field element has a magnitude, which represents how far away + * its representation is away from normalization. Normalized elements + * always have a magnitude of 1, but a magnitude of 1 doesn't imply + * normality. + */ + +#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" +#endif + +#if defined(USE_FIELD_10X26) +#include "field_10x26.h" +#elif defined(USE_FIELD_5X52) +#include "field_5x52.h" +#else +#error "Please select field implementation" +#endif + +#include "util.h" + +/** Normalize a field element. */ +static void secp256k1_fe_normalize(secp256k1_fe *r); + +/** Weakly normalize a field element: reduce it magnitude to 1, but don't fully normalize. */ +static void secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(secp256k1_fe *r); + +/** Normalize a field element, without constant-time guarantee. */ +static void secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(secp256k1_fe *r); + +/** Verify whether a field element represents zero i.e. would normalize to a zero value. The field + * implementation may optionally normalize the input, but this should not be relied upon. */ +static int secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero(secp256k1_fe *r); + +/** Verify whether a field element represents zero i.e. would normalize to a zero value. The field + * implementation may optionally normalize the input, but this should not be relied upon. */ +static int secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(secp256k1_fe *r); + +/** Set a field element equal to a small integer. Resulting field element is normalized. */ +static void secp256k1_fe_set_int(secp256k1_fe *r, int a); + +/** Sets a field element equal to zero, initializing all fields. */ +static void secp256k1_fe_clear(secp256k1_fe *a); + +/** Verify whether a field element is zero. Requires the input to be normalized. */ +static int secp256k1_fe_is_zero(const secp256k1_fe *a); + +/** Check the "oddness" of a field element. Requires the input to be normalized. */ +static int secp256k1_fe_is_odd(const secp256k1_fe *a); + +/** Compare two field elements. Requires magnitude-1 inputs. */ +static int secp256k1_fe_equal(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b); + +/** Same as secp256k1_fe_equal, but may be variable time. */ +static int secp256k1_fe_equal_var(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b); + +/** Compare two field elements. Requires both inputs to be normalized */ +static int secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b); + +/** Set a field element equal to 32-byte big endian value. If successful, the resulting field element is normalized. */ +static int secp256k1_fe_set_b32(secp256k1_fe *r, const unsigned char *a); + +/** Convert a field element to a 32-byte big endian value. Requires the input to be normalized */ +static void secp256k1_fe_get_b32(unsigned char *r, const secp256k1_fe *a); + +/** Set a field element equal to the additive inverse of another. Takes a maximum magnitude of the input + * as an argument. The magnitude of the output is one higher. */ +static void secp256k1_fe_negate(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, int m); + +/** Multiplies the passed field element with a small integer constant. Multiplies the magnitude by that + * small integer. */ +static void secp256k1_fe_mul_int(secp256k1_fe *r, int a); + +/** Adds a field element to another. The result has the sum of the inputs' magnitudes as magnitude. */ +static void secp256k1_fe_add(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a); + +/** Sets a field element to be the product of two others. Requires the inputs' magnitudes to be at most 8. + * The output magnitude is 1 (but not guaranteed to be normalized). */ +static void secp256k1_fe_mul(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe * SECP256K1_RESTRICT b); + +/** Sets a field element to be the square of another. Requires the input's magnitude to be at most 8. + * The output magnitude is 1 (but not guaranteed to be normalized). */ +static void secp256k1_fe_sqr(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a); + +/** If a has a square root, it is computed in r and 1 is returned. If a does not + * have a square root, the root of its negation is computed and 0 is returned. + * The input's magnitude can be at most 8. The output magnitude is 1 (but not + * guaranteed to be normalized). The result in r will always be a square + * itself. */ +static int secp256k1_fe_sqrt(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a); + +/** Checks whether a field element is a quadratic residue. */ +static int secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(const secp256k1_fe *a); + +/** Sets a field element to be the (modular) inverse of another. Requires the input's magnitude to be + * at most 8. The output magnitude is 1 (but not guaranteed to be normalized). */ +static void secp256k1_fe_inv(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a); + +/** Potentially faster version of secp256k1_fe_inv, without constant-time guarantee. */ +static void secp256k1_fe_inv_var(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a); + +/** Calculate the (modular) inverses of a batch of field elements. Requires the inputs' magnitudes to be + * at most 8. The output magnitudes are 1 (but not guaranteed to be normalized). The inputs and + * outputs must not overlap in memory. */ +static void secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, size_t len); + +/** Convert a field element to the storage type. */ +static void secp256k1_fe_to_storage(secp256k1_fe_storage *r, const secp256k1_fe *a); + +/** Convert a field element back from the storage type. */ +static void secp256k1_fe_from_storage(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe_storage *a); + +/** If flag is true, set *r equal to *a; otherwise leave it. Constant-time. */ +static void secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(secp256k1_fe_storage *r, const secp256k1_fe_storage *a, int flag); + +/** If flag is true, set *r equal to *a; otherwise leave it. Constant-time. */ +static void secp256k1_fe_cmov(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, int flag); + +#endif /* SECP256K1_FIELD_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_10x26.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_10x26.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..727c526 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_10x26.h @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_H +#define SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_H + +#include + +typedef struct { + /* X = sum(i=0..9, elem[i]*2^26) mod n */ + uint32_t n[10]; +#ifdef VERIFY + int magnitude; + int normalized; +#endif +} secp256k1_fe; + +/* Unpacks a constant into a overlapping multi-limbed FE element. */ +#define SECP256K1_FE_CONST_INNER(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) { \ + (d0) & 0x3FFFFFFUL, \ + (((uint32_t)d0) >> 26) | (((uint32_t)(d1) & 0xFFFFFUL) << 6), \ + (((uint32_t)d1) >> 20) | (((uint32_t)(d2) & 0x3FFFUL) << 12), \ + (((uint32_t)d2) >> 14) | (((uint32_t)(d3) & 0xFFUL) << 18), \ + (((uint32_t)d3) >> 8) | (((uint32_t)(d4) & 0x3UL) << 24), \ + (((uint32_t)d4) >> 2) & 0x3FFFFFFUL, \ + (((uint32_t)d4) >> 28) | (((uint32_t)(d5) & 0x3FFFFFUL) << 4), \ + (((uint32_t)d5) >> 22) | (((uint32_t)(d6) & 0xFFFFUL) << 10), \ + (((uint32_t)d6) >> 16) | (((uint32_t)(d7) & 0x3FFUL) << 16), \ + (((uint32_t)d7) >> 10) \ +} + +#ifdef VERIFY +#define SECP256K1_FE_CONST(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) {SECP256K1_FE_CONST_INNER((d7), (d6), (d5), (d4), (d3), (d2), (d1), (d0)), 1, 1} +#else +#define SECP256K1_FE_CONST(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) {SECP256K1_FE_CONST_INNER((d7), (d6), (d5), (d4), (d3), (d2), (d1), (d0))} +#endif + +typedef struct { + uint32_t n[8]; +} secp256k1_fe_storage; + +#define SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) {{ (d0), (d1), (d2), (d3), (d4), (d5), (d6), (d7) }} +#define SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST_GET(d) d.n[7], d.n[6], d.n[5], d.n[4],d.n[3], d.n[2], d.n[1], d.n[0] + +#endif /* SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_10x26_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_10x26_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..94f8132 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_10x26_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,1161 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_IMPL_H +#define SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_IMPL_H + +#include "util.h" +#include "num.h" +#include "field.h" + +#ifdef VERIFY +static void secp256k1_fe_verify(const secp256k1_fe *a) { + const uint32_t *d = a->n; + int m = a->normalized ? 1 : 2 * a->magnitude, r = 1; + r &= (d[0] <= 0x3FFFFFFUL * m); + r &= (d[1] <= 0x3FFFFFFUL * m); + r &= (d[2] <= 0x3FFFFFFUL * m); + r &= (d[3] <= 0x3FFFFFFUL * m); + r &= (d[4] <= 0x3FFFFFFUL * m); + r &= (d[5] <= 0x3FFFFFFUL * m); + r &= (d[6] <= 0x3FFFFFFUL * m); + r &= (d[7] <= 0x3FFFFFFUL * m); + r &= (d[8] <= 0x3FFFFFFUL * m); + r &= (d[9] <= 0x03FFFFFUL * m); + r &= (a->magnitude >= 0); + r &= (a->magnitude <= 32); + if (a->normalized) { + r &= (a->magnitude <= 1); + if (r && (d[9] == 0x03FFFFFUL)) { + uint32_t mid = d[8] & d[7] & d[6] & d[5] & d[4] & d[3] & d[2]; + if (mid == 0x3FFFFFFUL) { + r &= ((d[1] + 0x40UL + ((d[0] + 0x3D1UL) >> 26)) <= 0x3FFFFFFUL); + } + } + } + VERIFY_CHECK(r == 1); +} +#endif + +static void secp256k1_fe_normalize(secp256k1_fe *r) { + uint32_t t0 = r->n[0], t1 = r->n[1], t2 = r->n[2], t3 = r->n[3], t4 = r->n[4], + t5 = r->n[5], t6 = r->n[6], t7 = r->n[7], t8 = r->n[8], t9 = r->n[9]; + + /* Reduce t9 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */ + uint32_t m; + uint32_t x = t9 >> 22; t9 &= 0x03FFFFFUL; + + /* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */ + t0 += x * 0x3D1UL; t1 += (x << 6); + t1 += (t0 >> 26); t0 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t2 += (t1 >> 26); t1 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t3 += (t2 >> 26); t2 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m = t2; + t4 += (t3 >> 26); t3 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t3; + t5 += (t4 >> 26); t4 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t4; + t6 += (t5 >> 26); t5 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t5; + t7 += (t6 >> 26); t6 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t6; + t8 += (t7 >> 26); t7 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t7; + t9 += (t8 >> 26); t8 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t8; + + /* ... except for a possible carry at bit 22 of t9 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */ + VERIFY_CHECK(t9 >> 23 == 0); + + /* At most a single final reduction is needed; check if the value is >= the field characteristic */ + x = (t9 >> 22) | ((t9 == 0x03FFFFFUL) & (m == 0x3FFFFFFUL) + & ((t1 + 0x40UL + ((t0 + 0x3D1UL) >> 26)) > 0x3FFFFFFUL)); + + /* Apply the final reduction (for constant-time behaviour, we do it always) */ + t0 += x * 0x3D1UL; t1 += (x << 6); + t1 += (t0 >> 26); t0 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t2 += (t1 >> 26); t1 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t3 += (t2 >> 26); t2 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t4 += (t3 >> 26); t3 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t5 += (t4 >> 26); t4 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t6 += (t5 >> 26); t5 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t7 += (t6 >> 26); t6 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t8 += (t7 >> 26); t7 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t9 += (t8 >> 26); t8 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + + /* If t9 didn't carry to bit 22 already, then it should have after any final reduction */ + VERIFY_CHECK(t9 >> 22 == x); + + /* Mask off the possible multiple of 2^256 from the final reduction */ + t9 &= 0x03FFFFFUL; + + r->n[0] = t0; r->n[1] = t1; r->n[2] = t2; r->n[3] = t3; r->n[4] = t4; + r->n[5] = t5; r->n[6] = t6; r->n[7] = t7; r->n[8] = t8; r->n[9] = t9; + +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude = 1; + r->normalized = 1; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); +#endif +} + +static void secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(secp256k1_fe *r) { + uint32_t t0 = r->n[0], t1 = r->n[1], t2 = r->n[2], t3 = r->n[3], t4 = r->n[4], + t5 = r->n[5], t6 = r->n[6], t7 = r->n[7], t8 = r->n[8], t9 = r->n[9]; + + /* Reduce t9 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */ + uint32_t x = t9 >> 22; t9 &= 0x03FFFFFUL; + + /* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */ + t0 += x * 0x3D1UL; t1 += (x << 6); + t1 += (t0 >> 26); t0 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t2 += (t1 >> 26); t1 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t3 += (t2 >> 26); t2 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t4 += (t3 >> 26); t3 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t5 += (t4 >> 26); t4 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t6 += (t5 >> 26); t5 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t7 += (t6 >> 26); t6 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t8 += (t7 >> 26); t7 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t9 += (t8 >> 26); t8 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + + /* ... except for a possible carry at bit 22 of t9 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */ + VERIFY_CHECK(t9 >> 23 == 0); + + r->n[0] = t0; r->n[1] = t1; r->n[2] = t2; r->n[3] = t3; r->n[4] = t4; + r->n[5] = t5; r->n[6] = t6; r->n[7] = t7; r->n[8] = t8; r->n[9] = t9; + +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude = 1; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); +#endif +} + +static void secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(secp256k1_fe *r) { + uint32_t t0 = r->n[0], t1 = r->n[1], t2 = r->n[2], t3 = r->n[3], t4 = r->n[4], + t5 = r->n[5], t6 = r->n[6], t7 = r->n[7], t8 = r->n[8], t9 = r->n[9]; + + /* Reduce t9 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */ + uint32_t m; + uint32_t x = t9 >> 22; t9 &= 0x03FFFFFUL; + + /* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */ + t0 += x * 0x3D1UL; t1 += (x << 6); + t1 += (t0 >> 26); t0 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t2 += (t1 >> 26); t1 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t3 += (t2 >> 26); t2 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m = t2; + t4 += (t3 >> 26); t3 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t3; + t5 += (t4 >> 26); t4 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t4; + t6 += (t5 >> 26); t5 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t5; + t7 += (t6 >> 26); t6 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t6; + t8 += (t7 >> 26); t7 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t7; + t9 += (t8 >> 26); t8 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t8; + + /* ... except for a possible carry at bit 22 of t9 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */ + VERIFY_CHECK(t9 >> 23 == 0); + + /* At most a single final reduction is needed; check if the value is >= the field characteristic */ + x = (t9 >> 22) | ((t9 == 0x03FFFFFUL) & (m == 0x3FFFFFFUL) + & ((t1 + 0x40UL + ((t0 + 0x3D1UL) >> 26)) > 0x3FFFFFFUL)); + + if (x) { + t0 += 0x3D1UL; t1 += (x << 6); + t1 += (t0 >> 26); t0 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t2 += (t1 >> 26); t1 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t3 += (t2 >> 26); t2 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t4 += (t3 >> 26); t3 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t5 += (t4 >> 26); t4 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t6 += (t5 >> 26); t5 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t7 += (t6 >> 26); t6 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t8 += (t7 >> 26); t7 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + t9 += (t8 >> 26); t8 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; + + /* If t9 didn't carry to bit 22 already, then it should have after any final reduction */ + VERIFY_CHECK(t9 >> 22 == x); + + /* Mask off the possible multiple of 2^256 from the final reduction */ + t9 &= 0x03FFFFFUL; + } + + r->n[0] = t0; r->n[1] = t1; r->n[2] = t2; r->n[3] = t3; r->n[4] = t4; + r->n[5] = t5; r->n[6] = t6; r->n[7] = t7; r->n[8] = t8; r->n[9] = t9; + +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude = 1; + r->normalized = 1; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); +#endif +} + +static int secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero(secp256k1_fe *r) { + uint32_t t0 = r->n[0], t1 = r->n[1], t2 = r->n[2], t3 = r->n[3], t4 = r->n[4], + t5 = r->n[5], t6 = r->n[6], t7 = r->n[7], t8 = r->n[8], t9 = r->n[9]; + + /* z0 tracks a possible raw value of 0, z1 tracks a possible raw value of P */ + uint32_t z0, z1; + + /* Reduce t9 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */ + uint32_t x = t9 >> 22; t9 &= 0x03FFFFFUL; + + /* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */ + t0 += x * 0x3D1UL; t1 += (x << 6); + t1 += (t0 >> 26); t0 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 = t0; z1 = t0 ^ 0x3D0UL; + t2 += (t1 >> 26); t1 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t1; z1 &= t1 ^ 0x40UL; + t3 += (t2 >> 26); t2 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t2; z1 &= t2; + t4 += (t3 >> 26); t3 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t3; z1 &= t3; + t5 += (t4 >> 26); t4 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t4; z1 &= t4; + t6 += (t5 >> 26); t5 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t5; z1 &= t5; + t7 += (t6 >> 26); t6 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t6; z1 &= t6; + t8 += (t7 >> 26); t7 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t7; z1 &= t7; + t9 += (t8 >> 26); t8 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t8; z1 &= t8; + z0 |= t9; z1 &= t9 ^ 0x3C00000UL; + + /* ... except for a possible carry at bit 22 of t9 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */ + VERIFY_CHECK(t9 >> 23 == 0); + + return (z0 == 0) | (z1 == 0x3FFFFFFUL); +} + +static int secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(secp256k1_fe *r) { + uint32_t t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8, t9; + uint32_t z0, z1; + uint32_t x; + + t0 = r->n[0]; + t9 = r->n[9]; + + /* Reduce t9 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */ + x = t9 >> 22; + + /* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */ + t0 += x * 0x3D1UL; + + /* z0 tracks a possible raw value of 0, z1 tracks a possible raw value of P */ + z0 = t0 & 0x3FFFFFFUL; + z1 = z0 ^ 0x3D0UL; + + /* Fast return path should catch the majority of cases */ + if ((z0 != 0UL) & (z1 != 0x3FFFFFFUL)) { + return 0; + } + + t1 = r->n[1]; + t2 = r->n[2]; + t3 = r->n[3]; + t4 = r->n[4]; + t5 = r->n[5]; + t6 = r->n[6]; + t7 = r->n[7]; + t8 = r->n[8]; + + t9 &= 0x03FFFFFUL; + t1 += (x << 6); + + t1 += (t0 >> 26); + t2 += (t1 >> 26); t1 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t1; z1 &= t1 ^ 0x40UL; + t3 += (t2 >> 26); t2 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t2; z1 &= t2; + t4 += (t3 >> 26); t3 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t3; z1 &= t3; + t5 += (t4 >> 26); t4 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t4; z1 &= t4; + t6 += (t5 >> 26); t5 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t5; z1 &= t5; + t7 += (t6 >> 26); t6 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t6; z1 &= t6; + t8 += (t7 >> 26); t7 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t7; z1 &= t7; + t9 += (t8 >> 26); t8 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t8; z1 &= t8; + z0 |= t9; z1 &= t9 ^ 0x3C00000UL; + + /* ... except for a possible carry at bit 22 of t9 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */ + VERIFY_CHECK(t9 >> 23 == 0); + + return (z0 == 0) | (z1 == 0x3FFFFFFUL); +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_set_int(secp256k1_fe *r, int a) { + r->n[0] = a; + r->n[1] = r->n[2] = r->n[3] = r->n[4] = r->n[5] = r->n[6] = r->n[7] = r->n[8] = r->n[9] = 0; +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude = 1; + r->normalized = 1; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); +#endif +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_fe_is_zero(const secp256k1_fe *a) { + const uint32_t *t = a->n; +#ifdef VERIFY + VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized); + secp256k1_fe_verify(a); +#endif + return (t[0] | t[1] | t[2] | t[3] | t[4] | t[5] | t[6] | t[7] | t[8] | t[9]) == 0; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_fe_is_odd(const secp256k1_fe *a) { +#ifdef VERIFY + VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized); + secp256k1_fe_verify(a); +#endif + return a->n[0] & 1; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_clear(secp256k1_fe *a) { + int i; +#ifdef VERIFY + a->magnitude = 0; + a->normalized = 1; +#endif + for (i=0; i<10; i++) { + a->n[i] = 0; + } +} + +static int secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) { + int i; +#ifdef VERIFY + VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized); + VERIFY_CHECK(b->normalized); + secp256k1_fe_verify(a); + secp256k1_fe_verify(b); +#endif + for (i = 9; i >= 0; i--) { + if (a->n[i] > b->n[i]) { + return 1; + } + if (a->n[i] < b->n[i]) { + return -1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static int secp256k1_fe_set_b32(secp256k1_fe *r, const unsigned char *a) { + r->n[0] = (uint32_t)a[31] | ((uint32_t)a[30] << 8) | ((uint32_t)a[29] << 16) | ((uint32_t)(a[28] & 0x3) << 24); + r->n[1] = (uint32_t)((a[28] >> 2) & 0x3f) | ((uint32_t)a[27] << 6) | ((uint32_t)a[26] << 14) | ((uint32_t)(a[25] & 0xf) << 22); + r->n[2] = (uint32_t)((a[25] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((uint32_t)a[24] << 4) | ((uint32_t)a[23] << 12) | ((uint32_t)(a[22] & 0x3f) << 20); + r->n[3] = (uint32_t)((a[22] >> 6) & 0x3) | ((uint32_t)a[21] << 2) | ((uint32_t)a[20] << 10) | ((uint32_t)a[19] << 18); + r->n[4] = (uint32_t)a[18] | ((uint32_t)a[17] << 8) | ((uint32_t)a[16] << 16) | ((uint32_t)(a[15] & 0x3) << 24); + r->n[5] = (uint32_t)((a[15] >> 2) & 0x3f) | ((uint32_t)a[14] << 6) | ((uint32_t)a[13] << 14) | ((uint32_t)(a[12] & 0xf) << 22); + r->n[6] = (uint32_t)((a[12] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((uint32_t)a[11] << 4) | ((uint32_t)a[10] << 12) | ((uint32_t)(a[9] & 0x3f) << 20); + r->n[7] = (uint32_t)((a[9] >> 6) & 0x3) | ((uint32_t)a[8] << 2) | ((uint32_t)a[7] << 10) | ((uint32_t)a[6] << 18); + r->n[8] = (uint32_t)a[5] | ((uint32_t)a[4] << 8) | ((uint32_t)a[3] << 16) | ((uint32_t)(a[2] & 0x3) << 24); + r->n[9] = (uint32_t)((a[2] >> 2) & 0x3f) | ((uint32_t)a[1] << 6) | ((uint32_t)a[0] << 14); + + if (r->n[9] == 0x3FFFFFUL && (r->n[8] & r->n[7] & r->n[6] & r->n[5] & r->n[4] & r->n[3] & r->n[2]) == 0x3FFFFFFUL && (r->n[1] + 0x40UL + ((r->n[0] + 0x3D1UL) >> 26)) > 0x3FFFFFFUL) { + return 0; + } +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude = 1; + r->normalized = 1; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); +#endif + return 1; +} + +/** Convert a field element to a 32-byte big endian value. Requires the input to be normalized */ +static void secp256k1_fe_get_b32(unsigned char *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { +#ifdef VERIFY + VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized); + secp256k1_fe_verify(a); +#endif + r[0] = (a->n[9] >> 14) & 0xff; + r[1] = (a->n[9] >> 6) & 0xff; + r[2] = ((a->n[9] & 0x3F) << 2) | ((a->n[8] >> 24) & 0x3); + r[3] = (a->n[8] >> 16) & 0xff; + r[4] = (a->n[8] >> 8) & 0xff; + r[5] = a->n[8] & 0xff; + r[6] = (a->n[7] >> 18) & 0xff; + r[7] = (a->n[7] >> 10) & 0xff; + r[8] = (a->n[7] >> 2) & 0xff; + r[9] = ((a->n[7] & 0x3) << 6) | ((a->n[6] >> 20) & 0x3f); + r[10] = (a->n[6] >> 12) & 0xff; + r[11] = (a->n[6] >> 4) & 0xff; + r[12] = ((a->n[6] & 0xf) << 4) | ((a->n[5] >> 22) & 0xf); + r[13] = (a->n[5] >> 14) & 0xff; + r[14] = (a->n[5] >> 6) & 0xff; + r[15] = ((a->n[5] & 0x3f) << 2) | ((a->n[4] >> 24) & 0x3); + r[16] = (a->n[4] >> 16) & 0xff; + r[17] = (a->n[4] >> 8) & 0xff; + r[18] = a->n[4] & 0xff; + r[19] = (a->n[3] >> 18) & 0xff; + r[20] = (a->n[3] >> 10) & 0xff; + r[21] = (a->n[3] >> 2) & 0xff; + r[22] = ((a->n[3] & 0x3) << 6) | ((a->n[2] >> 20) & 0x3f); + r[23] = (a->n[2] >> 12) & 0xff; + r[24] = (a->n[2] >> 4) & 0xff; + r[25] = ((a->n[2] & 0xf) << 4) | ((a->n[1] >> 22) & 0xf); + r[26] = (a->n[1] >> 14) & 0xff; + r[27] = (a->n[1] >> 6) & 0xff; + r[28] = ((a->n[1] & 0x3f) << 2) | ((a->n[0] >> 24) & 0x3); + r[29] = (a->n[0] >> 16) & 0xff; + r[30] = (a->n[0] >> 8) & 0xff; + r[31] = a->n[0] & 0xff; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_negate(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, int m) { +#ifdef VERIFY + VERIFY_CHECK(a->magnitude <= m); + secp256k1_fe_verify(a); +#endif + r->n[0] = 0x3FFFC2FUL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[0]; + r->n[1] = 0x3FFFFBFUL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[1]; + r->n[2] = 0x3FFFFFFUL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[2]; + r->n[3] = 0x3FFFFFFUL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[3]; + r->n[4] = 0x3FFFFFFUL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[4]; + r->n[5] = 0x3FFFFFFUL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[5]; + r->n[6] = 0x3FFFFFFUL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[6]; + r->n[7] = 0x3FFFFFFUL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[7]; + r->n[8] = 0x3FFFFFFUL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[8]; + r->n[9] = 0x03FFFFFUL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[9]; +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude = m + 1; + r->normalized = 0; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); +#endif +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_mul_int(secp256k1_fe *r, int a) { + r->n[0] *= a; + r->n[1] *= a; + r->n[2] *= a; + r->n[3] *= a; + r->n[4] *= a; + r->n[5] *= a; + r->n[6] *= a; + r->n[7] *= a; + r->n[8] *= a; + r->n[9] *= a; +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude *= a; + r->normalized = 0; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); +#endif +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_add(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { +#ifdef VERIFY + secp256k1_fe_verify(a); +#endif + r->n[0] += a->n[0]; + r->n[1] += a->n[1]; + r->n[2] += a->n[2]; + r->n[3] += a->n[3]; + r->n[4] += a->n[4]; + r->n[5] += a->n[5]; + r->n[6] += a->n[6]; + r->n[7] += a->n[7]; + r->n[8] += a->n[8]; + r->n[9] += a->n[9]; +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude += a->magnitude; + r->normalized = 0; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); +#endif +} + +#if defined(USE_EXTERNAL_ASM) + +/* External assembler implementation */ +void secp256k1_fe_mul_inner(uint32_t *r, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t * SECP256K1_RESTRICT b); +void secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner(uint32_t *r, const uint32_t *a); + +#else + +#ifdef VERIFY +#define VERIFY_BITS(x, n) VERIFY_CHECK(((x) >> (n)) == 0) +#else +#define VERIFY_BITS(x, n) do { } while(0) +#endif + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_mul_inner(uint32_t *r, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t * SECP256K1_RESTRICT b) { + uint64_t c, d; + uint64_t u0, u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u7, u8; + uint32_t t9, t1, t0, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7; + const uint32_t M = 0x3FFFFFFUL, R0 = 0x3D10UL, R1 = 0x400UL; + + VERIFY_BITS(a[0], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(a[1], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(a[2], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(a[3], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(a[4], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(a[5], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(a[6], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(a[7], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(a[8], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(a[9], 26); + VERIFY_BITS(b[0], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(b[1], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(b[2], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(b[3], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(b[4], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(b[5], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(b[6], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(b[7], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(b[8], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(b[9], 26); + + /** [... a b c] is a shorthand for ... + a<<52 + b<<26 + c<<0 mod n. + * px is a shorthand for sum(a[i]*b[x-i], i=0..x). + * Note that [x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] = [x*R1 x*R0]. + */ + + d = (uint64_t)a[0] * b[9] + + (uint64_t)a[1] * b[8] + + (uint64_t)a[2] * b[7] + + (uint64_t)a[3] * b[6] + + (uint64_t)a[4] * b[5] + + (uint64_t)a[5] * b[4] + + (uint64_t)a[6] * b[3] + + (uint64_t)a[7] * b[2] + + (uint64_t)a[8] * b[1] + + (uint64_t)a[9] * b[0]; + /* VERIFY_BITS(d, 64); */ + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] = [p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] */ + t9 = d & M; d >>= 26; + VERIFY_BITS(t9, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 38); + /* [d t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] = [p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] */ + + c = (uint64_t)a[0] * b[0]; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 60); + /* [d t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c] = [p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p0] */ + d += (uint64_t)a[1] * b[9] + + (uint64_t)a[2] * b[8] + + (uint64_t)a[3] * b[7] + + (uint64_t)a[4] * b[6] + + (uint64_t)a[5] * b[5] + + (uint64_t)a[6] * b[4] + + (uint64_t)a[7] * b[3] + + (uint64_t)a[8] * b[2] + + (uint64_t)a[9] * b[1]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); + /* [d t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c] = [p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p0] */ + u0 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u0 * R0; + VERIFY_BITS(u0, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 37); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 61); + /* [d u0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-u0*R0] = [p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p0] */ + t0 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u0 * R1; + VERIFY_BITS(t0, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 37); + /* [d u0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-u0*R1 t0-u0*R0] = [p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p0] */ + /* [d 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t0] = [p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p0] */ + + c += (uint64_t)a[0] * b[1] + + (uint64_t)a[1] * b[0]; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 62); + /* [d 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t0] = [p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 p0] */ + d += (uint64_t)a[2] * b[9] + + (uint64_t)a[3] * b[8] + + (uint64_t)a[4] * b[7] + + (uint64_t)a[5] * b[6] + + (uint64_t)a[6] * b[5] + + (uint64_t)a[7] * b[4] + + (uint64_t)a[8] * b[3] + + (uint64_t)a[9] * b[2]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); + /* [d 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t0] = [p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 p0] */ + u1 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u1 * R0; + VERIFY_BITS(u1, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 37); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); + /* [d u1 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-u1*R0 t0] = [p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 p0] */ + t1 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u1 * R1; + VERIFY_BITS(t1, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 38); + /* [d u1 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-u1*R1 t1-u1*R0 t0] = [p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 p0] */ + /* [d 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t1 t0] = [p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 p0] */ + + c += (uint64_t)a[0] * b[2] + + (uint64_t)a[1] * b[1] + + (uint64_t)a[2] * b[0]; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 62); + /* [d 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t1 t0] = [p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 p1 p0] */ + d += (uint64_t)a[3] * b[9] + + (uint64_t)a[4] * b[8] + + (uint64_t)a[5] * b[7] + + (uint64_t)a[6] * b[6] + + (uint64_t)a[7] * b[5] + + (uint64_t)a[8] * b[4] + + (uint64_t)a[9] * b[3]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); + /* [d 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t1 t0] = [p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 p1 p0] */ + u2 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u2 * R0; + VERIFY_BITS(u2, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 37); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); + /* [d u2 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-u2*R0 t1 t0] = [p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 p1 p0] */ + t2 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u2 * R1; + VERIFY_BITS(t2, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 38); + /* [d u2 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 c-u2*R1 t2-u2*R0 t1 t0] = [p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 p1 p0] */ + /* [d 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 c t2 t1 t0] = [p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 p1 p0] */ + + c += (uint64_t)a[0] * b[3] + + (uint64_t)a[1] * b[2] + + (uint64_t)a[2] * b[1] + + (uint64_t)a[3] * b[0]; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); + /* [d 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 c t2 t1 t0] = [p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + d += (uint64_t)a[4] * b[9] + + (uint64_t)a[5] * b[8] + + (uint64_t)a[6] * b[7] + + (uint64_t)a[7] * b[6] + + (uint64_t)a[8] * b[5] + + (uint64_t)a[9] * b[4]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); + /* [d 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 c t2 t1 t0] = [p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + u3 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u3 * R0; + VERIFY_BITS(u3, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 37); + /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ + /* [d u3 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 c-u3*R0 t2 t1 t0] = [p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + t3 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u3 * R1; + VERIFY_BITS(t3, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 39); + /* [d u3 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 c-u3*R1 t3-u3*R0 t2 t1 t0] = [p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + /* [d 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 c t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + + c += (uint64_t)a[0] * b[4] + + (uint64_t)a[1] * b[3] + + (uint64_t)a[2] * b[2] + + (uint64_t)a[3] * b[1] + + (uint64_t)a[4] * b[0]; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 c t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + d += (uint64_t)a[5] * b[9] + + (uint64_t)a[6] * b[8] + + (uint64_t)a[7] * b[7] + + (uint64_t)a[8] * b[6] + + (uint64_t)a[9] * b[5]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 62); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 c t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + u4 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u4 * R0; + VERIFY_BITS(u4, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 36); + /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ + /* [d u4 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 c-u4*R0 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + t4 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u4 * R1; + VERIFY_BITS(t4, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 39); + /* [d u4 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 c-u4*R1 t4-u4*R0 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 c t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + + c += (uint64_t)a[0] * b[5] + + (uint64_t)a[1] * b[4] + + (uint64_t)a[2] * b[3] + + (uint64_t)a[3] * b[2] + + (uint64_t)a[4] * b[1] + + (uint64_t)a[5] * b[0]; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 c t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + d += (uint64_t)a[6] * b[9] + + (uint64_t)a[7] * b[8] + + (uint64_t)a[8] * b[7] + + (uint64_t)a[9] * b[6]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 62); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 c t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + u5 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u5 * R0; + VERIFY_BITS(u5, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 36); + /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ + /* [d u5 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 c-u5*R0 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + t5 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u5 * R1; + VERIFY_BITS(t5, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 39); + /* [d u5 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 c-u5*R1 t5-u5*R0 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 c t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + + c += (uint64_t)a[0] * b[6] + + (uint64_t)a[1] * b[5] + + (uint64_t)a[2] * b[4] + + (uint64_t)a[3] * b[3] + + (uint64_t)a[4] * b[2] + + (uint64_t)a[5] * b[1] + + (uint64_t)a[6] * b[0]; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 c t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + d += (uint64_t)a[7] * b[9] + + (uint64_t)a[8] * b[8] + + (uint64_t)a[9] * b[7]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 61); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 c t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + u6 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u6 * R0; + VERIFY_BITS(u6, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 35); + /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ + /* [d u6 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 c-u6*R0 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + t6 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u6 * R1; + VERIFY_BITS(t6, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 39); + /* [d u6 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 c-u6*R1 t6-u6*R0 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 c t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + + c += (uint64_t)a[0] * b[7] + + (uint64_t)a[1] * b[6] + + (uint64_t)a[2] * b[5] + + (uint64_t)a[3] * b[4] + + (uint64_t)a[4] * b[3] + + (uint64_t)a[5] * b[2] + + (uint64_t)a[6] * b[1] + + (uint64_t)a[7] * b[0]; + /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ + VERIFY_CHECK(c <= 0x8000007C00000007ULL); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 c t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + d += (uint64_t)a[8] * b[9] + + (uint64_t)a[9] * b[8]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 58); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 c t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + u7 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u7 * R0; + VERIFY_BITS(u7, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 32); + /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ + VERIFY_CHECK(c <= 0x800001703FFFC2F7ULL); + /* [d u7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 c-u7*R0 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + t7 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u7 * R1; + VERIFY_BITS(t7, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 38); + /* [d u7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u7*R1 t7-u7*R0 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c t7 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + + c += (uint64_t)a[0] * b[8] + + (uint64_t)a[1] * b[7] + + (uint64_t)a[2] * b[6] + + (uint64_t)a[3] * b[5] + + (uint64_t)a[4] * b[4] + + (uint64_t)a[5] * b[3] + + (uint64_t)a[6] * b[2] + + (uint64_t)a[7] * b[1] + + (uint64_t)a[8] * b[0]; + /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ + VERIFY_CHECK(c <= 0x9000007B80000008ULL); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c t7 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + d += (uint64_t)a[9] * b[9]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 57); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c t7 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + u8 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u8 * R0; + VERIFY_BITS(u8, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 31); + /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ + VERIFY_CHECK(c <= 0x9000016FBFFFC2F8ULL); + /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 t7 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + + r[3] = t3; + VERIFY_BITS(r[3], 26); + /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 t7 t6 t5 t4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[4] = t4; + VERIFY_BITS(r[4], 26); + /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 t7 t6 t5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[5] = t5; + VERIFY_BITS(r[5], 26); + /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 t7 t6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[6] = t6; + VERIFY_BITS(r[6], 26); + /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 t7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[7] = t7; + VERIFY_BITS(r[7], 26); + /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + + r[8] = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u8 * R1; + VERIFY_BITS(r[8], 26); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 39); + /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9+c-u8*R1 r8-u8*R0 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9+c r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + c += d * R0 + t9; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 45); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-d*R0 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[9] = c & (M >> 4); c >>= 22; c += d * (R1 << 4); + VERIFY_BITS(r[9], 22); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 46); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 r9+((c-d*R1<<4)<<22)-d*R0 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -d*R1 r9+(c<<22)-d*R0 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + /* [r9+(c<<22) r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + + d = c * (R0 >> 4) + t0; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 56); + /* [r9+(c<<22) r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 d-c*R0>>4] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[0] = d & M; d >>= 26; + VERIFY_BITS(r[0], 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 30); + /* [r9+(c<<22) r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1+d r0-c*R0>>4] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + d += c * (R1 >> 4) + t1; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 53); + VERIFY_CHECK(d <= 0x10000003FFFFBFULL); + /* [r9+(c<<22) r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 d-c*R1>>4 r0-c*R0>>4] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + /* [r9 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 d r0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[1] = d & M; d >>= 26; + VERIFY_BITS(r[1], 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 27); + VERIFY_CHECK(d <= 0x4000000ULL); + /* [r9 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2+d r1 r0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + d += t2; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 27); + /* [r9 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 d r1 r0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[2] = d; + VERIFY_BITS(r[2], 27); + /* [r9 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 r2 r1 r0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner(uint32_t *r, const uint32_t *a) { + uint64_t c, d; + uint64_t u0, u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u7, u8; + uint32_t t9, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7; + const uint32_t M = 0x3FFFFFFUL, R0 = 0x3D10UL, R1 = 0x400UL; + + VERIFY_BITS(a[0], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(a[1], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(a[2], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(a[3], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(a[4], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(a[5], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(a[6], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(a[7], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(a[8], 30); + VERIFY_BITS(a[9], 26); + + /** [... a b c] is a shorthand for ... + a<<52 + b<<26 + c<<0 mod n. + * px is a shorthand for sum(a[i]*a[x-i], i=0..x). + * Note that [x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] = [x*R1 x*R0]. + */ + + d = (uint64_t)(a[0]*2) * a[9] + + (uint64_t)(a[1]*2) * a[8] + + (uint64_t)(a[2]*2) * a[7] + + (uint64_t)(a[3]*2) * a[6] + + (uint64_t)(a[4]*2) * a[5]; + /* VERIFY_BITS(d, 64); */ + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] = [p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] */ + t9 = d & M; d >>= 26; + VERIFY_BITS(t9, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 38); + /* [d t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] = [p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] */ + + c = (uint64_t)a[0] * a[0]; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 60); + /* [d t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c] = [p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p0] */ + d += (uint64_t)(a[1]*2) * a[9] + + (uint64_t)(a[2]*2) * a[8] + + (uint64_t)(a[3]*2) * a[7] + + (uint64_t)(a[4]*2) * a[6] + + (uint64_t)a[5] * a[5]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); + /* [d t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c] = [p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p0] */ + u0 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u0 * R0; + VERIFY_BITS(u0, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 37); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 61); + /* [d u0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-u0*R0] = [p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p0] */ + t0 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u0 * R1; + VERIFY_BITS(t0, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 37); + /* [d u0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-u0*R1 t0-u0*R0] = [p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p0] */ + /* [d 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t0] = [p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p0] */ + + c += (uint64_t)(a[0]*2) * a[1]; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 62); + /* [d 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t0] = [p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 p0] */ + d += (uint64_t)(a[2]*2) * a[9] + + (uint64_t)(a[3]*2) * a[8] + + (uint64_t)(a[4]*2) * a[7] + + (uint64_t)(a[5]*2) * a[6]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); + /* [d 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t0] = [p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 p0] */ + u1 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u1 * R0; + VERIFY_BITS(u1, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 37); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); + /* [d u1 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-u1*R0 t0] = [p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 p0] */ + t1 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u1 * R1; + VERIFY_BITS(t1, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 38); + /* [d u1 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-u1*R1 t1-u1*R0 t0] = [p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 p0] */ + /* [d 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t1 t0] = [p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 p0] */ + + c += (uint64_t)(a[0]*2) * a[2] + + (uint64_t)a[1] * a[1]; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 62); + /* [d 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t1 t0] = [p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 p1 p0] */ + d += (uint64_t)(a[3]*2) * a[9] + + (uint64_t)(a[4]*2) * a[8] + + (uint64_t)(a[5]*2) * a[7] + + (uint64_t)a[6] * a[6]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); + /* [d 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t1 t0] = [p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 p1 p0] */ + u2 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u2 * R0; + VERIFY_BITS(u2, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 37); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); + /* [d u2 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-u2*R0 t1 t0] = [p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 p1 p0] */ + t2 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u2 * R1; + VERIFY_BITS(t2, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 38); + /* [d u2 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 c-u2*R1 t2-u2*R0 t1 t0] = [p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 p1 p0] */ + /* [d 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 c t2 t1 t0] = [p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 p1 p0] */ + + c += (uint64_t)(a[0]*2) * a[3] + + (uint64_t)(a[1]*2) * a[2]; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); + /* [d 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 c t2 t1 t0] = [p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + d += (uint64_t)(a[4]*2) * a[9] + + (uint64_t)(a[5]*2) * a[8] + + (uint64_t)(a[6]*2) * a[7]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); + /* [d 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 c t2 t1 t0] = [p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + u3 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u3 * R0; + VERIFY_BITS(u3, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 37); + /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ + /* [d u3 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 c-u3*R0 t2 t1 t0] = [p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + t3 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u3 * R1; + VERIFY_BITS(t3, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 39); + /* [d u3 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 c-u3*R1 t3-u3*R0 t2 t1 t0] = [p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + /* [d 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 c t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + + c += (uint64_t)(a[0]*2) * a[4] + + (uint64_t)(a[1]*2) * a[3] + + (uint64_t)a[2] * a[2]; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 c t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + d += (uint64_t)(a[5]*2) * a[9] + + (uint64_t)(a[6]*2) * a[8] + + (uint64_t)a[7] * a[7]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 62); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 c t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + u4 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u4 * R0; + VERIFY_BITS(u4, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 36); + /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ + /* [d u4 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 c-u4*R0 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + t4 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u4 * R1; + VERIFY_BITS(t4, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 39); + /* [d u4 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 c-u4*R1 t4-u4*R0 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 c t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + + c += (uint64_t)(a[0]*2) * a[5] + + (uint64_t)(a[1]*2) * a[4] + + (uint64_t)(a[2]*2) * a[3]; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 c t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + d += (uint64_t)(a[6]*2) * a[9] + + (uint64_t)(a[7]*2) * a[8]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 62); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 c t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + u5 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u5 * R0; + VERIFY_BITS(u5, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 36); + /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ + /* [d u5 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 c-u5*R0 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + t5 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u5 * R1; + VERIFY_BITS(t5, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 39); + /* [d u5 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 c-u5*R1 t5-u5*R0 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 c t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + + c += (uint64_t)(a[0]*2) * a[6] + + (uint64_t)(a[1]*2) * a[5] + + (uint64_t)(a[2]*2) * a[4] + + (uint64_t)a[3] * a[3]; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 c t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + d += (uint64_t)(a[7]*2) * a[9] + + (uint64_t)a[8] * a[8]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 61); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 c t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + u6 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u6 * R0; + VERIFY_BITS(u6, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 35); + /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ + /* [d u6 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 c-u6*R0 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + t6 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u6 * R1; + VERIFY_BITS(t6, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 39); + /* [d u6 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 c-u6*R1 t6-u6*R0 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 c t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + + c += (uint64_t)(a[0]*2) * a[7] + + (uint64_t)(a[1]*2) * a[6] + + (uint64_t)(a[2]*2) * a[5] + + (uint64_t)(a[3]*2) * a[4]; + /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ + VERIFY_CHECK(c <= 0x8000007C00000007ULL); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 c t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + d += (uint64_t)(a[8]*2) * a[9]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 58); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 c t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + u7 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u7 * R0; + VERIFY_BITS(u7, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 32); + /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ + VERIFY_CHECK(c <= 0x800001703FFFC2F7ULL); + /* [d u7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 c-u7*R0 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + t7 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u7 * R1; + VERIFY_BITS(t7, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 38); + /* [d u7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u7*R1 t7-u7*R0 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c t7 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + + c += (uint64_t)(a[0]*2) * a[8] + + (uint64_t)(a[1]*2) * a[7] + + (uint64_t)(a[2]*2) * a[6] + + (uint64_t)(a[3]*2) * a[5] + + (uint64_t)a[4] * a[4]; + /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ + VERIFY_CHECK(c <= 0x9000007B80000008ULL); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c t7 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + d += (uint64_t)a[9] * a[9]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 57); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c t7 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + u8 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u8 * R0; + VERIFY_BITS(u8, 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 31); + /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ + VERIFY_CHECK(c <= 0x9000016FBFFFC2F8ULL); + /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 t7 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + + r[3] = t3; + VERIFY_BITS(r[3], 26); + /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 t7 t6 t5 t4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[4] = t4; + VERIFY_BITS(r[4], 26); + /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 t7 t6 t5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[5] = t5; + VERIFY_BITS(r[5], 26); + /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 t7 t6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[6] = t6; + VERIFY_BITS(r[6], 26); + /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 t7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[7] = t7; + VERIFY_BITS(r[7], 26); + /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + + r[8] = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u8 * R1; + VERIFY_BITS(r[8], 26); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 39); + /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9+c-u8*R1 r8-u8*R0 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9+c r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + c += d * R0 + t9; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 45); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-d*R0 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[9] = c & (M >> 4); c >>= 22; c += d * (R1 << 4); + VERIFY_BITS(r[9], 22); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 46); + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 r9+((c-d*R1<<4)<<22)-d*R0 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -d*R1 r9+(c<<22)-d*R0 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + /* [r9+(c<<22) r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + + d = c * (R0 >> 4) + t0; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 56); + /* [r9+(c<<22) r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 d-c*R0>>4] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[0] = d & M; d >>= 26; + VERIFY_BITS(r[0], 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 30); + /* [r9+(c<<22) r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1+d r0-c*R0>>4] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + d += c * (R1 >> 4) + t1; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 53); + VERIFY_CHECK(d <= 0x10000003FFFFBFULL); + /* [r9+(c<<22) r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 d-c*R1>>4 r0-c*R0>>4] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + /* [r9 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 d r0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[1] = d & M; d >>= 26; + VERIFY_BITS(r[1], 26); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 27); + VERIFY_CHECK(d <= 0x4000000ULL); + /* [r9 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2+d r1 r0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + d += t2; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 27); + /* [r9 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 d r1 r0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[2] = d; + VERIFY_BITS(r[2], 27); + /* [r9 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 r2 r1 r0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ +} +#endif + +static void secp256k1_fe_mul(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe * SECP256K1_RESTRICT b) { +#ifdef VERIFY + VERIFY_CHECK(a->magnitude <= 8); + VERIFY_CHECK(b->magnitude <= 8); + secp256k1_fe_verify(a); + secp256k1_fe_verify(b); + VERIFY_CHECK(r != b); +#endif + secp256k1_fe_mul_inner(r->n, a->n, b->n); +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude = 1; + r->normalized = 0; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); +#endif +} + +static void secp256k1_fe_sqr(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { +#ifdef VERIFY + VERIFY_CHECK(a->magnitude <= 8); + secp256k1_fe_verify(a); +#endif + secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner(r->n, a->n); +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude = 1; + r->normalized = 0; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); +#endif +} + +static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_cmov(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, int flag) { + uint32_t mask0, mask1; + mask0 = flag + ~((uint32_t)0); + mask1 = ~mask0; + r->n[0] = (r->n[0] & mask0) | (a->n[0] & mask1); + r->n[1] = (r->n[1] & mask0) | (a->n[1] & mask1); + r->n[2] = (r->n[2] & mask0) | (a->n[2] & mask1); + r->n[3] = (r->n[3] & mask0) | (a->n[3] & mask1); + r->n[4] = (r->n[4] & mask0) | (a->n[4] & mask1); + r->n[5] = (r->n[5] & mask0) | (a->n[5] & mask1); + r->n[6] = (r->n[6] & mask0) | (a->n[6] & mask1); + r->n[7] = (r->n[7] & mask0) | (a->n[7] & mask1); + r->n[8] = (r->n[8] & mask0) | (a->n[8] & mask1); + r->n[9] = (r->n[9] & mask0) | (a->n[9] & mask1); +#ifdef VERIFY + if (a->magnitude > r->magnitude) { + r->magnitude = a->magnitude; + } + r->normalized &= a->normalized; +#endif +} + +static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(secp256k1_fe_storage *r, const secp256k1_fe_storage *a, int flag) { + uint32_t mask0, mask1; + mask0 = flag + ~((uint32_t)0); + mask1 = ~mask0; + r->n[0] = (r->n[0] & mask0) | (a->n[0] & mask1); + r->n[1] = (r->n[1] & mask0) | (a->n[1] & mask1); + r->n[2] = (r->n[2] & mask0) | (a->n[2] & mask1); + r->n[3] = (r->n[3] & mask0) | (a->n[3] & mask1); + r->n[4] = (r->n[4] & mask0) | (a->n[4] & mask1); + r->n[5] = (r->n[5] & mask0) | (a->n[5] & mask1); + r->n[6] = (r->n[6] & mask0) | (a->n[6] & mask1); + r->n[7] = (r->n[7] & mask0) | (a->n[7] & mask1); +} + +static void secp256k1_fe_to_storage(secp256k1_fe_storage *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { +#ifdef VERIFY + VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized); +#endif + r->n[0] = a->n[0] | a->n[1] << 26; + r->n[1] = a->n[1] >> 6 | a->n[2] << 20; + r->n[2] = a->n[2] >> 12 | a->n[3] << 14; + r->n[3] = a->n[3] >> 18 | a->n[4] << 8; + r->n[4] = a->n[4] >> 24 | a->n[5] << 2 | a->n[6] << 28; + r->n[5] = a->n[6] >> 4 | a->n[7] << 22; + r->n[6] = a->n[7] >> 10 | a->n[8] << 16; + r->n[7] = a->n[8] >> 16 | a->n[9] << 10; +} + +static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_from_storage(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe_storage *a) { + r->n[0] = a->n[0] & 0x3FFFFFFUL; + r->n[1] = a->n[0] >> 26 | ((a->n[1] << 6) & 0x3FFFFFFUL); + r->n[2] = a->n[1] >> 20 | ((a->n[2] << 12) & 0x3FFFFFFUL); + r->n[3] = a->n[2] >> 14 | ((a->n[3] << 18) & 0x3FFFFFFUL); + r->n[4] = a->n[3] >> 8 | ((a->n[4] << 24) & 0x3FFFFFFUL); + r->n[5] = (a->n[4] >> 2) & 0x3FFFFFFUL; + r->n[6] = a->n[4] >> 28 | ((a->n[5] << 4) & 0x3FFFFFFUL); + r->n[7] = a->n[5] >> 22 | ((a->n[6] << 10) & 0x3FFFFFFUL); + r->n[8] = a->n[6] >> 16 | ((a->n[7] << 16) & 0x3FFFFFFUL); + r->n[9] = a->n[7] >> 10; +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude = 1; + r->normalized = 1; +#endif +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bccd8fe --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52.h @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_H +#define SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_H + +#include + +typedef struct { + /* X = sum(i=0..4, elem[i]*2^52) mod n */ + uint64_t n[5]; +#ifdef VERIFY + int magnitude; + int normalized; +#endif +} secp256k1_fe; + +/* Unpacks a constant into a overlapping multi-limbed FE element. */ +#define SECP256K1_FE_CONST_INNER(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) { \ + (d0) | (((uint64_t)(d1) & 0xFFFFFUL) << 32), \ + ((uint64_t)(d1) >> 20) | (((uint64_t)(d2)) << 12) | (((uint64_t)(d3) & 0xFFUL) << 44), \ + ((uint64_t)(d3) >> 8) | (((uint64_t)(d4) & 0xFFFFFFFUL) << 24), \ + ((uint64_t)(d4) >> 28) | (((uint64_t)(d5)) << 4) | (((uint64_t)(d6) & 0xFFFFUL) << 36), \ + ((uint64_t)(d6) >> 16) | (((uint64_t)(d7)) << 16) \ +} + +#ifdef VERIFY +#define SECP256K1_FE_CONST(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) {SECP256K1_FE_CONST_INNER((d7), (d6), (d5), (d4), (d3), (d2), (d1), (d0)), 1, 1} +#else +#define SECP256K1_FE_CONST(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) {SECP256K1_FE_CONST_INNER((d7), (d6), (d5), (d4), (d3), (d2), (d1), (d0))} +#endif + +typedef struct { + uint64_t n[4]; +} secp256k1_fe_storage; + +#define SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) {{ \ + (d0) | (((uint64_t)(d1)) << 32), \ + (d2) | (((uint64_t)(d3)) << 32), \ + (d4) | (((uint64_t)(d5)) << 32), \ + (d6) | (((uint64_t)(d7)) << 32) \ +}} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_asm_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_asm_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1fc3171 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_asm_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,502 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013-2014 Diederik Huys, Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +/** + * Changelog: + * - March 2013, Diederik Huys: original version + * - November 2014, Pieter Wuille: updated to use Peter Dettman's parallel multiplication algorithm + * - December 2014, Pieter Wuille: converted from YASM to GCC inline assembly + */ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_FIELD_INNER5X52_IMPL_H +#define SECP256K1_FIELD_INNER5X52_IMPL_H + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_mul_inner(uint64_t *r, const uint64_t *a, const uint64_t * SECP256K1_RESTRICT b) { +/** + * Registers: rdx:rax = multiplication accumulator + * r9:r8 = c + * r15:rcx = d + * r10-r14 = a0-a4 + * rbx = b + * rdi = r + * rsi = a / t? + */ + uint64_t tmp1, tmp2, tmp3; +__asm__ __volatile__( + "movq 0(%%rsi),%%r10\n" + "movq 8(%%rsi),%%r11\n" + "movq 16(%%rsi),%%r12\n" + "movq 24(%%rsi),%%r13\n" + "movq 32(%%rsi),%%r14\n" + + /* d += a3 * b0 */ + "movq 0(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r13\n" + "movq %%rax,%%rcx\n" + "movq %%rdx,%%r15\n" + /* d += a2 * b1 */ + "movq 8(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r12\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" + /* d += a1 * b2 */ + "movq 16(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r11\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" + /* d = a0 * b3 */ + "movq 24(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r10\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" + /* c = a4 * b4 */ + "movq 32(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r14\n" + "movq %%rax,%%r8\n" + "movq %%rdx,%%r9\n" + /* d += (c & M) * R */ + "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%rdx\n" + "andq %%rdx,%%rax\n" + "movq $0x1000003d10,%%rdx\n" + "mulq %%rdx\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" + /* c >>= 52 (%%r8 only) */ + "shrdq $52,%%r9,%%r8\n" + /* t3 (tmp1) = d & M */ + "movq %%rcx,%%rsi\n" + "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%rdx\n" + "andq %%rdx,%%rsi\n" + "movq %%rsi,%q1\n" + /* d >>= 52 */ + "shrdq $52,%%r15,%%rcx\n" + "xorq %%r15,%%r15\n" + /* d += a4 * b0 */ + "movq 0(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r14\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" + /* d += a3 * b1 */ + "movq 8(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r13\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" + /* d += a2 * b2 */ + "movq 16(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r12\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" + /* d += a1 * b3 */ + "movq 24(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r11\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" + /* d += a0 * b4 */ + "movq 32(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r10\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" + /* d += c * R */ + "movq %%r8,%%rax\n" + "movq $0x1000003d10,%%rdx\n" + "mulq %%rdx\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" + /* t4 = d & M (%%rsi) */ + "movq %%rcx,%%rsi\n" + "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%rdx\n" + "andq %%rdx,%%rsi\n" + /* d >>= 52 */ + "shrdq $52,%%r15,%%rcx\n" + "xorq %%r15,%%r15\n" + /* tx = t4 >> 48 (tmp3) */ + "movq %%rsi,%%rax\n" + "shrq $48,%%rax\n" + "movq %%rax,%q3\n" + /* t4 &= (M >> 4) (tmp2) */ + "movq $0xffffffffffff,%%rax\n" + "andq %%rax,%%rsi\n" + "movq %%rsi,%q2\n" + /* c = a0 * b0 */ + "movq 0(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r10\n" + "movq %%rax,%%r8\n" + "movq %%rdx,%%r9\n" + /* d += a4 * b1 */ + "movq 8(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r14\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" + /* d += a3 * b2 */ + "movq 16(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r13\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" + /* d += a2 * b3 */ + "movq 24(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r12\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" + /* d += a1 * b4 */ + "movq 32(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r11\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" + /* u0 = d & M (%%rsi) */ + "movq %%rcx,%%rsi\n" + "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%rdx\n" + "andq %%rdx,%%rsi\n" + /* d >>= 52 */ + "shrdq $52,%%r15,%%rcx\n" + "xorq %%r15,%%r15\n" + /* u0 = (u0 << 4) | tx (%%rsi) */ + "shlq $4,%%rsi\n" + "movq %q3,%%rax\n" + "orq %%rax,%%rsi\n" + /* c += u0 * (R >> 4) */ + "movq $0x1000003d1,%%rax\n" + "mulq %%rsi\n" + "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" + /* r[0] = c & M */ + "movq %%r8,%%rax\n" + "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%rdx\n" + "andq %%rdx,%%rax\n" + "movq %%rax,0(%%rdi)\n" + /* c >>= 52 */ + "shrdq $52,%%r9,%%r8\n" + "xorq %%r9,%%r9\n" + /* c += a1 * b0 */ + "movq 0(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r11\n" + "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" + /* c += a0 * b1 */ + "movq 8(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r10\n" + "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" + /* d += a4 * b2 */ + "movq 16(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r14\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" + /* d += a3 * b3 */ + "movq 24(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r13\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" + /* d += a2 * b4 */ + "movq 32(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r12\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" + /* c += (d & M) * R */ + "movq %%rcx,%%rax\n" + "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%rdx\n" + "andq %%rdx,%%rax\n" + "movq $0x1000003d10,%%rdx\n" + "mulq %%rdx\n" + "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" + /* d >>= 52 */ + "shrdq $52,%%r15,%%rcx\n" + "xorq %%r15,%%r15\n" + /* r[1] = c & M */ + "movq %%r8,%%rax\n" + "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%rdx\n" + "andq %%rdx,%%rax\n" + "movq %%rax,8(%%rdi)\n" + /* c >>= 52 */ + "shrdq $52,%%r9,%%r8\n" + "xorq %%r9,%%r9\n" + /* c += a2 * b0 */ + "movq 0(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r12\n" + "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" + /* c += a1 * b1 */ + "movq 8(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r11\n" + "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" + /* c += a0 * b2 (last use of %%r10 = a0) */ + "movq 16(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r10\n" + "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" + /* fetch t3 (%%r10, overwrites a0), t4 (%%rsi) */ + "movq %q2,%%rsi\n" + "movq %q1,%%r10\n" + /* d += a4 * b3 */ + "movq 24(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r14\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" + /* d += a3 * b4 */ + "movq 32(%%rbx),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r13\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" + /* c += (d & M) * R */ + "movq %%rcx,%%rax\n" + "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%rdx\n" + "andq %%rdx,%%rax\n" + "movq $0x1000003d10,%%rdx\n" + "mulq %%rdx\n" + "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" + /* d >>= 52 (%%rcx only) */ + "shrdq $52,%%r15,%%rcx\n" + /* r[2] = c & M */ + "movq %%r8,%%rax\n" + "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%rdx\n" + "andq %%rdx,%%rax\n" + "movq %%rax,16(%%rdi)\n" + /* c >>= 52 */ + "shrdq $52,%%r9,%%r8\n" + "xorq %%r9,%%r9\n" + /* c += t3 */ + "addq %%r10,%%r8\n" + /* c += d * R */ + "movq %%rcx,%%rax\n" + "movq $0x1000003d10,%%rdx\n" + "mulq %%rdx\n" + "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" + /* r[3] = c & M */ + "movq %%r8,%%rax\n" + "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%rdx\n" + "andq %%rdx,%%rax\n" + "movq %%rax,24(%%rdi)\n" + /* c >>= 52 (%%r8 only) */ + "shrdq $52,%%r9,%%r8\n" + /* c += t4 (%%r8 only) */ + "addq %%rsi,%%r8\n" + /* r[4] = c */ + "movq %%r8,32(%%rdi)\n" +: "+S"(a), "=m"(tmp1), "=m"(tmp2), "=m"(tmp3) +: "b"(b), "D"(r) +: "%rax", "%rcx", "%rdx", "%r8", "%r9", "%r10", "%r11", "%r12", "%r13", "%r14", "%r15", "cc", "memory" +); +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner(uint64_t *r, const uint64_t *a) { +/** + * Registers: rdx:rax = multiplication accumulator + * r9:r8 = c + * rcx:rbx = d + * r10-r14 = a0-a4 + * r15 = M (0xfffffffffffff) + * rdi = r + * rsi = a / t? + */ + uint64_t tmp1, tmp2, tmp3; +__asm__ __volatile__( + "movq 0(%%rsi),%%r10\n" + "movq 8(%%rsi),%%r11\n" + "movq 16(%%rsi),%%r12\n" + "movq 24(%%rsi),%%r13\n" + "movq 32(%%rsi),%%r14\n" + "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%r15\n" + + /* d = (a0*2) * a3 */ + "leaq (%%r10,%%r10,1),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r13\n" + "movq %%rax,%%rbx\n" + "movq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" + /* d += (a1*2) * a2 */ + "leaq (%%r11,%%r11,1),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r12\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" + /* c = a4 * a4 */ + "movq %%r14,%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r14\n" + "movq %%rax,%%r8\n" + "movq %%rdx,%%r9\n" + /* d += (c & M) * R */ + "andq %%r15,%%rax\n" + "movq $0x1000003d10,%%rdx\n" + "mulq %%rdx\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" + /* c >>= 52 (%%r8 only) */ + "shrdq $52,%%r9,%%r8\n" + /* t3 (tmp1) = d & M */ + "movq %%rbx,%%rsi\n" + "andq %%r15,%%rsi\n" + "movq %%rsi,%q1\n" + /* d >>= 52 */ + "shrdq $52,%%rcx,%%rbx\n" + "xorq %%rcx,%%rcx\n" + /* a4 *= 2 */ + "addq %%r14,%%r14\n" + /* d += a0 * a4 */ + "movq %%r10,%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r14\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" + /* d+= (a1*2) * a3 */ + "leaq (%%r11,%%r11,1),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r13\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" + /* d += a2 * a2 */ + "movq %%r12,%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r12\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" + /* d += c * R */ + "movq %%r8,%%rax\n" + "movq $0x1000003d10,%%rdx\n" + "mulq %%rdx\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" + /* t4 = d & M (%%rsi) */ + "movq %%rbx,%%rsi\n" + "andq %%r15,%%rsi\n" + /* d >>= 52 */ + "shrdq $52,%%rcx,%%rbx\n" + "xorq %%rcx,%%rcx\n" + /* tx = t4 >> 48 (tmp3) */ + "movq %%rsi,%%rax\n" + "shrq $48,%%rax\n" + "movq %%rax,%q3\n" + /* t4 &= (M >> 4) (tmp2) */ + "movq $0xffffffffffff,%%rax\n" + "andq %%rax,%%rsi\n" + "movq %%rsi,%q2\n" + /* c = a0 * a0 */ + "movq %%r10,%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r10\n" + "movq %%rax,%%r8\n" + "movq %%rdx,%%r9\n" + /* d += a1 * a4 */ + "movq %%r11,%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r14\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" + /* d += (a2*2) * a3 */ + "leaq (%%r12,%%r12,1),%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r13\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" + /* u0 = d & M (%%rsi) */ + "movq %%rbx,%%rsi\n" + "andq %%r15,%%rsi\n" + /* d >>= 52 */ + "shrdq $52,%%rcx,%%rbx\n" + "xorq %%rcx,%%rcx\n" + /* u0 = (u0 << 4) | tx (%%rsi) */ + "shlq $4,%%rsi\n" + "movq %q3,%%rax\n" + "orq %%rax,%%rsi\n" + /* c += u0 * (R >> 4) */ + "movq $0x1000003d1,%%rax\n" + "mulq %%rsi\n" + "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" + /* r[0] = c & M */ + "movq %%r8,%%rax\n" + "andq %%r15,%%rax\n" + "movq %%rax,0(%%rdi)\n" + /* c >>= 52 */ + "shrdq $52,%%r9,%%r8\n" + "xorq %%r9,%%r9\n" + /* a0 *= 2 */ + "addq %%r10,%%r10\n" + /* c += a0 * a1 */ + "movq %%r10,%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r11\n" + "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" + /* d += a2 * a4 */ + "movq %%r12,%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r14\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" + /* d += a3 * a3 */ + "movq %%r13,%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r13\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" + /* c += (d & M) * R */ + "movq %%rbx,%%rax\n" + "andq %%r15,%%rax\n" + "movq $0x1000003d10,%%rdx\n" + "mulq %%rdx\n" + "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" + /* d >>= 52 */ + "shrdq $52,%%rcx,%%rbx\n" + "xorq %%rcx,%%rcx\n" + /* r[1] = c & M */ + "movq %%r8,%%rax\n" + "andq %%r15,%%rax\n" + "movq %%rax,8(%%rdi)\n" + /* c >>= 52 */ + "shrdq $52,%%r9,%%r8\n" + "xorq %%r9,%%r9\n" + /* c += a0 * a2 (last use of %%r10) */ + "movq %%r10,%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r12\n" + "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" + /* fetch t3 (%%r10, overwrites a0),t4 (%%rsi) */ + "movq %q2,%%rsi\n" + "movq %q1,%%r10\n" + /* c += a1 * a1 */ + "movq %%r11,%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r11\n" + "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" + /* d += a3 * a4 */ + "movq %%r13,%%rax\n" + "mulq %%r14\n" + "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" + /* c += (d & M) * R */ + "movq %%rbx,%%rax\n" + "andq %%r15,%%rax\n" + "movq $0x1000003d10,%%rdx\n" + "mulq %%rdx\n" + "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" + /* d >>= 52 (%%rbx only) */ + "shrdq $52,%%rcx,%%rbx\n" + /* r[2] = c & M */ + "movq %%r8,%%rax\n" + "andq %%r15,%%rax\n" + "movq %%rax,16(%%rdi)\n" + /* c >>= 52 */ + "shrdq $52,%%r9,%%r8\n" + "xorq %%r9,%%r9\n" + /* c += t3 */ + "addq %%r10,%%r8\n" + /* c += d * R */ + "movq %%rbx,%%rax\n" + "movq $0x1000003d10,%%rdx\n" + "mulq %%rdx\n" + "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" + /* r[3] = c & M */ + "movq %%r8,%%rax\n" + "andq %%r15,%%rax\n" + "movq %%rax,24(%%rdi)\n" + /* c >>= 52 (%%r8 only) */ + "shrdq $52,%%r9,%%r8\n" + /* c += t4 (%%r8 only) */ + "addq %%rsi,%%r8\n" + /* r[4] = c */ + "movq %%r8,32(%%rdi)\n" +: "+S"(a), "=m"(tmp1), "=m"(tmp2), "=m"(tmp3) +: "D"(r) +: "%rax", "%rbx", "%rcx", "%rdx", "%r8", "%r9", "%r10", "%r11", "%r12", "%r13", "%r14", "%r15", "cc", "memory" +); +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_FIELD_INNER5X52_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..957c61b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,496 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_IMPL_H +#define SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_IMPL_H + +#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" +#endif + +#include "util.h" +#include "num.h" +#include "field.h" + +#if defined(USE_ASM_X86_64) +#include "field_5x52_asm_impl.h" +#else +#include "field_5x52_int128_impl.h" +#endif + +/** Implements arithmetic modulo FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFE FFFFFC2F, + * represented as 5 uint64_t's in base 2^52. The values are allowed to contain >52 each. In particular, + * each FieldElem has a 'magnitude' associated with it. Internally, a magnitude M means each element + * is at most M*(2^53-1), except the most significant one, which is limited to M*(2^49-1). All operations + * accept any input with magnitude at most M, and have different rules for propagating magnitude to their + * output. + */ + +#ifdef VERIFY +static void secp256k1_fe_verify(const secp256k1_fe *a) { + const uint64_t *d = a->n; + int m = a->normalized ? 1 : 2 * a->magnitude, r = 1; + /* secp256k1 'p' value defined in "Standards for Efficient Cryptography" (SEC2) 2.7.1. */ + r &= (d[0] <= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * m); + r &= (d[1] <= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * m); + r &= (d[2] <= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * m); + r &= (d[3] <= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * m); + r &= (d[4] <= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL * m); + r &= (a->magnitude >= 0); + r &= (a->magnitude <= 2048); + if (a->normalized) { + r &= (a->magnitude <= 1); + if (r && (d[4] == 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL) && ((d[3] & d[2] & d[1]) == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL)) { + r &= (d[0] < 0xFFFFEFFFFFC2FULL); + } + } + VERIFY_CHECK(r == 1); +} +#endif + +static void secp256k1_fe_normalize(secp256k1_fe *r) { + uint64_t t0 = r->n[0], t1 = r->n[1], t2 = r->n[2], t3 = r->n[3], t4 = r->n[4]; + + /* Reduce t4 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */ + uint64_t m; + uint64_t x = t4 >> 48; t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + + /* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */ + t0 += x * 0x1000003D1ULL; + t1 += (t0 >> 52); t0 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; m = t1; + t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; m &= t2; + t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; m &= t3; + + /* ... except for a possible carry at bit 48 of t4 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */ + VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 49 == 0); + + /* At most a single final reduction is needed; check if the value is >= the field characteristic */ + x = (t4 >> 48) | ((t4 == 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL) & (m == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) + & (t0 >= 0xFFFFEFFFFFC2FULL)); + + /* Apply the final reduction (for constant-time behaviour, we do it always) */ + t0 += x * 0x1000003D1ULL; + t1 += (t0 >> 52); t0 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + + /* If t4 didn't carry to bit 48 already, then it should have after any final reduction */ + VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 48 == x); + + /* Mask off the possible multiple of 2^256 from the final reduction */ + t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + + r->n[0] = t0; r->n[1] = t1; r->n[2] = t2; r->n[3] = t3; r->n[4] = t4; + +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude = 1; + r->normalized = 1; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); +#endif +} + +static void secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(secp256k1_fe *r) { + uint64_t t0 = r->n[0], t1 = r->n[1], t2 = r->n[2], t3 = r->n[3], t4 = r->n[4]; + + /* Reduce t4 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */ + uint64_t x = t4 >> 48; t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + + /* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */ + t0 += x * 0x1000003D1ULL; + t1 += (t0 >> 52); t0 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + + /* ... except for a possible carry at bit 48 of t4 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */ + VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 49 == 0); + + r->n[0] = t0; r->n[1] = t1; r->n[2] = t2; r->n[3] = t3; r->n[4] = t4; + +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude = 1; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); +#endif +} + +static void secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(secp256k1_fe *r) { + uint64_t t0 = r->n[0], t1 = r->n[1], t2 = r->n[2], t3 = r->n[3], t4 = r->n[4]; + + /* Reduce t4 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */ + uint64_t m; + uint64_t x = t4 >> 48; t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + + /* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */ + t0 += x * 0x1000003D1ULL; + t1 += (t0 >> 52); t0 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; m = t1; + t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; m &= t2; + t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; m &= t3; + + /* ... except for a possible carry at bit 48 of t4 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */ + VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 49 == 0); + + /* At most a single final reduction is needed; check if the value is >= the field characteristic */ + x = (t4 >> 48) | ((t4 == 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL) & (m == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) + & (t0 >= 0xFFFFEFFFFFC2FULL)); + + if (x) { + t0 += 0x1000003D1ULL; + t1 += (t0 >> 52); t0 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + + /* If t4 didn't carry to bit 48 already, then it should have after any final reduction */ + VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 48 == x); + + /* Mask off the possible multiple of 2^256 from the final reduction */ + t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + } + + r->n[0] = t0; r->n[1] = t1; r->n[2] = t2; r->n[3] = t3; r->n[4] = t4; + +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude = 1; + r->normalized = 1; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); +#endif +} + +static int secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero(secp256k1_fe *r) { + uint64_t t0 = r->n[0], t1 = r->n[1], t2 = r->n[2], t3 = r->n[3], t4 = r->n[4]; + + /* z0 tracks a possible raw value of 0, z1 tracks a possible raw value of P */ + uint64_t z0, z1; + + /* Reduce t4 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */ + uint64_t x = t4 >> 48; t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + + /* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */ + t0 += x * 0x1000003D1ULL; + t1 += (t0 >> 52); t0 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 = t0; z1 = t0 ^ 0x1000003D0ULL; + t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 |= t1; z1 &= t1; + t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 |= t2; z1 &= t2; + t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 |= t3; z1 &= t3; + z0 |= t4; z1 &= t4 ^ 0xF000000000000ULL; + + /* ... except for a possible carry at bit 48 of t4 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */ + VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 49 == 0); + + return (z0 == 0) | (z1 == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL); +} + +static int secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(secp256k1_fe *r) { + uint64_t t0, t1, t2, t3, t4; + uint64_t z0, z1; + uint64_t x; + + t0 = r->n[0]; + t4 = r->n[4]; + + /* Reduce t4 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */ + x = t4 >> 48; + + /* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */ + t0 += x * 0x1000003D1ULL; + + /* z0 tracks a possible raw value of 0, z1 tracks a possible raw value of P */ + z0 = t0 & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + z1 = z0 ^ 0x1000003D0ULL; + + /* Fast return path should catch the majority of cases */ + if ((z0 != 0ULL) & (z1 != 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL)) { + return 0; + } + + t1 = r->n[1]; + t2 = r->n[2]; + t3 = r->n[3]; + + t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + + t1 += (t0 >> 52); + t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 |= t1; z1 &= t1; + t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 |= t2; z1 &= t2; + t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 |= t3; z1 &= t3; + z0 |= t4; z1 &= t4 ^ 0xF000000000000ULL; + + /* ... except for a possible carry at bit 48 of t4 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */ + VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 49 == 0); + + return (z0 == 0) | (z1 == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL); +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_set_int(secp256k1_fe *r, int a) { + r->n[0] = a; + r->n[1] = r->n[2] = r->n[3] = r->n[4] = 0; +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude = 1; + r->normalized = 1; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); +#endif +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_fe_is_zero(const secp256k1_fe *a) { + const uint64_t *t = a->n; +#ifdef VERIFY + VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized); + secp256k1_fe_verify(a); +#endif + return (t[0] | t[1] | t[2] | t[3] | t[4]) == 0; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_fe_is_odd(const secp256k1_fe *a) { +#ifdef VERIFY + VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized); + secp256k1_fe_verify(a); +#endif + return a->n[0] & 1; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_clear(secp256k1_fe *a) { + int i; +#ifdef VERIFY + a->magnitude = 0; + a->normalized = 1; +#endif + for (i=0; i<5; i++) { + a->n[i] = 0; + } +} + +static int secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) { + int i; +#ifdef VERIFY + VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized); + VERIFY_CHECK(b->normalized); + secp256k1_fe_verify(a); + secp256k1_fe_verify(b); +#endif + for (i = 4; i >= 0; i--) { + if (a->n[i] > b->n[i]) { + return 1; + } + if (a->n[i] < b->n[i]) { + return -1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static int secp256k1_fe_set_b32(secp256k1_fe *r, const unsigned char *a) { + r->n[0] = (uint64_t)a[31] + | ((uint64_t)a[30] << 8) + | ((uint64_t)a[29] << 16) + | ((uint64_t)a[28] << 24) + | ((uint64_t)a[27] << 32) + | ((uint64_t)a[26] << 40) + | ((uint64_t)(a[25] & 0xF) << 48); + r->n[1] = (uint64_t)((a[25] >> 4) & 0xF) + | ((uint64_t)a[24] << 4) + | ((uint64_t)a[23] << 12) + | ((uint64_t)a[22] << 20) + | ((uint64_t)a[21] << 28) + | ((uint64_t)a[20] << 36) + | ((uint64_t)a[19] << 44); + r->n[2] = (uint64_t)a[18] + | ((uint64_t)a[17] << 8) + | ((uint64_t)a[16] << 16) + | ((uint64_t)a[15] << 24) + | ((uint64_t)a[14] << 32) + | ((uint64_t)a[13] << 40) + | ((uint64_t)(a[12] & 0xF) << 48); + r->n[3] = (uint64_t)((a[12] >> 4) & 0xF) + | ((uint64_t)a[11] << 4) + | ((uint64_t)a[10] << 12) + | ((uint64_t)a[9] << 20) + | ((uint64_t)a[8] << 28) + | ((uint64_t)a[7] << 36) + | ((uint64_t)a[6] << 44); + r->n[4] = (uint64_t)a[5] + | ((uint64_t)a[4] << 8) + | ((uint64_t)a[3] << 16) + | ((uint64_t)a[2] << 24) + | ((uint64_t)a[1] << 32) + | ((uint64_t)a[0] << 40); + if (r->n[4] == 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL && (r->n[3] & r->n[2] & r->n[1]) == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL && r->n[0] >= 0xFFFFEFFFFFC2FULL) { + return 0; + } +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude = 1; + r->normalized = 1; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); +#endif + return 1; +} + +/** Convert a field element to a 32-byte big endian value. Requires the input to be normalized */ +static void secp256k1_fe_get_b32(unsigned char *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { +#ifdef VERIFY + VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized); + secp256k1_fe_verify(a); +#endif + r[0] = (a->n[4] >> 40) & 0xFF; + r[1] = (a->n[4] >> 32) & 0xFF; + r[2] = (a->n[4] >> 24) & 0xFF; + r[3] = (a->n[4] >> 16) & 0xFF; + r[4] = (a->n[4] >> 8) & 0xFF; + r[5] = a->n[4] & 0xFF; + r[6] = (a->n[3] >> 44) & 0xFF; + r[7] = (a->n[3] >> 36) & 0xFF; + r[8] = (a->n[3] >> 28) & 0xFF; + r[9] = (a->n[3] >> 20) & 0xFF; + r[10] = (a->n[3] >> 12) & 0xFF; + r[11] = (a->n[3] >> 4) & 0xFF; + r[12] = ((a->n[2] >> 48) & 0xF) | ((a->n[3] & 0xF) << 4); + r[13] = (a->n[2] >> 40) & 0xFF; + r[14] = (a->n[2] >> 32) & 0xFF; + r[15] = (a->n[2] >> 24) & 0xFF; + r[16] = (a->n[2] >> 16) & 0xFF; + r[17] = (a->n[2] >> 8) & 0xFF; + r[18] = a->n[2] & 0xFF; + r[19] = (a->n[1] >> 44) & 0xFF; + r[20] = (a->n[1] >> 36) & 0xFF; + r[21] = (a->n[1] >> 28) & 0xFF; + r[22] = (a->n[1] >> 20) & 0xFF; + r[23] = (a->n[1] >> 12) & 0xFF; + r[24] = (a->n[1] >> 4) & 0xFF; + r[25] = ((a->n[0] >> 48) & 0xF) | ((a->n[1] & 0xF) << 4); + r[26] = (a->n[0] >> 40) & 0xFF; + r[27] = (a->n[0] >> 32) & 0xFF; + r[28] = (a->n[0] >> 24) & 0xFF; + r[29] = (a->n[0] >> 16) & 0xFF; + r[30] = (a->n[0] >> 8) & 0xFF; + r[31] = a->n[0] & 0xFF; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_negate(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, int m) { +#ifdef VERIFY + VERIFY_CHECK(a->magnitude <= m); + secp256k1_fe_verify(a); +#endif + r->n[0] = 0xFFFFEFFFFFC2FULL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[0]; + r->n[1] = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[1]; + r->n[2] = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[2]; + r->n[3] = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[3]; + r->n[4] = 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[4]; +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude = m + 1; + r->normalized = 0; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); +#endif +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_mul_int(secp256k1_fe *r, int a) { + r->n[0] *= a; + r->n[1] *= a; + r->n[2] *= a; + r->n[3] *= a; + r->n[4] *= a; +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude *= a; + r->normalized = 0; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); +#endif +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_add(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { +#ifdef VERIFY + secp256k1_fe_verify(a); +#endif + r->n[0] += a->n[0]; + r->n[1] += a->n[1]; + r->n[2] += a->n[2]; + r->n[3] += a->n[3]; + r->n[4] += a->n[4]; +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude += a->magnitude; + r->normalized = 0; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); +#endif +} + +static void secp256k1_fe_mul(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe * SECP256K1_RESTRICT b) { +#ifdef VERIFY + VERIFY_CHECK(a->magnitude <= 8); + VERIFY_CHECK(b->magnitude <= 8); + secp256k1_fe_verify(a); + secp256k1_fe_verify(b); + VERIFY_CHECK(r != b); +#endif + secp256k1_fe_mul_inner(r->n, a->n, b->n); +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude = 1; + r->normalized = 0; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); +#endif +} + +static void secp256k1_fe_sqr(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { +#ifdef VERIFY + VERIFY_CHECK(a->magnitude <= 8); + secp256k1_fe_verify(a); +#endif + secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner(r->n, a->n); +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude = 1; + r->normalized = 0; + secp256k1_fe_verify(r); +#endif +} + +static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_cmov(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, int flag) { + uint64_t mask0, mask1; + mask0 = flag + ~((uint64_t)0); + mask1 = ~mask0; + r->n[0] = (r->n[0] & mask0) | (a->n[0] & mask1); + r->n[1] = (r->n[1] & mask0) | (a->n[1] & mask1); + r->n[2] = (r->n[2] & mask0) | (a->n[2] & mask1); + r->n[3] = (r->n[3] & mask0) | (a->n[3] & mask1); + r->n[4] = (r->n[4] & mask0) | (a->n[4] & mask1); +#ifdef VERIFY + if (a->magnitude > r->magnitude) { + r->magnitude = a->magnitude; + } + r->normalized &= a->normalized; +#endif +} + +static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(secp256k1_fe_storage *r, const secp256k1_fe_storage *a, int flag) { + uint64_t mask0, mask1; + mask0 = flag + ~((uint64_t)0); + mask1 = ~mask0; + r->n[0] = (r->n[0] & mask0) | (a->n[0] & mask1); + r->n[1] = (r->n[1] & mask0) | (a->n[1] & mask1); + r->n[2] = (r->n[2] & mask0) | (a->n[2] & mask1); + r->n[3] = (r->n[3] & mask0) | (a->n[3] & mask1); +} + +static void secp256k1_fe_to_storage(secp256k1_fe_storage *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { +#ifdef VERIFY + VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized); +#endif + r->n[0] = a->n[0] | a->n[1] << 52; + r->n[1] = a->n[1] >> 12 | a->n[2] << 40; + r->n[2] = a->n[2] >> 24 | a->n[3] << 28; + r->n[3] = a->n[3] >> 36 | a->n[4] << 16; +} + +static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_from_storage(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe_storage *a) { + r->n[0] = a->n[0] & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + r->n[1] = a->n[0] >> 52 | ((a->n[1] << 12) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL); + r->n[2] = a->n[1] >> 40 | ((a->n[2] << 24) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL); + r->n[3] = a->n[2] >> 28 | ((a->n[3] << 36) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL); + r->n[4] = a->n[3] >> 16; +#ifdef VERIFY + r->magnitude = 1; + r->normalized = 1; +#endif +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_int128_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_int128_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..95a0d17 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_int128_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,277 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_FIELD_INNER5X52_IMPL_H +#define SECP256K1_FIELD_INNER5X52_IMPL_H + +#include + +#ifdef VERIFY +#define VERIFY_BITS(x, n) VERIFY_CHECK(((x) >> (n)) == 0) +#else +#define VERIFY_BITS(x, n) do { } while(0) +#endif + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_mul_inner(uint64_t *r, const uint64_t *a, const uint64_t * SECP256K1_RESTRICT b) { + uint128_t c, d; + uint64_t t3, t4, tx, u0; + uint64_t a0 = a[0], a1 = a[1], a2 = a[2], a3 = a[3], a4 = a[4]; + const uint64_t M = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, R = 0x1000003D10ULL; + + VERIFY_BITS(a[0], 56); + VERIFY_BITS(a[1], 56); + VERIFY_BITS(a[2], 56); + VERIFY_BITS(a[3], 56); + VERIFY_BITS(a[4], 52); + VERIFY_BITS(b[0], 56); + VERIFY_BITS(b[1], 56); + VERIFY_BITS(b[2], 56); + VERIFY_BITS(b[3], 56); + VERIFY_BITS(b[4], 52); + VERIFY_CHECK(r != b); + + /* [... a b c] is a shorthand for ... + a<<104 + b<<52 + c<<0 mod n. + * px is a shorthand for sum(a[i]*b[x-i], i=0..x). + * Note that [x 0 0 0 0 0] = [x*R]. + */ + + d = (uint128_t)a0 * b[3] + + (uint128_t)a1 * b[2] + + (uint128_t)a2 * b[1] + + (uint128_t)a3 * b[0]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 114); + /* [d 0 0 0] = [p3 0 0 0] */ + c = (uint128_t)a4 * b[4]; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 112); + /* [c 0 0 0 0 d 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 0 p3 0 0 0] */ + d += (c & M) * R; c >>= 52; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 115); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 60); + /* [c 0 0 0 0 0 d 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 0 p3 0 0 0] */ + t3 = d & M; d >>= 52; + VERIFY_BITS(t3, 52); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); + /* [c 0 0 0 0 d t3 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 0 p3 0 0 0] */ + + d += (uint128_t)a0 * b[4] + + (uint128_t)a1 * b[3] + + (uint128_t)a2 * b[2] + + (uint128_t)a3 * b[1] + + (uint128_t)a4 * b[0]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 115); + /* [c 0 0 0 0 d t3 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 p4 p3 0 0 0] */ + d += c * R; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 116); + /* [d t3 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 p4 p3 0 0 0] */ + t4 = d & M; d >>= 52; + VERIFY_BITS(t4, 52); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 64); + /* [d t4 t3 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 p4 p3 0 0 0] */ + tx = (t4 >> 48); t4 &= (M >> 4); + VERIFY_BITS(tx, 4); + VERIFY_BITS(t4, 48); + /* [d t4+(tx<<48) t3 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 p4 p3 0 0 0] */ + + c = (uint128_t)a0 * b[0]; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 112); + /* [d t4+(tx<<48) t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 0 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ + d += (uint128_t)a1 * b[4] + + (uint128_t)a2 * b[3] + + (uint128_t)a3 * b[2] + + (uint128_t)a4 * b[1]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 115); + /* [d t4+(tx<<48) t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ + u0 = d & M; d >>= 52; + VERIFY_BITS(u0, 52); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); + /* [d u0 t4+(tx<<48) t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ + /* [d 0 t4+(tx<<48)+(u0<<52) t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ + u0 = (u0 << 4) | tx; + VERIFY_BITS(u0, 56); + /* [d 0 t4+(u0<<48) t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ + c += (uint128_t)u0 * (R >> 4); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 115); + /* [d 0 t4 t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ + r[0] = c & M; c >>= 52; + VERIFY_BITS(r[0], 52); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 61); + /* [d 0 t4 t3 0 c r0] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ + + c += (uint128_t)a0 * b[1] + + (uint128_t)a1 * b[0]; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 114); + /* [d 0 t4 t3 0 c r0] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 p1 p0] */ + d += (uint128_t)a2 * b[4] + + (uint128_t)a3 * b[3] + + (uint128_t)a4 * b[2]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 114); + /* [d 0 t4 t3 0 c r0] = [p8 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 0 p1 p0] */ + c += (d & M) * R; d >>= 52; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 115); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 62); + /* [d 0 0 t4 t3 0 c r0] = [p8 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 0 p1 p0] */ + r[1] = c & M; c >>= 52; + VERIFY_BITS(r[1], 52); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); + /* [d 0 0 t4 t3 c r1 r0] = [p8 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 0 p1 p0] */ + + c += (uint128_t)a0 * b[2] + + (uint128_t)a1 * b[1] + + (uint128_t)a2 * b[0]; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 114); + /* [d 0 0 t4 t3 c r1 r0] = [p8 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + d += (uint128_t)a3 * b[4] + + (uint128_t)a4 * b[3]; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 114); + /* [d 0 0 t4 t3 c t1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + c += (d & M) * R; d >>= 52; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 115); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 62); + /* [d 0 0 0 t4 t3 c r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + + /* [d 0 0 0 t4 t3 c r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[2] = c & M; c >>= 52; + VERIFY_BITS(r[2], 52); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); + /* [d 0 0 0 t4 t3+c r2 r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + c += d * R + t3; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 100); + /* [t4 c r2 r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[3] = c & M; c >>= 52; + VERIFY_BITS(r[3], 52); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 48); + /* [t4+c r3 r2 r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + c += t4; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 49); + /* [c r3 r2 r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[4] = c; + VERIFY_BITS(r[4], 49); + /* [r4 r3 r2 r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner(uint64_t *r, const uint64_t *a) { + uint128_t c, d; + uint64_t a0 = a[0], a1 = a[1], a2 = a[2], a3 = a[3], a4 = a[4]; + int64_t t3, t4, tx, u0; + const uint64_t M = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, R = 0x1000003D10ULL; + + VERIFY_BITS(a[0], 56); + VERIFY_BITS(a[1], 56); + VERIFY_BITS(a[2], 56); + VERIFY_BITS(a[3], 56); + VERIFY_BITS(a[4], 52); + + /** [... a b c] is a shorthand for ... + a<<104 + b<<52 + c<<0 mod n. + * px is a shorthand for sum(a[i]*a[x-i], i=0..x). + * Note that [x 0 0 0 0 0] = [x*R]. + */ + + d = (uint128_t)(a0*2) * a3 + + (uint128_t)(a1*2) * a2; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 114); + /* [d 0 0 0] = [p3 0 0 0] */ + c = (uint128_t)a4 * a4; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 112); + /* [c 0 0 0 0 d 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 0 p3 0 0 0] */ + d += (c & M) * R; c >>= 52; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 115); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 60); + /* [c 0 0 0 0 0 d 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 0 p3 0 0 0] */ + t3 = d & M; d >>= 52; + VERIFY_BITS(t3, 52); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); + /* [c 0 0 0 0 d t3 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 0 p3 0 0 0] */ + + a4 *= 2; + d += (uint128_t)a0 * a4 + + (uint128_t)(a1*2) * a3 + + (uint128_t)a2 * a2; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 115); + /* [c 0 0 0 0 d t3 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 p4 p3 0 0 0] */ + d += c * R; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 116); + /* [d t3 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 p4 p3 0 0 0] */ + t4 = d & M; d >>= 52; + VERIFY_BITS(t4, 52); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 64); + /* [d t4 t3 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 p4 p3 0 0 0] */ + tx = (t4 >> 48); t4 &= (M >> 4); + VERIFY_BITS(tx, 4); + VERIFY_BITS(t4, 48); + /* [d t4+(tx<<48) t3 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 p4 p3 0 0 0] */ + + c = (uint128_t)a0 * a0; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 112); + /* [d t4+(tx<<48) t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 0 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ + d += (uint128_t)a1 * a4 + + (uint128_t)(a2*2) * a3; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 114); + /* [d t4+(tx<<48) t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ + u0 = d & M; d >>= 52; + VERIFY_BITS(u0, 52); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 62); + /* [d u0 t4+(tx<<48) t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ + /* [d 0 t4+(tx<<48)+(u0<<52) t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ + u0 = (u0 << 4) | tx; + VERIFY_BITS(u0, 56); + /* [d 0 t4+(u0<<48) t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ + c += (uint128_t)u0 * (R >> 4); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 113); + /* [d 0 t4 t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ + r[0] = c & M; c >>= 52; + VERIFY_BITS(r[0], 52); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 61); + /* [d 0 t4 t3 0 c r0] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ + + a0 *= 2; + c += (uint128_t)a0 * a1; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 114); + /* [d 0 t4 t3 0 c r0] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 p1 p0] */ + d += (uint128_t)a2 * a4 + + (uint128_t)a3 * a3; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 114); + /* [d 0 t4 t3 0 c r0] = [p8 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 0 p1 p0] */ + c += (d & M) * R; d >>= 52; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 115); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 62); + /* [d 0 0 t4 t3 0 c r0] = [p8 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 0 p1 p0] */ + r[1] = c & M; c >>= 52; + VERIFY_BITS(r[1], 52); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); + /* [d 0 0 t4 t3 c r1 r0] = [p8 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 0 p1 p0] */ + + c += (uint128_t)a0 * a2 + + (uint128_t)a1 * a1; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 114); + /* [d 0 0 t4 t3 c r1 r0] = [p8 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + d += (uint128_t)a3 * a4; + VERIFY_BITS(d, 114); + /* [d 0 0 t4 t3 c r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + c += (d & M) * R; d >>= 52; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 115); + VERIFY_BITS(d, 62); + /* [d 0 0 0 t4 t3 c r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[2] = c & M; c >>= 52; + VERIFY_BITS(r[2], 52); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); + /* [d 0 0 0 t4 t3+c r2 r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + + c += d * R + t3; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 100); + /* [t4 c r2 r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[3] = c & M; c >>= 52; + VERIFY_BITS(r[3], 52); + VERIFY_BITS(c, 48); + /* [t4+c r3 r2 r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + c += t4; + VERIFY_BITS(c, 49); + /* [c r3 r2 r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ + r[4] = c; + VERIFY_BITS(r[4], 49); + /* [r4 r3 r2 r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_FIELD_INNER5X52_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2042864 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,315 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_FIELD_IMPL_H +#define SECP256K1_FIELD_IMPL_H + +#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" +#endif + +#include "util.h" + +#if defined(USE_FIELD_10X26) +#include "field_10x26_impl.h" +#elif defined(USE_FIELD_5X52) +#include "field_5x52_impl.h" +#else +#error "Please select field implementation" +#endif + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_fe_equal(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) { + secp256k1_fe na; + secp256k1_fe_negate(&na, a, 1); + secp256k1_fe_add(&na, b); + return secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero(&na); +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_fe_equal_var(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) { + secp256k1_fe na; + secp256k1_fe_negate(&na, a, 1); + secp256k1_fe_add(&na, b); + return secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&na); +} + +static int secp256k1_fe_sqrt(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { + /** Given that p is congruent to 3 mod 4, we can compute the square root of + * a mod p as the (p+1)/4'th power of a. + * + * As (p+1)/4 is an even number, it will have the same result for a and for + * (-a). Only one of these two numbers actually has a square root however, + * so we test at the end by squaring and comparing to the input. + * Also because (p+1)/4 is an even number, the computed square root is + * itself always a square (a ** ((p+1)/4) is the square of a ** ((p+1)/8)). + */ + secp256k1_fe x2, x3, x6, x9, x11, x22, x44, x88, x176, x220, x223, t1; + int j; + + /** The binary representation of (p + 1)/4 has 3 blocks of 1s, with lengths in + * { 2, 22, 223 }. Use an addition chain to calculate 2^n - 1 for each block: + * 1, [2], 3, 6, 9, 11, [22], 44, 88, 176, 220, [223] + */ + + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x2, a); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x2, &x2, a); + + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x3, &x2); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, &x3, a); + + x6 = x3; + for (j=0; j<3; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x6, &x6); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x6, &x6, &x3); + + x9 = x6; + for (j=0; j<3; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x9, &x9); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x9, &x9, &x3); + + x11 = x9; + for (j=0; j<2; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x11, &x11); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x11, &x11, &x2); + + x22 = x11; + for (j=0; j<11; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x22, &x22); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x22, &x22, &x11); + + x44 = x22; + for (j=0; j<22; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x44, &x44); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x44, &x44, &x22); + + x88 = x44; + for (j=0; j<44; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x88, &x88); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x88, &x88, &x44); + + x176 = x88; + for (j=0; j<88; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x176, &x176); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x176, &x176, &x88); + + x220 = x176; + for (j=0; j<44; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x220, &x220); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x220, &x220, &x44); + + x223 = x220; + for (j=0; j<3; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x223, &x223); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x223, &x223, &x3); + + /* The final result is then assembled using a sliding window over the blocks. */ + + t1 = x223; + for (j=0; j<23; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t1, &t1); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&t1, &t1, &x22); + for (j=0; j<6; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t1, &t1); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&t1, &t1, &x2); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t1, &t1); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(r, &t1); + + /* Check that a square root was actually calculated */ + + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t1, r); + return secp256k1_fe_equal(&t1, a); +} + +static void secp256k1_fe_inv(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { + secp256k1_fe x2, x3, x6, x9, x11, x22, x44, x88, x176, x220, x223, t1; + int j; + + /** The binary representation of (p - 2) has 5 blocks of 1s, with lengths in + * { 1, 2, 22, 223 }. Use an addition chain to calculate 2^n - 1 for each block: + * [1], [2], 3, 6, 9, 11, [22], 44, 88, 176, 220, [223] + */ + + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x2, a); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x2, &x2, a); + + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x3, &x2); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, &x3, a); + + x6 = x3; + for (j=0; j<3; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x6, &x6); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x6, &x6, &x3); + + x9 = x6; + for (j=0; j<3; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x9, &x9); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x9, &x9, &x3); + + x11 = x9; + for (j=0; j<2; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x11, &x11); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x11, &x11, &x2); + + x22 = x11; + for (j=0; j<11; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x22, &x22); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x22, &x22, &x11); + + x44 = x22; + for (j=0; j<22; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x44, &x44); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x44, &x44, &x22); + + x88 = x44; + for (j=0; j<44; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x88, &x88); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x88, &x88, &x44); + + x176 = x88; + for (j=0; j<88; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x176, &x176); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x176, &x176, &x88); + + x220 = x176; + for (j=0; j<44; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x220, &x220); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x220, &x220, &x44); + + x223 = x220; + for (j=0; j<3; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x223, &x223); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x223, &x223, &x3); + + /* The final result is then assembled using a sliding window over the blocks. */ + + t1 = x223; + for (j=0; j<23; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t1, &t1); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&t1, &t1, &x22); + for (j=0; j<5; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t1, &t1); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&t1, &t1, a); + for (j=0; j<3; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t1, &t1); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&t1, &t1, &x2); + for (j=0; j<2; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t1, &t1); + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(r, a, &t1); +} + +static void secp256k1_fe_inv_var(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { +#if defined(USE_FIELD_INV_BUILTIN) + secp256k1_fe_inv(r, a); +#elif defined(USE_FIELD_INV_NUM) + secp256k1_num n, m; + static const secp256k1_fe negone = SECP256K1_FE_CONST( + 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, + 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFEUL, 0xFFFFFC2EUL + ); + /* secp256k1 field prime, value p defined in "Standards for Efficient Cryptography" (SEC2) 2.7.1. */ + static const unsigned char prime[32] = { + 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, + 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, + 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, + 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFE,0xFF,0xFF,0xFC,0x2F + }; + unsigned char b[32]; + int res; + secp256k1_fe c = *a; + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&c); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(b, &c); + secp256k1_num_set_bin(&n, b, 32); + secp256k1_num_set_bin(&m, prime, 32); + secp256k1_num_mod_inverse(&n, &n, &m); + secp256k1_num_get_bin(b, 32, &n); + res = secp256k1_fe_set_b32(r, b); + (void)res; + VERIFY_CHECK(res); + /* Verify the result is the (unique) valid inverse using non-GMP code. */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&c, &c, r); + secp256k1_fe_add(&c, &negone); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&c)); +#else +#error "Please select field inverse implementation" +#endif +} + +static void secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, size_t len) { + secp256k1_fe u; + size_t i; + if (len < 1) { + return; + } + + VERIFY_CHECK((r + len <= a) || (a + len <= r)); + + r[0] = a[0]; + + i = 0; + while (++i < len) { + secp256k1_fe_mul(&r[i], &r[i - 1], &a[i]); + } + + secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&u, &r[--i]); + + while (i > 0) { + size_t j = i--; + secp256k1_fe_mul(&r[j], &r[i], &u); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&u, &u, &a[j]); + } + + r[0] = u; +} + +static int secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(const secp256k1_fe *a) { +#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE + unsigned char b[32]; + secp256k1_num n; + secp256k1_num m; + /* secp256k1 field prime, value p defined in "Standards for Efficient Cryptography" (SEC2) 2.7.1. */ + static const unsigned char prime[32] = { + 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, + 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, + 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, + 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFE,0xFF,0xFF,0xFC,0x2F + }; + + secp256k1_fe c = *a; + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&c); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(b, &c); + secp256k1_num_set_bin(&n, b, 32); + secp256k1_num_set_bin(&m, prime, 32); + return secp256k1_num_jacobi(&n, &m) >= 0; +#else + secp256k1_fe r; + return secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&r, a); +#endif +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_FIELD_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/gen_context.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/gen_context.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..87d296e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/gen_context.c @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014, 2015 Thomas Daede, Cory Fields * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#define USE_BASIC_CONFIG 1 + +#include "basic-config.h" +#include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "field_impl.h" +#include "scalar_impl.h" +#include "group_impl.h" +#include "ecmult_gen_impl.h" + +static void default_error_callback_fn(const char* str, void* data) { + (void)data; + fprintf(stderr, "[libsecp256k1] internal consistency check failed: %s\n", str); + abort(); +} + +static const secp256k1_callback default_error_callback = { + default_error_callback_fn, + NULL +}; + +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context ctx; + int inner; + int outer; + FILE* fp; + + (void)argc; + (void)argv; + + fp = fopen("src/ecmult_static_context.h","w"); + if (fp == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "Could not open src/ecmult_static_context.h for writing!\n"); + return -1; + } + + fprintf(fp, "#ifndef _SECP256K1_ECMULT_STATIC_CONTEXT_\n"); + fprintf(fp, "#define _SECP256K1_ECMULT_STATIC_CONTEXT_\n"); + fprintf(fp, "#include \"src/group.h\"\n"); + fprintf(fp, "#define SC SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST\n"); + fprintf(fp, "static const secp256k1_ge_storage secp256k1_ecmult_static_context[64][16] = {\n"); + + secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_init(&ctx); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_build(&ctx, &default_error_callback); + for(outer = 0; outer != 64; outer++) { + fprintf(fp,"{\n"); + for(inner = 0; inner != 16; inner++) { + fprintf(fp," SC(%uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu)", SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST_GET((*ctx.prec)[outer][inner])); + if (inner != 15) { + fprintf(fp,",\n"); + } else { + fprintf(fp,"\n"); + } + } + if (outer != 63) { + fprintf(fp,"},\n"); + } else { + fprintf(fp,"}\n"); + } + } + fprintf(fp,"};\n"); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_clear(&ctx); + + fprintf(fp, "#undef SC\n"); + fprintf(fp, "#endif\n"); + fclose(fp); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/group.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/group.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3947ea2 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/group.h @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_GROUP_H +#define SECP256K1_GROUP_H + +#include "num.h" +#include "field.h" + +/** A group element of the secp256k1 curve, in affine coordinates. */ +typedef struct { + secp256k1_fe x; + secp256k1_fe y; + int infinity; /* whether this represents the point at infinity */ +} secp256k1_ge; + +#define SECP256K1_GE_CONST(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p) {SECP256K1_FE_CONST((a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f),(g),(h)), SECP256K1_FE_CONST((i),(j),(k),(l),(m),(n),(o),(p)), 0} +#define SECP256K1_GE_CONST_INFINITY {SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), 1} + +/** A group element of the secp256k1 curve, in jacobian coordinates. */ +typedef struct { + secp256k1_fe x; /* actual X: x/z^2 */ + secp256k1_fe y; /* actual Y: y/z^3 */ + secp256k1_fe z; + int infinity; /* whether this represents the point at infinity */ +} secp256k1_gej; + +#define SECP256K1_GEJ_CONST(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p) {SECP256K1_FE_CONST((a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f),(g),(h)), SECP256K1_FE_CONST((i),(j),(k),(l),(m),(n),(o),(p)), SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1), 0} +#define SECP256K1_GEJ_CONST_INFINITY {SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), 1} + +typedef struct { + secp256k1_fe_storage x; + secp256k1_fe_storage y; +} secp256k1_ge_storage; + +#define SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p) {SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST((a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f),(g),(h)), SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST((i),(j),(k),(l),(m),(n),(o),(p))} + +#define SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST_GET(t) SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST_GET(t.x), SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST_GET(t.y) + +/** Set a group element equal to the point with given X and Y coordinates */ +static void secp256k1_ge_set_xy(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_fe *x, const secp256k1_fe *y); + +/** Set a group element (affine) equal to the point with the given X coordinate + * and a Y coordinate that is a quadratic residue modulo p. The return value + * is true iff a coordinate with the given X coordinate exists. + */ +static int secp256k1_ge_set_xquad(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_fe *x); + +/** Set a group element (affine) equal to the point with the given X coordinate, and given oddness + * for Y. Return value indicates whether the result is valid. */ +static int secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_fe *x, int odd); + +/** Check whether a group element is the point at infinity. */ +static int secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(const secp256k1_ge *a); + +/** Check whether a group element is valid (i.e., on the curve). */ +static int secp256k1_ge_is_valid_var(const secp256k1_ge *a); + +static void secp256k1_ge_neg(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge *a); + +/** Set a group element equal to another which is given in jacobian coordinates */ +static void secp256k1_ge_set_gej(secp256k1_ge *r, secp256k1_gej *a); + +/** Set a batch of group elements equal to the inputs given in jacobian coordinates */ +static void secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, size_t len, const secp256k1_callback *cb); + +/** Set a batch of group elements equal to the inputs given in jacobian + * coordinates (with known z-ratios). zr must contain the known z-ratios such + * that mul(a[i].z, zr[i+1]) == a[i+1].z. zr[0] is ignored. */ +static void secp256k1_ge_set_table_gej_var(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_fe *zr, size_t len); + +/** Bring a batch inputs given in jacobian coordinates (with known z-ratios) to + * the same global z "denominator". zr must contain the known z-ratios such + * that mul(a[i].z, zr[i+1]) == a[i+1].z. zr[0] is ignored. The x and y + * coordinates of the result are stored in r, the common z coordinate is + * stored in globalz. */ +static void secp256k1_ge_globalz_set_table_gej(size_t len, secp256k1_ge *r, secp256k1_fe *globalz, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_fe *zr); + +/** Set a group element (affine) equal to the point at infinity. */ +static void secp256k1_ge_set_infinity(secp256k1_ge *r); + +/** Set a group element (jacobian) equal to the point at infinity. */ +static void secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(secp256k1_gej *r); + +/** Set a group element (jacobian) equal to another which is given in affine coordinates. */ +static void secp256k1_gej_set_ge(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_ge *a); + +/** Compare the X coordinate of a group element (jacobian). */ +static int secp256k1_gej_eq_x_var(const secp256k1_fe *x, const secp256k1_gej *a); + +/** Set r equal to the inverse of a (i.e., mirrored around the X axis) */ +static void secp256k1_gej_neg(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a); + +/** Check whether a group element is the point at infinity. */ +static int secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(const secp256k1_gej *a); + +/** Check whether a group element's y coordinate is a quadratic residue. */ +static int secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(const secp256k1_gej *a); + +/** Set r equal to the double of a. If rzr is not-NULL, r->z = a->z * *rzr (where infinity means an implicit z = 0). + * a may not be zero. Constant time. */ +static void secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, secp256k1_fe *rzr); + +/** Set r equal to the double of a. If rzr is not-NULL, r->z = a->z * *rzr (where infinity means an implicit z = 0). */ +static void secp256k1_gej_double_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, secp256k1_fe *rzr); + +/** Set r equal to the sum of a and b. If rzr is non-NULL, r->z = a->z * *rzr (a cannot be infinity in that case). */ +static void secp256k1_gej_add_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_gej *b, secp256k1_fe *rzr); + +/** Set r equal to the sum of a and b (with b given in affine coordinates, and not infinity). */ +static void secp256k1_gej_add_ge(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_ge *b); + +/** Set r equal to the sum of a and b (with b given in affine coordinates). This is more efficient + than secp256k1_gej_add_var. It is identical to secp256k1_gej_add_ge but without constant-time + guarantee, and b is allowed to be infinity. If rzr is non-NULL, r->z = a->z * *rzr (a cannot be infinity in that case). */ +static void secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_ge *b, secp256k1_fe *rzr); + +/** Set r equal to the sum of a and b (with the inverse of b's Z coordinate passed as bzinv). */ +static void secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_ge *b, const secp256k1_fe *bzinv); + +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM +/** Set r to be equal to lambda times a, where lambda is chosen in a way such that this is very fast. */ +static void secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge *a); +#endif + +/** Clear a secp256k1_gej to prevent leaking sensitive information. */ +static void secp256k1_gej_clear(secp256k1_gej *r); + +/** Clear a secp256k1_ge to prevent leaking sensitive information. */ +static void secp256k1_ge_clear(secp256k1_ge *r); + +/** Convert a group element to the storage type. */ +static void secp256k1_ge_to_storage(secp256k1_ge_storage *r, const secp256k1_ge *a); + +/** Convert a group element back from the storage type. */ +static void secp256k1_ge_from_storage(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge_storage *a); + +/** If flag is true, set *r equal to *a; otherwise leave it. Constant-time. */ +static void secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(secp256k1_ge_storage *r, const secp256k1_ge_storage *a, int flag); + +/** Rescale a jacobian point by b which must be non-zero. Constant-time. */ +static void secp256k1_gej_rescale(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_fe *b); + +#endif /* SECP256K1_GROUP_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/group_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/group_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b1ace87 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/group_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,706 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_GROUP_IMPL_H +#define SECP256K1_GROUP_IMPL_H + +#include "num.h" +#include "field.h" +#include "group.h" + +/* These points can be generated in sage as follows: + * + * 0. Setup a worksheet with the following parameters. + * b = 4 # whatever CURVE_B will be set to + * F = FiniteField (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFC2F) + * C = EllipticCurve ([F (0), F (b)]) + * + * 1. Determine all the small orders available to you. (If there are + * no satisfactory ones, go back and change b.) + * print C.order().factor(limit=1000) + * + * 2. Choose an order as one of the prime factors listed in the above step. + * (You can also multiply some to get a composite order, though the + * tests will crash trying to invert scalars during signing.) We take a + * random point and scale it to drop its order to the desired value. + * There is some probability this won't work; just try again. + * order = 199 + * P = C.random_point() + * P = (int(P.order()) / int(order)) * P + * assert(P.order() == order) + * + * 3. Print the values. You'll need to use a vim macro or something to + * split the hex output into 4-byte chunks. + * print "%x %x" % P.xy() + */ +#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) +# if EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 199 +const secp256k1_ge secp256k1_ge_const_g = SECP256K1_GE_CONST( + 0xFA7CC9A7, 0x0737F2DB, 0xA749DD39, 0x2B4FB069, + 0x3B017A7D, 0xA808C2F1, 0xFB12940C, 0x9EA66C18, + 0x78AC123A, 0x5ED8AEF3, 0x8732BC91, 0x1F3A2868, + 0x48DF246C, 0x808DAE72, 0xCFE52572, 0x7F0501ED +); + +const int CURVE_B = 4; +# elif EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 13 +const secp256k1_ge secp256k1_ge_const_g = SECP256K1_GE_CONST( + 0xedc60018, 0xa51a786b, 0x2ea91f4d, 0x4c9416c0, + 0x9de54c3b, 0xa1316554, 0x6cf4345c, 0x7277ef15, + 0x54cb1b6b, 0xdc8c1273, 0x087844ea, 0x43f4603e, + 0x0eaf9a43, 0xf6effe55, 0x939f806d, 0x37adf8ac +); +const int CURVE_B = 2; +# else +# error No known generator for the specified exhaustive test group order. +# endif +#else +/** Generator for secp256k1, value 'g' defined in + * "Standards for Efficient Cryptography" (SEC2) 2.7.1. + */ +static const secp256k1_ge secp256k1_ge_const_g = SECP256K1_GE_CONST( + 0x79BE667EUL, 0xF9DCBBACUL, 0x55A06295UL, 0xCE870B07UL, + 0x029BFCDBUL, 0x2DCE28D9UL, 0x59F2815BUL, 0x16F81798UL, + 0x483ADA77UL, 0x26A3C465UL, 0x5DA4FBFCUL, 0x0E1108A8UL, + 0xFD17B448UL, 0xA6855419UL, 0x9C47D08FUL, 0xFB10D4B8UL +); + +const int CURVE_B = 7; +#endif + +static void secp256k1_ge_set_gej_zinv(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_fe *zi) { + secp256k1_fe zi2; + secp256k1_fe zi3; + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&zi2, zi); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&zi3, &zi2, zi); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->x, &a->x, &zi2); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &a->y, &zi3); + r->infinity = a->infinity; +} + +static void secp256k1_ge_set_xy(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_fe *x, const secp256k1_fe *y) { + r->infinity = 0; + r->x = *x; + r->y = *y; +} + +static int secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(const secp256k1_ge *a) { + return a->infinity; +} + +static void secp256k1_ge_neg(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge *a) { + *r = *a; + secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&r->y); + secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &r->y, 1); +} + +static void secp256k1_ge_set_gej(secp256k1_ge *r, secp256k1_gej *a) { + secp256k1_fe z2, z3; + r->infinity = a->infinity; + secp256k1_fe_inv(&a->z, &a->z); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z2, &a->z); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&z3, &a->z, &z2); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&a->x, &a->x, &z2); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&a->y, &a->y, &z3); + secp256k1_fe_set_int(&a->z, 1); + r->x = a->x; + r->y = a->y; +} + +static void secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(secp256k1_ge *r, secp256k1_gej *a) { + secp256k1_fe z2, z3; + r->infinity = a->infinity; + if (a->infinity) { + return; + } + secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&a->z, &a->z); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z2, &a->z); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&z3, &a->z, &z2); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&a->x, &a->x, &z2); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&a->y, &a->y, &z3); + secp256k1_fe_set_int(&a->z, 1); + r->x = a->x; + r->y = a->y; +} + +static void secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, size_t len, const secp256k1_callback *cb) { + secp256k1_fe *az; + secp256k1_fe *azi; + size_t i; + size_t count = 0; + az = (secp256k1_fe *)checked_malloc(cb, sizeof(secp256k1_fe) * len); + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (!a[i].infinity) { + az[count++] = a[i].z; + } + } + + azi = (secp256k1_fe *)checked_malloc(cb, sizeof(secp256k1_fe) * count); + secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(azi, az, count); + free(az); + + count = 0; + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + r[i].infinity = a[i].infinity; + if (!a[i].infinity) { + secp256k1_ge_set_gej_zinv(&r[i], &a[i], &azi[count++]); + } + } + free(azi); +} + +static void secp256k1_ge_set_table_gej_var(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_fe *zr, size_t len) { + size_t i = len - 1; + secp256k1_fe zi; + + if (len > 0) { + /* Compute the inverse of the last z coordinate, and use it to compute the last affine output. */ + secp256k1_fe_inv(&zi, &a[i].z); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej_zinv(&r[i], &a[i], &zi); + + /* Work out way backwards, using the z-ratios to scale the x/y values. */ + while (i > 0) { + secp256k1_fe_mul(&zi, &zi, &zr[i]); + i--; + secp256k1_ge_set_gej_zinv(&r[i], &a[i], &zi); + } + } +} + +static void secp256k1_ge_globalz_set_table_gej(size_t len, secp256k1_ge *r, secp256k1_fe *globalz, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_fe *zr) { + size_t i = len - 1; + secp256k1_fe zs; + + if (len > 0) { + /* The z of the final point gives us the "global Z" for the table. */ + r[i].x = a[i].x; + r[i].y = a[i].y; + *globalz = a[i].z; + r[i].infinity = 0; + zs = zr[i]; + + /* Work our way backwards, using the z-ratios to scale the x/y values. */ + while (i > 0) { + if (i != len - 1) { + secp256k1_fe_mul(&zs, &zs, &zr[i]); + } + i--; + secp256k1_ge_set_gej_zinv(&r[i], &a[i], &zs); + } + } +} + +static void secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(secp256k1_gej *r) { + r->infinity = 1; + secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->x); + secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->y); + secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->z); +} + +static void secp256k1_ge_set_infinity(secp256k1_ge *r) { + r->infinity = 1; + secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->x); + secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->y); +} + +static void secp256k1_gej_clear(secp256k1_gej *r) { + r->infinity = 0; + secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->x); + secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->y); + secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->z); +} + +static void secp256k1_ge_clear(secp256k1_ge *r) { + r->infinity = 0; + secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->x); + secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->y); +} + +static int secp256k1_ge_set_xquad(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_fe *x) { + secp256k1_fe x2, x3, c; + r->x = *x; + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x2, x); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, x, &x2); + r->infinity = 0; + secp256k1_fe_set_int(&c, CURVE_B); + secp256k1_fe_add(&c, &x3); + return secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&r->y, &c); +} + +static int secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_fe *x, int odd) { + if (!secp256k1_ge_set_xquad(r, x)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&r->y); + if (secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r->y) != odd) { + secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &r->y, 1); + } + return 1; + +} + +static void secp256k1_gej_set_ge(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_ge *a) { + r->infinity = a->infinity; + r->x = a->x; + r->y = a->y; + secp256k1_fe_set_int(&r->z, 1); +} + +static int secp256k1_gej_eq_x_var(const secp256k1_fe *x, const secp256k1_gej *a) { + secp256k1_fe r, r2; + VERIFY_CHECK(!a->infinity); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&r, &a->z); secp256k1_fe_mul(&r, &r, x); + r2 = a->x; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&r2); + return secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&r, &r2); +} + +static void secp256k1_gej_neg(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a) { + r->infinity = a->infinity; + r->x = a->x; + r->y = a->y; + r->z = a->z; + secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&r->y); + secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &r->y, 1); +} + +static int secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(const secp256k1_gej *a) { + return a->infinity; +} + +static int secp256k1_gej_is_valid_var(const secp256k1_gej *a) { + secp256k1_fe y2, x3, z2, z6; + if (a->infinity) { + return 0; + } + /** y^2 = x^3 + 7 + * (Y/Z^3)^2 = (X/Z^2)^3 + 7 + * Y^2 / Z^6 = X^3 / Z^6 + 7 + * Y^2 = X^3 + 7*Z^6 + */ + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&y2, &a->y); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x3, &a->x); secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, &x3, &a->x); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z2, &a->z); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z6, &z2); secp256k1_fe_mul(&z6, &z6, &z2); + secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&z6, CURVE_B); + secp256k1_fe_add(&x3, &z6); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&x3); + return secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&y2, &x3); +} + +static int secp256k1_ge_is_valid_var(const secp256k1_ge *a) { + secp256k1_fe y2, x3, c; + if (a->infinity) { + return 0; + } + /* y^2 = x^3 + 7 */ + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&y2, &a->y); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x3, &a->x); secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, &x3, &a->x); + secp256k1_fe_set_int(&c, CURVE_B); + secp256k1_fe_add(&x3, &c); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&x3); + return secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&y2, &x3); +} + +static void secp256k1_gej_double_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, secp256k1_fe *rzr) { + /* Operations: 3 mul, 4 sqr, 0 normalize, 12 mul_int/add/negate. + * + * Note that there is an implementation described at + * https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-0.html#doubling-dbl-2009-l + * which trades a multiply for a square, but in practice this is actually slower, + * mainly because it requires more normalizations. + */ + secp256k1_fe t1,t2,t3,t4; + /** For secp256k1, 2Q is infinity if and only if Q is infinity. This is because if 2Q = infinity, + * Q must equal -Q, or that Q.y == -(Q.y), or Q.y is 0. For a point on y^2 = x^3 + 7 to have + * y=0, x^3 must be -7 mod p. However, -7 has no cube root mod p. + * + * Having said this, if this function receives a point on a sextic twist, e.g. by + * a fault attack, it is possible for y to be 0. This happens for y^2 = x^3 + 6, + * since -6 does have a cube root mod p. For this point, this function will not set + * the infinity flag even though the point doubles to infinity, and the result + * point will be gibberish (z = 0 but infinity = 0). + */ + r->infinity = a->infinity; + if (r->infinity) { + if (rzr != NULL) { + secp256k1_fe_set_int(rzr, 1); + } + return; + } + + if (rzr != NULL) { + *rzr = a->y; + secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(rzr); + secp256k1_fe_mul_int(rzr, 2); + } + + secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &a->z, &a->y); + secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->z, 2); /* Z' = 2*Y*Z (2) */ + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t1, &a->x); + secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&t1, 3); /* T1 = 3*X^2 (3) */ + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t2, &t1); /* T2 = 9*X^4 (1) */ + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t3, &a->y); + secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&t3, 2); /* T3 = 2*Y^2 (2) */ + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t4, &t3); + secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&t4, 2); /* T4 = 8*Y^4 (2) */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&t3, &t3, &a->x); /* T3 = 2*X*Y^2 (1) */ + r->x = t3; + secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->x, 4); /* X' = 8*X*Y^2 (4) */ + secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->x, &r->x, 4); /* X' = -8*X*Y^2 (5) */ + secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &t2); /* X' = 9*X^4 - 8*X*Y^2 (6) */ + secp256k1_fe_negate(&t2, &t2, 1); /* T2 = -9*X^4 (2) */ + secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&t3, 6); /* T3 = 12*X*Y^2 (6) */ + secp256k1_fe_add(&t3, &t2); /* T3 = 12*X*Y^2 - 9*X^4 (8) */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &t1, &t3); /* Y' = 36*X^3*Y^2 - 27*X^6 (1) */ + secp256k1_fe_negate(&t2, &t4, 2); /* T2 = -8*Y^4 (3) */ + secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &t2); /* Y' = 36*X^3*Y^2 - 27*X^6 - 8*Y^4 (4) */ +} + +static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, secp256k1_fe *rzr) { + VERIFY_CHECK(!secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(a)); + secp256k1_gej_double_var(r, a, rzr); +} + +static void secp256k1_gej_add_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_gej *b, secp256k1_fe *rzr) { + /* Operations: 12 mul, 4 sqr, 2 normalize, 12 mul_int/add/negate */ + secp256k1_fe z22, z12, u1, u2, s1, s2, h, i, i2, h2, h3, t; + + if (a->infinity) { + VERIFY_CHECK(rzr == NULL); + *r = *b; + return; + } + + if (b->infinity) { + if (rzr != NULL) { + secp256k1_fe_set_int(rzr, 1); + } + *r = *a; + return; + } + + r->infinity = 0; + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z22, &b->z); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z12, &a->z); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&u1, &a->x, &z22); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&u2, &b->x, &z12); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&s1, &a->y, &z22); secp256k1_fe_mul(&s1, &s1, &b->z); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &b->y, &z12); secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &s2, &a->z); + secp256k1_fe_negate(&h, &u1, 1); secp256k1_fe_add(&h, &u2); + secp256k1_fe_negate(&i, &s1, 1); secp256k1_fe_add(&i, &s2); + if (secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&h)) { + if (secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&i)) { + secp256k1_gej_double_var(r, a, rzr); + } else { + if (rzr != NULL) { + secp256k1_fe_set_int(rzr, 0); + } + r->infinity = 1; + } + return; + } + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&i2, &i); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&h2, &h); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&h3, &h, &h2); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&h, &h, &b->z); + if (rzr != NULL) { + *rzr = h; + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &a->z, &h); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&t, &u1, &h2); + r->x = t; secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->x, 2); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &h3); secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->x, &r->x, 3); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &i2); + secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &r->x, 5); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &t); secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &r->y, &i); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&h3, &h3, &s1); secp256k1_fe_negate(&h3, &h3, 1); + secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &h3); +} + +static void secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_ge *b, secp256k1_fe *rzr) { + /* 8 mul, 3 sqr, 4 normalize, 12 mul_int/add/negate */ + secp256k1_fe z12, u1, u2, s1, s2, h, i, i2, h2, h3, t; + if (a->infinity) { + VERIFY_CHECK(rzr == NULL); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(r, b); + return; + } + if (b->infinity) { + if (rzr != NULL) { + secp256k1_fe_set_int(rzr, 1); + } + *r = *a; + return; + } + r->infinity = 0; + + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z12, &a->z); + u1 = a->x; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&u1); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&u2, &b->x, &z12); + s1 = a->y; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&s1); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &b->y, &z12); secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &s2, &a->z); + secp256k1_fe_negate(&h, &u1, 1); secp256k1_fe_add(&h, &u2); + secp256k1_fe_negate(&i, &s1, 1); secp256k1_fe_add(&i, &s2); + if (secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&h)) { + if (secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&i)) { + secp256k1_gej_double_var(r, a, rzr); + } else { + if (rzr != NULL) { + secp256k1_fe_set_int(rzr, 0); + } + r->infinity = 1; + } + return; + } + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&i2, &i); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&h2, &h); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&h3, &h, &h2); + if (rzr != NULL) { + *rzr = h; + } + secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &a->z, &h); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&t, &u1, &h2); + r->x = t; secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->x, 2); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &h3); secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->x, &r->x, 3); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &i2); + secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &r->x, 5); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &t); secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &r->y, &i); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&h3, &h3, &s1); secp256k1_fe_negate(&h3, &h3, 1); + secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &h3); +} + +static void secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_ge *b, const secp256k1_fe *bzinv) { + /* 9 mul, 3 sqr, 4 normalize, 12 mul_int/add/negate */ + secp256k1_fe az, z12, u1, u2, s1, s2, h, i, i2, h2, h3, t; + + if (b->infinity) { + *r = *a; + return; + } + if (a->infinity) { + secp256k1_fe bzinv2, bzinv3; + r->infinity = b->infinity; + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&bzinv2, bzinv); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&bzinv3, &bzinv2, bzinv); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->x, &b->x, &bzinv2); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &b->y, &bzinv3); + secp256k1_fe_set_int(&r->z, 1); + return; + } + r->infinity = 0; + + /** We need to calculate (rx,ry,rz) = (ax,ay,az) + (bx,by,1/bzinv). Due to + * secp256k1's isomorphism we can multiply the Z coordinates on both sides + * by bzinv, and get: (rx,ry,rz*bzinv) = (ax,ay,az*bzinv) + (bx,by,1). + * This means that (rx,ry,rz) can be calculated as + * (ax,ay,az*bzinv) + (bx,by,1), when not applying the bzinv factor to rz. + * The variable az below holds the modified Z coordinate for a, which is used + * for the computation of rx and ry, but not for rz. + */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&az, &a->z, bzinv); + + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z12, &az); + u1 = a->x; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&u1); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&u2, &b->x, &z12); + s1 = a->y; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&s1); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &b->y, &z12); secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &s2, &az); + secp256k1_fe_negate(&h, &u1, 1); secp256k1_fe_add(&h, &u2); + secp256k1_fe_negate(&i, &s1, 1); secp256k1_fe_add(&i, &s2); + if (secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&h)) { + if (secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&i)) { + secp256k1_gej_double_var(r, a, NULL); + } else { + r->infinity = 1; + } + return; + } + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&i2, &i); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&h2, &h); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&h3, &h, &h2); + r->z = a->z; secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &r->z, &h); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&t, &u1, &h2); + r->x = t; secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->x, 2); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &h3); secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->x, &r->x, 3); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &i2); + secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &r->x, 5); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &t); secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &r->y, &i); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&h3, &h3, &s1); secp256k1_fe_negate(&h3, &h3, 1); + secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &h3); +} + + +static void secp256k1_gej_add_ge(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_ge *b) { + /* Operations: 7 mul, 5 sqr, 4 normalize, 21 mul_int/add/negate/cmov */ + static const secp256k1_fe fe_1 = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); + secp256k1_fe zz, u1, u2, s1, s2, t, tt, m, n, q, rr; + secp256k1_fe m_alt, rr_alt; + int infinity, degenerate; + VERIFY_CHECK(!b->infinity); + VERIFY_CHECK(a->infinity == 0 || a->infinity == 1); + + /** In: + * Eric Brier and Marc Joye, Weierstrass Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks. + * In D. Naccache and P. Paillier, Eds., Public Key Cryptography, vol. 2274 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 335-345. Springer-Verlag, 2002. + * we find as solution for a unified addition/doubling formula: + * lambda = ((x1 + x2)^2 - x1 * x2 + a) / (y1 + y2), with a = 0 for secp256k1's curve equation. + * x3 = lambda^2 - (x1 + x2) + * 2*y3 = lambda * (x1 + x2 - 2 * x3) - (y1 + y2). + * + * Substituting x_i = Xi / Zi^2 and yi = Yi / Zi^3, for i=1,2,3, gives: + * U1 = X1*Z2^2, U2 = X2*Z1^2 + * S1 = Y1*Z2^3, S2 = Y2*Z1^3 + * Z = Z1*Z2 + * T = U1+U2 + * M = S1+S2 + * Q = T*M^2 + * R = T^2-U1*U2 + * X3 = 4*(R^2-Q) + * Y3 = 4*(R*(3*Q-2*R^2)-M^4) + * Z3 = 2*M*Z + * (Note that the paper uses xi = Xi / Zi and yi = Yi / Zi instead.) + * + * This formula has the benefit of being the same for both addition + * of distinct points and doubling. However, it breaks down in the + * case that either point is infinity, or that y1 = -y2. We handle + * these cases in the following ways: + * + * - If b is infinity we simply bail by means of a VERIFY_CHECK. + * + * - If a is infinity, we detect this, and at the end of the + * computation replace the result (which will be meaningless, + * but we compute to be constant-time) with b.x : b.y : 1. + * + * - If a = -b, we have y1 = -y2, which is a degenerate case. + * But here the answer is infinity, so we simply set the + * infinity flag of the result, overriding the computed values + * without even needing to cmov. + * + * - If y1 = -y2 but x1 != x2, which does occur thanks to certain + * properties of our curve (specifically, 1 has nontrivial cube + * roots in our field, and the curve equation has no x coefficient) + * then the answer is not infinity but also not given by the above + * equation. In this case, we cmov in place an alternate expression + * for lambda. Specifically (y1 - y2)/(x1 - x2). Where both these + * expressions for lambda are defined, they are equal, and can be + * obtained from each other by multiplication by (y1 + y2)/(y1 + y2) + * then substitution of x^3 + 7 for y^2 (using the curve equation). + * For all pairs of nonzero points (a, b) at least one is defined, + * so this covers everything. + */ + + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&zz, &a->z); /* z = Z1^2 */ + u1 = a->x; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&u1); /* u1 = U1 = X1*Z2^2 (1) */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&u2, &b->x, &zz); /* u2 = U2 = X2*Z1^2 (1) */ + s1 = a->y; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&s1); /* s1 = S1 = Y1*Z2^3 (1) */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &b->y, &zz); /* s2 = Y2*Z1^2 (1) */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &s2, &a->z); /* s2 = S2 = Y2*Z1^3 (1) */ + t = u1; secp256k1_fe_add(&t, &u2); /* t = T = U1+U2 (2) */ + m = s1; secp256k1_fe_add(&m, &s2); /* m = M = S1+S2 (2) */ + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&rr, &t); /* rr = T^2 (1) */ + secp256k1_fe_negate(&m_alt, &u2, 1); /* Malt = -X2*Z1^2 */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&tt, &u1, &m_alt); /* tt = -U1*U2 (2) */ + secp256k1_fe_add(&rr, &tt); /* rr = R = T^2-U1*U2 (3) */ + /** If lambda = R/M = 0/0 we have a problem (except in the "trivial" + * case that Z = z1z2 = 0, and this is special-cased later on). */ + degenerate = secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero(&m) & + secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero(&rr); + /* This only occurs when y1 == -y2 and x1^3 == x2^3, but x1 != x2. + * This means either x1 == beta*x2 or beta*x1 == x2, where beta is + * a nontrivial cube root of one. In either case, an alternate + * non-indeterminate expression for lambda is (y1 - y2)/(x1 - x2), + * so we set R/M equal to this. */ + rr_alt = s1; + secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&rr_alt, 2); /* rr = Y1*Z2^3 - Y2*Z1^3 (2) */ + secp256k1_fe_add(&m_alt, &u1); /* Malt = X1*Z2^2 - X2*Z1^2 */ + + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&rr_alt, &rr, !degenerate); + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&m_alt, &m, !degenerate); + /* Now Ralt / Malt = lambda and is guaranteed not to be 0/0. + * From here on out Ralt and Malt represent the numerator + * and denominator of lambda; R and M represent the explicit + * expressions x1^2 + x2^2 + x1x2 and y1 + y2. */ + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&n, &m_alt); /* n = Malt^2 (1) */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&q, &n, &t); /* q = Q = T*Malt^2 (1) */ + /* These two lines use the observation that either M == Malt or M == 0, + * so M^3 * Malt is either Malt^4 (which is computed by squaring), or + * zero (which is "computed" by cmov). So the cost is one squaring + * versus two multiplications. */ + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&n, &n); + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&n, &m, degenerate); /* n = M^3 * Malt (2) */ + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t, &rr_alt); /* t = Ralt^2 (1) */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &a->z, &m_alt); /* r->z = Malt*Z (1) */ + infinity = secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero(&r->z) * (1 - a->infinity); + secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->z, 2); /* r->z = Z3 = 2*Malt*Z (2) */ + secp256k1_fe_negate(&q, &q, 1); /* q = -Q (2) */ + secp256k1_fe_add(&t, &q); /* t = Ralt^2-Q (3) */ + secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&t); + r->x = t; /* r->x = Ralt^2-Q (1) */ + secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&t, 2); /* t = 2*x3 (2) */ + secp256k1_fe_add(&t, &q); /* t = 2*x3 - Q: (4) */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&t, &t, &rr_alt); /* t = Ralt*(2*x3 - Q) (1) */ + secp256k1_fe_add(&t, &n); /* t = Ralt*(2*x3 - Q) + M^3*Malt (3) */ + secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &t, 3); /* r->y = Ralt*(Q - 2x3) - M^3*Malt (4) */ + secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&r->y); + secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->x, 4); /* r->x = X3 = 4*(Ralt^2-Q) */ + secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->y, 4); /* r->y = Y3 = 4*Ralt*(Q - 2x3) - 4*M^3*Malt (4) */ + + /** In case a->infinity == 1, replace r with (b->x, b->y, 1). */ + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&r->x, &b->x, a->infinity); + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&r->y, &b->y, a->infinity); + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&r->z, &fe_1, a->infinity); + r->infinity = infinity; +} + +static void secp256k1_gej_rescale(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_fe *s) { + /* Operations: 4 mul, 1 sqr */ + secp256k1_fe zz; + VERIFY_CHECK(!secp256k1_fe_is_zero(s)); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&zz, s); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->x, &r->x, &zz); /* r->x *= s^2 */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &r->y, &zz); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &r->y, s); /* r->y *= s^3 */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &r->z, s); /* r->z *= s */ +} + +static void secp256k1_ge_to_storage(secp256k1_ge_storage *r, const secp256k1_ge *a) { + secp256k1_fe x, y; + VERIFY_CHECK(!a->infinity); + x = a->x; + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&x); + y = a->y; + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&y); + secp256k1_fe_to_storage(&r->x, &x); + secp256k1_fe_to_storage(&r->y, &y); +} + +static void secp256k1_ge_from_storage(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge_storage *a) { + secp256k1_fe_from_storage(&r->x, &a->x); + secp256k1_fe_from_storage(&r->y, &a->y); + r->infinity = 0; +} + +static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(secp256k1_ge_storage *r, const secp256k1_ge_storage *a, int flag) { + secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&r->x, &a->x, flag); + secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&r->y, &a->y, flag); +} + +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM +static void secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge *a) { + static const secp256k1_fe beta = SECP256K1_FE_CONST( + 0x7ae96a2bul, 0x657c0710ul, 0x6e64479eul, 0xac3434e9ul, + 0x9cf04975ul, 0x12f58995ul, 0xc1396c28ul, 0x719501eeul + ); + *r = *a; + secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->x, &r->x, &beta); +} +#endif + +static int secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(const secp256k1_gej *a) { + secp256k1_fe yz; + + if (a->infinity) { + return 0; + } + + /* We rely on the fact that the Jacobi symbol of 1 / a->z^3 is the same as + * that of a->z. Thus a->y / a->z^3 is a quadratic residue iff a->y * a->z + is */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&yz, &a->y, &a->z); + return secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(&yz); +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_GROUP_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/hash.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/hash.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..de26e4b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/hash.h @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_HASH_H +#define SECP256K1_HASH_H + +#include +#include + +typedef struct { + uint32_t s[8]; + uint32_t buf[16]; /* In big endian */ + size_t bytes; +} secp256k1_sha256; + +static void secp256k1_sha256_initialize(secp256k1_sha256 *hash); +static void secp256k1_sha256_write(secp256k1_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *data, size_t size); +static void secp256k1_sha256_finalize(secp256k1_sha256 *hash, unsigned char *out32); + +typedef struct { + secp256k1_sha256 inner, outer; +} secp256k1_hmac_sha256; + +static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *key, size_t size); +static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *data, size_t size); +static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, unsigned char *out32); + +typedef struct { + unsigned char v[32]; + unsigned char k[32]; + int retry; +} secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256; + +static void secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 *rng, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); +static void secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 *rng, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen); +static void secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 *rng); + +#endif /* SECP256K1_HASH_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/hash_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/hash_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..009f26b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/hash_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,282 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_HASH_IMPL_H +#define SECP256K1_HASH_IMPL_H + +#include "hash.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#define Ch(x,y,z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) +#define Maj(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((z) & ((x) | (y)))) +#define Sigma0(x) (((x) >> 2 | (x) << 30) ^ ((x) >> 13 | (x) << 19) ^ ((x) >> 22 | (x) << 10)) +#define Sigma1(x) (((x) >> 6 | (x) << 26) ^ ((x) >> 11 | (x) << 21) ^ ((x) >> 25 | (x) << 7)) +#define sigma0(x) (((x) >> 7 | (x) << 25) ^ ((x) >> 18 | (x) << 14) ^ ((x) >> 3)) +#define sigma1(x) (((x) >> 17 | (x) << 15) ^ ((x) >> 19 | (x) << 13) ^ ((x) >> 10)) + +#define Round(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,k,w) do { \ + uint32_t t1 = (h) + Sigma1(e) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + (k) + (w); \ + uint32_t t2 = Sigma0(a) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \ + (d) += t1; \ + (h) = t1 + t2; \ +} while(0) + +#ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN +#define BE32(x) (x) +#else +#define BE32(p) ((((p) & 0xFF) << 24) | (((p) & 0xFF00) << 8) | (((p) & 0xFF0000) >> 8) | (((p) & 0xFF000000) >> 24)) +#endif + +static void secp256k1_sha256_initialize(secp256k1_sha256 *hash) { + hash->s[0] = 0x6a09e667ul; + hash->s[1] = 0xbb67ae85ul; + hash->s[2] = 0x3c6ef372ul; + hash->s[3] = 0xa54ff53aul; + hash->s[4] = 0x510e527ful; + hash->s[5] = 0x9b05688cul; + hash->s[6] = 0x1f83d9abul; + hash->s[7] = 0x5be0cd19ul; + hash->bytes = 0; +} + +/** Perform one SHA-256 transformation, processing 16 big endian 32-bit words. */ +static void secp256k1_sha256_transform(uint32_t* s, const uint32_t* chunk) { + uint32_t a = s[0], b = s[1], c = s[2], d = s[3], e = s[4], f = s[5], g = s[6], h = s[7]; + uint32_t w0, w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w8, w9, w10, w11, w12, w13, w14, w15; + + Round(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, 0x428a2f98, w0 = BE32(chunk[0])); + Round(h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, 0x71374491, w1 = BE32(chunk[1])); + Round(g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, 0xb5c0fbcf, w2 = BE32(chunk[2])); + Round(f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, 0xe9b5dba5, w3 = BE32(chunk[3])); + Round(e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, 0x3956c25b, w4 = BE32(chunk[4])); + Round(d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, 0x59f111f1, w5 = BE32(chunk[5])); + Round(c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, 0x923f82a4, w6 = BE32(chunk[6])); + Round(b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, 0xab1c5ed5, w7 = BE32(chunk[7])); + Round(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, 0xd807aa98, w8 = BE32(chunk[8])); + Round(h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, 0x12835b01, w9 = BE32(chunk[9])); + Round(g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, 0x243185be, w10 = BE32(chunk[10])); + Round(f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, 0x550c7dc3, w11 = BE32(chunk[11])); + Round(e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, 0x72be5d74, w12 = BE32(chunk[12])); + Round(d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, 0x80deb1fe, w13 = BE32(chunk[13])); + Round(c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, 0x9bdc06a7, w14 = BE32(chunk[14])); + Round(b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, 0xc19bf174, w15 = BE32(chunk[15])); + + Round(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, 0xe49b69c1, w0 += sigma1(w14) + w9 + sigma0(w1)); + Round(h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, 0xefbe4786, w1 += sigma1(w15) + w10 + sigma0(w2)); + Round(g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, 0x0fc19dc6, w2 += sigma1(w0) + w11 + sigma0(w3)); + Round(f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, 0x240ca1cc, w3 += sigma1(w1) + w12 + sigma0(w4)); + Round(e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, 0x2de92c6f, w4 += sigma1(w2) + w13 + sigma0(w5)); + Round(d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, 0x4a7484aa, w5 += sigma1(w3) + w14 + sigma0(w6)); + Round(c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, 0x5cb0a9dc, w6 += sigma1(w4) + w15 + sigma0(w7)); + Round(b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, 0x76f988da, w7 += sigma1(w5) + w0 + sigma0(w8)); + Round(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, 0x983e5152, w8 += sigma1(w6) + w1 + sigma0(w9)); + Round(h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, 0xa831c66d, w9 += sigma1(w7) + w2 + sigma0(w10)); + Round(g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, 0xb00327c8, w10 += sigma1(w8) + w3 + sigma0(w11)); + Round(f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, 0xbf597fc7, w11 += sigma1(w9) + w4 + sigma0(w12)); + Round(e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, 0xc6e00bf3, w12 += sigma1(w10) + w5 + sigma0(w13)); + Round(d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, 0xd5a79147, w13 += sigma1(w11) + w6 + sigma0(w14)); + Round(c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, 0x06ca6351, w14 += sigma1(w12) + w7 + sigma0(w15)); + Round(b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, 0x14292967, w15 += sigma1(w13) + w8 + sigma0(w0)); + + Round(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, 0x27b70a85, w0 += sigma1(w14) + w9 + sigma0(w1)); + Round(h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, 0x2e1b2138, w1 += sigma1(w15) + w10 + sigma0(w2)); + Round(g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, 0x4d2c6dfc, w2 += sigma1(w0) + w11 + sigma0(w3)); + Round(f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, 0x53380d13, w3 += sigma1(w1) + w12 + sigma0(w4)); + Round(e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, 0x650a7354, w4 += sigma1(w2) + w13 + sigma0(w5)); + Round(d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, 0x766a0abb, w5 += sigma1(w3) + w14 + sigma0(w6)); + Round(c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, 0x81c2c92e, w6 += sigma1(w4) + w15 + sigma0(w7)); + Round(b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, 0x92722c85, w7 += sigma1(w5) + w0 + sigma0(w8)); + Round(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, 0xa2bfe8a1, w8 += sigma1(w6) + w1 + sigma0(w9)); + Round(h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, 0xa81a664b, w9 += sigma1(w7) + w2 + sigma0(w10)); + Round(g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, 0xc24b8b70, w10 += sigma1(w8) + w3 + sigma0(w11)); + Round(f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, 0xc76c51a3, w11 += sigma1(w9) + w4 + sigma0(w12)); + Round(e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, 0xd192e819, w12 += sigma1(w10) + w5 + sigma0(w13)); + Round(d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, 0xd6990624, w13 += sigma1(w11) + w6 + sigma0(w14)); + Round(c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, 0xf40e3585, w14 += sigma1(w12) + w7 + sigma0(w15)); + Round(b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, 0x106aa070, w15 += sigma1(w13) + w8 + sigma0(w0)); + + Round(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, 0x19a4c116, w0 += sigma1(w14) + w9 + sigma0(w1)); + Round(h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, 0x1e376c08, w1 += sigma1(w15) + w10 + sigma0(w2)); + Round(g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, 0x2748774c, w2 += sigma1(w0) + w11 + sigma0(w3)); + Round(f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, 0x34b0bcb5, w3 += sigma1(w1) + w12 + sigma0(w4)); + Round(e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, 0x391c0cb3, w4 += sigma1(w2) + w13 + sigma0(w5)); + Round(d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, 0x4ed8aa4a, w5 += sigma1(w3) + w14 + sigma0(w6)); + Round(c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, 0x5b9cca4f, w6 += sigma1(w4) + w15 + sigma0(w7)); + Round(b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, 0x682e6ff3, w7 += sigma1(w5) + w0 + sigma0(w8)); + Round(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, 0x748f82ee, w8 += sigma1(w6) + w1 + sigma0(w9)); + Round(h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, 0x78a5636f, w9 += sigma1(w7) + w2 + sigma0(w10)); + Round(g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, 0x84c87814, w10 += sigma1(w8) + w3 + sigma0(w11)); + Round(f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, 0x8cc70208, w11 += sigma1(w9) + w4 + sigma0(w12)); + Round(e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, 0x90befffa, w12 += sigma1(w10) + w5 + sigma0(w13)); + Round(d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, 0xa4506ceb, w13 += sigma1(w11) + w6 + sigma0(w14)); + Round(c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, 0xbef9a3f7, w14 + sigma1(w12) + w7 + sigma0(w15)); + Round(b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, 0xc67178f2, w15 + sigma1(w13) + w8 + sigma0(w0)); + + s[0] += a; + s[1] += b; + s[2] += c; + s[3] += d; + s[4] += e; + s[5] += f; + s[6] += g; + s[7] += h; +} + +static void secp256k1_sha256_write(secp256k1_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *data, size_t len) { + size_t bufsize = hash->bytes & 0x3F; + hash->bytes += len; + while (bufsize + len >= 64) { + /* Fill the buffer, and process it. */ + size_t chunk_len = 64 - bufsize; + memcpy(((unsigned char*)hash->buf) + bufsize, data, chunk_len); + data += chunk_len; + len -= chunk_len; + secp256k1_sha256_transform(hash->s, hash->buf); + bufsize = 0; + } + if (len) { + /* Fill the buffer with what remains. */ + memcpy(((unsigned char*)hash->buf) + bufsize, data, len); + } +} + +static void secp256k1_sha256_finalize(secp256k1_sha256 *hash, unsigned char *out32) { + static const unsigned char pad[64] = {0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; + uint32_t sizedesc[2]; + uint32_t out[8]; + int i = 0; + sizedesc[0] = BE32(hash->bytes >> 29); + sizedesc[1] = BE32(hash->bytes << 3); + secp256k1_sha256_write(hash, pad, 1 + ((119 - (hash->bytes % 64)) % 64)); + secp256k1_sha256_write(hash, (const unsigned char*)sizedesc, 8); + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + out[i] = BE32(hash->s[i]); + hash->s[i] = 0; + } + memcpy(out32, (const unsigned char*)out, 32); +} + +static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) { + size_t n; + unsigned char rkey[64]; + if (keylen <= sizeof(rkey)) { + memcpy(rkey, key, keylen); + memset(rkey + keylen, 0, sizeof(rkey) - keylen); + } else { + secp256k1_sha256 sha256; + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, key, keylen); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, rkey); + memset(rkey + 32, 0, 32); + } + + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&hash->outer); + for (n = 0; n < sizeof(rkey); n++) { + rkey[n] ^= 0x5c; + } + secp256k1_sha256_write(&hash->outer, rkey, sizeof(rkey)); + + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&hash->inner); + for (n = 0; n < sizeof(rkey); n++) { + rkey[n] ^= 0x5c ^ 0x36; + } + secp256k1_sha256_write(&hash->inner, rkey, sizeof(rkey)); + memset(rkey, 0, sizeof(rkey)); +} + +static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *data, size_t size) { + secp256k1_sha256_write(&hash->inner, data, size); +} + +static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, unsigned char *out32) { + unsigned char temp[32]; + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&hash->inner, temp); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&hash->outer, temp, 32); + memset(temp, 0, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&hash->outer, out32); +} + + +static void secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 *rng, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) { + secp256k1_hmac_sha256 hmac; + static const unsigned char zero[1] = {0x00}; + static const unsigned char one[1] = {0x01}; + + memset(rng->v, 0x01, 32); /* RFC6979 3.2.b. */ + memset(rng->k, 0x00, 32); /* RFC6979 3.2.c. */ + + /* RFC6979 3.2.d. */ + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hmac, rng->k, 32); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, rng->v, 32); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, zero, 1); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, key, keylen); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hmac, rng->k); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hmac, rng->k, 32); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, rng->v, 32); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hmac, rng->v); + + /* RFC6979 3.2.f. */ + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hmac, rng->k, 32); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, rng->v, 32); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, one, 1); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, key, keylen); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hmac, rng->k); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hmac, rng->k, 32); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, rng->v, 32); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hmac, rng->v); + rng->retry = 0; +} + +static void secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 *rng, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) { + /* RFC6979 3.2.h. */ + static const unsigned char zero[1] = {0x00}; + if (rng->retry) { + secp256k1_hmac_sha256 hmac; + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hmac, rng->k, 32); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, rng->v, 32); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, zero, 1); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hmac, rng->k); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hmac, rng->k, 32); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, rng->v, 32); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hmac, rng->v); + } + + while (outlen > 0) { + secp256k1_hmac_sha256 hmac; + int now = outlen; + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hmac, rng->k, 32); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, rng->v, 32); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hmac, rng->v); + if (now > 32) { + now = 32; + } + memcpy(out, rng->v, now); + out += now; + outlen -= now; + } + + rng->retry = 1; +} + +static void secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 *rng) { + memset(rng->k, 0, 32); + memset(rng->v, 0, 32); + rng->retry = 0; +} + +#undef BE32 +#undef Round +#undef sigma1 +#undef sigma0 +#undef Sigma1 +#undef Sigma0 +#undef Maj +#undef Ch + +#endif /* SECP256K1_HASH_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1.java b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1.java new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1c67802 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1.java @@ -0,0 +1,446 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2013 Google Inc. + * Copyright 2014-2016 the libsecp256k1 contributors + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); + * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +package org.bitcoin; + +import java.nio.ByteBuffer; +import java.nio.ByteOrder; + +import java.math.BigInteger; +import com.google.common.base.Preconditions; +import java.util.concurrent.locks.Lock; +import java.util.concurrent.locks.ReentrantReadWriteLock; +import static org.bitcoin.NativeSecp256k1Util.*; + +/** + *

This class holds native methods to handle ECDSA verification.

+ * + *

You can find an example library that can be used for this at https://github.com/bitcoin/secp256k1

+ * + *

To build secp256k1 for use with bitcoinj, run + * `./configure --enable-jni --enable-experimental --enable-module-ecdh` + * and `make` then copy `.libs/libsecp256k1.so` to your system library path + * or point the JVM to the folder containing it with -Djava.library.path + *

+ */ +public class NativeSecp256k1 { + + private static final ReentrantReadWriteLock rwl = new ReentrantReadWriteLock(); + private static final Lock r = rwl.readLock(); + private static final Lock w = rwl.writeLock(); + private static ThreadLocal nativeECDSABuffer = new ThreadLocal(); + /** + * Verifies the given secp256k1 signature in native code. + * Calling when enabled == false is undefined (probably library not loaded) + * + * @param data The data which was signed, must be exactly 32 bytes + * @param signature The signature + * @param pub The public key which did the signing + */ + public static boolean verify(byte[] data, byte[] signature, byte[] pub) throws AssertFailException{ + Preconditions.checkArgument(data.length == 32 && signature.length <= 520 && pub.length <= 520); + + ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get(); + if (byteBuff == null || byteBuff.capacity() < 520) { + byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(520); + byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder()); + nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff); + } + byteBuff.rewind(); + byteBuff.put(data); + byteBuff.put(signature); + byteBuff.put(pub); + + byte[][] retByteArray; + + r.lock(); + try { + return secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(byteBuff, Secp256k1Context.getContext(), signature.length, pub.length) == 1; + } finally { + r.unlock(); + } + } + + /** + * libsecp256k1 Create an ECDSA signature. + * + * @param data Message hash, 32 bytes + * @param key Secret key, 32 bytes + * + * Return values + * @param sig byte array of signature + */ + public static byte[] sign(byte[] data, byte[] sec) throws AssertFailException{ + Preconditions.checkArgument(data.length == 32 && sec.length <= 32); + + ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get(); + if (byteBuff == null || byteBuff.capacity() < 32 + 32) { + byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(32 + 32); + byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder()); + nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff); + } + byteBuff.rewind(); + byteBuff.put(data); + byteBuff.put(sec); + + byte[][] retByteArray; + + r.lock(); + try { + retByteArray = secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(byteBuff, Secp256k1Context.getContext()); + } finally { + r.unlock(); + } + + byte[] sigArr = retByteArray[0]; + int sigLen = new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][0] }).intValue(); + int retVal = new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][1] }).intValue(); + + assertEquals(sigArr.length, sigLen, "Got bad signature length."); + + return retVal == 0 ? new byte[0] : sigArr; + } + + /** + * libsecp256k1 Seckey Verify - returns 1 if valid, 0 if invalid + * + * @param seckey ECDSA Secret key, 32 bytes + */ + public static boolean secKeyVerify(byte[] seckey) { + Preconditions.checkArgument(seckey.length == 32); + + ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get(); + if (byteBuff == null || byteBuff.capacity() < seckey.length) { + byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(seckey.length); + byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder()); + nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff); + } + byteBuff.rewind(); + byteBuff.put(seckey); + + r.lock(); + try { + return secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(byteBuff,Secp256k1Context.getContext()) == 1; + } finally { + r.unlock(); + } + } + + + /** + * libsecp256k1 Compute Pubkey - computes public key from secret key + * + * @param seckey ECDSA Secret key, 32 bytes + * + * Return values + * @param pubkey ECDSA Public key, 33 or 65 bytes + */ + //TODO add a 'compressed' arg + public static byte[] computePubkey(byte[] seckey) throws AssertFailException{ + Preconditions.checkArgument(seckey.length == 32); + + ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get(); + if (byteBuff == null || byteBuff.capacity() < seckey.length) { + byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(seckey.length); + byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder()); + nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff); + } + byteBuff.rewind(); + byteBuff.put(seckey); + + byte[][] retByteArray; + + r.lock(); + try { + retByteArray = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(byteBuff, Secp256k1Context.getContext()); + } finally { + r.unlock(); + } + + byte[] pubArr = retByteArray[0]; + int pubLen = new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][0] }).intValue(); + int retVal = new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][1] }).intValue(); + + assertEquals(pubArr.length, pubLen, "Got bad pubkey length."); + + return retVal == 0 ? new byte[0]: pubArr; + } + + /** + * libsecp256k1 Cleanup - This destroys the secp256k1 context object + * This should be called at the end of the program for proper cleanup of the context. + */ + public static synchronized void cleanup() { + w.lock(); + try { + secp256k1_destroy_context(Secp256k1Context.getContext()); + } finally { + w.unlock(); + } + } + + public static long cloneContext() { + r.lock(); + try { + return secp256k1_ctx_clone(Secp256k1Context.getContext()); + } finally { r.unlock(); } + } + + /** + * libsecp256k1 PrivKey Tweak-Mul - Tweak privkey by multiplying to it + * + * @param tweak some bytes to tweak with + * @param seckey 32-byte seckey + */ + public static byte[] privKeyTweakMul(byte[] privkey, byte[] tweak) throws AssertFailException{ + Preconditions.checkArgument(privkey.length == 32); + + ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get(); + if (byteBuff == null || byteBuff.capacity() < privkey.length + tweak.length) { + byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(privkey.length + tweak.length); + byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder()); + nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff); + } + byteBuff.rewind(); + byteBuff.put(privkey); + byteBuff.put(tweak); + + byte[][] retByteArray; + r.lock(); + try { + retByteArray = secp256k1_privkey_tweak_mul(byteBuff,Secp256k1Context.getContext()); + } finally { + r.unlock(); + } + + byte[] privArr = retByteArray[0]; + + int privLen = (byte) new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][0] }).intValue() & 0xFF; + int retVal = new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][1] }).intValue(); + + assertEquals(privArr.length, privLen, "Got bad pubkey length."); + + assertEquals(retVal, 1, "Failed return value check."); + + return privArr; + } + + /** + * libsecp256k1 PrivKey Tweak-Add - Tweak privkey by adding to it + * + * @param tweak some bytes to tweak with + * @param seckey 32-byte seckey + */ + public static byte[] privKeyTweakAdd(byte[] privkey, byte[] tweak) throws AssertFailException{ + Preconditions.checkArgument(privkey.length == 32); + + ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get(); + if (byteBuff == null || byteBuff.capacity() < privkey.length + tweak.length) { + byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(privkey.length + tweak.length); + byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder()); + nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff); + } + byteBuff.rewind(); + byteBuff.put(privkey); + byteBuff.put(tweak); + + byte[][] retByteArray; + r.lock(); + try { + retByteArray = secp256k1_privkey_tweak_add(byteBuff,Secp256k1Context.getContext()); + } finally { + r.unlock(); + } + + byte[] privArr = retByteArray[0]; + + int privLen = (byte) new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][0] }).intValue() & 0xFF; + int retVal = new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][1] }).intValue(); + + assertEquals(privArr.length, privLen, "Got bad pubkey length."); + + assertEquals(retVal, 1, "Failed return value check."); + + return privArr; + } + + /** + * libsecp256k1 PubKey Tweak-Add - Tweak pubkey by adding to it + * + * @param tweak some bytes to tweak with + * @param pubkey 32-byte seckey + */ + public static byte[] pubKeyTweakAdd(byte[] pubkey, byte[] tweak) throws AssertFailException{ + Preconditions.checkArgument(pubkey.length == 33 || pubkey.length == 65); + + ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get(); + if (byteBuff == null || byteBuff.capacity() < pubkey.length + tweak.length) { + byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(pubkey.length + tweak.length); + byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder()); + nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff); + } + byteBuff.rewind(); + byteBuff.put(pubkey); + byteBuff.put(tweak); + + byte[][] retByteArray; + r.lock(); + try { + retByteArray = secp256k1_pubkey_tweak_add(byteBuff,Secp256k1Context.getContext(), pubkey.length); + } finally { + r.unlock(); + } + + byte[] pubArr = retByteArray[0]; + + int pubLen = (byte) new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][0] }).intValue() & 0xFF; + int retVal = new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][1] }).intValue(); + + assertEquals(pubArr.length, pubLen, "Got bad pubkey length."); + + assertEquals(retVal, 1, "Failed return value check."); + + return pubArr; + } + + /** + * libsecp256k1 PubKey Tweak-Mul - Tweak pubkey by multiplying to it + * + * @param tweak some bytes to tweak with + * @param pubkey 32-byte seckey + */ + public static byte[] pubKeyTweakMul(byte[] pubkey, byte[] tweak) throws AssertFailException{ + Preconditions.checkArgument(pubkey.length == 33 || pubkey.length == 65); + + ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get(); + if (byteBuff == null || byteBuff.capacity() < pubkey.length + tweak.length) { + byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(pubkey.length + tweak.length); + byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder()); + nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff); + } + byteBuff.rewind(); + byteBuff.put(pubkey); + byteBuff.put(tweak); + + byte[][] retByteArray; + r.lock(); + try { + retByteArray = secp256k1_pubkey_tweak_mul(byteBuff,Secp256k1Context.getContext(), pubkey.length); + } finally { + r.unlock(); + } + + byte[] pubArr = retByteArray[0]; + + int pubLen = (byte) new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][0] }).intValue() & 0xFF; + int retVal = new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][1] }).intValue(); + + assertEquals(pubArr.length, pubLen, "Got bad pubkey length."); + + assertEquals(retVal, 1, "Failed return value check."); + + return pubArr; + } + + /** + * libsecp256k1 create ECDH secret - constant time ECDH calculation + * + * @param seckey byte array of secret key used in exponentiaion + * @param pubkey byte array of public key used in exponentiaion + */ + public static byte[] createECDHSecret(byte[] seckey, byte[] pubkey) throws AssertFailException{ + Preconditions.checkArgument(seckey.length <= 32 && pubkey.length <= 65); + + ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get(); + if (byteBuff == null || byteBuff.capacity() < 32 + pubkey.length) { + byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(32 + pubkey.length); + byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder()); + nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff); + } + byteBuff.rewind(); + byteBuff.put(seckey); + byteBuff.put(pubkey); + + byte[][] retByteArray; + r.lock(); + try { + retByteArray = secp256k1_ecdh(byteBuff, Secp256k1Context.getContext(), pubkey.length); + } finally { + r.unlock(); + } + + byte[] resArr = retByteArray[0]; + int retVal = new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][0] }).intValue(); + + assertEquals(resArr.length, 32, "Got bad result length."); + assertEquals(retVal, 1, "Failed return value check."); + + return resArr; + } + + /** + * libsecp256k1 randomize - updates the context randomization + * + * @param seed 32-byte random seed + */ + public static synchronized boolean randomize(byte[] seed) throws AssertFailException{ + Preconditions.checkArgument(seed.length == 32 || seed == null); + + ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get(); + if (byteBuff == null || byteBuff.capacity() < seed.length) { + byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(seed.length); + byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder()); + nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff); + } + byteBuff.rewind(); + byteBuff.put(seed); + + w.lock(); + try { + return secp256k1_context_randomize(byteBuff, Secp256k1Context.getContext()) == 1; + } finally { + w.unlock(); + } + } + + private static native long secp256k1_ctx_clone(long context); + + private static native int secp256k1_context_randomize(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context); + + private static native byte[][] secp256k1_privkey_tweak_add(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context); + + private static native byte[][] secp256k1_privkey_tweak_mul(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context); + + private static native byte[][] secp256k1_pubkey_tweak_add(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context, int pubLen); + + private static native byte[][] secp256k1_pubkey_tweak_mul(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context, int pubLen); + + private static native void secp256k1_destroy_context(long context); + + private static native int secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context, int sigLen, int pubLen); + + private static native byte[][] secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context); + + private static native int secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context); + + private static native byte[][] secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context); + + private static native byte[][] secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context, int inputLen); + + private static native byte[][] secp256k1_ecdh(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context, int inputLen); + +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Test.java b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Test.java new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d766a10 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Test.java @@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +package org.bitcoin; + +import com.google.common.io.BaseEncoding; +import java.util.Arrays; +import java.math.BigInteger; +import javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter; +import static org.bitcoin.NativeSecp256k1Util.*; + +/** + * This class holds test cases defined for testing this library. + */ +public class NativeSecp256k1Test { + + //TODO improve comments/add more tests + /** + * This tests verify() for a valid signature + */ + public static void testVerifyPos() throws AssertFailException{ + boolean result = false; + byte[] data = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("CF80CD8AED482D5D1527D7DC72FCEFF84E6326592848447D2DC0B0E87DFC9A90".toLowerCase()); //sha256hash of "testing" + byte[] sig = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("3044022079BE667EF9DCBBAC55A06295CE870B07029BFCDB2DCE28D959F2815B16F817980220294F14E883B3F525B5367756C2A11EF6CF84B730B36C17CB0C56F0AAB2C98589".toLowerCase()); + byte[] pub = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("040A629506E1B65CD9D2E0BA9C75DF9C4FED0DB16DC9625ED14397F0AFC836FAE595DC53F8B0EFE61E703075BD9B143BAC75EC0E19F82A2208CAEB32BE53414C40".toLowerCase()); + + result = NativeSecp256k1.verify( data, sig, pub); + assertEquals( result, true , "testVerifyPos"); + } + + /** + * This tests verify() for a non-valid signature + */ + public static void testVerifyNeg() throws AssertFailException{ + boolean result = false; + byte[] data = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("CF80CD8AED482D5D1527D7DC72FCEFF84E6326592848447D2DC0B0E87DFC9A91".toLowerCase()); //sha256hash of "testing" + byte[] sig = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("3044022079BE667EF9DCBBAC55A06295CE870B07029BFCDB2DCE28D959F2815B16F817980220294F14E883B3F525B5367756C2A11EF6CF84B730B36C17CB0C56F0AAB2C98589".toLowerCase()); + byte[] pub = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("040A629506E1B65CD9D2E0BA9C75DF9C4FED0DB16DC9625ED14397F0AFC836FAE595DC53F8B0EFE61E703075BD9B143BAC75EC0E19F82A2208CAEB32BE53414C40".toLowerCase()); + + result = NativeSecp256k1.verify( data, sig, pub); + //System.out.println(" TEST " + new BigInteger(1, resultbytes).toString(16)); + assertEquals( result, false , "testVerifyNeg"); + } + + /** + * This tests secret key verify() for a valid secretkey + */ + public static void testSecKeyVerifyPos() throws AssertFailException{ + boolean result = false; + byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("67E56582298859DDAE725F972992A07C6C4FB9F62A8FFF58CE3CA926A1063530".toLowerCase()); + + result = NativeSecp256k1.secKeyVerify( sec ); + //System.out.println(" TEST " + new BigInteger(1, resultbytes).toString(16)); + assertEquals( result, true , "testSecKeyVerifyPos"); + } + + /** + * This tests secret key verify() for an invalid secretkey + */ + public static void testSecKeyVerifyNeg() throws AssertFailException{ + boolean result = false; + byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF".toLowerCase()); + + result = NativeSecp256k1.secKeyVerify( sec ); + //System.out.println(" TEST " + new BigInteger(1, resultbytes).toString(16)); + assertEquals( result, false , "testSecKeyVerifyNeg"); + } + + /** + * This tests public key create() for a valid secretkey + */ + public static void testPubKeyCreatePos() throws AssertFailException{ + byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("67E56582298859DDAE725F972992A07C6C4FB9F62A8FFF58CE3CA926A1063530".toLowerCase()); + + byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.computePubkey( sec); + String pubkeyString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr); + assertEquals( pubkeyString , "04C591A8FF19AC9C4E4E5793673B83123437E975285E7B442F4EE2654DFFCA5E2D2103ED494718C697AC9AEBCFD19612E224DB46661011863ED2FC54E71861E2A6" , "testPubKeyCreatePos"); + } + + /** + * This tests public key create() for a invalid secretkey + */ + public static void testPubKeyCreateNeg() throws AssertFailException{ + byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF".toLowerCase()); + + byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.computePubkey( sec); + String pubkeyString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr); + assertEquals( pubkeyString, "" , "testPubKeyCreateNeg"); + } + + /** + * This tests sign() for a valid secretkey + */ + public static void testSignPos() throws AssertFailException{ + + byte[] data = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("CF80CD8AED482D5D1527D7DC72FCEFF84E6326592848447D2DC0B0E87DFC9A90".toLowerCase()); //sha256hash of "testing" + byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("67E56582298859DDAE725F972992A07C6C4FB9F62A8FFF58CE3CA926A1063530".toLowerCase()); + + byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.sign(data, sec); + String sigString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr); + assertEquals( sigString, "30440220182A108E1448DC8F1FB467D06A0F3BB8EA0533584CB954EF8DA112F1D60E39A202201C66F36DA211C087F3AF88B50EDF4F9BDAA6CF5FD6817E74DCA34DB12390C6E9" , "testSignPos"); + } + + /** + * This tests sign() for a invalid secretkey + */ + public static void testSignNeg() throws AssertFailException{ + byte[] data = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("CF80CD8AED482D5D1527D7DC72FCEFF84E6326592848447D2DC0B0E87DFC9A90".toLowerCase()); //sha256hash of "testing" + byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF".toLowerCase()); + + byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.sign(data, sec); + String sigString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr); + assertEquals( sigString, "" , "testSignNeg"); + } + + /** + * This tests private key tweak-add + */ + public static void testPrivKeyTweakAdd_1() throws AssertFailException { + byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("67E56582298859DDAE725F972992A07C6C4FB9F62A8FFF58CE3CA926A1063530".toLowerCase()); + byte[] data = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("3982F19BEF1615BCCFBB05E321C10E1D4CBA3DF0E841C2E41EEB6016347653C3".toLowerCase()); //sha256hash of "tweak" + + byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.privKeyTweakAdd( sec , data ); + String sigString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr); + assertEquals( sigString , "A168571E189E6F9A7E2D657A4B53AE99B909F7E712D1C23CED28093CD57C88F3" , "testPrivKeyAdd_1"); + } + + /** + * This tests private key tweak-mul + */ + public static void testPrivKeyTweakMul_1() throws AssertFailException { + byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("67E56582298859DDAE725F972992A07C6C4FB9F62A8FFF58CE3CA926A1063530".toLowerCase()); + byte[] data = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("3982F19BEF1615BCCFBB05E321C10E1D4CBA3DF0E841C2E41EEB6016347653C3".toLowerCase()); //sha256hash of "tweak" + + byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.privKeyTweakMul( sec , data ); + String sigString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr); + assertEquals( sigString , "97F8184235F101550F3C71C927507651BD3F1CDB4A5A33B8986ACF0DEE20FFFC" , "testPrivKeyMul_1"); + } + + /** + * This tests private key tweak-add uncompressed + */ + public static void testPrivKeyTweakAdd_2() throws AssertFailException { + byte[] pub = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("040A629506E1B65CD9D2E0BA9C75DF9C4FED0DB16DC9625ED14397F0AFC836FAE595DC53F8B0EFE61E703075BD9B143BAC75EC0E19F82A2208CAEB32BE53414C40".toLowerCase()); + byte[] data = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("3982F19BEF1615BCCFBB05E321C10E1D4CBA3DF0E841C2E41EEB6016347653C3".toLowerCase()); //sha256hash of "tweak" + + byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.pubKeyTweakAdd( pub , data ); + String sigString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr); + assertEquals( sigString , "0411C6790F4B663CCE607BAAE08C43557EDC1A4D11D88DFCB3D841D0C6A941AF525A268E2A863C148555C48FB5FBA368E88718A46E205FABC3DBA2CCFFAB0796EF" , "testPrivKeyAdd_2"); + } + + /** + * This tests private key tweak-mul uncompressed + */ + public static void testPrivKeyTweakMul_2() throws AssertFailException { + byte[] pub = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("040A629506E1B65CD9D2E0BA9C75DF9C4FED0DB16DC9625ED14397F0AFC836FAE595DC53F8B0EFE61E703075BD9B143BAC75EC0E19F82A2208CAEB32BE53414C40".toLowerCase()); + byte[] data = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("3982F19BEF1615BCCFBB05E321C10E1D4CBA3DF0E841C2E41EEB6016347653C3".toLowerCase()); //sha256hash of "tweak" + + byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.pubKeyTweakMul( pub , data ); + String sigString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr); + assertEquals( sigString , "04E0FE6FE55EBCA626B98A807F6CAF654139E14E5E3698F01A9A658E21DC1D2791EC060D4F412A794D5370F672BC94B722640B5F76914151CFCA6E712CA48CC589" , "testPrivKeyMul_2"); + } + + /** + * This tests seed randomization + */ + public static void testRandomize() throws AssertFailException { + byte[] seed = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("A441B15FE9A3CF56661190A0B93B9DEC7D04127288CC87250967CF3B52894D11".toLowerCase()); //sha256hash of "random" + boolean result = NativeSecp256k1.randomize(seed); + assertEquals( result, true, "testRandomize"); + } + + public static void testCreateECDHSecret() throws AssertFailException{ + + byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("67E56582298859DDAE725F972992A07C6C4FB9F62A8FFF58CE3CA926A1063530".toLowerCase()); + byte[] pub = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("040A629506E1B65CD9D2E0BA9C75DF9C4FED0DB16DC9625ED14397F0AFC836FAE595DC53F8B0EFE61E703075BD9B143BAC75EC0E19F82A2208CAEB32BE53414C40".toLowerCase()); + + byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.createECDHSecret(sec, pub); + String ecdhString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr); + assertEquals( ecdhString, "2A2A67007A926E6594AF3EB564FC74005B37A9C8AEF2033C4552051B5C87F043" , "testCreateECDHSecret"); + } + + public static void main(String[] args) throws AssertFailException{ + + + System.out.println("\n libsecp256k1 enabled: " + Secp256k1Context.isEnabled() + "\n"); + + assertEquals( Secp256k1Context.isEnabled(), true, "isEnabled" ); + + //Test verify() success/fail + testVerifyPos(); + testVerifyNeg(); + + //Test secKeyVerify() success/fail + testSecKeyVerifyPos(); + testSecKeyVerifyNeg(); + + //Test computePubkey() success/fail + testPubKeyCreatePos(); + testPubKeyCreateNeg(); + + //Test sign() success/fail + testSignPos(); + testSignNeg(); + + //Test privKeyTweakAdd() 1 + testPrivKeyTweakAdd_1(); + + //Test privKeyTweakMul() 2 + testPrivKeyTweakMul_1(); + + //Test privKeyTweakAdd() 3 + testPrivKeyTweakAdd_2(); + + //Test privKeyTweakMul() 4 + testPrivKeyTweakMul_2(); + + //Test randomize() + testRandomize(); + + //Test ECDH + testCreateECDHSecret(); + + NativeSecp256k1.cleanup(); + + System.out.println(" All tests passed." ); + + } +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Util.java b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Util.java new file mode 100644 index 0000000..04732ba --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Util.java @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2014-2016 the libsecp256k1 contributors + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); + * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +package org.bitcoin; + +public class NativeSecp256k1Util{ + + public static void assertEquals( int val, int val2, String message ) throws AssertFailException{ + if( val != val2 ) + throw new AssertFailException("FAIL: " + message); + } + + public static void assertEquals( boolean val, boolean val2, String message ) throws AssertFailException{ + if( val != val2 ) + throw new AssertFailException("FAIL: " + message); + else + System.out.println("PASS: " + message); + } + + public static void assertEquals( String val, String val2, String message ) throws AssertFailException{ + if( !val.equals(val2) ) + throw new AssertFailException("FAIL: " + message); + else + System.out.println("PASS: " + message); + } + + public static class AssertFailException extends Exception { + public AssertFailException(String message) { + super( message ); + } + } +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/Secp256k1Context.java b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/Secp256k1Context.java new file mode 100644 index 0000000..216c986 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/Secp256k1Context.java @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2014-2016 the libsecp256k1 contributors + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); + * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +package org.bitcoin; + +/** + * This class holds the context reference used in native methods + * to handle ECDSA operations. + */ +public class Secp256k1Context { + private static final boolean enabled; //true if the library is loaded + private static final long context; //ref to pointer to context obj + + static { //static initializer + boolean isEnabled = true; + long contextRef = -1; + try { + System.loadLibrary("secp256k1"); + contextRef = secp256k1_init_context(); + } catch (UnsatisfiedLinkError e) { + System.out.println("UnsatisfiedLinkError: " + e.toString()); + isEnabled = false; + } + enabled = isEnabled; + context = contextRef; + } + + public static boolean isEnabled() { + return enabled; + } + + public static long getContext() { + if(!enabled) return -1; //sanity check + return context; + } + + private static native long secp256k1_init_context(); +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bcef7b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.c @@ -0,0 +1,377 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include "org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h" +#include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_ecdh.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_recovery.h" + + +SECP256K1_API jlong JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ctx_1clone + (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jlong ctx_l) +{ + const secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; + + jlong ctx_clone_l = (uintptr_t) secp256k1_context_clone(ctx); + + (void)classObject;(void)env; + + return ctx_clone_l; + +} + +SECP256K1_API jint JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1context_1randomize + (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l) +{ + secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; + + const unsigned char* seed = (unsigned char*) (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject); + + (void)classObject; + + return secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, seed); + +} + +SECP256K1_API void JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1destroy_1context + (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jlong ctx_l) +{ + secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; + + secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx); + + (void)classObject;(void)env; +} + +SECP256K1_API jint JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ecdsa_1verify + (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l, jint siglen, jint publen) +{ + secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; + + unsigned char* data = (unsigned char*) (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject); + const unsigned char* sigdata = { (unsigned char*) (data + 32) }; + const unsigned char* pubdata = { (unsigned char*) (data + siglen + 32) }; + + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; + + int ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigdata, siglen); + + if( ret ) { + ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pubdata, publen); + + if( ret ) { + ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, data, &pubkey); + } + } + + (void)classObject; + + return ret; +} + +SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ecdsa_1sign + (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l) +{ + secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; + unsigned char* data = (unsigned char*) (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject); + unsigned char* secKey = (unsigned char*) (data + 32); + + jobjectArray retArray; + jbyteArray sigArray, intsByteArray; + unsigned char intsarray[2]; + + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig[72]; + + int ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, sig, data, secKey, NULL, NULL ); + + unsigned char outputSer[72]; + size_t outputLen = 72; + + if( ret ) { + int ret2 = secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx,outputSer, &outputLen, sig ); (void)ret2; + } + + intsarray[0] = outputLen; + intsarray[1] = ret; + + retArray = (*env)->NewObjectArray(env, 2, + (*env)->FindClass(env, "[B"), + (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 1)); + + sigArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, outputLen); + (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, sigArray, 0, outputLen, (jbyte*)outputSer); + (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 0, sigArray); + + intsByteArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 2); + (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, intsByteArray, 0, 2, (jbyte*)intsarray); + (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 1, intsByteArray); + + (void)classObject; + + return retArray; +} + +SECP256K1_API jint JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ec_1seckey_1verify + (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l) +{ + secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; + unsigned char* secKey = (unsigned char*) (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject); + + (void)classObject; + + return secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, secKey); +} + +SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ec_1pubkey_1create + (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l) +{ + secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; + const unsigned char* secKey = (unsigned char*) (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject); + + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; + + jobjectArray retArray; + jbyteArray pubkeyArray, intsByteArray; + unsigned char intsarray[2]; + + int ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, secKey); + + unsigned char outputSer[65]; + size_t outputLen = 65; + + if( ret ) { + int ret2 = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx,outputSer, &outputLen, &pubkey,SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED );(void)ret2; + } + + intsarray[0] = outputLen; + intsarray[1] = ret; + + retArray = (*env)->NewObjectArray(env, 2, + (*env)->FindClass(env, "[B"), + (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 1)); + + pubkeyArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, outputLen); + (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, pubkeyArray, 0, outputLen, (jbyte*)outputSer); + (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 0, pubkeyArray); + + intsByteArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 2); + (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, intsByteArray, 0, 2, (jbyte*)intsarray); + (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 1, intsByteArray); + + (void)classObject; + + return retArray; + +} + +SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1privkey_1tweak_1add + (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l) +{ + secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; + unsigned char* privkey = (unsigned char*) (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject); + const unsigned char* tweak = (unsigned char*) (privkey + 32); + + jobjectArray retArray; + jbyteArray privArray, intsByteArray; + unsigned char intsarray[2]; + + int privkeylen = 32; + + int ret = secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, privkey, tweak); + + intsarray[0] = privkeylen; + intsarray[1] = ret; + + retArray = (*env)->NewObjectArray(env, 2, + (*env)->FindClass(env, "[B"), + (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 1)); + + privArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, privkeylen); + (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, privArray, 0, privkeylen, (jbyte*)privkey); + (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 0, privArray); + + intsByteArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 2); + (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, intsByteArray, 0, 2, (jbyte*)intsarray); + (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 1, intsByteArray); + + (void)classObject; + + return retArray; +} + +SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1privkey_1tweak_1mul + (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l) +{ + secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; + unsigned char* privkey = (unsigned char*) (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject); + const unsigned char* tweak = (unsigned char*) (privkey + 32); + + jobjectArray retArray; + jbyteArray privArray, intsByteArray; + unsigned char intsarray[2]; + + int privkeylen = 32; + + int ret = secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(ctx, privkey, tweak); + + intsarray[0] = privkeylen; + intsarray[1] = ret; + + retArray = (*env)->NewObjectArray(env, 2, + (*env)->FindClass(env, "[B"), + (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 1)); + + privArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, privkeylen); + (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, privArray, 0, privkeylen, (jbyte*)privkey); + (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 0, privArray); + + intsByteArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 2); + (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, intsByteArray, 0, 2, (jbyte*)intsarray); + (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 1, intsByteArray); + + (void)classObject; + + return retArray; +} + +SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1pubkey_1tweak_1add + (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l, jint publen) +{ + secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; +/* secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey = (secp256k1_pubkey*) (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject);*/ + unsigned char* pkey = (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject); + const unsigned char* tweak = (unsigned char*) (pkey + publen); + + jobjectArray retArray; + jbyteArray pubArray, intsByteArray; + unsigned char intsarray[2]; + unsigned char outputSer[65]; + size_t outputLen = 65; + + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; + int ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pkey, publen); + + if( ret ) { + ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, tweak); + } + + if( ret ) { + int ret2 = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx,outputSer, &outputLen, &pubkey,SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED );(void)ret2; + } + + intsarray[0] = outputLen; + intsarray[1] = ret; + + retArray = (*env)->NewObjectArray(env, 2, + (*env)->FindClass(env, "[B"), + (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 1)); + + pubArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, outputLen); + (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, pubArray, 0, outputLen, (jbyte*)outputSer); + (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 0, pubArray); + + intsByteArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 2); + (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, intsByteArray, 0, 2, (jbyte*)intsarray); + (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 1, intsByteArray); + + (void)classObject; + + return retArray; +} + +SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1pubkey_1tweak_1mul + (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l, jint publen) +{ + secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; + unsigned char* pkey = (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject); + const unsigned char* tweak = (unsigned char*) (pkey + publen); + + jobjectArray retArray; + jbyteArray pubArray, intsByteArray; + unsigned char intsarray[2]; + unsigned char outputSer[65]; + size_t outputLen = 65; + + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; + int ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pkey, publen); + + if ( ret ) { + ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, &pubkey, tweak); + } + + if( ret ) { + int ret2 = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx,outputSer, &outputLen, &pubkey,SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED );(void)ret2; + } + + intsarray[0] = outputLen; + intsarray[1] = ret; + + retArray = (*env)->NewObjectArray(env, 2, + (*env)->FindClass(env, "[B"), + (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 1)); + + pubArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, outputLen); + (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, pubArray, 0, outputLen, (jbyte*)outputSer); + (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 0, pubArray); + + intsByteArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 2); + (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, intsByteArray, 0, 2, (jbyte*)intsarray); + (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 1, intsByteArray); + + (void)classObject; + + return retArray; +} + +SECP256K1_API jlong JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ecdsa_1pubkey_1combine + (JNIEnv * env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l, jint numkeys) +{ + (void)classObject;(void)env;(void)byteBufferObject;(void)ctx_l;(void)numkeys; + + return 0; +} + +SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ecdh + (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l, jint publen) +{ + secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; + const unsigned char* secdata = (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject); + const unsigned char* pubdata = (const unsigned char*) (secdata + 32); + + jobjectArray retArray; + jbyteArray outArray, intsByteArray; + unsigned char intsarray[1]; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; + unsigned char nonce_res[32]; + size_t outputLen = 32; + + int ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pubdata, publen); + + if (ret) { + ret = secp256k1_ecdh( + ctx, + nonce_res, + &pubkey, + secdata + ); + } + + intsarray[0] = ret; + + retArray = (*env)->NewObjectArray(env, 2, + (*env)->FindClass(env, "[B"), + (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 1)); + + outArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, outputLen); + (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, outArray, 0, 32, (jbyte*)nonce_res); + (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 0, outArray); + + intsByteArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 1); + (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, intsByteArray, 0, 1, (jbyte*)intsarray); + (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 1, intsByteArray); + + (void)classObject; + + return retArray; +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fe613c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +/* DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE - it is machine generated */ +#include +#include "include/secp256k1.h" +/* Header for class org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 */ + +#ifndef _Included_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 +#define _Included_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif +/* + * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 + * Method: secp256k1_ctx_clone + * Signature: (J)J + */ +SECP256K1_API jlong JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ctx_1clone + (JNIEnv *, jclass, jlong); + +/* + * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 + * Method: secp256k1_context_randomize + * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;J)I + */ +SECP256K1_API jint JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1context_1randomize + (JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong); + +/* + * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 + * Method: secp256k1_privkey_tweak_add + * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;J)[[B + */ +SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1privkey_1tweak_1add + (JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong); + +/* + * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 + * Method: secp256k1_privkey_tweak_mul + * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;J)[[B + */ +SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1privkey_1tweak_1mul + (JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong); + +/* + * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 + * Method: secp256k1_pubkey_tweak_add + * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;JI)[[B + */ +SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1pubkey_1tweak_1add + (JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong, jint); + +/* + * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 + * Method: secp256k1_pubkey_tweak_mul + * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;JI)[[B + */ +SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1pubkey_1tweak_1mul + (JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong, jint); + +/* + * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 + * Method: secp256k1_destroy_context + * Signature: (J)V + */ +SECP256K1_API void JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1destroy_1context + (JNIEnv *, jclass, jlong); + +/* + * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 + * Method: secp256k1_ecdsa_verify + * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;JII)I + */ +SECP256K1_API jint JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ecdsa_1verify + (JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong, jint, jint); + +/* + * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 + * Method: secp256k1_ecdsa_sign + * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;J)[[B + */ +SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ecdsa_1sign + (JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong); + +/* + * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 + * Method: secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify + * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;J)I + */ +SECP256K1_API jint JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ec_1seckey_1verify + (JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong); + +/* + * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 + * Method: secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create + * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;J)[[B + */ +SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ec_1pubkey_1create + (JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong); + +/* + * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 + * Method: secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse + * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;JI)[[B + */ +SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ec_1pubkey_1parse + (JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong, jint); + +/* + * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 + * Method: secp256k1_ecdh + * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;JI)[[B + */ +SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ecdh + (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l, jint publen); + + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a52939e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.c @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +#include +#include +#include "org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.h" +#include "include/secp256k1.h" + +SECP256K1_API jlong JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context_secp256k1_1init_1context + (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject) +{ + secp256k1_context *ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + + (void)classObject;(void)env; + + return (uintptr_t)ctx; +} + diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0d2bc84 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE - it is machine generated */ +#include +#include "include/secp256k1.h" +/* Header for class org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context */ + +#ifndef _Included_org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context +#define _Included_org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif +/* + * Class: org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context + * Method: secp256k1_init_context + * Signature: ()J + */ +SECP256K1_API jlong JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context_secp256k1_1init_1context + (JNIEnv *, jclass); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif +#endif 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ztwjFyv~l}HrYCV{QLQF^23_HCE&V>K#l<<(vGC7w8SPX~9wJJs%_=n<8W5EYi zsjkC9pUGB|Mle6G^NyXJB|WKzq(h{7*^n)j?6I{+n+Hx?s|VLs4;hBUHrGvIWiQ!f zx^RIEJ0FqdtWNScC0CL36AAQAiYMzQ#d#JBu%)0Tb=G;C-8<5xWpde`7fUwfpdzPx zcQThMdEZFINWbFb!B4ugY}Ym55kDoxWp6y?*_*1?cs*&OI0?SaMQg*)axp9Uq^-w_ z#qg`ukxrBD(VFq}m55+lf!sh@csJIK95vQaGX=I6XY!es&1!AaWpnM4#FI!Cq}Q8Y z(`V>9`6WHzlew4D=Zrp2%hkt*8I_A3&w72_!sbGgDkgqwg7CuUlt*{?=>C)IYu3Xj*Vorh9DDTW(F4}W6U}utC)z%Ye}pBY z$}e)5a71n0a#xQYJKa3;2f~A|t5kotX$}U1#h}mqFo>kX7X#VB>*Ws4@j5wvbE&2$ zi~VkYv7-I#7on1(6)6Z3VIdM4aXQ>QL1EBV16y)R=RiZQ735?)_)^)o{h{zXsL|NZ pYS14_(djBOoH8|P^<{d = c`. + * where `G_i` and `H_i` are standard NUMS generators. + * + * Verification of the proof comes down to a single multiexponentiation of the form + * + * P + (c - a_1*b_1 - a_2*b_2)*x*G + * - sum_{i=1}^n [s'_i*G_i + s_i*H_i] + * + sum_{i=1}^log2(n) [x_i^-2 L_i + x_i^2 R_i] + * + * which will equal infinity if the inner product proof is correct. Here + * - `G` is the standard secp generator + * - `x` is a hash of `commit` and is used to rerandomize `c`. See Protocol 2 vs Protocol 1 in the paper. + * - `x_i = H(x_{i-1} || L_i || R_i)`, where `x_{-1}` is passed through the `commit` variable and + * must be a commitment to `P` and `c`. + * - `s_i` and `s'_i` are computed as follows. + * + * Letting `i_j` be defined as 1 if `i & 2^j == 1`, and -1 otherwise, + * - For `i` from `1` to `n/2`, `s'_i = a_1 * prod_{j=1}^log2(n) x_j^i_j` + * - For `i` from `n/2 + 1` to `n`, `s'_i = a_2 * prod_{j=1}^log2(n) x_j^i_j` + * - For `i` from `1` to `n/2`, `s_i = b_1 * prod_{j=1}^log2(n) x_j^-i_j` + * - For `i` from `n/2 + 1` to `n`, `s_i = b_2 * prod_{j=1}^log2(n) x_j^-i_j` + * + * Observe that these can be computed iteratively by labelling the coefficients `s_i` for `i` + * from `0` to `2n-1` rather than 1-indexing and distinguishing between `s_i'`s and `s_i`s: + * + * Start with `s_0 = a_1 * prod_{j=1}^log2(n) x_j^-1`, then for later `s_i`s, + * - For `i` from `1` to `n/2 - 1`, multiply some earlier `s'_j` by some `x_k^2` + * - For `i = n/2`, multiply `s_{i-1} by `a_2/a_1`. + * - For `i` from `n/2 + 1` to `n - 1`, multiply some earlier `s'_j` by some `x_k^2` + * - For `i = n`, multiply `s'_{i-1}` by `b_1/a_2` to get `s_i`. + * - For `i` from `n + 1` to `3n/2 - 1`, multiply some earlier `s_j` by some `x_k^-2` + * - For `i = 3n/2`, multiply `s_{i-1}` by `b_2/b_1`. + * - For `i` from `3n/2 + 1` to `2n - 1`, multiply some earlier `s_j` by some `x_k^-2` + * where of course, the indices `j` and `k` must be chosen carefully. + * + * The bulk of `secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_vfy_ecmult_callback` involves computing + * these indices, given `a_2/a_1`, `b_1/a_1`, `b_2/b_1`, and the `x_k^2`s as input. It + * computes `x_k^-2` as a side-effect of its other computation. + */ + +typedef int (secp256k1_bulletproof_vfy_callback)(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, secp256k1_scalar *randomizer, size_t idx, void *data); + +/* used by callers to wrap a proof with surrounding context */ +typedef struct { + const unsigned char *proof; + secp256k1_scalar p_offs; + secp256k1_scalar yinv; + unsigned char commit[32]; + secp256k1_bulletproof_vfy_callback *rangeproof_cb; + void *rangeproof_cb_data; + size_t n_extra_rangeproof_points; +} secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_context; + +/* used internally */ +typedef struct { + const secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_context *proof; + secp256k1_scalar abinv[IP_AB_SCALARS]; + secp256k1_scalar xsq[SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_DEPTH + 1]; + secp256k1_scalar xsqinv[SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_DEPTH + 1]; + secp256k1_scalar xsqinvy[SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_DEPTH + 1]; + secp256k1_scalar xcache[SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_DEPTH + 1]; + secp256k1_scalar xsqinv_mask; + const unsigned char *serialized_lr; +} secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_vfy_data; + +/* used by callers to modify the multiexp */ +typedef struct { + size_t n_proofs; + secp256k1_scalar p_offs; + const secp256k1_ge *g; + const secp256k1_ge *geng; + const secp256k1_ge *genh; + size_t vec_len; + size_t lg_vec_len; + int shared_g; + secp256k1_scalar *randomizer; + secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_vfy_data *proof; +} secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_vfy_ecmult_context; + +size_t secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_proof_length(size_t n) { + if (n < IP_AB_SCALARS / 2) { + return 32 * (1 + 2 * n); + } else { + size_t bit_count = POPCOUNT(n); + size_t log = secp256k1_floor_lg(2 * n / IP_AB_SCALARS); + return 32 * (1 + 2 * (bit_count - 1 + log) + IP_AB_SCALARS) + (2*log + 7) / 8; + } +} + +/* Our ecmult_multi function takes `(c - a*b)*x` directly and multiplies this by `G`. For every other + * (scalar, point) pair it calls the following callback function, which takes an index and outputs a + * pair. The function therefore has three regimes: + * + * For the first `n` invocations, it returns `(s'_i, G_i)` for `i` from 1 to `n`. + * For the next `n` invocations, it returns `(s_i, H_i)` for `i` from 1 to `n`. + * For the next `2*log2(n)` invocations it returns `(x_i^-2, L_i)` and `(x_i^2, R_i)`, + * alternating between the two choices, for `i` from 1 to `log2(n)`. + * + * For the remaining invocations it passes through to another callback, `rangeproof_cb_data` which + * computes `P`. The reason for this is that in practice `P` is usually defined by another multiexp + * rather than being a known point, and it is more efficient to compute one exponentiation. + * + * Inline we refer to the first `2n` coefficients as `s_i` for `i` from 0 to `2n-1`, since that + * is the more convenient indexing. In particular we describe (a) how the indices `j` and `k`, + * from the big comment block above, are chosen; and (b) when/how each `x_k^-2` is computed. + */ +static int secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_vfy_ecmult_callback(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *data) { + secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_vfy_ecmult_context *ctx = (secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_vfy_ecmult_context *) data; + + /* First 2N points use the standard Gi, Hi generators, and the scalars can be aggregated across proofs. + * Inside this if clause, `idx` corresponds to the index `i` in the big comment, and runs from 0 to `2n-1`. + * Also `ctx->vec_len` corresponds to `n`. */ + if (idx < 2 * ctx->vec_len) { + /* Number of `a` scalars in the proof (same as number of `b` scalars in the proof). Will + * be 2 except for very small proofs that have fewer than 2 scalars as input. */ + const size_t grouping = ctx->vec_len < IP_AB_SCALARS / 2 ? ctx->vec_len : IP_AB_SCALARS / 2; + const size_t lg_grouping = secp256k1_floor_lg(grouping); + size_t i; + VERIFY_CHECK(lg_grouping == 0 || lg_grouping == 1); /* TODO support higher IP_AB_SCALARS */ + + /* Determine whether we're multiplying by `G_i`s or `H_i`s. */ + if (idx < ctx->vec_len) { + *pt = ctx->geng[idx]; + } else { + *pt = ctx->genh[idx - ctx->vec_len]; + } + + secp256k1_scalar_clear(sc); + /* Loop over all the different inner product proofs we might be doing at once. Since they + * share generators `G_i` and `H_i`, we compute all of their scalars at once and add them. + * For each proof we start with the "seed value" `ctx->proof[i].xcache[0]` (see next comment + * for its meaning) from which every other scalar derived. We expect the caller to have + * randomized this to ensure that this wanton addition cannot enable cancellation attacks. + */ + for (i = 0; i < ctx->n_proofs; i++) { + /* To recall from the introductory comment: most `s_i` values are computed by taking an + * earlier `s_j` value and multiplying it by some `x_k^2`. + * + * We now explain the index `j`: it is the largest number with one fewer 1-bits than `i`. + * Alternately, the most recently returned `s_j` where `j` has one fewer 1-bits than `i`. + * + * To ensure that `s_j` is available when we need it, on each iteration we define the + * variable `cache_idx` which simply counts the 1-bits in `i`; before returning `s_i` + * we store it in `ctx->proof[i].xcache[cache_idx]`. Then later, when we want "most + * recently returned `s_j` with one fewer 1-bits than `i`, it'll be sitting right + * there in `ctx->proof[i].xcache[cache_idx - 1]`. + * + * Note that `ctx->proof[i].xcache[0]` will always equal `-a_1 * prod_{i=1}^{n-1} x_i^-2`, + * and we expect the caller to have set this. + */ + const size_t cache_idx = POPCOUNT(idx); + secp256k1_scalar term; + VERIFY_CHECK(cache_idx < SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_DEPTH); + /* For the special case `cache_idx == 0` (which is true iff `idx == 0`) there is nothing to do. */ + if (cache_idx > 0) { + /* Otherwise, check if this is one of the special indices where we transition from `a_1` to `a_2`, + * from `a_2` to `b_1`, or from `b_1` to `b_2`. (For small proofs there is only one transition, + * from `a` to `b`.) */ + if (idx % (ctx->vec_len / grouping) == 0) { + const size_t abinv_idx = idx / (ctx->vec_len / grouping) - 1; + size_t prev_cache_idx; + /* Check if it's the even specialer index where we're transitioning from `a`s to `b`s, from + * `G`s to `H`s, and from `x_k^2`s to `x_k^-2`s. In rangeproof and circuit applications, + * the caller secretly has a variable `y` such that `H_i` is really `y^-i H_i` for `i` ranging + * from 0 to `n-1`. Rather than forcing the caller to tweak every `H_i` herself, which would + * be very slow and prevent precomputation, we instead multiply our cached `x_k^-2` values + * by `y^(-2^k)` respectively, which will ultimately result in every `s_i` we return having + * been multiplied by `y^-i`. + * + * This is an underhanded trick but the result is that all `n` powers of `y^-i` show up + * in the right place, and we only need log-many scalar squarings and multiplications. + */ + if (idx == ctx->vec_len) { + secp256k1_scalar yinvn = ctx->proof[i].proof->yinv; + size_t j; + prev_cache_idx = POPCOUNT(idx - 1); + for (j = 0; j < (size_t) CTZ(idx) - lg_grouping; j++) { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->proof[i].xsqinvy[j], &ctx->proof[i].xsqinv[j], &yinvn); + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&yinvn, &yinvn); + } + if (lg_grouping == 1) { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->proof[i].abinv[2], &ctx->proof[i].abinv[2], &yinvn); + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&yinvn, &yinvn); + } + } else { + prev_cache_idx = cache_idx - 1; + } + /* Regardless of specialness, we multiply by `a_2/a_1` or whatever the appropriate multiplier + * is. We expect the caller to have given these to us in the `ctx->proof[i].abinv` array. */ + secp256k1_scalar_mul( + &ctx->proof[i].xcache[cache_idx], + &ctx->proof[i].xcache[prev_cache_idx], + &ctx->proof[i].abinv[abinv_idx] + ); + /* If it's *not* a special index, just multiply by the appropriate `x_k^2`, or `x_k^-2` in case + * we're in the `H_i` half of the multiexp. At this point we can explain the index `k`, which + * is computed in the variable `xsq_idx` (`xsqinv_idx` respectively). In light of our discussion + * of `j`, we see that this should be "the least significant bit that's 1 in `i` but not `i-1`." + * In other words, it is the number of trailing 0 bits in the index `i`. */ + } else if (idx < ctx->vec_len) { + const size_t xsq_idx = CTZ(idx); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->proof[i].xcache[cache_idx], &ctx->proof[i].xcache[cache_idx - 1], &ctx->proof[i].xsq[xsq_idx]); + } else { + const size_t xsqinv_idx = CTZ(idx); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->proof[i].xcache[cache_idx], &ctx->proof[i].xcache[cache_idx - 1], &ctx->proof[i].xsqinvy[xsqinv_idx]); + } + } + term = ctx->proof[i].xcache[cache_idx]; + + /* One last trick: compute `x_k^-2` while computing the `G_i` scalars, so that they'll be + * available when we need them for the `H_i` scalars. We can do this for every `i` value + * that has exactly one 0-bit, i.e. which is a product of all `x_i`s and one `x_k^-1`. By + * multiplying that by the special value `prod_{i=1}^n x_i^-1` we obtain simply `x_k^-2`. + * We expect the caller to give us this special value in `ctx->proof[i].xsqinv_mask`. */ + if (idx < ctx->vec_len / grouping && POPCOUNT(idx) == ctx->lg_vec_len - 1) { + const size_t xsqinv_idx = CTZ(~idx); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->proof[i].xsqinv[xsqinv_idx], &ctx->proof[i].xcache[cache_idx], &ctx->proof[i].xsqinv_mask); + } + + /* Finally, if the caller, in its computation of `P`, wants to multiply `G_i` or `H_i` by some scalar, + * we add that to our sum as well. Again, we trust the randomization in `xcache[0]` to prevent any + * cancellation attacks here. */ + if (ctx->proof[i].proof->rangeproof_cb != NULL) { + secp256k1_scalar rangeproof_offset; + if ((ctx->proof[i].proof->rangeproof_cb)(&rangeproof_offset, NULL, &ctx->randomizer[i], idx, ctx->proof[i].proof->rangeproof_cb_data) == 0) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_scalar_add(&term, &term, &rangeproof_offset); + } + + secp256k1_scalar_add(sc, sc, &term); + } + /* Next 2lgN points are the L and R vectors */ + } else if (idx < 2 * (ctx->vec_len + ctx->lg_vec_len * ctx->n_proofs)) { + size_t real_idx = idx - 2 * ctx->vec_len; + const size_t proof_idx = real_idx / (2 * ctx->lg_vec_len); + real_idx = real_idx % (2 * ctx->lg_vec_len); + secp256k1_bulletproof_deserialize_point( + pt, + ctx->proof[proof_idx].serialized_lr, + real_idx, + 2 * ctx->lg_vec_len + ); + if (idx % 2 == 0) { + *sc = ctx->proof[proof_idx].xsq[real_idx / 2]; + } else { + *sc = ctx->proof[proof_idx].xsqinv[real_idx / 2]; + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->randomizer[proof_idx]); + /* After the G's, H's, L's and R's, do the blinding_gen */ + } else if (idx == 2 * (ctx->vec_len + ctx->lg_vec_len * ctx->n_proofs)) { + *sc = ctx->p_offs; + *pt = *ctx->g; + /* Remaining points are whatever the rangeproof wants */ + } else if (ctx->shared_g && idx == 2 * (ctx->vec_len + ctx->lg_vec_len * ctx->n_proofs) + 1) { + /* Special case: the first extra point is independent of the proof, for both rangeproof and circuit */ + size_t i; + secp256k1_scalar_clear(sc); + for (i = 0; i < ctx->n_proofs; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar term; + if ((ctx->proof[i].proof->rangeproof_cb)(&term, pt, &ctx->randomizer[i], 2 * (ctx->vec_len + ctx->lg_vec_len), ctx->proof[i].proof->rangeproof_cb_data) == 0) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_scalar_add(sc, sc, &term); + } + } else { + size_t proof_idx = 0; + size_t real_idx = idx - 2 * (ctx->vec_len + ctx->lg_vec_len * ctx->n_proofs) - 1 - !!ctx->shared_g; + while (real_idx >= ctx->proof[proof_idx].proof->n_extra_rangeproof_points - !!ctx->shared_g) { + real_idx -= ctx->proof[proof_idx].proof->n_extra_rangeproof_points - !!ctx->shared_g; + proof_idx++; + VERIFY_CHECK(proof_idx < ctx->n_proofs); + } + if ((ctx->proof[proof_idx].proof->rangeproof_cb)(sc, pt, &ctx->randomizer[proof_idx], 2 * (ctx->vec_len + ctx->lg_vec_len), ctx->proof[proof_idx].proof->rangeproof_cb_data) == 0) { + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; +} + +/* nb For security it is essential that `commit_inp` already commit to all data + * needed to compute `P`. We do not hash it in during verification since `P` + * may be specified indirectly as a bunch of scalar offsets. + */ +static int secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ecmult_ctx, secp256k1_scratch *scratch, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, size_t vec_len, const secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_context *proof, size_t n_proofs, size_t plen, int shared_g) { + secp256k1_sha256 sha256; + secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_vfy_ecmult_context ecmult_data; + unsigned char commit[32]; + size_t total_n_points = 2 * vec_len + !!shared_g + 1; /* +1 for shared G (value_gen), +1 for H (blinding_gen) */ + secp256k1_gej r; + secp256k1_scalar zero; + size_t i; + + if (plen != secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_proof_length(vec_len)) { + return 0; + } + + if (n_proofs == 0) { + return 1; + } + + if (!secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(scratch, n_proofs * (sizeof(*ecmult_data.randomizer) + sizeof(*ecmult_data.proof)), 2)) { + return 0; + } + + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&zero); + ecmult_data.n_proofs = n_proofs; + ecmult_data.g = gens->blinding_gen; + ecmult_data.geng = gens->gens; + ecmult_data.genh = gens->gens + gens->n / 2; + ecmult_data.vec_len = vec_len; + ecmult_data.lg_vec_len = secp256k1_floor_lg(2 * vec_len / IP_AB_SCALARS); + ecmult_data.shared_g = shared_g; + ecmult_data.randomizer = (secp256k1_scalar *)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_proofs * sizeof(*ecmult_data.randomizer)); + ecmult_data.proof = (secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_vfy_data *)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_proofs * sizeof(*ecmult_data.proof)); + /* Seed RNG for per-proof randomizers */ + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + for (i = 0; i < n_proofs; i++) { + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, proof[i].proof, plen); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, proof[i].commit, 32); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(commit, &proof[i].p_offs); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); + } + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); + + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&ecmult_data.p_offs); + for (i = 0; i < n_proofs; i++) { + const unsigned char *serproof = proof[i].proof; + unsigned char proof_commit[32]; + secp256k1_scalar dot; + secp256k1_scalar ab[IP_AB_SCALARS]; + secp256k1_scalar negprod; + secp256k1_scalar x; + int overflow; + size_t j; + const size_t n_ab = 2 * vec_len < IP_AB_SCALARS ? 2 * vec_len : IP_AB_SCALARS; + + total_n_points += 2 * ecmult_data.lg_vec_len + proof[i].n_extra_rangeproof_points - !!shared_g; /* -1 for shared G */ + + /* Extract dot product, will always be the first 32 bytes */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&dot, serproof, &overflow); + if (overflow) { + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return 0; + } + /* Commit to dot product */ + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, proof[i].commit, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, serproof, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, proof_commit); + serproof += 32; + + /* Extract a, b */ + for (j = 0; j < n_ab; j++) { + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ab[j], serproof, &overflow); + if (overflow) { + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return 0; + } + /* TODO our verifier currently bombs out with zeros because it uses + * scalar inverses gratuitously. Fix that. */ + if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ab[j])) { + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return 0; + } + serproof += 32; + } + secp256k1_scalar_dot_product(&negprod, &ab[0], &ab[n_ab / 2], n_ab / 2); + + ecmult_data.proof[i].proof = &proof[i]; + /* set per-proof randomizer */ + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ecmult_data.randomizer[i], commit, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ecmult_data.randomizer[i])) { + /* cryptographically unreachable */ + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return 0; + } + + /* Compute x*(dot - a*b) for each proof; add it and p_offs to the p_offs accumulator */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&x, proof_commit, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&x)) { + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return 0; + } + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&negprod, &negprod); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&negprod, &negprod, &dot); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x, &x, &negprod); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&x, &x, &proof[i].p_offs); + + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x, &x, &ecmult_data.randomizer[i]); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&ecmult_data.p_offs, &ecmult_data.p_offs, &x); + + /* Special-case: trivial proofs are valid iff the explicitly revealed scalars + * dot to the explicitly revealed dot product. */ + if (2 * vec_len <= IP_AB_SCALARS) { + if (!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&negprod)) { + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return 0; + } + /* remaining data does not (and cannot) be computed for proofs with no a's or b's. */ + if (vec_len == 0) { + continue; + } + } + + /* Compute the inverse product and the array of squares; the rest will be filled + * in by the callback during the multiexp. */ + ecmult_data.proof[i].serialized_lr = serproof; /* bookmark L/R location in proof */ + negprod = ab[n_ab - 1]; + ab[n_ab - 1] = ecmult_data.randomizer[i]; /* build r * x1 * x2 * ... * xn in last slot of `ab` array */ + for (j = 0; j < ecmult_data.lg_vec_len; j++) { + secp256k1_scalar xi; + const size_t lidx = 2 * j; + const size_t ridx = 2 * j + 1; + const size_t bitveclen = (2 * ecmult_data.lg_vec_len + 7) / 8; + const unsigned char lrparity = 2 * !!(serproof[lidx / 8] & (1 << (lidx % 8))) + !!(serproof[ridx / 8] & (1 << (ridx % 8))); + /* Map commit -> H(commit || LR parity || Lx || Rx), compute xi from it */ + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, proof_commit, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &lrparity, 1); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &serproof[32 * lidx + bitveclen], 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &serproof[32 * ridx + bitveclen], 32); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, proof_commit); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&xi, proof_commit, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&xi)) { + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return 0; + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ab[n_ab - 1], &ab[n_ab - 1], &xi); + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&ecmult_data.proof[i].xsq[j], &xi); + } + /* Compute inverse of all a's and b's, except the last b whose inverse is not needed. + * Also compute the inverse of (-r * x1 * ... * xn) which will be needed */ + secp256k1_scalar_inverse_all_var(ecmult_data.proof[i].abinv, ab, n_ab); + ab[n_ab - 1] = negprod; + + /* Compute (-a0 * r * x1 * ... * xn)^-1 which will be used to mask out individual x_i^-2's */ + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&ecmult_data.proof[i].xsqinv_mask, &ecmult_data.proof[i].abinv[0]); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ecmult_data.proof[i].xsqinv_mask, &ecmult_data.proof[i].xsqinv_mask, &ecmult_data.proof[i].abinv[n_ab - 1]); + + /* Compute each scalar times the previous' inverse, which is used to switch between a's and b's */ + for (j = n_ab - 1; j > 0; j--) { + size_t prev_idx; + if (j == n_ab / 2) { + prev_idx = j - 1; /* we go from a_n to b_0 */ + } else { + prev_idx = j & (j - 1); /* but from a_i' to a_i, where i' is i with its lowest set bit unset */ + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul( + &ecmult_data.proof[i].abinv[j - 1], + &ecmult_data.proof[i].abinv[prev_idx], + &ab[j] + ); + } + + /* Extract -a0 * r * (x1 * ... * xn)^-1 which is our first coefficient. Use negprod as a dummy */ + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&negprod, &ecmult_data.randomizer[i], &ab[0]); /* r*a */ + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&negprod, &negprod); /* (r*a)^2 */ + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ecmult_data.proof[i].xcache[0], &ecmult_data.proof[i].xsqinv_mask, &negprod); /* -a * r * (x1 * x2 * ... * xn)^-1 */ + } + + /* Do the multiexp */ + if (secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, NULL, secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_vfy_ecmult_callback, (void *) &ecmult_data, total_n_points) != 1) { + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return 0; + } + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r); +} + +typedef struct { + secp256k1_scalar x[SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_DEPTH]; + secp256k1_scalar xinv[SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_DEPTH]; + secp256k1_scalar yinv; + secp256k1_scalar yinvn; + const secp256k1_ge *geng; + const secp256k1_ge *genh; + const secp256k1_ge *g; + const secp256k1_scalar *a; + const secp256k1_scalar *b; + secp256k1_scalar g_sc; + size_t grouping; + size_t n; +} secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_context; + +/* At each level i of recursion (i from 0 upto lg(vector size) - 1) + * L = a_even . G_odd + b_odd . H_even (18) + * which, by expanding the generators into the original G's and H's + * and setting n = (1 << i), can be computed as follows: + * + * For j from 1 to [vector size], + * 1. Use H[j] or G[j] as generator, starting with H and switching + * every n. + * 2. Start with b1 with H and a0 with G, and increment by 2 each switch. + * 3. For k = 1, 2, 4, ..., n/2, use the same algorithm to choose + * between a and b to choose between x and x^-1, except using + * k in place of n. With H's choose x then x^-1, with G's choose + * x^-1 then x. + * + * For R everything is the same except swap G/H and a/b and x/x^-1. + */ +static int secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_callback_l(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *data) { + secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_context *ctx = (secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_context *) data; + const size_t ab_idx = (idx / ctx->grouping) ^ 1; + size_t i; + + /* Special-case the primary generator */ + if (idx == ctx->n) { + *pt = *ctx->g; + *sc = ctx->g_sc; + return 1; + } + + /* steps 1/2 */ + if ((idx / ctx->grouping) % 2 == 0) { + *pt = ctx->genh[idx]; + *sc = ctx->b[ab_idx]; + /* Map h -> h' (eqn 59) */ + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->yinvn); + } else { + *pt = ctx->geng[idx]; + *sc = ctx->a[ab_idx]; + } + + /* step 3 */ + for (i = 0; (1u << i) < ctx->grouping; i++) { + size_t grouping = (1u << i); + if ((((idx / grouping) % 2) ^ ((idx / ctx->grouping) % 2)) == 0) { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->x[i]); + } else { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->xinv[i]); + } + } + + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->yinvn, &ctx->yinvn, &ctx->yinv); + return 1; +} + +/* Identical code except `== 0` changed to `== 1` twice, and the + * `+ 1` from Step 1/2 was moved to the other if branch. */ +static int secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_callback_r(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *data) { + secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_context *ctx = (secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_context *) data; + const size_t ab_idx = (idx / ctx->grouping) ^ 1; + size_t i; + + /* Special-case the primary generator */ + if (idx == ctx->n) { + *pt = *ctx->g; + *sc = ctx->g_sc; + return 1; + } + + /* steps 1/2 */ + if ((idx / ctx->grouping) % 2 == 1) { + *pt = ctx->genh[idx]; + *sc = ctx->b[ab_idx]; + /* Map h -> h' (eqn 59) */ + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->yinvn); + } else { + *pt = ctx->geng[idx]; + *sc = ctx->a[ab_idx]; + } + + /* step 3 */ + for (i = 0; (1u << i) < ctx->grouping; i++) { + size_t grouping = (1u << i); + if ((((idx / grouping) % 2) ^ ((idx / ctx->grouping) % 2)) == 1) { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->x[i]); + } else { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->xinv[i]); + } + } + + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->yinvn, &ctx->yinvn, &ctx->yinv); + return 1; +} + +static int secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_callback_g(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *data) { + secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_context *ctx = (secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_context *) data; + size_t i; + + *pt = ctx->geng[idx]; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(sc, 1); + for (i = 0; (1u << i) <= ctx->grouping; i++) { + if (idx & (1u << i)) { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->x[i]); + } else { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->xinv[i]); + } + } + return 1; +} + +static int secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_callback_h(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *data) { + secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_context *ctx = (secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_context *) data; + size_t i; + + *pt = ctx->genh[idx]; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(sc, 1); + for (i = 0; (1u << i) <= ctx->grouping; i++) { + if (idx & (1u << i)) { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->xinv[i]); + } else { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->x[i]); + } + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->yinvn); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->yinvn, &ctx->yinvn, &ctx->yinv); + return 1; +} + +/* These proofs are not zero-knowledge. There is no need to worry about constant timeness. + * `commit_inp` must contain 256 bits of randomness, it is used immediately as a randomizer. + */ +static int secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_real_prove_impl(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ecmult_ctx, secp256k1_scratch *scratch, secp256k1_ge *out_pt, size_t *pt_idx, const secp256k1_ge *g, secp256k1_ge *geng, secp256k1_ge *genh, secp256k1_scalar *a_arr, secp256k1_scalar *b_arr, const secp256k1_scalar *yinv, const secp256k1_scalar *ux, const size_t n, unsigned char *commit) { + size_t i; + size_t halfwidth; + + secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_context pfdata; + pfdata.yinv = *yinv; + pfdata.g = g; + pfdata.geng = geng; + pfdata.genh = genh; + pfdata.a = a_arr; + pfdata.b = b_arr; + pfdata.n = n; + + /* Protocol 1: Iterate, halving vector size until it is 1 */ + for (halfwidth = n / 2, i = 0; halfwidth > IP_AB_SCALARS / 4; halfwidth /= 2, i++) { + secp256k1_gej tmplj, tmprj; + size_t j; + int overflow; + + pfdata.grouping = 1u << i; + + /* L */ + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&pfdata.g_sc); + for (j = 0; j < halfwidth; j++) { + secp256k1_scalar prod; + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&prod, &a_arr[2*j], &b_arr[2*j + 1]); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&pfdata.g_sc, &pfdata.g_sc, &prod); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&pfdata.g_sc, &pfdata.g_sc, ux); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&pfdata.yinvn, 1); + secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(ecmult_ctx, scratch, &tmplj, NULL, &secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_callback_l, (void *) &pfdata, n + 1); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&out_pt[(*pt_idx)++], &tmplj); + + /* R */ + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&pfdata.g_sc); + for (j = 0; j < halfwidth; j++) { + secp256k1_scalar prod; + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&prod, &a_arr[2*j + 1], &b_arr[2*j]); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&pfdata.g_sc, &pfdata.g_sc, &prod); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&pfdata.g_sc, &pfdata.g_sc, ux); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&pfdata.yinvn, 1); + secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(ecmult_ctx, scratch, &tmprj, NULL, &secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_callback_r, (void *) &pfdata, n + 1); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&out_pt[(*pt_idx)++], &tmprj); + + /* x, x^2, x^-1, x^-2 */ + secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(commit, &out_pt[*pt_idx - 2], &out_pt[*pt_idx] - 1); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&pfdata.x[i], commit, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&pfdata.x[i])) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&pfdata.xinv[i], &pfdata.x[i]); + + /* update scalar array */ + for (j = 0; j < halfwidth; j++) { + secp256k1_scalar tmps; + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&a_arr[2*j], &a_arr[2*j], &pfdata.x[i]); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tmps, &a_arr[2*j + 1], &pfdata.xinv[i]); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&a_arr[j], &a_arr[2*j], &tmps); + + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&b_arr[2*j], &b_arr[2*j], &pfdata.xinv[i]); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tmps, &b_arr[2*j + 1], &pfdata.x[i]); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&b_arr[j], &b_arr[2*j], &tmps); + + } + + /* Combine G generators and recurse, if that would be more optimal */ + if ((n > 2048 && i == 3) || (n > 128 && i == 2) || (n > 32 && i == 1)) { + secp256k1_scalar yinv2; + + for (j = 0; j < halfwidth; j++) { + secp256k1_gej rj; + secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(ecmult_ctx, scratch, &rj, NULL, &secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_callback_g, (void *) &pfdata, 2u << i); + pfdata.geng += 2u << i; + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&geng[j], &rj); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&pfdata.yinvn, 1); + secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(ecmult_ctx, scratch, &rj, NULL, &secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_callback_h, (void *) &pfdata, 2u << i); + pfdata.genh += 2u << i; + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&genh[j], &rj); + } + + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&yinv2, yinv); + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&yinv2, &yinv2); + } + if (!secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_real_prove_impl(ecmult_ctx, scratch, out_pt, pt_idx, g, geng, genh, a_arr, b_arr, &yinv2, ux, halfwidth, commit)) { + return 0; + } + break; + } + } + return 1; +} + +static int secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_prove_impl(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ecmult_ctx, secp256k1_scratch *scratch, unsigned char *proof, size_t *proof_len, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, const secp256k1_scalar *yinv, const size_t n, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_callback *cb, void *cb_data, const unsigned char *commit_inp) { + secp256k1_sha256 sha256; + size_t i; + unsigned char commit[32]; + secp256k1_scalar *a_arr; + secp256k1_scalar *b_arr; + secp256k1_ge *out_pt; + secp256k1_ge *geng; + secp256k1_ge *genh; + secp256k1_scalar ux; + int overflow; + size_t pt_idx = 0; + secp256k1_scalar dot; + size_t half_n_ab = n < IP_AB_SCALARS / 2 ? n : IP_AB_SCALARS / 2; + + if (*proof_len < secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_proof_length(n)) { + return 0; + } + *proof_len = secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_proof_length(n); + + /* Special-case lengths 0 and 1 whose proofs are just expliict lists of scalars */ + if (n <= IP_AB_SCALARS / 2) { + secp256k1_scalar a[IP_AB_SCALARS / 2]; + secp256k1_scalar b[IP_AB_SCALARS / 2]; + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + cb(&a[i], NULL, 2*i, cb_data); + cb(&b[i], NULL, 2*i+1, cb_data); + } + + secp256k1_scalar_dot_product(&dot, a, b, n); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(proof, &dot); + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&proof[32 * (i + 1)], &a[i]); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&proof[32 * (i + n + 1)], &b[i]); + } + VERIFY_CHECK(*proof_len == 32 * (2 * n + 1)); + return 1; + } + + /* setup for nontrivial proofs */ + if (!secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(scratch, 2 * n * (sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) + sizeof(secp256k1_ge)) + 2 * secp256k1_floor_lg(n) * sizeof(secp256k1_ge), 5)) { + return 0; + } + + a_arr = (secp256k1_scalar*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n * sizeof(secp256k1_scalar)); + b_arr = (secp256k1_scalar*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n * sizeof(secp256k1_scalar)); + geng = (secp256k1_ge*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n * sizeof(secp256k1_ge)); + genh = (secp256k1_ge*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n * sizeof(secp256k1_ge)); + out_pt = (secp256k1_ge*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, 2 * secp256k1_floor_lg(n) * sizeof(secp256k1_ge)); + VERIFY_CHECK(a_arr != NULL); + VERIFY_CHECK(b_arr != NULL); + VERIFY_CHECK(gens != NULL); + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + cb(&a_arr[i], NULL, 2*i, cb_data); + cb(&b_arr[i], NULL, 2*i+1, cb_data); + geng[i] = gens->gens[i]; + genh[i] = gens->gens[i + gens->n/2]; + } + + /* Record final dot product */ + secp256k1_scalar_dot_product(&dot, a_arr, b_arr, n); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(proof, &dot); + + /* Protocol 2: hash dot product to obtain G-randomizer */ + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit_inp, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, proof, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); + + proof += 32; + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ux, commit, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ux)) { + /* cryptographically unreachable */ + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return 0; + } + + if (!secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_real_prove_impl(ecmult_ctx, scratch, out_pt, &pt_idx, gens->blinding_gen, geng, genh, a_arr, b_arr, yinv, &ux, n, commit)) { + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return 0; + } + + /* Final a/b values */ + for (i = 0; i < half_n_ab; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&proof[32 * i], &a_arr[i]); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&proof[32 * (i + half_n_ab)], &b_arr[i]); + } + proof += 64 * half_n_ab; + secp256k1_bulletproof_serialize_points(proof, out_pt, pt_idx); + + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return 1; +} + +#undef IP_AB_SCALARS + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/main_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/main_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f175ba0 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/main_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2018 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_BULLETPROOF_MAIN_IMPL +#define SECP256K1_MODULE_BULLETPROOF_MAIN_IMPL + +#include "group.h" +#include "scalar.h" + +#include "modules/commitment/main_impl.h" + +struct secp256k1_bulletproof_generators { + size_t n; + /* `G_i`, `H_i` generators, `n` each of them which are generated when creating this struct */ + secp256k1_ge *gens; + /* `H` "alternate" generator, used in Pedersen commitments. Passed in by caller to + * `secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_create`; stored in this structure to allow consistent + * generators between functions using `secp256k1_bulletproof_generators` and functions + * using the Pedersen commitment module. */ + secp256k1_ge *blinding_gen; +}; + +#include "modules/bulletproofs/inner_product_impl.h" +#include "modules/bulletproofs/rangeproof_impl.h" +#include "modules/bulletproofs/util.h" + + +// This is out setup +secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_create(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_generator *blinding_gen, size_t n) { + secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *ret; + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 rng; + unsigned char seed[64]; + secp256k1_gej precompj; + size_t i; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(blinding_gen != NULL); + + ret = (secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, sizeof(*ret)); + if (ret == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + ret->gens = (secp256k1_ge *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, (n + 1) * sizeof(*ret->gens)); + if (ret->gens == NULL) { + free(ret); + return NULL; + } + ret->blinding_gen = &ret->gens[n]; + ret->n = n; + + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(&seed[0], &secp256k1_ge_const_g.x); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(&seed[32], &secp256k1_ge_const_g.y); + + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, seed, 64); + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + unsigned char tmp[32] = { 0 }; + secp256k1_generator gen; + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, tmp, 32); + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate(ctx, &gen, tmp)); + secp256k1_generator_load(&ret->gens[i], &gen); + + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&precompj, &ret->gens[i]); + } + + secp256k1_generator_load(&ret->blinding_gen[0], blinding_gen); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&precompj, &ret->blinding_gen[0]); + + return ret; +} + +void secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_destroy(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens) { + (void) ctx; + if (gens != NULL) { + free(gens->gens); + free(gens); + } +} + +int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_scratch_space *scratch, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, const unsigned char *proof, size_t plen, + const uint64_t *min_value, const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* commit, size_t n_commits, size_t nbits, const secp256k1_generator *value_gen, const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len) { + int ret; + size_t i; + secp256k1_ge *commitp; + secp256k1_ge value_genp; + const secp256k1_ge *commitp_ptr; + const uint64_t *minvalue_ptr; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(scratch != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(gens != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(gens->n >= 2 * nbits * n_commits); + ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(commit != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(n_commits > 0); + ARG_CHECK(nbits > 0); + ARG_CHECK(nbits <= 64); + ARG_CHECK(value_gen != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(extra_commit != NULL || extra_commit_len == 0); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + + if (!secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(scratch, 2 * n_commits * sizeof(secp256k1_ge), 1)) { + return 0; + } + + commitp = (secp256k1_ge *)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_commits * sizeof(secp256k1_ge)); + for (i = 0; i < n_commits; i++) { + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_load(&commitp[i], &commit[i]); + } + secp256k1_generator_load(&value_genp, value_gen); + + commitp_ptr = commitp; + minvalue_ptr = min_value; + ret = secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &proof, 1, plen, nbits, &minvalue_ptr, &commitp_ptr, n_commits, &value_genp, gens, &extra_commit, &extra_commit_len); + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_scratch_space *scratch, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, const unsigned char* const* proof, size_t n_proofs, size_t plen, const uint64_t* const* min_value, const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* const* commit, size_t n_commits, size_t nbits, const secp256k1_generator *value_gen, const unsigned char* const* extra_commit, size_t *extra_commit_len) { + int ret; + secp256k1_ge **commitp; + secp256k1_ge *value_genp; + size_t i; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(scratch != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(gens != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(gens->n >= 2 * nbits * n_commits); + ARG_CHECK(commit != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(n_proofs > 0); + ARG_CHECK(n_commits > 0); + ARG_CHECK(nbits > 0); + ARG_CHECK(nbits <= 64); + ARG_CHECK(value_gen != NULL); + ARG_CHECK((extra_commit_len == NULL) == (extra_commit == NULL)); + if (extra_commit != NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < n_proofs; i++) { + ARG_CHECK(extra_commit[i] != NULL || extra_commit_len[i] == 0); + } + } + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + + if (!secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(scratch, n_proofs * (sizeof(*value_genp) + sizeof(*commitp) + n_commits * sizeof(**commitp)), 1 + n_proofs)) { + return 0; + } + + commitp = (secp256k1_ge **)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_proofs * sizeof(*commitp)); + value_genp = (secp256k1_ge *)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_proofs * sizeof(*value_genp)); + for (i = 0; i < n_proofs; i++) { + size_t j; + commitp[i] = (secp256k1_ge *)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_commits * sizeof(*commitp[i])); + for (j = 0; j < n_commits; j++) { + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_load(&commitp[i][j], &commit[i][j]); + } + secp256k1_generator_load(&value_genp[i], &value_gen[i]); + } + + ret = secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, proof, n_proofs, plen, nbits, min_value, (const secp256k1_ge **) commitp, n_commits, value_genp, gens, extra_commit, extra_commit_len); + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, uint64_t *value, unsigned char *blind, const unsigned char *proof, size_t plen, uint64_t min_value, const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* commit, const secp256k1_generator *value_gen, const unsigned char *nonce, const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len) { + secp256k1_scalar blinds; + int ret; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(value != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(blind != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(gens != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(commit != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(value_gen != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(nonce != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(extra_commit != NULL || extra_commit_len == 0); + + ret = secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind_impl(value, &blinds, proof, plen, min_value, commit, value_gen, gens->blinding_gen, nonce, extra_commit, extra_commit_len); + if (ret == 1) { + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(blind, &blinds); + } + return ret; +} + +// Put everything inside a struct, so that we can receive as input this struct and the commitment to the value +int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_scratch_space *scratch, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, unsigned char *proof, size_t *plen, const uint64_t *value, const uint64_t *min_value, const unsigned char* const* blind, size_t n_commits, const secp256k1_generator *value_gen, size_t nbits, const unsigned char *nonce, const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len) { + int ret; + secp256k1_ge *commitp; + secp256k1_scalar *blinds; + secp256k1_ge value_genp; + size_t i; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(scratch != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(gens != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(gens->n >= 2 * nbits * n_commits); + ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(plen != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(value != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(blind != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(value_gen != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(nonce != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(n_commits > 0 && n_commits); + ARG_CHECK(nbits <= 64); + if (nbits < 64) { + for (i = 0; i < n_commits; i++) { + ARG_CHECK(value[i] < (1ull << nbits)); + ARG_CHECK(blind[i] != NULL); + } + } + ARG_CHECK(extra_commit != NULL || extra_commit_len == 0); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); + + if (!secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(scratch, n_commits * (sizeof(*commitp) + sizeof(*blinds)), 2)) { + return 0; + } + commitp = (secp256k1_ge *)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_commits * sizeof(*commitp)); + blinds = (secp256k1_scalar *)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_commits * sizeof(*blinds)); + + secp256k1_generator_load(&value_genp, value_gen); + for (i = 0; i < n_commits; i++) { + int overflow; + secp256k1_gej commitj; + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&blinds[i], blind[i], &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&blinds[i])) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_pedersen_ecmult(&commitj, &blinds[i], value[i], &value_genp, &gens->blinding_gen[0]); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&commitp[i], &commitj); + } + + ret = secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, proof, plen, nbits, value, min_value, blinds, commitp, n_commits, &value_genp, gens, nonce, extra_commit, extra_commit_len); + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return ret; +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/rangeproof_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/rangeproof_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6287edb --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/rangeproof_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,792 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2018 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_BULLETPROOF_RANGEPROOF_IMPL +#define SECP256K1_MODULE_BULLETPROOF_RANGEPROOF_IMPL + +#include "modules/bulletproofs/inner_product_impl.h" +#include "modules/bulletproofs/util.h" +#include "group.h" + +#define MAX_NBITS 64 + +typedef struct { + secp256k1_scalar yinv; + secp256k1_scalar yinvn; + secp256k1_scalar z; + secp256k1_scalar z_randomized; + secp256k1_scalar zsq; + secp256k1_scalar g_exponent; + secp256k1_scalar negz; + secp256k1_scalar x; + secp256k1_ge a; + secp256k1_ge s; + size_t n; + /* eq (61) stuff */ + size_t count; + secp256k1_scalar randomizer61; + secp256k1_scalar y; + secp256k1_scalar t; + const secp256k1_ge *asset; + const secp256k1_ge *commit; + const uint64_t *min_value; + size_t n_commits; + secp256k1_ge t1; + secp256k1_ge t2; +} secp256k1_bulletproof_vfy_ecmult_context; + +static int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_vfy_callback(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, secp256k1_scalar *randomizer, size_t idx, void *data) { + secp256k1_bulletproof_vfy_ecmult_context *ctx = (secp256k1_bulletproof_vfy_ecmult_context *) data; + + if (idx == 0) { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->g_exponent, &ctx->negz, randomizer); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->z_randomized, &ctx->z, randomizer); + } + + if (idx < ctx->n) { + *sc = ctx->g_exponent; + } else if (idx < 2 * ctx->n) { + const size_t nbits = ctx->n / ctx->n_commits; + const size_t commit_idx = (idx - ctx->n) / nbits; + const size_t bit_idx = (idx - ctx->n) % nbits; + + if (bit_idx == 0) { + size_t i; + secp256k1_scalar tmp; + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tmp, &ctx->z, &ctx->yinvn); + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&ctx->zsq, &ctx->z); + for (i = 0; i < commit_idx; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->zsq, &ctx->zsq, &tmp); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->zsq, &ctx->zsq, randomizer); + } + secp256k1_scalar_add(sc, &ctx->zsq, &ctx->z_randomized); + + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->zsq, &ctx->zsq, &ctx->yinv); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&ctx->zsq, &ctx->zsq, &ctx->zsq); + } else { + switch(ctx->count) { + /* S^x in eq (62) */ + case 2: + *sc = ctx->x; + *pt = ctx->s; + break; + /* A in eq (62) */ + case 1: + *pt = ctx->a; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(sc, 1); + break; + /* G^[k(y, z) + sum_i y^i - t] from eq (61) */ + case 0: { + size_t i; + secp256k1_scalar yn; + secp256k1_scalar twosum; + secp256k1_scalar tmp; + + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&twosum); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&yn); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&tmp, 1); + + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&ctx->zsq, &ctx->z); /* need to re-set this */ + secp256k1_scalar_negate(sc, &ctx->zsq); /* -z^2 */ + secp256k1_scalar_add(sc, sc, &ctx->z); /* z - z^2 */ + + for (i = 0; i < ctx->n_commits; i++) { + const size_t nbits = ctx->n / ctx->n_commits; + secp256k1_scalar negzn; + secp256k1_scalar twon; + size_t j; + + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&twon); + for (j = 0; j < nbits; j++) { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&yn, &yn, &ctx->y); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&twon, &twon, &twon); + + secp256k1_scalar_add(&yn, &yn, &tmp); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&twon, &twon, &tmp); + } + + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&negzn, &ctx->zsq, &ctx->negz); + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&negzn, &negzn, &ctx->z); + } + if (ctx->min_value != NULL) { + secp256k1_scalar mv; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&mv, ctx->min_value[i]); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&mv, &mv, &ctx->negz); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&mv, &mv, &ctx->z); + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&negzn, &negzn, &ctx->z); + } + secp256k1_scalar_add(&twosum, &twosum, &mv); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&twon, &twon, &negzn); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&twosum, &twosum, &twon); + } /* yn = 1 + y + ... + y^(n-1); twosum = (z^3 + ... + z^{2 + n_commits})(1 + 2 + ... + 2^(n-1)) */ + + + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &yn); /* (z - z^2)(1 + ... + y^(n-1)) */ + secp256k1_scalar_add(sc, sc, &twosum); /* (z - z^2)(1 + ... + y^(n-1)) - z^3(1 + ... + 2^(n-1)) */ + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&tmp, &ctx->t); + secp256k1_scalar_add(sc, sc, &tmp); /* (z - z^2)(1 + ... + y^n) - z^3(1 + ... + 2^n) - t */ + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->randomizer61); + *pt = *ctx->asset; + break; + } + /* T1^x in eq (61) */ + case 3: + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, &ctx->x, &ctx->randomizer61); + *pt = ctx->t1; + break; + /* T2^x^2 in eq (61) */ + case 4: + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(sc, &ctx->x); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->randomizer61); + *pt = ctx->t2; + break; + /* V^z^2 in eq (61) */ + default: + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx->count < 5 + ctx->n_commits); + + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, &ctx->zsq, &ctx->randomizer61); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->zsq, &ctx->zsq, &ctx->z); + *pt = ctx->commit[ctx->count - 5]; + break; + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, randomizer); + ctx->count++; + } + return 1; +} + +static int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_impl(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ecmult_ctx, secp256k1_scratch *scratch, const unsigned char* const* proof, const size_t n_proofs, const size_t plen, size_t nbits, const uint64_t* const* min_value, const secp256k1_ge* const* commitp, size_t n_commits, const secp256k1_ge *value_gen, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, const unsigned char* const* extra_commit, size_t *extra_commit_len) { + secp256k1_bulletproof_vfy_ecmult_context *ecmult_data; + secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_context *innp_ctx; + int ret; + size_t i; + int same_generators = 1; + + /* sanity-check input */ + if (POPCOUNT(nbits) != 1 || nbits > MAX_NBITS) { + return 0; + } + if (plen < 64 + 128 + 1) { /* inner product argument will do a more precise check */ + return 0; + } + if (plen > SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_PROOF) { + return 0; + } + + if (!secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(scratch, n_proofs * (sizeof(*ecmult_data) + sizeof(*innp_ctx)), 2)) { + return 0; + } + ecmult_data = (secp256k1_bulletproof_vfy_ecmult_context *)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_proofs * sizeof(*ecmult_data)); + innp_ctx = (secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_context *)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_proofs * sizeof(*innp_ctx)); + + /* In general you cannot memcmp secp256k1_ge's like this because their field + * elements may represent the same number differently. In this case it is ok + * because (a) a false positive here is no big deal, it will add one mult per + * proof to he giant ecmult_multi at the end but not change any semantics; + * and (b) typically this list of generators was deterministically decoded + * from a list of secp256k1_generators which have a compact encoding, so that + * equal group elements actually will compare equal. */ + for (i = 1; i < n_proofs; i++) { + if (memcmp(&value_gen[i], &value_gen[i - 1], sizeof(value_gen[i])) != 0) { + same_generators = 0; + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < n_proofs; i++) { + secp256k1_sha256 sha256; + unsigned char commit[32] = {0}; + unsigned char randomizer61[32] = {0}; /* randomizer for eq (61) so we can add it to eq (62) to save a separate multiexp */ + secp256k1_scalar taux, mu; + secp256k1_ge age, sge; + int overflow; + size_t j; + + /* Commit to all input data: min value, pedersen commit, asset generator, extra_commit */ + if (min_value != NULL && min_value[i] != NULL) { + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); + for (j = 0; j < n_commits; j++) { + unsigned char vbuf[8]; + vbuf[0] = min_value[i][j]; + vbuf[1] = min_value[i][j] >> 8; + vbuf[2] = min_value[i][j] >> 16; + vbuf[3] = min_value[i][j] >> 24; + vbuf[4] = min_value[i][j] >> 32; + vbuf[5] = min_value[i][j] >> 40; + vbuf[6] = min_value[i][j] >> 48; + vbuf[7] = min_value[i][j] >> 56; + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, vbuf, 8); + } + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); + } + for (j = 0; j < n_commits; j++) { + secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(commit, &commitp[i][j], &value_gen[i]); + } + if (extra_commit != NULL && extra_commit[i] != NULL) { + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, extra_commit[i], extra_commit_len[i]); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); + } + + /* Compute y, z, x */ + secp256k1_bulletproof_deserialize_point(&age, &proof[i][64], 0, 4); + secp256k1_bulletproof_deserialize_point(&sge, &proof[i][64], 1, 4); + + secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(commit, &age, &sge); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ecmult_data[i].y, commit, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ecmult_data[i].y)) { + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return 0; + } + secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(commit, &age, &sge); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ecmult_data[i].z, commit, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ecmult_data[i].z)) { + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return 0; + } + + secp256k1_bulletproof_deserialize_point(&ecmult_data[i].t1, &proof[i][64], 2, 4); + secp256k1_bulletproof_deserialize_point(&ecmult_data[i].t2, &proof[i][64], 3, 4); + + secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(commit, &ecmult_data[i].t1, &ecmult_data[i].t2); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ecmult_data[i].x, commit, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ecmult_data[i].x)) { + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return 0; + } + + /* compute exponent offsets */ + secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&ecmult_data[i].yinv, &ecmult_data[i].y); /* TODO somehow batch this w the inner-product argument inverse */ + ecmult_data[i].yinvn = ecmult_data[i].yinv; + for (j = 0; j < secp256k1_floor_lg(nbits); j++) { + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&ecmult_data[i].yinvn, &ecmult_data[i].yinvn); + } + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&ecmult_data[i].zsq, &ecmult_data[i].z); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&ecmult_data[i].negz, &ecmult_data[i].z); + + /* Update commit with remaining data for the inner product proof */ + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &proof[i][0], 64); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); + + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, randomizer61); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ecmult_data[i].randomizer61, randomizer61, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ecmult_data[i].randomizer61)) { + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return 0; + } + + /* Deserialize everything else */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&taux, &proof[i][0], &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&taux)) { + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return 0; + } + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&mu, &proof[i][32], &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&mu)) { + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return 0; + } + /* A little sketchy, we read t (l(x) . r(x)) off the front of the inner product proof, + * which we otherwise treat as a black box */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ecmult_data[i].t, &proof[i][64 + 128 + 1], &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ecmult_data[i].t)) { + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return 0; + } + + /* Verify inner product proof */ + ecmult_data[i].a = age; + ecmult_data[i].s = sge; + ecmult_data[i].n = nbits * n_commits; + ecmult_data[i].count = 0; + ecmult_data[i].asset = &value_gen[i]; + ecmult_data[i].min_value = min_value == NULL ? NULL : min_value[i]; + ecmult_data[i].commit = commitp[i]; + ecmult_data[i].n_commits = n_commits; + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&taux, &taux, &ecmult_data[i].randomizer61); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&mu, &mu, &taux); + + innp_ctx[i].proof = &proof[i][64 + 128 + 1]; + innp_ctx[i].p_offs = mu; + memcpy(innp_ctx[i].commit, commit, 32); + innp_ctx[i].yinv = ecmult_data[i].yinv; + innp_ctx[i].rangeproof_cb = secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_vfy_callback; + innp_ctx[i].rangeproof_cb_data = (void *) &ecmult_data[i]; + innp_ctx[i].n_extra_rangeproof_points = 5 + n_commits; + } + + ret = secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(ecmult_ctx, scratch, gens, nbits * n_commits, innp_ctx, n_proofs, plen - (64 + 128 + 1), same_generators); + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + return ret; +} + +typedef struct { + const unsigned char *nonce; + secp256k1_scalar y; + secp256k1_scalar z; + secp256k1_scalar yn; + secp256k1_scalar z22n; + const uint64_t *val; + const uint64_t *min_val; + size_t n_vals; + size_t nbits; + size_t count; +} secp256k1_bulletproof_lr_generator; + +static void secp256k1_lr_generator_init(secp256k1_bulletproof_lr_generator *generator, const unsigned char *nonce, const secp256k1_scalar *y, const secp256k1_scalar *z, size_t nbits, const uint64_t *val, const uint64_t *min_val, size_t n_vals) { + generator->nonce = nonce; + generator->y = *y; + generator->z = *z; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&generator->yn, 1); + generator->nbits = nbits; + generator->val = val; + generator->min_val = min_val; + generator->n_vals = n_vals; + generator->count = 0; +} + +static void secp256k1_lr_generate(secp256k1_bulletproof_lr_generator *generator, secp256k1_scalar *lout, secp256k1_scalar *rout, const secp256k1_scalar *x) { + const size_t commit_idx = generator->count / generator->nbits; + const size_t bit_idx = generator->count % generator->nbits; + const uint64_t mv = generator->min_val == NULL ? 0 : generator->min_val[commit_idx]; + const int bit = ((generator->val[commit_idx] - mv)>> bit_idx) & 1; + secp256k1_scalar sl, sr; + secp256k1_scalar negz; + + if (bit_idx == 0) { + size_t i; + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&generator->z22n, &generator->z); + for (i = 0; i < commit_idx; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&generator->z22n, &generator->z22n, &generator->z); + } + } + + secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(&sl, &sr, generator->nonce, generator->count + 2); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&sl, &sl, x); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&sr, &sr, x); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(lout, bit); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&negz, &generator->z); + secp256k1_scalar_add(lout, lout, &negz); + secp256k1_scalar_add(lout, lout, &sl); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(rout, 1 - bit); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(rout, rout); + secp256k1_scalar_add(rout, rout, &generator->z); + secp256k1_scalar_add(rout, rout, &sr); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(rout, rout, &generator->yn); + secp256k1_scalar_add(rout, rout, &generator->z22n); + + generator->count++; + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&generator->yn, &generator->yn, &generator->y); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&generator->z22n, &generator->z22n, &generator->z22n); +} + +typedef struct { + secp256k1_scalar x; + secp256k1_scalar cache; + secp256k1_bulletproof_lr_generator lr_gen; +} secp256k1_bulletproof_abgh_data; + +static int secp256k1_bulletproof_abgh_callback(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *data) { + secp256k1_bulletproof_abgh_data *ctx = (secp256k1_bulletproof_abgh_data *) data; + const int is_g = idx % 2 == 0; + + (void) pt; + if (is_g) { + secp256k1_lr_generate(&ctx->lr_gen, sc, &ctx->cache, &ctx->x); + } else { + *sc = ctx->cache; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* Proof format: t, tau_x, mu, a, b, A, S, T_1, T_2, {L_i}, {R_i} + * 5 scalar + [4 + 2log(n)] ge + * + * The non-bold `h` in the Bulletproofs paper corresponds to our gens->blinding_gen + * while the non-bold `g` corresponds to the asset type `value_gen`. + */ +static int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove_impl(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ecmult_ctx, secp256k1_scratch *scratch, unsigned char *proof, size_t *plen, const size_t nbits, const uint64_t *value, const uint64_t *min_value, const secp256k1_scalar *blind, const secp256k1_ge *commitp, size_t n_commits, const secp256k1_ge *value_gen, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, const unsigned char *nonce, const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len) { + secp256k1_bulletproof_lr_generator lr_gen; + secp256k1_bulletproof_abgh_data abgh_data; + secp256k1_scalar zero; + secp256k1_sha256 sha256; + unsigned char commit[32] = {0}; + secp256k1_scalar alpha, rho; + secp256k1_scalar t0, t1, t2; + secp256k1_scalar tau1, tau2, taux, mu; + secp256k1_scalar y; + secp256k1_scalar z, zsq; + secp256k1_scalar x, xsq; + secp256k1_scalar tmps; + secp256k1_gej aj, sj; + secp256k1_gej tmpj; + size_t i, j; + int overflow; + /* inner product proof variables */ + secp256k1_ge out_pt[4]; + + if (POPCOUNT(nbits) != 1 || nbits > MAX_NBITS) { + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < n_commits; i++) { + uint64_t mv = min_value == NULL ? 0 : min_value[i]; + if (mv > value[i]) { + return 0; + } + if (nbits < 64 && (value[i] - mv) >= (1ull << nbits)) { + return 0; + } + } + if (*plen < 128 + 64 + 1) { /* inner product argument will check and assign plen */ + return 0; + } + + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&zero); + + /* Commit to all input data: min value, pedersen commit, asset generator, extra_commit */ + if (min_value != NULL) { + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); + for (i = 0; i < n_commits; i++) { + unsigned char vbuf[8]; + vbuf[0] = min_value[i]; + vbuf[1] = min_value[i] >> 8; + vbuf[2] = min_value[i] >> 16; + vbuf[3] = min_value[i] >> 24; + vbuf[4] = min_value[i] >> 32; + vbuf[5] = min_value[i] >> 40; + vbuf[6] = min_value[i] >> 48; + vbuf[7] = min_value[i] >> 56; + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, vbuf, 8); + } + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); + } + for (i = 0; i < n_commits; i++) { + secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(commit, &commitp[i], value_gen); /* TODO be less stupid about this */ + } + if (extra_commit != NULL) { + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, extra_commit, extra_commit_len); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); + } + + secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(&alpha, &rho, nonce, 0); + secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(&tau1, &tau2, nonce, 1); + /* Encrypt value into alpha, so it will be recoverable from -mu by someone who knows `nonce` */ + if (n_commits == 1) { + secp256k1_scalar vals; + secp256k1_scalar_set_u64(&vals, value[0]); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&vals, &vals); /* Negate so it'll be positive in -mu */ + secp256k1_scalar_add(&alpha, &alpha, &vals); + } + + /* Compute A and S */ + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&aj, &gens->blinding_gen[0], &alpha, 256); + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&sj, &gens->blinding_gen[0], &rho, 256); + for (i = 0; i < n_commits; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < nbits; j++) { + secp256k1_scalar sl, sr; + uint64_t mv = min_value == NULL ? 0 : min_value[i]; + size_t al = !!((value[i] - mv) & (1ull << j)); + secp256k1_ge aterm = gens->gens[i * nbits + j + gens->n/2]; + secp256k1_ge sterm; + secp256k1_gej stermj; + + secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(&sl, &sr, nonce, i * nbits + j + 2); + + secp256k1_ge_neg(&aterm, &aterm); + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&aterm.x, &gens->gens[i * nbits + j].x, al); + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&aterm.y, &gens->gens[i * nbits + j].y, al); + + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&aj, &aj, &aterm); + + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&stermj, &gens->gens[i * nbits + j], &sl, 256); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&sterm, &stermj); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&sj, &sj, &sterm); + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&stermj, &gens->gens[i * nbits + j + gens->n/2], &sr, 256); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&sterm, &stermj); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&sj, &sj, &sterm); + } + } + + /* get challenges y and z */ + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&out_pt[0], &aj); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&out_pt[1], &sj); + + secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(commit, &out_pt[0], &out_pt[1]); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&y, commit, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&y)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(commit, &out_pt[0], &out_pt[1]); /* TODO rehashing A and S to get a second challenge is overkill */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&z, commit, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&z)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&zsq, &z); + + /* Compute coefficients t0, t1, t2 of the polynomial */ + /* t0 = l(0) dot r(0) */ + secp256k1_lr_generator_init(&lr_gen, nonce, &y, &z, nbits, value, min_value, n_commits); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&t0); + for (i = 0; i < nbits * n_commits; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar l, r; + secp256k1_lr_generate(&lr_gen, &l, &r, &zero); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&l, &l, &r); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&t0, &t0, &l); + } + + /* A = t0 + t1 + t2 = l(1) dot r(1) */ + secp256k1_lr_generator_init(&lr_gen, nonce, &y, &z, nbits, value, min_value, n_commits); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&t1); + for (i = 0; i < nbits * n_commits; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar one; + secp256k1_scalar l, r; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&one, 1); + secp256k1_lr_generate(&lr_gen, &l, &r, &one); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&l, &l, &r); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&t1, &t1, &l); + } + + /* B = t0 - t1 + t2 = l(-1) dot r(-1) */ + secp256k1_lr_generator_init(&lr_gen, nonce, &y, &z, nbits, value, min_value, n_commits); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&t2); + for (i = 0; i < nbits * n_commits; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar negone; + secp256k1_scalar l, r; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&negone, 1); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&negone, &negone); + secp256k1_lr_generate(&lr_gen, &l, &r, &negone); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&l, &l, &r); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&t2, &t2, &l); + } + + /* t1 = (A - B)/2 */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&tmps, 2); + secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&tmps, &tmps); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&t2, &t2); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&t1, &t1, &t2); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&t1, &t1, &tmps); + + /* t2 = -(-B + t0) + t1 */ + secp256k1_scalar_add(&t2, &t2, &t0); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&t2, &t2); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&t2, &t2, &t1); + + /* Compute Ti = t_i*A + tau_i*G for i = 1,2 */ + /* TODO surely we can improve this */ + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&tmpj, value_gen, &t1, 256); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&out_pt[2], &tmpj); + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&tmpj, &gens->blinding_gen[0], &tau1, 256); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&tmpj, &tmpj, &out_pt[2]); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&out_pt[2], &tmpj); + + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&tmpj, value_gen, &t2, 256); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&out_pt[3], &tmpj); + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&tmpj, &gens->blinding_gen[0], &tau2, 256); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&tmpj, &tmpj, &out_pt[3]); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&out_pt[3], &tmpj); + + /* get challenge x */ + secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(commit, &out_pt[2], &out_pt[3]); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&x, commit, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&x)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&xsq, &x); + + /* compute tau_x and mu */ + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&taux, &tau1, &x); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tmps, &tau2, &xsq); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&taux, &taux, &tmps); + for (i = 0; i < n_commits; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tmps, &zsq, &blind[i]); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&taux, &taux, &tmps); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&zsq, &zsq, &z); + } + + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&mu, &rho, &x); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&mu, &mu, &alpha); + + /* Negate taux and mu so the verifier doesn't have to */ + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&taux, &taux); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&mu, &mu); + + /* Encode rangeproof stuff */ + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&proof[0], &taux); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&proof[32], &mu); + secp256k1_bulletproof_serialize_points(&proof[64], out_pt, 4); + + /* Mix this into the hash so the input to the inner product proof is fixed */ + /* TODO is this necessary? revisit */ + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, proof, 64); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); + + /* Compute l and r, do inner product proof */ + abgh_data.x = x; + secp256k1_lr_generator_init(&abgh_data.lr_gen, nonce, &y, &z, nbits, value, min_value, n_commits); + *plen -= 64 + 128 + 1; + secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&y, &y); + if (secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_prove_impl(ecmult_ctx, scratch, &proof[64 + 128 + 1], plen, gens, &y, nbits * n_commits, secp256k1_bulletproof_abgh_callback, (void *) &abgh_data, commit) == 0) { + return 0; + } + *plen += 64 + 128 + 1; + + return 1; +} + +static int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind_impl(uint64_t *value, secp256k1_scalar *blind, const unsigned char *proof, const size_t plen, uint64_t min_value, const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *pcommit, const secp256k1_generator *value_gen, const secp256k1_ge *blind_gen, const unsigned char *nonce, const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len) { + secp256k1_sha256 sha256; + static const unsigned char zero24[24] = { 0 }; + unsigned char commit[32] = { 0 }; + unsigned char lrparity; + secp256k1_scalar taux, mu; + secp256k1_scalar alpha, rho, tau1, tau2; + secp256k1_scalar x, z; + secp256k1_ge commitp, value_genp; + secp256k1_gej rewind_commitj; + int overflow; + + if (plen < 64 + 128 + 1 || plen > SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_PROOF) { + return 0; + } + + /* Extract data from beginning of proof */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&taux, &proof[0], &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&taux)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&mu, &proof[32], &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&mu)) { + return 0; + } + + secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(&alpha, &rho, nonce, 0); + secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(&tau1, &tau2, nonce, 1); + + if (min_value > 0) { + unsigned char vbuf[8]; + vbuf[0] = min_value; + vbuf[1] = min_value >> 8; + vbuf[2] = min_value >> 16; + vbuf[3] = min_value >> 24; + vbuf[4] = min_value >> 32; + vbuf[5] = min_value >> 40; + vbuf[6] = min_value >> 48; + vbuf[7] = min_value >> 56; + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, vbuf, 8); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); + } + + /* This breaks the abstraction of both the Pedersen commitment and the generator + * type by directly reading the parity bit and x-coordinate from the data. But + * the alternative using the _load functions is to do two full point decompression, + * and in my benchmarks we save ~80% of the rewinding time by avoiding this. -asp */ + lrparity = 2 * !!(pcommit->data[0] & 1) + !!(value_gen->data[0] & 1); + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &lrparity, 1); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &pcommit->data[1], 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &value_gen->data[1], 32); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); + + if (extra_commit != NULL) { + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, extra_commit, extra_commit_len); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); + } + + /* Extract A and S to compute y and z */ + lrparity = 2 * !!(proof[64] & 1) + !!(proof[64] & 2); + /* y */ + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &lrparity, 1); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &proof[65], 64); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); + + /* z */ + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &lrparity, 1); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &proof[65], 64); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&z, commit, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&z)) { + return 0; + } + + /* x */ + lrparity = 2 * !!(proof[64] & 4) + !!(proof[64] & 8); + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &lrparity, 1); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &proof[129], 64); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&x, commit, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&x)) { + return 0; + } + + /* Compute candidate mu and add to (negated) mu from proof to get value */ + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&rho, &rho, &x); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&mu, &mu, &rho); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&mu, &mu, &alpha); + + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(commit, &mu); + if (memcmp(commit, zero24, 24) != 0) { + return 0; + } + *value = commit[31] + ((uint64_t) commit[30] << 8) + + ((uint64_t) commit[29] << 16) + ((uint64_t) commit[28] << 24) + + ((uint64_t) commit[27] << 32) + ((uint64_t) commit[26] << 40) + + ((uint64_t) commit[25] << 48) + ((uint64_t) commit[24] << 56); + + /* Derive blinding factor */ + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tau1, &tau1, &x); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tau2, &tau2, &x); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tau2, &tau2, &x); + + secp256k1_scalar_add(&taux, &taux, &tau1); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&taux, &taux, &tau2); + + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&z, &z); + secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&z, &z); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(blind, &taux, &z); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(blind, blind); + + /* Check blinding factor */ + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_load(&commitp, pcommit); + secp256k1_generator_load(&value_genp, value_gen); + + secp256k1_pedersen_ecmult(&rewind_commitj, blind, *value, &value_genp, blind_gen); + secp256k1_gej_neg(&rewind_commitj, &rewind_commitj); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&rewind_commitj, &rewind_commitj, &commitp, NULL); + + return secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&rewind_commitj); +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/tests_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/tests_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8702e3d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/tests_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,608 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2018 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_BULLETPROOF_TESTS +#define SECP256K1_MODULE_BULLETPROOF_TESTS + +#include + +#include "group.h" +#include "scalar.h" +#include "testrand.h" +#include "util.h" + +#include "include/secp256k1_bulletproofs.h" + +static void test_bulletproof_api(void) { + secp256k1_context *none = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); + secp256k1_context *sign = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); + secp256k1_context *vrfy = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + secp256k1_context *both = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + secp256k1_scratch *scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(ctx, 1024 * 1024); + secp256k1_generator value_gen; + secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens; + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment pcommit[4]; + const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *pcommit_arr[1]; + unsigned char proof[2000]; + const unsigned char *proof_ptr = proof; + const unsigned char blind[32] = " i am not a blinding factor "; + const unsigned char *blind_ptr[4]; + size_t blindlen = sizeof(blind); + size_t plen = sizeof(proof); + uint64_t value[4] = { 1234, 4567, 8910, 1112 } ; + uint64_t min_value[4] = { 1000, 4567, 0, 5000 } ; + const uint64_t *mv_ptr = min_value; + unsigned char rewind_blind[32]; + size_t rewind_v; + + int32_t ecount = 0; + + blind_ptr[0] = blind; + blind_ptr[1] = blind; + blind_ptr[2] = blind; + blind_ptr[3] = blind; + pcommit_arr[0] = pcommit; + + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate(both, &value_gen, blind) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(both, &pcommit[0], blind, value[0], &value_gen, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(both, &pcommit[1], blind, value[1], &value_gen, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(both, &pcommit[2], blind, value[2], &value_gen, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(both, &pcommit[3], blind, value[3], &value_gen, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); + + /* generators */ + gens = secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_create(none, NULL, 256); + CHECK(gens == NULL && ecount == 1); + gens = secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_create(none, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, 256); + CHECK(gens != NULL && ecount == 1); + + /* rangeproof_prove */ + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(none, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(sign, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(vrfy, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + plen = 2000; + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 2, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + plen = 2000; + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 4, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); /* too few gens */ + CHECK(ecount == 4); + + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, min_value, blind_ptr, 2, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 1); /* mv = v, ok */ + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, &value[1], &min_value[1], blind_ptr, 2, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 1); /* mv = 0, ok */ + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, &value[2], &min_value[2], blind_ptr, 2, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); /* mv > v, !ok */ + CHECK(ecount == 4); + + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, NULL, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, NULL, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 6); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, NULL, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 7); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, NULL, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 8); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, NULL, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 9); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, NULL, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 10); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 0, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 11); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, NULL, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 12); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 0, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 13); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 65, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 14); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, -1, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 15); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, NULL, NULL, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 16); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, blind, 0) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 16); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, min_value, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, blind, 32) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 16); + + /* rangeproof_verify */ + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(none, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(sign, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(vrfy, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 63, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen - 1, min_value, pcommit, 1, 63, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, 0, min_value, pcommit, 1, 63, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 31) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, NULL, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 2, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 4, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, NULL, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, NULL, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, NULL, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 6); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, NULL, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 6); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, NULL, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 7); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 0, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 8); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 65, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 9); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 0, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 10); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, NULL, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 11); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, NULL, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 12); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 12); + + /* verify_multi */ + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(none, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(sign, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(vrfy, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, NULL, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, NULL, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, NULL, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 0, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 6); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, NULL, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 6); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, NULL, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 7); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, NULL, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 8); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, NULL, &blindlen) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 9); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 10); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 10); + + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 0, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 11); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 65, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 12); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 63, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 12); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 0, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 13); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 2, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 13); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 4, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 14); + + /* Rewind */ + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, proof, plen, min_value[0], pcommit, &value_gen, blind, blind, 32) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, NULL, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, proof, plen, min_value[0], pcommit, &value_gen, blind, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, NULL, rewind_blind, proof, plen, min_value[0], pcommit, &value_gen, blind, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, NULL, proof, plen, min_value[0], pcommit, &value_gen, blind, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, NULL, plen, min_value[0], pcommit, &value_gen, blind, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, proof, 0, min_value[0], pcommit, &value_gen, blind, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, proof, plen, 0, pcommit, &value_gen, blind, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, proof, plen, min_value[0], NULL, &value_gen, blind, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, proof, plen, min_value[0], pcommit, NULL, blind, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 6); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, proof, plen, min_value[0], pcommit, &value_gen, NULL, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 7); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, proof, plen, min_value[0], pcommit, &value_gen, blind, NULL, 32) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 8); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, proof, plen, min_value[0], pcommit, &value_gen, blind, blind, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 8); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, proof, plen, min_value[0], pcommit, &value_gen, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 8); + + secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_destroy(none, gens); + secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_destroy(none, NULL); + secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); + secp256k1_context_destroy(none); + secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); + secp256k1_context_destroy(vrfy); + secp256k1_context_destroy(both); +} + +#define MAX_WIDTH (1ul << 20) +typedef struct { + const secp256k1_scalar *a; + const secp256k1_scalar *b; + const secp256k1_ge *g; + const secp256k1_ge *h; + size_t n; +} test_bulletproof_ecmult_context; + +static int test_bulletproof_ecmult_callback(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *data) { + test_bulletproof_ecmult_context *ecctx = (test_bulletproof_ecmult_context *) data; + if (idx < ecctx->n) { + *sc = ecctx->a[idx]; + *pt = ecctx->g[idx]; + } else { + VERIFY_CHECK(idx < 2*ecctx->n); + *sc = ecctx->b[idx - ecctx->n]; + *pt = ecctx->h[idx - ecctx->n]; + } + return 1; +} + +typedef struct { + secp256k1_scalar offs; + secp256k1_scalar ext_sc; + secp256k1_scalar skew_sc; + secp256k1_ge ext_pt; + secp256k1_ge p; + size_t n; + int parity; +} test_bulletproof_offset_context; + +static int test_bulletproof_offset_vfy_callback(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, secp256k1_scalar *randomizer, size_t idx, void *data) { + test_bulletproof_offset_context *ecctx = (test_bulletproof_offset_context *) data; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ecctx->offs, 1); + if (idx < 2 * ecctx->n) { + secp256k1_scalar idxsc; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&idxsc, idx); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, &ecctx->skew_sc, &idxsc); + } else { + if (ecctx->parity) { + *sc = ecctx->ext_sc; + *pt = ecctx->ext_pt; + } else { + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(sc, 1); + *pt = ecctx->p; + } + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, randomizer); + ecctx->parity = !ecctx->parity; + return 1; +} + +typedef struct { + const secp256k1_scalar *a_arr; + const secp256k1_scalar *b_arr; +} secp256k1_bulletproof_ip_test_abgh_data; + + +static int secp256k1_bulletproof_ip_test_abgh_callback(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *data) { + secp256k1_bulletproof_ip_test_abgh_data *cbctx = (secp256k1_bulletproof_ip_test_abgh_data *) data; + const int is_g = idx % 2 == 0; + + (void) pt; + if (is_g) { + *sc = cbctx->a_arr[idx / 2]; + } else { + *sc = cbctx->b_arr[idx / 2]; + } + return 1; +} + +void test_bulletproof_inner_product(size_t n, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens) { + const secp256k1_scalar zero = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0); + secp256k1_gej pj; + secp256k1_gej tmpj, tmpj2; + secp256k1_scalar *a_arr = (secp256k1_scalar *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, n * sizeof(*a_arr)); + secp256k1_scalar *b_arr = (secp256k1_scalar *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, n * sizeof(*b_arr)); + unsigned char commit[32] = "hash of P, c, etc. all that jazz"; + secp256k1_scalar one; + size_t j; + test_bulletproof_offset_context offs_ctx; + secp256k1_bulletproof_ip_test_abgh_data abgh_data; + secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_context innp_ctx; + unsigned char proof[2000]; + size_t plen = sizeof(proof); + + secp256k1_scratch *scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(ctx, 100000 + 256 * (2 * n + 2)); + + for (j = 0; j < n; j++) { + random_scalar_order(&a_arr[j]); + random_scalar_order(&b_arr[j]); + } + + abgh_data.a_arr = a_arr; + abgh_data.b_arr = b_arr; + + random_group_element_test(&offs_ctx.ext_pt); + random_scalar_order(&offs_ctx.ext_sc); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&offs_ctx.skew_sc); + offs_ctx.n = n; + + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&one, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_prove_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, proof, &plen, gens, &one, n, secp256k1_bulletproof_ip_test_abgh_callback, (void *) &abgh_data, commit) == 1); + + innp_ctx.proof = proof; + memcpy(innp_ctx.commit, commit, 32); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&innp_ctx.yinv, 1); + innp_ctx.n_extra_rangeproof_points = 1; + innp_ctx.rangeproof_cb = test_bulletproof_offset_vfy_callback; + innp_ctx.rangeproof_cb_data = (void *) &offs_ctx; + + /* Manually do the multiexp to obtain the point P which commits to the inner product. + * The prover never computes this because it is implicit in the range/circuit proofs. */ + { + test_bulletproof_ecmult_context ecmult_data; + ecmult_data.n = n; + ecmult_data.a = a_arr; + ecmult_data.b = b_arr; + ecmult_data.g = gens->gens; + ecmult_data.h = gens->gens + gens->n/2; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &pj, &zero, test_bulletproof_ecmult_callback, (void*) &ecmult_data, 2 * n)); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&offs_ctx.p, &pj); + } + + /* Check proof with no offsets or other baubles */ + offs_ctx.parity = 0; + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&innp_ctx.p_offs); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, gens, n, &innp_ctx, 1, plen, 1) == 1); + + /* skew P by a random amount and instruct the verifier to offset it */ + random_scalar_order(&innp_ctx.p_offs); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&tmpj2, &gens->blinding_gen[0]); + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &tmpj, &tmpj2, &innp_ctx.p_offs, &zero); + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&pj, &pj, &tmpj, NULL); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&offs_ctx.p, &pj); + + /* wrong p_offs should fail */ + offs_ctx.parity = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, gens, n, &innp_ctx, 1, plen, 1) == 0); + + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&innp_ctx.p_offs, &innp_ctx.p_offs); + + offs_ctx.parity = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, gens, n, &innp_ctx, 1, plen, 1) == 1); + /* check that verification did not trash anything */ + offs_ctx.parity = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, gens, n, &innp_ctx, 1, plen, 1) == 1); + /* check that adding a no-op rangeproof skew function doesn't break anything */ + offs_ctx.parity = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, gens, n, &innp_ctx, 1, plen, 1) == 1); + + /* Offset P by some random point and then try to undo this in the verification */ + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&tmpj2, &offs_ctx.ext_pt); + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &tmpj, &tmpj2, &offs_ctx.ext_sc, &zero); + secp256k1_gej_neg(&tmpj, &tmpj); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&tmpj, &tmpj, &offs_ctx.p, NULL); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&offs_ctx.p, &tmpj); + offs_ctx.parity = 0; + innp_ctx.n_extra_rangeproof_points = 2; + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, gens, n, &innp_ctx, 1, plen, 1) == 1); + + /* Offset each basis by some random point and try to undo this in the verification */ + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&tmpj2); + for (j = 0; j < n; j++) { + size_t k; + /* Offset by k-times the kth G basis and (k+n)-times the kth H basis */ + for (k = 0; k < j; k++) { + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&tmpj2, &tmpj2, &gens->gens[j], NULL); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&tmpj2, &tmpj2, &gens->gens[j + gens->n/2], NULL); + } + for (k = 0; k < n; k++) { + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&tmpj2, &tmpj2, &gens->gens[j + gens->n/2], NULL); + } + } + random_scalar_order(&offs_ctx.skew_sc); + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &tmpj, &tmpj2, &offs_ctx.skew_sc, &zero); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&tmpj, &tmpj, &offs_ctx.p, NULL); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&offs_ctx.p, &tmpj); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&offs_ctx.skew_sc, &offs_ctx.skew_sc); + + offs_ctx.parity = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, gens, n, &innp_ctx, 1, plen, 1) == 1); + + /* Try to validate the same proof twice */ +{ + test_bulletproof_offset_context offs_ctxs[2]; + secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_context innp_ctxs[2]; + offs_ctx.parity = 1; /* set parity to 1 so the common point will be returned first, as required by the multi-proof verifier */ + memcpy(&innp_ctxs[0], &innp_ctx, sizeof(innp_ctx)); + memcpy(&innp_ctxs[1], &innp_ctx, sizeof(innp_ctx)); + memcpy(&offs_ctxs[0], &offs_ctx, sizeof(offs_ctx)); + memcpy(&offs_ctxs[1], &offs_ctx, sizeof(offs_ctx)); + innp_ctxs[0].rangeproof_cb_data = (void *)&offs_ctxs[0]; + innp_ctxs[1].rangeproof_cb_data = (void *)&offs_ctxs[1]; + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, gens, n, innp_ctxs, 2, plen, 1) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, gens, n, innp_ctxs, 2, plen, 0) == 1); +} + + free(a_arr); + free(b_arr); + secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); +} + +void test_bulletproof_rangeproof(size_t nbits, size_t expected_size, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens) { + secp256k1_scalar blind; + secp256k1_scalar blind_recovered; + unsigned char proof[1024]; + unsigned char proof2[1024]; + unsigned char proof3[1024]; + const unsigned char *proof_ptr[3]; + size_t plen = sizeof(proof); + uint64_t v = 123456; + uint64_t v_recovered; + secp256k1_gej commitj; + secp256k1_ge commitp; + secp256k1_ge commitp2; + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment pcommit; + const secp256k1_ge *commitp_ptr[3]; + secp256k1_ge value_gen[3]; + unsigned char nonce[32] = "my kingdom for some randomness!!"; + + secp256k1_scratch *scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(ctx, 10000000); + + if (v >> nbits > 0) { + v = 0; + } + + proof_ptr[0] = proof; + proof_ptr[1] = proof2; + proof_ptr[2] = proof3; + + secp256k1_generator_load(&value_gen[0], &secp256k1_generator_const_g); + secp256k1_generator_load(&value_gen[1], &secp256k1_generator_const_g); + secp256k1_generator_load(&value_gen[2], &secp256k1_generator_const_h); + random_scalar_order(&blind); + + secp256k1_pedersen_ecmult(&commitj, &blind, v, &value_gen[0], &gens->blinding_gen[0]); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&commitp, &commitj); + secp256k1_pedersen_ecmult(&commitj, &blind, v, &value_gen[2], &gens->blinding_gen[0]); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&commitp2, &commitj); + commitp_ptr[0] = commitp_ptr[1] = &commitp; + commitp_ptr[2] = &commitp2; + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_save(&pcommit, &commitp); + + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, proof, &plen, nbits, &v, NULL, &blind, &commitp, 1, &value_gen[0], gens, nonce, NULL, 0) == 1); + CHECK(plen == expected_size); + nonce[0] ^= 1; + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, proof2, &plen, nbits, &v, NULL, &blind, &commitp, 1, &value_gen[1], gens, nonce, NULL, 0) == 1); + CHECK(plen == expected_size); + nonce[0] ^= 2; + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, proof3, &plen, nbits, &v, NULL, &blind, &commitp2, 1, &value_gen[2], gens, nonce, NULL, 0) == 1); + CHECK(plen == expected_size); + nonce[0] ^= 3; + /* Verify once */ + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, proof_ptr, 1, plen, nbits, NULL, commitp_ptr, 1, value_gen, gens, NULL, 0) == 1); + /* Verify twice at once to test batch validation */ + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, proof_ptr, 2, plen, nbits, NULL, commitp_ptr, 1, value_gen, gens, NULL, 0) == 1); + /* Verify thrice at once where one has a different asset type */ + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, proof_ptr, 3, plen, nbits, NULL, commitp_ptr, 1, value_gen, gens, NULL, 0) == 1); + + /* Rewind */ + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind_impl(&v_recovered, &blind_recovered, proof, plen, 0, &pcommit, &secp256k1_generator_const_g, gens->blinding_gen, nonce, NULL, 0) == 1); + CHECK(v_recovered == v); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&blind_recovered, &blind) == 1); + + nonce[0] ^= 111; + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind_impl(&v_recovered, &blind_recovered, proof, plen, 0, &pcommit, &secp256k1_generator_const_g, gens->blinding_gen, nonce, NULL, 0) == 0); + + secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); +} + +void test_bulletproof_rangeproof_aggregate(size_t nbits, size_t n_commits, size_t expected_size, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens) { + unsigned char proof[1024]; + const unsigned char *proof_ptr = proof; + size_t plen = sizeof(proof); + secp256k1_scalar *blind = (secp256k1_scalar *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, n_commits * sizeof(*blind)); + uint64_t *v = (uint64_t *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, n_commits * sizeof(*v)); + secp256k1_ge *commitp = (secp256k1_ge *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, n_commits * sizeof(*commitp)); + const secp256k1_ge *constptr = commitp; + secp256k1_ge value_gen; + unsigned char commit[32] = {0}; + unsigned char nonce[32] = "mary, mary quite contrary how do"; + size_t i; + + secp256k1_scratch *scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(ctx, 10000000); + + secp256k1_generator_load(&value_gen, &secp256k1_generator_const_g); + for (i = 0; i < n_commits; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar vs; + secp256k1_gej commitj; + + v[i] = 223 * i; /* dice-roll random # */ + if (v[i] >> nbits > 0) { + v[i] = 0; + } + secp256k1_scalar_set_u64(&vs, v[i]); + random_scalar_order(&blind[i]); + secp256k1_pedersen_ecmult(&commitj, &blind[i], v[i], &value_gen, &gens->blinding_gen[0]); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&commitp[i], &commitj); + + secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(commit, &commitp[i], &value_gen); + } + + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, proof, &plen, nbits, v, NULL, blind, commitp, n_commits, &value_gen, gens, nonce, NULL, 0) == 1); + CHECK(plen == expected_size); + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, nbits, NULL, &constptr, n_commits, &value_gen, gens, NULL, 0) == 1); + + secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); + free(commitp); + free(v); + free(blind); +} + +void run_bulletproofs_tests(void) { + size_t i; + + /* Make a ton of generators */ + secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens = secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_create(ctx, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, 32768); + test_bulletproof_api(); + + /* sanity checks */ + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_proof_length(0) == 32); /* encoding of 1 */ + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_proof_length(1) == 96); /* encoding a*b, a, b */ + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_proof_length(2) == 160); /* dot prod, a, b, L, R, parity of L, R */ + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_proof_length(4) == 225); /* dot prod, a, b, a, b, L, R, parity of L, R */ + CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_proof_length(8) == 289); /* dot prod, a, b, a, b, L, R, L, R, parity of L, R */ + + test_bulletproof_inner_product(0, gens); + test_bulletproof_inner_product(1, gens); + test_bulletproof_inner_product(2, gens); + test_bulletproof_inner_product(4, gens); + test_bulletproof_inner_product(8, gens); + for (i = 0; i < (size_t) count; i++) { + test_bulletproof_inner_product(32, gens); + test_bulletproof_inner_product(64, gens); + } + test_bulletproof_inner_product(1024, gens); + + test_bulletproof_rangeproof(1, 289, gens); + test_bulletproof_rangeproof(2, 353, gens); + test_bulletproof_rangeproof(16, 546, gens); + test_bulletproof_rangeproof(32, 610, gens); + test_bulletproof_rangeproof(64, 675, gens); + + test_bulletproof_rangeproof_aggregate(64, 1, 675, gens); + test_bulletproof_rangeproof_aggregate(8, 2, 546, gens); + test_bulletproof_rangeproof_aggregate(8, 4, 610, gens); + + secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_destroy(ctx, gens); +} +#undef MAX_WIDTH + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/util.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/util.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b1b4d11 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/util.h @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2018 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_BULLETPROOF_UTIL +#define SECP256K1_MODULE_BULLETPROOF_UTIL + +/* floor(log2(n)) which returns 0 for 0, since this is used to estimate proof sizes */ +SECP256K1_INLINE static size_t secp256k1_floor_lg(size_t n) { + switch (n) { + case 0: return 0; + case 1: return 0; + case 2: return 1; + case 3: return 1; + case 4: return 2; + case 5: return 2; + case 6: return 2; + case 7: return 2; + case 8: return 3; + default: { + size_t i = 0; + while (n > 1) { + n /= 2; + i++; + } + return i; + } + } +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_dot_product(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b, size_t n) { + secp256k1_scalar_clear(r); + while(n--) { + secp256k1_scalar term; + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&term, &a[n], &b[n]); + secp256k1_scalar_add(r, r, &term); + } +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_inverse_all_var(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, size_t len) { + secp256k1_scalar u; + size_t i; + if (len < 1) { + return; + } + + VERIFY_CHECK((r + len <= a) || (a + len <= r)); + + r[0] = a[0]; + + i = 0; + while (++i < len) { + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r[i], &r[i - 1], &a[i]); + } + + secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&u, &r[--i]); + + while (i > 0) { + size_t j = i--; + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r[j], &r[i], &u); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&u, &u, &a[j]); + } + + r[0] = u; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_bulletproof_serialize_points(unsigned char *out, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t n) { + const size_t bitveclen = (n + 7) / 8; + size_t i; + + memset(out, 0, bitveclen); + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + secp256k1_fe pointx; + pointx = pt[i].x; + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pointx); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(&out[bitveclen + i*32], &pointx); + if (!secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(&pt[i].y)) { + out[i/8] |= (1ull << (i % 8)); + } + } +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_bulletproof_deserialize_point(secp256k1_ge *pt, const unsigned char *data, size_t i, size_t n) { + const size_t bitveclen = (n + 7) / 8; + const size_t offset = bitveclen + i*32; + secp256k1_fe fe; + + secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&fe, &data[offset]); + secp256k1_ge_set_xquad(pt, &fe); + if (data[i / 8] & (1 << (i % 8))) { + secp256k1_ge_neg(pt, pt); + } +} + +static void secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(unsigned char *commit, const secp256k1_ge *lpt, const secp256k1_ge *rpt) { + secp256k1_fe pointx; + secp256k1_sha256 sha256; + unsigned char lrparity; + lrparity = (!secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(&lpt->y) << 1) + !secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(&rpt->y); + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &lrparity, 1); + pointx = lpt->x; + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pointx); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(commit, &pointx); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); + pointx = rpt->x; + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pointx); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(commit, &pointx); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/.main_impl.h.swp b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/.main_impl.h.swp new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..047e28ca33add74fd1d5e44756f7c56f18e52b85 GIT binary patch literal 16384 zcmeHOYm6L65gwbw1nh)_#}9;r+O~4pTkq}eogHI*K7(_2F(y9S@*^m+oMCRKXLruK zGn;wb-Z`-YfB1=z!b2h^h=3FULP+_OAVGLUf`9-)_!VA4fTbV^fARwz|9|!^hS3E|!0&D|jL!g{20Fk3Fb~v$8n6X0 zfKS|N7!Ly<1nva30e{?K7{3L64g3mt2v`E%3H)X|o&moEP6Bn{4&c={8^#}i?*d;3 zz6=C_4J-o|@bfnr#?!!KKm;5Dsz3$U1AOlm!?^ZF!*~JsD)1@bqd*fl2P^=00^5L> zw;9IwfiD3bZ~)i}yaL5M0ru{CUf-a`6^qU7WY*=k8Fhd@h%X?=^6KfT= z+;%-XJnvqpunB*a2Tt4XP0otGjvug+%jQ^pmbvT@^YF80&m?pZkB?vopbEOx#P!&H=BMO z`(nwWT4rUX!g_?U;kuil{kc zkcg{b}=vCVIJ%H&;sU7bbDvm@_NK`ydWxuW{w-655x(nW3S~l zTFeSCQotdO&3bOs0ykw7q!~zPi>?8_^D&Ie!tMed#ev80GknF&Mw?qfX#(q_j7IjO z&7jw+$rHLjQRUlLQi7EXh2}-{5CYp{S_(oB=+c9v2BE(%GDB;X!z}1~BkZ{B;Qf6e zAZ^noUnxxlM46Ssby#Vq9tT9G8=9`?xSkuWqr=K%vQ7KBrV{Z+CvIb}1}oqVP8GTA zxDm^balI~Xq)F0^(t#K`*+9t{T9Ukj5u61RFiX4T7Y_V+U`2jl(q~3Eh!iPR?@!7pIpiH9fr%QH@Ek}A=b>j@Rop*TWm z+IOonB-v~5rX|t+eEkBOVD+_o7bi(&2NDN2I*1Y7a_ZIEmlEch|1IrzEkqa_XkKrP zG0IJLNN$X@`M$KJ~x%p7qJr<3QQ*s{%4I(3_T>hSu2s|Hmwi8=c?PE*)P zeb$Ec@%*48O)aGfBLp)IMnPppiXroq2kj;yVH9%wfvMBMwjTq1yW+%{+PCr>?a?8H$9x891P z?!j8E*XvdNF84w|4jR1b2Tgol-oQORCnq1SZmQi@w_2t^d;t-2;4a4$>c*HyAR=2# zkcGYz^(Ycnec<^y1>l^L48PO0ymdNO7!!Qv{qB0;Hd_(wZIaE@r}s_apS#)7fH(bM zoh?~wJ>G6p+&AhfQz-v>Tn6R;&mrHu7r83s|H=FPmy!3s2)qD%1-J}^z#{NI;CA4z z$oYQ?dC%*a8^9 zH<15d1p;6Zco%Rpa2@&ov%oVz7dQh<0)Iyh;6>n@z|+7AKy`uVk@tTV_$2Tca1giy zxCXs`5qJ{#2=E|q3OE5Q0i^dupt$~*HL#m|w(AU!b+jv1xmA+h#+`vfpr0b@P|{|Q z6BuBUoW@DaYRZ`Pyk|y!gkr!H6DPA|F_Z&J1EmSH<7|@uqTDe`AW?$gNXg?4$TcBi z@6*DQd47+93u{>@Bf#&qEmR7U(<2{PSJ|0(ISLSD3tF&aPT+T#8&w&_*(C0;Q@dX~ zkRMuC5|5r?Dl!C5x)3!)r-Ap(v5*F(M|2G+8i|cf!2&8AD2$0QE3%k|bR7X}I5{hs zQMw@MY=&6EjqVZ!8W~@X8$m2Y!Z{s+76q(HOvG%f0rHjLuB@b5LnL>9Kuk~Q8k~(P zt)xpW=|)o~Dl-y7`W?kqh@4VVK$TPs*c_@XNhmdxMH(#$W6Ya%zPgzXG9U`7B6^)h zYcsPT|JRC4b8A`C94HfyRwOM*ynmlorpVsGAT@ZHW!50`OF_j)>`)n9)0$^XBCu(d zybTnor3c$&sakArDpiY#=%rNqL1pP=iiu~0CDuiHKq8IK3ls9g4F8)@ZFDh)P7V_i z;>aF(Bz1Gj7w59Z(fx93wCR3gL2}e%a#JDw2E}r0zI-i7dR=msBMV7lw^G$c6#?Zv zdTfyAs-jU+9xC_Mhx+nbN?A~LpwzB!kX#8qCCm8_U0|2SmAO}IJ5Z_6);v(0MNpsA za<#$r)5G+k51CODIUPRg$F?ik7b0YZx^Hr1W{N4QqzaA|Dz1wSD3)??2^%y7&U$S3I{d1f6(@8g{wO`Nu8iGGu}QEKvfQ-Tg-3p)DE z(T&+wVgX0If@&fIw3P?ci;Tsf#1JLj5yd*Z#dDo?6LDO7eN$UV^B!VANL|(D!Nf9_ zFYe?P++=?!Fw-A*cR?x6pWO;Hd^J#j}yhVms67E(QyfuL-I z7>Kq+gHVBsimrH#g^+Sxgll+3#n&1<3}vJ!ZMWao>$&vDi-QHK{&uX0GKv8XeZe-p zvXt9-%mz}dvG`)kNqYR72th`pH=Zz|+}nXP=EQ5pzHW4ux$H3BxMBgt>(^{t)z5S= KD$E9D)bC#suh+o< literal 0 HcmV?d00001 diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/Makefile.am.include b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/Makefile.am.include new file mode 100644 index 0000000..132d6fe --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/Makefile.am.include @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_commitment.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/commitment/main_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/commitment/pedersen_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/commitment/tests_impl.h diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/main_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/main_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ffaec06 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/main_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,186 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Gregory Maxwell * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_COMMITMENT_MAIN +#define SECP256K1_MODULE_COMMITMENT_MAIN + +#include "group.h" + +#include "modules/commitment/pedersen_impl.h" + +static void secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_load(secp256k1_ge* ge, const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* commit) { + secp256k1_fe fe; + secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&fe, &commit->data[1]); + secp256k1_ge_set_xquad(ge, &fe); + if (commit->data[0] & 1) { + secp256k1_ge_neg(ge, ge); + } +} + +static void secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_save(secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* commit, secp256k1_ge* ge) { + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&ge->x); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(&commit->data[1], &ge->x); + commit->data[0] = 9 ^ secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(&ge->y); +} + +int secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_parse(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* commit, const unsigned char *input) { + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(commit != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(input != NULL); + (void) ctx; + if ((input[0] & 0xFE) != 8) { + return 0; + } + memcpy(commit->data, input, sizeof(commit->data)); + return 1; +} + +int secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_serialize(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output, const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* commit) { + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(output != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(commit != NULL); + memcpy(output, commit->data, sizeof(commit->data)); + return 1; +} + +/* Generates a pedersen commitment: *commit = blind * G + value * G2. The blinding factor is 32 bytes.*/ +int secp256k1_pedersen_commit(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *commit, const unsigned char *blind, uint64_t value, const secp256k1_generator* value_gen, const secp256k1_generator* blind_gen) { + secp256k1_ge value_genp; + secp256k1_ge blind_genp; + secp256k1_gej rj; + secp256k1_ge r; + secp256k1_scalar sec; + int overflow; + int ret = 0; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(commit != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(blind != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(value_gen != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(blind_gen != NULL); + secp256k1_generator_load(&value_genp, value_gen); + secp256k1_generator_load(&blind_genp, blind_gen); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, blind, &overflow); + if (!overflow) { + secp256k1_pedersen_ecmult(&rj, &sec, value, &value_genp, &blind_genp); + if (!secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&rj)) { + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&r, &rj); + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_save(commit, &r); + ret = 1; + } + secp256k1_gej_clear(&rj); + secp256k1_ge_clear(&r); + } + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); + return ret; +} + +/** Takes a list of n pointers to 32 byte blinding values, the first negs of which are treated with positive sign and the rest + * negative, then calculates an additional blinding value that adds to zero. + */ +int secp256k1_pedersen_blind_sum(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *blind_out, const unsigned char * const *blinds, size_t n, size_t npositive) { + secp256k1_scalar acc; + secp256k1_scalar x; + size_t i; + int overflow; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(blind_out != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(blinds != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(npositive <= n); + (void) ctx; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&acc, 0); + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&x, blinds[i], &overflow); + if (overflow) { + return 0; + } + if (i >= npositive) { + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&x, &x); + } + secp256k1_scalar_add(&acc, &acc, &x); + } + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(blind_out, &acc); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&acc); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&x); + return 1; +} + +/* Takes two lists of commitments and sums the first set and subtracts the second and verifies that they sum to excess. */ +int secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment * const* pos, size_t n_pos, const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment * const* neg, size_t n_neg) { + secp256k1_gej accj; + secp256k1_ge add; + size_t i; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(!n_pos || (pos != NULL)); + ARG_CHECK(!n_neg || (neg != NULL)); + (void) ctx; + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&accj); + for (i = 0; i < n_pos; i++) { + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_load(&add, neg[i]); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&accj, &accj, &add, NULL); + } + secp256k1_gej_neg(&accj, &accj); + for (i = 0; i < n_neg; i++) { + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_load(&add, pos[i]); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&accj, &accj, &add, NULL); + } + return secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&accj); +} + +int secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const uint64_t *value, const unsigned char* const* generator_blind, unsigned char* const* blinding_factor, size_t n_total, size_t n_inputs) { + secp256k1_scalar sum; + secp256k1_scalar tmp; + size_t i; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(n_total == 0 || value != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(n_total == 0 || generator_blind != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(n_total == 0 || blinding_factor != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(n_total > n_inputs); + (void) ctx; + + if (n_total == 0) { + return 1; + } + + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sum, 0); + for (i = 0; i < n_total; i++) { + int overflow = 0; + secp256k1_scalar addend; + secp256k1_scalar_set_u64(&addend, value[i]); /* s = v */ + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&tmp, generator_blind[i], &overflow); + if (overflow == 1) { + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&tmp); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&addend); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sum); + return 0; + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&addend, &addend, &tmp); /* s = vr */ + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&tmp, blinding_factor[i], &overflow); + if (overflow == 1) { + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&tmp); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&addend); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sum); + return 0; + } + secp256k1_scalar_add(&addend, &addend, &tmp); /* s = vr + r' */ + secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&addend, i < n_inputs); /* s is negated if it's an input */ + secp256k1_scalar_add(&sum, &sum, &addend); /* sum += s */ + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&addend); + } + + /* Right now tmp has the last pedersen blinding factor. Subtract the sum from it. */ + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&sum, &sum); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&tmp, &tmp, &sum); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(blinding_factor[n_total - 1], &tmp); + + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&tmp); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sum); + return 1; +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/pedersen_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/pedersen_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a6d9dfb --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/pedersen_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +/*********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2015 Gregory Maxwell * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php. * + ***********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_COMMITMENT_PEDERSEN +#define SECP256K1_MODULE_COMMITMENT_PEDERSEN + +#include + +#include "ecmult_const.h" +#include "group.h" +#include "scalar.h" + +/* sec * G + value * G2. */ +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_pedersen_ecmult(secp256k1_gej *rj, const secp256k1_scalar *sec, uint64_t value, const secp256k1_ge* value_gen, const secp256k1_ge* blind_gen) { + secp256k1_scalar vs; + secp256k1_gej bj; + secp256k1_ge bp; + + secp256k1_scalar_set_u64(&vs, value); + secp256k1_ecmult_const(rj, value_gen, &vs, 64); + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&bj, blind_gen, sec, 256); + + /* zero blinding factor indicates that we are not trying to be zero-knowledge, + * so not being constant-time in this case is OK. */ + if (!secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&bj)) { + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&bp, &bj); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(rj, rj, &bp); + } + + secp256k1_gej_clear(&bj); + secp256k1_ge_clear(&bp); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&vs); +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/tests_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/tests_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fe4f925 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/tests_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,230 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2015 Gregory Maxwell * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_COMMITMENT_TESTS +#define SECP256K1_MODULE_COMMITMENT_TESTS + +#include + +#include "group.h" +#include "scalar.h" +#include "testrand.h" +#include "util.h" + +#include "include/secp256k1_commitment.h" + +static void test_commitment_api(void) { + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment commit; + const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *commit_ptr = &commit; + unsigned char blind[32]; + unsigned char blind_out[32]; + const unsigned char *blind_ptr = blind; + unsigned char *blind_out_ptr = blind_out; + uint64_t val = secp256k1_rand32(); + + secp256k1_context *none = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); + secp256k1_context *sign = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); + secp256k1_context *vrfy = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + secp256k1_context *both = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + int32_t ecount; + + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + + secp256k1_rand256(blind); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(none, &commit, blind, val, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(vrfy, &commit, blind, val, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(sign, &commit, blind, val, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g) != 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(sign, NULL, blind, val, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(sign, &commit, NULL, val, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(sign, &commit, blind, val, NULL, &secp256k1_generator_const_g) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(sign, &commit, blind, val, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 6); + + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_sum(none, blind_out, &blind_ptr, 1, 1) != 0); + CHECK(ecount == 6); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_sum(none, NULL, &blind_ptr, 1, 1) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 7); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_sum(none, blind_out, NULL, 1, 1) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 8); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_sum(none, blind_out, &blind_ptr, 0, 1) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 9); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_sum(none, blind_out, &blind_ptr, 0, 0) != 0); + CHECK(ecount == 9); + + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(sign, &commit, blind, val, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(none, &commit_ptr, 1, &commit_ptr, 1) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(none, NULL, 0, &commit_ptr, 1) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(none, &commit_ptr, 1, NULL, 0) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(none, NULL, 0, NULL, 0) != 0); + CHECK(ecount == 9); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(none, NULL, 1, &commit_ptr, 1) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 10); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(none, &commit_ptr, 1, NULL, 1) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 11); + + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum(none, &val, &blind_ptr, &blind_out_ptr, 1, 0) != 0); + CHECK(ecount == 11); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum(none, &val, &blind_ptr, &blind_out_ptr, 1, 1) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 12); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum(none, &val, &blind_ptr, &blind_out_ptr, 0, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 13); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum(none, NULL, &blind_ptr, &blind_out_ptr, 1, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 14); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum(none, &val, NULL, &blind_out_ptr, 1, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 15); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum(none, &val, &blind_ptr, NULL, 1, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 16); + + secp256k1_context_destroy(none); + secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); + secp256k1_context_destroy(vrfy); + secp256k1_context_destroy(both); +} + +static void test_pedersen(void) { + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment commits[19]; + const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *cptr[19]; + unsigned char blinds[32*19]; + const unsigned char *bptr[19]; + secp256k1_scalar s; + uint64_t values[19]; + int64_t totalv; + int i; + int inputs; + int outputs; + int total; + inputs = (secp256k1_rand32() & 7) + 1; + outputs = (secp256k1_rand32() & 7) + 2; + total = inputs + outputs; + for (i = 0; i < 19; i++) { + cptr[i] = &commits[i]; + bptr[i] = &blinds[i * 32]; + } + totalv = 0; + for (i = 0; i < inputs; i++) { + values[i] = secp256k1_rands64(0, INT64_MAX - totalv); + totalv += values[i]; + } + for (i = 0; i < outputs - 1; i++) { + values[i + inputs] = secp256k1_rands64(0, totalv); + totalv -= values[i + inputs]; + } + values[total - 1] = totalv; + + for (i = 0; i < total - 1; i++) { + random_scalar_order(&s); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&blinds[i * 32], &s); + } + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_sum(ctx, &blinds[(total - 1) * 32], bptr, total - 1, inputs)); + for (i = 0; i < total; i++) { + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(ctx, &commits[i], &blinds[i * 32], values[i], &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g)); + } + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(ctx, cptr, inputs, &cptr[inputs], outputs)); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(ctx, &cptr[inputs], outputs, cptr, inputs)); + if (inputs > 0 && values[0] > 0) { + CHECK(!secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(ctx, cptr, inputs - 1, &cptr[inputs], outputs)); + } + random_scalar_order(&s); + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&blinds[i * 32], &s); + } + values[0] = INT64_MAX; + values[1] = 0; + values[2] = 1; + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(ctx, &commits[i], &blinds[i * 32], values[i], &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g)); + } + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(ctx, &cptr[0], 1, &cptr[0], 1)); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(ctx, &cptr[1], 1, &cptr[1], 1)); +} + +#define MAX_N_GENS 30 +void test_multiple_generators(void) { + const size_t n_inputs = (secp256k1_rand32() % (MAX_N_GENS / 2)) + 1; + const size_t n_outputs = (secp256k1_rand32() % (MAX_N_GENS / 2)) + 1; + const size_t n_generators = n_inputs + n_outputs; + unsigned char *generator_blind[MAX_N_GENS]; + unsigned char *pedersen_blind[MAX_N_GENS]; + secp256k1_generator generator[MAX_N_GENS]; + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment commit[MAX_N_GENS]; + const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *commit_ptr[MAX_N_GENS]; + size_t i; + int64_t total_value; + uint64_t value[MAX_N_GENS]; + + secp256k1_scalar s; + + unsigned char generator_seed[32]; + random_scalar_order(&s); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(generator_seed, &s); + /* Create all the needed generators */ + for (i = 0; i < n_generators; i++) { + generator_blind[i] = (unsigned char*) malloc(32); + pedersen_blind[i] = (unsigned char*) malloc(32); + + random_scalar_order(&s); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(generator_blind[i], &s); + random_scalar_order(&s); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(pedersen_blind[i], &s); + + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(ctx, &generator[i], generator_seed, generator_blind[i])); + + commit_ptr[i] = &commit[i]; + } + + /* Compute all the values -- can be positive or negative */ + total_value = 0; + for (i = 0; i < n_outputs; i++) { + value[n_inputs + i] = secp256k1_rands64(0, INT64_MAX - total_value); + total_value += value[n_inputs + i]; + } + for (i = 0; i < n_inputs - 1; i++) { + value[i] = secp256k1_rands64(0, total_value); + total_value -= value[i]; + } + value[i] = total_value; + + /* Correct for blinding factors and do the commitments */ + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum(ctx, value, (const unsigned char * const *) generator_blind, pedersen_blind, n_generators, n_inputs)); + for (i = 0; i < n_generators; i++) { + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(ctx, &commit[i], pedersen_blind[i], value[i], &generator[i], &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + } + + /* Verify */ + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(ctx, &commit_ptr[0], n_inputs, &commit_ptr[n_inputs], n_outputs)); + + /* Cleanup */ + for (i = 0; i < n_generators; i++) { + free(generator_blind[i]); + free(pedersen_blind[i]); + } +} +#undef MAX_N_GENS + +void run_commitment_tests(void) { + int i; + test_commitment_api(); + for (i = 0; i < 10*count; i++) { + test_pedersen(); + } + test_multiple_generators(); +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/Makefile.am.include b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/Makefile.am.include new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e3088b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/Makefile.am.include @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_ecdh.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/ecdh/main_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/ecdh/tests_impl.h +if USE_BENCHMARK +noinst_PROGRAMS += bench_ecdh +bench_ecdh_SOURCES = src/bench_ecdh.c +bench_ecdh_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) +endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/main_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/main_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df3ec5c --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/main_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2015 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_ECDH_MAIN_H +#define SECP256K1_MODULE_ECDH_MAIN_H + +#include "include/secp256k1_ecdh.h" +#include "ecmult_const_impl.h" + +int secp256k1_ecdh(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *result, const secp256k1_pubkey *point, const unsigned char *scalar) { + int ret = 0; + int overflow = 0; + secp256k1_gej res; + secp256k1_ge pt; + secp256k1_scalar s; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(result != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(point != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(scalar != NULL); + + secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &pt, point); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s, scalar, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s)) { + ret = 0; + } else { + unsigned char x[32]; + unsigned char y[1]; + secp256k1_sha256 sha; + + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&res, &pt, &s, 256); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&pt, &res); + /* Compute a hash of the point in compressed form + * Note we cannot use secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize here since it does not + * expect its output to be secret and has a timing sidechannel. */ + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pt.x); + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pt.y); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(x, &pt.x); + y[0] = 0x02 | secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&pt.y); + + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, y, sizeof(y)); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, x, sizeof(x)); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, result); + ret = 1; + } + + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&s); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_MODULE_ECDH_MAIN_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/tests_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/tests_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0c53f8e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/tests_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2015 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_ECDH_TESTS_H +#define SECP256K1_MODULE_ECDH_TESTS_H + +void test_ecdh_api(void) { + /* Setup context that just counts errors */ + secp256k1_context *tctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); + secp256k1_pubkey point; + unsigned char res[32]; + unsigned char s_one[32] = { 0 }; + int32_t ecount = 0; + s_one[31] = 1; + + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(tctx, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(tctx, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(tctx, &point, s_one) == 1); + + /* Check all NULLs are detected */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(tctx, res, &point, s_one) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(tctx, NULL, &point, s_one) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(tctx, res, NULL, s_one) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(tctx, res, &point, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(tctx, res, &point, s_one) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + + /* Cleanup */ + secp256k1_context_destroy(tctx); +} + +void test_ecdh_generator_basepoint(void) { + unsigned char s_one[32] = { 0 }; + secp256k1_pubkey point[2]; + int i; + + s_one[31] = 1; + /* Check against pubkey creation when the basepoint is the generator */ + for (i = 0; i < 100; ++i) { + secp256k1_sha256 sha; + unsigned char s_b32[32]; + unsigned char output_ecdh[32]; + unsigned char output_ser[32]; + unsigned char point_ser[33]; + size_t point_ser_len = sizeof(point_ser); + secp256k1_scalar s; + + random_scalar_order(&s); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(s_b32, &s); + + /* compute using ECDH function */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &point[0], s_one) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, output_ecdh, &point[0], s_b32) == 1); + /* compute "explicitly" */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &point[1], s_b32) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, point_ser, &point_ser_len, &point[1], SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); + CHECK(point_ser_len == sizeof(point_ser)); + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, point_ser, point_ser_len); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, output_ser); + /* compare */ + CHECK(memcmp(output_ecdh, output_ser, sizeof(output_ser)) == 0); + } +} + +void test_bad_scalar(void) { + unsigned char s_zero[32] = { 0 }; + unsigned char s_overflow[32] = { + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, + 0xba, 0xae, 0xdc, 0xe6, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xa0, 0x3b, + 0xbf, 0xd2, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xd0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x41 + }; + unsigned char s_rand[32] = { 0 }; + unsigned char output[32]; + secp256k1_scalar rand; + secp256k1_pubkey point; + + /* Create random point */ + random_scalar_order(&rand); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(s_rand, &rand); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &point, s_rand) == 1); + + /* Try to multiply it by bad values */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, output, &point, s_zero) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, output, &point, s_overflow) == 0); + /* ...and a good one */ + s_overflow[31] -= 1; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, output, &point, s_overflow) == 1); +} + +void run_ecdh_tests(void) { + test_ecdh_api(); + test_ecdh_generator_basepoint(); + test_bad_scalar(); +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_MODULE_ECDH_TESTS_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/generator/.main_impl.h.swp b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/generator/.main_impl.h.swp new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..85d9619c0145c3a42f8b1f4a11c9611b9fef6125 GIT binary patch literal 16384 zcmeHN>#y8K6*n!EN1K2e5PSeMNuphyT%A|yVcN(g~?{bp?M`fhHL61DIl zw)ERw&zy7S%x})vGiS%r&aNCI?TV)0dY7Vn^V~D%7aw?9dFVZg!sy5hX&`EDdnIz^ zqb7Ixh_Z64-j?>}w4P1`s|SOz?*%4}s+>iWM7P8TxYKNOc z9#kV{4{MF)1-Rf$tn}6jDmH@O5AvSOE&a9zcv80p6I4;3`%X@r6q# zRWhkja)3-0#HU_eCq*)*imXlQ^;wO*Rzp2stEB>``;4pyuFnZ&elT!-acYCC!_=5U zaw=aUrccqY_=+1-ZDFf0Gd5Z9r6L-6M5;cLZ7TM2=G&wuq|53=_aQ!}g{gJva7GXU z2M8^~qcY*ev7ZW}09}T13&?b8EaatgspRQ^m>Yph3C^;R8lmon8@YiWm53b-h9k~o zg=qyFjJQ7WM}y@2N|qHT2nUa5I7k}TtK$p>HI#}z!6QA>Ba|lIr!I|CA2Ecg5Vzt^ z6bLy#c6lH72S{sm+Mehu7%#(Ybvk@D3Zsi5SIY~9Sh89qA2B1>CZ^X5LfDzQoJLKN z;1Y*}e0iXU)HFS@Cu>f+EDTwB$-~JVawr&G95FHW^)PPPW#k{}L1zJ`a%l(o$K zi6cEFLYvfECB(Vqh))Lpv`Gh#6K!J4-)&9&UWiLHIRgj^G^x~<#SQtXNdvXEG-FFM zP4P(^rKy$`YgwYaEL|s*B&YEU6AZZ0pc$_L#4;$7d zj-eJReKw(P5081ZP|}+Pyi1{-)WXJot={Tbtl4Zar$cSaGVMmg)S9(U!)EQ4W@#<0 z*0CI$S~Y63TAOwn9jDgT8kc$Drt4bUY&%qM zS@n9`Y_=PXy58y7^%m9Ij$`Q>ty}H=70T>@GIc+E-5)!+4A;7z=MM4ak}o@=o7K9xaZ&t@Mdqi+rQL4ovS@JjwvC3n!5fg8Mc)5euh_HYce>Z(G zFL}ehS;4z=KFS+1KpYuFZ5cQX8A`egQb&fZF2l3ap2n+|i8)8cG?hvD5K1AeMX+>E}z7ldR#Y-oj7>rXxBL0J>EUFbo#_8NOhgKoq_*TUMJV(~*+C}+yCmD3~&96mNfMiL$I{z?}3wwNcTzbTfdgh)Hf!Eh5x z(>}-Qx*!(AO|sHirD|}#NPQ8K;fJJ{)GMh z&w%d%-vyorTEP2&e~7(5@Oj{~z-NHJVBdcYcnSCl@CiTzuEXCy0KZRs|F!Txzj6k0 z266^+266^+266`OX$JN(ktUtXLC$g-(=Aw`LCZ#te>3VTWugBI^Q7@!ydo+NYOdVt`t{V^l=@1kmspwY2 zxB9mrG0qbQ;xs-SPww%H?884Q)BIpI)rfxwkaE1q^*C>3V8flHUE_k=3Xk!}3_6fX zCZTw1<8$)J^f>MW4+7-H<|$9yaeWv6#>oE-l4c+&xlHqvB-2gsE>o&oSe*{jQv~~9 hmSpS2-gm~2P`vYSh}>^xN=Xy5IE4W^kv8M|MQLK zoAG#FSt=f#nxVCPk>I+MkoTT><@o-sXUT2%62i@p`KBu^>t2c9*fbNi2u(gVFSTHNPhr(pOio^T5RH$1IUJy|NW z?WOKb;2VXGYldwe6q?-OJ`=7VF$TKb@!I)TCVzFS6u7<>*h$J-DS9>c3_U>axqI>Y zmP3_ZDWDWk3Md7X0!jg;fKosyaGfb2yshLM%6wx|?jyTl(e{8G@ZIf%yaBupbbtfEBv1f$1G|82z%M%q z`4+egdfUt%NKBf9xRSU0@pcc{?Fr0~dh{ zzzV>CAz%k^X&WJ*03QPea0vMQ7DB!U-T=-4CEz~b(pLBa9GC&7f$hLgHxu#^@FuVb z>;oPFe!Yp1Pl5A*0Xz-t1b)F{#LvK2!27_m%WZ)parPmD)AOT5BZ%v02~idE4fAI>K#%wSgJ zZ&=27rCO9>t!h;Gcy&pJty)nlBkzc(u8mhK6(+-_s#P!YT1|$FwF);Y8XF!ZvWS7e zArylet`i7)<*bO_o^M5ziRbcP9|#RIx*ix$NJ6zYb; 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+ +/** Alternate secp256k1 generator, used in Elements Alpha. + * Computed as the hash of the above G, DER-encoded with 0x04 (uncompressed pubkey) as its flag byte. + * import hashlib + * C = EllipticCurve ([F (0), F (7)]) + * G_bytes = '0479be667ef9dcbbac55a06295ce870b07029bfcdb2dce28d959f2815b16f81798483ada7726a3c4655da4fbfc0e1108a8fd17b448a68554199c47d08ffb10d4b8'.decode('hex') + * H = C.lift_x(int(hashlib.sha256(G_bytes).hexdigest(),16)) + */ +const secp256k1_generator secp256k1_generator_const_h = { + { 0x0b, + 0x50, 0x92, 0x9b, 0x74, 0xc1, 0xa0, 0x49, 0x54, + 0xb7, 0x8b, 0x4b, 0x60, 0x35, 0xe9, 0x7a, 0x5e, + 0x07, 0x8a, 0x5a, 0x0f, 0x28, 0xec, 0x96, 0xd5, + 0x47, 0xbf, 0xee, 0x9a, 0xce, 0x80, 0x3a, 0xc0 + } +}; + +static void secp256k1_generator_load(secp256k1_ge* ge, const secp256k1_generator* gen) { + secp256k1_fe fe; + secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&fe, &gen->data[1]); + secp256k1_ge_set_xquad(ge, &fe); + if (gen->data[0] & 1) { + secp256k1_ge_neg(ge, ge); + } +} + +static void secp256k1_generator_save(secp256k1_generator* commit, secp256k1_ge* ge) { + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&ge->x); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(&commit->data[1], &ge->x); + commit->data[0] = 11 ^ secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(&ge->y); +} + +int secp256k1_generator_parse(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_generator* gen, const unsigned char *input) { + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(gen != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(input != NULL); + if ((input[0] & 0xFE) != 10) { + return 0; + } + memcpy(gen->data, input, sizeof(gen->data)); + return 1; +} + +int secp256k1_generator_serialize(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output, const secp256k1_generator* gen) { + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(output != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(gen != NULL); + memcpy(output, gen->data, sizeof(gen->data)); + return 1; +} + +static void shallue_van_de_woestijne(secp256k1_ge* ge, const secp256k1_fe* t) { + /* Implements the algorithm from: + * Indifferentiable Hashing to Barreto-Naehrig Curves + * Pierre-Alain Fouque and Mehdi Tibouchi + * Latincrypt 2012 + */ + + /* Basic algorithm: + + c = sqrt(-3) + d = (c - 1)/2 + + w = c * t / (1 + b + t^2) [with b = 7] + x1 = d - t*w + x2 = -(x1 + 1) + x3 = 1 + 1/w^2 + + To avoid the 2 divisions, compute the above in numerator/denominator form: + wn = c * t + wd = 1 + 7 + t^2 + x1n = d*wd - t*wn + x1d = wd + x2n = -(x1n + wd) + x2d = wd + x3n = wd^2 + c^2 + t^2 + x3d = (c * t)^2 + + The joint denominator j = wd * c^2 * t^2, and + 1 / x1d = 1/j * c^2 * t^2 + 1 / x2d = x3d = 1/j * wd + */ + + static const secp256k1_fe c = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0x0a2d2ba9, 0x3507f1df, 0x233770c2, 0xa797962c, 0xc61f6d15, 0xda14ecd4, 0x7d8d27ae, 0x1cd5f852); + static const secp256k1_fe d = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0x851695d4, 0x9a83f8ef, 0x919bb861, 0x53cbcb16, 0x630fb68a, 0xed0a766a, 0x3ec693d6, 0x8e6afa40); + static const secp256k1_fe b = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7); + static const secp256k1_fe b_plus_one = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8); + + secp256k1_fe wn, wd, x1n, x2n, x3n, x3d, jinv, tmp, x1, x2, x3, alphain, betain, gammain, y1, y2, y3; + int alphaquad, betaquad; + + secp256k1_fe_mul(&wn, &c, t); /* mag 1 */ + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&wd, t); /* mag 1 */ + secp256k1_fe_add(&wd, &b_plus_one); /* mag 2 */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&tmp, t, &wn); /* mag 1 */ + secp256k1_fe_negate(&tmp, &tmp, 1); /* mag 2 */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x1n, &d, &wd); /* mag 1 */ + secp256k1_fe_add(&x1n, &tmp); /* mag 3 */ + x2n = x1n; /* mag 3 */ + secp256k1_fe_add(&x2n, &wd); /* mag 5 */ + secp256k1_fe_negate(&x2n, &x2n, 5); /* mag 6 */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3d, &c, t); /* mag 1 */ + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x3d, &x3d); /* mag 1 */ + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x3n, &wd); /* mag 1 */ + secp256k1_fe_add(&x3n, &x3d); /* mag 2 */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&jinv, &x3d, &wd); /* mag 1 */ + secp256k1_fe_inv(&jinv, &jinv); /* mag 1 */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x1, &x1n, &x3d); /* mag 1 */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x1, &x1, &jinv); /* mag 1 */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x2, &x2n, &x3d); /* mag 1 */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x2, &x2, &jinv); /* mag 1 */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, &x3n, &wd); /* mag 1 */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, &x3, &jinv); /* mag 1 */ + + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&alphain, &x1); /* mag 1 */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&alphain, &alphain, &x1); /* mag 1 */ + secp256k1_fe_add(&alphain, &b); /* mag 2 */ + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&betain, &x2); /* mag 1 */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&betain, &betain, &x2); /* mag 1 */ + secp256k1_fe_add(&betain, &b); /* mag 2 */ + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&gammain, &x3); /* mag 1 */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&gammain, &gammain, &x3); /* mag 1 */ + secp256k1_fe_add(&gammain, &b); /* mag 2 */ + + alphaquad = secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&y1, &alphain); + betaquad = secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&y2, &betain); + secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&y3, &gammain); + + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&x1, &x2, (!alphaquad) & betaquad); + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&y1, &y2, (!alphaquad) & betaquad); + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&x1, &x3, (!alphaquad) & !betaquad); + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&y1, &y3, (!alphaquad) & !betaquad); + + secp256k1_ge_set_xy(ge, &x1, &y1); + + /* The linked algorithm from the paper uses the Jacobi symbol of t to + * determine the Jacobi symbol of the produced y coordinate. Since the + * rest of the algorithm only uses t^2, we can safely use another criterion + * as long as negation of t results in negation of the y coordinate. Here + * we choose to use t's oddness, as it is faster to determine. */ + secp256k1_fe_negate(&tmp, &ge->y, 1); + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&ge->y, &tmp, secp256k1_fe_is_odd(t)); +} + +static int secp256k1_generator_generate_internal(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_generator* gen, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *blind32) { + static const unsigned char prefix1[17] = "1st generation: "; + static const unsigned char prefix2[17] = "2nd generation: "; + secp256k1_fe t = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4); + secp256k1_ge add; + secp256k1_gej accum; + int overflow; + secp256k1_sha256 sha256; + unsigned char b32[32]; + int ret = 1; + + if (blind32) { + secp256k1_scalar blind; + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&blind, blind32, &overflow); + ret = !overflow; + CHECK(ret); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &accum, &blind); + } + + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, prefix1, 16); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, key32, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, b32); + ret &= secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&t, b32); + CHECK(ret); + shallue_van_de_woestijne(&add, &t); + if (blind32) { + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&accum, &accum, &add); + } else { + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&accum, &add); + } + + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, prefix2, 16); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, key32, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, b32); + ret &= secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&t, b32); + CHECK(ret); + shallue_van_de_woestijne(&add, &t); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&accum, &accum, &add); + + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&add, &accum); + secp256k1_generator_save(gen, &add); + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_generator_generate(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_generator* gen, const unsigned char *key32) { + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(gen != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(key32 != NULL); + return secp256k1_generator_generate_internal(ctx, gen, key32, NULL); +} + +int secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_generator* gen, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *blind32) { + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(gen != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(key32 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(blind32 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); + return secp256k1_generator_generate_internal(ctx, gen, key32, blind32); +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/generator/tests_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/generator/tests_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8b1a5ac --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/generator/tests_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2016 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_GENERATOR_TESTS +#define SECP256K1_MODULE_GENERATOR_TESTS + +#include +#include + +#include "group.h" +#include "scalar.h" +#include "testrand.h" +#include "util.h" + +#include "include/secp256k1_generator.h" + +void test_generator_api(void) { + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char blind[32]; + unsigned char sergen[33]; + secp256k1_context *none = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); + secp256k1_context *sign = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); + secp256k1_context *vrfy = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + secp256k1_generator gen; + int32_t ecount = 0; + + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_rand256(key); + secp256k1_rand256(blind); + + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate(none, &gen, key) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate(none, NULL, key) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate(none, &gen, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(sign, &gen, key, blind) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(vrfy, &gen, key, blind) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(none, &gen, key, blind) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(vrfy, NULL, key, blind) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(vrfy, &gen, NULL, blind) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 6); + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(vrfy, &gen, key, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 7); + + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_serialize(none, sergen, &gen) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 7); + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_serialize(none, NULL, &gen) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 8); + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_serialize(none, sergen, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 9); + + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_serialize(none, sergen, &gen) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_parse(none, &gen, sergen) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 9); + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_parse(none, NULL, sergen) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 10); + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_parse(none, &gen, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 11); + + secp256k1_context_destroy(none); + secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); + secp256k1_context_destroy(vrfy); +} + +void test_shallue_van_de_woestijne(void) { + /* Matches with the output of the shallue_van_de_woestijne.sage SAGE program */ + static const secp256k1_ge_storage results[32] = { + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xedd1fd3e, 0x327ce90c, 0xc7a35426, 0x14289aee, 0x9682003e, 0x9cf7dcc9, 0xcf2ca974, 0x3be5aa0c, 0x0225f529, 0xee75acaf, 0xccfc4560, 0x26c5e46b, 0xf80237a3, 0x3924655a, 0x16f90e88, 0x085ed52a), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xedd1fd3e, 0x327ce90c, 0xc7a35426, 0x14289aee, 0x9682003e, 0x9cf7dcc9, 0xcf2ca974, 0x3be5aa0c, 0xfdda0ad6, 0x118a5350, 0x3303ba9f, 0xd93a1b94, 0x07fdc85c, 0xc6db9aa5, 0xe906f176, 0xf7a12705), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x2c5cdc9c, 0x338152fa, 0x85de92cb, 0x1bee9907, 0x765a922e, 0x4f037cce, 0x14ecdbf2, 0x2f78fe15, 0x56716069, 0x6818286b, 0x72f01a3e, 0x5e8caca7, 0x36249160, 0xc7ded69d, 0xd51913c3, 0x03a2fa97), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x2c5cdc9c, 0x338152fa, 0x85de92cb, 0x1bee9907, 0x765a922e, 0x4f037cce, 0x14ecdbf2, 0x2f78fe15, 0xa98e9f96, 0x97e7d794, 0x8d0fe5c1, 0xa1735358, 0xc9db6e9f, 0x38212962, 0x2ae6ec3b, 0xfc5d0198), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x531f7239, 0xaebc780e, 0x179fbf8d, 0x412a1b01, 0x511f0abc, 0xe0c46151, 0x8b38db84, 0xcc2467f3, 0x82387d45, 0xec7bd5cc, 0x61fcb9df, 0x41cddd7b, 0x217d8114, 0x3577dc8f, 0x23de356a, 0x7e97704e), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x531f7239, 0xaebc780e, 0x179fbf8d, 0x412a1b01, 0x511f0abc, 0xe0c46151, 0x8b38db84, 0xcc2467f3, 0x7dc782ba, 0x13842a33, 0x9e034620, 0xbe322284, 0xde827eeb, 0xca882370, 0xdc21ca94, 0x81688be1), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x2c5cdc9c, 0x338152fa, 0x85de92cb, 0x1bee9907, 0x765a922e, 0x4f037cce, 0x14ecdbf2, 0x2f78fe15, 0x56716069, 0x6818286b, 0x72f01a3e, 0x5e8caca7, 0x36249160, 0xc7ded69d, 0xd51913c3, 0x03a2fa97), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x2c5cdc9c, 0x338152fa, 0x85de92cb, 0x1bee9907, 0x765a922e, 0x4f037cce, 0x14ecdbf2, 0x2f78fe15, 0xa98e9f96, 0x97e7d794, 0x8d0fe5c1, 0xa1735358, 0xc9db6e9f, 0x38212962, 0x2ae6ec3b, 0xfc5d0198), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x5e5936b1, 0x81db0b65, 0x8e33a8c6, 0x1aa687dd, 0x31d11e15, 0x85e35664, 0x6b4c2071, 0xcde7e942, 0x88bb5332, 0xa8e05654, 0x78d4f60c, 0x0cd979ec, 0x938558f2, 0xcac11216, 0x7c387a56, 0xe3a6d5f3), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x5e5936b1, 0x81db0b65, 0x8e33a8c6, 0x1aa687dd, 0x31d11e15, 0x85e35664, 0x6b4c2071, 0xcde7e942, 0x7744accd, 0x571fa9ab, 0x872b09f3, 0xf3268613, 0x6c7aa70d, 0x353eede9, 0x83c785a8, 0x1c59263c), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x657d438f, 0xfac34a50, 0x463fd07c, 0x3f09f320, 0x4c98e8ed, 0x6927e330, 0xc0c7735f, 0x76d32f6d, 0x577c2b11, 0xcaca2f6f, 0xd60bcaf0, 0x3e7cebe9, 0x5da6e1f4, 0xbb557f12, 0x2a397331, 0x81df897f), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x657d438f, 0xfac34a50, 0x463fd07c, 0x3f09f320, 0x4c98e8ed, 0x6927e330, 0xc0c7735f, 0x76d32f6d, 0xa883d4ee, 0x3535d090, 0x29f4350f, 0xc1831416, 0xa2591e0b, 0x44aa80ed, 0xd5c68ccd, 0x7e2072b0), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xbe0bc11b, 0x2bc639cb, 0xc28f72a8, 0xd07c21cc, 0xbc06cfa7, 0x4c2ff25e, 0x630c9740, 0x23128eab, 0x6f062fc8, 0x75148197, 0xd10375c3, 0xcc3fadb6, 0x20277e9c, 0x00579c55, 0xeddd7f95, 0xe95604db), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xbe0bc11b, 0x2bc639cb, 0xc28f72a8, 0xd07c21cc, 0xbc06cfa7, 0x4c2ff25e, 0x630c9740, 0x23128eab, 0x90f9d037, 0x8aeb7e68, 0x2efc8a3c, 0x33c05249, 0xdfd88163, 0xffa863aa, 0x12228069, 0x16a9f754), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xedd1fd3e, 0x327ce90c, 0xc7a35426, 0x14289aee, 0x9682003e, 0x9cf7dcc9, 0xcf2ca974, 0x3be5aa0c, 0xfdda0ad6, 0x118a5350, 0x3303ba9f, 0xd93a1b94, 0x07fdc85c, 0xc6db9aa5, 0xe906f176, 0xf7a12705), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xedd1fd3e, 0x327ce90c, 0xc7a35426, 0x14289aee, 0x9682003e, 0x9cf7dcc9, 0xcf2ca974, 0x3be5aa0c, 0x0225f529, 0xee75acaf, 0xccfc4560, 0x26c5e46b, 0xf80237a3, 0x3924655a, 0x16f90e88, 0x085ed52a), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xaee172d4, 0xce7c5010, 0xdb20a88f, 0x469598c1, 0xd7f7926f, 0xabb85cb5, 0x339f1403, 0x87e6b494, 0x38065980, 0x4de81b35, 0x098c7190, 0xe3380f9d, 0x95b2ed6c, 0x6c869e85, 0xc772bc5a, 0x7bc3d9d5), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xaee172d4, 0xce7c5010, 0xdb20a88f, 0x469598c1, 0xd7f7926f, 0xabb85cb5, 0x339f1403, 0x87e6b494, 0xc7f9a67f, 0xb217e4ca, 0xf6738e6f, 0x1cc7f062, 0x6a4d1293, 0x9379617a, 0x388d43a4, 0x843c225a), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xc28f5c28, 0xf5c28f5c, 0x28f5c28f, 0x5c28f5c2, 0x8f5c28f5, 0xc28f5c28, 0xf5c28f5b, 0x6666635a, 0x0c4da840, 0x1b2cf5be, 0x4604e6ec, 0xf92b2780, 0x063a5351, 0xe294bf65, 0xbb2f8b61, 0x00902db7), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xc28f5c28, 0xf5c28f5c, 0x28f5c28f, 0x5c28f5c2, 0x8f5c28f5, 0xc28f5c28, 0xf5c28f5b, 0x6666635a, 0xf3b257bf, 0xe4d30a41, 0xb9fb1913, 0x06d4d87f, 0xf9c5acae, 0x1d6b409a, 0x44d0749d, 0xff6fce78), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xecf56be6, 0x9c8fde26, 0x152832c6, 0xe043b3d5, 0xaf9a723f, 0x789854a0, 0xcb1b810d, 0xe2614ece, 0x66127ae4, 0xe4c17a75, 0x60a727e6, 0xffd2ea7f, 0xaed99088, 0xbec465c6, 0xbde56791, 0x37ed5572), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xecf56be6, 0x9c8fde26, 0x152832c6, 0xe043b3d5, 0xaf9a723f, 0x789854a0, 0xcb1b810d, 0xe2614ece, 0x99ed851b, 0x1b3e858a, 0x9f58d819, 0x002d1580, 0x51266f77, 0x413b9a39, 0x421a986d, 0xc812a6bd), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xba72860f, 0x10fcd142, 0x23f71e3c, 0x228deb9a, 0xc46c5ff5, 0x90b884e5, 0xcc60d51e, 0x0629d16e, 0x67999f31, 0x5a74ada3, 0x526832cf, 0x76b9fec3, 0xa348cc97, 0x33c3aa67, 0x02bd2516, 0x7814f635), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xba72860f, 0x10fcd142, 0x23f71e3c, 0x228deb9a, 0xc46c5ff5, 0x90b884e5, 0xcc60d51e, 0x0629d16e, 0x986660ce, 0xa58b525c, 0xad97cd30, 0x8946013c, 0x5cb73368, 0xcc3c5598, 0xfd42dae8, 0x87eb05fa), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x92ef5657, 0xdba51cc7, 0xf3e1b442, 0xa6a0916b, 0x8ce03079, 0x2ef5657d, 0xba51cc7e, 0xab2beb65, 0x782c65d2, 0x3f1e0eb2, 0x9179a994, 0xe5e8ff80, 0x5a0d50d9, 0xdeeaed90, 0xcec96ca5, 0x973e2ad3), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x92ef5657, 0xdba51cc7, 0xf3e1b442, 0xa6a0916b, 0x8ce03079, 0x2ef5657d, 0xba51cc7e, 0xab2beb65, 0x87d39a2d, 0xc0e1f14d, 0x6e86566b, 0x1a17007f, 0xa5f2af26, 0x2115126f, 0x31369359, 0x68c1d15c), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x9468ad22, 0xf921fc78, 0x8de3f1b0, 0x586c58eb, 0x5e6f0270, 0xe950b602, 0x7ada90d9, 0xd71ae323, 0x922a0c6a, 0x9ccc31d9, 0xc3bf87fd, 0x88381739, 0x35fe393f, 0xa64dfdec, 0x29f2846d, 0x12918d86), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x9468ad22, 0xf921fc78, 0x8de3f1b0, 0x586c58eb, 0x5e6f0270, 0xe950b602, 0x7ada90d9, 0xd71ae323, 0x6dd5f395, 0x6333ce26, 0x3c407802, 0x77c7e8c6, 0xca01c6c0, 0x59b20213, 0xd60d7b91, 0xed6e6ea9), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x76ddc7f5, 0xe029e59e, 0x22b0e54f, 0xa811db94, 0x5a209c4f, 0x5e912ca2, 0x8b4da6a7, 0x4c1e00a2, 0x1e8f516c, 0x91c20437, 0x50f6e24e, 0x8c2cf202, 0xacf68291, 0xbf8b66eb, 0xf7335b62, 0xec2c88fe), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x76ddc7f5, 0xe029e59e, 0x22b0e54f, 0xa811db94, 0x5a209c4f, 0x5e912ca2, 0x8b4da6a7, 0x4c1e00a2, 0xe170ae93, 0x6e3dfbc8, 0xaf091db1, 0x73d30dfd, 0x53097d6e, 0x40749914, 0x08cca49c, 0x13d37331), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xf75763bc, 0x2907e79b, 0x125e33c3, 0x9a027f48, 0x0f8c6409, 0x2153432f, 0x967bc2b1, 0x1d1f5cf0, 0xb4a8edc6, 0x36391b39, 0x9bc219c0, 0x3d033128, 0xdbcd463e, 0xd2506394, 0x061b87a5, 0x9e510235), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xf75763bc, 0x2907e79b, 0x125e33c3, 0x9a027f48, 0x0f8c6409, 0x2153432f, 0x967bc2b1, 0x1d1f5cf0, 0x4b571239, 0xc9c6e4c6, 0x643de63f, 0xc2fcced7, 0x2432b9c1, 0x2daf9c6b, 0xf9e47859, 0x61aef9fa), + }; + + secp256k1_ge ge; + secp256k1_fe fe; + secp256k1_ge_storage ges; + int i, s; + for (i = 1; i <= 16; i++) { + secp256k1_fe_set_int(&fe, i); + + for (s = 0; s < 2; s++) { + if (s) { + secp256k1_fe_negate(&fe, &fe, 1); + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&fe); + } + shallue_van_de_woestijne(&ge, &fe); + secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&ges, &ge); + + CHECK(memcmp(&ges, &results[i * 2 + s - 2], sizeof(secp256k1_ge_storage)) == 0); + } + } +} + +void test_generator_generate(void) { + static const secp256k1_ge_storage results[32] = { + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x806cd8ed, 0xd6c153e3, 0x4aa9b9a0, 0x8755c4be, 0x4718b1ef, 0xb26cb93f, 0xfdd99e1b, 0x21f2af8e, 0xc7062208, 0xcc649a03, 0x1bdc1a33, 0x9d01f115, 0x4bcd0dca, 0xfe0b875d, 0x62f35f73, 0x28673006), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xd91b15ec, 0x47a811f4, 0xaa189561, 0xd13f5c4d, 0x4e81f10d, 0xc7dc551f, 0x4fea9b84, 0x610314c4, 0x9b0ada1e, 0xb38efd67, 0x8bff0b6c, 0x7d7315f7, 0xb49b8cc5, 0xa679fad4, 0xc94f9dc6, 0x9da66382), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x11c00de6, 0xf885035e, 0x76051430, 0xa3c38b2a, 0x5f86ab8c, 0xf66dae58, 0x04ea7307, 0x348b19bf, 0xe0858ae7, 0x61dcb1ba, 0xff247e37, 0xd38fcd88, 0xf3bd7911, 0xaa4ed6e0, 0x28d792dd, 0x3ee1ac09), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x986b99eb, 0x3130e7f0, 0xe779f674, 0xb85cb514, 0x46a676bf, 0xb1dfb603, 0x4c4bb639, 0x7c406210, 0xdf900609, 0x8b3ef1e0, 0x30e32fb0, 0xd97a4329, 0xff98aed0, 0xcd278c3f, 0xe6078467, 0xfbd12f35), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xae528146, 0x03fdf91e, 0xc592977e, 0x12461dc7, 0xb9e038f8, 0x048dcb62, 0xea264756, 0xd459ae42, 0x80ef658d, 0x92becb84, 0xdba8e4f9, 0x560d7a72, 0xbaf4c393, 0xfbcf6007, 0x11039f1c, 0x224faaad), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x00df3d91, 0x35975eee, 0x91fab903, 0xe3128e4a, 0xca071dde, 0x270814e5, 0xcbda69ec, 0xcad58f46, 0x11b590aa, 0x92d89969, 0x2dbd932f, 0x08013b8b, 0x45afabc6, 0x43677db2, 0x143e0c0f, 0x5865fb03), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x1168155b, 0x987e9bc8, 0x84c5f3f4, 0x92ebf784, 0xcc8c6735, 0x39d8e5e8, 0xa967115a, 0x2949da9b, 0x0858a470, 0xf403ca97, 0xb1827f6f, 0x544c2c67, 0x08f6cb83, 0xc510c317, 0x96c981ed, 0xb9f61780), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xe8d7c0cf, 0x2bb4194c, 0x97bf2a36, 0xbd115ba0, 0x81a9afe8, 0x7663fa3c, 0x9c3cd253, 0x79fe2571, 0x2028ad04, 0xefa00119, 0x5a25d598, 0x67e79502, 0x49de7c61, 0x4751cd9d, 0x4fb317f6, 0xf76f1110), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x9532c491, 0xa64851dd, 0xcd0d3e5a, 0x93e17267, 0xa10aca95, 0xa23781aa, 0x5087f340, 0xc45fecc3, 0xb691ddc2, 0x3143a7b6, 0x09969302, 0x258affb8, 0x5bbf8666, 0xe1192319, 0xeb174d88, 0x308bd57a), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x6b20b6e2, 0x1ba6cc44, 0x3f2c3a0c, 0x5283ba44, 0xbee43a0a, 0x2799a6cf, 0xbecc0f8a, 0xf8c583ac, 0xf7021e76, 0xd51291a6, 0xf9396215, 0x686f25aa, 0xbec36282, 0x5e11eeea, 0x6e51a6e6, 0xd7d7c006), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xde27e6ff, 0x219b3ab1, 0x2b0a9e4e, 0x51fc6092, 0x96e55af6, 0xc6f717d6, 0x12cd6cce, 0x65d6c8f2, 0x48166884, 0x4dc13fd2, 0xed7a7d81, 0x66a0839a, 0x8a960863, 0xfe0001c1, 0x35d206fd, 0x63b87c09), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x79a96fb8, 0xd88a08d3, 0x055d38d1, 0x3346b0d4, 0x47d838ca, 0xfcc8fa40, 0x6d3a7157, 0xef84e7e3, 0x6bab9c45, 0x2871b51d, 0xb0df2369, 0xe7860e01, 0x2e37ffea, 0x6689fd1a, 0x9c6fe9cf, 0xb940acea), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x06c4d4cb, 0xd32c0ddb, 0x67e988c6, 0x2bdbe6ad, 0xa39b80cc, 0x61afb347, 0x234abe27, 0xa689618c, 0x5b355949, 0xf904fe08, 0x569b2313, 0xe8f19f8d, 0xc5b79e27, 0x70da0832, 0x5fb7a229, 0x238ca6b6), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x7027e566, 0x3e727c28, 0x42aa14e5, 0x52c2d2ec, 0x1d8beaa9, 0x8a22ceab, 0x15ccafc3, 0xb4f06249, 0x9b3dffbc, 0xdbd5e045, 0x6931fd03, 0x8b1c6a9b, 0x4c168c6d, 0xa6553897, 0xfe11ce49, 0xac728139), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xee3520c3, 0x9f2b954d, 0xf8e15547, 0xdaeb6cc8, 0x04c8f3b0, 0x9301f53e, 0xe0c11ea1, 0xeace539d, 0x244ff873, 0x7e060c98, 0xe843c353, 0xcd35d2e4, 0x3cd8b082, 0xcffbc9ae, 0x81eafa70, 0x332f9748), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xdaecd756, 0xf5b706a4, 0xc14e1095, 0x3e2f70df, 0xa81276e7, 0x71806b89, 0x4d8a5502, 0xa0ef4998, 0xbac906c0, 0x948b1d48, 0xe023f439, 0xfd3770b8, 0x837f60cc, 0x40552a51, 0x433d0b79, 0x6610da27), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x55e1ca28, 0x750fe2d0, 0x57f7449b, 0x3f49d999, 0x3b9616dd, 0x5387bc2e, 0x6e6698f8, 0xc4ea49f4, 0xe339e0e9, 0xa4c7fa99, 0xd063e062, 0x6582bce2, 0x33c6b1ee, 0x17a5b47f, 0x6d43ecf8, 0x98b40120), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xdd82cac2, 0x9e0e0135, 0x4964d3bc, 0x27469233, 0xf13bbd5e, 0xd7aff24b, 0x4902fca8, 0x17294b12, 0x561ab1d6, 0xcd9bcb6e, 0x805585cf, 0x3df8714c, 0x1bfa6304, 0x5efbf122, 0x1a3d8fd9, 0x3827764a), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xda5cbfb7, 0x3522e9c7, 0xcb594436, 0x83677038, 0x0eaa64a9, 0x2eca3888, 0x0fe4c9d6, 0xdeb22dbf, 0x4f46de68, 0x0447c780, 0xc54a314b, 0x5389a926, 0xbba8910b, 0x869fc6cd, 0x42ee82e8, 0x5895e42a), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x4e09830e, 0xc8894c58, 0x4e6278de, 0x167a96b0, 0x20d60463, 0xee48f788, 0x4974d66e, 0x871e35e9, 0x21259c4d, 0x332ca932, 0x2e187df9, 0xe7afbc23, 0x9d171ebc, 0x7d9e2560, 0x503f50b1, 0x9fe45834), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xabfff6ca, 0x41dcfd17, 0x03cae629, 0x9d127971, 0xf19ee000, 0x2db332e6, 0x5cc209a3, 0xc21b8f54, 0x65991d60, 0xee54f5cc, 0xddf7a732, 0xa76b0303, 0xb9f519a6, 0x22ea0390, 0x8af23ffa, 0x35ae6632), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xc6c9b92c, 0x91e045a5, 0xa1913277, 0x44d6fce2, 0x11b12c7c, 0x9b3112d6, 0xc61e14a6, 0xd6b1ae12, 0x04ab0396, 0xebdc4c6a, 0xc213cc3e, 0x077a2e80, 0xb4ba7b2b, 0x33907d56, 0x2c98ccf7, 0xb82a2e9f), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x66f6e6d9, 0xc4bb9a5f, 0x99085781, 0x83cb9362, 0x2ea437d8, 0xccd31969, 0xffadca3a, 0xff1d3935, 0x50a5b06e, 0x39e039d7, 0x1dfb2723, 0x18db74e5, 0x5af64da1, 0xdfc34586, 0x6aac3bd0, 0x5792a890), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x58ded03c, 0x98e1a890, 0x63fc7793, 0xe3ecd896, 0x235e75c9, 0x82e7008f, 0xddbf3ca8, 0x5b7e9ecb, 0x34594776, 0x58ab6821, 0xaf43a453, 0xa946fda9, 0x13d24999, 0xccf22df8, 0xd291ef59, 0xb08975c0), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x74557864, 0x4f2b0486, 0xd5beea7c, 0x2d258ccb, 0x78a870e1, 0x848982d8, 0xed3f91a4, 0x9db83a36, 0xd84e940e, 0x1d33c28a, 0x62398ec8, 0xc493aee7, 0x7c2ba722, 0x42dee7ae, 0x3c35c256, 0xad00cf42), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x7fc7963a, 0x16abc8fb, 0x5d61eb61, 0x0fc50a68, 0x754470d2, 0xf43df3be, 0x52228f66, 0x522fe61b, 0x499f9e7f, 0x462c6545, 0x29687af4, 0x9f7c732d, 0x48801ce5, 0x21acd546, 0xc6fb903c, 0x7c265032), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xb2f6257c, 0xc58df82f, 0xb9ba4f36, 0x7ededf03, 0xf8ea10f3, 0x104d7ae6, 0x233b7ac4, 0x725e11de, 0x9c7a32df, 0x4842f33d, 0xaad84f0b, 0x62e88b40, 0x46ddcbde, 0xbbeec6f8, 0x93bfde27, 0x0561dc73), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xe2cdfd27, 0x8a8e22be, 0xabf08b79, 0x1bc6ae38, 0x41d22a9a, 0x9472e266, 0x1a7c6e83, 0xa2f74725, 0x0e26c103, 0xe0dd93b2, 0x3724f3b7, 0x8bb7366e, 0x2c245768, 0xd64f3283, 0xd8316e8a, 0x1383b977), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x757c13e7, 0xe866017e, 0xe6af61d7, 0x161d208a, 0xc438f712, 0x242fcd23, 0x63a10e59, 0xd67e41fb, 0xb550c6a9, 0x4ddb15f3, 0xfeea4bfe, 0xd2faa19f, 0x2aa2fbd3, 0x0c6ae785, 0xe357f365, 0xb30d12e0), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x528d525e, 0xac30095b, 0x5e5f83ca, 0x4d3dea63, 0xeb608f2d, 0x18dd25a7, 0x2529c8e5, 0x1ae5f9f1, 0xfde2860b, 0x492a4106, 0x9f356c05, 0x3ebc045e, 0x4ad08b79, 0x3e264935, 0xf25785a9, 0x8690b5ee), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x150df593, 0x5b6956a0, 0x0cfed843, 0xb9d6ffce, 0x4f790022, 0xea18730f, 0xc495111d, 0x91568e55, 0x6700a2ca, 0x9ff4ed32, 0xc1697312, 0x4eb51ce3, 0x5656344b, 0x65a1e3d5, 0xd6c1f7ce, 0x29233f82), + SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x38e02eaf, 0x2c8774fd, 0x58b8b373, 0x732457f1, 0x16dbe53b, 0xea5683d9, 0xada20dd7, 0x14ce20a6, 0x6ac5362e, 0xbb425416, 0x8250f43f, 0xa4ee2b63, 0x0406324f, 0x1c876d60, 0xebe5be2c, 0x6eb1515b), + }; + secp256k1_generator gen; + secp256k1_ge ge; + secp256k1_ge_storage ges; + int i; + unsigned char v[32]; + static const unsigned char s[32] = {0}; + secp256k1_scalar sc; + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sc, s, NULL); + for (i = 1; i <= 32; i++) { + memset(v, 0, 31); + v[31] = i; + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(ctx, &gen, v, s)); + secp256k1_generator_load(&ge, &gen); + secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&ges, &ge); + CHECK(memcmp(&ges, &results[i - 1], sizeof(secp256k1_ge_storage)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate(ctx, &gen, v)); + secp256k1_generator_load(&ge, &gen); + secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&ges, &ge); + CHECK(memcmp(&ges, &results[i - 1], sizeof(secp256k1_ge_storage)) == 0); + } +} + +void run_generator_tests(void) { + test_shallue_van_de_woestijne(); + test_generator_api(); + test_generator_generate(); +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/.borromean.h.swp b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/.borromean.h.swp new file mode 100644 index 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b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/Makefile.am.include @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/rangeproof/main_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/rangeproof/borromean.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/rangeproof/borromean_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/rangeproof/rangeproof.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/rangeproof/rangeproof_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/rangeproof/tests_impl.h +if USE_BENCHMARK +noinst_PROGRAMS += bench_rangeproof +bench_rangeproof_SOURCES = src/bench_rangeproof.c +bench_rangeproof_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) +bench_rangeproof_LDFLAGS = -static +endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/borromean.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/borromean.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8f8cfed --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/borromean.h @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2014, 2015 Gregory Maxwell * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + + +#ifndef _SECP256K1_BORROMEAN_H_ +#define _SECP256K1_BORROMEAN_H_ + +#include "scalar.h" +#include "field.h" +#include "group.h" +#include "ecmult.h" +#include "ecmult_gen.h" + +int secp256k1_borromean_verify(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ecmult_ctx, secp256k1_scalar *evalues, const unsigned char *e0, const secp256k1_scalar *s, + const secp256k1_gej *pubs, const size_t *rsizes, size_t nrings, const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen); + +int secp256k1_borromean_sign(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ecmult_ctx, const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ecmult_gen_ctx, + unsigned char *e0, secp256k1_scalar *s, const secp256k1_gej *pubs, const secp256k1_scalar *k, const secp256k1_scalar *sec, + const size_t *rsizes, const size_t *secidx, size_t nrings, const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen); + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/borromean_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/borromean_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3a82f09 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/borromean_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2014, 2015 Gregory Maxwell * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + + +#ifndef _SECP256K1_BORROMEAN_IMPL_H_ +#define _SECP256K1_BORROMEAN_IMPL_H_ + +#include "scalar.h" +#include "field.h" +#include "group.h" +#include "hash.h" +#include "eckey.h" +#include "ecmult.h" +#include "ecmult_gen.h" +#include "borromean.h" + +#include +#include + +#ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN +#define BE32(x) (x) +#else +#define BE32(p) ((((p) & 0xFF) << 24) | (((p) & 0xFF00) << 8) | (((p) & 0xFF0000) >> 8) | (((p) & 0xFF000000) >> 24)) +#endif + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_borromean_hash(unsigned char *hash, const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen, const unsigned char *e, size_t elen, + size_t ridx, size_t eidx) { + uint32_t ring; + uint32_t epos; + secp256k1_sha256 sha256_en; + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256_en); + ring = BE32((uint32_t)ridx); + epos = BE32((uint32_t)eidx); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_en, e, elen); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_en, m, mlen); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_en, (unsigned char*)&ring, 4); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_en, (unsigned char*)&epos, 4); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256_en, hash); +} + +/** "Borromean" ring signature. + * Verifies nrings concurrent ring signatures all sharing a challenge value. + * Signature is one s value per pubkey and a hash. + * Verification equation: + * | m = H(P_{0..}||message) (Message must contain pubkeys or a pubkey commitment) + * | For each ring i: + * | | en = to_scalar(H(e0||m||i||0)) + * | | For each pubkey j: + * | | | r = s_i_j G + en * P_i_j + * | | | e = H(r||m||i||j) + * | | | en = to_scalar(e) + * | | r_i = r + * | return e_0 ==== H(r_{0..i}||m) + */ +int secp256k1_borromean_verify(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ecmult_ctx, secp256k1_scalar *evalues, const unsigned char *e0, + const secp256k1_scalar *s, const secp256k1_gej *pubs, const size_t *rsizes, size_t nrings, const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) { + secp256k1_gej rgej; + secp256k1_ge rge; + secp256k1_scalar ens; + secp256k1_sha256 sha256_e0; + unsigned char tmp[33]; + size_t i; + size_t j; + size_t count; + size_t size; + int overflow; + VERIFY_CHECK(ecmult_ctx != NULL); + VERIFY_CHECK(e0 != NULL); + VERIFY_CHECK(s != NULL); + VERIFY_CHECK(pubs != NULL); + VERIFY_CHECK(rsizes != NULL); + VERIFY_CHECK(nrings > 0); + VERIFY_CHECK(m != NULL); + count = 0; + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256_e0); + for (i = 0; i < nrings; i++) { + VERIFY_CHECK(INT_MAX - count > rsizes[i]); + secp256k1_borromean_hash(tmp, m, mlen, e0, 32, i, 0); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ens, tmp, &overflow); + for (j = 0; j < rsizes[i]; j++) { + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s[count]) || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ens) || secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&pubs[count])) { + return 0; + } + if (evalues) { + /*If requested, save the challenges for proof rewind.*/ + evalues[count] = ens; + } + secp256k1_ecmult(ecmult_ctx, &rgej, &pubs[count], &ens, &s[count]); + if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&rgej)) { + return 0; + } + /* OPT: loop can be hoisted and split to use batch inversion across all the rings; this would make it much faster. */ + secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&rge, &rgej); + secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&rge, tmp, &size, 1); + if (j != rsizes[i] - 1) { + secp256k1_borromean_hash(tmp, m, mlen, tmp, 33, i, j + 1); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ens, tmp, &overflow); + } else { + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_e0, tmp, size); + } + count++; + } + } + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_e0, m, mlen); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256_e0, tmp); + return memcmp(e0, tmp, 32) == 0; +} + +int secp256k1_borromean_sign(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ecmult_ctx, const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ecmult_gen_ctx, + unsigned char *e0, secp256k1_scalar *s, const secp256k1_gej *pubs, const secp256k1_scalar *k, const secp256k1_scalar *sec, + const size_t *rsizes, const size_t *secidx, size_t nrings, const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) { + secp256k1_gej rgej; + secp256k1_ge rge; + secp256k1_scalar ens; + secp256k1_sha256 sha256_e0; + unsigned char tmp[33]; + size_t i; + size_t j; + size_t count; + size_t size; + int overflow; + VERIFY_CHECK(ecmult_ctx != NULL); + VERIFY_CHECK(ecmult_gen_ctx != NULL); + VERIFY_CHECK(e0 != NULL); + VERIFY_CHECK(s != NULL); + VERIFY_CHECK(pubs != NULL); + VERIFY_CHECK(k != NULL); + VERIFY_CHECK(sec != NULL); + VERIFY_CHECK(rsizes != NULL); + VERIFY_CHECK(secidx != NULL); + VERIFY_CHECK(nrings > 0); + VERIFY_CHECK(m != NULL); + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256_e0); + count = 0; + for (i = 0; i < nrings; i++) { + VERIFY_CHECK(INT_MAX - count > rsizes[i]); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(ecmult_gen_ctx, &rgej, &k[i]); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&rge, &rgej); + if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&rgej)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&rge, tmp, &size, 1); + for (j = secidx[i] + 1; j < rsizes[i]; j++) { + secp256k1_borromean_hash(tmp, m, mlen, tmp, 33, i, j); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ens, tmp, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ens)) { + return 0; + } + /** The signing algorithm as a whole is not memory uniform so there is likely a cache sidechannel that + * leaks which members are non-forgeries. That the forgeries themselves are variable time may leave + * an additional privacy impacting timing side-channel, but not a key loss one. + */ + secp256k1_ecmult(ecmult_ctx, &rgej, &pubs[count + j], &ens, &s[count + j]); + if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&rgej)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&rge, &rgej); + secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&rge, tmp, &size, 1); + } + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_e0, tmp, size); + count += rsizes[i]; + } + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_e0, m, mlen); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256_e0, e0); + count = 0; + for (i = 0; i < nrings; i++) { + VERIFY_CHECK(INT_MAX - count > rsizes[i]); + secp256k1_borromean_hash(tmp, m, mlen, e0, 32, i, 0); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ens, tmp, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ens)) { + return 0; + } + for (j = 0; j < secidx[i]; j++) { + secp256k1_ecmult(ecmult_ctx, &rgej, &pubs[count + j], &ens, &s[count + j]); + if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&rgej)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&rge, &rgej); + secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&rge, tmp, &size, 1); + secp256k1_borromean_hash(tmp, m, mlen, tmp, 33, i, j + 1); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ens, tmp, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ens)) { + return 0; + } + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&s[count + j], &ens, &sec[i]); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s[count + j], &s[count + j]); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&s[count + j], &s[count + j], &k[i]); + if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s[count + j])) { + return 0; + } + count += rsizes[i]; + } + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&ens); + secp256k1_ge_clear(&rge); + secp256k1_gej_clear(&rgej); + memset(tmp, 0, 33); + return 1; +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/main_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/main_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9eebe38 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/main_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Gregory Maxwell * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_RANGEPROOF_MAIN +#define SECP256K1_MODULE_RANGEPROOF_MAIN + +#include "group.h" + +#include "modules/commitment/main_impl.h" + +#include "modules/rangeproof/borromean_impl.h" +#include "modules/rangeproof/rangeproof_impl.h" + +int secp256k1_rangeproof_info(const secp256k1_context* ctx, int *exp, int *mantissa, + uint64_t *min_value, uint64_t *max_value, const unsigned char *proof, size_t plen) { + size_t offset; + uint64_t scale; + ARG_CHECK(exp != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(mantissa != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(min_value != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(max_value != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); + offset = 0; + scale = 1; + (void)ctx; + return secp256k1_rangeproof_getheader_impl(&offset, exp, mantissa, &scale, min_value, max_value, proof, plen); +} + +int secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *blind_out, uint64_t *value_out, unsigned char *message_out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *nonce, + uint64_t *min_value, uint64_t *max_value, + const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *commit, const unsigned char *proof, size_t plen, const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len, const secp256k1_generator* gen) { + secp256k1_ge commitp; + secp256k1_ge genp; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(commit != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(min_value != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(max_value != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(message_out != NULL || outlen == NULL); + ARG_CHECK(nonce != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(extra_commit != NULL || extra_commit_len == 0); + ARG_CHECK(gen != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_load(&commitp, commit); + secp256k1_generator_load(&genp, gen); + return secp256k1_rangeproof_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, + blind_out, value_out, message_out, outlen, nonce, min_value, max_value, &commitp, proof, plen, extra_commit, extra_commit_len, &genp); +} + +int secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, uint64_t *min_value, uint64_t *max_value, + const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *commit, const unsigned char *proof, size_t plen, const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len, const secp256k1_generator* gen) { + secp256k1_ge commitp; + secp256k1_ge genp; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(commit != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(min_value != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(max_value != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(extra_commit != NULL || extra_commit_len == 0); + ARG_CHECK(gen != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_load(&commitp, commit); + secp256k1_generator_load(&genp, gen); + return secp256k1_rangeproof_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, NULL, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, min_value, max_value, &commitp, proof, plen, extra_commit, extra_commit_len, &genp); +} + +int secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *proof, size_t *plen, uint64_t min_value, + const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *commit, const unsigned char *blind, const unsigned char *nonce, int exp, int min_bits, uint64_t value, + const unsigned char *message, size_t msg_len, const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len, const secp256k1_generator* gen){ + secp256k1_ge commitp; + secp256k1_ge genp; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(plen != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(commit != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(blind != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(nonce != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(message != NULL || msg_len == 0); + ARG_CHECK(extra_commit != NULL || extra_commit_len == 0); + ARG_CHECK(gen != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_load(&commitp, commit); + secp256k1_generator_load(&genp, gen); + return secp256k1_rangeproof_sign_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, + proof, plen, min_value, &commitp, blind, nonce, exp, min_bits, value, message, msg_len, extra_commit, extra_commit_len, &genp); +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/rangeproof.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/rangeproof.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..840a09a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/rangeproof.h @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2015 Gregory Maxwell * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef _SECP256K1_RANGEPROOF_H_ +#define _SECP256K1_RANGEPROOF_H_ + +#include "scalar.h" +#include "group.h" +#include "ecmult.h" +#include "ecmult_gen.h" + +static int secp256k1_rangeproof_verify_impl(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ecmult_ctx, + const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ecmult_gen_ctx, + unsigned char *blindout, uint64_t *value_out, unsigned char *message_out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *nonce, + uint64_t *min_value, uint64_t *max_value, const secp256k1_ge *commit, const unsigned char *proof, size_t plen, + const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len, const secp256k1_ge* genp); + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/rangeproof_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/rangeproof_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8b78c95 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/rangeproof_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,685 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2015 Gregory Maxwell * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef _SECP256K1_RANGEPROOF_IMPL_H_ +#define _SECP256K1_RANGEPROOF_IMPL_H_ + +#include "eckey.h" +#include "scalar.h" +#include "group.h" +#include "rangeproof.h" +#include "hash_impl.h" +#include "util.h" + +#include "modules/commitment/pedersen_impl.h" +#include "modules/rangeproof/borromean.h" + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_rangeproof_pub_expand(secp256k1_gej *pubs, + int exp, size_t *rsizes, size_t rings, const secp256k1_ge* genp) { + secp256k1_gej base; + size_t i; + size_t j; + size_t npub; + VERIFY_CHECK(exp < 19); + if (exp < 0) { + exp = 0; + } + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&base, genp); + secp256k1_gej_neg(&base, &base); + while (exp--) { + /* Multiplication by 10 */ + secp256k1_gej tmp; + secp256k1_gej_double_var(&tmp, &base, NULL); + secp256k1_gej_double_var(&base, &tmp, NULL); + secp256k1_gej_double_var(&base, &base, NULL); + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&base, &base, &tmp, NULL); + } + npub = 0; + for (i = 0; i < rings; i++) { + for (j = 1; j < rsizes[i]; j++) { + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&pubs[npub + j], &pubs[npub + j - 1], &base, NULL); + } + if (i < rings - 1) { + secp256k1_gej_double_var(&base, &base, NULL); + secp256k1_gej_double_var(&base, &base, NULL); + } + npub += rsizes[i]; + } +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_rangeproof_serialize_point(unsigned char* data, const secp256k1_ge *point) { + secp256k1_fe pointx; + pointx = point->x; + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pointx); + data[0] = !secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(&point->y); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(data + 1, &pointx); +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_rangeproof_genrand(secp256k1_scalar *sec, secp256k1_scalar *s, unsigned char *message, + size_t *rsizes, size_t rings, const unsigned char *nonce, const secp256k1_ge *commit, const unsigned char *proof, size_t len, const secp256k1_ge* genp) { + unsigned char tmp[32]; + unsigned char rngseed[32 + 33 + 33 + 10]; + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 rng; + secp256k1_scalar acc; + int overflow; + int ret; + size_t i; + size_t j; + int b; + size_t npub; + VERIFY_CHECK(len <= 10); + memcpy(rngseed, nonce, 32); + secp256k1_rangeproof_serialize_point(rngseed + 32, commit); + secp256k1_rangeproof_serialize_point(rngseed + 32 + 33, genp); + memcpy(rngseed + 33 + 33 + 32, proof, len); + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, rngseed, 32 + 33 + 33 + len); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&acc); + npub = 0; + ret = 1; + for (i = 0; i < rings; i++) { + if (i < rings - 1) { + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, tmp, 32); + do { + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, tmp, 32); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec[i], tmp, &overflow); + } while (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec[i])); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&acc, &acc, &sec[i]); + } else { + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&acc, &acc); + sec[i] = acc; + } + for (j = 0; j < rsizes[i]; j++) { + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, tmp, 32); + if (message) { + for (b = 0; b < 32; b++) { + tmp[b] ^= message[(i * 4 + j) * 32 + b]; + message[(i * 4 + j) * 32 + b] = tmp[b]; + } + } + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s[npub], tmp, &overflow); + ret &= !(overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s[npub])); + npub++; + } + } + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(&rng); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&acc); + memset(tmp, 0, 32); + return ret; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_range_proveparams(uint64_t *v, size_t *rings, size_t *rsizes, size_t *npub, size_t *secidx, uint64_t *min_value, + int *mantissa, uint64_t *scale, int *exp, int *min_bits, uint64_t value) { + size_t i; + *rings = 1; + rsizes[0] = 1; + secidx[0] = 0; + *scale = 1; + *mantissa = 0; + *npub = 0; + if (*min_value == UINT64_MAX) { + /* If the minimum value is the maximal representable value, then we cannot code a range. */ + *exp = -1; + } + if (*exp >= 0) { + int max_bits; + uint64_t v2; + if ((*min_value && value > INT64_MAX) || (value && *min_value >= INT64_MAX)) { + /* If either value or min_value is >= 2^63-1 then the other must by zero to avoid overflowing the proven range. */ + return 0; + } + max_bits = *min_value ? secp256k1_clz64_var(*min_value) : 64; + if (*min_bits > max_bits) { + *min_bits = max_bits; + } + if (*min_bits > 61 || value > INT64_MAX) { + /** Ten is not a power of two, so dividing by ten and then representing in base-2 times ten + * expands the representable range. The verifier requires the proven range is within 0..2**64. + * For very large numbers (all over 2**63) we must change our exponent to compensate. + * Rather than handling it precisely, this just disables use of the exponent for big values. + */ + *exp = 0; + } + /* Mask off the least significant digits, as requested. */ + *v = value - *min_value; + /* If the user has asked for more bits of proof then there is room for in the exponent, reduce the exponent. */ + v2 = *min_bits ? (UINT64_MAX>>(64-*min_bits)) : 0; + for (i = 0; (int) i < *exp && (v2 <= UINT64_MAX / 10); i++) { + *v /= 10; + v2 *= 10; + } + *exp = i; + v2 = *v; + for (i = 0; (int) i < *exp; i++) { + v2 *= 10; + *scale *= 10; + } + /* If the masked number isn't precise, compute the public offset. */ + *min_value = value - v2; + /* How many bits do we need to represent our value? */ + *mantissa = *v ? 64 - secp256k1_clz64_var(*v) : 1; + if (*min_bits > *mantissa) { + /* If the user asked for more precision, give it to them. */ + *mantissa = *min_bits; + } + /* Digits in radix-4, except for the last digit if our mantissa length is odd. */ + *rings = (*mantissa + 1) >> 1; + for (i = 0; i < *rings; i++) { + rsizes[i] = ((i < *rings - 1) | (!(*mantissa&1))) ? 4 : 2; + *npub += rsizes[i]; + secidx[i] = (*v >> (i*2)) & 3; + } + VERIFY_CHECK(*mantissa>0); + VERIFY_CHECK((*v & ~(UINT64_MAX>>(64-*mantissa))) == 0); /* Did this get all the bits? */ + } else { + /* A proof for an exact value. */ + *exp = 0; + *min_value = value; + *v = 0; + *npub = 2; + } + VERIFY_CHECK(*v * *scale + *min_value == value); + VERIFY_CHECK(*rings > 0); + VERIFY_CHECK(*rings <= 32); + VERIFY_CHECK(*npub <= 128); + return 1; +} + +/* strawman interface, writes proof in proof, a buffer of plen, proves with respect to min_value the range for commit which has the provided blinding factor and value. */ +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_rangeproof_sign_impl(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ecmult_ctx, + const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ecmult_gen_ctx, + unsigned char *proof, size_t *plen, uint64_t min_value, + const secp256k1_ge *commit, const unsigned char *blind, const unsigned char *nonce, int exp, int min_bits, uint64_t value, + const unsigned char *message, size_t msg_len, const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len, const secp256k1_ge* genp){ + secp256k1_gej pubs[128]; /* Candidate digits for our proof, most inferred. */ + secp256k1_scalar s[128]; /* Signatures in our proof, most forged. */ + secp256k1_scalar sec[32]; /* Blinding factors for the correct digits. */ + secp256k1_scalar k[32]; /* Nonces for our non-forged signatures. */ + secp256k1_scalar stmp; + secp256k1_sha256 sha256_m; + unsigned char prep[4096]; + unsigned char tmp[33]; + unsigned char *signs; /* Location of sign flags in the proof. */ + uint64_t v; + uint64_t scale; /* scale = 10^exp. */ + int mantissa; /* Number of bits proven in the blinded value. */ + size_t rings; /* How many digits will our proof cover. */ + size_t rsizes[32]; /* How many possible values there are for each place. */ + size_t secidx[32]; /* Which digit is the correct one. */ + size_t len; /* Number of bytes used so far. */ + size_t i; + int overflow; + size_t npub; + len = 0; + if (*plen < 65 || min_value > value || min_bits > 64 || min_bits < 0 || exp < -1 || exp > 18) { + return 0; + } + if (!secp256k1_range_proveparams(&v, &rings, rsizes, &npub, secidx, &min_value, &mantissa, &scale, &exp, &min_bits, value)) { + return 0; + } + proof[len] = (rsizes[0] > 1 ? (64 | exp) : 0) | (min_value ? 32 : 0); + len++; + if (rsizes[0] > 1) { + VERIFY_CHECK(mantissa > 0 && mantissa <= 64); + proof[len] = mantissa - 1; + len++; + } + if (min_value) { + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + proof[len + i] = (min_value >> ((7-i) * 8)) & 255; + } + len += 8; + } + /* Do we have enough room in the proof for the message? Each ring gives us 128 bytes, but the + * final ring is used to encode the blinding factor and the value, so we can't use that. (Well, + * technically there are 64 bytes available if we avoided the other data, but this is difficult + * because it's not always in the same place. */ + if (msg_len > 0 && msg_len > 128 * (rings - 1)) { + return 0; + } + /* Do we have enough room for the proof? */ + if (*plen - len < 32 * (npub + rings - 1) + 32 + ((rings+6) >> 3)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256_m); + secp256k1_rangeproof_serialize_point(tmp, commit); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, tmp, 33); + secp256k1_rangeproof_serialize_point(tmp, genp); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, tmp, 33); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, proof, len); + + memset(prep, 0, 4096); + if (message != NULL) { + memcpy(prep, message, msg_len); + } + /* Note, the data corresponding to the blinding factors must be zero. */ + if (rsizes[rings - 1] > 1) { + size_t idx; + /* Value encoding sidechannel. */ + idx = rsizes[rings - 1] - 1; + idx -= secidx[rings - 1] == idx; + idx = ((rings - 1) * 4 + idx) * 32; + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + prep[8 + i + idx] = prep[16 + i + idx] = prep[24 + i + idx] = (v >> (56 - i * 8)) & 255; + prep[i + idx] = 0; + } + prep[idx] = 128; + } + if (!secp256k1_rangeproof_genrand(sec, s, prep, rsizes, rings, nonce, commit, proof, len, genp)) { + return 0; + } + memset(prep, 0, 4096); + for (i = 0; i < rings; i++) { + /* Sign will overwrite the non-forged signature, move that random value into the nonce. */ + k[i] = s[i * 4 + secidx[i]]; + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&s[i * 4 + secidx[i]]); + } + /** Genrand returns the last blinding factor as -sum(rest), + * adding in the blinding factor for our commitment, results in the blinding factor for + * the commitment to the last digit that the verifier can compute for itself by subtracting + * all the digits in the proof from the commitment. This lets the prover skip sending the + * blinded value for one digit. + */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&stmp, blind, &overflow); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&sec[rings - 1], &sec[rings - 1], &stmp); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec[rings - 1])) { + return 0; + } + signs = &proof[len]; + /* We need one sign bit for each blinded value we send. */ + for (i = 0; i < (rings + 6) >> 3; i++) { + signs[i] = 0; + len++; + } + npub = 0; + for (i = 0; i < rings; i++) { + /*OPT: Use the precomputed gen2 basis?*/ + secp256k1_pedersen_ecmult(&pubs[npub], &sec[i], ((uint64_t)secidx[i] * scale) << (i*2), genp, &secp256k1_ge_const_g); + if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&pubs[npub])) { + return 0; + } + if (i < rings - 1) { + unsigned char tmpc[33]; + secp256k1_ge c; + unsigned char quadness; + /*OPT: split loop and batch invert.*/ + /*OPT: do not compute full pubs[npub] in ge form; we only need x */ + secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&c, &pubs[npub]); + secp256k1_rangeproof_serialize_point(tmpc, &c); + quadness = tmpc[0]; + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, tmpc, 33); + signs[i>>3] |= quadness << (i&7); + memcpy(&proof[len], tmpc + 1, 32); + len += 32; + } + npub += rsizes[i]; + } + secp256k1_rangeproof_pub_expand(pubs, exp, rsizes, rings, genp); + if (extra_commit != NULL) { + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, extra_commit, extra_commit_len); + } + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256_m, tmp); + if (!secp256k1_borromean_sign(ecmult_ctx, ecmult_gen_ctx, &proof[len], s, pubs, k, sec, rsizes, secidx, rings, tmp, 32)) { + return 0; + } + len += 32; + for (i = 0; i < npub; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&proof[len],&s[i]); + len += 32; + } + VERIFY_CHECK(len <= *plen); + *plen = len; + memset(prep, 0, 4096); + return 1; +} + +/* Computes blinding factor x given k, s, and the challenge e. */ +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_rangeproof_recover_x(secp256k1_scalar *x, const secp256k1_scalar *k, const secp256k1_scalar *e, + const secp256k1_scalar *s) { + secp256k1_scalar stmp; + secp256k1_scalar_negate(x, s); + secp256k1_scalar_add(x, x, k); + secp256k1_scalar_inverse(&stmp, e); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(x, x, &stmp); +} + +/* Computes ring's nonce given the blinding factor x, the challenge e, and the signature s. */ +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_rangeproof_recover_k(secp256k1_scalar *k, const secp256k1_scalar *x, const secp256k1_scalar *e, + const secp256k1_scalar *s) { + secp256k1_scalar stmp; + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&stmp, x, e); + secp256k1_scalar_add(k, s, &stmp); +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_rangeproof_ch32xor(unsigned char *x, const unsigned char *y) { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { + x[i] ^= y[i]; + } +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind_inner(secp256k1_scalar *blind, uint64_t *v, + unsigned char *m, size_t *mlen, secp256k1_scalar *ev, secp256k1_scalar *s, + size_t *rsizes, size_t rings, const unsigned char *nonce, const secp256k1_ge *commit, const unsigned char *proof, size_t len, const secp256k1_ge *genp) { + secp256k1_scalar s_orig[128]; + secp256k1_scalar sec[32]; + secp256k1_scalar stmp; + unsigned char prep[4096]; + unsigned char tmp[32]; + uint64_t value; + size_t offset; + size_t i; + size_t j; + int b; + size_t skip1; + size_t skip2; + size_t npub; + npub = ((rings - 1) << 2) + rsizes[rings-1]; + VERIFY_CHECK(npub <= 128); + VERIFY_CHECK(npub >= 1); + memset(prep, 0, 4096); + /* Reconstruct the provers random values. */ + secp256k1_rangeproof_genrand(sec, s_orig, prep, rsizes, rings, nonce, commit, proof, len, genp); + *v = UINT64_MAX; + secp256k1_scalar_clear(blind); + if (rings == 1 && rsizes[0] == 1) { + /* With only a single proof, we can only recover the blinding factor. */ + secp256k1_rangeproof_recover_x(blind, &s_orig[0], &ev[0], &s[0]); + if (v) { + *v = 0; + } + if (mlen) { + *mlen = 0; + } + return 1; + } + npub = (rings - 1) << 2; + for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { + size_t idx; + /* Look for a value encoding in the last ring. */ + idx = npub + rsizes[rings - 1] - 1 - j; + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(tmp, &s[idx]); + secp256k1_rangeproof_ch32xor(tmp, &prep[idx * 32]); + if ((tmp[0] & 128) && (memcmp(&tmp[16], &tmp[24], 8) == 0) && (memcmp(&tmp[8], &tmp[16], 8) == 0)) { + value = 0; + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + value = (value << 8) + tmp[24 + i]; + } + if (v) { + *v = value; + } + memcpy(&prep[idx * 32], tmp, 32); + break; + } + } + if (j > 1) { + /* Couldn't extract a value. */ + if (mlen) { + *mlen = 0; + } + return 0; + } + skip1 = rsizes[rings - 1] - 1 - j; + skip2 = ((value >> ((rings - 1) << 1)) & 3); + if (skip1 == skip2) { + /*Value is in wrong position.*/ + if (mlen) { + *mlen = 0; + } + return 0; + } + skip1 += (rings - 1) << 2; + skip2 += (rings - 1) << 2; + /* Like in the rsize[] == 1 case, Having figured out which s is the one which was not forged, we can recover the blinding factor. */ + secp256k1_rangeproof_recover_x(&stmp, &s_orig[skip2], &ev[skip2], &s[skip2]); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&sec[rings - 1], &sec[rings - 1]); + secp256k1_scalar_add(blind, &stmp, &sec[rings - 1]); + if (!m || !mlen || *mlen == 0) { + if (mlen) { + *mlen = 0; + } + /* FIXME: cleanup in early out/failure cases. */ + return 1; + } + offset = 0; + npub = 0; + for (i = 0; i < rings; i++) { + size_t idx; + idx = (value >> (i << 1)) & 3; + for (j = 0; j < rsizes[i]; j++) { + if (npub == skip1 || npub == skip2) { + npub++; + continue; + } + if (idx == j) { + /** For the non-forged signatures the signature is calculated instead of random, instead we recover the prover's nonces. + * this could just as well recover the blinding factors and messages could be put there as is done for recovering the + * blinding factor in the last ring, but it takes an inversion to recover x so it's faster to put the message data in k. + */ + secp256k1_rangeproof_recover_k(&stmp, &sec[i], &ev[npub], &s[npub]); + } else { + stmp = s[npub]; + } + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(tmp, &stmp); + secp256k1_rangeproof_ch32xor(tmp, &prep[npub * 32]); + for (b = 0; b < 32 && offset < *mlen; b++) { + m[offset] = tmp[b]; + offset++; + } + npub++; + } + } + *mlen = offset; + memset(prep, 0, 4096); + for (i = 0; i < 128; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&s_orig[i]); + } + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec[i]); + } + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&stmp); + return 1; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_rangeproof_getheader_impl(size_t *offset, int *exp, int *mantissa, uint64_t *scale, + uint64_t *min_value, uint64_t *max_value, const unsigned char *proof, size_t plen) { + int i; + int has_nz_range; + int has_min; + if (plen < 65 || ((proof[*offset] & 128) != 0)) { + return 0; + } + has_nz_range = proof[*offset] & 64; + has_min = proof[*offset] & 32; + *exp = -1; + *mantissa = 0; + if (has_nz_range) { + *exp = proof[*offset] & 31; + *offset += 1; + if (*exp > 18) { + return 0; + } + *mantissa = proof[*offset] + 1; + if (*mantissa > 64) { + return 0; + } + *max_value = UINT64_MAX>>(64-*mantissa); + } else { + *max_value = 0; + } + *offset += 1; + *scale = 1; + for (i = 0; i < *exp; i++) { + if (*max_value > UINT64_MAX / 10) { + return 0; + } + *max_value *= 10; + *scale *= 10; + } + *min_value = 0; + if (has_min) { + if(plen - *offset < 8) { + return 0; + } + /*FIXME: Compact minvalue encoding?*/ + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + *min_value = (*min_value << 8) | proof[*offset + i]; + } + *offset += 8; + } + if (*max_value > UINT64_MAX - *min_value) { + return 0; + } + *max_value += *min_value; + return 1; +} + +/* Verifies range proof (len plen) for commit, the min/max values proven are put in the min/max arguments; returns 0 on failure 1 on success.*/ +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_rangeproof_verify_impl(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ecmult_ctx, + const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ecmult_gen_ctx, + unsigned char *blindout, uint64_t *value_out, unsigned char *message_out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *nonce, + uint64_t *min_value, uint64_t *max_value, const secp256k1_ge *commit, const unsigned char *proof, size_t plen, const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len, const secp256k1_ge* genp) { + secp256k1_gej accj; + secp256k1_gej pubs[128]; + secp256k1_ge c; + secp256k1_scalar s[128]; + secp256k1_scalar evalues[128]; /* Challenges, only used during proof rewind. */ + secp256k1_sha256 sha256_m; + size_t rsizes[32]; + int ret; + size_t i; + int exp; + int mantissa; + size_t offset; + size_t rings; + int overflow; + size_t npub; + int offset_post_header; + uint64_t scale; + unsigned char signs[31]; + unsigned char m[33]; + const unsigned char *e0; + offset = 0; + if (!secp256k1_rangeproof_getheader_impl(&offset, &exp, &mantissa, &scale, min_value, max_value, proof, plen)) { + return 0; + } + offset_post_header = offset; + rings = 1; + rsizes[0] = 1; + npub = 1; + if (mantissa != 0) { + rings = (mantissa >> 1); + for (i = 0; i < rings; i++) { + rsizes[i] = 4; + } + npub = (mantissa >> 1) << 2; + if (mantissa & 1) { + rsizes[rings] = 2; + npub += rsizes[rings]; + rings++; + } + } + VERIFY_CHECK(rings <= 32); + if (plen - offset < 32 * (npub + rings - 1) + 32 + ((rings+6) >> 3)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256_m); + secp256k1_rangeproof_serialize_point(m, commit); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, m, 33); + secp256k1_rangeproof_serialize_point(m, genp); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, m, 33); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, proof, offset); + for(i = 0; i < rings - 1; i++) { + signs[i] = (proof[offset + ( i>> 3)] & (1 << (i & 7))) != 0; + } + offset += (rings + 6) >> 3; + if ((rings - 1) & 7) { + /* Number of coded blinded points is not a multiple of 8, force extra sign bits to 0 to reject mutation. */ + if ((proof[offset - 1] >> ((rings - 1) & 7)) != 0) { + return 0; + } + } + npub = 0; + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&accj); + if (*min_value) { + secp256k1_scalar mvs; + secp256k1_scalar_set_u64(&mvs, *min_value); + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&accj, genp, &mvs, 64); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&mvs); + } + for(i = 0; i < rings - 1; i++) { + secp256k1_fe fe; + secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&fe, &proof[offset]); + secp256k1_ge_set_xquad(&c, &fe); + if (signs[i]) { + secp256k1_ge_neg(&c, &c); + } + /* Not using secp256k1_rangeproof_serialize_point as we almost have it + * serialized form already. */ + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, &signs[i], 1); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, &proof[offset], 32); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pubs[npub], &c); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&accj, &accj, &c, NULL); + offset += 32; + npub += rsizes[i]; + } + secp256k1_gej_neg(&accj, &accj); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&pubs[npub], &accj, commit, NULL); + if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&pubs[npub])) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_rangeproof_pub_expand(pubs, exp, rsizes, rings, genp); + npub += rsizes[rings - 1]; + e0 = &proof[offset]; + offset += 32; + for (i = 0; i < npub; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s[i], &proof[offset], &overflow); + if (overflow) { + return 0; + } + offset += 32; + } + if (offset != plen) { + /*Extra data found, reject.*/ + return 0; + } + if (extra_commit != NULL) { + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, extra_commit, extra_commit_len); + } + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256_m, m); + ret = secp256k1_borromean_verify(ecmult_ctx, nonce ? evalues : NULL, e0, s, pubs, rsizes, rings, m, 32); + if (ret && nonce) { + /* Given the nonce, try rewinding the witness to recover its initial state. */ + secp256k1_scalar blind; + uint64_t vv; + if (!ecmult_gen_ctx) { + return 0; + } + if (!secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind_inner(&blind, &vv, message_out, outlen, evalues, s, rsizes, rings, nonce, commit, proof, offset_post_header, genp)) { + return 0; + } + /* Unwind apparently successful, see if the commitment can be reconstructed. */ + /* FIXME: should check vv is in the mantissa's range. */ + vv = (vv * scale) + *min_value; + secp256k1_pedersen_ecmult(&accj, &blind, vv, genp, &secp256k1_ge_const_g); + if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&accj)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_gej_neg(&accj, &accj); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&accj, &accj, commit, NULL); + if (!secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&accj)) { + return 0; + } + if (blindout) { + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(blindout, &blind); + } + if (value_out) { + *value_out = vv; + } + } + return ret; +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/tests_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/tests_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..921498d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/tests_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,439 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2015 Gregory Maxwell * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_RANGEPROOF_TESTS +#define SECP256K1_MODULE_RANGEPROOF_TESTS + +#include + +#include "group.h" +#include "scalar.h" +#include "testrand.h" +#include "util.h" + +#include "include/secp256k1_commitment.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h" + +static void test_rangeproof_api(const secp256k1_context *none, const secp256k1_context *sign, const secp256k1_context *vrfy, const secp256k1_context *both, const int32_t *ecount) { + unsigned char proof[5134]; + unsigned char blind[32]; + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment commit; + uint64_t vmin = secp256k1_rand32(); + uint64_t val = vmin + secp256k1_rand32(); + size_t len = sizeof(proof); + /* we'll switch to dylan thomas for this one */ + const unsigned char message[68] = "My tears are like the quiet drift / Of petals from some magic rose;"; + size_t mlen = sizeof(message); + const unsigned char ext_commit[72] = "And all my grief flows from the rift / Of unremembered skies and snows."; + size_t ext_commit_len = sizeof(ext_commit); + + secp256k1_rand256(blind); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(ctx, &commit, blind, val, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g)); + + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(none, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(sign, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(vrfy, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 3); + + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, NULL, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, NULL, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 5); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, NULL, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 6); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, NULL, commit.data, 0, 0, val, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 7); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, NULL, 0, 0, val, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 8); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, vmin - 1, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 8); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, NULL, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 9); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, NULL, 0, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 9); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, NULL, 0, NULL, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 10); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 10); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 11); + + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); + { + int exp; + int mantissa; + uint64_t min_value; + uint64_t max_value; + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_info(none, &exp, &mantissa, &min_value, &max_value, proof, len) != 0); + CHECK(exp == 0); + CHECK(((uint64_t) 1 << mantissa) > val - vmin); + CHECK(((uint64_t) 1 << (mantissa - 1)) <= val - vmin); + CHECK(min_value == vmin); + CHECK(max_value >= val); + + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_info(none, NULL, &mantissa, &min_value, &max_value, proof, len) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 12); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_info(none, &exp, NULL, &min_value, &max_value, proof, len) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 13); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_info(none, &exp, &mantissa, NULL, &max_value, proof, len) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 14); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_info(none, &exp, &mantissa, &min_value, NULL, proof, len) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 15); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_info(none, &exp, &mantissa, &min_value, &max_value, NULL, len) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 16); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_info(none, &exp, &mantissa, &min_value, &max_value, proof, 0) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 16); + } + { + uint64_t min_value; + uint64_t max_value; + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(none, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 17); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(sign, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 18); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(vrfy, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 18); + + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(vrfy, NULL, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 19); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(vrfy, &min_value, NULL, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 20); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(vrfy, &min_value, &max_value, NULL, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 21); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(vrfy, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, NULL, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 22); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(vrfy, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, 0, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 22); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(vrfy, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, NULL, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 23); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(vrfy, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 23); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(vrfy, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 24); + } + { + unsigned char blind_out[32]; + unsigned char message_out[68]; + uint64_t value_out; + uint64_t min_value; + uint64_t max_value; + size_t message_len = sizeof(message_out); + + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(none, blind_out, &value_out, message_out, &message_len, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 25); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(sign, blind_out, &value_out, message_out, &message_len, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 26); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(vrfy, blind_out, &value_out, message_out, &message_len, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 27); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, message_out, &message_len, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 27); + + CHECK(min_value == vmin); + CHECK(max_value >= val); + CHECK(value_out == val); + CHECK(message_len == sizeof(message_out)); + CHECK(memcmp(message, message_out, sizeof(message_out)) == 0); + + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, NULL, &value_out, message_out, &message_len, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 27); /* blindout may be NULL */ + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, NULL, message_out, &message_len, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 27); /* valueout may be NULL */ + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, &message_len, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 28); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, 0, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 28); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, 0, NULL, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 29); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, 0, commit.data, NULL, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 30); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, 0, commit.data, &min_value, NULL, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 31); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, 0, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, NULL, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 32); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, 0, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, NULL, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 33); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, 0, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, 0, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 33); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, 0, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, NULL, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 34); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, 0, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 34); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, 0, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(*ecount == 35); + } +} + +static void test_api(void) { + secp256k1_context *none = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); + secp256k1_context *sign = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); + secp256k1_context *vrfy = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + secp256k1_context *both = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + int32_t ecount; + int i; + + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + ecount = 0; + test_rangeproof_api(none, sign, vrfy, both, &ecount); + } + + secp256k1_context_destroy(none); + secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); + secp256k1_context_destroy(vrfy); + secp256k1_context_destroy(both); +} + +static void test_borromean(void) { + unsigned char e0[32]; + secp256k1_scalar s[64]; + secp256k1_gej pubs[64]; + secp256k1_scalar k[8]; + secp256k1_scalar sec[8]; + secp256k1_ge ge; + secp256k1_scalar one; + unsigned char m[32]; + size_t rsizes[8]; + size_t secidx[8]; + size_t nrings; + size_t i; + size_t j; + int c; + secp256k1_rand256_test(m); + nrings = 1 + (secp256k1_rand32()&7); + c = 0; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&one, 1); + if (secp256k1_rand32()&1) { + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&one, &one); + } + for (i = 0; i < nrings; i++) { + rsizes[i] = 1 + (secp256k1_rand32()&7); + secidx[i] = secp256k1_rand32() % rsizes[i]; + random_scalar_order(&sec[i]); + random_scalar_order(&k[i]); + if(secp256k1_rand32()&7) { + sec[i] = one; + } + if(secp256k1_rand32()&7) { + k[i] = one; + } + for (j = 0; j < rsizes[i]; j++) { + random_scalar_order(&s[c + j]); + if(secp256k1_rand32()&7) { + s[i] = one; + } + if (j == secidx[i]) { + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pubs[c + j], &sec[i]); + } else { + random_group_element_test(&ge); + random_group_element_jacobian_test(&pubs[c + j],&ge); + } + } + c += rsizes[i]; + } + CHECK(secp256k1_borromean_sign(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, e0, s, pubs, k, sec, rsizes, secidx, nrings, m, 32)); + CHECK(secp256k1_borromean_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, NULL, e0, s, pubs, rsizes, nrings, m, 32)); + i = secp256k1_rand32() % c; + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s[i],&s[i]); + CHECK(!secp256k1_borromean_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, NULL, e0, s, pubs, rsizes, nrings, m, 32)); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s[i],&s[i]); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&one, 1); + for(j = 0; j < 4; j++) { + i = secp256k1_rand32() % c; + if (secp256k1_rand32() & 1) { + secp256k1_gej_double_var(&pubs[i],&pubs[i], NULL); + } else { + secp256k1_scalar_add(&s[i],&s[i],&one); + } + CHECK(!secp256k1_borromean_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, NULL, e0, s, pubs, rsizes, nrings, m, 32)); + } +} + +static void test_rangeproof(void) { + const uint64_t testvs[11] = {0, 1, 5, 11, 65535, 65537, INT32_MAX, UINT32_MAX, INT64_MAX - 1, INT64_MAX, UINT64_MAX}; + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment commit; + secp256k1_pedersen_commitment commit2; + unsigned char proof[5134 + 1]; /* One additional byte to test if trailing bytes are rejected */ + unsigned char blind[32]; + unsigned char blindout[32]; + unsigned char message[4096]; + size_t mlen; + uint64_t v; + uint64_t vout; + uint64_t vmin; + uint64_t minv; + uint64_t maxv; + size_t len; + size_t i; + size_t j; + size_t k; + /* Short message is a Simone de Beauvoir quote */ + const unsigned char message_short[120] = "When I see my own likeness in the depths of someone else's consciousness, I always experience a moment of panic."; + /* Long message is 0xA5 with a bunch of this quote in the middle */ + unsigned char message_long[3968]; + memset(message_long, 0xa5, sizeof(message_long)); + for (i = 1200; i < 3600; i += 120) { + memcpy(&message_long[i], message_short, sizeof(message_short)); + } + + secp256k1_rand256(blind); + for (i = 0; i < 11; i++) { + v = testvs[i]; + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(ctx, &commit, blind, v, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g)); + for (vmin = 0; vmin < (i<9 && i > 0 ? 2 : 1); vmin++) { + const unsigned char *input_message = NULL; + size_t input_message_len = 0; + /* vmin is always either 0 or 1; if it is 1, then we have no room for a message. + * If it's 0, we use "minimum encoding" and only have room for a small message when + * `testvs[i]` is >= 4; for a large message when it's >= 2^32. */ + if (vmin == 0 && i > 2) { + input_message = message_short; + input_message_len = sizeof(message_short); + } + if (vmin == 0 && i > 7) { + input_message = message_long; + input_message_len = sizeof(message_long); + } + len = 5134; + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(ctx, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, v, input_message, input_message_len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + CHECK(len <= 5134); + mlen = 4096; + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(ctx, blindout, &vout, message, &mlen, commit.data, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + if (input_message != NULL) { + CHECK(memcmp(message, input_message, input_message_len) == 0); + } + for (j = input_message_len; j < mlen; j++) { + CHECK(message[j] == 0); + } + CHECK(mlen <= 4096); + CHECK(memcmp(blindout, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(vout == v); + CHECK(minv <= v); + CHECK(maxv >= v); + len = 5134; + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(ctx, proof, &len, v, &commit, blind, commit.data, -1, 64, v, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + CHECK(len <= 73); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(ctx, blindout, &vout, NULL, NULL, commit.data, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + CHECK(memcmp(blindout, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(vout == v); + CHECK(minv == v); + CHECK(maxv == v); + + /* Check with a committed message */ + len = 5134; + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(ctx, proof, &len, v, &commit, blind, commit.data, -1, 64, v, NULL, 0, message_short, sizeof(message_short), &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + CHECK(len <= 73); + CHECK(!secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(ctx, blindout, &vout, NULL, NULL, commit.data, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + CHECK(!secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(ctx, blindout, &vout, NULL, NULL, commit.data, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, message_long, sizeof(message_long), &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(ctx, blindout, &vout, NULL, NULL, commit.data, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, message_short, sizeof(message_short), &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + CHECK(memcmp(blindout, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(vout == v); + CHECK(minv == v); + CHECK(maxv == v); + } + } + secp256k1_rand256(blind); + v = INT64_MAX - 1; + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(ctx, &commit, blind, v, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g)); + for (i = 0; i < 19; i++) { + len = 5134; + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(ctx, proof, &len, 0, &commit, blind, commit.data, i, 0, v, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(ctx, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + CHECK(len <= 5134); + CHECK(minv <= v); + CHECK(maxv >= v); + /* Make sure it fails when validating with a committed message */ + CHECK(!secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(ctx, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, message_short, sizeof(message_short), &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + } + secp256k1_rand256(blind); + { + /*Malleability test.*/ + v = secp256k1_rands64(0, 255); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(ctx, &commit, blind, v, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g)); + len = 5134; + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(ctx, proof, &len, 0, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 3, v, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + CHECK(len <= 5134); + /* Test if trailing bytes are rejected. */ + proof[len] = v; + CHECK(!secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(ctx, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len + 1, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + for (i = 0; i < len*8; i++) { + proof[i >> 3] ^= 1 << (i & 7); + CHECK(!secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(ctx, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + proof[i >> 3] ^= 1 << (i & 7); + } + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(ctx, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + CHECK(minv <= v); + CHECK(maxv >= v); + } + memcpy(&commit2, &commit, sizeof(commit)); + for (i = 0; i < 10 * (size_t) count; i++) { + int exp; + int min_bits; + v = secp256k1_rands64(0, UINT64_MAX >> (secp256k1_rand32()&63)); + vmin = 0; + if ((v < INT64_MAX) && (secp256k1_rand32()&1)) { + vmin = secp256k1_rands64(0, v); + } + secp256k1_rand256(blind); + CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(ctx, &commit, blind, v, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g)); + len = 5134; + exp = (int)secp256k1_rands64(0,18)-(int)secp256k1_rands64(0,18); + if (exp < 0) { + exp = -exp; + } + min_bits = (int)secp256k1_rands64(0,64)-(int)secp256k1_rands64(0,64); + if (min_bits < 0) { + min_bits = -min_bits; + } + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(ctx, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, exp, min_bits, v, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + CHECK(len <= 5134); + mlen = 4096; + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(ctx, blindout, &vout, message, &mlen, commit.data, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + for (j = 0; j < mlen; j++) { + CHECK(message[j] == 0); + } + CHECK(mlen <= 4096); + CHECK(memcmp(blindout, blind, 32) == 0); + CHECK(vout == v); + CHECK(minv <= v); + CHECK(maxv >= v); + CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(ctx, blindout, &vout, NULL, NULL, commit.data, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + memcpy(&commit2, &commit, sizeof(commit)); + } + for (j = 0; j < 10; j++) { + for (i = 0; i < 96; i++) { + secp256k1_rand256(&proof[i * 32]); + } + for (k = 0; k < 128; k++) { + len = k; + CHECK(!secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(ctx, &minv, &maxv, &commit2, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + } + len = secp256k1_rands64(0, 3072); + CHECK(!secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(ctx, &minv, &maxv, &commit2, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); + } +} + +void run_rangeproof_tests(void) { + int i; + test_api(); + for (i = 0; i < 10*count; i++) { + test_borromean(); + } + test_rangeproof(); +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/Makefile.am.include b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/Makefile.am.include new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bf23c26 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/Makefile.am.include @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_recovery.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/recovery/tests_impl.h +if USE_BENCHMARK +noinst_PROGRAMS += bench_recover +bench_recover_SOURCES = src/bench_recover.c +bench_recover_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) +endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h new file mode 100755 index 0000000..2f6691c --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,193 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013-2015 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_RECOVERY_MAIN_H +#define SECP256K1_MODULE_RECOVERY_MAIN_H + +#include "include/secp256k1_recovery.h" + +static void secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_load(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_scalar* r, secp256k1_scalar* s, int* recid, const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature* sig) { + (void)ctx; + if (sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) == 32) { + /* When the secp256k1_scalar type is exactly 32 byte, use its + * representation inside secp256k1_ecdsa_signature, as conversion is very fast. + * Note that secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save must use the same representation. */ + memcpy(r, &sig->data[0], 32); + memcpy(s, &sig->data[32], 32); + } else { + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(r, &sig->data[0], NULL); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(s, &sig->data[32], NULL); + } + *recid = sig->data[64]; +} + +static void secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_save(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature* sig, const secp256k1_scalar* r, const secp256k1_scalar* s, int recid) { + if (sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) == 32) { + memcpy(&sig->data[0], r, 32); + memcpy(&sig->data[32], s, 32); + } else { + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&sig->data[0], r); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&sig->data[32], s); + } + sig->data[64] = recid; +} + +int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature* sig, const unsigned char *input64, int recid) { + secp256k1_scalar r, s; + int ret = 1; + int overflow = 0; + + (void)ctx; + ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(input64 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(recid >= 0 && recid <= 3); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&r, &input64[0], &overflow); + ret &= !overflow; + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s, &input64[32], &overflow); + ret &= !overflow; + if (ret) { + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_save(sig, &r, &s, recid); + } else { + memset(sig, 0, sizeof(*sig)); + } + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output64, int *recid, const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature* sig) { + secp256k1_scalar r, s; + + (void)ctx; + ARG_CHECK(output64 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(recid != NULL); + + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, recid, sig); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&output64[0], &r); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&output64[32], &s); + return 1; +} + +int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig, const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature* sigin) { + secp256k1_scalar r, s; + int recid; + + (void)ctx; + ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(sigin != NULL); + + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, &recid, sigin); + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(sig, &r, &s); + return 1; +} + +static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_recover(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, const secp256k1_scalar *sigr, const secp256k1_scalar* sigs, secp256k1_ge *pubkey, const secp256k1_scalar *message, int recid) { + unsigned char brx[32]; + secp256k1_fe fx; + secp256k1_ge x; + secp256k1_gej xj; + secp256k1_scalar rn, u1, u2; + secp256k1_gej qj; + int r; + + if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigr) || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigs)) { + return 0; + } + + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(brx, sigr); + r = secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&fx, brx); + (void)r; + VERIFY_CHECK(r); /* brx comes from a scalar, so is less than the order; certainly less than p */ + if (recid & 2) { + if (secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(&fx, &secp256k1_ecdsa_const_p_minus_order) >= 0) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_fe_add(&fx, &secp256k1_ecdsa_const_order_as_fe); + } + if (!secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&x, &fx, recid & 1)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&xj, &x); + secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&rn, sigr); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&u1, &rn, message); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&u1, &u1); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&u2, &rn, sigs); + secp256k1_ecmult(ctx, &qj, &xj, &u2, &u1); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(pubkey, &qj); + return !secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&qj); +} + +int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *signature, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *seckey, secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, const void* noncedata) { + secp256k1_scalar r, s; + secp256k1_scalar sec, non, msg; + int recid; + int ret = 0; + int overflow = 0; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(signature != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); + if (noncefp == NULL) { + noncefp = secp256k1_nonce_function_default; + } + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, &overflow); + /* Fail if the secret key is invalid. */ + if (!overflow && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec)) { + unsigned char nonce32[32]; + unsigned int count = 0; + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&msg, msg32, NULL); + while (1) { + ret = noncefp(nonce32, msg32, seckey, NULL, (void*)noncedata, count); + if (!ret) { + break; + } + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&non, nonce32, &overflow); + if (!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&non) && !overflow) { + if (secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &r, &s, &sec, &msg, &non, &recid)) { + break; + } + } + count++; + } + memset(nonce32, 0, 32); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&msg); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&non); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); + } + if (ret) { + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_save(signature, &r, &s, recid); + } else { + memset(signature, 0, sizeof(*signature)); + } + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *signature, const unsigned char *msg32) { + secp256k1_ge q; + secp256k1_scalar r, s; + secp256k1_scalar m; + int recid; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(signature != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); + + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, &recid, signature); + VERIFY_CHECK(recid >= 0 && recid < 4); /* should have been caught in parse_compact */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&m, msg32, NULL); + if (secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_recover(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &r, &s, &q, &m, recid)) { + secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &q); + return 1; + } else { + memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey)); + return 0; + } +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_MODULE_RECOVERY_MAIN_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/tests_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/tests_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c9bbe8 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/tests_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,393 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013-2015 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_RECOVERY_TESTS_H +#define SECP256K1_MODULE_RECOVERY_TESTS_H + +static int recovery_test_nonce_function(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *algo16, void *data, unsigned int counter) { + (void) msg32; + (void) key32; + (void) algo16; + (void) data; + + /* On the first run, return 0 to force a second run */ + if (counter == 0) { + memset(nonce32, 0, 32); + return 1; + } + /* On the second run, return an overflow to force a third run */ + if (counter == 1) { + memset(nonce32, 0xff, 32); + return 1; + } + /* On the next run, return a valid nonce, but flip a coin as to whether or not to fail signing. */ + memset(nonce32, 1, 32); + return secp256k1_rand_bits(1); +} + +void test_ecdsa_recovery_api(void) { + /* Setup contexts that just count errors */ + secp256k1_context *none = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); + secp256k1_context *sign = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); + secp256k1_context *vrfy = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + secp256k1_context *both = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; + secp256k1_pubkey recpubkey; + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature normal_sig; + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature recsig; + unsigned char privkey[32] = { 1 }; + unsigned char message[32] = { 2 }; + int32_t ecount = 0; + int recid = 0; + unsigned char sig[74]; + unsigned char zero_privkey[32] = { 0 }; + unsigned char over_privkey[32] = { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff }; + + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + + /* Construct and verify corresponding public key. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, privkey) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, privkey) == 1); + + /* Check bad contexts and NULLs for signing */ + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(none, &recsig, message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(sign, &recsig, message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(vrfy, &recsig, message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(both, &recsig, message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(both, NULL, message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(both, &recsig, NULL, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(both, &recsig, message, NULL, NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + /* This will fail or succeed randomly, and in either case will not ARG_CHECK failure */ + secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(both, &recsig, message, privkey, recovery_test_nonce_function, NULL); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + /* These will all fail, but not in ARG_CHECK way */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(both, &recsig, message, zero_privkey, NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(both, &recsig, message, over_privkey, NULL, NULL) == 0); + /* This one will succeed. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(both, &recsig, message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + + /* Check signing with a goofy nonce function */ + + /* Check bad contexts and NULLs for recovery */ + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(none, &recpubkey, &recsig, message) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(sign, &recpubkey, &recsig, message) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(vrfy, &recpubkey, &recsig, message) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(both, &recpubkey, &recsig, message) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(both, NULL, &recsig, message) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(both, &recpubkey, NULL, message) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(both, &recpubkey, &recsig, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + + /* Check NULLs for conversion */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(both, &normal_sig, message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(both, NULL, &recsig) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(both, &normal_sig, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(both, &normal_sig, &recsig) == 1); + + /* Check NULLs for de/serialization */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(both, &recsig, message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(both, NULL, &recid, &recsig) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(both, sig, NULL, &recsig) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(both, sig, &recid, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(both, sig, &recid, &recsig) == 1); + + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(both, NULL, sig, recid) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(both, &recsig, NULL, recid) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(both, &recsig, sig, -1) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 6); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(both, &recsig, sig, 5) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 7); + /* overflow in signature will fail but not affect ecount */ + memcpy(sig, over_privkey, 32); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(both, &recsig, sig, recid) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 7); + + /* cleanup */ + secp256k1_context_destroy(none); + secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); + secp256k1_context_destroy(vrfy); + secp256k1_context_destroy(both); +} + +void test_ecdsa_recovery_end_to_end(void) { + unsigned char extra[32] = {0x00}; + unsigned char privkey[32]; + unsigned char message[32]; + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature signature[5]; + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature rsignature[5]; + unsigned char sig[74]; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; + secp256k1_pubkey recpubkey; + int recid = 0; + + /* Generate a random key and message. */ + { + secp256k1_scalar msg, key; + random_scalar_order_test(&msg); + random_scalar_order_test(&key); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(privkey, &key); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(message, &msg); + } + + /* Construct and verify corresponding public key. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, privkey) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, privkey) == 1); + + /* Serialize/parse compact and verify/recover. */ + extra[0] = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(ctx, &rsignature[0], message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &signature[0], message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(ctx, &rsignature[4], message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(ctx, &rsignature[1], message, privkey, NULL, extra) == 1); + extra[31] = 1; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(ctx, &rsignature[2], message, privkey, NULL, extra) == 1); + extra[31] = 0; + extra[0] = 1; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(ctx, &rsignature[3], message, privkey, NULL, extra) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, sig, &recid, &rsignature[4]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(ctx, &signature[4], &rsignature[4]) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&signature[4], &signature[0], 64) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[4], message, &pubkey) == 1); + memset(&rsignature[4], 0, sizeof(rsignature[4])); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsignature[4], sig, recid) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(ctx, &signature[4], &rsignature[4]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[4], message, &pubkey) == 1); + /* Parse compact (with recovery id) and recover. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsignature[4], sig, recid) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &recpubkey, &rsignature[4], message) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, &recpubkey, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + /* Serialize/destroy/parse signature and verify again. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, sig, &recid, &rsignature[4]) == 1); + sig[secp256k1_rand_bits(6)] += 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsignature[4], sig, recid) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(ctx, &signature[4], &rsignature[4]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[4], message, &pubkey) == 0); + /* Recover again */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &recpubkey, &rsignature[4], message) == 0 || + memcmp(&pubkey, &recpubkey, sizeof(pubkey)) != 0); +} + +/* Tests several edge cases. */ +void test_ecdsa_recovery_edge_cases(void) { + const unsigned char msg32[32] = { + 'T', 'h', 'i', 's', ' ', 'i', 's', ' ', + 'a', ' ', 'v', 'e', 'r', 'y', ' ', 's', + 'e', 'c', 'r', 'e', 't', ' ', 'm', 'e', + 's', 's', 'a', 'g', 'e', '.', '.', '.' + }; + const unsigned char sig64[64] = { + /* Generated by signing the above message with nonce 'This is the nonce we will use...' + * and secret key 0 (which is not valid), resulting in recid 0. */ + 0x67, 0xCB, 0x28, 0x5F, 0x9C, 0xD1, 0x94, 0xE8, + 0x40, 0xD6, 0x29, 0x39, 0x7A, 0xF5, 0x56, 0x96, + 0x62, 0xFD, 0xE4, 0x46, 0x49, 0x99, 0x59, 0x63, + 0x17, 0x9A, 0x7D, 0xD1, 0x7B, 0xD2, 0x35, 0x32, + 0x4B, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0xF3, 0x4C, 0xE1, 0xF6, 0x8E, + 0x69, 0x4F, 0xF6, 0xF1, 0x1A, 0xC7, 0x51, 0xDD, + 0x7D, 0xD7, 0x3E, 0x38, 0x7E, 0xE4, 0xFC, 0x86, + 0x6E, 0x1B, 0xE8, 0xEC, 0xC7, 0xDD, 0x95, 0x57 + }; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; + /* signature (r,s) = (4,4), which can be recovered with all 4 recids. */ + const unsigned char sigb64[64] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, + }; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkeyb; + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature rsig; + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; + int recid; + + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsig, sig64, 0)); + CHECK(!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &pubkey, &rsig, msg32)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsig, sig64, 1)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &pubkey, &rsig, msg32)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsig, sig64, 2)); + CHECK(!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &pubkey, &rsig, msg32)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsig, sig64, 3)); + CHECK(!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &pubkey, &rsig, msg32)); + + for (recid = 0; recid < 4; recid++) { + int i; + int recid2; + /* (4,4) encoded in DER. */ + unsigned char sigbder[8] = {0x30, 0x06, 0x02, 0x01, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x04}; + unsigned char sigcder_zr[7] = {0x30, 0x05, 0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01}; + unsigned char sigcder_zs[7] = {0x30, 0x05, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x00}; + unsigned char sigbderalt1[39] = { + 0x30, 0x25, 0x02, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x04, + }; + unsigned char sigbderalt2[39] = { + 0x30, 0x25, 0x02, 0x01, 0x04, 0x02, 0x20, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, + }; + unsigned char sigbderalt3[40] = { + 0x30, 0x26, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x04, + }; + unsigned char sigbderalt4[40] = { + 0x30, 0x26, 0x02, 0x01, 0x04, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, + }; + /* (order + r,4) encoded in DER. */ + unsigned char sigbderlong[40] = { + 0x30, 0x26, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xBA, 0xAE, 0xDC, + 0xE6, 0xAF, 0x48, 0xA0, 0x3B, 0xBF, 0xD2, 0x5E, + 0x8C, 0xD0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x45, 0x02, 0x01, 0x04 + }; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsig, sigb64, recid) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &pubkeyb, &rsig, msg32) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbder, sizeof(sigbder)) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pubkeyb) == 1); + for (recid2 = 0; recid2 < 4; recid2++) { + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey2b; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsig, sigb64, recid2) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &pubkey2b, &rsig, msg32) == 1); + /* Verifying with (order + r,4) should always fail. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbderlong, sizeof(sigbderlong)) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pubkeyb) == 0); + } + /* DER parsing tests. */ + /* Zero length r/s. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigcder_zr, sizeof(sigcder_zr)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigcder_zs, sizeof(sigcder_zs)) == 0); + /* Leading zeros. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbderalt1, sizeof(sigbderalt1)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbderalt2, sizeof(sigbderalt2)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbderalt3, sizeof(sigbderalt3)) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbderalt4, sizeof(sigbderalt4)) == 0); + sigbderalt3[4] = 1; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbderalt3, sizeof(sigbderalt3)) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pubkeyb) == 0); + sigbderalt4[7] = 1; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbderalt4, sizeof(sigbderalt4)) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pubkeyb) == 0); + /* Damage signature. */ + sigbder[7]++; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbder, sizeof(sigbder)) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pubkeyb) == 0); + sigbder[7]--; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbder, 6) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbder, sizeof(sigbder) - 1) == 0); + for(i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + int c; + unsigned char orig = sigbder[i]; + /*Try every single-byte change.*/ + for (c = 0; c < 256; c++) { + if (c == orig ) { + continue; + } + sigbder[i] = c; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbder, sizeof(sigbder)) == 0 || secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pubkeyb) == 0); + } + sigbder[i] = orig; + } + } + + /* Test r/s equal to zero */ + { + /* (1,1) encoded in DER. */ + unsigned char sigcder[8] = {0x30, 0x06, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01}; + unsigned char sigc64[64] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + }; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkeyc; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsig, sigc64, 0) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &pubkeyc, &rsig, msg32) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigcder, sizeof(sigcder)) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pubkeyc) == 1); + sigcder[4] = 0; + sigc64[31] = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsig, sigc64, 0) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &pubkeyb, &rsig, msg32) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigcder, sizeof(sigcder)) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pubkeyc) == 0); + sigcder[4] = 1; + sigcder[7] = 0; + sigc64[31] = 1; + sigc64[63] = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsig, sigc64, 0) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &pubkeyb, &rsig, msg32) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigcder, sizeof(sigcder)) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pubkeyc) == 0); + } +} + +void run_recovery_tests(void) { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + test_ecdsa_recovery_api(); + } + for (i = 0; i < 64*count; i++) { + test_ecdsa_recovery_end_to_end(); + } + test_ecdsa_recovery_edge_cases(); +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_MODULE_RECOVERY_TESTS_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/Makefile.am.include b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/Makefile.am.include new file mode 100644 index 0000000..51ece21 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/Makefile.am.include @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_surjectionproof.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/surjection/main_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/surjection/surjection.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/surjection/surjection_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/surjection/tests_impl.h + diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/main_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/main_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c67d4c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/main_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,338 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2016 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ +#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_SURJECTION_MAIN +#define SECP256K1_MODULE_SURJECTION_MAIN + +#include +#include + +#include "modules/rangeproof/borromean.h" +#include "modules/surjection/surjection_impl.h" +#include "hash.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_surjectionproof.h" + +static size_t secp256k1_count_bits_set(const unsigned char* data, size_t count) { + size_t ret = 0; + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { +#ifdef HAVE_BUILTIN_POPCOUNT + ret += __builtin_popcount(data[i]); +#else + ret += !!(data[i] & 0x1); + ret += !!(data[i] & 0x2); + ret += !!(data[i] & 0x4); + ret += !!(data[i] & 0x8); + ret += !!(data[i] & 0x10); + ret += !!(data[i] & 0x20); + ret += !!(data[i] & 0x40); + ret += !!(data[i] & 0x80); +#endif + } + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_surjectionproof *proof, const unsigned char *input, size_t inputlen) { + size_t n_inputs; + size_t signature_len; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(input != NULL); + (void) ctx; + + if (inputlen < 2) { + return 0; + } + n_inputs = ((size_t) (input[1] << 8)) + input[0]; + if (n_inputs > SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS) { + return 0; + } + if (inputlen < 2 + (n_inputs + 7) / 8) { + return 0; + } + + signature_len = 32 * (1 + secp256k1_count_bits_set(&input[2], (n_inputs + 7) / 8)); + if (inputlen != 2 + (n_inputs + 7) / 8 + signature_len) { + return 0; + } + proof->n_inputs = n_inputs; + memcpy(proof->used_inputs, &input[2], (n_inputs + 7) / 8); + memcpy(proof->data, &input[2 + (n_inputs + 7) / 8], signature_len); + + return 1; +} + +int secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *outputlen, const secp256k1_surjectionproof *proof) { + size_t signature_len; + size_t serialized_len; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(output != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(outputlen != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); + (void) ctx; + + signature_len = 32 * (1 + secp256k1_count_bits_set(proof->used_inputs, (proof->n_inputs + 7) / 8)); + serialized_len = 2 + (proof->n_inputs + 7) / 8 + signature_len; + if (*outputlen < serialized_len) { + return 0; + } + + output[0] = proof->n_inputs % 0x100; + output[1] = proof->n_inputs / 0x100; + memcpy(&output[2], proof->used_inputs, (proof->n_inputs + 7) / 8); + memcpy(&output[2 + (proof->n_inputs + 7) / 8], proof->data, signature_len); + *outputlen = serialized_len; + + return 1; +} + +size_t secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_total_inputs(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof) { + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); + (void) ctx; + return proof->n_inputs; +} + +size_t secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_used_inputs(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof) { + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); + (void) ctx; + return secp256k1_count_bits_set(proof->used_inputs, (proof->n_inputs + 7) / 8); +} + +size_t secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialized_size(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof) { + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); + return 2 + (proof->n_inputs + 7) / 8 + 32 * (1 + secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_used_inputs(ctx, proof)); +} + +typedef struct { + unsigned char state[32]; + size_t state_i; +} secp256k1_surjectionproof_csprng; + +static void secp256k1_surjectionproof_csprng_init(secp256k1_surjectionproof_csprng *csprng, const unsigned char* state) { + memcpy(csprng->state, state, 32); + csprng->state_i = 0; +} + +static size_t secp256k1_surjectionproof_csprng_next(secp256k1_surjectionproof_csprng *csprng, size_t rand_max) { + /* The number of random bytes to read for each random sample */ + const size_t increment = rand_max > 256 ? 2 : 1; + /* The maximum value expressable by the number of random bytes we read */ + const size_t selection_range = rand_max > 256 ? 0xffff : 0xff; + /* The largest multiple of rand_max that fits within selection_range */ + const size_t limit = ((selection_range + 1) / rand_max) * rand_max; + + while (1) { + size_t val; + if (csprng->state_i + increment >= 32) { + secp256k1_sha256 sha; + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, csprng->state, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, csprng->state); + csprng->state_i = 0; + } + val = csprng->state[csprng->state_i]; + if (increment > 1) { + val = (val << 8) + csprng->state[csprng->state_i + 1]; + } + csprng->state_i += increment; + /* Accept only values below our limit. Values equal to or above the limit are + * biased because they comprise only a subset of the range (0, rand_max - 1) */ + if (val < limit) { + return val % rand_max; + } + } +} + +int secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof, size_t *input_index, const secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag* fixed_input_tags, const size_t n_input_tags, const size_t n_input_tags_to_use, const secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag* fixed_output_tag, const size_t n_max_iterations, const unsigned char *random_seed32) { + secp256k1_surjectionproof_csprng csprng; + size_t n_iterations = 0; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(input_index != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(fixed_input_tags != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(fixed_output_tag != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(random_seed32 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(n_input_tags <= SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS); + ARG_CHECK(n_input_tags_to_use <= n_input_tags); + (void) ctx; + + secp256k1_surjectionproof_csprng_init(&csprng, random_seed32); + memset(proof->data, 0, sizeof(proof->data)); + proof->n_inputs = n_input_tags; + + while (1) { + int has_output_tag = 0; + size_t i; + + /* obtain a random set of indices */ + memset(proof->used_inputs, 0, sizeof(proof->used_inputs)); + for (i = 0; i < n_input_tags_to_use; i++) { + while (1) { + size_t next_input_index; + next_input_index = secp256k1_surjectionproof_csprng_next(&csprng, n_input_tags); + if (memcmp(&fixed_input_tags[next_input_index], fixed_output_tag, sizeof(*fixed_output_tag)) == 0) { + *input_index = next_input_index; + has_output_tag = 1; + } + + if (!(proof->used_inputs[next_input_index / 8] & (1 << (next_input_index % 8)))) { + proof->used_inputs[next_input_index / 8] |= (1 << (next_input_index % 8)); + break; + } + } + } + + /* Check if we succeeded */ + n_iterations++; + if (has_output_tag) { +#ifdef VERIFY + proof->initialized = 1; +#endif + return n_iterations; + } + if (n_iterations >= n_max_iterations) { +#ifdef VERIFY + proof->initialized = 0; +#endif + return 0; + } + } +} + +int secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof, const secp256k1_generator* ephemeral_input_tags, size_t n_ephemeral_input_tags, const secp256k1_generator* ephemeral_output_tag, size_t input_index, const unsigned char *input_blinding_key, const unsigned char *output_blinding_key) { + secp256k1_scalar blinding_key; + secp256k1_scalar tmps; + secp256k1_scalar nonce; + int overflow = 0; + size_t rsizes[1]; /* array needed for borromean sig API */ + size_t indices[1]; /* array needed for borromean sig API */ + size_t i; + size_t n_total_pubkeys; + size_t n_used_pubkeys; + size_t ring_input_index = 0; + secp256k1_gej ring_pubkeys[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS]; + secp256k1_scalar borromean_s[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS]; + secp256k1_ge inputs[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS]; + secp256k1_ge output; + unsigned char msg32[32]; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(ephemeral_input_tags != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(ephemeral_output_tag != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(input_blinding_key != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(output_blinding_key != NULL); +#ifdef VERIFY + CHECK(proof->initialized == 1); +#endif + + /* Compute secret key */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&tmps, input_blinding_key, &overflow); + if (overflow) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&blinding_key, output_blinding_key, &overflow); + if (overflow) { + return 0; + } + /* The only time the input may equal the output is if neither one was blinded in the first place, + * i.e. both blinding keys are zero. Otherwise this is a privacy leak. */ + if (secp256k1_scalar_eq(&tmps, &blinding_key) && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&blinding_key)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&tmps, &tmps); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&blinding_key, &blinding_key, &tmps); + + /* Compute public keys */ + n_total_pubkeys = secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_total_inputs(ctx, proof); + n_used_pubkeys = secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_used_inputs(ctx, proof); + if (n_used_pubkeys > n_total_pubkeys || n_total_pubkeys != n_ephemeral_input_tags) { + return 0; + } + + secp256k1_generator_load(&output, ephemeral_output_tag); + for (i = 0; i < n_total_pubkeys; i++) { + secp256k1_generator_load(&inputs[i], &ephemeral_input_tags[i]); + } + + secp256k1_surjection_compute_public_keys(ring_pubkeys, n_used_pubkeys, inputs, n_total_pubkeys, proof->used_inputs, &output, input_index, &ring_input_index); + + /* Produce signature */ + rsizes[0] = (int) n_used_pubkeys; + indices[0] = (int) ring_input_index; + secp256k1_surjection_genmessage(msg32, inputs, n_total_pubkeys, &output); + if (secp256k1_surjection_genrand(borromean_s, n_used_pubkeys, &blinding_key) == 0) { + return 0; + } + /* Borromean sign will overwrite one of the s values we just generated, so use + * it as a nonce instead. This avoids extra random generation and also is an + * homage to the rangeproof code which does this very cleverly to encode messages. */ + nonce = borromean_s[ring_input_index]; + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&borromean_s[ring_input_index]); + if (secp256k1_borromean_sign(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &proof->data[0], borromean_s, ring_pubkeys, &nonce, &blinding_key, rsizes, indices, 1, msg32, 32) == 0) { + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < n_used_pubkeys; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&proof->data[32 + 32 * i], &borromean_s[i]); + } + return 1; +} + +int secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof, const secp256k1_generator* ephemeral_input_tags, size_t n_ephemeral_input_tags, const secp256k1_generator* ephemeral_output_tag) { + size_t rsizes[1]; /* array needed for borromean sig API */ + size_t i; + size_t n_total_pubkeys; + size_t n_used_pubkeys; + secp256k1_gej ring_pubkeys[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS]; + secp256k1_scalar borromean_s[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS]; + secp256k1_ge inputs[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS]; + secp256k1_ge output; + unsigned char msg32[32]; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(ephemeral_input_tags != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(ephemeral_output_tag != NULL); + + /* Compute public keys */ + n_total_pubkeys = secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_total_inputs(ctx, proof); + n_used_pubkeys = secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_used_inputs(ctx, proof); + if (n_used_pubkeys == 0 || n_used_pubkeys > n_total_pubkeys || n_total_pubkeys != n_ephemeral_input_tags) { + return 0; + } + + secp256k1_generator_load(&output, ephemeral_output_tag); + for (i = 0; i < n_total_pubkeys; i++) { + secp256k1_generator_load(&inputs[i], &ephemeral_input_tags[i]); + } + + if (secp256k1_surjection_compute_public_keys(ring_pubkeys, n_used_pubkeys, inputs, n_total_pubkeys, proof->used_inputs, &output, 0, NULL) == 0) { + return 0; + } + + /* Verify signature */ + rsizes[0] = (int) n_used_pubkeys; + for (i = 0; i < n_used_pubkeys; i++) { + int overflow = 0; + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&borromean_s[i], &proof->data[32 + 32 * i], &overflow); + if (overflow == 1) { + return 0; + } + } + secp256k1_surjection_genmessage(msg32, inputs, n_total_pubkeys, &output); + return secp256k1_borromean_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, NULL, &proof->data[0], borromean_s, ring_pubkeys, rsizes, 1, msg32, 32); +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..20ac493 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection.h @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2016 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef _SECP256K1_SURJECTION_H_ +#define _SECP256K1_SURJECTION_H_ + +#include "group.h" +#include "scalar.h" + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_surjection_genmessage(unsigned char *msg32, secp256k1_ge *ephemeral_input_tags, size_t n_input_tags, secp256k1_ge *ephemeral_output_tag); + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_surjection_genrand(secp256k1_scalar *s, size_t ns, const secp256k1_scalar *blinding_key); + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_surjection_compute_public_keys(secp256k1_gej *pubkeys, size_t n_pubkeys, const secp256k1_ge *input_tags, size_t n_input_tags, const unsigned char *used_tags, const secp256k1_ge *output_tag, size_t input_index, size_t *ring_input_index); + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection.md b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e7bd4db --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection.md @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +Surjection Proof Module +=========================== + +This module implements a scheme by which a given point can be proven to be +equal to one of a set of points, plus a known difference. This is used in +Confidential Assets when reblinding "asset commitments", which are NUMS +points, to prove that the underlying NUMS point does not change during +reblinding. + +Assets are represented, in general, by a 32-byte seed (a hash of some +transaction data) which is hashed to form a NUMS generator, which appears +on the blockchain only in blinded form. We refer to the seed as an +"asset ID" and the blinded generator as an "(ephemeral) asset commitment". +These asset commitments are unique per-output, and their NUMS components +are in general known only to the holder of the output. + +The result is that within a transaction, all outputs are able to have +a new uniformly-random asset commitment which cannot be associated with +any individual input asset id, but verifiers are nonetheless assured that +all assets coming out of a transaction are ones that went in. + +### Terminology + +Assets are identified by a 32-byte "asset ID". In this library these IDs +are used as input to a point-valued hash function `H`. We usually refer +to the hash output as `A`, since this output is the only thing that appears +in the algebra. + +Then transaction outputs have "asset commitments", which are curvepoints +of the form `A + rG`, where `A` is the hash of the asset ID and `r` is +some random "blinding factor". + +### Design Rationale + +Confidential Assets essentially works by replacing the second NUMS generator +`H` in Confidental Transactions with a per-asset unique NUMS generator. This +allows the same verification equation (the sum of all blinded inputs must +equal the sum of all blinded outputs) to imply that quantity of *every* asset +type is preserved in each transaction. + +It turns out that even if outputs are reblinded by the addition of `rG` for +some known `r`, this verification equation has the same meaning, with one +caveat: verifiers must be assured that the reblinding preserves the original +generators (and does not, for example, negate them). + +This assurance is what surjection proofs provide. + +### Limitations + +The naive scheme works as follows: every output asset is shown to have come +from some input asset. However, the proofs scale with the number of input +assets, so for all outputs the total size of all surjection proofs is `O(mn)` +for `m`, `n` the number of inputs and outputs. + +We therefore restrict the number of inputs that each output may have come +from to 3 (well, some fixed number, which is passed into the API), which +provides a weaker form of blinding, but gives `O(n)` scaling. Over many +transactions, the privacy afforded by this increases exponentially. + +### Our Scheme + +Our scheme works as follows. Proofs are generated in two steps, "initialization" +which selects a subset of inputs and "generation" which does the mathematical +part of proof generation. + +Every input has an asset commitment for which we know the blinding key and +underlying asset ID. + +#### Initialization + +The initialization function takes a list of input asset IDs and one output +asset ID. It chooses an input subset of some fixed size repeatedly until it +the output ID appears at least once in its subset. + +It stores a bitmap representing this subset in the proof object and returns +the number of iterations it needed to choose the subset. The reciprocal of +this represents the probability that a uniformly random input-output +mapping would correspond to the actual input-output mapping, and therefore +gives a measure of privacy. (Lower iteration counts are better.) + +It also informs the caller the index of the input whose ID matches the output. + +As the API works on only a single output at a time, the total probability +should be computed by multiplying together the counts for each output. + +#### Generation + +The generation function takes a list of input asset commitments, an output +asset commitment, the input index returned by the initialization step, and +blinding keys for (a) the output commitment, (b) the input commitment. Here +"the input commitment" refers specifically to the input whose index was +chosen during initialization. + +Next, it computes a ring signature over the differences between the output +commitment and every input commitment chosen during initialization. Since +the discrete log of one of these is the difference between the output and +input blinding keys, it is possible to create a ring signature over every +differences will be the blinding factor of the output. We create such a +signature, which completes the proof. + +#### Verification + +Verification takes a surjection proof object, a list of input commitments, +and an output commitment. The proof object contains a ring signature and +a bitmap describing which input commitments to use, and verification +succeeds iff the signature verifies. + + diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f58026d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2016 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef _SECP256K1_SURJECTION_IMPL_H_ +#define _SECP256K1_SURJECTION_IMPL_H_ + +#include +#include + +#include "eckey.h" +#include "group.h" +#include "scalar.h" +#include "hash.h" + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_surjection_genmessage(unsigned char *msg32, secp256k1_ge *ephemeral_input_tags, size_t n_input_tags, secp256k1_ge *ephemeral_output_tag) { + /* compute message */ + size_t i; + unsigned char pk_ser[33]; + size_t pk_len = sizeof(pk_ser); + secp256k1_sha256 sha256_en; + + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256_en); + for (i = 0; i < n_input_tags; i++) { + secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&ephemeral_input_tags[i], pk_ser, &pk_len, 1); + assert(pk_len == sizeof(pk_ser)); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_en, pk_ser, pk_len); + } + secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(ephemeral_output_tag, pk_ser, &pk_len, 1); + assert(pk_len == sizeof(pk_ser)); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_en, pk_ser, pk_len); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256_en, msg32); +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_surjection_genrand(secp256k1_scalar *s, size_t ns, const secp256k1_scalar *blinding_key) { + size_t i; + unsigned char sec_input[36]; + secp256k1_sha256 sha256_en; + + /* compute s values */ + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&sec_input[4], blinding_key); + for (i = 0; i < ns; i++) { + int overflow = 0; + sec_input[0] = i; + sec_input[1] = i >> 8; + sec_input[2] = i >> 16; + sec_input[3] = i >> 24; + + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256_en); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_en, sec_input, 36); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256_en, sec_input); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s[i], sec_input, &overflow); + if (overflow == 1) { + memset(sec_input, 0, 32); + return 0; + } + } + memset(sec_input, 0, 32); + return 1; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_surjection_compute_public_keys(secp256k1_gej *pubkeys, size_t n_pubkeys, const secp256k1_ge *input_tags, size_t n_input_tags, const unsigned char *used_tags, const secp256k1_ge *output_tag, size_t input_index, size_t *ring_input_index) { + size_t i; + size_t j = 0; + for (i = 0; i < n_input_tags; i++) { + if (used_tags[i / 8] & (1 << (i % 8))) { + secp256k1_ge tmpge; + secp256k1_ge_neg(&tmpge, &input_tags[i]); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pubkeys[j], &tmpge); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&pubkeys[j], &pubkeys[j], output_tag, NULL); + if (ring_input_index != NULL && input_index == i) { + *ring_input_index = j; + } + j++; + if (j > n_pubkeys) { + return 0; + } + } + } + return 1; +} + + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/tests_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/tests_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a0856e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/tests_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,494 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2016 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_SURJECTIONPROOF_TESTS +#define SECP256K1_MODULE_SURJECTIONPROOF_TESTS + +#include "testrand.h" +#include "group.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_generator.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_surjectionproof.h" + +static void test_surjectionproof_api(void) { + unsigned char seed[32]; + secp256k1_context *none = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); + secp256k1_context *sign = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); + secp256k1_context *vrfy = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + secp256k1_context *both = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag fixed_input_tags[10]; + secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag fixed_output_tag; + secp256k1_generator ephemeral_input_tags[10]; + secp256k1_generator ephemeral_output_tag; + unsigned char input_blinding_key[10][32]; + unsigned char output_blinding_key[32]; + unsigned char serialized_proof[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_SERIALIZATION_BYTES_MAX]; + size_t serialized_len; + secp256k1_surjectionproof proof; + size_t n_inputs = sizeof(fixed_input_tags) / sizeof(fixed_input_tags[0]); + size_t input_index; + int32_t ecount = 0; + size_t i; + + secp256k1_rand256(seed); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + + for (i = 0; i < n_inputs; i++) { + secp256k1_rand256(input_blinding_key[i]); + secp256k1_rand256(fixed_input_tags[i].data); + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(ctx, &ephemeral_input_tags[i], fixed_input_tags[i].data, input_blinding_key[i])); + } + secp256k1_rand256(output_blinding_key); + memcpy(&fixed_output_tag, &fixed_input_tags[0], sizeof(fixed_input_tags[0])); + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(ctx, &ephemeral_output_tag, fixed_output_tag.data, output_blinding_key)); + + /* check initialize */ + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 0, &fixed_input_tags[0], 100, seed) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 3, &fixed_input_tags[0], 100, seed) != 0); + CHECK(ecount == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, NULL, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 3, &fixed_input_tags[0], 100, seed) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, NULL, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 3, &fixed_input_tags[0], 100, seed) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, &input_index, NULL, n_inputs, 3, &fixed_input_tags[0], 100, seed) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS + 1, 3, &fixed_input_tags[0], 100, seed) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_inputs, &fixed_input_tags[0], 100, seed) != 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_inputs + 1, &fixed_input_tags[0], 100, seed) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 3, NULL, 100, seed) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 6); + CHECK((secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 0, &fixed_input_tags[0], 0, seed) & 1) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 6); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 0, &fixed_input_tags[0], 100, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 7); + + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 3, &fixed_input_tags[0], 100, seed) != 0); + /* check generate */ + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(none, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 8); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(vrfy, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 9); + + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(sign, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 10); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) != 0); + CHECK(ecount == 10); + + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, NULL, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 11); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, NULL, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 12); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs + 1, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 12); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs - 1, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 12); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, 0, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 12); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, NULL, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 13); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, 1, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) != 0); + CHECK(ecount == 13); /* the above line "succeeds" but generates an invalid proof as the input_index is wrong. it is fairly expensive to detect this. should we? */ + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, n_inputs + 1, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) != 0); + CHECK(ecount == 13); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, NULL, output_blinding_key) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 14); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 15); + + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) != 0); + /* check verify */ + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(none, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 16); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(sign, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 17); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(vrfy, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag) != 0); + CHECK(ecount == 17); + + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(vrfy, NULL, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 18); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(vrfy, &proof, NULL, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 19); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(vrfy, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs - 1, &ephemeral_output_tag) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 19); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(vrfy, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs + 1, &ephemeral_output_tag) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 19); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(vrfy, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 20); + + /* Check serialize */ + serialized_len = sizeof(serialized_proof); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize(none, serialized_proof, &serialized_len, &proof) != 0); + CHECK(ecount == 20); + serialized_len = sizeof(serialized_proof); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize(none, NULL, &serialized_len, &proof) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 21); + serialized_len = sizeof(serialized_proof); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize(none, serialized_proof, NULL, &proof) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 22); + serialized_len = sizeof(serialized_proof); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize(none, serialized_proof, &serialized_len, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 23); + + serialized_len = sizeof(serialized_proof); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize(none, serialized_proof, &serialized_len, &proof) != 0); + /* Check parse */ + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse(none, &proof, serialized_proof, serialized_len) != 0); + CHECK(ecount == 23); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse(none, NULL, serialized_proof, serialized_len) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 24); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse(none, &proof, NULL, serialized_len) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 25); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse(none, &proof, serialized_proof, 0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 25); + + secp256k1_context_destroy(none); + secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); + secp256k1_context_destroy(vrfy); + secp256k1_context_destroy(both); +} + +static void test_input_selection(size_t n_inputs) { + unsigned char seed[32]; + size_t i; + size_t result; + size_t input_index; + size_t try_count = n_inputs * 100; + secp256k1_surjectionproof proof; + secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag fixed_input_tags[1000]; + const size_t max_n_inputs = sizeof(fixed_input_tags) / sizeof(fixed_input_tags[0]) - 1; + + CHECK(n_inputs < max_n_inputs); + secp256k1_rand256(seed); + + for (i = 0; i < n_inputs + 1; i++) { + secp256k1_rand256(fixed_input_tags[i].data); + } + + /* cannot match output when told to use zero keys */ + result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(ctx, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 0, &fixed_input_tags[0], try_count, seed); + CHECK(result == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_used_inputs(ctx, &proof) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_total_inputs(ctx, &proof) == n_inputs); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialized_size(ctx, &proof) == 34 + (n_inputs + 7) / 8); + if (n_inputs > 0) { + /* succeed in 100*n_inputs tries (probability of failure e^-100) */ + result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(ctx, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 1, &fixed_input_tags[0], try_count, seed); + CHECK(result > 0); + CHECK(result < n_inputs * 10); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_used_inputs(ctx, &proof) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_total_inputs(ctx, &proof) == n_inputs); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialized_size(ctx, &proof) == 66 + (n_inputs + 7) / 8); + CHECK(input_index == 0); + } + + if (n_inputs >= 3) { + /* succeed in 10*n_inputs tries (probability of failure e^-10) */ + result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(ctx, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 3, &fixed_input_tags[1], try_count, seed); + CHECK(result > 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_used_inputs(ctx, &proof) == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_total_inputs(ctx, &proof) == n_inputs); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialized_size(ctx, &proof) == 130 + (n_inputs + 7) / 8); + CHECK(input_index == 1); + + /* fail, key not found */ + result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(ctx, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 3, &fixed_input_tags[n_inputs], try_count, seed); + CHECK(result == 0); + + /* succeed on first try when told to use all keys */ + result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(ctx, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_inputs, &fixed_input_tags[0], try_count, seed); + CHECK(result == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_used_inputs(ctx, &proof) == n_inputs); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_total_inputs(ctx, &proof) == n_inputs); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialized_size(ctx, &proof) == 2 + 32 * (n_inputs + 1) + (n_inputs + 7) / 8); + CHECK(input_index == 0); + + /* succeed in less than 64 tries when told to use half keys. (probability of failure 2^-64) */ + result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(ctx, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_inputs / 2, &fixed_input_tags[0], 64, seed); + CHECK(result > 0); + CHECK(result < 64); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_used_inputs(ctx, &proof) == n_inputs / 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_total_inputs(ctx, &proof) == n_inputs); + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialized_size(ctx, &proof) == 2 + 32 * (n_inputs / 2 + 1) + (n_inputs + 7) / 8); + CHECK(input_index == 0); + } +} + +/** Runs surjectionproof_initilize multiple times and records the number of times each input was used. + */ +static void test_input_selection_distribution_helper(const secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag* fixed_input_tags, const size_t n_input_tags, const size_t n_input_tags_to_use, size_t *used_inputs) { + secp256k1_surjectionproof proof; + size_t input_index; + size_t i; + size_t j; + unsigned char seed[32]; + size_t result; + for (i = 0; i < n_input_tags; i++) { + used_inputs[i] = 0; + } + for(j = 0; j < 10000; j++) { + secp256k1_rand256(seed); + result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(ctx, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_input_tags, n_input_tags_to_use, &fixed_input_tags[0], 64, seed); + CHECK(result > 0); + + for (i = 0; i < n_input_tags; i++) { + if (proof.used_inputs[i / 8] & (1 << (i % 8))) { + used_inputs[i] += 1; + } + } + } +} + +/** Probabilistic test of the distribution of used_inputs after surjectionproof_initialize. + * Each confidence interval assertion fails incorrectly with a probability of 2^-128. + */ +static void test_input_selection_distribution(void) { + size_t i; + size_t n_input_tags_to_use; + const size_t n_inputs = 4; + secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag fixed_input_tags[4]; + size_t used_inputs[4]; + + for (i = 0; i < n_inputs; i++) { + secp256k1_rand256(fixed_input_tags[i].data); + } + + /* If there is one input tag to use, initialize must choose the one equal to fixed_output_tag. */ + n_input_tags_to_use = 1; + test_input_selection_distribution_helper(fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_input_tags_to_use, used_inputs); + CHECK(used_inputs[0] == 10000); + CHECK(used_inputs[1] == 0); + CHECK(used_inputs[2] == 0); + CHECK(used_inputs[3] == 0); + + n_input_tags_to_use = 2; + /* The input equal to the fixed_output_tag must be included in all used_inputs sets. + * For each fixed_input_tag != fixed_output_tag the probability that it's included + * in the used_inputs set is P(used_input|not fixed_output_tag) = 1/3. + */ + test_input_selection_distribution_helper(fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_input_tags_to_use, used_inputs); + CHECK(used_inputs[0] == 10000); + CHECK(used_inputs[1] > 2725 && used_inputs[1] < 3961); + CHECK(used_inputs[2] > 2725 && used_inputs[2] < 3961); + CHECK(used_inputs[3] > 2725 && used_inputs[3] < 3961); + + n_input_tags_to_use = 3; + /* P(used_input|not fixed_output_tag) = 2/3 */ + test_input_selection_distribution_helper(fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_input_tags_to_use, used_inputs); + CHECK(used_inputs[0] == 10000); + CHECK(used_inputs[1] > 6039 && used_inputs[1] < 7275); + CHECK(used_inputs[2] > 6039 && used_inputs[2] < 7275); + CHECK(used_inputs[3] > 6039 && used_inputs[3] < 7275); + + + n_input_tags_to_use = 1; + /* Create second input tag that is equal to the output tag. Therefore, when using only + * one input we have P(used_input|fixed_output_tag) = 1/2 and P(used_input|not fixed_output_tag) = 0 + */ + memcpy(fixed_input_tags[0].data, fixed_input_tags[1].data, 32); + test_input_selection_distribution_helper(fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_input_tags_to_use, used_inputs); + CHECK(used_inputs[0] > 4345 && used_inputs[0] < 5655); + CHECK(used_inputs[1] > 4345 && used_inputs[1] < 5655); + CHECK(used_inputs[2] == 0); + CHECK(used_inputs[3] == 0); + + n_input_tags_to_use = 2; + /* When choosing 2 inputs in initialization there are 5 possible combinations of + * input indexes {(0, 1), (1, 2), (0, 3), (1, 3), (0, 2)}. Therefore we have + * P(used_input|fixed_output_tag) = 3/5 and P(used_input|not fixed_output_tag) = 2/5. + */ + test_input_selection_distribution_helper(fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_input_tags_to_use, used_inputs); + CHECK(used_inputs[0] > 5352 && used_inputs[0] < 6637); + CHECK(used_inputs[1] > 5352 && used_inputs[1] < 6637); + CHECK(used_inputs[2] > 3363 && used_inputs[2] < 4648); + CHECK(used_inputs[3] > 3363 && used_inputs[3] < 4648); + + n_input_tags_to_use = 3; + /* There are 4 combinations, each with all inputs except one. Therefore we have + * P(used_input|fixed_output_tag) = 3/4 and P(used_input|not fixed_output_tag) = 3/4. + */ + test_input_selection_distribution_helper(fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_input_tags_to_use, used_inputs); + CHECK(used_inputs[0] > 6918 && used_inputs[0] < 8053); + CHECK(used_inputs[1] > 6918 && used_inputs[1] < 8053); + CHECK(used_inputs[2] > 6918 && used_inputs[2] < 8053); + CHECK(used_inputs[3] > 6918 && used_inputs[3] < 8053); +} + +static void test_gen_verify(size_t n_inputs, size_t n_used) { + unsigned char seed[32]; + secp256k1_surjectionproof proof; + unsigned char serialized_proof[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_SERIALIZATION_BYTES_MAX]; + unsigned char serialized_proof_trailing[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_SERIALIZATION_BYTES_MAX + 1]; + size_t serialized_len = SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_SERIALIZATION_BYTES_MAX; + secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag fixed_input_tags[1000]; + secp256k1_generator ephemeral_input_tags[1000]; + unsigned char *input_blinding_key[1000]; + const size_t max_n_inputs = sizeof(fixed_input_tags) / sizeof(fixed_input_tags[0]) - 1; + size_t try_count = n_inputs * 100; + size_t key_index; + size_t input_index; + size_t i; + int result; + + /* setup */ + CHECK(n_used <= n_inputs); + CHECK(n_inputs < max_n_inputs); + secp256k1_rand256(seed); + + key_index = (((size_t) seed[0] << 8) + seed[1]) % n_inputs; + + for (i = 0; i < n_inputs + 1; i++) { + input_blinding_key[i] = malloc(32); + secp256k1_rand256(input_blinding_key[i]); + /* choose random fixed tag, except that for the output one copy from the key_index */ + if (i < n_inputs) { + secp256k1_rand256(fixed_input_tags[i].data); + } else { + memcpy(&fixed_input_tags[i], &fixed_input_tags[key_index], sizeof(fixed_input_tags[i])); + } + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(ctx, &ephemeral_input_tags[i], fixed_input_tags[i].data, input_blinding_key[i])); + } + + /* test */ + result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(ctx, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_used, &fixed_input_tags[key_index], try_count, seed); + if (n_used == 0) { + CHECK(result == 0); + return; + } + CHECK(result > 0); + CHECK(input_index == key_index); + + result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(ctx, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_input_tags[n_inputs], input_index, input_blinding_key[input_index], input_blinding_key[n_inputs]); + CHECK(result == 1); + + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize(ctx, serialized_proof, &serialized_len, &proof)); + CHECK(serialized_len == secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialized_size(ctx, &proof)); + CHECK(serialized_len == SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_SERIALIZATION_BYTES(n_inputs, n_used)); + + /* trailing garbage */ + memcpy(&serialized_proof_trailing, &serialized_proof, serialized_len); + serialized_proof_trailing[serialized_len] = seed[0]; + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse(ctx, &proof, serialized_proof, serialized_len + 1) == 0); + + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse(ctx, &proof, serialized_proof, serialized_len)); + result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(ctx, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_input_tags[n_inputs]); + CHECK(result == 1); + /* various fail cases */ + if (n_inputs > 1) { + result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(ctx, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_input_tags[n_inputs - 1]); + CHECK(result == 0); + + /* number of entries in ephemeral_input_tags array is less than proof.n_inputs */ + n_inputs -= 1; + result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(ctx, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_input_tags[n_inputs], input_index, input_blinding_key[input_index], input_blinding_key[n_inputs]); + CHECK(result == 0); + result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(ctx, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_input_tags[n_inputs - 1]); + CHECK(result == 0); + n_inputs += 1; + } + + /* cleanup */ + for (i = 0; i < n_inputs + 1; i++) { + free(input_blinding_key[i]); + } +} + +/* check that a proof with empty n_used_inputs is invalid */ +static void test_no_used_inputs_verify(void) { + secp256k1_surjectionproof proof; + secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag fixed_input_tag; + secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag fixed_output_tag; + secp256k1_generator ephemeral_input_tags[1]; + size_t n_ephemeral_input_tags = 1; + secp256k1_generator ephemeral_output_tag; + unsigned char blinding_key[32]; + secp256k1_ge inputs[1]; + secp256k1_ge output; + secp256k1_sha256 sha256_e0; + int result; + + /* Create proof that doesn't use inputs. secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize + * will not work here since it insists on selecting an input that matches the output. */ + proof.n_inputs = 1; + memset(proof.used_inputs, 0, SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS / 8); + + /* create different fixed input and output tags */ + secp256k1_rand256(fixed_input_tag.data); + secp256k1_rand256(fixed_output_tag.data); + + /* blind fixed output tags with random blinding key */ + secp256k1_rand256(blinding_key); + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(ctx, &ephemeral_input_tags[0], fixed_input_tag.data, blinding_key)); + CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(ctx, &ephemeral_output_tag, fixed_output_tag.data, blinding_key)); + + /* create "borromean signature" which is just a hash of metadata (pubkeys, etc) in this case */ + secp256k1_generator_load(&output, &ephemeral_output_tag); + secp256k1_generator_load(&inputs[0], &ephemeral_input_tags[0]); + secp256k1_surjection_genmessage(proof.data, inputs, 1, &output); + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256_e0); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_e0, proof.data, 32); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256_e0, proof.data); + + result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(ctx, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_ephemeral_input_tags, &ephemeral_output_tag); + CHECK(result == 0); +} + +void test_bad_serialize(void) { + secp256k1_surjectionproof proof; + unsigned char serialized_proof[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_SERIALIZATION_BYTES_MAX]; + size_t serialized_len; + + proof.n_inputs = 0; + serialized_len = 2 + 31; + /* e0 is one byte too short */ + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize(ctx, serialized_proof, &serialized_len, &proof) == 0); +} + +void test_bad_parse(void) { + secp256k1_surjectionproof proof; + unsigned char serialized_proof0[] = { 0x00 }; + unsigned char serialized_proof1[] = { 0x01, 0x00 }; + unsigned char serialized_proof2[33] = { 0 }; + + /* Missing total input count */ + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse(ctx, &proof, serialized_proof0, sizeof(serialized_proof0)) == 0); + /* Missing bitmap */ + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse(ctx, &proof, serialized_proof1, sizeof(serialized_proof1)) == 0); + /* Missing e0 value */ + CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse(ctx, &proof, serialized_proof2, sizeof(serialized_proof2)) == 0); +} + +void run_surjection_tests(void) { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + test_surjectionproof_api(); + } + + test_input_selection(0); + test_input_selection(1); + test_input_selection(5); + test_input_selection(100); + test_input_selection(SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS); + + test_input_selection_distribution(); + test_gen_verify(10, 3); + test_gen_verify(SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS, SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS); + test_no_used_inputs_verify(); + test_bad_serialize(); + test_bad_parse(); +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/Makefile.am.include b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/Makefile.am.include new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0dc5a64 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/Makefile.am.include @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_whitelist.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/whitelist/whitelist_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/whitelist/main_impl.h +noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/whitelist/tests_impl.h +if USE_BENCHMARK +noinst_PROGRAMS += bench_whitelist +bench_whitelist_SOURCES = src/bench_whitelist.c +bench_whitelist_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) +bench_generator_LDFLAGS = -static +endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/main_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/main_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0b2d6c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/main_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2016 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_WHITELIST_MAIN +#define SECP256K1_MODULE_WHITELIST_MAIN + +#include "include/secp256k1_whitelist.h" +#include "modules/whitelist/whitelist_impl.h" + +#define MAX_KEYS SECP256K1_WHITELIST_MAX_N_KEYS /* shorter alias */ + +int secp256k1_whitelist_sign(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_whitelist_signature *sig, const secp256k1_pubkey *online_pubkeys, const secp256k1_pubkey *offline_pubkeys, const size_t n_keys, const secp256k1_pubkey *sub_pubkey, const unsigned char *online_seckey, const unsigned char *summed_seckey, const size_t index, secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, const void *noncedata) { + secp256k1_gej pubs[MAX_KEYS]; + secp256k1_scalar s[MAX_KEYS]; + secp256k1_scalar sec, non; + unsigned char msg32[32]; + int ret; + + if (noncefp == NULL) { + noncefp = secp256k1_nonce_function_default; + } + + /* Sanity checks */ + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(online_pubkeys != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(offline_pubkeys != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(n_keys <= MAX_KEYS); + ARG_CHECK(sub_pubkey != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(online_seckey != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(summed_seckey != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(index < n_keys); + + /* Compute pubkeys: online_pubkey + tweaked(offline_pubkey + address), and message */ + ret = secp256k1_whitelist_compute_keys_and_message(ctx, msg32, pubs, online_pubkeys, offline_pubkeys, n_keys, sub_pubkey); + + /* Compute signing key: online_seckey + tweaked(summed_seckey) */ + if (ret) { + ret = secp256k1_whitelist_compute_tweaked_privkey(ctx, &sec, online_seckey, summed_seckey); + } + /* Compute nonce and random s-values */ + if (ret) { + unsigned char seckey32[32]; + unsigned int count = 0; + int overflow = 0; + + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(seckey32, &sec); + while (1) { + size_t i; + unsigned char nonce32[32]; + int done; + ret = noncefp(nonce32, msg32, seckey32, NULL, (void*)noncedata, count); + if (!ret) { + break; + } + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&non, nonce32, &overflow); + memset(nonce32, 0, 32); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&non)) { + count++; + continue; + } + done = 1; + for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) { + msg32[0] ^= i + 1; + msg32[1] ^= (i + 1) / 0x100; + ret = noncefp(&sig->data[32 * (i + 1)], msg32, seckey32, NULL, (void*)noncedata, count); + if (!ret) { + break; + } + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s[i], &sig->data[32 * (i + 1)], &overflow); + msg32[0] ^= i + 1; + msg32[1] ^= (i + 1) / 0x100; + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s[i])) { + count++; + done = 0; + break; + } + } + if (done) { + break; + } + } + memset(seckey32, 0, 32); + } + /* Actually sign */ + if (ret) { + sig->n_keys = n_keys; + ret = secp256k1_borromean_sign(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &sig->data[0], s, pubs, &non, &sec, &n_keys, &index, 1, msg32, 32); + /* Signing will change s[index], so update in the sig structure */ + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&sig->data[32 * (index + 1)], &s[index]); + } + + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&non); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_whitelist_verify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const secp256k1_whitelist_signature *sig, const secp256k1_pubkey *online_pubkeys, const secp256k1_pubkey *offline_pubkeys, const size_t n_keys, const secp256k1_pubkey *sub_pubkey) { + secp256k1_scalar s[MAX_KEYS]; + secp256k1_gej pubs[MAX_KEYS]; + unsigned char msg32[32]; + size_t i; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(online_pubkeys != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(offline_pubkeys != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(sub_pubkey != NULL); + + if (sig->n_keys > MAX_KEYS || sig->n_keys != n_keys) { + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < sig->n_keys; i++) { + int overflow = 0; + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s[i], &sig->data[32 * (i + 1)], &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s[i])) { + return 0; + } + } + + /* Compute pubkeys: online_pubkey + tweaked(offline_pubkey + address), and message */ + if (!secp256k1_whitelist_compute_keys_and_message(ctx, msg32, pubs, online_pubkeys, offline_pubkeys, sig->n_keys, sub_pubkey)) { + return 0; + } + /* Do verification */ + return secp256k1_borromean_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, NULL, &sig->data[0], s, pubs, &sig->n_keys, 1, msg32, 32); +} + +size_t secp256k1_whitelist_signature_n_keys(const secp256k1_whitelist_signature *sig) { + return sig->n_keys; +} + +int secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_whitelist_signature *sig, const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len) { + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(input != NULL); + + if (input_len == 0) { + return 0; + } + + sig->n_keys = input[0]; + if (sig->n_keys >= MAX_KEYS || input_len != 1 + 32 * (sig->n_keys + 1)) { + return 0; + } + memcpy(&sig->data[0], &input[1], 32 * (sig->n_keys + 1)); + + return 1; +} + +int secp256k1_whitelist_signature_serialize(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *output_len, const secp256k1_whitelist_signature *sig) { + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(output != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(output_len != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); + + if (*output_len < 1 + 32 * (sig->n_keys + 1)) { + return 0; + } + + output[0] = sig->n_keys; + memcpy(&output[1], &sig->data[0], 32 * (sig->n_keys + 1)); + *output_len = 1 + 32 * (sig->n_keys + 1); + + return 1; +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/tests_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/tests_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7cf1fb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/tests_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2014-2016 Pieter Wuille, Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_WHITELIST_TESTS +#define SECP256K1_MODULE_WHITELIST_TESTS + +#include "include/secp256k1_whitelist.h" + +void test_whitelist_end_to_end(const size_t n_keys) { + unsigned char **online_seckey = (unsigned char **) malloc(n_keys * sizeof(*online_seckey)); + unsigned char **summed_seckey = (unsigned char **) malloc(n_keys * sizeof(*summed_seckey)); + secp256k1_pubkey *online_pubkeys = (secp256k1_pubkey *) malloc(n_keys * sizeof(*online_pubkeys)); + secp256k1_pubkey *offline_pubkeys = (secp256k1_pubkey *) malloc(n_keys * sizeof(*offline_pubkeys)); + + secp256k1_scalar ssub; + unsigned char csub[32]; + secp256k1_pubkey sub_pubkey; + + /* Generate random keys */ + size_t i; + /* Start with subkey */ + random_scalar_order_test(&ssub); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(csub, &ssub); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, csub) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &sub_pubkey, csub) == 1); + /* Then offline and online whitelist keys */ + for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar son, soff; + + online_seckey[i] = (unsigned char *) malloc(32); + summed_seckey[i] = (unsigned char *) malloc(32); + + /* Create two keys */ + random_scalar_order_test(&son); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(online_seckey[i], &son); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, online_seckey[i]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &online_pubkeys[i], online_seckey[i]) == 1); + + random_scalar_order_test(&soff); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(summed_seckey[i], &soff); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, summed_seckey[i]) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &offline_pubkeys[i], summed_seckey[i]) == 1); + + /* Make summed_seckey correspond to the sum of offline_pubkey and sub_pubkey */ + secp256k1_scalar_add(&soff, &soff, &ssub); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(summed_seckey[i], &soff); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, summed_seckey[i]) == 1); + } + + /* Sign/verify with each one */ + for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) { + unsigned char serialized[32 + 4 + 32 * SECP256K1_WHITELIST_MAX_N_KEYS] = {0}; + size_t slen = sizeof(serialized); + secp256k1_whitelist_signature sig; + secp256k1_whitelist_signature sig1; + + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_sign(ctx, &sig, online_pubkeys, offline_pubkeys, n_keys, &sub_pubkey, online_seckey[i], summed_seckey[i], i, NULL, NULL)); + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_verify(ctx, &sig, online_pubkeys, offline_pubkeys, n_keys, &sub_pubkey) == 1); + /* Check that exchanging keys causes a failure */ + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_verify(ctx, &sig, offline_pubkeys, online_pubkeys, n_keys, &sub_pubkey) != 1); + /* Serialization round trip */ + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_serialize(ctx, serialized, &slen, &sig) == 1); + CHECK(slen == 33 + 32 * n_keys); + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse(ctx, &sig1, serialized, slen) == 1); + /* (Check various bad-length conditions) */ + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse(ctx, &sig1, serialized, slen + 32) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse(ctx, &sig1, serialized, slen + 1) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse(ctx, &sig1, serialized, slen - 1) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse(ctx, &sig1, serialized, 0) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_verify(ctx, &sig1, online_pubkeys, offline_pubkeys, n_keys, &sub_pubkey) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_verify(ctx, &sig1, offline_pubkeys, online_pubkeys, n_keys, &sub_pubkey) != 1); + + /* Test n_keys */ + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_n_keys(&sig) == n_keys); + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_n_keys(&sig1) == n_keys); + + /* Test bad number of keys in signature */ + sig.n_keys = n_keys + 1; + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_verify(ctx, &sig, offline_pubkeys, online_pubkeys, n_keys, &sub_pubkey) != 1); + sig.n_keys = n_keys; + } + + for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) { + free(online_seckey[i]); + free(summed_seckey[i]); + } + free(online_seckey); + free(summed_seckey); + free(online_pubkeys); + free(offline_pubkeys); +} + +void test_whitelist_bad_parse(void) { + secp256k1_whitelist_signature sig; + + const unsigned char serialized0[] = { 1+32*(0+1) }; + const unsigned char serialized1[] = { + 0x00, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06 + }; + const unsigned char serialized2[] = { + 0x01, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 + }; + + /* Empty input */ + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse(ctx, &sig, serialized0, 0) == 0); + /* Misses one byte of e0 */ + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse(ctx, &sig, serialized1, sizeof(serialized1)) == 0); + /* Enough bytes for e0, but there is no s value */ + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse(ctx, &sig, serialized2, sizeof(serialized2)) == 0); +} + +void test_whitelist_bad_serialize(void) { + unsigned char serialized[] = { + 0x00, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 + }; + size_t serialized_len; + secp256k1_whitelist_signature sig; + + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse(ctx, &sig, serialized, sizeof(serialized)) == 1); + serialized_len = sizeof(serialized) - 1; + /* Output buffer is one byte too short */ + CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_serialize(ctx, serialized, &serialized_len, &sig) == 0); +} + +void run_whitelist_tests(void) { + int i; + test_whitelist_bad_parse(); + test_whitelist_bad_serialize(); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + test_whitelist_end_to_end(1); + test_whitelist_end_to_end(10); + test_whitelist_end_to_end(50); + } +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/whitelist.md b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/whitelist.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..15ab998 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/whitelist.md @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +Address Whitelisting Module +=========================== + +This module implements a scheme by which members of some group, having fixed +signing keys, can prove control of an arbitrary other key without associating +their own identity (only that they belong to the group) to the new key. The +application is to patch ring-signature-like behaviour onto systems such as +Bitcoin or PGP which do not directly support this. + +We refer to such delegation as "whitelisting" because we expect it to be used +to build a dynamic whitelist of authorized keys. + +For example, imagine a private sidechain with a fixed membership set but +stronger privacy properties than Bitcoin. When moving coins from this system +to Bitcoin, it is desirable that the destination Bitcoin addresses be provably +in control of some user of the sidechain. This prevents malicious or erroneous +behaviour on the sidechain, which can likely be resolved by its participants, +from translating to theft on the wider Bitcoin network, which is irreversible. + +### Unused Schemes and Design Rationale + +#### Direct Signing + +An obvious scheme for such delegation is to simply have participants sign the +key they want to whitelist. To avoid revealing their specific identity, they +could use a ring signature. The problem with this is that it really only proves +that a participant *signed off* on a key, not that they control it. Thus any +security failure that allows text substitution could be used to subvert this +and redirect coins to an attacker-controlled address. + +#### Signing with Difference-of-Keys + +A less obvious scheme is to have a participant sign an arbitrary message with +the sum of her key `P` and the whitelisted key `W`. Such a signature with the key +`P + W` proves knowledge of either (a) discrete logarithms of both `P` and `W`; +or (b) neither. This makes directly attacking participants' signing schemes much +harder, but allows an attacker to whitelist arbitrary "garbage" keys by computing +`W` as the difference between an attacker-controlled key and `P`. For Bitcoin, +the effect of garbage keys is to "burn" stolen coins, destroying them. + +In an important sense, this "burning coins" attack is a good thing: it enables +*offline delegation*. That is, the key `P` does not need to be available at the +time of delegation. Instead, participants could choose `S = P + W`, sign with +this to delegate, and only later compute the discrete logarithm of `W = P - S`. +This allows `P` to be in cold storage or be otherwise inaccessible, improving +the overall system security. + +#### Signing with Tweaked-Difference-of-Keys + +A modification of this scheme, which prevents this "garbage key" attack, is to +instead have participants sign some message with the key `P + H(W)W`, for `H` +some random-oracle hash that maps group elements to scalars. This key, and its +discrete logarithm, cannot be known until after `W` is chosen, so `W` cannot +be selected as the difference between it and `P`. (Note that `P` could still +be some chosen difference; however `P` is a fixed key and must be verified +out-of-band to have come from a legitimate participant anyway.) + +This scheme is almost what we want, but it no longer supports offline +delegation. However, we can get this back by introducing a new key, `P'`, +and signing with the key `P + H(W + P')(W + P')`. This gives us the best +of both worlds: `P'` does not need to be online to delegate, allowing it +to be securely stored and preventing real-time attacks; `P` does need to +be online, but its compromise only allows an attacker to whitelist "garbage +keys", not attacker-controlled ones. + +### Our Scheme + +Our scheme works as follows: each participant `i` chooses two keys, `P_i` and `Q_i`. +We refer to `P_i` as the "online key" and `Q_i` as the "offline key". To whitelist +a key `W`, the participant computes the key `L_j = P_j + H(W + Q_j)(W + Q_j)` for +every participant `j`. Then she will know the discrete logarithm of `L_i` for her +own `i`. + +Next, she signs a message containing every `P_i` and `Q_i` as well as `W` with +a ring signature over all the keys `L_j`. This proves that she knows the discrete +logarithm of some `L_i` (though it is zero-knowledge which one), and therefore +knows: +1. The discrete logarithms of all of `W`, `P_i` and `Q_i`; or +2. The discrete logarithm of `P_i` but of *neither* `W` nor `Q_i`. +In other words, compromise of the online key `P_i` allows an attacker to whitelist +"garbage keys" for which nobody knows the discrete logarithm; to whitelist an +attacker-controlled key, he must compromise both `P_i` and `Q_i`. This is difficult +because by design, only the sum `S = W + Q_i` is used when signing; then by choosing +`S` freely, a participant can delegate without the secret key to `Q_i` ever being online. +(Later, when she wants to actually use `W`, she will need to compute its key as the +difference between `S` and `Q_i`; but this can be done offline and much later +and with more expensive security requirements.) + +The message to be signed contains all public keys to prevent a class of attacks +centered around choosing keys to match pre-computed signatures. In our proposed +use case, whitelisted keys already must be computed before they are signed, and +the remaining public keys are verified out-of-band when setting up the system, +so there is no direct benefit to this. We do it only to reduce fragility and +increase safety of unforeseen uses. + + diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/whitelist_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/whitelist_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ff8d87f --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/whitelist_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2016 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef _SECP256K1_WHITELIST_IMPL_H_ +#define _SECP256K1_WHITELIST_IMPL_H_ + +static int secp256k1_whitelist_hash_pubkey(secp256k1_scalar* output, secp256k1_gej* pubkey) { + unsigned char h[32]; + unsigned char c[33]; + secp256k1_sha256 sha; + int overflow = 0; + size_t size = 33; + secp256k1_ge ge; + + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&ge, pubkey); + + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha); + if (!secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&ge, c, &size, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, c, size); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, h); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(output, h, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(output)) { + /* This return path is mathematically impossible to hit */ + secp256k1_scalar_clear(output); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static int secp256k1_whitelist_tweak_pubkey(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_gej* pub_tweaked) { + secp256k1_scalar tweak; + secp256k1_scalar zero; + int ret; + + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&zero, 0); + + ret = secp256k1_whitelist_hash_pubkey(&tweak, pub_tweaked); + if (ret) { + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, pub_tweaked, pub_tweaked, &tweak, &zero); + } + return ret; +} + +static int secp256k1_whitelist_compute_tweaked_privkey(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_scalar* skey, const unsigned char *online_key, const unsigned char *summed_key) { + secp256k1_scalar tweak; + int ret = 1; + int overflow = 0; + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(skey, summed_key, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(skey)) { + ret = 0; + } + if (ret) { + secp256k1_gej pkeyj; + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pkeyj, skey); + ret = secp256k1_whitelist_hash_pubkey(&tweak, &pkeyj); + } + if (ret) { + secp256k1_scalar sonline; + secp256k1_scalar_mul(skey, skey, &tweak); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sonline, online_key, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sonline)) { + ret = 0; + } + secp256k1_scalar_add(skey, skey, &sonline); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sonline); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&tweak); + } + + if (!ret) { + secp256k1_scalar_clear(skey); + } + return ret; +} + +/* Takes a list of pubkeys and combines them to form the public keys needed + * for the ring signature; also produce a commitment to every one that will + * be our "message". */ +static int secp256k1_whitelist_compute_keys_and_message(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *msg32, secp256k1_gej *keys, const secp256k1_pubkey *online_pubkeys, const secp256k1_pubkey *offline_pubkeys, const int n_keys, const secp256k1_pubkey *sub_pubkey) { + unsigned char c[33]; + size_t size = 33; + secp256k1_sha256 sha; + int i; + secp256k1_ge subkey_ge; + + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha); + secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &subkey_ge, sub_pubkey); + + /* commit to sub-key */ + if (!secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&subkey_ge, c, &size, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, c, size); + for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) { + secp256k1_ge offline_ge; + secp256k1_ge online_ge; + secp256k1_gej tweaked_gej; + + /* commit to fixed keys */ + secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &offline_ge, &offline_pubkeys[i]); + if (!secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&offline_ge, c, &size, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, c, size); + secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &online_ge, &online_pubkeys[i]); + if (!secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&online_ge, c, &size, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, c, size); + + /* compute tweaked keys */ + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&tweaked_gej, &offline_ge); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&tweaked_gej, &tweaked_gej, &subkey_ge, NULL); + secp256k1_whitelist_tweak_pubkey(ctx, &tweaked_gej); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&keys[i], &tweaked_gej, &online_ge, NULL); + } + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, msg32); + return 1; +} + + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..49f2dd7 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num.h @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_NUM_H +#define SECP256K1_NUM_H + +#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE + +#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" +#endif + +#if defined(USE_NUM_GMP) +#include "num_gmp.h" +#else +#error "Please select num implementation" +#endif + +/** Copy a number. */ +static void secp256k1_num_copy(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a); + +/** Convert a number's absolute value to a binary big-endian string. + * There must be enough place. */ +static void secp256k1_num_get_bin(unsigned char *r, unsigned int rlen, const secp256k1_num *a); + +/** Set a number to the value of a binary big-endian string. */ +static void secp256k1_num_set_bin(secp256k1_num *r, const unsigned char *a, unsigned int alen); + +/** Compute a modular inverse. The input must be less than the modulus. */ +static void secp256k1_num_mod_inverse(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *m); + +/** Compute the jacobi symbol (a|b). b must be positive and odd. */ +static int secp256k1_num_jacobi(const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b); + +/** Compare the absolute value of two numbers. */ +static int secp256k1_num_cmp(const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b); + +/** Test whether two number are equal (including sign). */ +static int secp256k1_num_eq(const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b); + +/** Add two (signed) numbers. */ +static void secp256k1_num_add(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b); + +/** Subtract two (signed) numbers. */ +static void secp256k1_num_sub(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b); + +/** Multiply two (signed) numbers. */ +static void secp256k1_num_mul(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b); + +/** Replace a number by its remainder modulo m. M's sign is ignored. The result is a number between 0 and m-1, + even if r was negative. */ +static void secp256k1_num_mod(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *m); + +/** Right-shift the passed number by bits bits. */ +static void secp256k1_num_shift(secp256k1_num *r, int bits); + +/** Check whether a number is zero. */ +static int secp256k1_num_is_zero(const secp256k1_num *a); + +/** Check whether a number is one. */ +static int secp256k1_num_is_one(const secp256k1_num *a); + +/** Check whether a number is strictly negative. */ +static int secp256k1_num_is_neg(const secp256k1_num *a); + +/** Change a number's sign. */ +static void secp256k1_num_negate(secp256k1_num *r); + +#endif + +#endif /* SECP256K1_NUM_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_gmp.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_gmp.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3619844 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_gmp.h @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_NUM_REPR_H +#define SECP256K1_NUM_REPR_H + +#include + +#define NUM_LIMBS ((256+GMP_NUMB_BITS-1)/GMP_NUMB_BITS) + +typedef struct { + mp_limb_t data[2*NUM_LIMBS]; + int neg; + int limbs; +} secp256k1_num; + +#endif /* SECP256K1_NUM_REPR_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_gmp_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_gmp_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0ae2a8b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_gmp_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_NUM_REPR_IMPL_H +#define SECP256K1_NUM_REPR_IMPL_H + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "util.h" +#include "num.h" + +#ifdef VERIFY +static void secp256k1_num_sanity(const secp256k1_num *a) { + VERIFY_CHECK(a->limbs == 1 || (a->limbs > 1 && a->data[a->limbs-1] != 0)); +} +#else +#define secp256k1_num_sanity(a) do { } while(0) +#endif + +static void secp256k1_num_copy(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a) { + *r = *a; +} + +static void secp256k1_num_get_bin(unsigned char *r, unsigned int rlen, const secp256k1_num *a) { + unsigned char tmp[65]; + int len = 0; + int shift = 0; + if (a->limbs>1 || a->data[0] != 0) { + len = mpn_get_str(tmp, 256, (mp_limb_t*)a->data, a->limbs); + } + while (shift < len && tmp[shift] == 0) shift++; + VERIFY_CHECK(len-shift <= (int)rlen); + memset(r, 0, rlen - len + shift); + if (len > shift) { + memcpy(r + rlen - len + shift, tmp + shift, len - shift); + } + memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); +} + +static void secp256k1_num_set_bin(secp256k1_num *r, const unsigned char *a, unsigned int alen) { + int len; + VERIFY_CHECK(alen > 0); + VERIFY_CHECK(alen <= 64); + len = mpn_set_str(r->data, a, alen, 256); + if (len == 0) { + r->data[0] = 0; + len = 1; + } + VERIFY_CHECK(len <= NUM_LIMBS*2); + r->limbs = len; + r->neg = 0; + while (r->limbs > 1 && r->data[r->limbs-1]==0) { + r->limbs--; + } +} + +static void secp256k1_num_add_abs(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b) { + mp_limb_t c = mpn_add(r->data, a->data, a->limbs, b->data, b->limbs); + r->limbs = a->limbs; + if (c != 0) { + VERIFY_CHECK(r->limbs < 2*NUM_LIMBS); + r->data[r->limbs++] = c; + } +} + +static void secp256k1_num_sub_abs(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b) { + mp_limb_t c = mpn_sub(r->data, a->data, a->limbs, b->data, b->limbs); + (void)c; + VERIFY_CHECK(c == 0); + r->limbs = a->limbs; + while (r->limbs > 1 && r->data[r->limbs-1]==0) { + r->limbs--; + } +} + +static void secp256k1_num_mod(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *m) { + secp256k1_num_sanity(r); + secp256k1_num_sanity(m); + + if (r->limbs >= m->limbs) { + mp_limb_t t[2*NUM_LIMBS]; + mpn_tdiv_qr(t, r->data, 0, r->data, r->limbs, m->data, m->limbs); + memset(t, 0, sizeof(t)); + r->limbs = m->limbs; + while (r->limbs > 1 && r->data[r->limbs-1]==0) { + r->limbs--; + } + } + + if (r->neg && (r->limbs > 1 || r->data[0] != 0)) { + secp256k1_num_sub_abs(r, m, r); + r->neg = 0; + } +} + +static void secp256k1_num_mod_inverse(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *m) { + int i; + mp_limb_t g[NUM_LIMBS+1]; + mp_limb_t u[NUM_LIMBS+1]; + mp_limb_t v[NUM_LIMBS+1]; + mp_size_t sn; + mp_size_t gn; + secp256k1_num_sanity(a); + secp256k1_num_sanity(m); + + /** mpn_gcdext computes: (G,S) = gcdext(U,V), where + * * G = gcd(U,V) + * * G = U*S + V*T + * * U has equal or more limbs than V, and V has no padding + * If we set U to be (a padded version of) a, and V = m: + * G = a*S + m*T + * G = a*S mod m + * Assuming G=1: + * S = 1/a mod m + */ + VERIFY_CHECK(m->limbs <= NUM_LIMBS); + VERIFY_CHECK(m->data[m->limbs-1] != 0); + for (i = 0; i < m->limbs; i++) { + u[i] = (i < a->limbs) ? a->data[i] : 0; + v[i] = m->data[i]; + } + sn = NUM_LIMBS+1; + gn = mpn_gcdext(g, r->data, &sn, u, m->limbs, v, m->limbs); + (void)gn; + VERIFY_CHECK(gn == 1); + VERIFY_CHECK(g[0] == 1); + r->neg = a->neg ^ m->neg; + if (sn < 0) { + mpn_sub(r->data, m->data, m->limbs, r->data, -sn); + r->limbs = m->limbs; + while (r->limbs > 1 && r->data[r->limbs-1]==0) { + r->limbs--; + } + } else { + r->limbs = sn; + } + memset(g, 0, sizeof(g)); + memset(u, 0, sizeof(u)); + memset(v, 0, sizeof(v)); +} + +static int secp256k1_num_jacobi(const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b) { + int ret; + mpz_t ga, gb; + secp256k1_num_sanity(a); + secp256k1_num_sanity(b); + VERIFY_CHECK(!b->neg && (b->limbs > 0) && (b->data[0] & 1)); + + mpz_inits(ga, gb, NULL); + + mpz_import(gb, b->limbs, -1, sizeof(mp_limb_t), 0, 0, b->data); + mpz_import(ga, a->limbs, -1, sizeof(mp_limb_t), 0, 0, a->data); + if (a->neg) { + mpz_neg(ga, ga); + } + + ret = mpz_jacobi(ga, gb); + + mpz_clears(ga, gb, NULL); + + return ret; +} + +static int secp256k1_num_is_one(const secp256k1_num *a) { + return (a->limbs == 1 && a->data[0] == 1); +} + +static int secp256k1_num_is_zero(const secp256k1_num *a) { + return (a->limbs == 1 && a->data[0] == 0); +} + +static int secp256k1_num_is_neg(const secp256k1_num *a) { + return (a->limbs > 1 || a->data[0] != 0) && a->neg; +} + +static int secp256k1_num_cmp(const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b) { + if (a->limbs > b->limbs) { + return 1; + } + if (a->limbs < b->limbs) { + return -1; + } + return mpn_cmp(a->data, b->data, a->limbs); +} + +static int secp256k1_num_eq(const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b) { + if (a->limbs > b->limbs) { + return 0; + } + if (a->limbs < b->limbs) { + return 0; + } + if ((a->neg && !secp256k1_num_is_zero(a)) != (b->neg && !secp256k1_num_is_zero(b))) { + return 0; + } + return mpn_cmp(a->data, b->data, a->limbs) == 0; +} + +static void secp256k1_num_subadd(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b, int bneg) { + if (!(b->neg ^ bneg ^ a->neg)) { /* a and b have the same sign */ + r->neg = a->neg; + if (a->limbs >= b->limbs) { + secp256k1_num_add_abs(r, a, b); + } else { + secp256k1_num_add_abs(r, b, a); + } + } else { + if (secp256k1_num_cmp(a, b) > 0) { + r->neg = a->neg; + secp256k1_num_sub_abs(r, a, b); + } else { + r->neg = b->neg ^ bneg; + secp256k1_num_sub_abs(r, b, a); + } + } +} + +static void secp256k1_num_add(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b) { + secp256k1_num_sanity(a); + secp256k1_num_sanity(b); + secp256k1_num_subadd(r, a, b, 0); +} + +static void secp256k1_num_sub(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b) { + secp256k1_num_sanity(a); + secp256k1_num_sanity(b); + secp256k1_num_subadd(r, a, b, 1); +} + +static void secp256k1_num_mul(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b) { + mp_limb_t tmp[2*NUM_LIMBS+1]; + secp256k1_num_sanity(a); + secp256k1_num_sanity(b); + + VERIFY_CHECK(a->limbs + b->limbs <= 2*NUM_LIMBS+1); + if ((a->limbs==1 && a->data[0]==0) || (b->limbs==1 && b->data[0]==0)) { + r->limbs = 1; + r->neg = 0; + r->data[0] = 0; + return; + } + if (a->limbs >= b->limbs) { + mpn_mul(tmp, a->data, a->limbs, b->data, b->limbs); + } else { + mpn_mul(tmp, b->data, b->limbs, a->data, a->limbs); + } + r->limbs = a->limbs + b->limbs; + if (r->limbs > 1 && tmp[r->limbs - 1]==0) { + r->limbs--; + } + VERIFY_CHECK(r->limbs <= 2*NUM_LIMBS); + mpn_copyi(r->data, tmp, r->limbs); + r->neg = a->neg ^ b->neg; + memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); +} + +static void secp256k1_num_shift(secp256k1_num *r, int bits) { + if (bits % GMP_NUMB_BITS) { + /* Shift within limbs. */ + mpn_rshift(r->data, r->data, r->limbs, bits % GMP_NUMB_BITS); + } + if (bits >= GMP_NUMB_BITS) { + int i; + /* Shift full limbs. */ + for (i = 0; i < r->limbs; i++) { + int index = i + (bits / GMP_NUMB_BITS); + if (index < r->limbs && index < 2*NUM_LIMBS) { + r->data[i] = r->data[index]; + } else { + r->data[i] = 0; + } + } + } + while (r->limbs>1 && r->data[r->limbs-1]==0) { + r->limbs--; + } +} + +static void secp256k1_num_negate(secp256k1_num *r) { + r->neg ^= 1; +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_NUM_REPR_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c45193b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_NUM_IMPL_H +#define SECP256K1_NUM_IMPL_H + +#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" +#endif + +#include "num.h" + +#if defined(USE_NUM_GMP) +#include "num_gmp_impl.h" +#elif defined(USE_NUM_NONE) +/* Nothing. */ +#else +#error "Please select num implementation" +#endif + +#endif /* SECP256K1_NUM_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..57389da --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar.h @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_SCALAR_H +#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_H + +#include "num.h" + +#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" +#endif + +#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) +#include "scalar_low.h" +#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_4X64) +#include "scalar_4x64.h" +#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_8X32) +#include "scalar_8x32.h" +#else +#error "Please select scalar implementation" +#endif + +/** Clear a scalar to prevent the leak of sensitive data. */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_clear(secp256k1_scalar *r); + +/** Access bits from a scalar. All requested bits must belong to the same 32-bit limb. */ +static unsigned int secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(const secp256k1_scalar *a, unsigned int offset, unsigned int count); + +/** Access bits from a scalar. Not constant time. */ +static unsigned int secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(const secp256k1_scalar *a, unsigned int offset, unsigned int count); + +/** Set a scalar from a big endian byte array. */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(secp256k1_scalar *r, const unsigned char *bin, int *overflow); + +/** Set a scalar to an unsigned integer. */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_set_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int v); + +/** Set a scalar to an unsigned 64-bit integer */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_set_u64(secp256k1_scalar *r, uint64_t v); + +/** Convert a scalar to a byte array. */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(unsigned char *bin, const secp256k1_scalar* a); + +/** Add two scalars together (modulo the group order). Returns whether it overflowed. */ +static int secp256k1_scalar_add(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b); + +/** Conditionally add a power of two to a scalar. The result is not allowed to overflow. */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int bit, int flag); + +/** Multiply two scalars (modulo the group order). */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_mul(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b); + +/** Shift a scalar right by some amount strictly between 0 and 16, returning + * the low bits that were shifted off */ +static int secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, int n); + +/** Compute the square of a scalar (modulo the group order). */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_sqr(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a); + +/** Compute the inverse of a scalar (modulo the group order). */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_inverse(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a); + +/** Compute the inverse of a scalar (modulo the group order), without constant-time guarantee. */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a); + +/** Compute the complement of a scalar (modulo the group order). */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a); + +/** Check whether a scalar equals zero. */ +static int secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(const secp256k1_scalar *a); + +/** Check whether a scalar equals one. */ +static int secp256k1_scalar_is_one(const secp256k1_scalar *a); + +/** Check whether a scalar, considered as an nonnegative integer, is even. */ +static int secp256k1_scalar_is_even(const secp256k1_scalar *a); + +/** Check whether a scalar is higher than the group order divided by 2. */ +static int secp256k1_scalar_is_high(const secp256k1_scalar *a); + +/** Conditionally negate a number, in constant time. + * Returns -1 if the number was negated, 1 otherwise */ +static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *a, int flag); + +#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE +/** Convert a scalar to a number. */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_get_num(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a); + +/** Get the order of the group as a number. */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(secp256k1_num *r); +#endif + +/** Compare two scalars. */ +static int secp256k1_scalar_eq(const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b); + +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM +/** Find r1 and r2 such that r1+r2*2^128 = a. */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_split_128(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a); +/** Find r1 and r2 such that r1+r2*lambda = a, and r1 and r2 are maximum 128 bits long (see secp256k1_gej_mul_lambda). */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a); +#endif + +/** Multiply a and b (without taking the modulus!), divide by 2**shift, and round to the nearest integer. Shift must be at least 256. */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b, unsigned int shift); + +/** Generate two scalars from a 32-byte seed and an integer using the chacha20 stream cipher */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const unsigned char *seed, uint64_t idx); + +#endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_4x64.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_4x64.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..19c7495 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_4x64.h @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H +#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H + +#include + +/** A scalar modulo the group order of the secp256k1 curve. */ +typedef struct { + uint64_t d[4]; +} secp256k1_scalar; + +#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) {{((uint64_t)(d1)) << 32 | (d0), ((uint64_t)(d3)) << 32 | (d2), ((uint64_t)(d5)) << 32 | (d4), ((uint64_t)(d7)) << 32 | (d6)}} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_4x64_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_4x64_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2673caa --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_4x64_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,1049 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H +#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H + +#include "scalar.h" +#include + +/* Limbs of the secp256k1 order. */ +#define SECP256K1_N_0 ((uint64_t)0xBFD25E8CD0364141ULL) +#define SECP256K1_N_1 ((uint64_t)0xBAAEDCE6AF48A03BULL) +#define SECP256K1_N_2 ((uint64_t)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEULL) +#define SECP256K1_N_3 ((uint64_t)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) + +/* Limbs of 2^256 minus the secp256k1 order. */ +#define SECP256K1_N_C_0 (~SECP256K1_N_0 + 1) +#define SECP256K1_N_C_1 (~SECP256K1_N_1) +#define SECP256K1_N_C_2 (1) + +/* Limbs of half the secp256k1 order. */ +#define SECP256K1_N_H_0 ((uint64_t)0xDFE92F46681B20A0ULL) +#define SECP256K1_N_H_1 ((uint64_t)0x5D576E7357A4501DULL) +#define SECP256K1_N_H_2 ((uint64_t)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) +#define SECP256K1_N_H_3 ((uint64_t)0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_clear(secp256k1_scalar *r) { + r->d[0] = 0; + r->d[1] = 0; + r->d[2] = 0; + r->d[3] = 0; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_set_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int v) { + r->d[0] = v; + r->d[1] = 0; + r->d[2] = 0; + r->d[3] = 0; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_set_u64(secp256k1_scalar *r, uint64_t v) { + r->d[0] = v; + r->d[1] = 0; + r->d[2] = 0; + r->d[3] = 0; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static unsigned int secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(const secp256k1_scalar *a, unsigned int offset, unsigned int count) { + VERIFY_CHECK((offset + count - 1) >> 6 == offset >> 6); + return (a->d[offset >> 6] >> (offset & 0x3F)) & ((((uint64_t)1) << count) - 1); +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static unsigned int secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(const secp256k1_scalar *a, unsigned int offset, unsigned int count) { + VERIFY_CHECK(count < 32); + VERIFY_CHECK(offset + count <= 256); + if ((offset + count - 1) >> 6 == offset >> 6) { + return secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(a, offset, count); + } else { + VERIFY_CHECK((offset >> 6) + 1 < 4); + return ((a->d[offset >> 6] >> (offset & 0x3F)) | (a->d[(offset >> 6) + 1] << (64 - (offset & 0x3F)))) & ((((uint64_t)1) << count) - 1); + } +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + int yes = 0; + int no = 0; + no |= (a->d[3] < SECP256K1_N_3); /* No need for a > check. */ + no |= (a->d[2] < SECP256K1_N_2); + yes |= (a->d[2] > SECP256K1_N_2) & ~no; + no |= (a->d[1] < SECP256K1_N_1); + yes |= (a->d[1] > SECP256K1_N_1) & ~no; + yes |= (a->d[0] >= SECP256K1_N_0) & ~no; + return yes; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_reduce(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int overflow) { + uint128_t t; + VERIFY_CHECK(overflow <= 1); + t = (uint128_t)r->d[0] + overflow * SECP256K1_N_C_0; + r->d[0] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 64; + t += (uint128_t)r->d[1] + overflow * SECP256K1_N_C_1; + r->d[1] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 64; + t += (uint128_t)r->d[2] + overflow * SECP256K1_N_C_2; + r->d[2] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 64; + t += (uint64_t)r->d[3]; + r->d[3] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; + return overflow; +} + +static int secp256k1_scalar_add(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { + int overflow; + uint128_t t = (uint128_t)a->d[0] + b->d[0]; + r->d[0] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 64; + t += (uint128_t)a->d[1] + b->d[1]; + r->d[1] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 64; + t += (uint128_t)a->d[2] + b->d[2]; + r->d[2] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 64; + t += (uint128_t)a->d[3] + b->d[3]; + r->d[3] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 64; + overflow = t + secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r); + VERIFY_CHECK(overflow == 0 || overflow == 1); + secp256k1_scalar_reduce(r, overflow); + return overflow; +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int bit, int flag) { + uint128_t t; + VERIFY_CHECK(bit < 256); + bit += ((uint32_t) flag - 1) & 0x100; /* forcing (bit >> 6) > 3 makes this a noop */ + t = (uint128_t)r->d[0] + (((uint64_t)((bit >> 6) == 0)) << (bit & 0x3F)); + r->d[0] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 64; + t += (uint128_t)r->d[1] + (((uint64_t)((bit >> 6) == 1)) << (bit & 0x3F)); + r->d[1] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 64; + t += (uint128_t)r->d[2] + (((uint64_t)((bit >> 6) == 2)) << (bit & 0x3F)); + r->d[2] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 64; + t += (uint128_t)r->d[3] + (((uint64_t)((bit >> 6) == 3)) << (bit & 0x3F)); + r->d[3] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; +#ifdef VERIFY + VERIFY_CHECK((t >> 64) == 0); + VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r) == 0); +#endif +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(secp256k1_scalar *r, const unsigned char *b32, int *overflow) { + int over; + r->d[0] = (uint64_t)b32[31] | (uint64_t)b32[30] << 8 | (uint64_t)b32[29] << 16 | (uint64_t)b32[28] << 24 | (uint64_t)b32[27] << 32 | (uint64_t)b32[26] << 40 | (uint64_t)b32[25] << 48 | (uint64_t)b32[24] << 56; + r->d[1] = (uint64_t)b32[23] | (uint64_t)b32[22] << 8 | (uint64_t)b32[21] << 16 | (uint64_t)b32[20] << 24 | (uint64_t)b32[19] << 32 | (uint64_t)b32[18] << 40 | (uint64_t)b32[17] << 48 | (uint64_t)b32[16] << 56; + r->d[2] = (uint64_t)b32[15] | (uint64_t)b32[14] << 8 | (uint64_t)b32[13] << 16 | (uint64_t)b32[12] << 24 | (uint64_t)b32[11] << 32 | (uint64_t)b32[10] << 40 | (uint64_t)b32[9] << 48 | (uint64_t)b32[8] << 56; + r->d[3] = (uint64_t)b32[7] | (uint64_t)b32[6] << 8 | (uint64_t)b32[5] << 16 | (uint64_t)b32[4] << 24 | (uint64_t)b32[3] << 32 | (uint64_t)b32[2] << 40 | (uint64_t)b32[1] << 48 | (uint64_t)b32[0] << 56; + over = secp256k1_scalar_reduce(r, secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r)); + if (overflow) { + *overflow = over; + } +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(unsigned char *bin, const secp256k1_scalar* a) { + bin[0] = a->d[3] >> 56; bin[1] = a->d[3] >> 48; bin[2] = a->d[3] >> 40; bin[3] = a->d[3] >> 32; bin[4] = a->d[3] >> 24; bin[5] = a->d[3] >> 16; bin[6] = a->d[3] >> 8; bin[7] = a->d[3]; + bin[8] = a->d[2] >> 56; bin[9] = a->d[2] >> 48; bin[10] = a->d[2] >> 40; bin[11] = a->d[2] >> 32; bin[12] = a->d[2] >> 24; bin[13] = a->d[2] >> 16; bin[14] = a->d[2] >> 8; bin[15] = a->d[2]; + bin[16] = a->d[1] >> 56; bin[17] = a->d[1] >> 48; bin[18] = a->d[1] >> 40; bin[19] = a->d[1] >> 32; bin[20] = a->d[1] >> 24; bin[21] = a->d[1] >> 16; bin[22] = a->d[1] >> 8; bin[23] = a->d[1]; + bin[24] = a->d[0] >> 56; bin[25] = a->d[0] >> 48; bin[26] = a->d[0] >> 40; bin[27] = a->d[0] >> 32; bin[28] = a->d[0] >> 24; bin[29] = a->d[0] >> 16; bin[30] = a->d[0] >> 8; bin[31] = a->d[0]; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + return (a->d[0] | a->d[1] | a->d[2] | a->d[3]) == 0; +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + uint64_t nonzero = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(a) == 0); + uint128_t t = (uint128_t)(~a->d[0]) + SECP256K1_N_0 + 1; + r->d[0] = t & nonzero; t >>= 64; + t += (uint128_t)(~a->d[1]) + SECP256K1_N_1; + r->d[1] = t & nonzero; t >>= 64; + t += (uint128_t)(~a->d[2]) + SECP256K1_N_2; + r->d[2] = t & nonzero; t >>= 64; + t += (uint128_t)(~a->d[3]) + SECP256K1_N_3; + r->d[3] = t & nonzero; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_one(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + return ((a->d[0] ^ 1) | a->d[1] | a->d[2] | a->d[3]) == 0; +} + +static int secp256k1_scalar_is_high(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + int yes = 0; + int no = 0; + no |= (a->d[3] < SECP256K1_N_H_3); + yes |= (a->d[3] > SECP256K1_N_H_3) & ~no; + no |= (a->d[2] < SECP256K1_N_H_2) & ~yes; /* No need for a > check. */ + no |= (a->d[1] < SECP256K1_N_H_1) & ~yes; + yes |= (a->d[1] > SECP256K1_N_H_1) & ~no; + yes |= (a->d[0] > SECP256K1_N_H_0) & ~no; + return yes; +} + +static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { + /* If we are flag = 0, mask = 00...00 and this is a no-op; + * if we are flag = 1, mask = 11...11 and this is identical to secp256k1_scalar_negate */ + uint64_t mask = !flag - 1; + uint64_t nonzero = (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(r) != 0) - 1; + uint128_t t = (uint128_t)(r->d[0] ^ mask) + ((SECP256K1_N_0 + 1) & mask); + r->d[0] = t & nonzero; t >>= 64; + t += (uint128_t)(r->d[1] ^ mask) + (SECP256K1_N_1 & mask); + r->d[1] = t & nonzero; t >>= 64; + t += (uint128_t)(r->d[2] ^ mask) + (SECP256K1_N_2 & mask); + r->d[2] = t & nonzero; t >>= 64; + t += (uint128_t)(r->d[3] ^ mask) + (SECP256K1_N_3 & mask); + r->d[3] = t & nonzero; + return 2 * (mask == 0) - 1; +} + +/* Inspired by the macros in OpenSSL's crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c. */ + +/** Add a*b to the number defined by (c0,c1,c2). c2 must never overflow. */ +#define muladd(a,b) { \ + uint64_t tl, th; \ + { \ + uint128_t t = (uint128_t)a * b; \ + th = t >> 64; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE */ \ + tl = t; \ + } \ + c0 += tl; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + th += (c0 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF */ \ + c1 += th; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + c2 += (c1 < th) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified in the next line) */ \ + VERIFY_CHECK((c1 >= th) || (c2 != 0)); \ +} + +/** Add a*b to the number defined by (c0,c1). c1 must never overflow. */ +#define muladd_fast(a,b) { \ + uint64_t tl, th; \ + { \ + uint128_t t = (uint128_t)a * b; \ + th = t >> 64; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE */ \ + tl = t; \ + } \ + c0 += tl; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + th += (c0 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF */ \ + c1 += th; /* never overflows by contract (verified in the next line) */ \ + VERIFY_CHECK(c1 >= th); \ +} + +/** Add 2*a*b to the number defined by (c0,c1,c2). c2 must never overflow. */ +#define muladd2(a,b) { \ + uint64_t tl, th, th2, tl2; \ + { \ + uint128_t t = (uint128_t)a * b; \ + th = t >> 64; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE */ \ + tl = t; \ + } \ + th2 = th + th; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE (in case th was 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) */ \ + c2 += (th2 < th) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ + VERIFY_CHECK((th2 >= th) || (c2 != 0)); \ + tl2 = tl + tl; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE (in case the lowest 63 bits of tl were 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) */ \ + th2 += (tl2 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF */ \ + c0 += tl2; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + th2 += (c0 < tl2) ? 1 : 0; /* second overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + c2 += (c0 < tl2) & (th2 == 0); /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ + VERIFY_CHECK((c0 >= tl2) || (th2 != 0) || (c2 != 0)); \ + c1 += th2; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + c2 += (c1 < th2) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ + VERIFY_CHECK((c1 >= th2) || (c2 != 0)); \ +} + +/** Add a to the number defined by (c0,c1,c2). c2 must never overflow. */ +#define sumadd(a) { \ + unsigned int over; \ + c0 += (a); /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + over = (c0 < (a)) ? 1 : 0; \ + c1 += over; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + c2 += (c1 < over) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract */ \ +} + +/** Add a to the number defined by (c0,c1). c1 must never overflow, c2 must be zero. */ +#define sumadd_fast(a) { \ + c0 += (a); /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + c1 += (c0 < (a)) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ + VERIFY_CHECK((c1 != 0) | (c0 >= (a))); \ + VERIFY_CHECK(c2 == 0); \ +} + +/** Extract the lowest 64 bits of (c0,c1,c2) into n, and left shift the number 64 bits. */ +#define extract(n) { \ + (n) = c0; \ + c0 = c1; \ + c1 = c2; \ + c2 = 0; \ +} + +/** Extract the lowest 64 bits of (c0,c1,c2) into n, and left shift the number 64 bits. c2 is required to be zero. */ +#define extract_fast(n) { \ + (n) = c0; \ + c0 = c1; \ + c1 = 0; \ + VERIFY_CHECK(c2 == 0); \ +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(secp256k1_scalar *r, const uint64_t *l) { +#ifdef USE_ASM_X86_64 + /* Reduce 512 bits into 385. */ + uint64_t m0, m1, m2, m3, m4, m5, m6; + uint64_t p0, p1, p2, p3, p4; + uint64_t c; + + __asm__ __volatile__( + /* Preload. */ + "movq 32(%%rsi), %%r11\n" + "movq 40(%%rsi), %%r12\n" + "movq 48(%%rsi), %%r13\n" + "movq 56(%%rsi), %%r14\n" + /* Initialize r8,r9,r10 */ + "movq 0(%%rsi), %%r8\n" + "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n" + "xorq %%r10, %%r10\n" + /* (r8,r9) += n0 * c0 */ + "movq %8, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r11\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" + /* extract m0 */ + "movq %%r8, %q0\n" + "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" + /* (r9,r10) += l1 */ + "addq 8(%%rsi), %%r9\n" + "adcq $0, %%r10\n" + /* (r9,r10,r8) += n1 * c0 */ + "movq %8, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r12\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + /* (r9,r10,r8) += n0 * c1 */ + "movq %9, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r11\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + /* extract m1 */ + "movq %%r9, %q1\n" + "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n" + /* (r10,r8,r9) += l2 */ + "addq 16(%%rsi), %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + /* (r10,r8,r9) += n2 * c0 */ + "movq %8, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r13\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + /* (r10,r8,r9) += n1 * c1 */ + "movq %9, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r12\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + /* (r10,r8,r9) += n0 */ + "addq %%r11, %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + /* extract m2 */ + "movq %%r10, %q2\n" + "xorq %%r10, %%r10\n" + /* (r8,r9,r10) += l3 */ + "addq 24(%%rsi), %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + "adcq $0, %%r10\n" + /* (r8,r9,r10) += n3 * c0 */ + "movq %8, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r14\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" + "adcq $0, %%r10\n" + /* (r8,r9,r10) += n2 * c1 */ + "movq %9, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r13\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" + "adcq $0, %%r10\n" + /* (r8,r9,r10) += n1 */ + "addq %%r12, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + "adcq $0, %%r10\n" + /* extract m3 */ + "movq %%r8, %q3\n" + "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" + /* (r9,r10,r8) += n3 * c1 */ + "movq %9, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r14\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + /* (r9,r10,r8) += n2 */ + "addq %%r13, %%r9\n" + "adcq $0, %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + /* extract m4 */ + "movq %%r9, %q4\n" + /* (r10,r8) += n3 */ + "addq %%r14, %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + /* extract m5 */ + "movq %%r10, %q5\n" + /* extract m6 */ + "movq %%r8, %q6\n" + : "=g"(m0), "=g"(m1), "=g"(m2), "=g"(m3), "=g"(m4), "=g"(m5), "=g"(m6) + : "S"(l), "n"(SECP256K1_N_C_0), "n"(SECP256K1_N_C_1) + : "rax", "rdx", "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13", "r14", "cc"); + + /* Reduce 385 bits into 258. */ + __asm__ __volatile__( + /* Preload */ + "movq %q9, %%r11\n" + "movq %q10, %%r12\n" + "movq %q11, %%r13\n" + /* Initialize (r8,r9,r10) */ + "movq %q5, %%r8\n" + "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n" + "xorq %%r10, %%r10\n" + /* (r8,r9) += m4 * c0 */ + "movq %12, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r11\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" + /* extract p0 */ + "movq %%r8, %q0\n" + "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" + /* (r9,r10) += m1 */ + "addq %q6, %%r9\n" + "adcq $0, %%r10\n" + /* (r9,r10,r8) += m5 * c0 */ + "movq %12, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r12\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + /* (r9,r10,r8) += m4 * c1 */ + "movq %13, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r11\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + /* extract p1 */ + "movq %%r9, %q1\n" + "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n" + /* (r10,r8,r9) += m2 */ + "addq %q7, %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + /* (r10,r8,r9) += m6 * c0 */ + "movq %12, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r13\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + /* (r10,r8,r9) += m5 * c1 */ + "movq %13, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r12\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + /* (r10,r8,r9) += m4 */ + "addq %%r11, %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + /* extract p2 */ + "movq %%r10, %q2\n" + /* (r8,r9) += m3 */ + "addq %q8, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + /* (r8,r9) += m6 * c1 */ + "movq %13, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r13\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" + /* (r8,r9) += m5 */ + "addq %%r12, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + /* extract p3 */ + "movq %%r8, %q3\n" + /* (r9) += m6 */ + "addq %%r13, %%r9\n" + /* extract p4 */ + "movq %%r9, %q4\n" + : "=&g"(p0), "=&g"(p1), "=&g"(p2), "=g"(p3), "=g"(p4) + : "g"(m0), "g"(m1), "g"(m2), "g"(m3), "g"(m4), "g"(m5), "g"(m6), "n"(SECP256K1_N_C_0), "n"(SECP256K1_N_C_1) + : "rax", "rdx", "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13", "cc"); + + /* Reduce 258 bits into 256. */ + __asm__ __volatile__( + /* Preload */ + "movq %q5, %%r10\n" + /* (rax,rdx) = p4 * c0 */ + "movq %7, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r10\n" + /* (rax,rdx) += p0 */ + "addq %q1, %%rax\n" + "adcq $0, %%rdx\n" + /* extract r0 */ + "movq %%rax, 0(%q6)\n" + /* Move to (r8,r9) */ + "movq %%rdx, %%r8\n" + "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n" + /* (r8,r9) += p1 */ + "addq %q2, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + /* (r8,r9) += p4 * c1 */ + "movq %8, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r10\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" + /* Extract r1 */ + "movq %%r8, 8(%q6)\n" + "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" + /* (r9,r8) += p4 */ + "addq %%r10, %%r9\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + /* (r9,r8) += p2 */ + "addq %q3, %%r9\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + /* Extract r2 */ + "movq %%r9, 16(%q6)\n" + "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n" + /* (r8,r9) += p3 */ + "addq %q4, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + /* Extract r3 */ + "movq %%r8, 24(%q6)\n" + /* Extract c */ + "movq %%r9, %q0\n" + : "=g"(c) + : "g"(p0), "g"(p1), "g"(p2), "g"(p3), "g"(p4), "D"(r), "n"(SECP256K1_N_C_0), "n"(SECP256K1_N_C_1) + : "rax", "rdx", "r8", "r9", "r10", "cc", "memory"); +#else + uint128_t c; + uint64_t c0, c1, c2; + uint64_t n0 = l[4], n1 = l[5], n2 = l[6], n3 = l[7]; + uint64_t m0, m1, m2, m3, m4, m5; + uint32_t m6; + uint64_t p0, p1, p2, p3; + uint32_t p4; + + /* Reduce 512 bits into 385. */ + /* m[0..6] = l[0..3] + n[0..3] * SECP256K1_N_C. */ + c0 = l[0]; c1 = 0; c2 = 0; + muladd_fast(n0, SECP256K1_N_C_0); + extract_fast(m0); + sumadd_fast(l[1]); + muladd(n1, SECP256K1_N_C_0); + muladd(n0, SECP256K1_N_C_1); + extract(m1); + sumadd(l[2]); + muladd(n2, SECP256K1_N_C_0); + muladd(n1, SECP256K1_N_C_1); + sumadd(n0); + extract(m2); + sumadd(l[3]); + muladd(n3, SECP256K1_N_C_0); + muladd(n2, SECP256K1_N_C_1); + sumadd(n1); + extract(m3); + muladd(n3, SECP256K1_N_C_1); + sumadd(n2); + extract(m4); + sumadd_fast(n3); + extract_fast(m5); + VERIFY_CHECK(c0 <= 1); + m6 = c0; + + /* Reduce 385 bits into 258. */ + /* p[0..4] = m[0..3] + m[4..6] * SECP256K1_N_C. */ + c0 = m0; c1 = 0; c2 = 0; + muladd_fast(m4, SECP256K1_N_C_0); + extract_fast(p0); + sumadd_fast(m1); + muladd(m5, SECP256K1_N_C_0); + muladd(m4, SECP256K1_N_C_1); + extract(p1); + sumadd(m2); + muladd(m6, SECP256K1_N_C_0); + muladd(m5, SECP256K1_N_C_1); + sumadd(m4); + extract(p2); + sumadd_fast(m3); + muladd_fast(m6, SECP256K1_N_C_1); + sumadd_fast(m5); + extract_fast(p3); + p4 = c0 + m6; + VERIFY_CHECK(p4 <= 2); + + /* Reduce 258 bits into 256. */ + /* r[0..3] = p[0..3] + p[4] * SECP256K1_N_C. */ + c = p0 + (uint128_t)SECP256K1_N_C_0 * p4; + r->d[0] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; c >>= 64; + c += p1 + (uint128_t)SECP256K1_N_C_1 * p4; + r->d[1] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; c >>= 64; + c += p2 + (uint128_t)p4; + r->d[2] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; c >>= 64; + c += p3; + r->d[3] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; c >>= 64; +#endif + + /* Final reduction of r. */ + secp256k1_scalar_reduce(r, c + secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r)); +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_mul_512(uint64_t l[8], const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { +#ifdef USE_ASM_X86_64 + const uint64_t *pb = b->d; + __asm__ __volatile__( + /* Preload */ + "movq 0(%%rdi), %%r15\n" + "movq 8(%%rdi), %%rbx\n" + "movq 16(%%rdi), %%rcx\n" + "movq 0(%%rdx), %%r11\n" + "movq 8(%%rdx), %%r12\n" + "movq 16(%%rdx), %%r13\n" + "movq 24(%%rdx), %%r14\n" + /* (rax,rdx) = a0 * b0 */ + "movq %%r15, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r11\n" + /* Extract l0 */ + "movq %%rax, 0(%%rsi)\n" + /* (r8,r9,r10) = (rdx) */ + "movq %%rdx, %%r8\n" + "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n" + "xorq %%r10, %%r10\n" + /* (r8,r9,r10) += a0 * b1 */ + "movq %%r15, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r12\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" + "adcq $0, %%r10\n" + /* (r8,r9,r10) += a1 * b0 */ + "movq %%rbx, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r11\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" + "adcq $0, %%r10\n" + /* Extract l1 */ + "movq %%r8, 8(%%rsi)\n" + "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" + /* (r9,r10,r8) += a0 * b2 */ + "movq %%r15, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r13\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + /* (r9,r10,r8) += a1 * b1 */ + "movq %%rbx, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r12\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + /* (r9,r10,r8) += a2 * b0 */ + "movq %%rcx, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r11\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + /* Extract l2 */ + "movq %%r9, 16(%%rsi)\n" + "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n" + /* (r10,r8,r9) += a0 * b3 */ + "movq %%r15, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r14\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + /* Preload a3 */ + "movq 24(%%rdi), %%r15\n" + /* (r10,r8,r9) += a1 * b2 */ + "movq %%rbx, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r13\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + /* (r10,r8,r9) += a2 * b1 */ + "movq %%rcx, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r12\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + /* (r10,r8,r9) += a3 * b0 */ + "movq %%r15, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r11\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + /* Extract l3 */ + "movq %%r10, 24(%%rsi)\n" + "xorq %%r10, %%r10\n" + /* (r8,r9,r10) += a1 * b3 */ + "movq %%rbx, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r14\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" + "adcq $0, %%r10\n" + /* (r8,r9,r10) += a2 * b2 */ + "movq %%rcx, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r13\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" + "adcq $0, %%r10\n" + /* (r8,r9,r10) += a3 * b1 */ + "movq %%r15, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r12\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" + "adcq $0, %%r10\n" + /* Extract l4 */ + "movq %%r8, 32(%%rsi)\n" + "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" + /* (r9,r10,r8) += a2 * b3 */ + "movq %%rcx, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r14\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + /* (r9,r10,r8) += a3 * b2 */ + "movq %%r15, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r13\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + /* Extract l5 */ + "movq %%r9, 40(%%rsi)\n" + /* (r10,r8) += a3 * b3 */ + "movq %%r15, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r14\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" + /* Extract l6 */ + "movq %%r10, 48(%%rsi)\n" + /* Extract l7 */ + "movq %%r8, 56(%%rsi)\n" + : "+d"(pb) + : "S"(l), "D"(a->d) + : "rax", "rbx", "rcx", "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13", "r14", "r15", "cc", "memory"); +#else + /* 160 bit accumulator. */ + uint64_t c0 = 0, c1 = 0; + uint32_t c2 = 0; + + /* l[0..7] = a[0..3] * b[0..3]. */ + muladd_fast(a->d[0], b->d[0]); + extract_fast(l[0]); + muladd(a->d[0], b->d[1]); + muladd(a->d[1], b->d[0]); + extract(l[1]); + muladd(a->d[0], b->d[2]); + muladd(a->d[1], b->d[1]); + muladd(a->d[2], b->d[0]); + extract(l[2]); + muladd(a->d[0], b->d[3]); + muladd(a->d[1], b->d[2]); + muladd(a->d[2], b->d[1]); + muladd(a->d[3], b->d[0]); + extract(l[3]); + muladd(a->d[1], b->d[3]); + muladd(a->d[2], b->d[2]); + muladd(a->d[3], b->d[1]); + extract(l[4]); + muladd(a->d[2], b->d[3]); + muladd(a->d[3], b->d[2]); + extract(l[5]); + muladd_fast(a->d[3], b->d[3]); + extract_fast(l[6]); + VERIFY_CHECK(c1 == 0); + l[7] = c0; +#endif +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_sqr_512(uint64_t l[8], const secp256k1_scalar *a) { +#ifdef USE_ASM_X86_64 + __asm__ __volatile__( + /* Preload */ + "movq 0(%%rdi), %%r11\n" + "movq 8(%%rdi), %%r12\n" + "movq 16(%%rdi), %%r13\n" + "movq 24(%%rdi), %%r14\n" + /* (rax,rdx) = a0 * a0 */ + "movq %%r11, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r11\n" + /* Extract l0 */ + "movq %%rax, 0(%%rsi)\n" + /* (r8,r9,r10) = (rdx,0) */ + "movq %%rdx, %%r8\n" + "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n" + "xorq %%r10, %%r10\n" + /* (r8,r9,r10) += 2 * a0 * a1 */ + "movq %%r11, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r12\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" + "adcq $0, %%r10\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" + "adcq $0, %%r10\n" + /* Extract l1 */ + "movq %%r8, 8(%%rsi)\n" + "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" + /* (r9,r10,r8) += 2 * a0 * a2 */ + "movq %%r11, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r13\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + /* (r9,r10,r8) += a1 * a1 */ + "movq %%r12, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r12\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + /* Extract l2 */ + "movq %%r9, 16(%%rsi)\n" + "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n" + /* (r10,r8,r9) += 2 * a0 * a3 */ + "movq %%r11, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r14\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + /* (r10,r8,r9) += 2 * a1 * a2 */ + "movq %%r12, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r13\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" + "adcq $0, %%r9\n" + /* Extract l3 */ + "movq %%r10, 24(%%rsi)\n" + "xorq %%r10, %%r10\n" + /* (r8,r9,r10) += 2 * a1 * a3 */ + "movq %%r12, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r14\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" + "adcq $0, %%r10\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" + "adcq $0, %%r10\n" + /* (r8,r9,r10) += a2 * a2 */ + "movq %%r13, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r13\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" + "adcq $0, %%r10\n" + /* Extract l4 */ + "movq %%r8, 32(%%rsi)\n" + "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" + /* (r9,r10,r8) += 2 * a2 * a3 */ + "movq %%r13, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r14\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" + "adcq $0, %%r8\n" + /* Extract l5 */ + "movq %%r9, 40(%%rsi)\n" + /* (r10,r8) += a3 * a3 */ + "movq %%r14, %%rax\n" + "mulq %%r14\n" + "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" + "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" + /* Extract l6 */ + "movq %%r10, 48(%%rsi)\n" + /* Extract l7 */ + "movq %%r8, 56(%%rsi)\n" + : + : "S"(l), "D"(a->d) + : "rax", "rdx", "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13", "r14", "cc", "memory"); +#else + /* 160 bit accumulator. */ + uint64_t c0 = 0, c1 = 0; + uint32_t c2 = 0; + + /* l[0..7] = a[0..3] * b[0..3]. */ + muladd_fast(a->d[0], a->d[0]); + extract_fast(l[0]); + muladd2(a->d[0], a->d[1]); + extract(l[1]); + muladd2(a->d[0], a->d[2]); + muladd(a->d[1], a->d[1]); + extract(l[2]); + muladd2(a->d[0], a->d[3]); + muladd2(a->d[1], a->d[2]); + extract(l[3]); + muladd2(a->d[1], a->d[3]); + muladd(a->d[2], a->d[2]); + extract(l[4]); + muladd2(a->d[2], a->d[3]); + extract(l[5]); + muladd_fast(a->d[3], a->d[3]); + extract_fast(l[6]); + VERIFY_CHECK(c1 == 0); + l[7] = c0; +#endif +} + +#undef sumadd +#undef sumadd_fast +#undef muladd +#undef muladd_fast +#undef muladd2 +#undef extract +#undef extract_fast + +static void secp256k1_scalar_mul(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { + uint64_t l[8]; + secp256k1_scalar_mul_512(l, a, b); + secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(r, l); +} + +static int secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, int n) { + int ret; + VERIFY_CHECK(n > 0); + VERIFY_CHECK(n < 16); + ret = r->d[0] & ((1 << n) - 1); + r->d[0] = (r->d[0] >> n) + (r->d[1] << (64 - n)); + r->d[1] = (r->d[1] >> n) + (r->d[2] << (64 - n)); + r->d[2] = (r->d[2] >> n) + (r->d[3] << (64 - n)); + r->d[3] = (r->d[3] >> n); + return ret; +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_sqr(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + uint64_t l[8]; + secp256k1_scalar_sqr_512(l, a); + secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(r, l); +} + +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM +static void secp256k1_scalar_split_128(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + r1->d[0] = a->d[0]; + r1->d[1] = a->d[1]; + r1->d[2] = 0; + r1->d[3] = 0; + r2->d[0] = a->d[2]; + r2->d[1] = a->d[3]; + r2->d[2] = 0; + r2->d[3] = 0; +} +#endif + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_eq(const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { + return ((a->d[0] ^ b->d[0]) | (a->d[1] ^ b->d[1]) | (a->d[2] ^ b->d[2]) | (a->d[3] ^ b->d[3])) == 0; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b, unsigned int shift) { + uint64_t l[8]; + unsigned int shiftlimbs; + unsigned int shiftlow; + unsigned int shifthigh; + VERIFY_CHECK(shift >= 256); + secp256k1_scalar_mul_512(l, a, b); + shiftlimbs = shift >> 6; + shiftlow = shift & 0x3F; + shifthigh = 64 - shiftlow; + r->d[0] = shift < 512 ? (l[0 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow | (shift < 448 && shiftlow ? (l[1 + shiftlimbs] << shifthigh) : 0)) : 0; + r->d[1] = shift < 448 ? (l[1 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow | (shift < 384 && shiftlow ? (l[2 + shiftlimbs] << shifthigh) : 0)) : 0; + r->d[2] = shift < 384 ? (l[2 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow | (shift < 320 && shiftlow ? (l[3 + shiftlimbs] << shifthigh) : 0)) : 0; + r->d[3] = shift < 320 ? (l[3 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow) : 0; + secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(r, 0, (l[(shift - 1) >> 6] >> ((shift - 1) & 0x3f)) & 1); +} + +#define ROTL32(x,n) ((x) << (n) | (x) >> (32-(n))) +#define QUARTERROUND(a,b,c,d) \ + a += b; d = ROTL32(d ^ a, 16); \ + c += d; b = ROTL32(b ^ c, 12); \ + a += b; d = ROTL32(d ^ a, 8); \ + c += d; b = ROTL32(b ^ c, 7); + +#ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN +#define LE32(p) ((((p) & 0xFF) << 24) | (((p) & 0xFF00) << 8) | (((p) & 0xFF0000) >> 8) | (((p) & 0xFF000000) >> 24)) +#define BE32(p) (p) +#else +#define BE32(p) ((((p) & 0xFF) << 24) | (((p) & 0xFF00) << 8) | (((p) & 0xFF0000) >> 8) | (((p) & 0xFF000000) >> 24)) +#define LE32(p) (p) +#endif + +static void secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const unsigned char *seed, uint64_t idx) { + size_t n; + size_t over_count = 0; + uint32_t seed32[8]; + uint32_t x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12, x13, x14, x15; + int over1, over2; + + memcpy((void *) seed32, (const void *) seed, 32); + do { + x0 = 0x61707865; + x1 = 0x3320646e; + x2 = 0x79622d32; + x3 = 0x6b206574; + x4 = LE32(seed32[0]); + x5 = LE32(seed32[1]); + x6 = LE32(seed32[2]); + x7 = LE32(seed32[3]); + x8 = LE32(seed32[4]); + x9 = LE32(seed32[5]); + x10 = LE32(seed32[6]); + x11 = LE32(seed32[7]); + x12 = idx; + x13 = idx >> 32; + x14 = 0; + x15 = over_count; + + n = 10; + while (n--) { + QUARTERROUND(x0, x4, x8,x12) + QUARTERROUND(x1, x5, x9,x13) + QUARTERROUND(x2, x6,x10,x14) + QUARTERROUND(x3, x7,x11,x15) + QUARTERROUND(x0, x5,x10,x15) + QUARTERROUND(x1, x6,x11,x12) + QUARTERROUND(x2, x7, x8,x13) + QUARTERROUND(x3, x4, x9,x14) + } + + x0 += 0x61707865; + x1 += 0x3320646e; + x2 += 0x79622d32; + x3 += 0x6b206574; + x4 += LE32(seed32[0]); + x5 += LE32(seed32[1]); + x6 += LE32(seed32[2]); + x7 += LE32(seed32[3]); + x8 += LE32(seed32[4]); + x9 += LE32(seed32[5]); + x10 += LE32(seed32[6]); + x11 += LE32(seed32[7]); + x12 += idx; + x13 += idx >> 32; + x14 += 0; + x15 += over_count; + + r1->d[3] = BE32((uint64_t) x0) << 32 | BE32(x1); + r1->d[2] = BE32((uint64_t) x2) << 32 | BE32(x3); + r1->d[1] = BE32((uint64_t) x4) << 32 | BE32(x5); + r1->d[0] = BE32((uint64_t) x6) << 32 | BE32(x7); + r2->d[3] = BE32((uint64_t) x8) << 32 | BE32(x9); + r2->d[2] = BE32((uint64_t) x10) << 32 | BE32(x11); + r2->d[1] = BE32((uint64_t) x12) << 32 | BE32(x13); + r2->d[0] = BE32((uint64_t) x14) << 32 | BE32(x15); + + over1 = secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r1); + over2 = secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r2); + over_count++; + } while (over1 | over2); +} + +#undef ROTL32 +#undef QUARTERROUND +#undef BE32 +#undef LE32 + +#endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_8x32.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_8x32.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2c9a348 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_8x32.h @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H +#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H + +#include + +/** A scalar modulo the group order of the secp256k1 curve. */ +typedef struct { + uint32_t d[8]; +} secp256k1_scalar; + +#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) {{(d0), (d1), (d2), (d3), (d4), (d5), (d6), (d7)}} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_8x32_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_8x32_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9cf5c54 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_8x32_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,832 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H +#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H + +#include + +/* Limbs of the secp256k1 order. */ +#define SECP256K1_N_0 ((uint32_t)0xD0364141UL) +#define SECP256K1_N_1 ((uint32_t)0xBFD25E8CUL) +#define SECP256K1_N_2 ((uint32_t)0xAF48A03BUL) +#define SECP256K1_N_3 ((uint32_t)0xBAAEDCE6UL) +#define SECP256K1_N_4 ((uint32_t)0xFFFFFFFEUL) +#define SECP256K1_N_5 ((uint32_t)0xFFFFFFFFUL) +#define SECP256K1_N_6 ((uint32_t)0xFFFFFFFFUL) +#define SECP256K1_N_7 ((uint32_t)0xFFFFFFFFUL) + +/* Limbs of 2^256 minus the secp256k1 order. */ +#define SECP256K1_N_C_0 (~SECP256K1_N_0 + 1) +#define SECP256K1_N_C_1 (~SECP256K1_N_1) +#define SECP256K1_N_C_2 (~SECP256K1_N_2) +#define SECP256K1_N_C_3 (~SECP256K1_N_3) +#define SECP256K1_N_C_4 (1) + +/* Limbs of half the secp256k1 order. */ +#define SECP256K1_N_H_0 ((uint32_t)0x681B20A0UL) +#define SECP256K1_N_H_1 ((uint32_t)0xDFE92F46UL) +#define SECP256K1_N_H_2 ((uint32_t)0x57A4501DUL) +#define SECP256K1_N_H_3 ((uint32_t)0x5D576E73UL) +#define SECP256K1_N_H_4 ((uint32_t)0xFFFFFFFFUL) +#define SECP256K1_N_H_5 ((uint32_t)0xFFFFFFFFUL) +#define SECP256K1_N_H_6 ((uint32_t)0xFFFFFFFFUL) +#define SECP256K1_N_H_7 ((uint32_t)0x7FFFFFFFUL) + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_clear(secp256k1_scalar *r) { + r->d[0] = 0; + r->d[1] = 0; + r->d[2] = 0; + r->d[3] = 0; + r->d[4] = 0; + r->d[5] = 0; + r->d[6] = 0; + r->d[7] = 0; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_set_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int v) { + r->d[0] = v; + r->d[1] = 0; + r->d[2] = 0; + r->d[3] = 0; + r->d[4] = 0; + r->d[5] = 0; + r->d[6] = 0; + r->d[7] = 0; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_set_u64(secp256k1_scalar *r, uint64_t v) { + r->d[0] = v; + r->d[1] = v >> 32; + r->d[2] = 0; + r->d[3] = 0; + r->d[4] = 0; + r->d[5] = 0; + r->d[6] = 0; + r->d[7] = 0; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static unsigned int secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(const secp256k1_scalar *a, unsigned int offset, unsigned int count) { + VERIFY_CHECK((offset + count - 1) >> 5 == offset >> 5); + return (a->d[offset >> 5] >> (offset & 0x1F)) & ((1 << count) - 1); +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static unsigned int secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(const secp256k1_scalar *a, unsigned int offset, unsigned int count) { + VERIFY_CHECK(count < 32); + VERIFY_CHECK(offset + count <= 256); + if ((offset + count - 1) >> 5 == offset >> 5) { + return secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(a, offset, count); + } else { + VERIFY_CHECK((offset >> 5) + 1 < 8); + return ((a->d[offset >> 5] >> (offset & 0x1F)) | (a->d[(offset >> 5) + 1] << (32 - (offset & 0x1F)))) & ((((uint32_t)1) << count) - 1); + } +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + int yes = 0; + int no = 0; + no |= (a->d[7] < SECP256K1_N_7); /* No need for a > check. */ + no |= (a->d[6] < SECP256K1_N_6); /* No need for a > check. */ + no |= (a->d[5] < SECP256K1_N_5); /* No need for a > check. */ + no |= (a->d[4] < SECP256K1_N_4); + yes |= (a->d[4] > SECP256K1_N_4) & ~no; + no |= (a->d[3] < SECP256K1_N_3) & ~yes; + yes |= (a->d[3] > SECP256K1_N_3) & ~no; + no |= (a->d[2] < SECP256K1_N_2) & ~yes; + yes |= (a->d[2] > SECP256K1_N_2) & ~no; + no |= (a->d[1] < SECP256K1_N_1) & ~yes; + yes |= (a->d[1] > SECP256K1_N_1) & ~no; + yes |= (a->d[0] >= SECP256K1_N_0) & ~no; + return yes; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_reduce(secp256k1_scalar *r, uint32_t overflow) { + uint64_t t; + VERIFY_CHECK(overflow <= 1); + t = (uint64_t)r->d[0] + overflow * SECP256K1_N_C_0; + r->d[0] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)r->d[1] + overflow * SECP256K1_N_C_1; + r->d[1] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)r->d[2] + overflow * SECP256K1_N_C_2; + r->d[2] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)r->d[3] + overflow * SECP256K1_N_C_3; + r->d[3] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)r->d[4] + overflow * SECP256K1_N_C_4; + r->d[4] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)r->d[5]; + r->d[5] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)r->d[6]; + r->d[6] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)r->d[7]; + r->d[7] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; + return overflow; +} + +static int secp256k1_scalar_add(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { + int overflow; + uint64_t t = (uint64_t)a->d[0] + b->d[0]; + r->d[0] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)a->d[1] + b->d[1]; + r->d[1] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)a->d[2] + b->d[2]; + r->d[2] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)a->d[3] + b->d[3]; + r->d[3] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)a->d[4] + b->d[4]; + r->d[4] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)a->d[5] + b->d[5]; + r->d[5] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)a->d[6] + b->d[6]; + r->d[6] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)a->d[7] + b->d[7]; + r->d[7] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; + overflow = t + secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r); + VERIFY_CHECK(overflow == 0 || overflow == 1); + secp256k1_scalar_reduce(r, overflow); + return overflow; +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int bit, int flag) { + uint64_t t; + VERIFY_CHECK(bit < 256); + bit += ((uint32_t) flag - 1) & 0x100; /* forcing (bit >> 5) > 7 makes this a noop */ + t = (uint64_t)r->d[0] + (((uint32_t)((bit >> 5) == 0)) << (bit & 0x1F)); + r->d[0] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)r->d[1] + (((uint32_t)((bit >> 5) == 1)) << (bit & 0x1F)); + r->d[1] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)r->d[2] + (((uint32_t)((bit >> 5) == 2)) << (bit & 0x1F)); + r->d[2] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)r->d[3] + (((uint32_t)((bit >> 5) == 3)) << (bit & 0x1F)); + r->d[3] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)r->d[4] + (((uint32_t)((bit >> 5) == 4)) << (bit & 0x1F)); + r->d[4] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)r->d[5] + (((uint32_t)((bit >> 5) == 5)) << (bit & 0x1F)); + r->d[5] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)r->d[6] + (((uint32_t)((bit >> 5) == 6)) << (bit & 0x1F)); + r->d[6] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)r->d[7] + (((uint32_t)((bit >> 5) == 7)) << (bit & 0x1F)); + r->d[7] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; +#ifdef VERIFY + VERIFY_CHECK((t >> 32) == 0); + VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r) == 0); +#endif +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(secp256k1_scalar *r, const unsigned char *b32, int *overflow) { + int over; + r->d[0] = (uint32_t)b32[31] | (uint32_t)b32[30] << 8 | (uint32_t)b32[29] << 16 | (uint32_t)b32[28] << 24; + r->d[1] = (uint32_t)b32[27] | (uint32_t)b32[26] << 8 | (uint32_t)b32[25] << 16 | (uint32_t)b32[24] << 24; + r->d[2] = (uint32_t)b32[23] | (uint32_t)b32[22] << 8 | (uint32_t)b32[21] << 16 | (uint32_t)b32[20] << 24; + r->d[3] = (uint32_t)b32[19] | (uint32_t)b32[18] << 8 | (uint32_t)b32[17] << 16 | (uint32_t)b32[16] << 24; + r->d[4] = (uint32_t)b32[15] | (uint32_t)b32[14] << 8 | (uint32_t)b32[13] << 16 | (uint32_t)b32[12] << 24; + r->d[5] = (uint32_t)b32[11] | (uint32_t)b32[10] << 8 | (uint32_t)b32[9] << 16 | (uint32_t)b32[8] << 24; + r->d[6] = (uint32_t)b32[7] | (uint32_t)b32[6] << 8 | (uint32_t)b32[5] << 16 | (uint32_t)b32[4] << 24; + r->d[7] = (uint32_t)b32[3] | (uint32_t)b32[2] << 8 | (uint32_t)b32[1] << 16 | (uint32_t)b32[0] << 24; + over = secp256k1_scalar_reduce(r, secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r)); + if (overflow) { + *overflow = over; + } +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(unsigned char *bin, const secp256k1_scalar* a) { + bin[0] = a->d[7] >> 24; bin[1] = a->d[7] >> 16; bin[2] = a->d[7] >> 8; bin[3] = a->d[7]; + bin[4] = a->d[6] >> 24; bin[5] = a->d[6] >> 16; bin[6] = a->d[6] >> 8; bin[7] = a->d[6]; + bin[8] = a->d[5] >> 24; bin[9] = a->d[5] >> 16; bin[10] = a->d[5] >> 8; bin[11] = a->d[5]; + bin[12] = a->d[4] >> 24; bin[13] = a->d[4] >> 16; bin[14] = a->d[4] >> 8; bin[15] = a->d[4]; + bin[16] = a->d[3] >> 24; bin[17] = a->d[3] >> 16; bin[18] = a->d[3] >> 8; bin[19] = a->d[3]; + bin[20] = a->d[2] >> 24; bin[21] = a->d[2] >> 16; bin[22] = a->d[2] >> 8; bin[23] = a->d[2]; + bin[24] = a->d[1] >> 24; bin[25] = a->d[1] >> 16; bin[26] = a->d[1] >> 8; bin[27] = a->d[1]; + bin[28] = a->d[0] >> 24; bin[29] = a->d[0] >> 16; bin[30] = a->d[0] >> 8; bin[31] = a->d[0]; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + return (a->d[0] | a->d[1] | a->d[2] | a->d[3] | a->d[4] | a->d[5] | a->d[6] | a->d[7]) == 0; +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + uint32_t nonzero = 0xFFFFFFFFUL * (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(a) == 0); + uint64_t t = (uint64_t)(~a->d[0]) + SECP256K1_N_0 + 1; + r->d[0] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)(~a->d[1]) + SECP256K1_N_1; + r->d[1] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)(~a->d[2]) + SECP256K1_N_2; + r->d[2] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)(~a->d[3]) + SECP256K1_N_3; + r->d[3] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)(~a->d[4]) + SECP256K1_N_4; + r->d[4] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)(~a->d[5]) + SECP256K1_N_5; + r->d[5] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)(~a->d[6]) + SECP256K1_N_6; + r->d[6] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)(~a->d[7]) + SECP256K1_N_7; + r->d[7] = t & nonzero; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_one(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + return ((a->d[0] ^ 1) | a->d[1] | a->d[2] | a->d[3] | a->d[4] | a->d[5] | a->d[6] | a->d[7]) == 0; +} + +static int secp256k1_scalar_is_high(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + int yes = 0; + int no = 0; + no |= (a->d[7] < SECP256K1_N_H_7); + yes |= (a->d[7] > SECP256K1_N_H_7) & ~no; + no |= (a->d[6] < SECP256K1_N_H_6) & ~yes; /* No need for a > check. */ + no |= (a->d[5] < SECP256K1_N_H_5) & ~yes; /* No need for a > check. */ + no |= (a->d[4] < SECP256K1_N_H_4) & ~yes; /* No need for a > check. */ + no |= (a->d[3] < SECP256K1_N_H_3) & ~yes; + yes |= (a->d[3] > SECP256K1_N_H_3) & ~no; + no |= (a->d[2] < SECP256K1_N_H_2) & ~yes; + yes |= (a->d[2] > SECP256K1_N_H_2) & ~no; + no |= (a->d[1] < SECP256K1_N_H_1) & ~yes; + yes |= (a->d[1] > SECP256K1_N_H_1) & ~no; + yes |= (a->d[0] > SECP256K1_N_H_0) & ~no; + return yes; +} + +static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { + /* If we are flag = 0, mask = 00...00 and this is a no-op; + * if we are flag = 1, mask = 11...11 and this is identical to secp256k1_scalar_negate */ + uint32_t mask = !flag - 1; + uint32_t nonzero = 0xFFFFFFFFUL * (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(r) == 0); + uint64_t t = (uint64_t)(r->d[0] ^ mask) + ((SECP256K1_N_0 + 1) & mask); + r->d[0] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)(r->d[1] ^ mask) + (SECP256K1_N_1 & mask); + r->d[1] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)(r->d[2] ^ mask) + (SECP256K1_N_2 & mask); + r->d[2] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)(r->d[3] ^ mask) + (SECP256K1_N_3 & mask); + r->d[3] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)(r->d[4] ^ mask) + (SECP256K1_N_4 & mask); + r->d[4] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)(r->d[5] ^ mask) + (SECP256K1_N_5 & mask); + r->d[5] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)(r->d[6] ^ mask) + (SECP256K1_N_6 & mask); + r->d[6] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; + t += (uint64_t)(r->d[7] ^ mask) + (SECP256K1_N_7 & mask); + r->d[7] = t & nonzero; + return 2 * (mask == 0) - 1; +} + + +/* Inspired by the macros in OpenSSL's crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c. */ + +/** Add a*b to the number defined by (c0,c1,c2). c2 must never overflow. */ +#define muladd(a,b) { \ + uint32_t tl, th; \ + { \ + uint64_t t = (uint64_t)a * b; \ + th = t >> 32; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFE */ \ + tl = t; \ + } \ + c0 += tl; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + th += (c0 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFF */ \ + c1 += th; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + c2 += (c1 < th) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified in the next line) */ \ + VERIFY_CHECK((c1 >= th) || (c2 != 0)); \ +} + +/** Add a*b to the number defined by (c0,c1). c1 must never overflow. */ +#define muladd_fast(a,b) { \ + uint32_t tl, th; \ + { \ + uint64_t t = (uint64_t)a * b; \ + th = t >> 32; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFE */ \ + tl = t; \ + } \ + c0 += tl; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + th += (c0 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFF */ \ + c1 += th; /* never overflows by contract (verified in the next line) */ \ + VERIFY_CHECK(c1 >= th); \ +} + +/** Add 2*a*b to the number defined by (c0,c1,c2). c2 must never overflow. */ +#define muladd2(a,b) { \ + uint32_t tl, th, th2, tl2; \ + { \ + uint64_t t = (uint64_t)a * b; \ + th = t >> 32; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFE */ \ + tl = t; \ + } \ + th2 = th + th; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFE (in case th was 0x7FFFFFFF) */ \ + c2 += (th2 < th) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ + VERIFY_CHECK((th2 >= th) || (c2 != 0)); \ + tl2 = tl + tl; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFE (in case the lowest 63 bits of tl were 0x7FFFFFFF) */ \ + th2 += (tl2 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFF */ \ + c0 += tl2; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + th2 += (c0 < tl2) ? 1 : 0; /* second overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + c2 += (c0 < tl2) & (th2 == 0); /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ + VERIFY_CHECK((c0 >= tl2) || (th2 != 0) || (c2 != 0)); \ + c1 += th2; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + c2 += (c1 < th2) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ + VERIFY_CHECK((c1 >= th2) || (c2 != 0)); \ +} + +/** Add a to the number defined by (c0,c1,c2). c2 must never overflow. */ +#define sumadd(a) { \ + unsigned int over; \ + c0 += (a); /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + over = (c0 < (a)) ? 1 : 0; \ + c1 += over; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + c2 += (c1 < over) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract */ \ +} + +/** Add a to the number defined by (c0,c1). c1 must never overflow, c2 must be zero. */ +#define sumadd_fast(a) { \ + c0 += (a); /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ + c1 += (c0 < (a)) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ + VERIFY_CHECK((c1 != 0) | (c0 >= (a))); \ + VERIFY_CHECK(c2 == 0); \ +} + +/** Extract the lowest 32 bits of (c0,c1,c2) into n, and left shift the number 32 bits. */ +#define extract(n) { \ + (n) = c0; \ + c0 = c1; \ + c1 = c2; \ + c2 = 0; \ +} + +/** Extract the lowest 32 bits of (c0,c1,c2) into n, and left shift the number 32 bits. c2 is required to be zero. */ +#define extract_fast(n) { \ + (n) = c0; \ + c0 = c1; \ + c1 = 0; \ + VERIFY_CHECK(c2 == 0); \ +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(secp256k1_scalar *r, const uint32_t *l) { + uint64_t c; + uint32_t n0 = l[8], n1 = l[9], n2 = l[10], n3 = l[11], n4 = l[12], n5 = l[13], n6 = l[14], n7 = l[15]; + uint32_t m0, m1, m2, m3, m4, m5, m6, m7, m8, m9, m10, m11, m12; + uint32_t p0, p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8; + + /* 96 bit accumulator. */ + uint32_t c0, c1, c2; + + /* Reduce 512 bits into 385. */ + /* m[0..12] = l[0..7] + n[0..7] * SECP256K1_N_C. */ + c0 = l[0]; c1 = 0; c2 = 0; + muladd_fast(n0, SECP256K1_N_C_0); + extract_fast(m0); + sumadd_fast(l[1]); + muladd(n1, SECP256K1_N_C_0); + muladd(n0, SECP256K1_N_C_1); + extract(m1); + sumadd(l[2]); + muladd(n2, SECP256K1_N_C_0); + muladd(n1, SECP256K1_N_C_1); + muladd(n0, SECP256K1_N_C_2); + extract(m2); + sumadd(l[3]); + muladd(n3, SECP256K1_N_C_0); + muladd(n2, SECP256K1_N_C_1); + muladd(n1, SECP256K1_N_C_2); + muladd(n0, SECP256K1_N_C_3); + extract(m3); + sumadd(l[4]); + muladd(n4, SECP256K1_N_C_0); + muladd(n3, SECP256K1_N_C_1); + muladd(n2, SECP256K1_N_C_2); + muladd(n1, SECP256K1_N_C_3); + sumadd(n0); + extract(m4); + sumadd(l[5]); + muladd(n5, SECP256K1_N_C_0); + muladd(n4, SECP256K1_N_C_1); + muladd(n3, SECP256K1_N_C_2); + muladd(n2, SECP256K1_N_C_3); + sumadd(n1); + extract(m5); + sumadd(l[6]); + muladd(n6, SECP256K1_N_C_0); + muladd(n5, SECP256K1_N_C_1); + muladd(n4, SECP256K1_N_C_2); + muladd(n3, SECP256K1_N_C_3); + sumadd(n2); + extract(m6); + sumadd(l[7]); + muladd(n7, SECP256K1_N_C_0); + muladd(n6, SECP256K1_N_C_1); + muladd(n5, SECP256K1_N_C_2); + muladd(n4, SECP256K1_N_C_3); + sumadd(n3); + extract(m7); + muladd(n7, SECP256K1_N_C_1); + muladd(n6, SECP256K1_N_C_2); + muladd(n5, SECP256K1_N_C_3); + sumadd(n4); + extract(m8); + muladd(n7, SECP256K1_N_C_2); + muladd(n6, SECP256K1_N_C_3); + sumadd(n5); + extract(m9); + muladd(n7, SECP256K1_N_C_3); + sumadd(n6); + extract(m10); + sumadd_fast(n7); + extract_fast(m11); + VERIFY_CHECK(c0 <= 1); + m12 = c0; + + /* Reduce 385 bits into 258. */ + /* p[0..8] = m[0..7] + m[8..12] * SECP256K1_N_C. */ + c0 = m0; c1 = 0; c2 = 0; + muladd_fast(m8, SECP256K1_N_C_0); + extract_fast(p0); + sumadd_fast(m1); + muladd(m9, SECP256K1_N_C_0); + muladd(m8, SECP256K1_N_C_1); + extract(p1); + sumadd(m2); + muladd(m10, SECP256K1_N_C_0); + muladd(m9, SECP256K1_N_C_1); + muladd(m8, SECP256K1_N_C_2); + extract(p2); + sumadd(m3); + muladd(m11, SECP256K1_N_C_0); + muladd(m10, SECP256K1_N_C_1); + muladd(m9, SECP256K1_N_C_2); + muladd(m8, SECP256K1_N_C_3); + extract(p3); + sumadd(m4); + muladd(m12, SECP256K1_N_C_0); + muladd(m11, SECP256K1_N_C_1); + muladd(m10, SECP256K1_N_C_2); + muladd(m9, SECP256K1_N_C_3); + sumadd(m8); + extract(p4); + sumadd(m5); + muladd(m12, SECP256K1_N_C_1); + muladd(m11, SECP256K1_N_C_2); + muladd(m10, SECP256K1_N_C_3); + sumadd(m9); + extract(p5); + sumadd(m6); + muladd(m12, SECP256K1_N_C_2); + muladd(m11, SECP256K1_N_C_3); + sumadd(m10); + extract(p6); + sumadd_fast(m7); + muladd_fast(m12, SECP256K1_N_C_3); + sumadd_fast(m11); + extract_fast(p7); + p8 = c0 + m12; + VERIFY_CHECK(p8 <= 2); + + /* Reduce 258 bits into 256. */ + /* r[0..7] = p[0..7] + p[8] * SECP256K1_N_C. */ + c = p0 + (uint64_t)SECP256K1_N_C_0 * p8; + r->d[0] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; c >>= 32; + c += p1 + (uint64_t)SECP256K1_N_C_1 * p8; + r->d[1] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; c >>= 32; + c += p2 + (uint64_t)SECP256K1_N_C_2 * p8; + r->d[2] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; c >>= 32; + c += p3 + (uint64_t)SECP256K1_N_C_3 * p8; + r->d[3] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; c >>= 32; + c += p4 + (uint64_t)p8; + r->d[4] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; c >>= 32; + c += p5; + r->d[5] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; c >>= 32; + c += p6; + r->d[6] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; c >>= 32; + c += p7; + r->d[7] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; c >>= 32; + + /* Final reduction of r. */ + secp256k1_scalar_reduce(r, c + secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r)); +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_mul_512(uint32_t *l, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { + /* 96 bit accumulator. */ + uint32_t c0 = 0, c1 = 0, c2 = 0; + + /* l[0..15] = a[0..7] * b[0..7]. */ + muladd_fast(a->d[0], b->d[0]); + extract_fast(l[0]); + muladd(a->d[0], b->d[1]); + muladd(a->d[1], b->d[0]); + extract(l[1]); + muladd(a->d[0], b->d[2]); + muladd(a->d[1], b->d[1]); + muladd(a->d[2], b->d[0]); + extract(l[2]); + muladd(a->d[0], b->d[3]); + muladd(a->d[1], b->d[2]); + muladd(a->d[2], b->d[1]); + muladd(a->d[3], b->d[0]); + extract(l[3]); + muladd(a->d[0], b->d[4]); + muladd(a->d[1], b->d[3]); + muladd(a->d[2], b->d[2]); + muladd(a->d[3], b->d[1]); + muladd(a->d[4], b->d[0]); + extract(l[4]); + muladd(a->d[0], b->d[5]); + muladd(a->d[1], b->d[4]); + muladd(a->d[2], b->d[3]); + muladd(a->d[3], b->d[2]); + muladd(a->d[4], b->d[1]); + muladd(a->d[5], b->d[0]); + extract(l[5]); + muladd(a->d[0], b->d[6]); + muladd(a->d[1], b->d[5]); + muladd(a->d[2], b->d[4]); + muladd(a->d[3], b->d[3]); + muladd(a->d[4], b->d[2]); + muladd(a->d[5], b->d[1]); + muladd(a->d[6], b->d[0]); + extract(l[6]); + muladd(a->d[0], b->d[7]); + muladd(a->d[1], b->d[6]); + muladd(a->d[2], b->d[5]); + muladd(a->d[3], b->d[4]); + muladd(a->d[4], b->d[3]); + muladd(a->d[5], b->d[2]); + muladd(a->d[6], b->d[1]); + muladd(a->d[7], b->d[0]); + extract(l[7]); + muladd(a->d[1], b->d[7]); + muladd(a->d[2], b->d[6]); + muladd(a->d[3], b->d[5]); + muladd(a->d[4], b->d[4]); + muladd(a->d[5], b->d[3]); + muladd(a->d[6], b->d[2]); + muladd(a->d[7], b->d[1]); + extract(l[8]); + muladd(a->d[2], b->d[7]); + muladd(a->d[3], b->d[6]); + muladd(a->d[4], b->d[5]); + muladd(a->d[5], b->d[4]); + muladd(a->d[6], b->d[3]); + muladd(a->d[7], b->d[2]); + extract(l[9]); + muladd(a->d[3], b->d[7]); + muladd(a->d[4], b->d[6]); + muladd(a->d[5], b->d[5]); + muladd(a->d[6], b->d[4]); + muladd(a->d[7], b->d[3]); + extract(l[10]); + muladd(a->d[4], b->d[7]); + muladd(a->d[5], b->d[6]); + muladd(a->d[6], b->d[5]); + muladd(a->d[7], b->d[4]); + extract(l[11]); + muladd(a->d[5], b->d[7]); + muladd(a->d[6], b->d[6]); + muladd(a->d[7], b->d[5]); + extract(l[12]); + muladd(a->d[6], b->d[7]); + muladd(a->d[7], b->d[6]); + extract(l[13]); + muladd_fast(a->d[7], b->d[7]); + extract_fast(l[14]); + VERIFY_CHECK(c1 == 0); + l[15] = c0; +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_sqr_512(uint32_t *l, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + /* 96 bit accumulator. */ + uint32_t c0 = 0, c1 = 0, c2 = 0; + + /* l[0..15] = a[0..7]^2. */ + muladd_fast(a->d[0], a->d[0]); + extract_fast(l[0]); + muladd2(a->d[0], a->d[1]); + extract(l[1]); + muladd2(a->d[0], a->d[2]); + muladd(a->d[1], a->d[1]); + extract(l[2]); + muladd2(a->d[0], a->d[3]); + muladd2(a->d[1], a->d[2]); + extract(l[3]); + muladd2(a->d[0], a->d[4]); + muladd2(a->d[1], a->d[3]); + muladd(a->d[2], a->d[2]); + extract(l[4]); + muladd2(a->d[0], a->d[5]); + muladd2(a->d[1], a->d[4]); + muladd2(a->d[2], a->d[3]); + extract(l[5]); + muladd2(a->d[0], a->d[6]); + muladd2(a->d[1], a->d[5]); + muladd2(a->d[2], a->d[4]); + muladd(a->d[3], a->d[3]); + extract(l[6]); + muladd2(a->d[0], a->d[7]); + muladd2(a->d[1], a->d[6]); + muladd2(a->d[2], a->d[5]); + muladd2(a->d[3], a->d[4]); + extract(l[7]); + muladd2(a->d[1], a->d[7]); + muladd2(a->d[2], a->d[6]); + muladd2(a->d[3], a->d[5]); + muladd(a->d[4], a->d[4]); + extract(l[8]); + muladd2(a->d[2], a->d[7]); + muladd2(a->d[3], a->d[6]); + muladd2(a->d[4], a->d[5]); + extract(l[9]); + muladd2(a->d[3], a->d[7]); + muladd2(a->d[4], a->d[6]); + muladd(a->d[5], a->d[5]); + extract(l[10]); + muladd2(a->d[4], a->d[7]); + muladd2(a->d[5], a->d[6]); + extract(l[11]); + muladd2(a->d[5], a->d[7]); + muladd(a->d[6], a->d[6]); + extract(l[12]); + muladd2(a->d[6], a->d[7]); + extract(l[13]); + muladd_fast(a->d[7], a->d[7]); + extract_fast(l[14]); + VERIFY_CHECK(c1 == 0); + l[15] = c0; +} + +#undef sumadd +#undef sumadd_fast +#undef muladd +#undef muladd_fast +#undef muladd2 +#undef extract +#undef extract_fast + +static void secp256k1_scalar_mul(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { + uint32_t l[16]; + secp256k1_scalar_mul_512(l, a, b); + secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(r, l); +} + +static int secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, int n) { + int ret; + VERIFY_CHECK(n > 0); + VERIFY_CHECK(n < 16); + ret = r->d[0] & ((1 << n) - 1); + r->d[0] = (r->d[0] >> n) + (r->d[1] << (32 - n)); + r->d[1] = (r->d[1] >> n) + (r->d[2] << (32 - n)); + r->d[2] = (r->d[2] >> n) + (r->d[3] << (32 - n)); + r->d[3] = (r->d[3] >> n) + (r->d[4] << (32 - n)); + r->d[4] = (r->d[4] >> n) + (r->d[5] << (32 - n)); + r->d[5] = (r->d[5] >> n) + (r->d[6] << (32 - n)); + r->d[6] = (r->d[6] >> n) + (r->d[7] << (32 - n)); + r->d[7] = (r->d[7] >> n); + return ret; +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_sqr(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + uint32_t l[16]; + secp256k1_scalar_sqr_512(l, a); + secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(r, l); +} + +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM +static void secp256k1_scalar_split_128(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + r1->d[0] = a->d[0]; + r1->d[1] = a->d[1]; + r1->d[2] = a->d[2]; + r1->d[3] = a->d[3]; + r1->d[4] = 0; + r1->d[5] = 0; + r1->d[6] = 0; + r1->d[7] = 0; + r2->d[0] = a->d[4]; + r2->d[1] = a->d[5]; + r2->d[2] = a->d[6]; + r2->d[3] = a->d[7]; + r2->d[4] = 0; + r2->d[5] = 0; + r2->d[6] = 0; + r2->d[7] = 0; +} +#endif + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_eq(const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { + return ((a->d[0] ^ b->d[0]) | (a->d[1] ^ b->d[1]) | (a->d[2] ^ b->d[2]) | (a->d[3] ^ b->d[3]) | (a->d[4] ^ b->d[4]) | (a->d[5] ^ b->d[5]) | (a->d[6] ^ b->d[6]) | (a->d[7] ^ b->d[7])) == 0; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b, unsigned int shift) { + uint32_t l[16]; + unsigned int shiftlimbs; + unsigned int shiftlow; + unsigned int shifthigh; + VERIFY_CHECK(shift >= 256); + secp256k1_scalar_mul_512(l, a, b); + shiftlimbs = shift >> 5; + shiftlow = shift & 0x1F; + shifthigh = 32 - shiftlow; + r->d[0] = shift < 512 ? (l[0 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow | (shift < 480 && shiftlow ? (l[1 + shiftlimbs] << shifthigh) : 0)) : 0; + r->d[1] = shift < 480 ? (l[1 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow | (shift < 448 && shiftlow ? (l[2 + shiftlimbs] << shifthigh) : 0)) : 0; + r->d[2] = shift < 448 ? (l[2 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow | (shift < 416 && shiftlow ? (l[3 + shiftlimbs] << shifthigh) : 0)) : 0; + r->d[3] = shift < 416 ? (l[3 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow | (shift < 384 && shiftlow ? (l[4 + shiftlimbs] << shifthigh) : 0)) : 0; + r->d[4] = shift < 384 ? (l[4 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow | (shift < 352 && shiftlow ? (l[5 + shiftlimbs] << shifthigh) : 0)) : 0; + r->d[5] = shift < 352 ? (l[5 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow | (shift < 320 && shiftlow ? (l[6 + shiftlimbs] << shifthigh) : 0)) : 0; + r->d[6] = shift < 320 ? (l[6 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow | (shift < 288 && shiftlow ? (l[7 + shiftlimbs] << shifthigh) : 0)) : 0; + r->d[7] = shift < 288 ? (l[7 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow) : 0; + secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(r, 0, (l[(shift - 1) >> 5] >> ((shift - 1) & 0x1f)) & 1); +} + +#define ROTL32(x,n) ((x) << (n) | (x) >> (32-(n))) +#define QUARTERROUND(a,b,c,d) \ + a += b; d = ROTL32(d ^ a, 16); \ + c += d; b = ROTL32(b ^ c, 12); \ + a += b; d = ROTL32(d ^ a, 8); \ + c += d; b = ROTL32(b ^ c, 7); + +#ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN +#define LE32(p) ((((p) & 0xFF) << 24) | (((p) & 0xFF00) << 8) | (((p) & 0xFF0000) >> 8) | (((p) & 0xFF000000) >> 24)) +#define BE32(p) (p) +#else +#define BE32(p) ((((p) & 0xFF) << 24) | (((p) & 0xFF00) << 8) | (((p) & 0xFF0000) >> 8) | (((p) & 0xFF000000) >> 24)) +#define LE32(p) (p) +#endif + +static void secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const unsigned char *seed, uint64_t idx) { + size_t n; + size_t over_count = 0; + uint32_t seed32[8]; + uint32_t x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12, x13, x14, x15; + int over1, over2; + + memcpy((void *) seed32, (const void *) seed, 32); + do { + x0 = 0x61707865; + x1 = 0x3320646e; + x2 = 0x79622d32; + x3 = 0x6b206574; + x4 = LE32(seed32[0]); + x5 = LE32(seed32[1]); + x6 = LE32(seed32[2]); + x7 = LE32(seed32[3]); + x8 = LE32(seed32[4]); + x9 = LE32(seed32[5]); + x10 = LE32(seed32[6]); + x11 = LE32(seed32[7]); + x12 = idx; + x13 = idx >> 32; + x14 = 0; + x15 = over_count; + + n = 10; + while (n--) { + QUARTERROUND(x0, x4, x8,x12) + QUARTERROUND(x1, x5, x9,x13) + QUARTERROUND(x2, x6,x10,x14) + QUARTERROUND(x3, x7,x11,x15) + QUARTERROUND(x0, x5,x10,x15) + QUARTERROUND(x1, x6,x11,x12) + QUARTERROUND(x2, x7, x8,x13) + QUARTERROUND(x3, x4, x9,x14) + } + + x0 += 0x61707865; + x1 += 0x3320646e; + x2 += 0x79622d32; + x3 += 0x6b206574; + x4 += LE32(seed32[0]); + x5 += LE32(seed32[1]); + x6 += LE32(seed32[2]); + x7 += LE32(seed32[3]); + x8 += LE32(seed32[4]); + x9 += LE32(seed32[5]); + x10 += LE32(seed32[6]); + x11 += LE32(seed32[7]); + x12 += idx; + x13 += idx >> 32; + x14 += 0; + x15 += over_count; + + r1->d[7] = BE32(x0); + r1->d[6] = BE32(x1); + r1->d[5] = BE32(x2); + r1->d[4] = BE32(x3); + r1->d[3] = BE32(x4); + r1->d[2] = BE32(x5); + r1->d[1] = BE32(x6); + r1->d[0] = BE32(x7); + r2->d[7] = BE32(x8); + r2->d[6] = BE32(x9); + r2->d[5] = BE32(x10); + r2->d[4] = BE32(x11); + r2->d[3] = BE32(x12); + r2->d[2] = BE32(x13); + r2->d[1] = BE32(x14); + r2->d[0] = BE32(x15); + + over1 = secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r1); + over2 = secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r2); + over_count++; + } while (over1 | over2); +} + +#undef ROTL32 +#undef QUARTERROUND +#undef BE32 +#undef LE32 + +#endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fa79057 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,333 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_SCALAR_IMPL_H +#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_IMPL_H + +#include "group.h" +#include "scalar.h" + +#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" +#endif + +#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) +#include "scalar_low_impl.h" +#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_4X64) +#include "scalar_4x64_impl.h" +#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_8X32) +#include "scalar_8x32_impl.h" +#else +#error "Please select scalar implementation" +#endif + +#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE +static void secp256k1_scalar_get_num(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + unsigned char c[32]; + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(c, a); + secp256k1_num_set_bin(r, c, 32); +} + +/** secp256k1 curve order, see secp256k1_ecdsa_const_order_as_fe in ecdsa_impl.h */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(secp256k1_num *r) { +#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) + static const unsigned char order[32] = { + 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, + 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, + 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, + 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER + }; +#else + static const unsigned char order[32] = { + 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, + 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFE, + 0xBA,0xAE,0xDC,0xE6,0xAF,0x48,0xA0,0x3B, + 0xBF,0xD2,0x5E,0x8C,0xD0,0x36,0x41,0x41 + }; +#endif + secp256k1_num_set_bin(r, order, 32); +} +#endif + +static void secp256k1_scalar_inverse(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *x) { +#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) + int i; + *r = 0; + for (i = 0; i < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; i++) + if ((i * *x) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 1) + *r = i; + /* If this VERIFY_CHECK triggers we were given a noninvertible scalar (and thus + * have a composite group order; fix it in exhaustive_tests.c). */ + VERIFY_CHECK(*r != 0); +} +#else + secp256k1_scalar *t; + int i; + /* First compute xN as x ^ (2^N - 1) for some values of N, + * and uM as x ^ M for some values of M. */ + secp256k1_scalar x2, x3, x6, x8, x14, x28, x56, x112, x126; + secp256k1_scalar u2, u5, u9, u11, u13; + + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&u2, x); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x2, &u2, x); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&u5, &u2, &x2); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x3, &u5, &u2); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&u9, &x3, &u2); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&u11, &u9, &u2); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&u13, &u11, &u2); + + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x6, &u13); + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x6, &x6); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x6, &x6, &u11); + + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x8, &x6); + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x8, &x8); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x8, &x8, &x2); + + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x14, &x8); + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x14, &x14); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x14, &x14, &x6); + + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x28, &x14); + for (i = 0; i < 13; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x28, &x28); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x28, &x28, &x14); + + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x56, &x28); + for (i = 0; i < 27; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x56, &x56); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x56, &x56, &x28); + + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x112, &x56); + for (i = 0; i < 55; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x112, &x112); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x112, &x112, &x56); + + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x126, &x112); + for (i = 0; i < 13; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x126, &x126); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x126, &x126, &x14); + + /* Then accumulate the final result (t starts at x126). */ + t = &x126; + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u5); /* 101 */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { /* 0 */ + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &x3); /* 111 */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { /* 0 */ + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u5); /* 101 */ + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { /* 0 */ + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u11); /* 1011 */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u11); /* 1011 */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { /* 0 */ + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &x3); /* 111 */ + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { /* 00 */ + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &x3); /* 111 */ + for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { /* 00 */ + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u13); /* 1101 */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { /* 0 */ + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u5); /* 101 */ + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &x3); /* 111 */ + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { /* 0 */ + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u9); /* 1001 */ + for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { /* 000 */ + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u5); /* 101 */ + for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { /* 0000000 */ + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &x3); /* 111 */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { /* 0 */ + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &x3); /* 111 */ + for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) { /* 0 */ + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &x8); /* 11111111 */ + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { /* 0 */ + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u9); /* 1001 */ + for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { /* 00 */ + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u11); /* 1011 */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u13); /* 1101 */ + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &x2); /* 11 */ + for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { /* 00 */ + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u13); /* 1101 */ + for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { /* 000000 */ + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u13); /* 1101 */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u9); /* 1001 */ + for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { /* 00000 */ + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, x); /* 1 */ + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { /* 00 */ + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(r, t, &x6); /* 111111 */ +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_even(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + return !(a->d[0] & 1); +} +#endif + +static void secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *x) { +#if defined(USE_SCALAR_INV_BUILTIN) + secp256k1_scalar_inverse(r, x); +#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_INV_NUM) + unsigned char b[32]; + secp256k1_num n, m; + secp256k1_scalar t = *x; + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(b, &t); + secp256k1_num_set_bin(&n, b, 32); + secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(&m); + secp256k1_num_mod_inverse(&n, &n, &m); + secp256k1_num_get_bin(b, 32, &n); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(r, b, NULL); + /* Verify that the inverse was computed correctly, without GMP code. */ + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&t, &t, r); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&t)); +#else +#error "Please select scalar inverse implementation" +#endif +} + +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM +#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) +/** + * Find k1 and k2 given k, such that k1 + k2 * lambda == k mod n; unlike in the + * full case we don't bother making k1 and k2 be small, we just want them to be + * nontrivial to get full test coverage for the exhaustive tests. We therefore + * (arbitrarily) set k2 = k + 5 and k1 = k - k2 * lambda. + */ +static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + *r2 = (*a + 5) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; + *r1 = (*a + (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - *r2) * EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_LAMBDA) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; +} +#else +/** + * The Secp256k1 curve has an endomorphism, where lambda * (x, y) = (beta * x, y), where + * lambda is {0x53,0x63,0xad,0x4c,0xc0,0x5c,0x30,0xe0,0xa5,0x26,0x1c,0x02,0x88,0x12,0x64,0x5a, + * 0x12,0x2e,0x22,0xea,0x20,0x81,0x66,0x78,0xdf,0x02,0x96,0x7c,0x1b,0x23,0xbd,0x72} + * + * "Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography" (Hankerson, Menezes, Vanstone) gives an algorithm + * (algorithm 3.74) to find k1 and k2 given k, such that k1 + k2 * lambda == k mod n, and k1 + * and k2 have a small size. + * It relies on constants a1, b1, a2, b2. These constants for the value of lambda above are: + * + * - a1 = {0x30,0x86,0xd2,0x21,0xa7,0xd4,0x6b,0xcd,0xe8,0x6c,0x90,0xe4,0x92,0x84,0xeb,0x15} + * - b1 = -{0xe4,0x43,0x7e,0xd6,0x01,0x0e,0x88,0x28,0x6f,0x54,0x7f,0xa9,0x0a,0xbf,0xe4,0xc3} + * - a2 = {0x01,0x14,0xca,0x50,0xf7,0xa8,0xe2,0xf3,0xf6,0x57,0xc1,0x10,0x8d,0x9d,0x44,0xcf,0xd8} + * - b2 = {0x30,0x86,0xd2,0x21,0xa7,0xd4,0x6b,0xcd,0xe8,0x6c,0x90,0xe4,0x92,0x84,0xeb,0x15} + * + * The algorithm then computes c1 = round(b1 * k / n) and c2 = round(b2 * k / n), and gives + * k1 = k - (c1*a1 + c2*a2) and k2 = -(c1*b1 + c2*b2). Instead, we use modular arithmetic, and + * compute k1 as k - k2 * lambda, avoiding the need for constants a1 and a2. + * + * g1, g2 are precomputed constants used to replace division with a rounded multiplication + * when decomposing the scalar for an endomorphism-based point multiplication. + * + * The possibility of using precomputed estimates is mentioned in "Guide to Elliptic Curve + * Cryptography" (Hankerson, Menezes, Vanstone) in section 3.5. + * + * The derivation is described in the paper "Efficient Software Implementation of Public-Key + * Cryptography on Sensor Networks Using the MSP430X Microcontroller" (Gouvea, Oliveira, Lopez), + * Section 4.3 (here we use a somewhat higher-precision estimate): + * d = a1*b2 - b1*a2 + * g1 = round((2^272)*b2/d) + * g2 = round((2^272)*b1/d) + * + * (Note that 'd' is also equal to the curve order here because [a1,b1] and [a2,b2] are found + * as outputs of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm on inputs 'order' and 'lambda'). + * + * The function below splits a in r1 and r2, such that r1 + lambda * r2 == a (mod order). + */ + +static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + secp256k1_scalar c1, c2; + static const secp256k1_scalar minus_lambda = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( + 0xAC9C52B3UL, 0x3FA3CF1FUL, 0x5AD9E3FDUL, 0x77ED9BA4UL, + 0xA880B9FCUL, 0x8EC739C2UL, 0xE0CFC810UL, 0xB51283CFUL + ); + static const secp256k1_scalar minus_b1 = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( + 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, + 0xE4437ED6UL, 0x010E8828UL, 0x6F547FA9UL, 0x0ABFE4C3UL + ); + static const secp256k1_scalar minus_b2 = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( + 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFEUL, + 0x8A280AC5UL, 0x0774346DUL, 0xD765CDA8UL, 0x3DB1562CUL + ); + static const secp256k1_scalar g1 = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( + 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x00003086UL, + 0xD221A7D4UL, 0x6BCDE86CUL, 0x90E49284UL, 0xEB153DABUL + ); + static const secp256k1_scalar g2 = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( + 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x0000E443UL, + 0x7ED6010EUL, 0x88286F54UL, 0x7FA90ABFUL, 0xE4C42212UL + ); + VERIFY_CHECK(r1 != a); + VERIFY_CHECK(r2 != a); + /* these _var calls are constant time since the shift amount is constant */ + secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(&c1, a, &g1, 272); + secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(&c2, a, &g2, 272); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&c1, &c1, &minus_b1); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&c2, &c2, &minus_b2); + secp256k1_scalar_add(r2, &c1, &c2); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(r1, r2, &minus_lambda); + secp256k1_scalar_add(r1, r1, a); +} +#endif +#endif + +#endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_low.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_low.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5836feb --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_low.h @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2015 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H +#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H + +#include + +/** A scalar modulo the group order of the secp256k1 curve. */ +typedef uint32_t secp256k1_scalar; + +#endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_low_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_low_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d6fdead --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_low_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2015 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H +#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H + +#include "scalar.h" + +#include + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_even(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + return !(*a & 1); +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_clear(secp256k1_scalar *r) { *r = 0; } +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_set_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int v) { *r = v; } +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_set_u64(secp256k1_scalar *r, uint64_t v) { *r = v % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; } + +SECP256K1_INLINE static unsigned int secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(const secp256k1_scalar *a, unsigned int offset, unsigned int count) { + if (offset < 32) + return ((*a >> offset) & ((((uint32_t)1) << count) - 1)); + else + return 0; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static unsigned int secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(const secp256k1_scalar *a, unsigned int offset, unsigned int count) { + return secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(a, offset, count); +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { return *a >= EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; } + +static int secp256k1_scalar_add(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { + *r = (*a + *b) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; + return *r < *b; +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int bit, int flag) { + if (flag && bit < 32) + *r += (1 << bit); +#ifdef VERIFY + VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r) == 0); +#endif +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(secp256k1_scalar *r, const unsigned char *b32, int *overflow) { + const int base = 0x100 % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; + int i; + *r = 0; + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { + *r = ((*r * base) + b32[i]) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; + } + /* just deny overflow, it basically always happens */ + if (overflow) *overflow = 0; +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(unsigned char *bin, const secp256k1_scalar* a) { + memset(bin, 0, 32); + bin[28] = *a >> 24; bin[29] = *a >> 16; bin[30] = *a >> 8; bin[31] = *a; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + return *a == 0; +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + if (*a == 0) { + *r = 0; + } else { + *r = EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - *a; + } +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_one(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + return *a == 1; +} + +static int secp256k1_scalar_is_high(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + return *a > EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER / 2; +} + +static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { + if (flag) secp256k1_scalar_negate(r, r); + return flag ? -1 : 1; +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_mul(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { + *r = (*a * *b) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; +} + +static int secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, int n) { + int ret; + VERIFY_CHECK(n > 0); + VERIFY_CHECK(n < 16); + ret = *r & ((1 << n) - 1); + *r >>= n; + return ret; +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_sqr(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + *r = (*a * *a) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; +} + +static void secp256k1_scalar_split_128(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { + *r1 = *a; + *r2 = 0; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_eq(const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { + return *a == *b; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const unsigned char *seed, uint64_t n) { + *r1 = (seed[0] + n) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; + *r2 = (seed[1] + n) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scratch.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scratch.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fef377a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scratch.h @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2017 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef _SECP256K1_SCRATCH_ +#define _SECP256K1_SCRATCH_ + +#define SECP256K1_SCRATCH_MAX_FRAMES 5 + +/* The typedef is used internally; the struct name is used in the public API + * (where it is exposed as a different typedef) */ +typedef struct secp256k1_scratch_space_struct { + void *data[SECP256K1_SCRATCH_MAX_FRAMES]; + size_t offset[SECP256K1_SCRATCH_MAX_FRAMES]; + size_t frame_size[SECP256K1_SCRATCH_MAX_FRAMES]; + size_t frame; + size_t max_size; + const secp256k1_callback* error_callback; +} secp256k1_scratch; + +static secp256k1_scratch* secp256k1_scratch_create(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, size_t max_size); + +static void secp256k1_scratch_destroy(secp256k1_scratch* scratch); + +/** Attempts to allocate a new stack frame with `n` available bytes. Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure */ +static int secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t n, size_t objects); + +/** Deallocates a stack frame */ +static void secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(secp256k1_scratch* scratch); + +/** Returns the maximum allocation the scratch space will allow */ +static size_t secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(const secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t n_objects); + +/** Returns a pointer into the most recently allocated frame, or NULL if there is insufficient available space */ +static void *secp256k1_scratch_alloc(secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t n); + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scratch_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scratch_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..abed713 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scratch_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2017 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef _SECP256K1_SCRATCH_IMPL_H_ +#define _SECP256K1_SCRATCH_IMPL_H_ + +#include "scratch.h" + +/* Using 16 bytes alignment because common architectures never have alignment + * requirements above 8 for any of the types we care about. In addition we + * leave some room because currently we don't care about a few bytes. + * TODO: Determine this at configure time. */ +#define ALIGNMENT 16 + +static secp256k1_scratch* secp256k1_scratch_create(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, size_t max_size) { + secp256k1_scratch* ret = (secp256k1_scratch*)checked_malloc(error_callback, sizeof(*ret)); + if (ret != NULL) { + memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret)); + ret->max_size = max_size; + ret->error_callback = error_callback; + } + return ret; +} + +static void secp256k1_scratch_destroy(secp256k1_scratch* scratch) { + if (scratch != NULL) { + VERIFY_CHECK(scratch->frame == 0); + free(scratch); + } +} + +static size_t secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(const secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t objects) { + size_t i = 0; + size_t allocated = 0; + for (i = 0; i < scratch->frame; i++) { + allocated += scratch->frame_size[i]; + } + if (scratch->max_size - allocated <= objects * ALIGNMENT) { + return 0; + } + return scratch->max_size - allocated - objects * ALIGNMENT; +} + +static int secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t n, size_t objects) { + VERIFY_CHECK(scratch->frame < SECP256K1_SCRATCH_MAX_FRAMES); + + if (n <= secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(scratch, objects)) { + n += objects * ALIGNMENT; + scratch->data[scratch->frame] = checked_malloc(scratch->error_callback, n); + if (scratch->data[scratch->frame] == NULL) { + return 0; + } + scratch->frame_size[scratch->frame] = n; + scratch->offset[scratch->frame] = 0; + scratch->frame++; + return 1; + } else { + return 0; + } +} + +static void secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(secp256k1_scratch* scratch) { + VERIFY_CHECK(scratch->frame > 0); + scratch->frame -= 1; + free(scratch->data[scratch->frame]); +} + +static void *secp256k1_scratch_alloc(secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t size) { + void *ret; + size_t frame = scratch->frame - 1; + size = ((size + ALIGNMENT - 1) / ALIGNMENT) * ALIGNMENT; + + if (scratch->frame == 0 || size + scratch->offset[frame] > scratch->frame_size[frame]) { + return NULL; + } + ret = (void *) ((unsigned char *) scratch->data[frame] + scratch->offset[frame]); + memset(ret, 0, size); + scratch->offset[frame] += size; + + return ret; +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/secp256k1.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/secp256k1.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..159768a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/secp256k1.c @@ -0,0 +1,637 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013-2015 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#include "include/secp256k1.h" + +#include "util.h" +#include "num_impl.h" +#include "field_impl.h" +#include "scalar_impl.h" +#include "group_impl.h" +#include "ecmult_impl.h" +#include "ecmult_const_impl.h" +#include "ecmult_gen_impl.h" +#include "ecdsa_impl.h" +#include "eckey_impl.h" +#include "hash_impl.h" +#include "scratch_impl.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR +# include "include/secp256k1_generator.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_COMMITMENT +# include "include/secp256k1_commitment.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RANGEPROOF +# include "include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_BULLETPROOF +# include "include/secp256k1_bulletproofs.h" +#endif + +#define ARG_CHECK(cond) do { \ + if (EXPECT(!(cond), 0)) { \ + secp256k1_callback_call(&ctx->illegal_callback, #cond); \ + return 0; \ + } \ +} while(0) + +static void default_illegal_callback_fn(const char* str, void* data) { + (void)data; + fprintf(stderr, "[libsecp256k1] illegal argument: %s\n", str); + abort(); +} + +static const secp256k1_callback default_illegal_callback = { + default_illegal_callback_fn, + NULL +}; + +static void default_error_callback_fn(const char* str, void* data) { + (void)data; + fprintf(stderr, "[libsecp256k1] internal consistency check failed: %s\n", str); + abort(); +} + +static const secp256k1_callback default_error_callback = { + default_error_callback_fn, + NULL +}; + + +struct secp256k1_context_struct { + secp256k1_ecmult_context ecmult_ctx; + secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context ecmult_gen_ctx; + secp256k1_callback illegal_callback; + secp256k1_callback error_callback; +}; + +secp256k1_context* secp256k1_context_create(unsigned int flags) { + secp256k1_context* ret = (secp256k1_context*)checked_malloc(&default_error_callback, sizeof(secp256k1_context)); + ret->illegal_callback = default_illegal_callback; + ret->error_callback = default_error_callback; + + if (EXPECT((flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_MASK) != SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT, 0)) { + secp256k1_callback_call(&ret->illegal_callback, + "Invalid flags"); + free(ret); + return NULL; + } + + secp256k1_ecmult_context_init(&ret->ecmult_ctx); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_init(&ret->ecmult_gen_ctx); + + if (flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN) { + secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_build(&ret->ecmult_gen_ctx, &ret->error_callback); + } + if (flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY) { + secp256k1_ecmult_context_build(&ret->ecmult_ctx, &ret->error_callback); + } + + return ret; +} + +secp256k1_context* secp256k1_context_clone(const secp256k1_context* ctx) { + secp256k1_context* ret = (secp256k1_context*)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, sizeof(secp256k1_context)); + ret->illegal_callback = ctx->illegal_callback; + ret->error_callback = ctx->error_callback; + secp256k1_ecmult_context_clone(&ret->ecmult_ctx, &ctx->ecmult_ctx, &ctx->error_callback); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_clone(&ret->ecmult_gen_ctx, &ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &ctx->error_callback); + return ret; +} + +void secp256k1_context_destroy(secp256k1_context* ctx) { + if (ctx != NULL) { + secp256k1_ecmult_context_clear(&ctx->ecmult_ctx); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_clear(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx); + + free(ctx); + } +} + +void secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(secp256k1_context* ctx, void (*fun)(const char* message, void* data), const void* data) { + if (fun == NULL) { + fun = default_illegal_callback_fn; + } + ctx->illegal_callback.fn = fun; + ctx->illegal_callback.data = data; +} + +void secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(secp256k1_context* ctx, void (*fun)(const char* message, void* data), const void* data) { + if (fun == NULL) { + fun = default_error_callback_fn; + } + ctx->error_callback.fn = fun; + ctx->error_callback.data = data; +} + +secp256k1_scratch_space* secp256k1_scratch_space_create(const secp256k1_context* ctx, size_t max_size) { + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + return secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, max_size); +} + +void secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy(secp256k1_scratch_space* scratch) { + secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); +} + +static int secp256k1_pubkey_load(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ge* ge, const secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey) { + if (sizeof(secp256k1_ge_storage) == 64) { + /* When the secp256k1_ge_storage type is exactly 64 byte, use its + * representation inside secp256k1_pubkey, as conversion is very fast. + * Note that secp256k1_pubkey_save must use the same representation. */ + secp256k1_ge_storage s; + memcpy(&s, &pubkey->data[0], sizeof(s)); + secp256k1_ge_from_storage(ge, &s); + } else { + /* Otherwise, fall back to 32-byte big endian for X and Y. */ + secp256k1_fe x, y; + secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&x, pubkey->data); + secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&y, pubkey->data + 32); + secp256k1_ge_set_xy(ge, &x, &y); + } + ARG_CHECK(!secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&ge->x)); + return 1; +} + +static void secp256k1_pubkey_save(secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey, secp256k1_ge* ge) { + if (sizeof(secp256k1_ge_storage) == 64) { + secp256k1_ge_storage s; + secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&s, ge); + memcpy(&pubkey->data[0], &s, sizeof(s)); + } else { + VERIFY_CHECK(!secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(ge)); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&ge->x); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&ge->y); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(pubkey->data, &ge->x); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(pubkey->data + 32, &ge->y); + } +} + +int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey, const unsigned char *input, size_t inputlen) { + secp256k1_ge Q; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); + memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey)); + ARG_CHECK(input != NULL); + if (!secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&Q, input, inputlen)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &Q); + secp256k1_ge_clear(&Q); + return 1; +} + +int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *outputlen, const secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey, unsigned int flags) { + secp256k1_ge Q; + size_t len; + int ret = 0; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(outputlen != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(*outputlen >= ((flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION) ? 33 : 65)); + len = *outputlen; + *outputlen = 0; + ARG_CHECK(output != NULL); + memset(output, 0, len); + ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); + ARG_CHECK((flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_MASK) == SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION); + if (secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &Q, pubkey)) { + ret = secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&Q, output, &len, flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION); + if (ret) { + *outputlen = len; + } + } + return ret; +} + +static void secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_scalar* r, secp256k1_scalar* s, const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig) { + (void)ctx; + if (sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) == 32) { + /* When the secp256k1_scalar type is exactly 32 byte, use its + * representation inside secp256k1_ecdsa_signature, as conversion is very fast. + * Note that secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save must use the same representation. */ + memcpy(r, &sig->data[0], 32); + memcpy(s, &sig->data[32], 32); + } else { + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(r, &sig->data[0], NULL); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(s, &sig->data[32], NULL); + } +} + +static void secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig, const secp256k1_scalar* r, const secp256k1_scalar* s) { + if (sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) == 32) { + memcpy(&sig->data[0], r, 32); + memcpy(&sig->data[32], s, 32); + } else { + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&sig->data[0], r); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&sig->data[32], s); + } +} + +int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig, const unsigned char *input, size_t inputlen) { + secp256k1_scalar r, s; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(input != NULL); + + if (secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_parse(&r, &s, input, inputlen)) { + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(sig, &r, &s); + return 1; + } else { + memset(sig, 0, sizeof(*sig)); + return 0; + } +} + +int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig, const unsigned char *input64) { + secp256k1_scalar r, s; + int ret = 1; + int overflow = 0; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(input64 != NULL); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&r, &input64[0], &overflow); + ret &= !overflow; + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s, &input64[32], &overflow); + ret &= !overflow; + if (ret) { + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(sig, &r, &s); + } else { + memset(sig, 0, sizeof(*sig)); + } + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *outputlen, const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig) { + secp256k1_scalar r, s; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(output != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(outputlen != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); + + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, sig); + return secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_serialize(output, outputlen, &r, &s); +} + +int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output64, const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig) { + secp256k1_scalar r, s; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(output64 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); + + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, sig); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&output64[0], &r); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&output64[32], &s); + return 1; +} + +int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigout, const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigin) { + secp256k1_scalar r, s; + int ret = 0; + + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(sigin != NULL); + + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, sigin); + ret = secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s); + if (sigout != NULL) { + if (ret) { + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s, &s); + } + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(sigout, &r, &s); + } + + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig, const unsigned char *msg32, const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey) { + secp256k1_ge q; + secp256k1_scalar r, s; + secp256k1_scalar m; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&m, msg32, NULL); + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, sig); + return (!secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s) && + secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &q, pubkey) && + secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &r, &s, &q, &m)); +} + +static SECP256K1_INLINE void buffer_append(unsigned char *buf, unsigned int *offset, const void *data, unsigned int len) { + memcpy(buf + *offset, data, len); + *offset += len; +} + +static int nonce_function_rfc6979(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *algo16, void *data, unsigned int counter) { + unsigned char keydata[112]; + unsigned int offset = 0; + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 rng; + unsigned int i; + /* We feed a byte array to the PRNG as input, consisting of: + * - the private key (32 bytes) and message (32 bytes), see RFC 6979 3.2d. + * - optionally 32 extra bytes of data, see RFC 6979 3.6 Additional Data. + * - optionally 16 extra bytes with the algorithm name. + * Because the arguments have distinct fixed lengths it is not possible for + * different argument mixtures to emulate each other and result in the same + * nonces. + */ + buffer_append(keydata, &offset, key32, 32); + buffer_append(keydata, &offset, msg32, 32); + if (data != NULL) { + buffer_append(keydata, &offset, data, 32); + } + if (algo16 != NULL) { + buffer_append(keydata, &offset, algo16, 16); + } + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, keydata, offset); + memset(keydata, 0, sizeof(keydata)); + for (i = 0; i <= counter; i++) { + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, nonce32, 32); + } + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(&rng); + return 1; +} + +const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979 = nonce_function_rfc6979; +const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_default = nonce_function_rfc6979; + +int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *signature, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *seckey, secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, const void* noncedata) { + secp256k1_scalar r, s; + secp256k1_scalar sec, non, msg; + int ret = 0; + int overflow = 0; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(signature != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); + if (noncefp == NULL) { + noncefp = secp256k1_nonce_function_default; + } + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, &overflow); + /* Fail if the secret key is invalid. */ + if (!overflow && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec)) { + unsigned char nonce32[32]; + unsigned int count = 0; + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&msg, msg32, NULL); + while (1) { + ret = noncefp(nonce32, msg32, seckey, NULL, (void*)noncedata, count); + if (!ret) { + break; + } + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&non, nonce32, &overflow); + if (!overflow && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&non)) { + if (secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &r, &s, &sec, &msg, &non, NULL)) { + break; + } + } + count++; + } + memset(nonce32, 0, 32); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&msg); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&non); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); + } + if (ret) { + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(signature, &r, &s); + } else { + memset(signature, 0, sizeof(*signature)); + } + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const unsigned char *seckey) { + secp256k1_scalar sec; + int ret; + int overflow; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, &overflow); + ret = !overflow && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, const unsigned char *seckey) { + secp256k1_gej pj; + secp256k1_ge p; + secp256k1_scalar sec; + int overflow; + int ret = 0; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); + memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey)); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, &overflow); + ret = (!overflow) & (!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec)); + if (ret) { + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pj, &sec); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&p, &pj); + secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &p); + } + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_ec_privkey_negate(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *seckey) { + secp256k1_scalar sec; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, NULL); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&sec, &sec); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(seckey, &sec); + + return 1; +} + +int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey) { + int ret = 0; + secp256k1_ge p; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); + + ret = secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &p, pubkey); + memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey)); + if (ret) { + secp256k1_ge_neg(&p, &p); + secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &p); + } + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *seckey, const unsigned char *tweak) { + secp256k1_scalar term; + secp256k1_scalar sec; + int ret = 0; + int overflow = 0; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(tweak != NULL); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&term, tweak, &overflow); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, NULL); + + ret = !overflow && secp256k1_eckey_privkey_tweak_add(&sec, &term); + memset(seckey, 0, 32); + if (ret) { + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(seckey, &sec); + } + + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&term); + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, const unsigned char *tweak) { + secp256k1_ge p; + secp256k1_scalar term; + int ret = 0; + int overflow = 0; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(tweak != NULL); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&term, tweak, &overflow); + ret = !overflow && secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &p, pubkey); + memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey)); + if (ret) { + if (secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_add(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &p, &term)) { + secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &p); + } else { + ret = 0; + } + } + + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *seckey, const unsigned char *tweak) { + secp256k1_scalar factor; + secp256k1_scalar sec; + int ret = 0; + int overflow = 0; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(tweak != NULL); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&factor, tweak, &overflow); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, NULL); + ret = !overflow && secp256k1_eckey_privkey_tweak_mul(&sec, &factor); + memset(seckey, 0, 32); + if (ret) { + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(seckey, &sec); + } + + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&factor); + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, const unsigned char *tweak) { + secp256k1_ge p; + secp256k1_scalar factor; + int ret = 0; + int overflow = 0; + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); + ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(tweak != NULL); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&factor, tweak, &overflow); + ret = !overflow && secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &p, pubkey); + memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey)); + if (ret) { + if (secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_mul(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &p, &factor)) { + secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &p); + } else { + ret = 0; + } + } + + return ret; +} + +int secp256k1_context_randomize(secp256k1_context* ctx, const unsigned char *seed32) { + VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); + ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, seed32); + return 1; +} + +int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubnonce, const secp256k1_pubkey * const *pubnonces, size_t n) { + size_t i; + secp256k1_gej Qj; + secp256k1_ge Q; + + ARG_CHECK(pubnonce != NULL); + memset(pubnonce, 0, sizeof(*pubnonce)); + ARG_CHECK(n >= 1); + ARG_CHECK(pubnonces != NULL); + + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&Qj); + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &Q, pubnonces[i]); + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&Qj, &Qj, &Q); + } + if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&Qj)) { + return 0; + } + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&Q, &Qj); + secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubnonce, &Q); + return 1; +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH +# include "modules/ecdh/main_impl.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY +# include "modules/recovery/main_impl.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR +# include "modules/generator/main_impl.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_COMMITMENT +# include "modules/commitment/main_impl.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RANGEPROOF +# include "modules/rangeproof/main_impl.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_BULLETPROOF +# include "modules/bulletproofs/main_impl.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_WHITELIST +# include "modules/whitelist/main_impl.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SURJECTIONPROOF +# include "modules/surjection/main_impl.h" +#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/testrand.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/testrand.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8259959 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/testrand.h @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_TESTRAND_H +#define SECP256K1_TESTRAND_H + +#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" +#endif + +/* A non-cryptographic RNG used only for test infrastructure. */ + +/** Seed the pseudorandom number generator for testing. */ +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_rand_seed(const unsigned char *seed16); + +/** Generate a pseudorandom number in the range [0..2**32-1]. */ +static uint32_t secp256k1_rand32(void); + +/** Generate a pseudorandom number in the range [0..2**bits-1]. Bits must be 1 or + * more. */ +static uint32_t secp256k1_rand_bits(int bits); + +/** Generate a pseudorandom number in the range [0..range-1]. */ +static uint32_t secp256k1_rand_int(uint32_t range); + +/** Generate a pseudorandom 32-byte array. */ +static void secp256k1_rand256(unsigned char *b32); + +/** Generate a pseudorandom 32-byte array with long sequences of zero and one bits. */ +static void secp256k1_rand256_test(unsigned char *b32); + +/** Generate pseudorandom bytes with long sequences of zero and one bits. */ +static void secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(unsigned char *bytes, size_t len); + +/** Generate a pseudorandom 64-bit integer in the range min..max, inclusive. */ +static int64_t secp256k1_rands64(uint64_t min, uint64_t max); + +#endif /* SECP256K1_TESTRAND_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/testrand_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/testrand_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0db523d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/testrand_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013-2015 Pieter Wuille, Gregory Maxwell * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_TESTRAND_IMPL_H +#define SECP256K1_TESTRAND_IMPL_H + +#include +#include + +#include "testrand.h" +#include "hash.h" + +static secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 secp256k1_test_rng; +static uint32_t secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed[8]; +static int secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed_used = 8; +static uint64_t secp256k1_test_rng_integer; +static int secp256k1_test_rng_integer_bits_left = 0; + +SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_rand_seed(const unsigned char *seed16) { + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&secp256k1_test_rng, seed16, 16); +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static uint32_t secp256k1_rand32(void) { + if (secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed_used == 8) { + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&secp256k1_test_rng, (unsigned char*)(&secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed[0]), sizeof(secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed)); + secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed_used = 0; + } + return secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed[secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed_used++]; +} + +static uint32_t secp256k1_rand_bits(int bits) { + uint32_t ret; + if (secp256k1_test_rng_integer_bits_left < bits) { + secp256k1_test_rng_integer |= (((uint64_t)secp256k1_rand32()) << secp256k1_test_rng_integer_bits_left); + secp256k1_test_rng_integer_bits_left += 32; + } + ret = secp256k1_test_rng_integer; + secp256k1_test_rng_integer >>= bits; + secp256k1_test_rng_integer_bits_left -= bits; + ret &= ((~((uint32_t)0)) >> (32 - bits)); + return ret; +} + +static uint32_t secp256k1_rand_int(uint32_t range) { + /* We want a uniform integer between 0 and range-1, inclusive. + * B is the smallest number such that range <= 2**B. + * two mechanisms implemented here: + * - generate B bits numbers until one below range is found, and return it + * - find the largest multiple M of range that is <= 2**(B+A), generate B+A + * bits numbers until one below M is found, and return it modulo range + * The second mechanism consumes A more bits of entropy in every iteration, + * but may need fewer iterations due to M being closer to 2**(B+A) then + * range is to 2**B. The array below (indexed by B) contains a 0 when the + * first mechanism is to be used, and the number A otherwise. + */ + static const int addbits[] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 1, 0}; + uint32_t trange, mult; + int bits = 0; + if (range <= 1) { + return 0; + } + trange = range - 1; + while (trange > 0) { + trange >>= 1; + bits++; + } + if (addbits[bits]) { + bits = bits + addbits[bits]; + mult = ((~((uint32_t)0)) >> (32 - bits)) / range; + trange = range * mult; + } else { + trange = range; + mult = 1; + } + while(1) { + uint32_t x = secp256k1_rand_bits(bits); + if (x < trange) { + return (mult == 1) ? x : (x % range); + } + } +} + +static void secp256k1_rand256(unsigned char *b32) { + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&secp256k1_test_rng, b32, 32); +} + +static void secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(unsigned char *bytes, size_t len) { + size_t bits = 0; + memset(bytes, 0, len); + while (bits < len * 8) { + int now; + uint32_t val; + now = 1 + (secp256k1_rand_bits(6) * secp256k1_rand_bits(5) + 16) / 31; + val = secp256k1_rand_bits(1); + while (now > 0 && bits < len * 8) { + bytes[bits / 8] |= val << (bits % 8); + now--; + bits++; + } + } +} + +static void secp256k1_rand256_test(unsigned char *b32) { + secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(b32, 32); +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int64_t secp256k1_rands64(uint64_t min, uint64_t max) { + uint64_t range; + uint64_t r; + uint64_t clz; + VERIFY_CHECK(max >= min); + if (max == min) { + return min; + } + range = max - min; + clz = secp256k1_clz64_var(range); + do { + r = ((uint64_t)secp256k1_rand32() << 32) | secp256k1_rand32(); + r >>= clz; + } while (r > range); + return min + (int64_t)r; +} + +#endif /* SECP256K1_TESTRAND_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/tests.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/tests.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7b0af8a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/tests.c @@ -0,0 +1,5231 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013-2015 Pieter Wuille, Gregory Maxwell * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "secp256k1.c" +#include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "testrand_impl.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS +#include "openssl/bn.h" +#include "openssl/ec.h" +#include "openssl/ecdsa.h" +#include "openssl/obj_mac.h" +# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L +void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps) {*pr = sig->r; *ps = sig->s;} +# endif +#endif + +#include "contrib/lax_der_parsing.c" +#include "contrib/lax_der_privatekey_parsing.c" + +#if !defined(VG_CHECK) +# if defined(VALGRIND) +# include +# define VG_UNDEF(x,y) VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED((x),(y)) +# define VG_CHECK(x,y) VALGRIND_CHECK_MEM_IS_DEFINED((x),(y)) +# else +# define VG_UNDEF(x,y) +# define VG_CHECK(x,y) +# endif +#endif + +static int count = 64; +static secp256k1_context *ctx = NULL; + +static void counting_illegal_callback_fn(const char* str, void* data) { + /* Dummy callback function that just counts. */ + int32_t *p; + (void)str; + p = data; + (*p)++; +} + +static void uncounting_illegal_callback_fn(const char* str, void* data) { + /* Dummy callback function that just counts (backwards). */ + int32_t *p; + (void)str; + p = data; + (*p)--; +} + +void random_field_element_test(secp256k1_fe *fe) { + do { + unsigned char b32[32]; + secp256k1_rand256_test(b32); + if (secp256k1_fe_set_b32(fe, b32)) { + break; + } + } while(1); +} + +void random_field_element_magnitude(secp256k1_fe *fe) { + secp256k1_fe zero; + int n = secp256k1_rand_int(9); + secp256k1_fe_normalize(fe); + if (n == 0) { + return; + } + secp256k1_fe_clear(&zero); + secp256k1_fe_negate(&zero, &zero, 0); + secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&zero, n - 1); + secp256k1_fe_add(fe, &zero); + VERIFY_CHECK(fe->magnitude == n); +} + +void random_group_element_test(secp256k1_ge *ge) { + secp256k1_fe fe; + do { + random_field_element_test(&fe); + if (secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(ge, &fe, secp256k1_rand_bits(1))) { + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&ge->y); + break; + } + } while(1); +} + +void random_group_element_jacobian_test(secp256k1_gej *gej, const secp256k1_ge *ge) { + secp256k1_fe z2, z3; + do { + random_field_element_test(&gej->z); + if (!secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&gej->z)) { + break; + } + } while(1); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z2, &gej->z); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&z3, &z2, &gej->z); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&gej->x, &ge->x, &z2); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&gej->y, &ge->y, &z3); + gej->infinity = ge->infinity; +} + +void random_scalar_order_test(secp256k1_scalar *num) { + do { + unsigned char b32[32]; + int overflow = 0; + secp256k1_rand256_test(b32); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(num, b32, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(num)) { + continue; + } + break; + } while(1); +} + +void random_scalar_order(secp256k1_scalar *num) { + do { + unsigned char b32[32]; + int overflow = 0; + secp256k1_rand256(b32); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(num, b32, &overflow); + if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(num)) { + continue; + } + break; + } while(1); +} + +void run_util_tests(void) { + int i; + uint64_t r; + uint64_t r2; + uint64_t r3; + int64_t s; + CHECK(secp256k1_clz64_var(0) == 64); + CHECK(secp256k1_clz64_var(1) == 63); + CHECK(secp256k1_clz64_var(2) == 62); + CHECK(secp256k1_clz64_var(3) == 62); + CHECK(secp256k1_clz64_var(~0ULL) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_clz64_var((~0ULL) - 1) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_clz64_var((~0ULL) >> 1) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_clz64_var((~0ULL) >> 2) == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(&r, INT64_MAX) == 0); + CHECK(r == INT64_MAX); + CHECK(secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(&r, INT64_MAX - 1) == 0); + CHECK(r == INT64_MAX - 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(&r, INT64_MIN) == 1); + CHECK(r == (uint64_t)INT64_MAX + 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(&r, INT64_MIN + 1) == 1); + CHECK(r == (uint64_t)INT64_MAX); + CHECK(secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(&r, 0) == 0); + CHECK(r == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(&r, 1) == 0); + CHECK(r == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(&r, -1) == 1); + CHECK(r == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(&r, 2) == 0); + CHECK(r == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(&r, -2) == 1); + CHECK(r == 2); + for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { + CHECK(secp256k1_clz64_var((~0ULL) - secp256k1_rand32()) == 0); + r = ((uint64_t)secp256k1_rand32() << 32) | secp256k1_rand32(); + r2 = secp256k1_rands64(0, r); + CHECK(r2 <= r); + r3 = secp256k1_rands64(r2, r); + CHECK((r3 >= r2) && (r3 <= r)); + r = secp256k1_rands64(0, INT64_MAX); + s = (int64_t)r * (secp256k1_rand32()&1?-1:1); + CHECK(secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(&r2, s) == (s < 0)); + CHECK(r2 == r); + } +} + +void run_context_tests(void) { + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; + secp256k1_pubkey zero_pubkey; + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; + unsigned char ctmp[32]; + int32_t ecount; + int32_t ecount2; + secp256k1_context *none = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); + secp256k1_context *sign = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); + secp256k1_context *vrfy = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + secp256k1_context *both = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + + secp256k1_gej pubj; + secp256k1_ge pub; + secp256k1_scalar msg, key, nonce; + secp256k1_scalar sigr, sigs; + + memset(&zero_pubkey, 0, sizeof(zero_pubkey)); + + ecount = 0; + ecount2 = 10; + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount2); + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, NULL); + CHECK(vrfy->error_callback.fn != sign->error_callback.fn); + + /*** clone and destroy all of them to make sure cloning was complete ***/ + { + secp256k1_context *ctx_tmp; + + ctx_tmp = none; none = secp256k1_context_clone(none); secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx_tmp); + ctx_tmp = sign; sign = secp256k1_context_clone(sign); secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx_tmp); + ctx_tmp = vrfy; vrfy = secp256k1_context_clone(vrfy); secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx_tmp); + ctx_tmp = both; both = secp256k1_context_clone(both); secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx_tmp); + } + + /* Verify that the error callback makes it across the clone. */ + CHECK(vrfy->error_callback.fn != sign->error_callback.fn); + /* And that it resets back to default. */ + secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, NULL, NULL); + CHECK(vrfy->error_callback.fn == sign->error_callback.fn); + + /*** attempt to use them ***/ + random_scalar_order_test(&msg); + random_scalar_order_test(&key); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&both->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pubj, &key); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&pub, &pubj); + + /* Verify context-type checking illegal-argument errors. */ + memset(ctmp, 1, 32); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(vrfy, &pubkey, ctmp) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(sign, &pubkey, ctmp) == 1); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(vrfy, &sig, ctmp, ctmp, NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + VG_UNDEF(&sig, sizeof(sig)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(sign, &sig, ctmp, ctmp, NULL, NULL) == 1); + VG_CHECK(&sig, sizeof(sig)); + CHECK(ecount2 == 10); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(sign, &sig, ctmp, &pubkey) == 0); + CHECK(ecount2 == 11); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(vrfy, &sig, ctmp, &pubkey) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(sign, &pubkey, ctmp) == 0); + CHECK(ecount2 == 12); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(vrfy, &pubkey, ctmp) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(sign, &pubkey, ctmp) == 0); + CHECK(ecount2 == 13); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(vrfy, &pubkey) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(sign, &pubkey) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(sign, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount2 == 14); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(vrfy, &zero_pubkey) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(vrfy, &pubkey, ctmp) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_context_randomize(vrfy, ctmp) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_context_randomize(sign, NULL) == 1); + CHECK(ecount2 == 14); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(vrfy, NULL, NULL); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(sign, NULL, NULL); + + /* This shouldn't leak memory, due to already-set tests. */ + secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_build(&sign->ecmult_gen_ctx, NULL); + secp256k1_ecmult_context_build(&vrfy->ecmult_ctx, NULL); + + /* obtain a working nonce */ + do { + random_scalar_order_test(&nonce); + } while(!secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(&both->ecmult_gen_ctx, &sigr, &sigs, &key, &msg, &nonce, NULL)); + + /* try signing */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(&sign->ecmult_gen_ctx, &sigr, &sigs, &key, &msg, &nonce, NULL)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(&both->ecmult_gen_ctx, &sigr, &sigs, &key, &msg, &nonce, NULL)); + + /* try verifying */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&vrfy->ecmult_ctx, &sigr, &sigs, &pub, &msg)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&both->ecmult_ctx, &sigr, &sigs, &pub, &msg)); + + /* cleanup */ + secp256k1_context_destroy(none); + secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); + secp256k1_context_destroy(vrfy); + secp256k1_context_destroy(both); + /* Defined as no-op. */ + secp256k1_context_destroy(NULL); +} + +void run_scratch_tests(void) { + int32_t ecount = 0; + secp256k1_context *none = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); + secp256k1_scratch_space *scratch; + + /* Test public API */ + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + + scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(none, 1000); + CHECK(scratch != NULL); + CHECK(ecount == 0); + + /* Test internal API */ + CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(scratch, 0) == 1000); + CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(scratch, 1) < 1000); + + /* Allocating 500 bytes with no frame fails */ + CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, 500) == NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(scratch, 0) == 1000); + + /* ...but pushing a new stack frame does affect the max allocation */ + CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(scratch, 500, 1 == 1)); + CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(scratch, 1) < 500); /* 500 - ALIGNMENT */ + CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, 500) != NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, 500) == NULL); + + CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(scratch, 500, 1) == 0); + + /* ...and this effect is undone by popping the frame */ + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(scratch, 0) == 1000); + CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, 500) == NULL); + + /* cleanup */ + secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy(scratch); + secp256k1_context_destroy(none); +} + +/***** HASH TESTS *****/ + +void run_sha256_tests(void) { + static const char *inputs[8] = { + "", "abc", "message digest", "secure hash algorithm", "SHA256 is considered to be safe", + "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq", + "For this sample, this 63-byte string will be used as input data", + "This is exactly 64 bytes long, not counting the terminating byte" + }; + static const unsigned char outputs[8][32] = { + {0xe3, 0xb0, 0xc4, 0x42, 0x98, 0xfc, 0x1c, 0x14, 0x9a, 0xfb, 0xf4, 0xc8, 0x99, 0x6f, 0xb9, 0x24, 0x27, 0xae, 0x41, 0xe4, 0x64, 0x9b, 0x93, 0x4c, 0xa4, 0x95, 0x99, 0x1b, 0x78, 0x52, 0xb8, 0x55}, + {0xba, 0x78, 0x16, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0x01, 0xcf, 0xea, 0x41, 0x41, 0x40, 0xde, 0x5d, 0xae, 0x22, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x03, 0x61, 0xa3, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7a, 0x9c, 0xb4, 0x10, 0xff, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x00, 0x15, 0xad}, + {0xf7, 0x84, 0x6f, 0x55, 0xcf, 0x23, 0xe1, 0x4e, 0xeb, 0xea, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xe1, 0x55, 0x0c, 0xad, 0x5b, 0x50, 0x9e, 0x33, 0x48, 0xfb, 0xc4, 0xef, 0xa3, 0xa1, 0x41, 0x3d, 0x39, 0x3c, 0xb6, 0x50}, + {0xf3, 0x0c, 0xeb, 0x2b, 0xb2, 0x82, 0x9e, 0x79, 0xe4, 0xca, 0x97, 0x53, 0xd3, 0x5a, 0x8e, 0xcc, 0x00, 0x26, 0x2d, 0x16, 0x4c, 0xc0, 0x77, 0x08, 0x02, 0x95, 0x38, 0x1c, 0xbd, 0x64, 0x3f, 0x0d}, + {0x68, 0x19, 0xd9, 0x15, 0xc7, 0x3f, 0x4d, 0x1e, 0x77, 0xe4, 0xe1, 0xb5, 0x2d, 0x1f, 0xa0, 0xf9, 0xcf, 0x9b, 0xea, 0xea, 0xd3, 0x93, 0x9f, 0x15, 0x87, 0x4b, 0xd9, 0x88, 0xe2, 0xa2, 0x36, 0x30}, + {0x24, 0x8d, 0x6a, 0x61, 0xd2, 0x06, 0x38, 0xb8, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0x26, 0x93, 0x0c, 0x3e, 0x60, 0x39, 0xa3, 0x3c, 0xe4, 0x59, 0x64, 0xff, 0x21, 0x67, 0xf6, 0xec, 0xed, 0xd4, 0x19, 0xdb, 0x06, 0xc1}, + {0xf0, 0x8a, 0x78, 0xcb, 0xba, 0xee, 0x08, 0x2b, 0x05, 0x2a, 0xe0, 0x70, 0x8f, 0x32, 0xfa, 0x1e, 0x50, 0xc5, 0xc4, 0x21, 0xaa, 0x77, 0x2b, 0xa5, 0xdb, 0xb4, 0x06, 0xa2, 0xea, 0x6b, 0xe3, 0x42}, + {0xab, 0x64, 0xef, 0xf7, 0xe8, 0x8e, 0x2e, 0x46, 0x16, 0x5e, 0x29, 0xf2, 0xbc, 0xe4, 0x18, 0x26, 0xbd, 0x4c, 0x7b, 0x35, 0x52, 0xf6, 0xb3, 0x82, 0xa9, 0xe7, 0xd3, 0xaf, 0x47, 0xc2, 0x45, 0xf8} + }; + int i; + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + unsigned char out[32]; + secp256k1_sha256 hasher; + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&hasher); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(inputs[i]), strlen(inputs[i])); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&hasher, out); + CHECK(memcmp(out, outputs[i], 32) == 0); + if (strlen(inputs[i]) > 0) { + int split = secp256k1_rand_int(strlen(inputs[i])); + secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&hasher); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(inputs[i]), split); + secp256k1_sha256_write(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(inputs[i] + split), strlen(inputs[i]) - split); + secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&hasher, out); + CHECK(memcmp(out, outputs[i], 32) == 0); + } + } +} + +void run_hmac_sha256_tests(void) { + static const char *keys[6] = { + "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b", + "\x4a\x65\x66\x65", + "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa", + "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19", + "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa", + "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa" + }; + static const char *inputs[6] = { + "\x48\x69\x20\x54\x68\x65\x72\x65", + "\x77\x68\x61\x74\x20\x64\x6f\x20\x79\x61\x20\x77\x61\x6e\x74\x20\x66\x6f\x72\x20\x6e\x6f\x74\x68\x69\x6e\x67\x3f", + "\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd", + "\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd", + "\x54\x65\x73\x74\x20\x55\x73\x69\x6e\x67\x20\x4c\x61\x72\x67\x65\x72\x20\x54\x68\x61\x6e\x20\x42\x6c\x6f\x63\x6b\x2d\x53\x69\x7a\x65\x20\x4b\x65\x79\x20\x2d\x20\x48\x61\x73\x68\x20\x4b\x65\x79\x20\x46\x69\x72\x73\x74", + "\x54\x68\x69\x73\x20\x69\x73\x20\x61\x20\x74\x65\x73\x74\x20\x75\x73\x69\x6e\x67\x20\x61\x20\x6c\x61\x72\x67\x65\x72\x20\x74\x68\x61\x6e\x20\x62\x6c\x6f\x63\x6b\x2d\x73\x69\x7a\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79\x20\x61\x6e\x64\x20\x61\x20\x6c\x61\x72\x67\x65\x72\x20\x74\x68\x61\x6e\x20\x62\x6c\x6f\x63\x6b\x2d\x73\x69\x7a\x65\x20\x64\x61\x74\x61\x2e\x20\x54\x68\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79\x20\x6e\x65\x65\x64\x73\x20\x74\x6f\x20\x62\x65\x20\x68\x61\x73\x68\x65\x64\x20\x62\x65\x66\x6f\x72\x65\x20\x62\x65\x69\x6e\x67\x20\x75\x73\x65\x64\x20\x62\x79\x20\x74\x68\x65\x20\x48\x4d\x41\x43\x20\x61\x6c\x67\x6f\x72\x69\x74\x68\x6d\x2e" + }; + static const unsigned char outputs[6][32] = { + {0xb0, 0x34, 0x4c, 0x61, 0xd8, 0xdb, 0x38, 0x53, 0x5c, 0xa8, 0xaf, 0xce, 0xaf, 0x0b, 0xf1, 0x2b, 0x88, 0x1d, 0xc2, 0x00, 0xc9, 0x83, 0x3d, 0xa7, 0x26, 0xe9, 0x37, 0x6c, 0x2e, 0x32, 0xcf, 0xf7}, + {0x5b, 0xdc, 0xc1, 0x46, 0xbf, 0x60, 0x75, 0x4e, 0x6a, 0x04, 0x24, 0x26, 0x08, 0x95, 0x75, 0xc7, 0x5a, 0x00, 0x3f, 0x08, 0x9d, 0x27, 0x39, 0x83, 0x9d, 0xec, 0x58, 0xb9, 0x64, 0xec, 0x38, 0x43}, + {0x77, 0x3e, 0xa9, 0x1e, 0x36, 0x80, 0x0e, 0x46, 0x85, 0x4d, 0xb8, 0xeb, 0xd0, 0x91, 0x81, 0xa7, 0x29, 0x59, 0x09, 0x8b, 0x3e, 0xf8, 0xc1, 0x22, 0xd9, 0x63, 0x55, 0x14, 0xce, 0xd5, 0x65, 0xfe}, + {0x82, 0x55, 0x8a, 0x38, 0x9a, 0x44, 0x3c, 0x0e, 0xa4, 0xcc, 0x81, 0x98, 0x99, 0xf2, 0x08, 0x3a, 0x85, 0xf0, 0xfa, 0xa3, 0xe5, 0x78, 0xf8, 0x07, 0x7a, 0x2e, 0x3f, 0xf4, 0x67, 0x29, 0x66, 0x5b}, + {0x60, 0xe4, 0x31, 0x59, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0xb6, 0x7f, 0x0d, 0x8a, 0x26, 0xaa, 0xcb, 0xf5, 0xb7, 0x7f, 0x8e, 0x0b, 0xc6, 0x21, 0x37, 0x28, 0xc5, 0x14, 0x05, 0x46, 0x04, 0x0f, 0x0e, 0xe3, 0x7f, 0x54}, + {0x9b, 0x09, 0xff, 0xa7, 0x1b, 0x94, 0x2f, 0xcb, 0x27, 0x63, 0x5f, 0xbc, 0xd5, 0xb0, 0xe9, 0x44, 0xbf, 0xdc, 0x63, 0x64, 0x4f, 0x07, 0x13, 0x93, 0x8a, 0x7f, 0x51, 0x53, 0x5c, 0x3a, 0x35, 0xe2} + }; + int i; + for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { + secp256k1_hmac_sha256 hasher; + unsigned char out[32]; + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(keys[i]), strlen(keys[i])); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(inputs[i]), strlen(inputs[i])); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hasher, out); + CHECK(memcmp(out, outputs[i], 32) == 0); + if (strlen(inputs[i]) > 0) { + int split = secp256k1_rand_int(strlen(inputs[i])); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(keys[i]), strlen(keys[i])); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(inputs[i]), split); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(inputs[i] + split), strlen(inputs[i]) - split); + secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hasher, out); + CHECK(memcmp(out, outputs[i], 32) == 0); + } + } +} + +void run_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_tests(void) { + static const unsigned char key1[65] = {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x4b, 0xf5, 0x12, 0x2f, 0x34, 0x45, 0x54, 0xc5, 0x3b, 0xde, 0x2e, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0xd2, 0xb7, 0xe3, 0xd1, 0x60, 0x0a, 0xd6, 0x31, 0xc3, 0x85, 0xa5, 0xd7, 0xcc, 0xe2, 0x3c, 0x77, 0x85, 0x45, 0x9a, 0}; + static const unsigned char out1[3][32] = { + {0x4f, 0xe2, 0x95, 0x25, 0xb2, 0x08, 0x68, 0x09, 0x15, 0x9a, 0xcd, 0xf0, 0x50, 0x6e, 0xfb, 0x86, 0xb0, 0xec, 0x93, 0x2c, 0x7b, 0xa4, 0x42, 0x56, 0xab, 0x32, 0x1e, 0x42, 0x1e, 0x67, 0xe9, 0xfb}, + {0x2b, 0xf0, 0xff, 0xf1, 0xd3, 0xc3, 0x78, 0xa2, 0x2d, 0xc5, 0xde, 0x1d, 0x85, 0x65, 0x22, 0x32, 0x5c, 0x65, 0xb5, 0x04, 0x49, 0x1a, 0x0c, 0xbd, 0x01, 0xcb, 0x8f, 0x3a, 0xa6, 0x7f, 0xfd, 0x4a}, + {0xf5, 0x28, 0xb4, 0x10, 0xcb, 0x54, 0x1f, 0x77, 0x00, 0x0d, 0x7a, 0xfb, 0x6c, 0x5b, 0x53, 0xc5, 0xc4, 0x71, 0xea, 0xb4, 0x3e, 0x46, 0x6d, 0x9a, 0xc5, 0x19, 0x0c, 0x39, 0xc8, 0x2f, 0xd8, 0x2e} + }; + + static const unsigned char key2[64] = {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xe3, 0xb0, 0xc4, 0x42, 0x98, 0xfc, 0x1c, 0x14, 0x9a, 0xfb, 0xf4, 0xc8, 0x99, 0x6f, 0xb9, 0x24, 0x27, 0xae, 0x41, 0xe4, 0x64, 0x9b, 0x93, 0x4c, 0xa4, 0x95, 0x99, 0x1b, 0x78, 0x52, 0xb8, 0x55}; + static const unsigned char out2[3][32] = { + {0x9c, 0x23, 0x6c, 0x16, 0x5b, 0x82, 0xae, 0x0c, 0xd5, 0x90, 0x65, 0x9e, 0x10, 0x0b, 0x6b, 0xab, 0x30, 0x36, 0xe7, 0xba, 0x8b, 0x06, 0x74, 0x9b, 0xaf, 0x69, 0x81, 0xe1, 0x6f, 0x1a, 0x2b, 0x95}, + {0xdf, 0x47, 0x10, 0x61, 0x62, 0x5b, 0xc0, 0xea, 0x14, 0xb6, 0x82, 0xfe, 0xee, 0x2c, 0x9c, 0x02, 0xf2, 0x35, 0xda, 0x04, 0x20, 0x4c, 0x1d, 0x62, 0xa1, 0x53, 0x6c, 0x6e, 0x17, 0xae, 0xd7, 0xa9}, + {0x75, 0x97, 0x88, 0x7c, 0xbd, 0x76, 0x32, 0x1f, 0x32, 0xe3, 0x04, 0x40, 0x67, 0x9a, 0x22, 0xcf, 0x7f, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x2e, 0xac, 0x39, 0x0e, 0x58, 0x1f, 0xea, 0x09, 0x1c, 0xe2, 0x02, 0xba, 0x94} + }; + + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 rng; + unsigned char out[32]; + int i; + + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, key1, 64); + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, out, 32); + CHECK(memcmp(out, out1[i], 32) == 0); + } + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(&rng); + + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, key1, 65); + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, out, 32); + CHECK(memcmp(out, out1[i], 32) != 0); + } + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(&rng); + + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, key2, 64); + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, out, 32); + CHECK(memcmp(out, out2[i], 32) == 0); + } + secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(&rng); +} + +/***** RANDOM TESTS *****/ + +void test_rand_bits(int rand32, int bits) { + /* (1-1/2^B)^rounds[B] < 1/10^9, so rounds is the number of iterations to + * get a false negative chance below once in a billion */ + static const unsigned int rounds[7] = {1, 30, 73, 156, 322, 653, 1316}; + /* We try multiplying the results with various odd numbers, which shouldn't + * influence the uniform distribution modulo a power of 2. */ + static const uint32_t mults[6] = {1, 3, 21, 289, 0x9999, 0x80402011}; + /* We only select up to 6 bits from the output to analyse */ + unsigned int usebits = bits > 6 ? 6 : bits; + unsigned int maxshift = bits - usebits; + /* For each of the maxshift+1 usebits-bit sequences inside a bits-bit + number, track all observed outcomes, one per bit in a uint64_t. */ + uint64_t x[6][27] = {{0}}; + unsigned int i, shift, m; + /* Multiply the output of all rand calls with the odd number m, which + should not change the uniformity of its distribution. */ + for (i = 0; i < rounds[usebits]; i++) { + uint32_t r = (rand32 ? secp256k1_rand32() : secp256k1_rand_bits(bits)); + CHECK((((uint64_t)r) >> bits) == 0); + for (m = 0; m < sizeof(mults) / sizeof(mults[0]); m++) { + uint32_t rm = r * mults[m]; + for (shift = 0; shift <= maxshift; shift++) { + x[m][shift] |= (((uint64_t)1) << ((rm >> shift) & ((1 << usebits) - 1))); + } + } + } + for (m = 0; m < sizeof(mults) / sizeof(mults[0]); m++) { + for (shift = 0; shift <= maxshift; shift++) { + /* Test that the lower usebits bits of x[shift] are 1 */ + CHECK(((~x[m][shift]) << (64 - (1 << usebits))) == 0); + } + } +} + +/* Subrange must be a whole divisor of range, and at most 64 */ +void test_rand_int(uint32_t range, uint32_t subrange) { + /* (1-1/subrange)^rounds < 1/10^9 */ + int rounds = (subrange * 2073) / 100; + int i; + uint64_t x = 0; + CHECK((range % subrange) == 0); + for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) { + uint32_t r = secp256k1_rand_int(range); + CHECK(r < range); + r = r % subrange; + x |= (((uint64_t)1) << r); + } + /* Test that the lower subrange bits of x are 1. */ + CHECK(((~x) << (64 - subrange)) == 0); +} + +void run_rand_bits(void) { + size_t b; + test_rand_bits(1, 32); + for (b = 1; b <= 32; b++) { + test_rand_bits(0, b); + } +} + +void run_rand_int(void) { + static const uint32_t ms[] = {1, 3, 17, 1000, 13771, 999999, 33554432}; + static const uint32_t ss[] = {1, 3, 6, 9, 13, 31, 64}; + unsigned int m, s; + for (m = 0; m < sizeof(ms) / sizeof(ms[0]); m++) { + for (s = 0; s < sizeof(ss) / sizeof(ss[0]); s++) { + test_rand_int(ms[m] * ss[s], ss[s]); + } + } +} + +/***** NUM TESTS *****/ + +#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE +void random_num_negate(secp256k1_num *num) { + if (secp256k1_rand_bits(1)) { + secp256k1_num_negate(num); + } +} + +void random_num_order_test(secp256k1_num *num) { + secp256k1_scalar sc; + random_scalar_order_test(&sc); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(num, &sc); +} + +void random_num_order(secp256k1_num *num) { + secp256k1_scalar sc; + random_scalar_order(&sc); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(num, &sc); +} + +void test_num_negate(void) { + secp256k1_num n1; + secp256k1_num n2; + random_num_order_test(&n1); /* n1 = R */ + random_num_negate(&n1); + secp256k1_num_copy(&n2, &n1); /* n2 = R */ + secp256k1_num_sub(&n1, &n2, &n1); /* n1 = n2-n1 = 0 */ + CHECK(secp256k1_num_is_zero(&n1)); + secp256k1_num_copy(&n1, &n2); /* n1 = R */ + secp256k1_num_negate(&n1); /* n1 = -R */ + CHECK(!secp256k1_num_is_zero(&n1)); + secp256k1_num_add(&n1, &n2, &n1); /* n1 = n2+n1 = 0 */ + CHECK(secp256k1_num_is_zero(&n1)); + secp256k1_num_copy(&n1, &n2); /* n1 = R */ + secp256k1_num_negate(&n1); /* n1 = -R */ + CHECK(secp256k1_num_is_neg(&n1) != secp256k1_num_is_neg(&n2)); + secp256k1_num_negate(&n1); /* n1 = R */ + CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&n1, &n2)); +} + +void test_num_add_sub(void) { + int i; + secp256k1_scalar s; + secp256k1_num n1; + secp256k1_num n2; + secp256k1_num n1p2, n2p1, n1m2, n2m1; + random_num_order_test(&n1); /* n1 = R1 */ + if (secp256k1_rand_bits(1)) { + random_num_negate(&n1); + } + random_num_order_test(&n2); /* n2 = R2 */ + if (secp256k1_rand_bits(1)) { + random_num_negate(&n2); + } + secp256k1_num_add(&n1p2, &n1, &n2); /* n1p2 = R1 + R2 */ + secp256k1_num_add(&n2p1, &n2, &n1); /* n2p1 = R2 + R1 */ + secp256k1_num_sub(&n1m2, &n1, &n2); /* n1m2 = R1 - R2 */ + secp256k1_num_sub(&n2m1, &n2, &n1); /* n2m1 = R2 - R1 */ + CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&n1p2, &n2p1)); + CHECK(!secp256k1_num_eq(&n1p2, &n1m2)); + secp256k1_num_negate(&n2m1); /* n2m1 = -R2 + R1 */ + CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&n2m1, &n1m2)); + CHECK(!secp256k1_num_eq(&n2m1, &n1)); + secp256k1_num_add(&n2m1, &n2m1, &n2); /* n2m1 = -R2 + R1 + R2 = R1 */ + CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&n2m1, &n1)); + CHECK(!secp256k1_num_eq(&n2p1, &n1)); + secp256k1_num_sub(&n2p1, &n2p1, &n2); /* n2p1 = R2 + R1 - R2 = R1 */ + CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&n2p1, &n1)); + + /* check is_one */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s, 1); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n1, &s); + CHECK(secp256k1_num_is_one(&n1)); + /* check that 2^n + 1 is never 1 */ + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n2, &s); + for (i = 0; i < 250; ++i) { + secp256k1_num_add(&n1, &n1, &n1); /* n1 *= 2 */ + secp256k1_num_add(&n1p2, &n1, &n2); /* n1p2 = n1 + 1 */ + CHECK(!secp256k1_num_is_one(&n1p2)); + } +} + +void test_num_mod(void) { + int i; + secp256k1_scalar s; + secp256k1_num order, n; + + /* check that 0 mod anything is 0 */ + random_scalar_order_test(&s); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&order, &s); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s, 0); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n, &s); + secp256k1_num_mod(&n, &order); + CHECK(secp256k1_num_is_zero(&n)); + + /* check that anything mod 1 is 0 */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s, 1); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&order, &s); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n, &s); + secp256k1_num_mod(&n, &order); + CHECK(secp256k1_num_is_zero(&n)); + + /* check that increasing the number past 2^256 does not break this */ + random_scalar_order_test(&s); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n, &s); + /* multiply by 2^8, which'll test this case with high probability */ + for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { + secp256k1_num_add(&n, &n, &n); + } + secp256k1_num_mod(&n, &order); + CHECK(secp256k1_num_is_zero(&n)); +} + +void test_num_jacobi(void) { + secp256k1_scalar sqr; + secp256k1_scalar small; + secp256k1_scalar five; /* five is not a quadratic residue */ + secp256k1_num order, n; + int i; + /* squares mod 5 are 1, 4 */ + const int jacobi5[10] = { 0, 1, -1, -1, 1, 0, 1, -1, -1, 1 }; + + /* check some small values with 5 as the order */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&five, 5); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&order, &five); + for (i = 0; i < 10; ++i) { + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&small, i); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n, &small); + CHECK(secp256k1_num_jacobi(&n, &order) == jacobi5[i]); + } + + /** test large values with 5 as group order */ + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&order, &five); + /* we first need a scalar which is not a multiple of 5 */ + do { + secp256k1_num fiven; + random_scalar_order_test(&sqr); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&fiven, &five); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n, &sqr); + secp256k1_num_mod(&n, &fiven); + } while (secp256k1_num_is_zero(&n)); + /* next force it to be a residue. 2 is a nonresidue mod 5 so we can + * just multiply by two, i.e. add the number to itself */ + if (secp256k1_num_jacobi(&n, &order) == -1) { + secp256k1_num_add(&n, &n, &n); + } + + /* test residue */ + CHECK(secp256k1_num_jacobi(&n, &order) == 1); + /* test nonresidue */ + secp256k1_num_add(&n, &n, &n); + CHECK(secp256k1_num_jacobi(&n, &order) == -1); + + /** test with secp group order as order */ + secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(&order); + random_scalar_order_test(&sqr); + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&sqr, &sqr); + /* test residue */ + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n, &sqr); + CHECK(secp256k1_num_jacobi(&n, &order) == 1); + /* test nonresidue */ + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&sqr, &sqr, &five); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n, &sqr); + CHECK(secp256k1_num_jacobi(&n, &order) == -1); + /* test multiple of the order*/ + CHECK(secp256k1_num_jacobi(&order, &order) == 0); + + /* check one less than the order */ + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&small, 1); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n, &small); + secp256k1_num_sub(&n, &order, &n); + CHECK(secp256k1_num_jacobi(&n, &order) == 1); /* sage confirms this is 1 */ +} + +void run_num_smalltests(void) { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < 100*count; i++) { + test_num_negate(); + test_num_add_sub(); + test_num_mod(); + test_num_jacobi(); + } +} +#endif + +/***** SCALAR TESTS *****/ + +void scalar_test(void) { + secp256k1_scalar s; + secp256k1_scalar s1; + secp256k1_scalar s2; +#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE + secp256k1_num snum, s1num, s2num; + secp256k1_num order, half_order; +#endif + unsigned char c[32]; + + /* Set 's' to a random scalar, with value 'snum'. */ + random_scalar_order_test(&s); + + /* Set 's1' to a random scalar, with value 's1num'. */ + random_scalar_order_test(&s1); + + /* Set 's2' to a random scalar, with value 'snum2', and byte array representation 'c'. */ + random_scalar_order_test(&s2); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(c, &s2); + +#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&snum, &s); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&s1num, &s1); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&s2num, &s2); + + secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(&order); + half_order = order; + secp256k1_num_shift(&half_order, 1); +#endif + + { + int i; + /* Test that fetching groups of 4 bits from a scalar and recursing n(i)=16*n(i-1)+p(i) reconstructs it. */ + secp256k1_scalar n; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&n, 0); + for (i = 0; i < 256; i += 4) { + secp256k1_scalar t; + int j; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&t, secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(&s, 256 - 4 - i, 4)); + for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { + secp256k1_scalar_add(&n, &n, &n); + } + secp256k1_scalar_add(&n, &n, &t); + } + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&n, &s)); + } + + { + /* Test that fetching groups of randomly-sized bits from a scalar and recursing n(i)=b*n(i-1)+p(i) reconstructs it. */ + secp256k1_scalar n; + int i = 0; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&n, 0); + while (i < 256) { + secp256k1_scalar t; + int j; + int now = secp256k1_rand_int(15) + 1; + if (now + i > 256) { + now = 256 - i; + } + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&t, secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(&s, 256 - now - i, now)); + for (j = 0; j < now; j++) { + secp256k1_scalar_add(&n, &n, &n); + } + secp256k1_scalar_add(&n, &n, &t); + i += now; + } + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&n, &s)); + } + +#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE + { + /* Test that adding the scalars together is equal to adding their numbers together modulo the order. */ + secp256k1_num rnum; + secp256k1_num r2num; + secp256k1_scalar r; + secp256k1_num_add(&rnum, &snum, &s2num); + secp256k1_num_mod(&rnum, &order); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&r, &s, &s2); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&r2num, &r); + CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&rnum, &r2num)); + } + + { + /* Test that multiplying the scalars is equal to multiplying their numbers modulo the order. */ + secp256k1_scalar r; + secp256k1_num r2num; + secp256k1_num rnum; + secp256k1_num_mul(&rnum, &snum, &s2num); + secp256k1_num_mod(&rnum, &order); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r, &s, &s2); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&r2num, &r); + CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&rnum, &r2num)); + /* The result can only be zero if at least one of the factors was zero. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&r) == (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s) || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s2))); + /* The results can only be equal to one of the factors if that factor was zero, or the other factor was one. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&rnum, &snum) == (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s) || secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&s2))); + CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&rnum, &s2num) == (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s2) || secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&s))); + } + + { + secp256k1_scalar neg; + secp256k1_num negnum; + secp256k1_num negnum2; + /* Check that comparison with zero matches comparison with zero on the number. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_num_is_zero(&snum) == secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s)); + /* Check that comparison with the half order is equal to testing for high scalar. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s) == (secp256k1_num_cmp(&snum, &half_order) > 0)); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&neg, &s); + secp256k1_num_sub(&negnum, &order, &snum); + secp256k1_num_mod(&negnum, &order); + /* Check that comparison with the half order is equal to testing for high scalar after negation. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&neg) == (secp256k1_num_cmp(&negnum, &half_order) > 0)); + /* Negating should change the high property, unless the value was already zero. */ + CHECK((secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s) == secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&neg)) == secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s)); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&negnum2, &neg); + /* Negating a scalar should be equal to (order - n) mod order on the number. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&negnum, &negnum2)); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&neg, &neg, &s); + /* Adding a number to its negation should result in zero. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&neg)); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&neg, &neg); + /* Negating zero should still result in zero. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&neg)); + } + + { + /* Test secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var. */ + secp256k1_scalar r; + secp256k1_num one; + secp256k1_num rnum; + secp256k1_num rnum2; + unsigned char cone[1] = {0x01}; + unsigned int shift = 256 + secp256k1_rand_int(257); + secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(&r, &s1, &s2, shift); + secp256k1_num_mul(&rnum, &s1num, &s2num); + secp256k1_num_shift(&rnum, shift - 1); + secp256k1_num_set_bin(&one, cone, 1); + secp256k1_num_add(&rnum, &rnum, &one); + secp256k1_num_shift(&rnum, 1); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&rnum2, &r); + CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&rnum, &rnum2)); + } + + { + /* test secp256k1_scalar_shr_int */ + secp256k1_scalar r; + int i; + random_scalar_order_test(&r); + for (i = 0; i < 100; ++i) { + int low; + int shift = 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(15); + int expected = r.d[0] % (1 << shift); + low = secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&r, shift); + CHECK(expected == low); + } + } +#endif + + { + /* Test that scalar inverses are equal to the inverse of their number modulo the order. */ + if (!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s)) { + secp256k1_scalar inv; +#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE + secp256k1_num invnum; + secp256k1_num invnum2; +#endif + secp256k1_scalar_inverse(&inv, &s); +#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE + secp256k1_num_mod_inverse(&invnum, &snum, &order); + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&invnum2, &inv); + CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&invnum, &invnum2)); +#endif + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&inv, &inv, &s); + /* Multiplying a scalar with its inverse must result in one. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&inv)); + secp256k1_scalar_inverse(&inv, &inv); + /* Inverting one must result in one. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&inv)); +#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE + secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&invnum, &inv); + CHECK(secp256k1_num_is_one(&invnum)); +#endif + } + } + + { + /* Test commutativity of add. */ + secp256k1_scalar r1, r2; + secp256k1_scalar_add(&r1, &s1, &s2); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&r2, &s2, &s1); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &r2)); + } + + { + secp256k1_scalar r1, r2; + secp256k1_scalar b; + int i; + /* Test add_bit. */ + int bit = secp256k1_rand_bits(8); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&b, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&b)); + for (i = 0; i < bit; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_add(&b, &b, &b); + } + r1 = s1; + r2 = s1; + if (!secp256k1_scalar_add(&r1, &r1, &b)) { + /* No overflow happened. */ + secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(&r2, bit, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &r2)); + /* cadd is a noop when flag is zero */ + secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(&r2, bit, 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &r2)); + } + } + + { + /* Test commutativity of mul. */ + secp256k1_scalar r1, r2; + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r1, &s1, &s2); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r2, &s2, &s1); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &r2)); + } + + { + /* Test associativity of add. */ + secp256k1_scalar r1, r2; + secp256k1_scalar_add(&r1, &s1, &s2); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&r1, &r1, &s); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&r2, &s2, &s); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&r2, &s1, &r2); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &r2)); + } + + { + /* Test associativity of mul. */ + secp256k1_scalar r1, r2; + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r1, &s1, &s2); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r1, &r1, &s); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r2, &s2, &s); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r2, &s1, &r2); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &r2)); + } + + { + /* Test distributitivity of mul over add. */ + secp256k1_scalar r1, r2, t; + secp256k1_scalar_add(&r1, &s1, &s2); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r1, &r1, &s); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r2, &s1, &s); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&t, &s2, &s); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&r2, &r2, &t); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &r2)); + } + + { + /* Test square. */ + secp256k1_scalar r1, r2; + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&r1, &s1); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r2, &s1, &s1); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &r2)); + } + + { + /* Test multiplicative identity. */ + secp256k1_scalar r1, v1; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&v1,1); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r1, &s1, &v1); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &s1)); + } + + { + /* Test additive identity. */ + secp256k1_scalar r1, v0; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&v0,0); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&r1, &s1, &v0); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &s1)); + } + + { + /* Test zero product property. */ + secp256k1_scalar r1, v0; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&v0,0); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r1, &s1, &v0); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &v0)); + } + +} + +void scalar_chacha_tests(void) { + unsigned char expected1[64] = { + 0x76, 0xb8, 0xe0, 0xad, 0xa0, 0xf1, 0x3d, 0x90, + 0x40, 0x5d, 0x6a, 0xe5, 0x53, 0x86, 0xbd, 0x28, + 0xbd, 0xd2, 0x19, 0xb8, 0xa0, 0x8d, 0xed, 0x1a, + 0xa8, 0x36, 0xef, 0xcc, 0x8b, 0x77, 0x0d, 0xc7, + 0xda, 0x41, 0x59, 0x7c, 0x51, 0x57, 0x48, 0x8d, + 0x77, 0x24, 0xe0, 0x3f, 0xb8, 0xd8, 0x4a, 0x37, + 0x6a, 0x43, 0xb8, 0xf4, 0x15, 0x18, 0xa1, 0x1c, + 0xc3, 0x87, 0xb6, 0x69, 0xb2, 0xee, 0x65, 0x86 + }; + unsigned char expected2[64] = { + 0x45, 0x40, 0xf0, 0x5a, 0x9f, 0x1f, 0xb2, 0x96, + 0xd7, 0x73, 0x6e, 0x7b, 0x20, 0x8e, 0x3c, 0x96, + 0xeb, 0x4f, 0xe1, 0x83, 0x46, 0x88, 0xd2, 0x60, + 0x4f, 0x45, 0x09, 0x52, 0xed, 0x43, 0x2d, 0x41, + 0xbb, 0xe2, 0xa0, 0xb6, 0xea, 0x75, 0x66, 0xd2, + 0xa5, 0xd1, 0xe7, 0xe2, 0x0d, 0x42, 0xaf, 0x2c, + 0x53, 0xd7, 0x92, 0xb1, 0xc4, 0x3f, 0xea, 0x81, + 0x7e, 0x9a, 0xd2, 0x75, 0xae, 0x54, 0x69, 0x63 + }; + unsigned char expected3[64] = { + 0x47, 0x4a, 0x4f, 0x35, 0x4f, 0xee, 0x93, 0x59, + 0xbb, 0x65, 0x81, 0xe5, 0xd9, 0x15, 0xa6, 0x01, + 0xb6, 0x8c, 0x68, 0x03, 0x38, 0xff, 0x65, 0xe6, + 0x56, 0x4a, 0x3e, 0x65, 0x59, 0xfc, 0x12, 0x3f, + 0xa9, 0xb2, 0xf9, 0x3e, 0x57, 0xc3, 0xa5, 0xcb, + 0xe0, 0x72, 0x74, 0x27, 0x88, 0x1c, 0x23, 0xdf, + 0xe2, 0xb6, 0xcc, 0xfb, 0x93, 0xed, 0xcb, 0x02, + 0xd7, 0x50, 0x52, 0x45, 0x84, 0x88, 0xbb, 0xea + }; + + secp256k1_scalar exp_r1, exp_r2; + secp256k1_scalar r1, r2; + unsigned char seed1[32] = { 0 }; + + secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(&r1, &r2, seed1, 0); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&exp_r1, &expected1[0], NULL); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&exp_r2, &expected1[32], NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&exp_r1, &r1)); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&exp_r2, &r2)); + + seed1[31] = 1; + secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(&r1, &r2, seed1, 0); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&exp_r1, &expected2[0], NULL); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&exp_r2, &expected2[32], NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&exp_r1, &r1)); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&exp_r2, &r2)); + + secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(&r1, &r2, seed1, 100); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&exp_r1, &expected3[0], NULL); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&exp_r2, &expected3[32], NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&exp_r1, &r1)); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&exp_r2, &r2)); +} + +void run_scalar_tests(void) { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < 128 * count; i++) { + scalar_test(); + } + + scalar_chacha_tests(); + + { + /* (-1)+1 should be zero. */ + secp256k1_scalar s, o; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&s)); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&o, &s); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&o, &o, &s); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&o)); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&o, &o); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&o)); + } + +#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE + { + /* A scalar with value of the curve order should be 0. */ + secp256k1_num order; + secp256k1_scalar zero; + unsigned char bin[32]; + int overflow = 0; + secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(&order); + secp256k1_num_get_bin(bin, 32, &order); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&zero, bin, &overflow); + CHECK(overflow == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&zero)); + } +#endif + + { + /* Does check_overflow check catch all ones? */ + static const secp256k1_scalar overflowed = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( + 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, + 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL + ); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(&overflowed)); + } + + { + /* Static test vectors. + * These were reduced from ~10^12 random vectors based on comparison-decision + * and edge-case coverage on 32-bit and 64-bit implementations. + * The responses were generated with Sage 5.9. + */ + secp256k1_scalar x; + secp256k1_scalar y; + secp256k1_scalar z; + secp256k1_scalar zz; + secp256k1_scalar one; + secp256k1_scalar r1; + secp256k1_scalar r2; +#if defined(USE_SCALAR_INV_NUM) + secp256k1_scalar zzv; +#endif + int overflow; + unsigned char chal[33][2][32] = { + {{0xff, 0xff, 0x03, 0x07, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, + {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xff}}, + {{0xef, 0xff, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, + {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xe0, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff}}, + {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0x3f, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00}, + {0x00, 0x00, 0xfc, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x80, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x0f, 0x00, 0xe0, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7f, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}}, + {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x1e, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfd, 0xff}, + {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x1f, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0x03, 0x00, 0xe0, + 0xff, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xff, + 0xf3, 0xff, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, + {{0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x1c, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, + {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, 0x00, + 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f, + 0x00, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xdf, 0xff, 0xff}}, + {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x0f, 0xfc, 0x9f, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, + 0xff, 0x0f, 0xfc, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00}, + {0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, + 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0x0f, 0xc0, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x07, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}}, + {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xf7, 0xff, 0xff, 0xef, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf0}, + {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}}, + {{0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0x03, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, + 0x00, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, + 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, 0xc0, 0xff, 0x0f, 0xfc, 0xff}, + {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3f, 0x00, 0xc0, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}}, + {{0x8f, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0x7f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00}, + {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, + {{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0x7f}, + {0xff, 0xcf, 0xff, 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0xc0, 0xff, 0xcf, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xbf, 0xff, 0x0e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, + {{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0xfc, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, + 0xff, 0x01, 0xfc, 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xff}, + {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xc0, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, 0x00}}, + {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0x7f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80}, + {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xe0, 0xff, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, + {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0x00}, + {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, + 0xfc, 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f, 0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f, + 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0x07, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x0f, 0x7e, 0x00, 0x00}}, + {{0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x07, 0x00}, + {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xfb, 0xff, 0x07, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x60}}, + {{0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x0f, 0x00, + 0x80, 0x7f, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, + {0xff, 0xff, 0x1f, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, + {{0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, + {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xf1, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}}, + {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, + 0x7e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0xc0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xcf, 0xff, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80}, + {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f, 0x00, 0x7e, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, + {{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfc, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7c, 0x00}, + {0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, + 0xff, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}}, + {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x80, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, + 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00}, + {0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, + 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0x7f, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0x1f, 0x00, 0xfe}}, + {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0x03, 0xfe, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x07}, + {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, + 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x01, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00}}, + {{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, + {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, + 0xba, 0xae, 0xdc, 0xe6, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xa0, 0x3b, + 0xbf, 0xd2, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xd0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x40}}, + {{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01}, + {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, + {{0x7f, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, + {0x7f, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}}, + {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0xc0, + 0xff, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x7f}, + {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, + 0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x07, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x01, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}}, + {{0x7f, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, + {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02}}, + {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, + 0xba, 0xae, 0xdc, 0xe6, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xa0, 0x3b, + 0xbf, 0xd2, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xd0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x40}, + {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01}}, + {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0x7e, 0x00, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xff, 0xff, 0x07, 0x00, + 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0xfc, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, + {0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x80, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}}, + {{0xff, 0xff, 0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, + 0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, + 0x00, 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x01, + 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, + {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0x3f, 0x00, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xf1, 0x7f, 0x00}}, + {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00}, + {0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x01, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, + 0xff, 0x7f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x1f, + 0x00, 0x00, 0xfc, 0xff, 0xff, 0x01, 0xff, 0xff}}, + {{0x00, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, + 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0x03, 0xe0, 0x01, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfc, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00}, + {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xf0, 0x07, 0x00, 0x3c, 0x80, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0x07, 0xe0, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, + {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, + 0xfc, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x07, 0xf8, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80}, + {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x0c, 0x80, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xc0, 0x7f, 0xfe, 0xff, 0x1f, + 0x00, 0xfe, 0xff, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xff}}, + {{0xff, 0xff, 0x81, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, + 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x83, + 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, + 0xff, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf0}, + {0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x00, + 0xf8, 0x07, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xc7, 0xff, 0xff, 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}}, + {{0x82, 0xc9, 0xfa, 0xb0, 0x68, 0x04, 0xa0, 0x00, + 0x82, 0xc9, 0xfa, 0xb0, 0x68, 0x04, 0xa0, 0x00, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x6f, 0x03, 0xfb, + 0xfa, 0x8a, 0x7d, 0xdf, 0x13, 0x86, 0xe2, 0x03}, + {0x82, 0xc9, 0xfa, 0xb0, 0x68, 0x04, 0xa0, 0x00, + 0x82, 0xc9, 0xfa, 0xb0, 0x68, 0x04, 0xa0, 0x00, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x6f, 0x03, 0xfb, + 0xfa, 0x8a, 0x7d, 0xdf, 0x13, 0x86, 0xe2, 0x03}} + }; + unsigned char res[33][2][32] = { + {{0x0c, 0x3b, 0x0a, 0xca, 0x8d, 0x1a, 0x2f, 0xb9, + 0x8a, 0x7b, 0x53, 0x5a, 0x1f, 0xc5, 0x22, 0xa1, + 0x07, 0x2a, 0x48, 0xea, 0x02, 0xeb, 0xb3, 0xd6, + 0x20, 0x1e, 0x86, 0xd0, 0x95, 0xf6, 0x92, 0x35}, + {0xdc, 0x90, 0x7a, 0x07, 0x2e, 0x1e, 0x44, 0x6d, + 0xf8, 0x15, 0x24, 0x5b, 0x5a, 0x96, 0x37, 0x9c, + 0x37, 0x7b, 0x0d, 0xac, 0x1b, 0x65, 0x58, 0x49, + 0x43, 0xb7, 0x31, 0xbb, 0xa7, 0xf4, 0x97, 0x15}}, + {{0xf1, 0xf7, 0x3a, 0x50, 0xe6, 0x10, 0xba, 0x22, + 0x43, 0x4d, 0x1f, 0x1f, 0x7c, 0x27, 0xca, 0x9c, + 0xb8, 0xb6, 0xa0, 0xfc, 0xd8, 0xc0, 0x05, 0x2f, + 0xf7, 0x08, 0xe1, 0x76, 0xdd, 0xd0, 0x80, 0xc8}, + {0xe3, 0x80, 0x80, 0xb8, 0xdb, 0xe3, 0xa9, 0x77, + 0x00, 0xb0, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0x27, 0xe2, 0x68, 0xc4, + 0x88, 0xe8, 0x04, 0xc1, 0x12, 0xbf, 0x78, 0x59, + 0xe6, 0xa9, 0x7c, 0xe1, 0x81, 0xdd, 0xb9, 0xd5}}, + {{0x96, 0xe2, 0xee, 0x01, 0xa6, 0x80, 0x31, 0xef, + 0x5c, 0xd0, 0x19, 0xb4, 0x7d, 0x5f, 0x79, 0xab, + 0xa1, 0x97, 0xd3, 0x7e, 0x33, 0xbb, 0x86, 0x55, + 0x60, 0x20, 0x10, 0x0d, 0x94, 0x2d, 0x11, 0x7c}, + {0xcc, 0xab, 0xe0, 0xe8, 0x98, 0x65, 0x12, 0x96, + 0x38, 0x5a, 0x1a, 0xf2, 0x85, 0x23, 0x59, 0x5f, + 0xf9, 0xf3, 0xc2, 0x81, 0x70, 0x92, 0x65, 0x12, + 0x9c, 0x65, 0x1e, 0x96, 0x00, 0xef, 0xe7, 0x63}}, + {{0xac, 0x1e, 0x62, 0xc2, 0x59, 0xfc, 0x4e, 0x5c, + 0x83, 0xb0, 0xd0, 0x6f, 0xce, 0x19, 0xf6, 0xbf, + 0xa4, 0xb0, 0xe0, 0x53, 0x66, 0x1f, 0xbf, 0xc9, + 0x33, 0x47, 0x37, 0xa9, 0x3d, 0x5d, 0xb0, 0x48}, + {0x86, 0xb9, 0x2a, 0x7f, 0x8e, 0xa8, 0x60, 0x42, + 0x26, 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x1c, 0xa2, 0xec, 0xe0, 0xe5, + 0x3e, 0x0a, 0x33, 0xbb, 0x61, 0x4c, 0x9f, 0x3c, + 0xd1, 0xdf, 0x49, 0x33, 0xcd, 0x72, 0x78, 0x18}}, + {{0xf7, 0xd3, 0xcd, 0x49, 0x5c, 0x13, 0x22, 0xfb, + 0x2e, 0xb2, 0x2f, 0x27, 0xf5, 0x8a, 0x5d, 0x74, + 0xc1, 0x58, 0xc5, 0xc2, 0x2d, 0x9f, 0x52, 0xc6, + 0x63, 0x9f, 0xba, 0x05, 0x76, 0x45, 0x7a, 0x63}, + {0x8a, 0xfa, 0x55, 0x4d, 0xdd, 0xa3, 0xb2, 0xc3, + 0x44, 0xfd, 0xec, 0x72, 0xde, 0xef, 0xc0, 0x99, + 0xf5, 0x9f, 0xe2, 0x52, 0xb4, 0x05, 0x32, 0x58, + 0x57, 0xc1, 0x8f, 0xea, 0xc3, 0x24, 0x5b, 0x94}}, + {{0x05, 0x83, 0xee, 0xdd, 0x64, 0xf0, 0x14, 0x3b, + 0xa0, 0x14, 0x4a, 0x3a, 0x41, 0x82, 0x7c, 0xa7, + 0x2c, 0xaa, 0xb1, 0x76, 0xbb, 0x59, 0x64, 0x5f, + 0x52, 0xad, 0x25, 0x29, 0x9d, 0x8f, 0x0b, 0xb0}, + {0x7e, 0xe3, 0x7c, 0xca, 0xcd, 0x4f, 0xb0, 0x6d, + 0x7a, 0xb2, 0x3e, 0xa0, 0x08, 0xb9, 0xa8, 0x2d, + 0xc2, 0xf4, 0x99, 0x66, 0xcc, 0xac, 0xd8, 0xb9, + 0x72, 0x2a, 0x4a, 0x3e, 0x0f, 0x7b, 0xbf, 0xf4}}, + {{0x8c, 0x9c, 0x78, 0x2b, 0x39, 0x61, 0x7e, 0xf7, + 0x65, 0x37, 0x66, 0x09, 0x38, 0xb9, 0x6f, 0x70, + 0x78, 0x87, 0xff, 0xcf, 0x93, 0xca, 0x85, 0x06, + 0x44, 0x84, 0xa7, 0xfe, 0xd3, 0xa4, 0xe3, 0x7e}, + {0xa2, 0x56, 0x49, 0x23, 0x54, 0xa5, 0x50, 0xe9, + 0x5f, 0xf0, 0x4d, 0xe7, 0xdc, 0x38, 0x32, 0x79, + 0x4f, 0x1c, 0xb7, 0xe4, 0xbb, 0xf8, 0xbb, 0x2e, + 0x40, 0x41, 0x4b, 0xcc, 0xe3, 0x1e, 0x16, 0x36}}, + {{0x0c, 0x1e, 0xd7, 0x09, 0x25, 0x40, 0x97, 0xcb, + 0x5c, 0x46, 0xa8, 0xda, 0xef, 0x25, 0xd5, 0xe5, + 0x92, 0x4d, 0xcf, 0xa3, 0xc4, 0x5d, 0x35, 0x4a, + 0xe4, 0x61, 0x92, 0xf3, 0xbf, 0x0e, 0xcd, 0xbe}, + {0xe4, 0xaf, 0x0a, 0xb3, 0x30, 0x8b, 0x9b, 0x48, + 0x49, 0x43, 0xc7, 0x64, 0x60, 0x4a, 0x2b, 0x9e, + 0x95, 0x5f, 0x56, 0xe8, 0x35, 0xdc, 0xeb, 0xdc, + 0xc7, 0xc4, 0xfe, 0x30, 0x40, 0xc7, 0xbf, 0xa4}}, + {{0xd4, 0xa0, 0xf5, 0x81, 0x49, 0x6b, 0xb6, 0x8b, + 0x0a, 0x69, 0xf9, 0xfe, 0xa8, 0x32, 0xe5, 0xe0, + 0xa5, 0xcd, 0x02, 0x53, 0xf9, 0x2c, 0xe3, 0x53, + 0x83, 0x36, 0xc6, 0x02, 0xb5, 0xeb, 0x64, 0xb8}, + {0x1d, 0x42, 0xb9, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xe3, 0x93, 0x2c, + 0x4c, 0xee, 0x6c, 0x5a, 0x47, 0x9e, 0x62, 0x01, + 0x6b, 0x04, 0xfe, 0xa4, 0x30, 0x2b, 0x0d, 0x4f, + 0x71, 0x10, 0xd3, 0x55, 0xca, 0xf3, 0x5e, 0x80}}, + {{0x77, 0x05, 0xf6, 0x0c, 0x15, 0x9b, 0x45, 0xe7, + 0xb9, 0x11, 0xb8, 0xf5, 0xd6, 0xda, 0x73, 0x0c, + 0xda, 0x92, 0xea, 0xd0, 0x9d, 0xd0, 0x18, 0x92, + 0xce, 0x9a, 0xaa, 0xee, 0x0f, 0xef, 0xde, 0x30}, + {0xf1, 0xf1, 0xd6, 0x9b, 0x51, 0xd7, 0x77, 0x62, + 0x52, 0x10, 0xb8, 0x7a, 0x84, 0x9d, 0x15, 0x4e, + 0x07, 0xdc, 0x1e, 0x75, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x3b, 0xdb, + 0x74, 0x58, 0x62, 0x02, 0x90, 0x54, 0x8b, 0x43}}, + {{0xa6, 0xfe, 0x0b, 0x87, 0x80, 0x43, 0x67, 0x25, + 0x57, 0x5d, 0xec, 0x40, 0x50, 0x08, 0xd5, 0x5d, + 0x43, 0xd7, 0xe0, 0xaa, 0xe0, 0x13, 0xb6, 0xb0, + 0xc0, 0xd4, 0xe5, 0x0d, 0x45, 0x83, 0xd6, 0x13}, + {0x40, 0x45, 0x0a, 0x92, 0x31, 0xea, 0x8c, 0x60, + 0x8c, 0x1f, 0xd8, 0x76, 0x45, 0xb9, 0x29, 0x00, + 0x26, 0x32, 0xd8, 0xa6, 0x96, 0x88, 0xe2, 0xc4, + 0x8b, 0xdb, 0x7f, 0x17, 0x87, 0xcc, 0xc8, 0xf2}}, + {{0xc2, 0x56, 0xe2, 0xb6, 0x1a, 0x81, 0xe7, 0x31, + 0x63, 0x2e, 0xbb, 0x0d, 0x2f, 0x81, 0x67, 0xd4, + 0x22, 0xe2, 0x38, 0x02, 0x25, 0x97, 0xc7, 0x88, + 0x6e, 0xdf, 0xbe, 0x2a, 0xa5, 0x73, 0x63, 0xaa}, + {0x50, 0x45, 0xe2, 0xc3, 0xbd, 0x89, 0xfc, 0x57, + 0xbd, 0x3c, 0xa3, 0x98, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x36, 0x38, + 0x92, 0x39, 0x1f, 0x0f, 0x81, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x51, + 0x1f, 0x8d, 0x6a, 0xff, 0x47, 0x16, 0x06, 0x9c}}, + {{0x33, 0x95, 0xa2, 0x6f, 0x27, 0x5f, 0x9c, 0x9c, + 0x64, 0x45, 0xcb, 0xd1, 0x3c, 0xee, 0x5e, 0x5f, + 0x48, 0xa6, 0xaf, 0xe3, 0x79, 0xcf, 0xb1, 0xe2, + 0xbf, 0x55, 0x0e, 0xa2, 0x3b, 0x62, 0xf0, 0xe4}, + {0x14, 0xe8, 0x06, 0xe3, 0xbe, 0x7e, 0x67, 0x01, + 0xc5, 0x21, 0x67, 0xd8, 0x54, 0xb5, 0x7f, 0xa4, + 0xf9, 0x75, 0x70, 0x1c, 0xfd, 0x79, 0xdb, 0x86, + 0xad, 0x37, 0x85, 0x83, 0x56, 0x4e, 0xf0, 0xbf}}, + {{0xbc, 0xa6, 0xe0, 0x56, 0x4e, 0xef, 0xfa, 0xf5, + 0x1d, 0x5d, 0x3f, 0x2a, 0x5b, 0x19, 0xab, 0x51, + 0xc5, 0x8b, 0xdd, 0x98, 0x28, 0x35, 0x2f, 0xc3, + 0x81, 0x4f, 0x5c, 0xe5, 0x70, 0xb9, 0xeb, 0x62}, + {0xc4, 0x6d, 0x26, 0xb0, 0x17, 0x6b, 0xfe, 0x6c, + 0x12, 0xf8, 0xe7, 0xc1, 0xf5, 0x2f, 0xfa, 0x91, + 0x13, 0x27, 0xbd, 0x73, 0xcc, 0x33, 0x31, 0x1c, + 0x39, 0xe3, 0x27, 0x6a, 0x95, 0xcf, 0xc5, 0xfb}}, + {{0x30, 0xb2, 0x99, 0x84, 0xf0, 0x18, 0x2a, 0x6e, + 0x1e, 0x27, 0xed, 0xa2, 0x29, 0x99, 0x41, 0x56, + 0xe8, 0xd4, 0x0d, 0xef, 0x99, 0x9c, 0xf3, 0x58, + 0x29, 0x55, 0x1a, 0xc0, 0x68, 0xd6, 0x74, 0xa4}, + {0x07, 0x9c, 0xe7, 0xec, 0xf5, 0x36, 0x73, 0x41, + 0xa3, 0x1c, 0xe5, 0x93, 0x97, 0x6a, 0xfd, 0xf7, + 0x53, 0x18, 0xab, 0xaf, 0xeb, 0x85, 0xbd, 0x92, + 0x90, 0xab, 0x3c, 0xbf, 0x30, 0x82, 0xad, 0xf6}}, + {{0xc6, 0x87, 0x8a, 0x2a, 0xea, 0xc0, 0xa9, 0xec, + 0x6d, 0xd3, 0xdc, 0x32, 0x23, 0xce, 0x62, 0x19, + 0xa4, 0x7e, 0xa8, 0xdd, 0x1c, 0x33, 0xae, 0xd3, + 0x4f, 0x62, 0x9f, 0x52, 0xe7, 0x65, 0x46, 0xf4}, + {0x97, 0x51, 0x27, 0x67, 0x2d, 0xa2, 0x82, 0x87, + 0x98, 0xd3, 0xb6, 0x14, 0x7f, 0x51, 0xd3, 0x9a, + 0x0b, 0xd0, 0x76, 0x81, 0xb2, 0x4f, 0x58, 0x92, + 0xa4, 0x86, 0xa1, 0xa7, 0x09, 0x1d, 0xef, 0x9b}}, + {{0xb3, 0x0f, 0x2b, 0x69, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x90, 0x64, + 0xbd, 0x43, 0x4c, 0x10, 0xe8, 0x98, 0x1c, 0xa3, + 0xe1, 0x68, 0xe9, 0x79, 0x6c, 0x29, 0x51, 0x3f, + 0x41, 0xdc, 0xdf, 0x1f, 0xf3, 0x60, 0xbe, 0x33}, + {0xa1, 0x5f, 0xf7, 0x1d, 0xb4, 0x3e, 0x9b, 0x3c, + 0xe7, 0xbd, 0xb6, 0x06, 0xd5, 0x60, 0x06, 0x6d, + 0x50, 0xd2, 0xf4, 0x1a, 0x31, 0x08, 0xf2, 0xea, + 0x8e, 0xef, 0x5f, 0x7d, 0xb6, 0xd0, 0xc0, 0x27}}, + {{0x62, 0x9a, 0xd9, 0xbb, 0x38, 0x36, 0xce, 0xf7, + 0x5d, 0x2f, 0x13, 0xec, 0xc8, 0x2d, 0x02, 0x8a, + 0x2e, 0x72, 0xf0, 0xe5, 0x15, 0x9d, 0x72, 0xae, + 0xfc, 0xb3, 0x4f, 0x02, 0xea, 0xe1, 0x09, 0xfe}, + {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfa, 0x0a, 0x3d, 0xbc, + 0xad, 0x16, 0x0c, 0xb6, 0xe7, 0x7c, 0x8b, 0x39, + 0x9a, 0x43, 0xbb, 0xe3, 0xc2, 0x55, 0x15, 0x14, + 0x75, 0xac, 0x90, 0x9b, 0x7f, 0x9a, 0x92, 0x00}}, + {{0x8b, 0xac, 0x70, 0x86, 0x29, 0x8f, 0x00, 0x23, + 0x7b, 0x45, 0x30, 0xaa, 0xb8, 0x4c, 0xc7, 0x8d, + 0x4e, 0x47, 0x85, 0xc6, 0x19, 0xe3, 0x96, 0xc2, + 0x9a, 0xa0, 0x12, 0xed, 0x6f, 0xd7, 0x76, 0x16}, + {0x45, 0xaf, 0x7e, 0x33, 0xc7, 0x7f, 0x10, 0x6c, + 0x7c, 0x9f, 0x29, 0xc1, 0xa8, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x84, + 0xe7, 0x7d, 0xc0, 0x6d, 0xab, 0x71, 0x5d, 0xd0, + 0x6b, 0x9f, 0x97, 0xab, 0xcb, 0x51, 0x0c, 0x9f}}, + {{0x9e, 0xc3, 0x92, 0xb4, 0x04, 0x9f, 0xc8, 0xbb, + 0xdd, 0x9e, 0xc6, 0x05, 0xfd, 0x65, 0xec, 0x94, + 0x7f, 0x2c, 0x16, 0xc4, 0x40, 0xac, 0x63, 0x7b, + 0x7d, 0xb8, 0x0c, 0xe4, 0x5b, 0xe3, 0xa7, 0x0e}, + {0x43, 0xf4, 0x44, 0xe8, 0xcc, 0xc8, 0xd4, 0x54, + 0x33, 0x37, 0x50, 0xf2, 0x87, 0x42, 0x2e, 0x00, + 0x49, 0x60, 0x62, 0x02, 0xfd, 0x1a, 0x7c, 0xdb, + 0x29, 0x6c, 0x6d, 0x54, 0x53, 0x08, 0xd1, 0xc8}}, + {{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, + {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, + {{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, + {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01}}, + {{0x27, 0x59, 0xc7, 0x35, 0x60, 0x71, 0xa6, 0xf1, + 0x79, 0xa5, 0xfd, 0x79, 0x16, 0xf3, 0x41, 0xf0, + 0x57, 0xb4, 0x02, 0x97, 0x32, 0xe7, 0xde, 0x59, + 0xe2, 0x2d, 0x9b, 0x11, 0xea, 0x2c, 0x35, 0x92}, + {0x27, 0x59, 0xc7, 0x35, 0x60, 0x71, 0xa6, 0xf1, + 0x79, 0xa5, 0xfd, 0x79, 0x16, 0xf3, 0x41, 0xf0, + 0x57, 0xb4, 0x02, 0x97, 0x32, 0xe7, 0xde, 0x59, + 0xe2, 0x2d, 0x9b, 0x11, 0xea, 0x2c, 0x35, 0x92}}, + {{0x28, 0x56, 0xac, 0x0e, 0x4f, 0x98, 0x09, 0xf0, + 0x49, 0xfa, 0x7f, 0x84, 0xac, 0x7e, 0x50, 0x5b, + 0x17, 0x43, 0x14, 0x89, 0x9c, 0x53, 0xa8, 0x94, + 0x30, 0xf2, 0x11, 0x4d, 0x92, 0x14, 0x27, 0xe8}, + {0x39, 0x7a, 0x84, 0x56, 0x79, 0x9d, 0xec, 0x26, + 0x2c, 0x53, 0xc1, 0x94, 0xc9, 0x8d, 0x9e, 0x9d, + 0x32, 0x1f, 0xdd, 0x84, 0x04, 0xe8, 0xe2, 0x0a, + 0x6b, 0xbe, 0xbb, 0x42, 0x40, 0x67, 0x30, 0x6c}}, + {{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + 0x45, 0x51, 0x23, 0x19, 0x50, 0xb7, 0x5f, 0xc4, + 0x40, 0x2d, 0xa1, 0x73, 0x2f, 0xc9, 0xbe, 0xbd}, + {0x27, 0x59, 0xc7, 0x35, 0x60, 0x71, 0xa6, 0xf1, + 0x79, 0xa5, 0xfd, 0x79, 0x16, 0xf3, 0x41, 0xf0, + 0x57, 0xb4, 0x02, 0x97, 0x32, 0xe7, 0xde, 0x59, + 0xe2, 0x2d, 0x9b, 0x11, 0xea, 0x2c, 0x35, 0x92}}, + {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, + 0xba, 0xae, 0xdc, 0xe6, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xa0, 0x3b, + 0xbf, 0xd2, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xd0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x40}, + {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01}}, + {{0x1c, 0xc4, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x0f, 0x65, 0xca, 0x39, + 0x70, 0x52, 0x92, 0x8e, 0xc3, 0xc8, 0x15, 0xea, + 0x7f, 0x10, 0x9e, 0x77, 0x4b, 0x6e, 0x2d, 0xdf, + 0xe8, 0x30, 0x9d, 0xda, 0xe8, 0x9a, 0x65, 0xae}, + {0x02, 0xb0, 0x16, 0xb1, 0x1d, 0xc8, 0x57, 0x7b, + 0xa2, 0x3a, 0xa2, 0xa3, 0x38, 0x5c, 0x8f, 0xeb, + 0x66, 0x37, 0x91, 0xa8, 0x5f, 0xef, 0x04, 0xf6, + 0x59, 0x75, 0xe1, 0xee, 0x92, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x30}}, + {{0x8d, 0x76, 0x14, 0xa4, 0x14, 0x06, 0x9f, 0x9a, + 0xdf, 0x4a, 0x85, 0xa7, 0x6b, 0xbf, 0x29, 0x6f, + 0xbc, 0x34, 0x87, 0x5d, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x2e, 0xa9, + 0xc9, 0x1f, 0x58, 0xd6, 0x9a, 0x82, 0xa0, 0x56}, + {0xd4, 0xb9, 0xdb, 0x88, 0x1d, 0x04, 0xe9, 0x93, + 0x8d, 0x3f, 0x20, 0xd5, 0x86, 0xa8, 0x83, 0x07, + 0xdb, 0x09, 0xd8, 0x22, 0x1f, 0x7f, 0xf1, 0x71, + 0xc8, 0xe7, 0x5d, 0x47, 0xaf, 0x8b, 0x72, 0xe9}}, + {{0x83, 0xb9, 0x39, 0xb2, 0xa4, 0xdf, 0x46, 0x87, + 0xc2, 0xb8, 0xf1, 0xe6, 0x4c, 0xd1, 0xe2, 0xa9, + 0xe4, 0x70, 0x30, 0x34, 0xbc, 0x52, 0x7c, 0x55, + 0xa6, 0xec, 0x80, 0xa4, 0xe5, 0xd2, 0xdc, 0x73}, + {0x08, 0xf1, 0x03, 0xcf, 0x16, 0x73, 0xe8, 0x7d, + 0xb6, 0x7e, 0x9b, 0xc0, 0xb4, 0xc2, 0xa5, 0x86, + 0x02, 0x77, 0xd5, 0x27, 0x86, 0xa5, 0x15, 0xfb, + 0xae, 0x9b, 0x8c, 0xa9, 0xf9, 0xf8, 0xa8, 0x4a}}, + {{0x8b, 0x00, 0x49, 0xdb, 0xfa, 0xf0, 0x1b, 0xa2, + 0xed, 0x8a, 0x9a, 0x7a, 0x36, 0x78, 0x4a, 0xc7, + 0xf7, 0xad, 0x39, 0xd0, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x7a, 0x41, + 0xce, 0xd6, 0xd6, 0x4c, 0x20, 0x21, 0x6b, 0xc7}, + {0xc6, 0xca, 0x78, 0x1d, 0x32, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x06, + 0x91, 0xf2, 0x1a, 0xe8, 0x43, 0x16, 0xea, 0x04, + 0x3c, 0x1f, 0x07, 0x85, 0xf7, 0x09, 0x22, 0x08, + 0xba, 0x13, 0xfd, 0x78, 0x1e, 0x3f, 0x6f, 0x62}}, + {{0x25, 0x9b, 0x7c, 0xb0, 0xac, 0x72, 0x6f, 0xb2, + 0xe3, 0x53, 0x84, 0x7a, 0x1a, 0x9a, 0x98, 0x9b, + 0x44, 0xd3, 0x59, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x57, 0x41, 0x40, + 0x78, 0xa7, 0x30, 0x2f, 0x4c, 0x9c, 0xb9, 0x68}, + {0xb7, 0x75, 0x03, 0x63, 0x61, 0xc2, 0x48, 0x6e, + 0x12, 0x3d, 0xbf, 0x4b, 0x27, 0xdf, 0xb1, 0x7a, + 0xff, 0x4e, 0x31, 0x07, 0x83, 0xf4, 0x62, 0x5b, + 0x19, 0xa5, 0xac, 0xa0, 0x32, 0x58, 0x0d, 0xa7}}, + {{0x43, 0x4f, 0x10, 0xa4, 0xca, 0xdb, 0x38, 0x67, + 0xfa, 0xae, 0x96, 0xb5, 0x6d, 0x97, 0xff, 0x1f, + 0xb6, 0x83, 0x43, 0xd3, 0xa0, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x7a, + 0x64, 0x05, 0x4c, 0xa7, 0xc1, 0xa5, 0x21, 0x51}, + {0xe4, 0xf1, 0x23, 0x84, 0xe1, 0xb5, 0x9d, 0xf2, + 0xb8, 0x73, 0x8b, 0x45, 0x2b, 0x35, 0x46, 0x38, + 0x10, 0x2b, 0x50, 0xf8, 0x8b, 0x35, 0xcd, 0x34, + 0xc8, 0x0e, 0xf6, 0xdb, 0x09, 0x35, 0xf0, 0xda}}, + {{0xdb, 0x21, 0x5c, 0x8d, 0x83, 0x1d, 0xb3, 0x34, + 0xc7, 0x0e, 0x43, 0xa1, 0x58, 0x79, 0x67, 0x13, + 0x1e, 0x86, 0x5d, 0x89, 0x63, 0xe6, 0x0a, 0x46, + 0x5c, 0x02, 0x97, 0x1b, 0x62, 0x43, 0x86, 0xf5}, + {0xdb, 0x21, 0x5c, 0x8d, 0x83, 0x1d, 0xb3, 0x34, + 0xc7, 0x0e, 0x43, 0xa1, 0x58, 0x79, 0x67, 0x13, + 0x1e, 0x86, 0x5d, 0x89, 0x63, 0xe6, 0x0a, 0x46, + 0x5c, 0x02, 0x97, 0x1b, 0x62, 0x43, 0x86, 0xf5}} + }; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&one, 1); + for (i = 0; i < 33; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&x, chal[i][0], &overflow); + CHECK(!overflow); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&y, chal[i][1], &overflow); + CHECK(!overflow); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&r1, res[i][0], &overflow); + CHECK(!overflow); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&r2, res[i][1], &overflow); + CHECK(!overflow); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&z, &x, &y); + CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(&z)); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &z)); + if (!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&y)) { + secp256k1_scalar_inverse(&zz, &y); + CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(&zz)); +#if defined(USE_SCALAR_INV_NUM) + secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&zzv, &y); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&zzv, &zz)); +#endif + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&z, &z, &zz); + CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(&z)); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&x, &z)); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&zz, &zz, &y); + CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(&zz)); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&one, &zz)); + } + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&z, &x, &x); + CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(&z)); + secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&zz, &x); + CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(&zz)); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&zz, &z)); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r2, &zz)); + } + } +} + +/***** FIELD TESTS *****/ + +void random_fe(secp256k1_fe *x) { + unsigned char bin[32]; + do { + secp256k1_rand256(bin); + if (secp256k1_fe_set_b32(x, bin)) { + return; + } + } while(1); +} + +void random_fe_test(secp256k1_fe *x) { + unsigned char bin[32]; + do { + secp256k1_rand256_test(bin); + if (secp256k1_fe_set_b32(x, bin)) { + return; + } + } while(1); +} + +void random_fe_non_zero(secp256k1_fe *nz) { + int tries = 10; + while (--tries >= 0) { + random_fe(nz); + secp256k1_fe_normalize(nz); + if (!secp256k1_fe_is_zero(nz)) { + break; + } + } + /* Infinitesimal probability of spurious failure here */ + CHECK(tries >= 0); +} + +void random_fe_non_square(secp256k1_fe *ns) { + secp256k1_fe r; + random_fe_non_zero(ns); + if (secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&r, ns)) { + secp256k1_fe_negate(ns, ns, 1); + } +} + +int check_fe_equal(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) { + secp256k1_fe an = *a; + secp256k1_fe bn = *b; + secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&an); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&bn); + return secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&an, &bn); +} + +int check_fe_inverse(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *ai) { + secp256k1_fe x; + secp256k1_fe one = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&x, a, ai); + return check_fe_equal(&x, &one); +} + +void run_field_convert(void) { + static const unsigned char b32[32] = { + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, + 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28, 0x29, + 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x40 + }; + static const secp256k1_fe_storage fes = SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST( + 0x00010203UL, 0x04050607UL, 0x11121314UL, 0x15161718UL, + 0x22232425UL, 0x26272829UL, 0x33343536UL, 0x37383940UL + ); + static const secp256k1_fe fe = SECP256K1_FE_CONST( + 0x00010203UL, 0x04050607UL, 0x11121314UL, 0x15161718UL, + 0x22232425UL, 0x26272829UL, 0x33343536UL, 0x37383940UL + ); + secp256k1_fe fe2; + unsigned char b322[32]; + secp256k1_fe_storage fes2; + /* Check conversions to fe. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&fe2, b32)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&fe, &fe2)); + secp256k1_fe_from_storage(&fe2, &fes); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&fe, &fe2)); + /* Check conversion from fe. */ + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(b322, &fe); + CHECK(memcmp(b322, b32, 32) == 0); + secp256k1_fe_to_storage(&fes2, &fe); + CHECK(memcmp(&fes2, &fes, sizeof(fes)) == 0); +} + +int fe_memcmp(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) { + secp256k1_fe t = *b; +#ifdef VERIFY + t.magnitude = a->magnitude; + t.normalized = a->normalized; +#endif + return memcmp(a, &t, sizeof(secp256k1_fe)); +} + +void run_field_misc(void) { + secp256k1_fe x; + secp256k1_fe y; + secp256k1_fe z; + secp256k1_fe q; + secp256k1_fe fe5 = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5); + int i, j; + for (i = 0; i < 5*count; i++) { + secp256k1_fe_storage xs, ys, zs; + random_fe(&x); + random_fe_non_zero(&y); + /* Test the fe equality and comparison operations. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(&x, &x) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&x, &x)); + z = x; + secp256k1_fe_add(&z,&y); + /* Test fe conditional move; z is not normalized here. */ + q = x; + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&x, &z, 0); + VERIFY_CHECK(!x.normalized && x.magnitude == z.magnitude); + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&x, &x, 1); + CHECK(fe_memcmp(&x, &z) != 0); + CHECK(fe_memcmp(&x, &q) == 0); + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&q, &z, 1); + VERIFY_CHECK(!q.normalized && q.magnitude == z.magnitude); + CHECK(fe_memcmp(&q, &z) == 0); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&x); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&z); + CHECK(!secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&x, &z)); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&q); + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&q, &z, (i&1)); + VERIFY_CHECK(q.normalized && q.magnitude == 1); + for (j = 0; j < 6; j++) { + secp256k1_fe_negate(&z, &z, j+1); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&q); + secp256k1_fe_cmov(&q, &z, (j&1)); + VERIFY_CHECK(!q.normalized && q.magnitude == (j+2)); + } + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&z); + /* Test storage conversion and conditional moves. */ + secp256k1_fe_to_storage(&xs, &x); + secp256k1_fe_to_storage(&ys, &y); + secp256k1_fe_to_storage(&zs, &z); + secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&zs, &xs, 0); + secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&zs, &zs, 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&xs, &zs, sizeof(xs)) != 0); + secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&ys, &xs, 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&xs, &ys, sizeof(xs)) == 0); + secp256k1_fe_from_storage(&x, &xs); + secp256k1_fe_from_storage(&y, &ys); + secp256k1_fe_from_storage(&z, &zs); + /* Test that mul_int, mul, and add agree. */ + secp256k1_fe_add(&y, &x); + secp256k1_fe_add(&y, &x); + z = x; + secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&z, 3); + CHECK(check_fe_equal(&y, &z)); + secp256k1_fe_add(&y, &x); + secp256k1_fe_add(&z, &x); + CHECK(check_fe_equal(&z, &y)); + z = x; + secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&z, 5); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&q, &x, &fe5); + CHECK(check_fe_equal(&z, &q)); + secp256k1_fe_negate(&x, &x, 1); + secp256k1_fe_add(&z, &x); + secp256k1_fe_add(&q, &x); + CHECK(check_fe_equal(&y, &z)); + CHECK(check_fe_equal(&q, &y)); + } +} + +void run_field_inv(void) { + secp256k1_fe x, xi, xii; + int i; + for (i = 0; i < 10*count; i++) { + random_fe_non_zero(&x); + secp256k1_fe_inv(&xi, &x); + CHECK(check_fe_inverse(&x, &xi)); + secp256k1_fe_inv(&xii, &xi); + CHECK(check_fe_equal(&x, &xii)); + } +} + +void run_field_inv_var(void) { + secp256k1_fe x, xi, xii; + int i; + for (i = 0; i < 10*count; i++) { + random_fe_non_zero(&x); + secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&xi, &x); + CHECK(check_fe_inverse(&x, &xi)); + secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&xii, &xi); + CHECK(check_fe_equal(&x, &xii)); + } +} + +void run_field_inv_all_var(void) { + secp256k1_fe x[16], xi[16], xii[16]; + int i; + /* Check it's safe to call for 0 elements */ + secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(xi, x, 0); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + size_t j; + size_t len = secp256k1_rand_int(15) + 1; + for (j = 0; j < len; j++) { + random_fe_non_zero(&x[j]); + } + secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(xi, x, len); + for (j = 0; j < len; j++) { + CHECK(check_fe_inverse(&x[j], &xi[j])); + } + secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(xii, xi, len); + for (j = 0; j < len; j++) { + CHECK(check_fe_equal(&x[j], &xii[j])); + } + } +} + +void run_sqr(void) { + secp256k1_fe x, s; + + { + int i; + secp256k1_fe_set_int(&x, 1); + secp256k1_fe_negate(&x, &x, 1); + + for (i = 1; i <= 512; ++i) { + secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&x, 2); + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&x); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&s, &x); + } + } +} + +void test_sqrt(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *k) { + secp256k1_fe r1, r2; + int v = secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&r1, a); + CHECK((v == 0) == (k == NULL)); + + if (k != NULL) { + /* Check that the returned root is +/- the given known answer */ + secp256k1_fe_negate(&r2, &r1, 1); + secp256k1_fe_add(&r1, k); secp256k1_fe_add(&r2, k); + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&r1); secp256k1_fe_normalize(&r2); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&r1) || secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&r2)); + } +} + +void run_sqrt(void) { + secp256k1_fe ns, x, s, t; + int i; + + /* Check sqrt(0) is 0 */ + secp256k1_fe_set_int(&x, 0); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&s, &x); + test_sqrt(&s, &x); + + /* Check sqrt of small squares (and their negatives) */ + for (i = 1; i <= 100; i++) { + secp256k1_fe_set_int(&x, i); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&s, &x); + test_sqrt(&s, &x); + secp256k1_fe_negate(&t, &s, 1); + test_sqrt(&t, NULL); + } + + /* Consistency checks for large random values */ + for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { + int j; + random_fe_non_square(&ns); + for (j = 0; j < count; j++) { + random_fe(&x); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&s, &x); + test_sqrt(&s, &x); + secp256k1_fe_negate(&t, &s, 1); + test_sqrt(&t, NULL); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&t, &s, &ns); + test_sqrt(&t, NULL); + } + } +} + +/***** GROUP TESTS *****/ + +void ge_equals_ge(const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_ge *b) { + CHECK(a->infinity == b->infinity); + if (a->infinity) { + return; + } + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&a->x, &b->x)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&a->y, &b->y)); +} + +/* This compares jacobian points including their Z, not just their geometric meaning. */ +int gej_xyz_equals_gej(const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_gej *b) { + secp256k1_gej a2; + secp256k1_gej b2; + int ret = 1; + ret &= a->infinity == b->infinity; + if (ret && !a->infinity) { + a2 = *a; + b2 = *b; + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&a2.x); + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&a2.y); + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&a2.z); + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&b2.x); + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&b2.y); + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&b2.z); + ret &= secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(&a2.x, &b2.x) == 0; + ret &= secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(&a2.y, &b2.y) == 0; + ret &= secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(&a2.z, &b2.z) == 0; + } + return ret; +} + +void ge_equals_gej(const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_gej *b) { + secp256k1_fe z2s; + secp256k1_fe u1, u2, s1, s2; + CHECK(a->infinity == b->infinity); + if (a->infinity) { + return; + } + /* Check a.x * b.z^2 == b.x && a.y * b.z^3 == b.y, to avoid inverses. */ + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z2s, &b->z); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&u1, &a->x, &z2s); + u2 = b->x; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&u2); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&s1, &a->y, &z2s); secp256k1_fe_mul(&s1, &s1, &b->z); + s2 = b->y; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&s2); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&u1, &u2)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&s1, &s2)); +} + +void test_ge(void) { + int i, i1; +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + int runs = 6; +#else + int runs = 4; +#endif + /* Points: (infinity, p1, p1, -p1, -p1, p2, p2, -p2, -p2, p3, p3, -p3, -p3, p4, p4, -p4, -p4). + * The second in each pair of identical points uses a random Z coordinate in the Jacobian form. + * All magnitudes are randomized. + * All 17*17 combinations of points are added to each other, using all applicable methods. + * + * When the endomorphism code is compiled in, p5 = lambda*p1 and p6 = lambda^2*p1 are added as well. + */ + secp256k1_ge *ge = (secp256k1_ge *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, sizeof(secp256k1_ge) * (1 + 4 * runs)); + secp256k1_gej *gej = (secp256k1_gej *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, sizeof(secp256k1_gej) * (1 + 4 * runs)); + secp256k1_fe *zinv = (secp256k1_fe *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, sizeof(secp256k1_fe) * (1 + 4 * runs)); + secp256k1_fe zf; + secp256k1_fe zfi2, zfi3; + + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&gej[0]); + secp256k1_ge_clear(&ge[0]); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&ge[0], &gej[0]); + for (i = 0; i < runs; i++) { + int j; + secp256k1_ge g; + random_group_element_test(&g); +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + if (i >= runs - 2) { + secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&g, &ge[1]); + } + if (i >= runs - 1) { + secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&g, &g); + } +#endif + ge[1 + 4 * i] = g; + ge[2 + 4 * i] = g; + secp256k1_ge_neg(&ge[3 + 4 * i], &g); + secp256k1_ge_neg(&ge[4 + 4 * i], &g); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&gej[1 + 4 * i], &ge[1 + 4 * i]); + random_group_element_jacobian_test(&gej[2 + 4 * i], &ge[2 + 4 * i]); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&gej[3 + 4 * i], &ge[3 + 4 * i]); + random_group_element_jacobian_test(&gej[4 + 4 * i], &ge[4 + 4 * i]); + for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { + random_field_element_magnitude(&ge[1 + j + 4 * i].x); + random_field_element_magnitude(&ge[1 + j + 4 * i].y); + random_field_element_magnitude(&gej[1 + j + 4 * i].x); + random_field_element_magnitude(&gej[1 + j + 4 * i].y); + random_field_element_magnitude(&gej[1 + j + 4 * i].z); + } + } + + /* Compute z inverses. */ + { + secp256k1_fe *zs = checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, sizeof(secp256k1_fe) * (1 + 4 * runs)); + for (i = 0; i < 4 * runs + 1; i++) { + if (i == 0) { + /* The point at infinity does not have a meaningful z inverse. Any should do. */ + do { + random_field_element_test(&zs[i]); + } while(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&zs[i])); + } else { + zs[i] = gej[i].z; + } + } + secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(zinv, zs, 4 * runs + 1); + free(zs); + } + + /* Generate random zf, and zfi2 = 1/zf^2, zfi3 = 1/zf^3 */ + do { + random_field_element_test(&zf); + } while(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&zf)); + random_field_element_magnitude(&zf); + secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&zfi3, &zf); + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&zfi2, &zfi3); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&zfi3, &zfi3, &zfi2); + + for (i1 = 0; i1 < 1 + 4 * runs; i1++) { + int i2; + for (i2 = 0; i2 < 1 + 4 * runs; i2++) { + /* Compute reference result using gej + gej (var). */ + secp256k1_gej refj, resj; + secp256k1_ge ref; + secp256k1_fe zr; + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&refj, &gej[i1], &gej[i2], secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&gej[i1]) ? NULL : &zr); + /* Check Z ratio. */ + if (!secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&gej[i1]) && !secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&refj)) { + secp256k1_fe zrz; secp256k1_fe_mul(&zrz, &zr, &gej[i1].z); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&zrz, &refj.z)); + } + secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&ref, &refj); + + /* Test gej + ge with Z ratio result (var). */ + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&resj, &gej[i1], &ge[i2], secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&gej[i1]) ? NULL : &zr); + ge_equals_gej(&ref, &resj); + if (!secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&gej[i1]) && !secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&resj)) { + secp256k1_fe zrz; secp256k1_fe_mul(&zrz, &zr, &gej[i1].z); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&zrz, &resj.z)); + } + + /* Test gej + ge (var, with additional Z factor). */ + { + secp256k1_ge ge2_zfi = ge[i2]; /* the second term with x and y rescaled for z = 1/zf */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&ge2_zfi.x, &ge2_zfi.x, &zfi2); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&ge2_zfi.y, &ge2_zfi.y, &zfi3); + random_field_element_magnitude(&ge2_zfi.x); + random_field_element_magnitude(&ge2_zfi.y); + secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(&resj, &gej[i1], &ge2_zfi, &zf); + ge_equals_gej(&ref, &resj); + } + + /* Test gej + ge (const). */ + if (i2 != 0) { + /* secp256k1_gej_add_ge does not support its second argument being infinity. */ + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&resj, &gej[i1], &ge[i2]); + ge_equals_gej(&ref, &resj); + } + + /* Test doubling (var). */ + if ((i1 == 0 && i2 == 0) || ((i1 + 3)/4 == (i2 + 3)/4 && ((i1 + 3)%4)/2 == ((i2 + 3)%4)/2)) { + secp256k1_fe zr2; + /* Normal doubling with Z ratio result. */ + secp256k1_gej_double_var(&resj, &gej[i1], &zr2); + ge_equals_gej(&ref, &resj); + /* Check Z ratio. */ + secp256k1_fe_mul(&zr2, &zr2, &gej[i1].z); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&zr2, &resj.z)); + /* Normal doubling. */ + secp256k1_gej_double_var(&resj, &gej[i2], NULL); + ge_equals_gej(&ref, &resj); + } + + /* Test adding opposites. */ + if ((i1 == 0 && i2 == 0) || ((i1 + 3)/4 == (i2 + 3)/4 && ((i1 + 3)%4)/2 != ((i2 + 3)%4)/2)) { + CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&ref)); + } + + /* Test adding infinity. */ + if (i1 == 0) { + CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&ge[i1])); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&gej[i1])); + ge_equals_gej(&ref, &gej[i2]); + } + if (i2 == 0) { + CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&ge[i2])); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&gej[i2])); + ge_equals_gej(&ref, &gej[i1]); + } + } + } + + /* Test adding all points together in random order equals infinity. */ + { + secp256k1_gej sum = SECP256K1_GEJ_CONST_INFINITY; + secp256k1_gej *gej_shuffled = (secp256k1_gej *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, (4 * runs + 1) * sizeof(secp256k1_gej)); + for (i = 0; i < 4 * runs + 1; i++) { + gej_shuffled[i] = gej[i]; + } + for (i = 0; i < 4 * runs + 1; i++) { + int swap = i + secp256k1_rand_int(4 * runs + 1 - i); + if (swap != i) { + secp256k1_gej t = gej_shuffled[i]; + gej_shuffled[i] = gej_shuffled[swap]; + gej_shuffled[swap] = t; + } + } + for (i = 0; i < 4 * runs + 1; i++) { + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&sum, &sum, &gej_shuffled[i], NULL); + } + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&sum)); + free(gej_shuffled); + } + + /* Test batch gej -> ge conversion with and without known z ratios. */ + { + secp256k1_fe *zr = (secp256k1_fe *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, (4 * runs + 1) * sizeof(secp256k1_fe)); + secp256k1_ge *ge_set_table = (secp256k1_ge *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, (4 * runs + 1) * sizeof(secp256k1_ge)); + secp256k1_ge *ge_set_all = (secp256k1_ge *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, (4 * runs + 1) * sizeof(secp256k1_ge)); + for (i = 0; i < 4 * runs + 1; i++) { + /* Compute gej[i + 1].z / gez[i].z (with gej[n].z taken to be 1). */ + if (i < 4 * runs) { + secp256k1_fe_mul(&zr[i + 1], &zinv[i], &gej[i + 1].z); + } + } + secp256k1_ge_set_table_gej_var(ge_set_table, gej, zr, 4 * runs + 1); + secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(ge_set_all, gej, 4 * runs + 1, &ctx->error_callback); + for (i = 0; i < 4 * runs + 1; i++) { + secp256k1_fe s; + random_fe_non_zero(&s); + secp256k1_gej_rescale(&gej[i], &s); + ge_equals_gej(&ge_set_table[i], &gej[i]); + ge_equals_gej(&ge_set_all[i], &gej[i]); + } + free(ge_set_table); + free(ge_set_all); + free(zr); + } + + free(ge); + free(gej); + free(zinv); +} + +void test_add_neg_y_diff_x(void) { + /* The point of this test is to check that we can add two points + * whose y-coordinates are negatives of each other but whose x + * coordinates differ. If the x-coordinates were the same, these + * points would be negatives of each other and their sum is + * infinity. This is cool because it "covers up" any degeneracy + * in the addition algorithm that would cause the xy coordinates + * of the sum to be wrong (since infinity has no xy coordinates). + * HOWEVER, if the x-coordinates are different, infinity is the + * wrong answer, and such degeneracies are exposed. This is the + * root of https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/issues/257 + * which this test is a regression test for. + * + * These points were generated in sage as + * # secp256k1 params + * F = FiniteField (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFC2F) + * C = EllipticCurve ([F (0), F (7)]) + * G = C.lift_x(0x79BE667EF9DCBBAC55A06295CE870B07029BFCDB2DCE28D959F2815B16F81798) + * N = FiniteField(G.order()) + * + * # endomorphism values (lambda is 1^{1/3} in N, beta is 1^{1/3} in F) + * x = polygen(N) + * lam = (1 - x^3).roots()[1][0] + * + * # random "bad pair" + * P = C.random_element() + * Q = -int(lam) * P + * print " P: %x %x" % P.xy() + * print " Q: %x %x" % Q.xy() + * print "P + Q: %x %x" % (P + Q).xy() + */ + secp256k1_gej aj = SECP256K1_GEJ_CONST( + 0x8d24cd95, 0x0a355af1, 0x3c543505, 0x44238d30, + 0x0643d79f, 0x05a59614, 0x2f8ec030, 0xd58977cb, + 0x001e337a, 0x38093dcd, 0x6c0f386d, 0x0b1293a8, + 0x4d72c879, 0xd7681924, 0x44e6d2f3, 0x9190117d + ); + secp256k1_gej bj = SECP256K1_GEJ_CONST( + 0xc7b74206, 0x1f788cd9, 0xabd0937d, 0x164a0d86, + 0x95f6ff75, 0xf19a4ce9, 0xd013bd7b, 0xbf92d2a7, + 0xffe1cc85, 0xc7f6c232, 0x93f0c792, 0xf4ed6c57, + 0xb28d3786, 0x2897e6db, 0xbb192d0b, 0x6e6feab2 + ); + secp256k1_gej sumj = SECP256K1_GEJ_CONST( + 0x671a63c0, 0x3efdad4c, 0x389a7798, 0x24356027, + 0xb3d69010, 0x278625c3, 0x5c86d390, 0x184a8f7a, + 0x5f6409c2, 0x2ce01f2b, 0x511fd375, 0x25071d08, + 0xda651801, 0x70e95caf, 0x8f0d893c, 0xbed8fbbe + ); + secp256k1_ge b; + secp256k1_gej resj; + secp256k1_ge res; + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&b, &bj); + + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&resj, &aj, &bj, NULL); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res, &resj); + ge_equals_gej(&res, &sumj); + + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&resj, &aj, &b); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res, &resj); + ge_equals_gej(&res, &sumj); + + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&resj, &aj, &b, NULL); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res, &resj); + ge_equals_gej(&res, &sumj); +} + +void run_ge(void) { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < count * 32; i++) { + test_ge(); + } + test_add_neg_y_diff_x(); +} + +void test_ec_combine(void) { + secp256k1_scalar sum = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + secp256k1_pubkey data[6]; + const secp256k1_pubkey* d[6]; + secp256k1_pubkey sd; + secp256k1_pubkey sd2; + secp256k1_gej Qj; + secp256k1_ge Q; + int i; + for (i = 1; i <= 6; i++) { + secp256k1_scalar s; + random_scalar_order_test(&s); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&sum, &sum, &s); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &Qj, &s); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&Q, &Qj); + secp256k1_pubkey_save(&data[i - 1], &Q); + d[i - 1] = &data[i - 1]; + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &Qj, &sum); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&Q, &Qj); + secp256k1_pubkey_save(&sd, &Q); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &sd2, d, i) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&sd, &sd2, sizeof(sd)) == 0); + } +} + +void run_ec_combine(void) { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < count * 8; i++) { + test_ec_combine(); + } +} + +void test_group_decompress(const secp256k1_fe* x) { + /* The input itself, normalized. */ + secp256k1_fe fex = *x; + secp256k1_fe fez; + /* Results of set_xquad_var, set_xo_var(..., 0), set_xo_var(..., 1). */ + secp256k1_ge ge_quad, ge_even, ge_odd; + secp256k1_gej gej_quad; + /* Return values of the above calls. */ + int res_quad, res_even, res_odd; + + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&fex); + + res_quad = secp256k1_ge_set_xquad(&ge_quad, &fex); + res_even = secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&ge_even, &fex, 0); + res_odd = secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&ge_odd, &fex, 1); + + CHECK(res_quad == res_even); + CHECK(res_quad == res_odd); + + if (res_quad) { + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&ge_quad.x); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&ge_odd.x); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&ge_even.x); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&ge_quad.y); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&ge_odd.y); + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&ge_even.y); + + /* No infinity allowed. */ + CHECK(!ge_quad.infinity); + CHECK(!ge_even.infinity); + CHECK(!ge_odd.infinity); + + /* Check that the x coordinates check out. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&ge_quad.x, x)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&ge_even.x, x)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&ge_odd.x, x)); + + /* Check that the Y coordinate result in ge_quad is a square. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(&ge_quad.y)); + + /* Check odd/even Y in ge_odd, ge_even. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&ge_odd.y)); + CHECK(!secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&ge_even.y)); + + /* Check secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var. */ + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&gej_quad, &ge_quad); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(&gej_quad)); + do { + random_fe_test(&fez); + } while (secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&fez)); + secp256k1_gej_rescale(&gej_quad, &fez); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(&gej_quad)); + secp256k1_gej_neg(&gej_quad, &gej_quad); + CHECK(!secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(&gej_quad)); + do { + random_fe_test(&fez); + } while (secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&fez)); + secp256k1_gej_rescale(&gej_quad, &fez); + CHECK(!secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(&gej_quad)); + secp256k1_gej_neg(&gej_quad, &gej_quad); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(&gej_quad)); + } +} + +void run_group_decompress(void) { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < count * 4; i++) { + secp256k1_fe fe; + random_fe_test(&fe); + test_group_decompress(&fe); + } +} + +/***** ECMULT TESTS *****/ + +void run_ecmult_chain(void) { + /* random starting point A (on the curve) */ + secp256k1_gej a = SECP256K1_GEJ_CONST( + 0x8b30bbe9, 0xae2a9906, 0x96b22f67, 0x0709dff3, + 0x727fd8bc, 0x04d3362c, 0x6c7bf458, 0xe2846004, + 0xa357ae91, 0x5c4a6528, 0x1309edf2, 0x0504740f, + 0x0eb33439, 0x90216b4f, 0x81063cb6, 0x5f2f7e0f + ); + /* two random initial factors xn and gn */ + secp256k1_scalar xn = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( + 0x84cc5452, 0xf7fde1ed, 0xb4d38a8c, 0xe9b1b84c, + 0xcef31f14, 0x6e569be9, 0x705d357a, 0x42985407 + ); + secp256k1_scalar gn = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( + 0xa1e58d22, 0x553dcd42, 0xb2398062, 0x5d4c57a9, + 0x6e9323d4, 0x2b3152e5, 0xca2c3990, 0xedc7c9de + ); + /* two small multipliers to be applied to xn and gn in every iteration: */ + static const secp256k1_scalar xf = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x1337); + static const secp256k1_scalar gf = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x7113); + /* accumulators with the resulting coefficients to A and G */ + secp256k1_scalar ae = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); + secp256k1_scalar ge = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + /* actual points */ + secp256k1_gej x; + secp256k1_gej x2; + int i; + + /* the point being computed */ + x = a; + for (i = 0; i < 200*count; i++) { + /* in each iteration, compute X = xn*X + gn*G; */ + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &x, &x, &xn, &gn); + /* also compute ae and ge: the actual accumulated factors for A and G */ + /* if X was (ae*A+ge*G), xn*X + gn*G results in (xn*ae*A + (xn*ge+gn)*G) */ + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ae, &ae, &xn); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ge, &ge, &xn); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&ge, &ge, &gn); + /* modify xn and gn */ + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&xn, &xn, &xf); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&gn, &gn, &gf); + + /* verify */ + if (i == 19999) { + /* expected result after 19999 iterations */ + secp256k1_gej rp = SECP256K1_GEJ_CONST( + 0xD6E96687, 0xF9B10D09, 0x2A6F3543, 0x9D86CEBE, + 0xA4535D0D, 0x409F5358, 0x6440BD74, 0xB933E830, + 0xB95CBCA2, 0xC77DA786, 0x539BE8FD, 0x53354D2D, + 0x3B4F566A, 0xE6580454, 0x07ED6015, 0xEE1B2A88 + ); + + secp256k1_gej_neg(&rp, &rp); + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&rp, &rp, &x, NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&rp)); + } + } + /* redo the computation, but directly with the resulting ae and ge coefficients: */ + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &x2, &a, &ae, &ge); + secp256k1_gej_neg(&x2, &x2); + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&x2, &x2, &x, NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&x2)); +} + +void test_point_times_order(const secp256k1_gej *point) { + /* X * (point + G) + (order-X) * (pointer + G) = 0 */ + secp256k1_scalar x; + secp256k1_scalar nx; + secp256k1_scalar zero = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + secp256k1_scalar one = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); + secp256k1_gej res1, res2; + secp256k1_ge res3; + unsigned char pub[65]; + size_t psize = 65; + random_scalar_order_test(&x); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&nx, &x); + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &res1, point, &x, &x); /* calc res1 = x * point + x * G; */ + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &res2, point, &nx, &nx); /* calc res2 = (order - x) * point + (order - x) * G; */ + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&res1, &res1, &res2, NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&res1)); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_valid_var(&res1) == 0); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res3, &res1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&res3)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_valid_var(&res3) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&res3, pub, &psize, 0) == 0); + psize = 65; + CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&res3, pub, &psize, 1) == 0); + /* check zero/one edge cases */ + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &res1, point, &zero, &zero); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res3, &res1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&res3)); + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &res1, point, &one, &zero); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res3, &res1); + ge_equals_gej(&res3, point); + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &res1, point, &zero, &one); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res3, &res1); + ge_equals_ge(&res3, &secp256k1_ge_const_g); +} + +void run_point_times_order(void) { + int i; + secp256k1_fe x = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2); + static const secp256k1_fe xr = SECP256K1_FE_CONST( + 0x7603CB59, 0xB0EF6C63, 0xFE608479, 0x2A0C378C, + 0xDB3233A8, 0x0F8A9A09, 0xA877DEAD, 0x31B38C45 + ); + for (i = 0; i < 500; i++) { + secp256k1_ge p; + if (secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&p, &x, 1)) { + secp256k1_gej j; + CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_valid_var(&p)); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&j, &p); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_valid_var(&j)); + test_point_times_order(&j); + } + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x, &x); + } + secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&x); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&x, &xr)); +} + +void ecmult_const_random_mult(void) { + /* random starting point A (on the curve) */ + secp256k1_ge a = SECP256K1_GE_CONST( + 0x6d986544, 0x57ff52b8, 0xcf1b8126, 0x5b802a5b, + 0xa97f9263, 0xb1e88044, 0x93351325, 0x91bc450a, + 0x535c59f7, 0x325e5d2b, 0xc391fbe8, 0x3c12787c, + 0x337e4a98, 0xe82a9011, 0x0123ba37, 0xdd769c7d + ); + /* random initial factor xn */ + secp256k1_scalar xn = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( + 0x649d4f77, 0xc4242df7, 0x7f2079c9, 0x14530327, + 0xa31b876a, 0xd2d8ce2a, 0x2236d5c6, 0xd7b2029b + ); + /* expected xn * A (from sage) */ + secp256k1_ge expected_b = SECP256K1_GE_CONST( + 0x23773684, 0x4d209dc7, 0x098a786f, 0x20d06fcd, + 0x070a38bf, 0xc11ac651, 0x03004319, 0x1e2a8786, + 0xed8c3b8e, 0xc06dd57b, 0xd06ea66e, 0x45492b0f, + 0xb84e4e1b, 0xfb77e21f, 0x96baae2a, 0x63dec956 + ); + secp256k1_gej b; + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&b, &a, &xn, 256); + + CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_valid_var(&a)); + ge_equals_gej(&expected_b, &b); +} + +void ecmult_const_commutativity(void) { + secp256k1_scalar a; + secp256k1_scalar b; + secp256k1_gej res1; + secp256k1_gej res2; + secp256k1_ge mid1; + secp256k1_ge mid2; + random_scalar_order_test(&a); + random_scalar_order_test(&b); + + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&res1, &secp256k1_ge_const_g, &a, 256); + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&res2, &secp256k1_ge_const_g, &b, 256); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&mid1, &res1); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&mid2, &res2); + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&res1, &mid1, &b, 256); + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&res2, &mid2, &a, 256); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&mid1, &res1); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&mid2, &res2); + ge_equals_ge(&mid1, &mid2); +} + +void ecmult_const_mult_zero_one(void) { + secp256k1_scalar zero = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + secp256k1_scalar one = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); + secp256k1_scalar negone; + secp256k1_gej res1; + secp256k1_ge res2; + secp256k1_ge point; + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&negone, &one); + + random_group_element_test(&point); + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&res1, &point, &zero, 3); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res2, &res1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&res2)); + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&res1, &point, &one, 2); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res2, &res1); + ge_equals_ge(&res2, &point); + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&res1, &point, &negone, 256); + secp256k1_gej_neg(&res1, &res1); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res2, &res1); + ge_equals_ge(&res2, &point); +} + +void ecmult_const_chain_multiply(void) { + /* Check known result (randomly generated test problem from sage) */ + const secp256k1_scalar scalar = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( + 0x4968d524, 0x2abf9b7a, 0x466abbcf, 0x34b11b6d, + 0xcd83d307, 0x827bed62, 0x05fad0ce, 0x18fae63b + ); + const secp256k1_gej expected_point = SECP256K1_GEJ_CONST( + 0x5494c15d, 0x32099706, 0xc2395f94, 0x348745fd, + 0x757ce30e, 0x4e8c90fb, 0xa2bad184, 0xf883c69f, + 0x5d195d20, 0xe191bf7f, 0x1be3e55f, 0x56a80196, + 0x6071ad01, 0xf1462f66, 0xc997fa94, 0xdb858435 + ); + secp256k1_gej point; + secp256k1_ge res; + int i; + + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&point, &secp256k1_ge_const_g); + for (i = 0; i < 100; ++i) { + secp256k1_ge tmp; + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&tmp, &point); + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&point, &tmp, &scalar, 256); + } + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res, &point); + ge_equals_gej(&res, &expected_point); +} + +void run_ecmult_const_tests(void) { + ecmult_const_mult_zero_one(); + ecmult_const_random_mult(); + ecmult_const_commutativity(); + ecmult_const_chain_multiply(); +} + +typedef struct { + secp256k1_scalar *sc; + secp256k1_ge *pt; +} ecmult_multi_data; + +static int ecmult_multi_callback(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *cbdata) { + ecmult_multi_data *data = (ecmult_multi_data*) cbdata; + *sc = data->sc[idx]; + *pt = data->pt[idx]; + return 1; +} + +static int ecmult_multi_false_callback(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *cbdata) { + (void)sc; + (void)pt; + (void)idx; + (void)cbdata; + return 0; +} + +void test_ecmult_multi(secp256k1_scratch *scratch, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_func ecmult_multi) { + int ncount; + secp256k1_scalar szero; + secp256k1_scalar sc[32]; + secp256k1_ge pt[32]; + secp256k1_gej r; + secp256k1_gej r2; + ecmult_multi_data data; + secp256k1_scratch *scratch_empty; + + data.sc = sc; + data.pt = pt; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&szero, 0); + + /* No points to multiply */ + CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, NULL, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 0)); + + /* Check 1- and 2-point multiplies against ecmult */ + for (ncount = 0; ncount < count; ncount++) { + secp256k1_ge ptg; + secp256k1_gej ptgj; + random_scalar_order(&sc[0]); + random_scalar_order(&sc[1]); + + random_group_element_test(&ptg); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&ptgj, &ptg); + pt[0] = ptg; + pt[1] = secp256k1_ge_const_g; + + /* only G scalar */ + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &r2, &ptgj, &szero, &sc[0]); + CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &sc[0], ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 0)); + secp256k1_gej_neg(&r2, &r2); + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&r, &r, &r2, NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); + + /* 1-point */ + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &r2, &ptgj, &sc[0], &szero); + CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 1)); + secp256k1_gej_neg(&r2, &r2); + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&r, &r, &r2, NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); + + /* Try to multiply 1 point, but scratch space is empty */ + scratch_empty = secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, 0); + CHECK(!ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch_empty, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 1)); + secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch_empty); + + /* Try to multiply 1 point, but callback returns false */ + CHECK(!ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_false_callback, &data, 1)); + + /* 2-point */ + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &r2, &ptgj, &sc[0], &sc[1]); + CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 2)); + secp256k1_gej_neg(&r2, &r2); + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&r, &r, &r2, NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); + + /* 2-point with G scalar */ + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &r2, &ptgj, &sc[0], &sc[1]); + CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &sc[1], ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 1)); + secp256k1_gej_neg(&r2, &r2); + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&r, &r, &r2, NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); + } + + /* Check infinite outputs of various forms */ + for (ncount = 0; ncount < count; ncount++) { + secp256k1_ge ptg; + size_t i, j; + size_t sizes[] = { 2, 10, 32 }; + + for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) { + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { + random_scalar_order(&sc[i]); + secp256k1_ge_set_infinity(&pt[i]); + } + CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, sizes[j])); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); + } + + for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) { + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { + random_group_element_test(&ptg); + pt[i] = ptg; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sc[i], 0); + } + CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, sizes[j])); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); + } + + for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) { + random_group_element_test(&ptg); + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + random_scalar_order(&sc[2*i]); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&sc[2*i + 1], &sc[2*i]); + pt[2 * i] = ptg; + pt[2 * i + 1] = ptg; + } + + CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, sizes[j])); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); + + random_scalar_order(&sc[0]); + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + random_group_element_test(&ptg); + + sc[2*i] = sc[0]; + sc[2*i+1] = sc[0]; + pt[2 * i] = ptg; + secp256k1_ge_neg(&pt[2*i+1], &pt[2*i]); + } + + CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, sizes[j])); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); + } + + random_group_element_test(&ptg); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sc[0], 0); + pt[0] = ptg; + for (i = 1; i < 32; i++) { + pt[i] = ptg; + + random_scalar_order(&sc[i]); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&sc[0], &sc[0], &sc[i]); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&sc[i], &sc[i]); + } + + CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 32)); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); + } + + /* Check random points, constant scalar */ + for (ncount = 0; ncount < count; ncount++) { + size_t i; + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&r); + + random_scalar_order(&sc[0]); + for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { + secp256k1_ge ptg; + sc[i] = sc[0]; + random_group_element_test(&ptg); + pt[i] = ptg; + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&r, &r, &pt[i], NULL); + } + + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &r2, &r, &sc[0], &szero); + CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 20)); + secp256k1_gej_neg(&r2, &r2); + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&r, &r, &r2, NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); + } + + /* Check random scalars, constant point */ + for (ncount = 0; ncount < count; ncount++) { + size_t i; + secp256k1_ge ptg; + secp256k1_gej p0j; + secp256k1_scalar rs; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&rs, 0); + + random_group_element_test(&ptg); + for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { + random_scalar_order(&sc[i]); + pt[i] = ptg; + secp256k1_scalar_add(&rs, &rs, &sc[i]); + } + + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&p0j, &pt[0]); + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &r2, &p0j, &rs, &szero); + CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 20)); + secp256k1_gej_neg(&r2, &r2); + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&r, &r, &r2, NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); + } + + /* Sanity check that zero scalars don't cause problems */ + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sc[0]); + CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 20)); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sc[1]); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sc[2]); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sc[3]); + secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sc[4]); + CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 6)); + CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 5)); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); + + /* Run through s0*(t0*P) + s1*(t1*P) exhaustively for many small values of s0, s1, t0, t1 */ + { + const size_t TOP = 8; + size_t s0i, s1i; + size_t t0i, t1i; + secp256k1_ge ptg; + secp256k1_gej ptgj; + + random_group_element_test(&ptg); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&ptgj, &ptg); + + for(t0i = 0; t0i < TOP; t0i++) { + for(t1i = 0; t1i < TOP; t1i++) { + secp256k1_gej t0p, t1p; + secp256k1_scalar t0, t1; + + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&t0, (t0i + 1) / 2); + secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&t0, t0i & 1); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&t1, (t1i + 1) / 2); + secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&t1, t1i & 1); + + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &t0p, &ptgj, &t0, &szero); + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &t1p, &ptgj, &t1, &szero); + + for(s0i = 0; s0i < TOP; s0i++) { + for(s1i = 0; s1i < TOP; s1i++) { + secp256k1_scalar tmp1, tmp2; + secp256k1_gej expected, actual; + + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&pt[0], &t0p); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&pt[1], &t1p); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sc[0], (s0i + 1) / 2); + secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&sc[0], s0i & 1); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sc[1], (s1i + 1) / 2); + secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&sc[1], s1i & 1); + + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tmp1, &t0, &sc[0]); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tmp2, &t1, &sc[1]); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&tmp1, &tmp1, &tmp2); + + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &expected, &ptgj, &tmp1, &szero); + CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &actual, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 2)); + secp256k1_gej_neg(&expected, &expected); + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&actual, &actual, &expected, NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&actual)); + } + } + } + } + } +} + +void test_secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(void) { + int i; + + CHECK(secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(0) == 0); + for(i = 1; i <= PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW; i++) { +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + /* Bucket_window of 8 is not used with endo */ + if (i == 8) { + continue; + } +#endif + CHECK(secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window(secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(i)) == i); + if (i != PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW) { + CHECK(secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window(secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(i)+1) > i); + } + } +} + +/** + * Probabilistically test the function returning the maximum number of possible points + * for a given scratch space. + */ +void test_ecmult_multi_pippenger_max_points(void) { + size_t scratch_size = secp256k1_rand_int(256); + size_t max_size = secp256k1_pippenger_scratch_size(secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW-1)+512, 12); + secp256k1_scratch *scratch; + size_t n_points_supported; + int bucket_window = 0; + + for(; scratch_size < max_size; scratch_size+=256) { + scratch = secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, scratch_size); + CHECK(scratch != NULL); + n_points_supported = secp256k1_pippenger_max_points(scratch); + if (n_points_supported == 0) { + secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); + continue; + } + bucket_window = secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window(n_points_supported); + CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(scratch, secp256k1_pippenger_scratch_size(n_points_supported, bucket_window), PIPPENGER_SCRATCH_OBJECTS)); + secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); + secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); + } + CHECK(bucket_window == PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW); +} + +/** + * Run secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var with num points and a scratch space restricted to + * 1 <= i <= num points. + */ +void test_ecmult_multi_batching(void) { + static const int n_points = 2*ECMULT_PIPPENGER_THRESHOLD; + secp256k1_scalar scG; + secp256k1_scalar szero; + secp256k1_scalar *sc = (secp256k1_scalar *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) * n_points); + secp256k1_ge *pt = (secp256k1_ge *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, sizeof(secp256k1_ge) * n_points); + secp256k1_gej r; + secp256k1_gej r2; + ecmult_multi_data data; + int i; + secp256k1_scratch *scratch; + + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&r2); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&szero, 0); + + /* Get random scalars and group elements and compute result */ + random_scalar_order(&scG); + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &r2, &r2, &szero, &scG); + for(i = 0; i < n_points; i++) { + secp256k1_ge ptg; + secp256k1_gej ptgj; + random_group_element_test(&ptg); + secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&ptgj, &ptg); + pt[i] = ptg; + random_scalar_order(&sc[i]); + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &ptgj, &ptgj, &sc[i], NULL); + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&r2, &r2, &ptgj, NULL); + } + data.sc = sc; + data.pt = pt; + + /* Test with empty scratch space */ + scratch = secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, 0); + CHECK(!secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &scG, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 1)); + secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); + + /* Test with space for 1 point in pippenger. That's not enough because + * ecmult_multi selects strauss which requires more memory. */ + scratch = secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, secp256k1_pippenger_scratch_size(1, 1) + PIPPENGER_SCRATCH_OBJECTS*ALIGNMENT); + CHECK(!secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &scG, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 1)); + secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); + + secp256k1_gej_neg(&r2, &r2); + for(i = 1; i <= n_points; i++) { + if (i > ECMULT_PIPPENGER_THRESHOLD) { + int bucket_window = secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window(i); + size_t scratch_size = secp256k1_pippenger_scratch_size(i, bucket_window); + scratch = secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, scratch_size + PIPPENGER_SCRATCH_OBJECTS*ALIGNMENT); + } else { + size_t scratch_size = secp256k1_strauss_scratch_size(i); + scratch = secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, scratch_size + STRAUSS_SCRATCH_OBJECTS*ALIGNMENT); + } + CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &scG, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, n_points)); + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&r, &r, &r2, NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); + secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); + } + free(sc); + free(pt); +} + +void run_ecmult_multi_tests(void) { + secp256k1_scratch *scratch; + + test_secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(); + test_ecmult_multi_pippenger_max_points(); + scratch = secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, 819200); + test_ecmult_multi(scratch, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var); + test_ecmult_multi(scratch, secp256k1_ecmult_pippenger_batch_single); + test_ecmult_multi(scratch, secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_batch_single); + secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); + + /* Run test_ecmult_multi with space for exactly one point */ + scratch = secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, secp256k1_strauss_scratch_size(1) + STRAUSS_SCRATCH_OBJECTS*ALIGNMENT); + test_ecmult_multi(scratch, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var); + secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); + + test_ecmult_multi_batching(); +} + +void test_wnaf(const secp256k1_scalar *number, int w) { + secp256k1_scalar x, two, t; + int wnaf[256]; + int zeroes = -1; + int i; + int bits; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&x, 0); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&two, 2); + bits = secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(wnaf, 256, number, w); + CHECK(bits <= 256); + for (i = bits-1; i >= 0; i--) { + int v = wnaf[i]; + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x, &x, &two); + if (v) { + CHECK(zeroes == -1 || zeroes >= w-1); /* check that distance between non-zero elements is at least w-1 */ + zeroes=0; + CHECK((v & 1) == 1); /* check non-zero elements are odd */ + CHECK(v <= (1 << (w-1)) - 1); /* check range below */ + CHECK(v >= -(1 << (w-1)) - 1); /* check range above */ + } else { + CHECK(zeroes != -1); /* check that no unnecessary zero padding exists */ + zeroes++; + } + if (v >= 0) { + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&t, v); + } else { + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&t, -v); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&t, &t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_add(&x, &x, &t); + } + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&x, number)); /* check that wnaf represents number */ +} + +void test_constant_wnaf_negate(const secp256k1_scalar *number) { + secp256k1_scalar neg1 = *number; + secp256k1_scalar neg2 = *number; + int sign1 = 1; + int sign2 = 1; + + if (!secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(&neg1, 0, 1)) { + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&neg1, &neg1); + sign1 = -1; + } + sign2 = secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&neg2, secp256k1_scalar_is_even(&neg2)); + CHECK(sign1 == sign2); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&neg1, &neg2)); +} + +void test_constant_wnaf(const secp256k1_scalar *number, int w) { + secp256k1_scalar x, shift; + int wnaf[256] = {0}; + int i; + int skew; + int bits = 256; + secp256k1_scalar num = *number; + + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&x, 0); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&shift, 1 << w); + /* With USE_ENDOMORPHISM on we only consider 128-bit numbers */ +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) { + secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&num, 8); + } + bits = 128; +#endif + skew = secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf, num, w, bits); + + for (i = WNAF_SIZE_BITS(bits, w); i >= 0; --i) { + secp256k1_scalar t; + int v = wnaf[i]; + CHECK(v != 0); /* check nonzero */ + CHECK(v & 1); /* check parity */ + CHECK(v > -(1 << w)); /* check range above */ + CHECK(v < (1 << w)); /* check range below */ + + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x, &x, &shift); + if (v >= 0) { + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&t, v); + } else { + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&t, -v); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&t, &t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_add(&x, &x, &t); + } + /* Skew num because when encoding numbers as odd we use an offset */ + secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(&num, skew == 2, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&x, &num)); +} + +void test_fixed_wnaf(const secp256k1_scalar *number, int w) { + secp256k1_scalar x, shift; + int wnaf[256] = {0}; + int i; + int skew; + secp256k1_scalar num = *number; + + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&x, 0); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&shift, 1 << w); + /* With USE_ENDOMORPHISM on we only consider 128-bit numbers */ +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) { + secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&num, 8); + } +#endif + skew = secp256k1_wnaf_fixed(wnaf, &num, w); + + for (i = WNAF_SIZE(w)-1; i >= 0; --i) { + secp256k1_scalar t; + int v = wnaf[i]; + CHECK(v == 0 || v & 1); /* check parity */ + CHECK(v > -(1 << w)); /* check range above */ + CHECK(v < (1 << w)); /* check range below */ + + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x, &x, &shift); + if (v >= 0) { + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&t, v); + } else { + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&t, -v); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&t, &t); + } + secp256k1_scalar_add(&x, &x, &t); + } + /* If skew is 1 then add 1 to num */ + secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(&num, 0, skew == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&x, &num)); +} + +/* Checks that the first 8 elements of wnaf are equal to wnaf_expected and the + * rest is 0.*/ +void test_fixed_wnaf_small_helper(int *wnaf, int *wnaf_expected, int w) { + int i; + for (i = WNAF_SIZE(w)-1; i >= 8; --i) { + CHECK(wnaf[i] == 0); + } + for (i = 7; i >= 0; --i) { + CHECK(wnaf[i] == wnaf_expected[i]); + } +} + +void test_fixed_wnaf_small(void) { + int w = 4; + int wnaf[256] = {0}; + int i; + int skew; + secp256k1_scalar num; + + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&num, 0); + skew = secp256k1_wnaf_fixed(wnaf, &num, w); + for (i = WNAF_SIZE(w)-1; i >= 0; --i) { + int v = wnaf[i]; + CHECK(v == 0); + } + CHECK(skew == 0); + + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&num, 1); + skew = secp256k1_wnaf_fixed(wnaf, &num, w); + for (i = WNAF_SIZE(w)-1; i >= 1; --i) { + int v = wnaf[i]; + CHECK(v == 0); + } + CHECK(wnaf[0] == 1); + CHECK(skew == 0); + + { + int wnaf_expected[8] = { 0xf, 0xf, 0xf, 0xf, 0xf, 0xf, 0xf, 0xf }; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&num, 0xffffffff); + skew = secp256k1_wnaf_fixed(wnaf, &num, w); + test_fixed_wnaf_small_helper(wnaf, wnaf_expected, w); + CHECK(skew == 0); + } + { + int wnaf_expected[8] = { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 0xf }; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&num, 0xeeeeeeee); + skew = secp256k1_wnaf_fixed(wnaf, &num, w); + test_fixed_wnaf_small_helper(wnaf, wnaf_expected, w); + CHECK(skew == 1); + } + { + int wnaf_expected[8] = { 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0 }; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&num, 0x01010101); + skew = secp256k1_wnaf_fixed(wnaf, &num, w); + test_fixed_wnaf_small_helper(wnaf, wnaf_expected, w); + CHECK(skew == 0); + } + { + int wnaf_expected[8] = { -0xf, 0, 0xf, -0xf, 0, 0xf, 1, 0 }; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&num, 0x01ef1ef1); + skew = secp256k1_wnaf_fixed(wnaf, &num, w); + test_fixed_wnaf_small_helper(wnaf, wnaf_expected, w); + CHECK(skew == 0); + } +} + +void run_wnaf(void) { + int i; + secp256k1_scalar n = {{0}}; + + /* Sanity check: 1 and 2 are the smallest odd and even numbers and should + * have easier-to-diagnose failure modes */ + n.d[0] = 1; + test_constant_wnaf(&n, 4); + n.d[0] = 2; + test_constant_wnaf(&n, 4); + /* Test 0 */ + test_fixed_wnaf_small(); + /* Random tests */ + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + random_scalar_order(&n); + test_wnaf(&n, 4+(i%10)); + test_constant_wnaf_negate(&n); + test_constant_wnaf(&n, 4 + (i % 10)); + test_fixed_wnaf(&n, 4 + (i % 10)); + } + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&n, 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&n, 1) == -1); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&n)); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&n, 0) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&n)); +} + +void test_ecmult_constants(void) { + /* Test ecmult_gen() for [0..36) and [order-36..0). */ + secp256k1_scalar x; + secp256k1_gej r; + secp256k1_ge ng; + int i; + int j; + secp256k1_ge_neg(&ng, &secp256k1_ge_const_g); + for (i = 0; i < 36; i++ ) { + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&x, i); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &r, &x); + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { + if (j == i - 1) { + ge_equals_gej(&secp256k1_ge_const_g, &r); + } + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&r, &r, &ng); + } + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); + } + for (i = 1; i <= 36; i++ ) { + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&x, i); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&x, &x); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &r, &x); + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { + if (j == i - 1) { + ge_equals_gej(&ng, &r); + } + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&r, &r, &secp256k1_ge_const_g); + } + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); + } +} + +void run_ecmult_constants(void) { + test_ecmult_constants(); +} + +void test_ecmult_gen_blind(void) { + /* Test ecmult_gen() blinding and confirm that the blinding changes, the affine points match, and the z's don't match. */ + secp256k1_scalar key; + secp256k1_scalar b; + unsigned char seed32[32]; + secp256k1_gej pgej; + secp256k1_gej pgej2; + secp256k1_gej i; + secp256k1_ge pge; + random_scalar_order_test(&key); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pgej, &key); + secp256k1_rand256(seed32); + b = ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx.blind; + i = ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx.initial; + secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, seed32); + CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_eq(&b, &ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx.blind)); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pgej2, &key); + CHECK(!gej_xyz_equals_gej(&pgej, &pgej2)); + CHECK(!gej_xyz_equals_gej(&i, &ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx.initial)); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&pge, &pgej); + ge_equals_gej(&pge, &pgej2); +} + +void test_ecmult_gen_blind_reset(void) { + /* Test ecmult_gen() blinding reset and confirm that the blinding is consistent. */ + secp256k1_scalar b; + secp256k1_gej initial; + secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, 0); + b = ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx.blind; + initial = ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx.initial; + secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&b, &ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx.blind)); + CHECK(gej_xyz_equals_gej(&initial, &ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx.initial)); +} + +void run_ecmult_gen_blind(void) { + int i; + test_ecmult_gen_blind_reset(); + for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { + test_ecmult_gen_blind(); + } +} + +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM +/***** ENDOMORPHISH TESTS *****/ +void test_scalar_split(void) { + secp256k1_scalar full; + secp256k1_scalar s1, slam; + const unsigned char zero[32] = {0}; + unsigned char tmp[32]; + + random_scalar_order_test(&full); + secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(&s1, &slam, &full); + + /* check that both are <= 128 bits in size */ + if (secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s1)) { + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s1, &s1); + } + if (secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&slam)) { + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&slam, &slam); + } + + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(tmp, &s1); + CHECK(memcmp(zero, tmp, 16) == 0); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(tmp, &slam); + CHECK(memcmp(zero, tmp, 16) == 0); +} + +void run_endomorphism_tests(void) { + test_scalar_split(); +} +#endif + +void ec_pubkey_parse_pointtest(const unsigned char *input, int xvalid, int yvalid) { + unsigned char pubkeyc[65]; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; + secp256k1_ge ge; + size_t pubkeyclen; + int32_t ecount; + ecount = 0; + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + for (pubkeyclen = 3; pubkeyclen <= 65; pubkeyclen++) { + /* Smaller sizes are tested exhaustively elsewhere. */ + int32_t i; + memcpy(&pubkeyc[1], input, 64); + VG_UNDEF(&pubkeyc[pubkeyclen], 65 - pubkeyclen); + for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { + /* Try all type bytes. */ + int xpass; + int ypass; + int ysign; + pubkeyc[0] = i; + /* What sign does this point have? */ + ysign = (input[63] & 1) + 2; + /* For the current type (i) do we expect parsing to work? Handled all of compressed/uncompressed/hybrid. */ + xpass = xvalid && (pubkeyclen == 33) && ((i & 254) == 2); + /* Do we expect a parse and re-serialize as uncompressed to give a matching y? */ + ypass = xvalid && yvalid && ((i & 4) == ((pubkeyclen == 65) << 2)) && + ((i == 4) || ((i & 251) == ysign)) && ((pubkeyclen == 33) || (pubkeyclen == 65)); + if (xpass || ypass) { + /* These cases must parse. */ + unsigned char pubkeyo[65]; + size_t outl; + memset(&pubkey, 0, sizeof(pubkey)); + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeyc, pubkeyclen) == 1); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + outl = 65; + VG_UNDEF(pubkeyo, 65); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, pubkeyo, &outl, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); + VG_CHECK(pubkeyo, outl); + CHECK(outl == 33); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkeyo[1], &pubkeyc[1], 32) == 0); + CHECK((pubkeyclen != 33) || (pubkeyo[0] == pubkeyc[0])); + if (ypass) { + /* This test isn't always done because we decode with alternative signs, so the y won't match. */ + CHECK(pubkeyo[0] == ysign); + CHECK(secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &ge, &pubkey) == 1); + memset(&pubkey, 0, sizeof(pubkey)); + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + secp256k1_pubkey_save(&pubkey, &ge); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + outl = 65; + VG_UNDEF(pubkeyo, 65); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, pubkeyo, &outl, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED) == 1); + VG_CHECK(pubkeyo, outl); + CHECK(outl == 65); + CHECK(pubkeyo[0] == 4); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkeyo[1], input, 64) == 0); + } + CHECK(ecount == 0); + } else { + /* These cases must fail to parse. */ + memset(&pubkey, 0xfe, sizeof(pubkey)); + ecount = 0; + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeyc, pubkeyclen) == 0); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(ecount == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &ge, &pubkey) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + } + } + } + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx, NULL, NULL); +} + +void run_ec_pubkey_parse_test(void) { +#define SECP256K1_EC_PARSE_TEST_NVALID (12) + const unsigned char valid[SECP256K1_EC_PARSE_TEST_NVALID][64] = { + { + /* Point with leading and trailing zeros in x and y serialization. */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x52, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x64, 0xef, 0xa1, 0x7b, 0x77, 0x61, 0xe1, 0xe4, 0x27, 0x06, 0x98, 0x9f, 0xb4, 0x83, + 0xb8, 0xd2, 0xd4, 0x9b, 0xf7, 0x8f, 0xae, 0x98, 0x03, 0xf0, 0x99, 0xb8, 0x34, 0xed, 0xeb, 0x00 + }, + { + /* Point with x equal to a 3rd root of unity.*/ + 0x7a, 0xe9, 0x6a, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x7c, 0x07, 0x10, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x47, 0x9e, 0xac, 0x34, 0x34, 0xe9, + 0x9c, 0xf0, 0x49, 0x75, 0x12, 0xf5, 0x89, 0x95, 0xc1, 0x39, 0x6c, 0x28, 0x71, 0x95, 0x01, 0xee, + 0x42, 0x18, 0xf2, 0x0a, 0xe6, 0xc6, 0x46, 0xb3, 0x63, 0xdb, 0x68, 0x60, 0x58, 0x22, 0xfb, 0x14, + 0x26, 0x4c, 0xa8, 0xd2, 0x58, 0x7f, 0xdd, 0x6f, 0xbc, 0x75, 0x0d, 0x58, 0x7e, 0x76, 0xa7, 0xee, + }, + { + /* Point with largest x. (1/2) */ + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x2c, + 0x0e, 0x99, 0x4b, 0x14, 0xea, 0x72, 0xf8, 0xc3, 0xeb, 0x95, 0xc7, 0x1e, 0xf6, 0x92, 0x57, 0x5e, + 0x77, 0x50, 0x58, 0x33, 0x2d, 0x7e, 0x52, 0xd0, 0x99, 0x5c, 0xf8, 0x03, 0x88, 0x71, 0xb6, 0x7d, + }, + { + /* Point with largest x. (2/2) */ + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x2c, + 0xf1, 0x66, 0xb4, 0xeb, 0x15, 0x8d, 0x07, 0x3c, 0x14, 0x6a, 0x38, 0xe1, 0x09, 0x6d, 0xa8, 0xa1, + 0x88, 0xaf, 0xa7, 0xcc, 0xd2, 0x81, 0xad, 0x2f, 0x66, 0xa3, 0x07, 0xfb, 0x77, 0x8e, 0x45, 0xb2, + }, + { + /* Point with smallest x. (1/2) */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + 0x42, 0x18, 0xf2, 0x0a, 0xe6, 0xc6, 0x46, 0xb3, 0x63, 0xdb, 0x68, 0x60, 0x58, 0x22, 0xfb, 0x14, + 0x26, 0x4c, 0xa8, 0xd2, 0x58, 0x7f, 0xdd, 0x6f, 0xbc, 0x75, 0x0d, 0x58, 0x7e, 0x76, 0xa7, 0xee, + }, + { + /* Point with smallest x. (2/2) */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + 0xbd, 0xe7, 0x0d, 0xf5, 0x19, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x4c, 0x9c, 0x24, 0x97, 0x9f, 0xa7, 0xdd, 0x04, 0xeb, + 0xd9, 0xb3, 0x57, 0x2d, 0xa7, 0x80, 0x22, 0x90, 0x43, 0x8a, 0xf2, 0xa6, 0x81, 0x89, 0x54, 0x41, + }, + { + /* Point with largest y. (1/3) */ + 0x1f, 0xe1, 0xe5, 0xef, 0x3f, 0xce, 0xb5, 0xc1, 0x35, 0xab, 0x77, 0x41, 0x33, 0x3c, 0xe5, 0xa6, + 0xe8, 0x0d, 0x68, 0x16, 0x76, 0x53, 0xf6, 0xb2, 0xb2, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0xcf, 0xaa, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x07, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x2e, + }, + { + /* Point with largest y. (2/3) */ + 0xcb, 0xb0, 0xde, 0xab, 0x12, 0x57, 0x54, 0xf1, 0xfd, 0xb2, 0x03, 0x8b, 0x04, 0x34, 0xed, 0x9c, + 0xb3, 0xfb, 0x53, 0xab, 0x73, 0x53, 0x91, 0x12, 0x99, 0x94, 0xa5, 0x35, 0xd9, 0x25, 0xf6, 0x73, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x2e, + }, + { + /* Point with largest y. (3/3) */ + 0x14, 0x6d, 0x3b, 0x65, 0xad, 0xd9, 0xf5, 0x4c, 0xcc, 0xa2, 0x85, 0x33, 0xc8, 0x8e, 0x2c, 0xbc, + 0x63, 0xf7, 0x44, 0x3e, 0x16, 0x58, 0x78, 0x3a, 0xb4, 0x1f, 0x8e, 0xf9, 0x7c, 0x2a, 0x10, 0xb5, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x2e, + }, + { + /* Point with smallest y. (1/3) */ + 0x1f, 0xe1, 0xe5, 0xef, 0x3f, 0xce, 0xb5, 0xc1, 0x35, 0xab, 0x77, 0x41, 0x33, 0x3c, 0xe5, 0xa6, + 0xe8, 0x0d, 0x68, 0x16, 0x76, 0x53, 0xf6, 0xb2, 0xb2, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0xcf, 0xaa, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x07, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + }, + { + /* Point with smallest y. (2/3) */ + 0xcb, 0xb0, 0xde, 0xab, 0x12, 0x57, 0x54, 0xf1, 0xfd, 0xb2, 0x03, 0x8b, 0x04, 0x34, 0xed, 0x9c, + 0xb3, 0xfb, 0x53, 0xab, 0x73, 0x53, 0x91, 0x12, 0x99, 0x94, 0xa5, 0x35, 0xd9, 0x25, 0xf6, 0x73, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + }, + { + /* Point with smallest y. (3/3) */ + 0x14, 0x6d, 0x3b, 0x65, 0xad, 0xd9, 0xf5, 0x4c, 0xcc, 0xa2, 0x85, 0x33, 0xc8, 0x8e, 0x2c, 0xbc, + 0x63, 0xf7, 0x44, 0x3e, 0x16, 0x58, 0x78, 0x3a, 0xb4, 0x1f, 0x8e, 0xf9, 0x7c, 0x2a, 0x10, 0xb5, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 + } + }; +#define SECP256K1_EC_PARSE_TEST_NXVALID (4) + const unsigned char onlyxvalid[SECP256K1_EC_PARSE_TEST_NXVALID][64] = { + { + /* Valid if y overflow ignored (y = 1 mod p). (1/3) */ + 0x1f, 0xe1, 0xe5, 0xef, 0x3f, 0xce, 0xb5, 0xc1, 0x35, 0xab, 0x77, 0x41, 0x33, 0x3c, 0xe5, 0xa6, + 0xe8, 0x0d, 0x68, 0x16, 0x76, 0x53, 0xf6, 0xb2, 0xb2, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0xcf, 0xaa, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x07, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x30, + }, + { + /* Valid if y overflow ignored (y = 1 mod p). (2/3) */ + 0xcb, 0xb0, 0xde, 0xab, 0x12, 0x57, 0x54, 0xf1, 0xfd, 0xb2, 0x03, 0x8b, 0x04, 0x34, 0xed, 0x9c, + 0xb3, 0xfb, 0x53, 0xab, 0x73, 0x53, 0x91, 0x12, 0x99, 0x94, 0xa5, 0x35, 0xd9, 0x25, 0xf6, 0x73, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x30, + }, + { + /* Valid if y overflow ignored (y = 1 mod p). (3/3)*/ + 0x14, 0x6d, 0x3b, 0x65, 0xad, 0xd9, 0xf5, 0x4c, 0xcc, 0xa2, 0x85, 0x33, 0xc8, 0x8e, 0x2c, 0xbc, + 0x63, 0xf7, 0x44, 0x3e, 0x16, 0x58, 0x78, 0x3a, 0xb4, 0x1f, 0x8e, 0xf9, 0x7c, 0x2a, 0x10, 0xb5, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x30, + }, + { + /* x on curve, y is from y^2 = x^3 + 8. */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03 + } + }; +#define SECP256K1_EC_PARSE_TEST_NINVALID (7) + const unsigned char invalid[SECP256K1_EC_PARSE_TEST_NINVALID][64] = { + { + /* x is third root of -8, y is -1 * (x^3+7); also on the curve for y^2 = x^3 + 9. */ + 0x0a, 0x2d, 0x2b, 0xa9, 0x35, 0x07, 0xf1, 0xdf, 0x23, 0x37, 0x70, 0xc2, 0xa7, 0x97, 0x96, 0x2c, + 0xc6, 0x1f, 0x6d, 0x15, 0xda, 0x14, 0xec, 0xd4, 0x7d, 0x8d, 0x27, 0xae, 0x1c, 0xd5, 0xf8, 0x53, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + }, + { + /* Valid if x overflow ignored (x = 1 mod p). */ + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x30, + 0x42, 0x18, 0xf2, 0x0a, 0xe6, 0xc6, 0x46, 0xb3, 0x63, 0xdb, 0x68, 0x60, 0x58, 0x22, 0xfb, 0x14, + 0x26, 0x4c, 0xa8, 0xd2, 0x58, 0x7f, 0xdd, 0x6f, 0xbc, 0x75, 0x0d, 0x58, 0x7e, 0x76, 0xa7, 0xee, + }, + { + /* Valid if x overflow ignored (x = 1 mod p). */ + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x30, + 0xbd, 0xe7, 0x0d, 0xf5, 0x19, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x4c, 0x9c, 0x24, 0x97, 0x9f, 0xa7, 0xdd, 0x04, 0xeb, + 0xd9, 0xb3, 0x57, 0x2d, 0xa7, 0x80, 0x22, 0x90, 0x43, 0x8a, 0xf2, 0xa6, 0x81, 0x89, 0x54, 0x41, + }, + { + /* x is -1, y is the result of the sqrt ladder; also on the curve for y^2 = x^3 - 5. */ + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x2e, + 0xf4, 0x84, 0x14, 0x5c, 0xb0, 0x14, 0x9b, 0x82, 0x5d, 0xff, 0x41, 0x2f, 0xa0, 0x52, 0xa8, 0x3f, + 0xcb, 0x72, 0xdb, 0x61, 0xd5, 0x6f, 0x37, 0x70, 0xce, 0x06, 0x6b, 0x73, 0x49, 0xa2, 0xaa, 0x28, + }, + { + /* x is -1, y is the result of the sqrt ladder; also on the curve for y^2 = x^3 - 5. */ + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x2e, + 0x0b, 0x7b, 0xeb, 0xa3, 0x4f, 0xeb, 0x64, 0x7d, 0xa2, 0x00, 0xbe, 0xd0, 0x5f, 0xad, 0x57, 0xc0, + 0x34, 0x8d, 0x24, 0x9e, 0x2a, 0x90, 0xc8, 0x8f, 0x31, 0xf9, 0x94, 0x8b, 0xb6, 0x5d, 0x52, 0x07, + }, + { + /* x is zero, y is the result of the sqrt ladder; also on the curve for y^2 = x^3 - 7. */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x8f, 0x53, 0x7e, 0xef, 0xdf, 0xc1, 0x60, 0x6a, 0x07, 0x27, 0xcd, 0x69, 0xb4, 0xa7, 0x33, 0x3d, + 0x38, 0xed, 0x44, 0xe3, 0x93, 0x2a, 0x71, 0x79, 0xee, 0xcb, 0x4b, 0x6f, 0xba, 0x93, 0x60, 0xdc, + }, + { + /* x is zero, y is the result of the sqrt ladder; also on the curve for y^2 = x^3 - 7. */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x70, 0xac, 0x81, 0x10, 0x20, 0x3e, 0x9f, 0x95, 0xf8, 0xd8, 0x32, 0x96, 0x4b, 0x58, 0xcc, 0xc2, + 0xc7, 0x12, 0xbb, 0x1c, 0x6c, 0xd5, 0x8e, 0x86, 0x11, 0x34, 0xb4, 0x8f, 0x45, 0x6c, 0x9b, 0x53 + } + }; + const unsigned char pubkeyc[66] = { + /* Serialization of G. */ + 0x04, 0x79, 0xBE, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xF9, 0xDC, 0xBB, 0xAC, 0x55, 0xA0, 0x62, 0x95, 0xCE, 0x87, 0x0B, + 0x07, 0x02, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0x2D, 0xCE, 0x28, 0xD9, 0x59, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x5B, 0x16, 0xF8, 0x17, + 0x98, 0x48, 0x3A, 0xDA, 0x77, 0x26, 0xA3, 0xC4, 0x65, 0x5D, 0xA4, 0xFB, 0xFC, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x08, + 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x17, 0xB4, 0x48, 0xA6, 0x85, 0x54, 0x19, 0x9C, 0x47, 0xD0, 0x8F, 0xFB, 0x10, 0xD4, + 0xB8, 0x00 + }; + unsigned char sout[65]; + unsigned char shortkey[2]; + secp256k1_ge ge; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; + size_t len; + int32_t i; + int32_t ecount; + int32_t ecount2; + ecount = 0; + /* Nothing should be reading this far into pubkeyc. */ + VG_UNDEF(&pubkeyc[65], 1); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + /* Zero length claimed, fail, zeroize, no illegal arg error. */ + memset(&pubkey, 0xfe, sizeof(pubkey)); + ecount = 0; + VG_UNDEF(shortkey, 2); + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, shortkey, 0) == 0); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(ecount == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &ge, &pubkey) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + /* Length one claimed, fail, zeroize, no illegal arg error. */ + for (i = 0; i < 256 ; i++) { + memset(&pubkey, 0xfe, sizeof(pubkey)); + ecount = 0; + shortkey[0] = i; + VG_UNDEF(&shortkey[1], 1); + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, shortkey, 1) == 0); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(ecount == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &ge, &pubkey) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + } + /* Length two claimed, fail, zeroize, no illegal arg error. */ + for (i = 0; i < 65536 ; i++) { + memset(&pubkey, 0xfe, sizeof(pubkey)); + ecount = 0; + shortkey[0] = i & 255; + shortkey[1] = i >> 8; + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, shortkey, 2) == 0); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(ecount == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &ge, &pubkey) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + } + memset(&pubkey, 0xfe, sizeof(pubkey)); + ecount = 0; + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + /* 33 bytes claimed on otherwise valid input starting with 0x04, fail, zeroize output, no illegal arg error. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeyc, 33) == 0); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(ecount == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &ge, &pubkey) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + /* NULL pubkey, illegal arg error. Pubkey isn't rewritten before this step, since it's NULL into the parser. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, NULL, pubkeyc, 65) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + /* NULL input string. Illegal arg and zeroize output. */ + memset(&pubkey, 0xfe, sizeof(pubkey)); + ecount = 0; + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, NULL, 65) == 0); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &ge, &pubkey) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + /* 64 bytes claimed on input starting with 0x04, fail, zeroize output, no illegal arg error. */ + memset(&pubkey, 0xfe, sizeof(pubkey)); + ecount = 0; + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeyc, 64) == 0); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(ecount == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &ge, &pubkey) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + /* 66 bytes claimed, fail, zeroize output, no illegal arg error. */ + memset(&pubkey, 0xfe, sizeof(pubkey)); + ecount = 0; + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeyc, 66) == 0); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(ecount == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &ge, &pubkey) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + /* Valid parse. */ + memset(&pubkey, 0, sizeof(pubkey)); + ecount = 0; + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeyc, 65) == 1); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(ecount == 0); + VG_UNDEF(&ge, sizeof(ge)); + CHECK(secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &ge, &pubkey) == 1); + VG_CHECK(&ge.x, sizeof(ge.x)); + VG_CHECK(&ge.y, sizeof(ge.y)); + VG_CHECK(&ge.infinity, sizeof(ge.infinity)); + ge_equals_ge(&secp256k1_ge_const_g, &ge); + CHECK(ecount == 0); + /* secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize illegal args. */ + ecount = 0; + len = 65; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, NULL, &len, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(len == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, sout, NULL, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + len = 65; + VG_UNDEF(sout, 65); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, sout, &len, NULL, SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED) == 0); + VG_CHECK(sout, 65); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(len == 0); + len = 65; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, sout, &len, &pubkey, ~0) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(len == 0); + len = 65; + VG_UNDEF(sout, 65); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, sout, &len, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED) == 1); + VG_CHECK(sout, 65); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(len == 65); + /* Multiple illegal args. Should still set arg error only once. */ + ecount = 0; + ecount2 = 11; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, NULL, NULL, 65) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + /* Does the illegal arg callback actually change the behavior? */ + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx, uncounting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount2); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, NULL, NULL, 65) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(ecount2 == 10); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx, NULL, NULL); + /* Try a bunch of prefabbed points with all possible encodings. */ + for (i = 0; i < SECP256K1_EC_PARSE_TEST_NVALID; i++) { + ec_pubkey_parse_pointtest(valid[i], 1, 1); + } + for (i = 0; i < SECP256K1_EC_PARSE_TEST_NXVALID; i++) { + ec_pubkey_parse_pointtest(onlyxvalid[i], 1, 0); + } + for (i = 0; i < SECP256K1_EC_PARSE_TEST_NINVALID; i++) { + ec_pubkey_parse_pointtest(invalid[i], 0, 0); + } +} + +void run_eckey_edge_case_test(void) { + const unsigned char orderc[32] = { + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, + 0xba, 0xae, 0xdc, 0xe6, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xa0, 0x3b, + 0xbf, 0xd2, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xd0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x41 + }; + const unsigned char zeros[sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)] = {0x00}; + unsigned char ctmp[33]; + unsigned char ctmp2[33]; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey2; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey_one; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey_negone; + const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkeys[3]; + size_t len; + int32_t ecount; + /* Group order is too large, reject. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, orderc) == 0); + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, orderc) == 0); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); + /* Maximum value is too large, reject. */ + memset(ctmp, 255, 32); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, ctmp) == 0); + memset(&pubkey, 1, sizeof(pubkey)); + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp) == 0); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); + /* Zero is too small, reject. */ + memset(ctmp, 0, 32); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, ctmp) == 0); + memset(&pubkey, 1, sizeof(pubkey)); + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp) == 0); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); + /* One must be accepted. */ + ctmp[31] = 0x01; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, ctmp) == 1); + memset(&pubkey, 0, sizeof(pubkey)); + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp) == 1); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) > 0); + pubkey_one = pubkey; + /* Group order + 1 is too large, reject. */ + memcpy(ctmp, orderc, 32); + ctmp[31] = 0x42; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, ctmp) == 0); + memset(&pubkey, 1, sizeof(pubkey)); + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp) == 0); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); + /* -1 must be accepted. */ + ctmp[31] = 0x40; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, ctmp) == 1); + memset(&pubkey, 0, sizeof(pubkey)); + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp) == 1); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) > 0); + pubkey_negone = pubkey; + /* Tweak of zero leaves the value unchanged. */ + memset(ctmp2, 0, 32); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp, ctmp2) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(orderc, ctmp, 31) == 0 && ctmp[31] == 0x40); + memcpy(&pubkey2, &pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp2) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + /* Multiply tweak of zero zeroizes the output. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(ctx, ctmp, ctmp2) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(zeros, ctmp, 32) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp2) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + memcpy(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)); + /* Overflowing key tweak zeroizes. */ + memcpy(ctmp, orderc, 32); + ctmp[31] = 0x40; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp, orderc) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(zeros, ctmp, 32) == 0); + memcpy(ctmp, orderc, 32); + ctmp[31] = 0x40; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(ctx, ctmp, orderc) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(zeros, ctmp, 32) == 0); + memcpy(ctmp, orderc, 32); + ctmp[31] = 0x40; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, orderc) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + memcpy(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, &pubkey, orderc) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + memcpy(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)); + /* Private key tweaks results in a key of zero. */ + ctmp2[31] = 1; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp2, ctmp) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(zeros, ctmp2, 32) == 0); + ctmp2[31] = 1; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp2) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + memcpy(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)); + /* Tweak computation wraps and results in a key of 1. */ + ctmp2[31] = 2; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp2, ctmp) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(ctmp2, zeros, 31) == 0 && ctmp2[31] == 1); + ctmp2[31] = 2; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp2) == 1); + ctmp2[31] = 1; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey2, ctmp2) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + /* Tweak mul * 2 = 1+1. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp2) == 1); + ctmp2[31] = 2; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, &pubkey2, ctmp2) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + /* Test argument errors. */ + ecount = 0; + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + CHECK(ecount == 0); + /* Zeroize pubkey on parse error. */ + memset(&pubkey, 0, 32); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp2) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + memcpy(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)); + memset(&pubkey2, 0, 32); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, &pubkey2, ctmp2) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey2, zeros, sizeof(pubkey2)) == 0); + /* Plain argument errors. */ + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, ctmp) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + ecount = 0; + memset(ctmp2, 0, 32); + ctmp2[31] = 4; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, NULL, ctmp2) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + ecount = 0; + memset(ctmp2, 0, 32); + ctmp2[31] = 4; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, NULL, ctmp2) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, &pubkey, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + ecount = 0; + memset(ctmp2, 0, 32); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, NULL, ctmp2) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + ecount = 0; + memset(ctmp2, 0, 32); + ctmp2[31] = 1; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(ctx, NULL, ctmp2) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(ctx, ctmp, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, NULL, ctmp) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + memset(&pubkey, 1, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); + /* secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine tests. */ + ecount = 0; + pubkeys[0] = &pubkey_one; + VG_UNDEF(&pubkeys[0], sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey *)); + VG_UNDEF(&pubkeys[1], sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey *)); + VG_UNDEF(&pubkeys[2], sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey *)); + memset(&pubkey, 255, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeys, 0) == 0); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, NULL, pubkeys, 1) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + memset(&pubkey, 255, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &pubkey, NULL, 1) == 0); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + pubkeys[0] = &pubkey_negone; + memset(&pubkey, 255, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeys, 1) == 1); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) > 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + len = 33; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, ctmp, &len, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, ctmp2, &len, &pubkey_negone, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(ctmp, ctmp2, 33) == 0); + /* Result is infinity. */ + pubkeys[0] = &pubkey_one; + pubkeys[1] = &pubkey_negone; + memset(&pubkey, 255, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeys, 2) == 0); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + /* Passes through infinity but comes out one. */ + pubkeys[2] = &pubkey_one; + memset(&pubkey, 255, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeys, 3) == 1); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) > 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + len = 33; + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, ctmp, &len, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, ctmp2, &len, &pubkey_one, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(ctmp, ctmp2, 33) == 0); + /* Adds to two. */ + pubkeys[1] = &pubkey_one; + memset(&pubkey, 255, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); + VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeys, 2) == 1); + VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) > 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx, NULL, NULL); +} + +void random_sign(secp256k1_scalar *sigr, secp256k1_scalar *sigs, const secp256k1_scalar *key, const secp256k1_scalar *msg, int *recid) { + secp256k1_scalar nonce; + do { + random_scalar_order_test(&nonce); + } while(!secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, sigr, sigs, key, msg, &nonce, recid)); +} + +void test_ecdsa_sign_verify(void) { + secp256k1_gej pubj; + secp256k1_ge pub; + secp256k1_scalar one; + secp256k1_scalar msg, key; + secp256k1_scalar sigr, sigs; + int recid; + int getrec; + random_scalar_order_test(&msg); + random_scalar_order_test(&key); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pubj, &key); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&pub, &pubj); + getrec = secp256k1_rand_bits(1); + random_sign(&sigr, &sigs, &key, &msg, getrec?&recid:NULL); + if (getrec) { + CHECK(recid >= 0 && recid < 4); + } + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sigr, &sigs, &pub, &msg)); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&one, 1); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&msg, &msg, &one); + CHECK(!secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sigr, &sigs, &pub, &msg)); +} + +void run_ecdsa_sign_verify(void) { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < 10*count; i++) { + test_ecdsa_sign_verify(); + } +} + +/** Dummy nonce generation function that just uses a precomputed nonce, and fails if it is not accepted. Use only for testing. */ +static int precomputed_nonce_function(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *algo16, void *data, unsigned int counter) { + (void)msg32; + (void)key32; + (void)algo16; + memcpy(nonce32, data, 32); + return (counter == 0); +} + +static int nonce_function_test_fail(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *algo16, void *data, unsigned int counter) { + /* Dummy nonce generator that has a fatal error on the first counter value. */ + if (counter == 0) { + return 0; + } + return nonce_function_rfc6979(nonce32, msg32, key32, algo16, data, counter - 1); +} + +static int nonce_function_test_retry(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *algo16, void *data, unsigned int counter) { + /* Dummy nonce generator that produces unacceptable nonces for the first several counter values. */ + if (counter < 3) { + memset(nonce32, counter==0 ? 0 : 255, 32); + if (counter == 2) { + nonce32[31]--; + } + return 1; + } + if (counter < 5) { + static const unsigned char order[] = { + 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, + 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFE, + 0xBA,0xAE,0xDC,0xE6,0xAF,0x48,0xA0,0x3B, + 0xBF,0xD2,0x5E,0x8C,0xD0,0x36,0x41,0x41 + }; + memcpy(nonce32, order, 32); + if (counter == 4) { + nonce32[31]++; + } + return 1; + } + /* Retry rate of 6979 is negligible esp. as we only call this in deterministic tests. */ + /* If someone does fine a case where it retries for secp256k1, we'd like to know. */ + if (counter > 5) { + return 0; + } + return nonce_function_rfc6979(nonce32, msg32, key32, algo16, data, counter - 5); +} + +int is_empty_signature(const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig) { + static const unsigned char res[sizeof(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature)] = {0}; + return memcmp(sig, res, sizeof(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature)) == 0; +} + +void test_ecdsa_end_to_end(void) { + unsigned char extra[32] = {0x00}; + unsigned char privkey[32]; + unsigned char message[32]; + unsigned char privkey2[32]; + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature signature[6]; + secp256k1_scalar r, s; + unsigned char sig[74]; + size_t siglen = 74; + unsigned char pubkeyc[65]; + size_t pubkeyclen = 65; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey_tmp; + unsigned char seckey[300]; + size_t seckeylen = 300; + + /* Generate a random key and message. */ + { + secp256k1_scalar msg, key; + random_scalar_order_test(&msg); + random_scalar_order_test(&key); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(privkey, &key); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(message, &msg); + } + + /* Construct and verify corresponding public key. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, privkey) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, privkey) == 1); + + /* Verify exporting and importing public key. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, pubkeyc, &pubkeyclen, &pubkey, secp256k1_rand_bits(1) == 1 ? SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED : SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED)); + memset(&pubkey, 0, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeyc, pubkeyclen) == 1); + + /* Verify negation changes the key and changes it back */ + memcpy(&pubkey_tmp, &pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(ctx, &pubkey_tmp) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey_tmp, &pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)) != 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(ctx, &pubkey_tmp) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey_tmp, &pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + + /* Verify private key import and export. */ + CHECK(ec_privkey_export_der(ctx, seckey, &seckeylen, privkey, secp256k1_rand_bits(1) == 1)); + CHECK(ec_privkey_import_der(ctx, privkey2, seckey, seckeylen) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(privkey, privkey2, 32) == 0); + + /* Optionally tweak the keys using addition. */ + if (secp256k1_rand_int(3) == 0) { + int ret1; + int ret2; + unsigned char rnd[32]; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey2; + secp256k1_rand256_test(rnd); + ret1 = secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, privkey, rnd); + ret2 = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, rnd); + CHECK(ret1 == ret2); + if (ret1 == 0) { + return; + } + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey2, privkey) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + } + + /* Optionally tweak the keys using multiplication. */ + if (secp256k1_rand_int(3) == 0) { + int ret1; + int ret2; + unsigned char rnd[32]; + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey2; + secp256k1_rand256_test(rnd); + ret1 = secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(ctx, privkey, rnd); + ret2 = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, &pubkey, rnd); + CHECK(ret1 == ret2); + if (ret1 == 0) { + return; + } + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey2, privkey) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); + } + + /* Sign. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &signature[0], message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &signature[4], message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &signature[1], message, privkey, NULL, extra) == 1); + extra[31] = 1; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &signature[2], message, privkey, NULL, extra) == 1); + extra[31] = 0; + extra[0] = 1; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &signature[3], message, privkey, NULL, extra) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&signature[0], &signature[4], sizeof(signature[0])) == 0); + CHECK(memcmp(&signature[0], &signature[1], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); + CHECK(memcmp(&signature[0], &signature[2], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); + CHECK(memcmp(&signature[0], &signature[3], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); + CHECK(memcmp(&signature[1], &signature[2], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); + CHECK(memcmp(&signature[1], &signature[3], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); + CHECK(memcmp(&signature[2], &signature[3], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); + /* Verify. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[0], message, &pubkey) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[1], message, &pubkey) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[2], message, &pubkey) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[3], message, &pubkey) == 1); + /* Test lower-S form, malleate, verify and fail, test again, malleate again */ + CHECK(!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(ctx, NULL, &signature[0])); + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, &signature[0]); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s, &s); + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(&signature[5], &r, &s); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[5], message, &pubkey) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(ctx, NULL, &signature[5])); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(ctx, &signature[5], &signature[5])); + CHECK(!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(ctx, NULL, &signature[5])); + CHECK(!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(ctx, &signature[5], &signature[5])); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[5], message, &pubkey) == 1); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s, &s); + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(&signature[5], &r, &s); + CHECK(!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(ctx, NULL, &signature[5])); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[5], message, &pubkey) == 1); + CHECK(memcmp(&signature[5], &signature[0], 64) == 0); + + /* Serialize/parse DER and verify again */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, sig, &siglen, &signature[0]) == 1); + memset(&signature[0], 0, sizeof(signature[0])); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &signature[0], sig, siglen) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[0], message, &pubkey) == 1); + /* Serialize/destroy/parse DER and verify again. */ + siglen = 74; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, sig, &siglen, &signature[0]) == 1); + sig[secp256k1_rand_int(siglen)] += 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &signature[0], sig, siglen) == 0 || + secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[0], message, &pubkey) == 0); +} + +void test_random_pubkeys(void) { + secp256k1_ge elem; + secp256k1_ge elem2; + unsigned char in[65]; + /* Generate some randomly sized pubkeys. */ + size_t len = secp256k1_rand_bits(2) == 0 ? 65 : 33; + if (secp256k1_rand_bits(2) == 0) { + len = secp256k1_rand_bits(6); + } + if (len == 65) { + in[0] = secp256k1_rand_bits(1) ? 4 : (secp256k1_rand_bits(1) ? 6 : 7); + } else { + in[0] = secp256k1_rand_bits(1) ? 2 : 3; + } + if (secp256k1_rand_bits(3) == 0) { + in[0] = secp256k1_rand_bits(8); + } + if (len > 1) { + secp256k1_rand256(&in[1]); + } + if (len > 33) { + secp256k1_rand256(&in[33]); + } + if (secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&elem, in, len)) { + unsigned char out[65]; + unsigned char firstb; + int res; + size_t size = len; + firstb = in[0]; + /* If the pubkey can be parsed, it should round-trip... */ + CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&elem, out, &size, len == 33)); + CHECK(size == len); + CHECK(memcmp(&in[1], &out[1], len-1) == 0); + /* ... except for the type of hybrid inputs. */ + if ((in[0] != 6) && (in[0] != 7)) { + CHECK(in[0] == out[0]); + } + size = 65; + CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&elem, in, &size, 0)); + CHECK(size == 65); + CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&elem2, in, size)); + ge_equals_ge(&elem,&elem2); + /* Check that the X9.62 hybrid type is checked. */ + in[0] = secp256k1_rand_bits(1) ? 6 : 7; + res = secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&elem2, in, size); + if (firstb == 2 || firstb == 3) { + if (in[0] == firstb + 4) { + CHECK(res); + } else { + CHECK(!res); + } + } + if (res) { + ge_equals_ge(&elem,&elem2); + CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&elem, out, &size, 0)); + CHECK(memcmp(&in[1], &out[1], 64) == 0); + } + } +} + +void run_random_pubkeys(void) { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < 10*count; i++) { + test_random_pubkeys(); + } +} + +void run_ecdsa_end_to_end(void) { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < 64*count; i++) { + test_ecdsa_end_to_end(); + } +} + +int test_ecdsa_der_parse(const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, int certainly_der, int certainly_not_der) { + static const unsigned char zeroes[32] = {0}; +#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS + static const unsigned char max_scalar[32] = { + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, + 0xba, 0xae, 0xdc, 0xe6, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xa0, 0x3b, + 0xbf, 0xd2, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xd0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x40 + }; +#endif + + int ret = 0; + + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig_der; + unsigned char roundtrip_der[2048]; + unsigned char compact_der[64]; + size_t len_der = 2048; + int parsed_der = 0, valid_der = 0, roundtrips_der = 0; + + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig_der_lax; + unsigned char roundtrip_der_lax[2048]; + unsigned char compact_der_lax[64]; + size_t len_der_lax = 2048; + int parsed_der_lax = 0, valid_der_lax = 0, roundtrips_der_lax = 0; + +#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS + ECDSA_SIG *sig_openssl; + const BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; + const unsigned char *sigptr; + unsigned char roundtrip_openssl[2048]; + int len_openssl = 2048; + int parsed_openssl, valid_openssl = 0, roundtrips_openssl = 0; +#endif + + parsed_der = secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig_der, sig, siglen); + if (parsed_der) { + ret |= (!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, compact_der, &sig_der)) << 0; + valid_der = (memcmp(compact_der, zeroes, 32) != 0) && (memcmp(compact_der + 32, zeroes, 32) != 0); + } + if (valid_der) { + ret |= (!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, roundtrip_der, &len_der, &sig_der)) << 1; + roundtrips_der = (len_der == siglen) && memcmp(roundtrip_der, sig, siglen) == 0; + } + + parsed_der_lax = ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax(ctx, &sig_der_lax, sig, siglen); + if (parsed_der_lax) { + ret |= (!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, compact_der_lax, &sig_der_lax)) << 10; + valid_der_lax = (memcmp(compact_der_lax, zeroes, 32) != 0) && (memcmp(compact_der_lax + 32, zeroes, 32) != 0); + } + if (valid_der_lax) { + ret |= (!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, roundtrip_der_lax, &len_der_lax, &sig_der_lax)) << 11; + roundtrips_der_lax = (len_der_lax == siglen) && memcmp(roundtrip_der_lax, sig, siglen) == 0; + } + + if (certainly_der) { + ret |= (!parsed_der) << 2; + } + if (certainly_not_der) { + ret |= (parsed_der) << 17; + } + if (valid_der) { + ret |= (!roundtrips_der) << 3; + } + + if (valid_der) { + ret |= (!roundtrips_der_lax) << 12; + ret |= (len_der != len_der_lax) << 13; + ret |= (memcmp(roundtrip_der_lax, roundtrip_der, len_der) != 0) << 14; + } + ret |= (roundtrips_der != roundtrips_der_lax) << 15; + if (parsed_der) { + ret |= (!parsed_der_lax) << 16; + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS + sig_openssl = ECDSA_SIG_new(); + sigptr = sig; + parsed_openssl = (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&sig_openssl, &sigptr, siglen) != NULL); + if (parsed_openssl) { + ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig_openssl, &r, &s); + valid_openssl = !BN_is_negative(r) && !BN_is_negative(s) && BN_num_bits(r) > 0 && BN_num_bits(r) <= 256 && BN_num_bits(s) > 0 && BN_num_bits(s) <= 256; + if (valid_openssl) { + unsigned char tmp[32] = {0}; + BN_bn2bin(r, tmp + 32 - BN_num_bytes(r)); + valid_openssl = memcmp(tmp, max_scalar, 32) < 0; + } + if (valid_openssl) { + unsigned char tmp[32] = {0}; + BN_bn2bin(s, tmp + 32 - BN_num_bytes(s)); + valid_openssl = memcmp(tmp, max_scalar, 32) < 0; + } + } + len_openssl = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig_openssl, NULL); + if (len_openssl <= 2048) { + unsigned char *ptr = roundtrip_openssl; + CHECK(i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig_openssl, &ptr) == len_openssl); + roundtrips_openssl = valid_openssl && ((size_t)len_openssl == siglen) && (memcmp(roundtrip_openssl, sig, siglen) == 0); + } else { + len_openssl = 0; + } + ECDSA_SIG_free(sig_openssl); + + ret |= (parsed_der && !parsed_openssl) << 4; + ret |= (valid_der && !valid_openssl) << 5; + ret |= (roundtrips_openssl && !parsed_der) << 6; + ret |= (roundtrips_der != roundtrips_openssl) << 7; + if (roundtrips_openssl) { + ret |= (len_der != (size_t)len_openssl) << 8; + ret |= (memcmp(roundtrip_der, roundtrip_openssl, len_der) != 0) << 9; + } +#endif + return ret; +} + +static void assign_big_endian(unsigned char *ptr, size_t ptrlen, uint32_t val) { + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < ptrlen; i++) { + int shift = ptrlen - 1 - i; + if (shift >= 4) { + ptr[i] = 0; + } else { + ptr[i] = (val >> shift) & 0xFF; + } + } +} + +static void damage_array(unsigned char *sig, size_t *len) { + int pos; + int action = secp256k1_rand_bits(3); + if (action < 1 && *len > 3) { + /* Delete a byte. */ + pos = secp256k1_rand_int(*len); + memmove(sig + pos, sig + pos + 1, *len - pos - 1); + (*len)--; + return; + } else if (action < 2 && *len < 2048) { + /* Insert a byte. */ + pos = secp256k1_rand_int(1 + *len); + memmove(sig + pos + 1, sig + pos, *len - pos); + sig[pos] = secp256k1_rand_bits(8); + (*len)++; + return; + } else if (action < 4) { + /* Modify a byte. */ + sig[secp256k1_rand_int(*len)] += 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255); + return; + } else { /* action < 8 */ + /* Modify a bit. */ + sig[secp256k1_rand_int(*len)] ^= 1 << secp256k1_rand_bits(3); + return; + } +} + +static void random_ber_signature(unsigned char *sig, size_t *len, int* certainly_der, int* certainly_not_der) { + int der; + int nlow[2], nlen[2], nlenlen[2], nhbit[2], nhbyte[2], nzlen[2]; + size_t tlen, elen, glen; + int indet; + int n; + + *len = 0; + der = secp256k1_rand_bits(2) == 0; + *certainly_der = der; + *certainly_not_der = 0; + indet = der ? 0 : secp256k1_rand_int(10) == 0; + + for (n = 0; n < 2; n++) { + /* We generate two classes of numbers: nlow==1 "low" ones (up to 32 bytes), nlow==0 "high" ones (32 bytes with 129 top bits set, or larger than 32 bytes) */ + nlow[n] = der ? 1 : (secp256k1_rand_bits(3) != 0); + /* The length of the number in bytes (the first byte of which will always be nonzero) */ + nlen[n] = nlow[n] ? secp256k1_rand_int(33) : 32 + secp256k1_rand_int(200) * secp256k1_rand_int(8) / 8; + CHECK(nlen[n] <= 232); + /* The top bit of the number. */ + nhbit[n] = (nlow[n] == 0 && nlen[n] == 32) ? 1 : (nlen[n] == 0 ? 0 : secp256k1_rand_bits(1)); + /* The top byte of the number (after the potential hardcoded 16 0xFF characters for "high" 32 bytes numbers) */ + nhbyte[n] = nlen[n] == 0 ? 0 : (nhbit[n] ? 128 + secp256k1_rand_bits(7) : 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(127)); + /* The number of zero bytes in front of the number (which is 0 or 1 in case of DER, otherwise we extend up to 300 bytes) */ + nzlen[n] = der ? ((nlen[n] == 0 || nhbit[n]) ? 1 : 0) : (nlow[n] ? secp256k1_rand_int(3) : secp256k1_rand_int(300 - nlen[n]) * secp256k1_rand_int(8) / 8); + if (nzlen[n] > ((nlen[n] == 0 || nhbit[n]) ? 1 : 0)) { + *certainly_not_der = 1; + } + CHECK(nlen[n] + nzlen[n] <= 300); + /* The length of the length descriptor for the number. 0 means short encoding, anything else is long encoding. */ + nlenlen[n] = nlen[n] + nzlen[n] < 128 ? 0 : (nlen[n] + nzlen[n] < 256 ? 1 : 2); + if (!der) { + /* nlenlen[n] max 127 bytes */ + int add = secp256k1_rand_int(127 - nlenlen[n]) * secp256k1_rand_int(16) * secp256k1_rand_int(16) / 256; + nlenlen[n] += add; + if (add != 0) { + *certainly_not_der = 1; + } + } + CHECK(nlen[n] + nzlen[n] + nlenlen[n] <= 427); + } + + /* The total length of the data to go, so far */ + tlen = 2 + nlenlen[0] + nlen[0] + nzlen[0] + 2 + nlenlen[1] + nlen[1] + nzlen[1]; + CHECK(tlen <= 856); + + /* The length of the garbage inside the tuple. */ + elen = (der || indet) ? 0 : secp256k1_rand_int(980 - tlen) * secp256k1_rand_int(8) / 8; + if (elen != 0) { + *certainly_not_der = 1; + } + tlen += elen; + CHECK(tlen <= 980); + + /* The length of the garbage after the end of the tuple. */ + glen = der ? 0 : secp256k1_rand_int(990 - tlen) * secp256k1_rand_int(8) / 8; + if (glen != 0) { + *certainly_not_der = 1; + } + CHECK(tlen + glen <= 990); + + /* Write the tuple header. */ + sig[(*len)++] = 0x30; + if (indet) { + /* Indeterminate length */ + sig[(*len)++] = 0x80; + *certainly_not_der = 1; + } else { + int tlenlen = tlen < 128 ? 0 : (tlen < 256 ? 1 : 2); + if (!der) { + int add = secp256k1_rand_int(127 - tlenlen) * secp256k1_rand_int(16) * secp256k1_rand_int(16) / 256; + tlenlen += add; + if (add != 0) { + *certainly_not_der = 1; + } + } + if (tlenlen == 0) { + /* Short length notation */ + sig[(*len)++] = tlen; + } else { + /* Long length notation */ + sig[(*len)++] = 128 + tlenlen; + assign_big_endian(sig + *len, tlenlen, tlen); + *len += tlenlen; + } + tlen += tlenlen; + } + tlen += 2; + CHECK(tlen + glen <= 1119); + + for (n = 0; n < 2; n++) { + /* Write the integer header. */ + sig[(*len)++] = 0x02; + if (nlenlen[n] == 0) { + /* Short length notation */ + sig[(*len)++] = nlen[n] + nzlen[n]; + } else { + /* Long length notation. */ + sig[(*len)++] = 128 + nlenlen[n]; + assign_big_endian(sig + *len, nlenlen[n], nlen[n] + nzlen[n]); + *len += nlenlen[n]; + } + /* Write zero padding */ + while (nzlen[n] > 0) { + sig[(*len)++] = 0x00; + nzlen[n]--; + } + if (nlen[n] == 32 && !nlow[n]) { + /* Special extra 16 0xFF bytes in "high" 32-byte numbers */ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + sig[(*len)++] = 0xFF; + } + nlen[n] -= 16; + } + /* Write first byte of number */ + if (nlen[n] > 0) { + sig[(*len)++] = nhbyte[n]; + nlen[n]--; + } + /* Generate remaining random bytes of number */ + secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(sig + *len, nlen[n]); + *len += nlen[n]; + nlen[n] = 0; + } + + /* Generate random garbage inside tuple. */ + secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(sig + *len, elen); + *len += elen; + + /* Generate end-of-contents bytes. */ + if (indet) { + sig[(*len)++] = 0; + sig[(*len)++] = 0; + tlen += 2; + } + CHECK(tlen + glen <= 1121); + + /* Generate random garbage outside tuple. */ + secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(sig + *len, glen); + *len += glen; + tlen += glen; + CHECK(tlen <= 1121); + CHECK(tlen == *len); +} + +void run_ecdsa_der_parse(void) { + int i,j; + for (i = 0; i < 200 * count; i++) { + unsigned char buffer[2048]; + size_t buflen = 0; + int certainly_der = 0; + int certainly_not_der = 0; + random_ber_signature(buffer, &buflen, &certainly_der, &certainly_not_der); + CHECK(buflen <= 2048); + for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) { + int ret = 0; + if (j > 0) { + damage_array(buffer, &buflen); + /* We don't know anything anymore about the DERness of the result */ + certainly_der = 0; + certainly_not_der = 0; + } + ret = test_ecdsa_der_parse(buffer, buflen, certainly_der, certainly_not_der); + if (ret != 0) { + size_t k; + fprintf(stderr, "Failure %x on ", ret); + for (k = 0; k < buflen; k++) { + fprintf(stderr, "%02x ", buffer[k]); + } + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + } + CHECK(ret == 0); + } + } +} + +/* Tests several edge cases. */ +void test_ecdsa_edge_cases(void) { + int t; + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; + + /* Test the case where ECDSA recomputes a point that is infinity. */ + { + secp256k1_gej keyj; + secp256k1_ge key; + secp256k1_scalar msg; + secp256k1_scalar sr, ss; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ss, 1); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&ss, &ss); + secp256k1_scalar_inverse(&ss, &ss); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sr, 1); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &keyj, &sr); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&key, &keyj); + msg = ss; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 0); + } + + /* Verify signature with r of zero fails. */ + { + const unsigned char pubkey_mods_zero[33] = { + 0x02, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xfe, 0xba, 0xae, 0xdc, 0xe6, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xa0, + 0x3b, 0xbf, 0xd2, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xd0, 0x36, 0x41, + 0x41 + }; + secp256k1_ge key; + secp256k1_scalar msg; + secp256k1_scalar sr, ss; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ss, 1); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg, 0); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sr, 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&key, pubkey_mods_zero, 33)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 0); + } + + /* Verify signature with s of zero fails. */ + { + const unsigned char pubkey[33] = { + 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x01 + }; + secp256k1_ge key; + secp256k1_scalar msg; + secp256k1_scalar sr, ss; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ss, 0); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg, 0); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sr, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&key, pubkey, 33)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 0); + } + + /* Verify signature with message 0 passes. */ + { + const unsigned char pubkey[33] = { + 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x02 + }; + const unsigned char pubkey2[33] = { + 0x02, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xfe, 0xba, 0xae, 0xdc, 0xe6, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xa0, + 0x3b, 0xbf, 0xd2, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xd0, 0x36, 0x41, + 0x43 + }; + secp256k1_ge key; + secp256k1_ge key2; + secp256k1_scalar msg; + secp256k1_scalar sr, ss; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ss, 2); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg, 0); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sr, 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&key, pubkey, 33)); + CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&key2, pubkey2, 33)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key2, &msg) == 1); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&ss, &ss); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key2, &msg) == 1); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ss, 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key2, &msg) == 0); + } + + /* Verify signature with message 1 passes. */ + { + const unsigned char pubkey[33] = { + 0x02, 0x14, 0x4e, 0x5a, 0x58, 0xef, 0x5b, 0x22, + 0x6f, 0xd2, 0xe2, 0x07, 0x6a, 0x77, 0xcf, 0x05, + 0xb4, 0x1d, 0xe7, 0x4a, 0x30, 0x98, 0x27, 0x8c, + 0x93, 0xe6, 0xe6, 0x3c, 0x0b, 0xc4, 0x73, 0x76, + 0x25 + }; + const unsigned char pubkey2[33] = { + 0x02, 0x8a, 0xd5, 0x37, 0xed, 0x73, 0xd9, 0x40, + 0x1d, 0xa0, 0x33, 0xd2, 0xdc, 0xf0, 0xaf, 0xae, + 0x34, 0xcf, 0x5f, 0x96, 0x4c, 0x73, 0x28, 0x0f, + 0x92, 0xc0, 0xf6, 0x9d, 0xd9, 0xb2, 0x09, 0x10, + 0x62 + }; + const unsigned char csr[32] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + 0x45, 0x51, 0x23, 0x19, 0x50, 0xb7, 0x5f, 0xc4, + 0x40, 0x2d, 0xa1, 0x72, 0x2f, 0xc9, 0xba, 0xeb + }; + secp256k1_ge key; + secp256k1_ge key2; + secp256k1_scalar msg; + secp256k1_scalar sr, ss; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ss, 1); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg, 1); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sr, csr, NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&key, pubkey, 33)); + CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&key2, pubkey2, 33)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key2, &msg) == 1); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&ss, &ss); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key2, &msg) == 1); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ss, 2); + secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&ss, &ss); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key2, &msg) == 0); + } + + /* Verify signature with message -1 passes. */ + { + const unsigned char pubkey[33] = { + 0x03, 0xaf, 0x97, 0xff, 0x7d, 0x3a, 0xf6, 0xa0, + 0x02, 0x94, 0xbd, 0x9f, 0x4b, 0x2e, 0xd7, 0x52, + 0x28, 0xdb, 0x49, 0x2a, 0x65, 0xcb, 0x1e, 0x27, + 0x57, 0x9c, 0xba, 0x74, 0x20, 0xd5, 0x1d, 0x20, + 0xf1 + }; + const unsigned char csr[32] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + 0x45, 0x51, 0x23, 0x19, 0x50, 0xb7, 0x5f, 0xc4, + 0x40, 0x2d, 0xa1, 0x72, 0x2f, 0xc9, 0xba, 0xee + }; + secp256k1_ge key; + secp256k1_scalar msg; + secp256k1_scalar sr, ss; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ss, 1); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg, 1); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&msg, &msg); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sr, csr, NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&key, pubkey, 33)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 1); + secp256k1_scalar_negate(&ss, &ss); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 1); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ss, 3); + secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&ss, &ss); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 0); + } + + /* Signature where s would be zero. */ + { + secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; + size_t siglen; + int32_t ecount; + unsigned char signature[72]; + static const unsigned char nonce[32] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + }; + static const unsigned char nonce2[32] = { + 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, + 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFE, + 0xBA,0xAE,0xDC,0xE6,0xAF,0x48,0xA0,0x3B, + 0xBF,0xD2,0x5E,0x8C,0xD0,0x36,0x41,0x40 + }; + const unsigned char key[32] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + }; + unsigned char msg[32] = { + 0x86, 0x41, 0x99, 0x81, 0x06, 0x23, 0x44, 0x53, + 0xaa, 0x5f, 0x9d, 0x6a, 0x31, 0x78, 0xf4, 0xf7, + 0xb8, 0x12, 0xe0, 0x0b, 0x81, 0x7a, 0x77, 0x62, + 0x65, 0xdf, 0xdd, 0x31, 0xb9, 0x3e, 0x29, 0xa9, + }; + ecount = 0; + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg, key, precomputed_nonce_function, nonce) == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg, key, precomputed_nonce_function, nonce2) == 0); + msg[31] = 0xaa; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg, key, precomputed_nonce_function, nonce) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, NULL, msg, key, precomputed_nonce_function, nonce2) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, NULL, key, precomputed_nonce_function, nonce2) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg, NULL, precomputed_nonce_function, nonce2) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg, key, precomputed_nonce_function, nonce2) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, key) == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, NULL, msg, &pubkey) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, NULL, &pubkey) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 6); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg, &pubkey) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 6); + CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 7); + /* That pubkeyload fails via an ARGCHECK is a little odd but makes sense because pubkeys are an opaque data type. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg, &pubkey) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 8); + siglen = 72; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, NULL, &siglen, &sig) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 9); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, signature, NULL, &sig) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 10); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, signature, &siglen, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 11); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, signature, &siglen, &sig) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 11); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, NULL, signature, siglen) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 12); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, NULL, siglen) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 13); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, signature, siglen) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 13); + siglen = 10; + /* Too little room for a signature does not fail via ARGCHECK. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, signature, &siglen, &sig) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 13); + ecount = 0; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(ctx, NULL, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 1); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, NULL, &sig) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 2); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, signature, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, signature, &sig) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 3); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(ctx, NULL, signature) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 4); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &sig, NULL) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &sig, signature) == 1); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + memset(signature, 255, 64); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &sig, signature) == 0); + CHECK(ecount == 5); + secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx, NULL, NULL); + } + + /* Nonce function corner cases. */ + for (t = 0; t < 2; t++) { + static const unsigned char zero[32] = {0x00}; + int i; + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char msg[32]; + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig2; + secp256k1_scalar sr[512], ss; + const unsigned char *extra; + extra = t == 0 ? NULL : zero; + memset(msg, 0, 32); + msg[31] = 1; + /* High key results in signature failure. */ + memset(key, 0xFF, 32); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg, key, NULL, extra) == 0); + CHECK(is_empty_signature(&sig)); + /* Zero key results in signature failure. */ + memset(key, 0, 32); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg, key, NULL, extra) == 0); + CHECK(is_empty_signature(&sig)); + /* Nonce function failure results in signature failure. */ + key[31] = 1; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg, key, nonce_function_test_fail, extra) == 0); + CHECK(is_empty_signature(&sig)); + /* The retry loop successfully makes its way to the first good value. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg, key, nonce_function_test_retry, extra) == 1); + CHECK(!is_empty_signature(&sig)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig2, msg, key, nonce_function_rfc6979, extra) == 1); + CHECK(!is_empty_signature(&sig2)); + CHECK(memcmp(&sig, &sig2, sizeof(sig)) == 0); + /* The default nonce function is deterministic. */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig2, msg, key, NULL, extra) == 1); + CHECK(!is_empty_signature(&sig2)); + CHECK(memcmp(&sig, &sig2, sizeof(sig)) == 0); + /* The default nonce function changes output with different messages. */ + for(i = 0; i < 256; i++) { + int j; + msg[0] = i; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig2, msg, key, NULL, extra) == 1); + CHECK(!is_empty_signature(&sig2)); + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &sr[i], &ss, &sig2); + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { + CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_eq(&sr[i], &sr[j])); + } + } + msg[0] = 0; + msg[31] = 2; + /* The default nonce function changes output with different keys. */ + for(i = 256; i < 512; i++) { + int j; + key[0] = i - 256; + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig2, msg, key, NULL, extra) == 1); + CHECK(!is_empty_signature(&sig2)); + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &sr[i], &ss, &sig2); + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { + CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_eq(&sr[i], &sr[j])); + } + } + key[0] = 0; + } + + { + /* Check that optional nonce arguments do not have equivalent effect. */ + const unsigned char zeros[32] = {0}; + unsigned char nonce[32]; + unsigned char nonce2[32]; + unsigned char nonce3[32]; + unsigned char nonce4[32]; + VG_UNDEF(nonce,32); + VG_UNDEF(nonce2,32); + VG_UNDEF(nonce3,32); + VG_UNDEF(nonce4,32); + CHECK(nonce_function_rfc6979(nonce, zeros, zeros, NULL, NULL, 0) == 1); + VG_CHECK(nonce,32); + CHECK(nonce_function_rfc6979(nonce2, zeros, zeros, zeros, NULL, 0) == 1); + VG_CHECK(nonce2,32); + CHECK(nonce_function_rfc6979(nonce3, zeros, zeros, NULL, (void *)zeros, 0) == 1); + VG_CHECK(nonce3,32); + CHECK(nonce_function_rfc6979(nonce4, zeros, zeros, zeros, (void *)zeros, 0) == 1); + VG_CHECK(nonce4,32); + CHECK(memcmp(nonce, nonce2, 32) != 0); + CHECK(memcmp(nonce, nonce3, 32) != 0); + CHECK(memcmp(nonce, nonce4, 32) != 0); + CHECK(memcmp(nonce2, nonce3, 32) != 0); + CHECK(memcmp(nonce2, nonce4, 32) != 0); + CHECK(memcmp(nonce3, nonce4, 32) != 0); + } + + + /* Privkey export where pubkey is the point at infinity. */ + { + unsigned char privkey[300]; + unsigned char seckey[32] = { + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, + 0xba, 0xae, 0xdc, 0xe6, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xa0, 0x3b, + 0xbf, 0xd2, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xd0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x41, + }; + size_t outlen = 300; + CHECK(!ec_privkey_export_der(ctx, privkey, &outlen, seckey, 0)); + outlen = 300; + CHECK(!ec_privkey_export_der(ctx, privkey, &outlen, seckey, 1)); + } +} + +void run_ecdsa_edge_cases(void) { + test_ecdsa_edge_cases(); +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS +EC_KEY *get_openssl_key(const unsigned char *key32) { + unsigned char privkey[300]; + size_t privkeylen; + const unsigned char* pbegin = privkey; + int compr = secp256k1_rand_bits(1); + EC_KEY *ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp256k1); + CHECK(ec_privkey_export_der(ctx, privkey, &privkeylen, key32, compr)); + CHECK(d2i_ECPrivateKey(&ec_key, &pbegin, privkeylen)); + CHECK(EC_KEY_check_key(ec_key)); + return ec_key; +} + +void test_ecdsa_openssl(void) { + secp256k1_gej qj; + secp256k1_ge q; + secp256k1_scalar sigr, sigs; + secp256k1_scalar one; + secp256k1_scalar msg2; + secp256k1_scalar key, msg; + EC_KEY *ec_key; + unsigned int sigsize = 80; + size_t secp_sigsize = 80; + unsigned char message[32]; + unsigned char signature[80]; + unsigned char key32[32]; + secp256k1_rand256_test(message); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&msg, message, NULL); + random_scalar_order_test(&key); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(key32, &key); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &qj, &key); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&q, &qj); + ec_key = get_openssl_key(key32); + CHECK(ec_key != NULL); + CHECK(ECDSA_sign(0, message, sizeof(message), signature, &sigsize, ec_key)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_parse(&sigr, &sigs, signature, sigsize)); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sigr, &sigs, &q, &msg)); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&one, 1); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&msg2, &msg, &one); + CHECK(!secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sigr, &sigs, &q, &msg2)); + + random_sign(&sigr, &sigs, &key, &msg, NULL); + CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_serialize(signature, &secp_sigsize, &sigr, &sigs)); + CHECK(ECDSA_verify(0, message, sizeof(message), signature, secp_sigsize, ec_key) == 1); + + EC_KEY_free(ec_key); +} + +void run_ecdsa_openssl(void) { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < 10*count; i++) { + test_ecdsa_openssl(); + } +} +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH +# include "modules/ecdh/tests_impl.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY +# include "modules/recovery/tests_impl.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR +# include "modules/generator/tests_impl.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_COMMITMENT +# include "modules/commitment/tests_impl.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RANGEPROOF +# include "modules/rangeproof/tests_impl.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_BULLETPROOF +# include "modules/bulletproofs/tests_impl.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_WHITELIST +# include "modules/whitelist/tests_impl.h" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SURJECTIONPROOF +# include "modules/surjection/tests_impl.h" +#endif + +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + unsigned char seed16[16] = {0}; + unsigned char run32[32] = {0}; + /* find iteration count */ + if (argc > 1) { + count = strtol(argv[1], NULL, 0); + } + + /* find random seed */ + if (argc > 2) { + int pos = 0; + const char* ch = argv[2]; + while (pos < 16 && ch[0] != 0 && ch[1] != 0) { + unsigned short sh; + if (sscanf(ch, "%2hx", &sh)) { + seed16[pos] = sh; + } else { + break; + } + ch += 2; + pos++; + } + } else { + FILE *frand = fopen("/dev/urandom", "r"); + if ((frand == NULL) || fread(&seed16, sizeof(seed16), 1, frand) != sizeof(seed16)) { + uint64_t t = time(NULL) * (uint64_t)1337; + seed16[0] ^= t; + seed16[1] ^= t >> 8; + seed16[2] ^= t >> 16; + seed16[3] ^= t >> 24; + seed16[4] ^= t >> 32; + seed16[5] ^= t >> 40; + seed16[6] ^= t >> 48; + seed16[7] ^= t >> 56; + } + if (frand) { + fclose(frand); + } + } + secp256k1_rand_seed(seed16); + + printf("test count = %i\n", count); + printf("random seed = %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x\n", seed16[0], seed16[1], seed16[2], seed16[3], seed16[4], seed16[5], seed16[6], seed16[7], seed16[8], seed16[9], seed16[10], seed16[11], seed16[12], seed16[13], seed16[14], seed16[15]); + + /* initialize */ + run_context_tests(); + run_scratch_tests(); + ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + if (secp256k1_rand_bits(1)) { + secp256k1_rand256(run32); + CHECK(secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, secp256k1_rand_bits(1) ? run32 : NULL)); + } + + run_rand_bits(); + run_rand_int(); + run_util_tests(); + + run_sha256_tests(); + run_hmac_sha256_tests(); + run_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_tests(); + +#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE + /* num tests */ + run_num_smalltests(); +#endif + + /* scalar tests */ + run_scalar_tests(); + + /* field tests */ + run_field_inv(); + run_field_inv_var(); + run_field_inv_all_var(); + run_field_misc(); + run_field_convert(); + run_sqr(); + run_sqrt(); + + /* group tests */ + run_ge(); + run_group_decompress(); + + /* ecmult tests */ + run_wnaf(); + run_point_times_order(); + run_ecmult_chain(); + run_ecmult_constants(); + run_ecmult_gen_blind(); + run_ecmult_const_tests(); + run_ecmult_multi_tests(); + run_ec_combine(); + + /* endomorphism tests */ +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + run_endomorphism_tests(); +#endif + + /* EC point parser test */ + run_ec_pubkey_parse_test(); + + /* EC key edge cases */ + run_eckey_edge_case_test(); + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH + /* ecdh tests */ + run_ecdh_tests(); +#endif + + /* ecdsa tests */ + run_random_pubkeys(); + run_ecdsa_der_parse(); + run_ecdsa_sign_verify(); + run_ecdsa_end_to_end(); + run_ecdsa_edge_cases(); +#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS + run_ecdsa_openssl(); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY + /* ECDSA pubkey recovery tests */ + run_recovery_tests(); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR + run_generator_tests(); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RANGEPROOF + run_rangeproof_tests(); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_BULLETPROOF + run_bulletproofs_tests(); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_WHITELIST + /* Key whitelisting tests */ + run_whitelist_tests(); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SURJECTIONPROOF + run_surjection_tests(); +#endif + + secp256k1_rand256(run32); + printf("random run = %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x\n", run32[0], run32[1], run32[2], run32[3], run32[4], run32[5], run32[6], run32[7], run32[8], run32[9], run32[10], run32[11], run32[12], run32[13], run32[14], run32[15]); + + /* shutdown */ + secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx); + + printf("no problems found\n"); + return 0; +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/tests_exhaustive.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/tests_exhaustive.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ab9779b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/tests_exhaustive.c @@ -0,0 +1,511 @@ +/*********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2016 Andrew Poelstra * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include + +#undef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION + +#ifndef EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER +/* see group_impl.h for allowable values */ +#define EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER 13 +#define EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_LAMBDA 9 /* cube root of 1 mod 13 */ +#endif + +#include "include/secp256k1.h" +#include "group.h" +#include "secp256k1.c" +#include "testrand_impl.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY +#include "src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h" +#include "include/secp256k1_recovery.h" +#endif + +/** stolen from tests.c */ +void ge_equals_ge(const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_ge *b) { + CHECK(a->infinity == b->infinity); + if (a->infinity) { + return; + } + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&a->x, &b->x)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&a->y, &b->y)); +} + +void ge_equals_gej(const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_gej *b) { + secp256k1_fe z2s; + secp256k1_fe u1, u2, s1, s2; + CHECK(a->infinity == b->infinity); + if (a->infinity) { + return; + } + /* Check a.x * b.z^2 == b.x && a.y * b.z^3 == b.y, to avoid inverses. */ + secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z2s, &b->z); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&u1, &a->x, &z2s); + u2 = b->x; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&u2); + secp256k1_fe_mul(&s1, &a->y, &z2s); secp256k1_fe_mul(&s1, &s1, &b->z); + s2 = b->y; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&s2); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&u1, &u2)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&s1, &s2)); +} + +void random_fe(secp256k1_fe *x) { + unsigned char bin[32]; + do { + secp256k1_rand256(bin); + if (secp256k1_fe_set_b32(x, bin)) { + return; + } + } while(1); +} +/** END stolen from tests.c */ + +int secp256k1_nonce_function_smallint(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, + const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *algo16, + void *data, unsigned int attempt) { + secp256k1_scalar s; + int *idata = data; + (void)msg32; + (void)key32; + (void)algo16; + /* Some nonces cannot be used because they'd cause s and/or r to be zero. + * The signing function has retry logic here that just re-calls the nonce + * function with an increased `attempt`. So if attempt > 0 this means we + * need to change the nonce to avoid an infinite loop. */ + if (attempt > 0) { + *idata = (*idata + 1) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; + } + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s, *idata); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(nonce32, &s); + return 1; +} + +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM +void test_exhaustive_endomorphism(const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < order; i++) { + secp256k1_ge res; + secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&res, &group[i]); + ge_equals_ge(&group[i * EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_LAMBDA % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER], &res); + } +} +#endif + +void test_exhaustive_addition(const secp256k1_ge *group, const secp256k1_gej *groupj, int order) { + int i, j; + + /* Sanity-check (and check infinity functions) */ + CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&group[0])); + CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&groupj[0])); + for (i = 1; i < order; i++) { + CHECK(!secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&group[i])); + CHECK(!secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&groupj[i])); + } + + /* Check all addition formulae */ + for (j = 0; j < order; j++) { + secp256k1_fe fe_inv; + secp256k1_fe_inv(&fe_inv, &groupj[j].z); + for (i = 0; i < order; i++) { + secp256k1_ge zless_gej; + secp256k1_gej tmp; + /* add_var */ + secp256k1_gej_add_var(&tmp, &groupj[i], &groupj[j], NULL); + ge_equals_gej(&group[(i + j) % order], &tmp); + /* add_ge */ + if (j > 0) { + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&tmp, &groupj[i], &group[j]); + ge_equals_gej(&group[(i + j) % order], &tmp); + } + /* add_ge_var */ + secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&tmp, &groupj[i], &group[j], NULL); + ge_equals_gej(&group[(i + j) % order], &tmp); + /* add_zinv_var */ + zless_gej.infinity = groupj[j].infinity; + zless_gej.x = groupj[j].x; + zless_gej.y = groupj[j].y; + secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(&tmp, &groupj[i], &zless_gej, &fe_inv); + ge_equals_gej(&group[(i + j) % order], &tmp); + } + } + + /* Check doubling */ + for (i = 0; i < order; i++) { + secp256k1_gej tmp; + if (i > 0) { + secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(&tmp, &groupj[i], NULL); + ge_equals_gej(&group[(2 * i) % order], &tmp); + } + secp256k1_gej_double_var(&tmp, &groupj[i], NULL); + ge_equals_gej(&group[(2 * i) % order], &tmp); + } + + /* Check negation */ + for (i = 1; i < order; i++) { + secp256k1_ge tmp; + secp256k1_gej tmpj; + secp256k1_ge_neg(&tmp, &group[i]); + ge_equals_ge(&group[order - i], &tmp); + secp256k1_gej_neg(&tmpj, &groupj[i]); + ge_equals_gej(&group[order - i], &tmpj); + } +} + +void test_exhaustive_ecmult(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, const secp256k1_gej *groupj, int order) { + int i, j, r_log; + for (r_log = 1; r_log < order; r_log++) { + for (j = 0; j < order; j++) { + for (i = 0; i < order; i++) { + secp256k1_gej tmp; + secp256k1_scalar na, ng; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&na, i); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ng, j); + + secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &tmp, &groupj[r_log], &na, &ng); + ge_equals_gej(&group[(i * r_log + j) % order], &tmp); + + if (i > 0) { + secp256k1_ecmult_const(&tmp, &group[i], &ng, 256); + ge_equals_gej(&group[(i * j) % order], &tmp); + } + } + } + } +} + +typedef struct { + secp256k1_scalar sc[2]; + secp256k1_ge pt[2]; +} ecmult_multi_data; + +static int ecmult_multi_callback(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *cbdata) { + ecmult_multi_data *data = (ecmult_multi_data*) cbdata; + *sc = data->sc[idx]; + *pt = data->pt[idx]; + return 1; +} + +void test_exhaustive_ecmult_multi(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) { + int i, j, k, x, y; + secp256k1_scratch *scratch = secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, 4096); + for (i = 0; i < order; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < order; j++) { + for (k = 0; k < order; k++) { + for (x = 0; x < order; x++) { + for (y = 0; y < order; y++) { + secp256k1_gej tmp; + secp256k1_scalar g_sc; + ecmult_multi_data data; + + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&data.sc[0], i); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&data.sc[1], j); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&g_sc, k); + data.pt[0] = group[x]; + data.pt[1] = group[y]; + + secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &tmp, &g_sc, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 2); + ge_equals_gej(&group[(i * x + j * y + k) % order], &tmp); + } + } + } + } + } + secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); +} + +void r_from_k(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_ge *group, int k) { + secp256k1_fe x; + unsigned char x_bin[32]; + k %= EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; + x = group[k].x; + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&x); + secp256k1_fe_get_b32(x_bin, &x); + secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(r, x_bin, NULL); +} + +void test_exhaustive_verify(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) { + int s, r, msg, key; + for (s = 1; s < order; s++) { + for (r = 1; r < order; r++) { + for (msg = 1; msg < order; msg++) { + for (key = 1; key < order; key++) { + secp256k1_ge nonconst_ge; + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; + secp256k1_pubkey pk; + secp256k1_scalar sk_s, msg_s, r_s, s_s; + secp256k1_scalar s_times_k_s, msg_plus_r_times_sk_s; + int k, should_verify; + unsigned char msg32[32]; + + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s_s, s); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&r_s, r); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg_s, msg); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sk_s, key); + + /* Verify by hand */ + /* Run through every k value that gives us this r and check that *one* works. + * Note there could be none, there could be multiple, ECDSA is weird. */ + should_verify = 0; + for (k = 0; k < order; k++) { + secp256k1_scalar check_x_s; + r_from_k(&check_x_s, group, k); + if (r_s == check_x_s) { + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s_times_k_s, k); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&s_times_k_s, &s_times_k_s, &s_s); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &r_s, &sk_s); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &msg_s); + should_verify |= secp256k1_scalar_eq(&s_times_k_s, &msg_plus_r_times_sk_s); + } + } + /* nb we have a "high s" rule */ + should_verify &= !secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s_s); + + /* Verify by calling verify */ + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(&sig, &r_s, &s_s); + memcpy(&nonconst_ge, &group[sk_s], sizeof(nonconst_ge)); + secp256k1_pubkey_save(&pk, &nonconst_ge); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(msg32, &msg_s); + CHECK(should_verify == + secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pk)); + } + } + } + } +} + +void test_exhaustive_sign(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) { + int i, j, k; + + /* Loop */ + for (i = 1; i < order; i++) { /* message */ + for (j = 1; j < order; j++) { /* key */ + for (k = 1; k < order; k++) { /* nonce */ + const int starting_k = k; + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; + secp256k1_scalar sk, msg, r, s, expected_r; + unsigned char sk32[32], msg32[32]; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg, i); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sk, j); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(sk32, &sk); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(msg32, &msg); + + secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg32, sk32, secp256k1_nonce_function_smallint, &k); + + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, &sig); + /* Note that we compute expected_r *after* signing -- this is important + * because our nonce-computing function function might change k during + * signing. */ + r_from_k(&expected_r, group, k); + CHECK(r == expected_r); + CHECK((k * s) % order == (i + r * j) % order || + (k * (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - s)) % order == (i + r * j) % order); + + /* Overflow means we've tried every possible nonce */ + if (k < starting_k) { + break; + } + } + } + } + + /* We would like to verify zero-knowledge here by counting how often every + * possible (s, r) tuple appears, but because the group order is larger + * than the field order, when coercing the x-values to scalar values, some + * appear more often than others, so we are actually not zero-knowledge. + * (This effect also appears in the real code, but the difference is on the + * order of 1/2^128th the field order, so the deviation is not useful to a + * computationally bounded attacker.) + */ +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY +void test_exhaustive_recovery_sign(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) { + int i, j, k; + + /* Loop */ + for (i = 1; i < order; i++) { /* message */ + for (j = 1; j < order; j++) { /* key */ + for (k = 1; k < order; k++) { /* nonce */ + const int starting_k = k; + secp256k1_fe r_dot_y_normalized; + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature rsig; + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; + secp256k1_scalar sk, msg, r, s, expected_r; + unsigned char sk32[32], msg32[32]; + int expected_recid; + int recid; + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg, i); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sk, j); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(sk32, &sk); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(msg32, &msg); + + secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(ctx, &rsig, msg32, sk32, secp256k1_nonce_function_smallint, &k); + + /* Check directly */ + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, &recid, &rsig); + r_from_k(&expected_r, group, k); + CHECK(r == expected_r); + CHECK((k * s) % order == (i + r * j) % order || + (k * (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - s)) % order == (i + r * j) % order); + /* In computing the recid, there is an overflow condition that is disabled in + * scalar_low_impl.h `secp256k1_scalar_set_b32` because almost every r.y value + * will exceed the group order, and our signing code always holds out for r + * values that don't overflow, so with a proper overflow check the tests would + * loop indefinitely. */ + r_dot_y_normalized = group[k].y; + secp256k1_fe_normalize(&r_dot_y_normalized); + /* Also the recovery id is flipped depending if we hit the low-s branch */ + if ((k * s) % order == (i + r * j) % order) { + expected_recid = secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r_dot_y_normalized) ? 1 : 0; + } else { + expected_recid = secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r_dot_y_normalized) ? 0 : 1; + } + CHECK(recid == expected_recid); + + /* Convert to a standard sig then check */ + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(ctx, &sig, &rsig); + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, &sig); + /* Note that we compute expected_r *after* signing -- this is important + * because our nonce-computing function function might change k during + * signing. */ + r_from_k(&expected_r, group, k); + CHECK(r == expected_r); + CHECK((k * s) % order == (i + r * j) % order || + (k * (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - s)) % order == (i + r * j) % order); + + /* Overflow means we've tried every possible nonce */ + if (k < starting_k) { + break; + } + } + } + } +} + +void test_exhaustive_recovery_verify(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) { + /* This is essentially a copy of test_exhaustive_verify, with recovery added */ + int s, r, msg, key; + for (s = 1; s < order; s++) { + for (r = 1; r < order; r++) { + for (msg = 1; msg < order; msg++) { + for (key = 1; key < order; key++) { + secp256k1_ge nonconst_ge; + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature rsig; + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; + secp256k1_pubkey pk; + secp256k1_scalar sk_s, msg_s, r_s, s_s; + secp256k1_scalar s_times_k_s, msg_plus_r_times_sk_s; + int recid = 0; + int k, should_verify; + unsigned char msg32[32]; + + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s_s, s); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&r_s, r); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg_s, msg); + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sk_s, key); + secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(msg32, &msg_s); + + /* Verify by hand */ + /* Run through every k value that gives us this r and check that *one* works. + * Note there could be none, there could be multiple, ECDSA is weird. */ + should_verify = 0; + for (k = 0; k < order; k++) { + secp256k1_scalar check_x_s; + r_from_k(&check_x_s, group, k); + if (r_s == check_x_s) { + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s_times_k_s, k); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&s_times_k_s, &s_times_k_s, &s_s); + secp256k1_scalar_mul(&msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &r_s, &sk_s); + secp256k1_scalar_add(&msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &msg_s); + should_verify |= secp256k1_scalar_eq(&s_times_k_s, &msg_plus_r_times_sk_s); + } + } + /* nb we have a "high s" rule */ + should_verify &= !secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s_s); + + /* We would like to try recovering the pubkey and checking that it matches, + * but pubkey recovery is impossible in the exhaustive tests (the reason + * being that there are 12 nonzero r values, 12 nonzero points, and no + * overlap between the sets, so there are no valid signatures). */ + + /* Verify by converting to a standard signature and calling verify */ + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_save(&rsig, &r_s, &s_s, recid); + secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(ctx, &sig, &rsig); + memcpy(&nonconst_ge, &group[sk_s], sizeof(nonconst_ge)); + secp256k1_pubkey_save(&pk, &nonconst_ge); + CHECK(should_verify == + secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pk)); + } + } + } + } +} +#endif + +int main(void) { + int i; + secp256k1_gej groupj[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER]; + secp256k1_ge group[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER]; + + /* Build context */ + secp256k1_context *ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + + /* TODO set z = 1, then do num_tests runs with random z values */ + + /* Generate the entire group */ + secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&groupj[0]); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&group[0], &groupj[0]); + for (i = 1; i < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; i++) { + /* Set a different random z-value for each Jacobian point */ + secp256k1_fe z; + random_fe(&z); + + secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&groupj[i], &groupj[i - 1], &secp256k1_ge_const_g); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&group[i], &groupj[i]); + secp256k1_gej_rescale(&groupj[i], &z); + + /* Verify against ecmult_gen */ + { + secp256k1_scalar scalar_i; + secp256k1_gej generatedj; + secp256k1_ge generated; + + secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&scalar_i, i); + secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &generatedj, &scalar_i); + secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&generated, &generatedj); + + CHECK(group[i].infinity == 0); + CHECK(generated.infinity == 0); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&generated.x, &group[i].x)); + CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&generated.y, &group[i].y)); + } + } + + /* Run the tests */ +#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM + test_exhaustive_endomorphism(group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); +#endif + test_exhaustive_addition(group, groupj, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); + test_exhaustive_ecmult(ctx, group, groupj, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); + test_exhaustive_ecmult_multi(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); + test_exhaustive_sign(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); + test_exhaustive_verify(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); + +#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY + test_exhaustive_recovery_sign(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); + test_exhaustive_recovery_verify(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); +#endif + + secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx); + return 0; +} + diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/util.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/util.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aca79d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/util.h @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +/********************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 2013-2015 Pieter Wuille, Gregory Maxwell * + * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * + * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* + **********************************************************************/ + +#ifndef SECP256K1_UTIL_H +#define SECP256K1_UTIL_H + +#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +typedef struct { + void (*fn)(const char *text, void* data); + const void* data; +} secp256k1_callback; + +static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_callback_call(const secp256k1_callback * const cb, const char * const text) { + cb->fn(text, (void*)cb->data); +} + +#ifdef DETERMINISTIC +#define TEST_FAILURE(msg) do { \ + fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg); \ + abort(); \ +} while(0); +#else +#define TEST_FAILURE(msg) do { \ + fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: %s\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, msg); \ + abort(); \ +} while(0) +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_BUILTIN_EXPECT +#define EXPECT(x,c) __builtin_expect((x),(c)) +#else +#define EXPECT(x,c) (x) +#endif + +#ifdef DETERMINISTIC +#define CHECK(cond) do { \ + if (EXPECT(!(cond), 0)) { \ + TEST_FAILURE("test condition failed"); \ + } \ +} while(0) +#else +#define CHECK(cond) do { \ + if (EXPECT(!(cond), 0)) { \ + TEST_FAILURE("test condition failed: " #cond); \ + } \ +} while(0) +#endif + +/* Like assert(), but when VERIFY is defined, and side-effect safe. */ +#if defined(COVERAGE) +#define VERIFY_CHECK(check) +#define VERIFY_SETUP(stmt) +#elif defined(VERIFY) +#define VERIFY_CHECK CHECK +#define VERIFY_SETUP(stmt) do { stmt; } while(0) +#else +#define VERIFY_CHECK(cond) do { (void)(cond); } while(0) +#define VERIFY_SETUP(stmt) +#endif + +static SECP256K1_INLINE void *checked_malloc(const secp256k1_callback* cb, size_t size) { + void *ret = malloc(size); + if (ret == NULL) { + secp256k1_callback_call(cb, "Out of memory"); + } + return ret; +} + +static SECP256K1_INLINE void *checked_realloc(const secp256k1_callback* cb, void *ptr, size_t size) { + void *ret = realloc(ptr, size); + if (ret == NULL) { + secp256k1_callback_call(cb, "Out of memory"); + } + return ret; +} + +/* Extract the sign of an int64, take the abs and return a uint64, constant time. */ +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(uint64_t *out, int64_t in) { + uint64_t mask0, mask1; + int ret; + ret = in < 0; + mask0 = ret + ~((uint64_t)0); + mask1 = ~mask0; + *out = (uint64_t)in; + *out = (*out & mask0) | ((~*out + 1) & mask1); + return ret; +} + +SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_clz64_var(uint64_t x) { + int ret; + if (!x) { + return 64; + } +# if defined(HAVE_BUILTIN_CLZLL) + ret = __builtin_clzll(x); +# else + /*FIXME: debruijn fallback. */ + for (ret = 0; ((x & (1ULL << 63)) == 0); x <<= 1, ret++); +# endif + return ret; +} + +/* Macro for restrict, when available and not in a VERIFY build. */ +#if defined(SECP256K1_BUILD) && defined(VERIFY) +# define SECP256K1_RESTRICT +#else +# if (!defined(__STDC_VERSION__) || (__STDC_VERSION__ < 199901L) ) +# if SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(3,0) +# define SECP256K1_RESTRICT __restrict__ +# elif (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER >= 1400) +# define SECP256K1_RESTRICT __restrict +# else +# define SECP256K1_RESTRICT +# endif +# else +# define SECP256K1_RESTRICT restrict +# endif +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) +# define I64FORMAT "I64d" +# define I64uFORMAT "I64u" +#else +# define I64FORMAT "lld" +# define I64uFORMAT "llu" +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE___INT128) +# if defined(__GNUC__) +# define SECP256K1_GNUC_EXT __extension__ +# else +# define SECP256K1_GNUC_EXT +# endif +SECP256K1_GNUC_EXT typedef unsigned __int128 uint128_t; +#endif + +#endif /* SECP256K1_UTIL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/panic_cb.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/panic_cb.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e0e9034 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/panic_cb.go @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +// Copyright 2015 The go-ethereum Authors +// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. +// +// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +// (at your option) any later version. +// +// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +// +// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . + +package secp256k1 + +import "C" +import "unsafe" + +// Callbacks for converting libsecp256k1 internal faults into +// recoverable Go panics. + +//export secp256k1GoPanicIllegal +func secp256k1GoPanicIllegal(msg *C.char, data unsafe.Pointer) { + panic("illegal argument: " + C.GoString(msg)) +} + +//export secp256k1GoPanicError +func secp256k1GoPanicError(msg *C.char, data unsafe.Pointer) { + panic("internal error: " + C.GoString(msg)) +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/secp256.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/secp256.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e72f524 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/secp256.go @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +// Copyright 2015 The go-ethereum Authors +// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. +// +// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +// (at your option) any later version. +// +// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +// +// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . + +// Package secp256k1 wraps the bitcoin secp256k1 C library. +package secp256k1 + +/* +#cgo CFLAGS: -I./libsecp256k1 +#cgo CFLAGS: -I./libsecp256k1/src/ +#define USE_NUM_NONE +#define USE_FIELD_10X26 +#define USE_FIELD_INV_BUILTIN +#define USE_SCALAR_8X32 +#define USE_SCALAR_INV_BUILTIN +#define NDEBUG +#define ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR +#define ENABLE_MODULE_BULLETPROOF +#define SECP256K1_MODULE_BULLETPROOF_TESTS +#include "./libsecp256k1/src/secp256k1.c" +#include "./libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h" +#include "./libsecp256k1/src/bench_bulletproof.c" +#include "./libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/tests_impl.h" +#include "ext.h" + +typedef void (*callbackFunc) (const char* msg, void* data); +extern void secp256k1GoPanicIllegal(const char* msg, void* data); +extern void secp256k1GoPanicError(const char* msg, void* data); +extern void test_rangeproof(); +extern void setup_rangeproof(zkrp_t *dt); +extern void commit_rangeproof(zkrp_t *dt); +extern void prove_rangeproof(zkrp_t *dt); +extern int verify_rangeproof(zkrp_t *dt); +*/ +import "C" + +import ( + "errors" + "unsafe" +) + +var context *C.secp256k1_context + +func init() { + // around 20 ms on a modern CPU. + context = C.secp256k1_context_create_sign_verify() + C.secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(context, C.callbackFunc(C.secp256k1GoPanicIllegal), nil) + C.secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(context, C.callbackFunc(C.secp256k1GoPanicError), nil) +} + +var ( + ErrInvalidMsgLen = errors.New("invalid message length, need 32 bytes") + ErrInvalidSignatureLen = errors.New("invalid signature length") + ErrInvalidRecoveryID = errors.New("invalid signature recovery id") + ErrInvalidKey = errors.New("invalid private key") + ErrSignFailed = errors.New("signing failed") + ErrRecoverFailed = errors.New("recovery failed") +) + +// Sign creates a recoverable ECDSA signature. +// The produced signature is in the 65-byte [R || S || V] format where V is 0 or 1. +// +// The caller is responsible for ensuring that msg cannot be chosen +// directly by an attacker. It is usually preferable to use a cryptographic +// hash function on any input before handing it to this function. +func Sign(msg []byte, seckey []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if len(msg) != 32 { + return nil, ErrInvalidMsgLen + } + if len(seckey) != 32 { + return nil, ErrInvalidKey + } + seckeydata := (*C.uchar)(unsafe.Pointer(&seckey[0])) + if C.secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(context, seckeydata) != 1 { + return nil, ErrInvalidKey + } + + var ( + msgdata = (*C.uchar)(unsafe.Pointer(&msg[0])) + noncefunc = C.secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979 + sigstruct C.secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature + ) + if C.secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(context, &sigstruct, msgdata, seckeydata, noncefunc, nil) == 0 { + return nil, ErrSignFailed + } + + var ( + sig = make([]byte, 65) + sigdata = (*C.uchar)(unsafe.Pointer(&sig[0])) + recid C.int + ) + C.secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(context, sigdata, &recid, &sigstruct) + sig[64] = byte(recid) // add back recid to get 65 bytes sig + return sig, nil +} + +// RecoverPubkey returns the the public key of the signer. +// msg must be the 32-byte hash of the message to be signed. +// sig must be a 65-byte compact ECDSA signature containing the +// recovery id as the last element. +func RecoverPubkey(msg []byte, sig []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if len(msg) != 32 { + return nil, ErrInvalidMsgLen + } + if err := checkSignature(sig); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var ( + pubkey = make([]byte, 65) + sigdata = (*C.uchar)(unsafe.Pointer(&sig[0])) + msgdata = (*C.uchar)(unsafe.Pointer(&msg[0])) + ) + if C.secp256k1_ecdsa_recover_pubkey(context, (*C.uchar)(unsafe.Pointer(&pubkey[0])), sigdata, msgdata) == 0 { + return nil, ErrRecoverFailed + } + return pubkey, nil +} + +func checkSignature(sig []byte) error { + if len(sig) != 65 { + return ErrInvalidSignatureLen + } + if sig[64] >= 4 { + return ErrInvalidRecoveryID + } + return nil +} + +//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// Rangeproofs functions: should be separated from this file in the near future +//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + +/*func RunRangeproof() { + C.test_rangeproof() +} + +func SetupRangeproof(nbits _Ctype_ulong) (*C.zkrp_t) { + var dt *C.zkrp_t + dt = new(C.zkrp_t) + dt.nbits = nbits + C.setup_rangeproof(dt) + return dt +} + +func PrintRangeproof(dt *C.zkrp_t) { + C.myprint(C.CString("GO print"), dt) +} + +func CommitRangeproof(dt *C.zkrp_t) { + C.commit_rangeproof(dt) +} + +func ProveRangeproof(dt *C.zkrp_t) { + C.prove_rangeproof(dt) +} + +func VerifyRangeproof(dt *C.zkrp_t) (bool) { + return (C.verify_rangeproof(dt) == 1) +}*/ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/secp256_test.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/secp256_test.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7877855 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/secp256_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,263 @@ +// Copyright 2015 The go-ethereum Authors +// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. +// +// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +// (at your option) any later version. +// +// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +// +// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . + +package secp256k1 + +import ( + "testing" + "fmt" + "time" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/rand" + "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common/math" + "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/randentropy" + "bytes" + "encoding/hex" +) + +const TestCount = 1000 + +func generateKeyPair() (pubkey, privkey []byte) { + key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(S256(), rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + pubkey = elliptic.Marshal(S256(), key.X, key.Y) + return pubkey, math.PaddedBigBytes(key.D, 32) +} + +func randSig() []byte { + sig := randentropy.GetEntropyCSPRNG(65) + sig[32] &= 0x70 + sig[64] %= 4 + return sig +} + +// tests for malleability +// highest bit of signature ECDSA s value must be 0, in the 33th byte +func compactSigCheck(t *testing.T, sig []byte) { + var b int = int(sig[32]) + if b < 0 { + t.Errorf("highest bit is negative: %d", b) + } + if ((b >> 7) == 1) != ((b & 0x80) == 0x80) { + t.Errorf("highest bit: %d bit >> 7: %d", b, b>>7) + } + if (b & 0x80) == 0x80 { + t.Errorf("highest bit: %d bit & 0x80: %d", b, b&0x80) + } +} + +func TestSignatureValidity(t *testing.T) { + pubkey, seckey := generateKeyPair() + msg := randentropy.GetEntropyCSPRNG(32) + sig, err := Sign(msg, seckey) + if err != nil { + t.Errorf("signature error: %s", err) + } + compactSigCheck(t, sig) + if len(pubkey) != 65 { + t.Errorf("pubkey length mismatch: want: 65 have: %d", len(pubkey)) + } + if len(seckey) != 32 { + t.Errorf("seckey length mismatch: want: 32 have: %d", len(seckey)) + } + if len(sig) != 65 { + t.Errorf("sig length mismatch: want: 65 have: %d", len(sig)) + } + recid := int(sig[64]) + if recid > 4 || recid < 0 { + t.Errorf("sig recid mismatch: want: within 0 to 4 have: %d", int(sig[64])) + } +} + +func TestInvalidRecoveryID(t *testing.T) { + _, seckey := generateKeyPair() + msg := randentropy.GetEntropyCSPRNG(32) + sig, _ := Sign(msg, seckey) + sig[64] = 99 + _, err := RecoverPubkey(msg, sig) + if err != ErrInvalidRecoveryID { + t.Fatalf("got %q, want %q", err, ErrInvalidRecoveryID) + } +} + +func TestSignAndRecover(t *testing.T) { + pubkey1, seckey := generateKeyPair() + msg := randentropy.GetEntropyCSPRNG(32) + sig, err := Sign(msg, seckey) + if err != nil { + t.Errorf("signature error: %s", err) + } + pubkey2, err := RecoverPubkey(msg, sig) + if err != nil { + t.Errorf("recover error: %s", err) + } + if !bytes.Equal(pubkey1, pubkey2) { + t.Errorf("pubkey mismatch: want: %x have: %x", pubkey1, pubkey2) + } +} + +func TestSignDeterministic(t *testing.T) { + _, seckey := generateKeyPair() + msg := make([]byte, 32) + copy(msg, "hi there") + + sig1, err := Sign(msg, seckey) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + sig2, err := Sign(msg, seckey) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if !bytes.Equal(sig1, sig2) { + t.Fatal("signatures not equal") + } +} + +func TestRandomMessagesWithSameKey(t *testing.T) { + pubkey, seckey := generateKeyPair() + keys := func() ([]byte, []byte) { + return pubkey, seckey + } + signAndRecoverWithRandomMessages(t, keys) +} + +func TestRandomMessagesWithRandomKeys(t *testing.T) { + keys := func() ([]byte, []byte) { + pubkey, seckey := generateKeyPair() + return pubkey, seckey + } + signAndRecoverWithRandomMessages(t, keys) +} + +func signAndRecoverWithRandomMessages(t *testing.T, keys func() ([]byte, []byte)) { + for i := 0; i < TestCount; i++ { + pubkey1, seckey := keys() + msg := randentropy.GetEntropyCSPRNG(32) + sig, err := Sign(msg, seckey) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("signature error: %s", err) + } + if sig == nil { + t.Fatal("signature is nil") + } + compactSigCheck(t, sig) + + // TODO: why do we flip around the recovery id? + sig[len(sig)-1] %= 4 + + pubkey2, err := RecoverPubkey(msg, sig) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("recover error: %s", err) + } + if pubkey2 == nil { + t.Error("pubkey is nil") + } + if !bytes.Equal(pubkey1, pubkey2) { + t.Fatalf("pubkey mismatch: want: %x have: %x", pubkey1, pubkey2) + } + } +} + +func TestRecoveryOfRandomSignature(t *testing.T) { + pubkey1, _ := generateKeyPair() + msg := randentropy.GetEntropyCSPRNG(32) + + for i := 0; i < TestCount; i++ { + // recovery can sometimes work, but if so should always give wrong pubkey + pubkey2, _ := RecoverPubkey(msg, randSig()) + if bytes.Equal(pubkey1, pubkey2) { + t.Fatalf("iteration: %d: pubkey mismatch: do NOT want %x: ", i, pubkey2) + } + } +} + +func TestRandomMessagesAgainstValidSig(t *testing.T) { + pubkey1, seckey := generateKeyPair() + msg := randentropy.GetEntropyCSPRNG(32) + sig, _ := Sign(msg, seckey) + + for i := 0; i < TestCount; i++ { + msg = randentropy.GetEntropyCSPRNG(32) + pubkey2, _ := RecoverPubkey(msg, sig) + // recovery can sometimes work, but if so should always give wrong pubkey + if bytes.Equal(pubkey1, pubkey2) { + t.Fatalf("iteration: %d: pubkey mismatch: do NOT want %x: ", i, pubkey2) + } + } +} + +// Useful when the underlying libsecp256k1 API changes to quickly +// check only recover function without use of signature function +func TestRecoverSanity(t *testing.T) { + msg, _ := hex.DecodeString("ce0677bb30baa8cf067c88db9811f4333d131bf8bcf12fe7065d211dce971008") + sig, _ := hex.DecodeString("90f27b8b488db00b00606796d2987f6a5f59ae62ea05effe84fef5b8b0e549984a691139ad57a3f0b906637673aa2f63d1f55cb1a69199d4009eea23ceaddc9301") + pubkey1, _ := hex.DecodeString("04e32df42865e97135acfb65f3bae71bdc86f4d49150ad6a440b6f15878109880a0a2b2667f7e725ceea70c673093bf67663e0312623c8e091b13cf2c0f11ef652") + pubkey2, err := RecoverPubkey(msg, sig) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("recover error: %s", err) + } + if !bytes.Equal(pubkey1, pubkey2) { + t.Errorf("pubkey mismatch: want: %x have: %x", pubkey1, pubkey2) + } +} + +func TestRangeproof(t *testing.T) { + RunRangeproof() + startTime := time.Now() + dt := SetupRangeproof(32) + setupTime := time.Now() + fmt.Println("Setup time:") + fmt.Println(setupTime.Sub(startTime)) + CommitRangeproof(dt) + commitTime := time.Now() + fmt.Println("Commit time:") + fmt.Println(commitTime.Sub(setupTime)) + ProveRangeproof(dt) + proveTime := time.Now() + fmt.Println("Prove time:") + fmt.Println(proveTime.Sub(commitTime)) + result := VerifyRangeproof(dt) + verifyTime := time.Now() + fmt.Println("Verify time:") + fmt.Println(verifyTime.Sub(proveTime)) + fmt.Println("result:") + fmt.Println(result) +} + +func BenchmarkSign(b *testing.B) { + _, seckey := generateKeyPair() + msg := randentropy.GetEntropyCSPRNG(32) + b.ResetTimer() + + for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ { + Sign(msg, seckey) + } +} + +func BenchmarkRecover(b *testing.B) { + msg := randentropy.GetEntropyCSPRNG(32) + _, seckey := generateKeyPair() + sig, _ := Sign(msg, seckey) + b.ResetTimer() + + for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ { + RecoverPubkey(msg, sig) + } +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/main.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/main.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..641db6a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/main.go @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +package main + +import ( + "fmt" + "math/big" + + "./zkproofs" +) + +func main() { + var ( + zkrpX zkproofs.Bp + zkrpY zkproofs.Bp + zkrpZ zkproofs.Bp + ) + // common setup + zkrpX.Setup(0, 4294967296) + zkrpY.Setup(0, 4294967296) + zkrpZ.Setup(0, 4294967296) + + // value + x := new(big.Int).SetInt64(30) + y := new(big.Int).SetInt64(20) + z := new(big.Int).SetInt64(10) + // get blind factor, pedersen commit and zkproof + // 这里会更新 zkrpX，所以 zkrpX 和 proofX 都需要保存下来 + blindFactorX, commitmentX, proofX, _ := zkrpX.Prove(x) + + // zkrp, _ := zkproofs.LoadParamFromDisk("setup.dat") + var ok bool + // proofX中包含commitmentX，如果修改了proofX.V 验证也不会通过 + ok, err := zkrpX.Verify(proofX) + if !ok { + fmt.Println("proofX failed!!!") + fmt.Println(ok) + fmt.Println(err) + } + + blindFactorY, commitmentY, proofY, _ := zkrpY.Prove(y) + + // zkrp, _ = zkproofs.LoadParamFromDisk("setup.dat") + ok, _ = zkrpY.Verify(proofY) + if !ok { + fmt.Println("proofY failed!!!") + } + + blindFactorZ, commitmentZ, proofZ, _ := zkrpZ.Prove(z) + // zkrp, _ = zkproofs.LoadParamFromDisk("setup.dat") + ok, err = zkrpZ.Verify(proofZ) + if !ok { + fmt.Println("proofZ failed!!!") + } + blindOut := new(big.Int).Add(blindFactorY, blindFactorZ) + blindDiff := new(big.Int).Sub(blindFactorX, blindOut) + + commitmentOut := commitmentY.Add(commitmentY, commitmentZ) + commitmentDiff := commitmentX.Add(commitmentX, commitmentOut.Neg(commitmentOut)) + + fmt.Printf("blind diff: %d\n", blindDiff) + fmt.Printf("pedersen commitment diff: ( %d , %d )\n", commitmentDiff.X, commitmentDiff.Y) + + check := zkproofs.Mult(zkrpX.H, blindDiff) + fmt.Printf("check diff: ( %d , %d )\n", check.X, check.Y) + fmt.Println(check.X.Cmp(commitmentDiff.X) == 0) + fmt.Println(check.Y.Cmp(commitmentDiff.Y) == 0) + +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bb.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bb.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..70ef505 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bb.go @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +// Copyright 2017 ING Bank N.V. +// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. +// +// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +// (at your option) any later version. +// +// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +// +// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . + +package zkproofs + +/* +This file contains the implementation of the BB signature scheme proposed in the paper: +Short signatures without random oracle +Boneh and Boyen +Eurocrypt 2004 +*/ + +import ( + "crypto/rand" + "errors" + "math/big" + + "../crypto/bn256" +) + +type keypair struct { + pubk *bn256.G1 + privk *big.Int +} + +/* +keygen is responsible for the key generation. +*/ +func keygen() (keypair, error) { + var ( + kp keypair + e error + res bool + ) + kp.privk, e = rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) + if e != nil { + return kp, e + } + kp.pubk, res = new(bn256.G1).Unmarshal(new(bn256.G1).ScalarBaseMult(kp.privk).Marshal()) + if res { + return kp, errors.New("Could not compute scalar multiplication.") + } + return kp, e +} + +/* +sign receives as input a message and a private key and outputs a digital signature. +*/ +func sign(m *big.Int, privk *big.Int) (*bn256.G2, error) { + var ( + res bool + signature *bn256.G2 + ) + inv := ModInverse(Mod(Add(m, privk), bn256.Order), bn256.Order) + signature, res = new(bn256.G2).Unmarshal(new(bn256.G2).ScalarBaseMult(inv).Marshal()) + if res != false { + return signature, nil + } else { + return nil, errors.New("Error while computing signature.") + } +} + +/* +verify receives as input the digital signature, the message and the public key. It outputs +true if and only if the signature is valid. +*/ +func verify(signature *bn256.G2, m *big.Int, pubk *bn256.G1) (bool, error) { + // e(y.g^m, sig) = e(g1,g2) + var ( + gm *bn256.G1 + e, res bool + ) + // g^m + gm, e = new(bn256.G1).Unmarshal(new(bn256.G1).ScalarBaseMult(m).Marshal()) + // y.g^m + gm = gm.Add(gm, pubk) + // e(y.g^m, sig) + p1 := bn256.Pair(gm, signature) + // e(g1,g2) + g1 := new(bn256.G1).ScalarBaseMult(new(big.Int).SetInt64(1)) + g2 := new(bn256.G2).ScalarBaseMult(new(big.Int).SetInt64(1)) + p2 := bn256.Pair(g1, g2) + // p1 == p2? + p2 = p2.Neg(p2) + p1 = p1.Add(p1, p2) + res = p1.IsOne() + if e != false { + return res, nil + } + return false, errors.New("Error while computing signature.") +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bb_test.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bb_test.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6c524be --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bb_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +// Copyright 2017 ING Bank N.V. +// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. +// +// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +// (at your option) any later version. +// +// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +// +// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . + +package zkproofs + +import ( + "testing" + "math/big" +) + +func TestKeyGen(t *testing.T) { + kp, _ := keygen() + signature, _ := sign(big.NewInt(42), kp.privk) + res, _ := verify(signature, big.NewInt(42), kp.pubk) + if res != true { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", res) + t.Fail() + } +} + diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bn.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bn.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..14ff674 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bn.go @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +// Copyright 2017 ING Bank N.V. +// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. +// +// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +// (at your option) any later version. +// +// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +// +// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . + +package zkproofs + +import ( + "crypto/sha256" + "math/big" + + "../byteconversion" +) + +var k1 = new(big.Int).SetBit(big.NewInt(0), 160, 1) // 2^160, security parameter that should match prover + +func CalculateHash(b1 *big.Int, b2 *big.Int) (*big.Int, error) { + + digest := sha256.New() + digest.Write(byteconversion.ToByteArray(b1)) + if b2 != nil { + digest.Write(byteconversion.ToByteArray(b2)) + } + output := digest.Sum(nil) + tmp := output[0:len(output)] + return byteconversion.FromByteArray(tmp) +} + +/** + * Returns base**exponent mod |modulo| also works for negative exponent (contrary to big.Int.Exp) + */ +func ModPow(base *big.Int, exponent *big.Int, modulo *big.Int) *big.Int { + + var returnValue *big.Int + + if exponent.Cmp(big.NewInt(0)) >= 0 { + returnValue = new(big.Int).Exp(base, exponent, modulo) + } else { + // Exp doesn't support negative exponent so instead: + // use positive exponent than take inverse (modulo).. + returnValue = ModInverse(new(big.Int).Exp(base, new(big.Int).Abs(exponent), modulo), modulo) + } + return returnValue +} + +func Add(x *big.Int, y *big.Int) *big.Int { + return new(big.Int).Add(x, y) +} + +func Sub(x *big.Int, y *big.Int) *big.Int { + return new(big.Int).Sub(x, y) +} + +func Mod(base *big.Int, modulo *big.Int) *big.Int { + return new(big.Int).Mod(base, modulo) +} + +func Multiply(factor1 *big.Int, factor2 *big.Int) *big.Int { + return new(big.Int).Mul(factor1, factor2) +} + +func ModInverse(base *big.Int, modulo *big.Int) *big.Int { + return new(big.Int).ModInverse(base, modulo) +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bn_test.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bn_test.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..880d5a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bn_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +// Copyright 2017 ING Bank N.V. +// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. +// +// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +// (at your option) any later version. +// +// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +// +// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . + +package zkproofs + +import ( + "testing" + "math/big" + ) + + +func TestCalculateHash(t * testing.T) { + + a := GetBigInt("20905485153255974750600830283139712767405035066172127447413526262122898097752829902691919420016794244099612526431387099905077116995490485444167190551980224865082320241670546533063409921082864323224863076823319894932240914571396941354556281385023649535909639921239646795929610627460276589386330363348840105387073757406261480377763345436612442076323102518362946991582624513737241437269968051355243751819094759669539075841991633425362795570590507959822047022497500292880734028347273355847985904992235033659931679254742902977502890883426551960403450937665750386501228142099266824028488862959626463948822181376617128628357") + b := GetBigInt("5711912074763938920844020768820827016918638588776093786691324830937965710562669998102969607754216881533101753509522661181935679768137553251696427895001308210043958162362474454915118307661021406997989560047755201343617470288619030784987198511772840498354380632474664457429003510207310347179884080000294301502325103527312780599913053243627156705417875172756769585807691558680079741149166677442267851492473670184071199725213912264373214980177804010561543807969309223405291240876888702197126709861726023144260487044339708816278182396486957437256069194438047922679665536060592545457448379589893428429445378466414731324407") + + expectedResult := GetBigInt("-19913561841364303941087968013056854925409568225408501509608065500928998362191") + actualResult, _ := CalculateHash(a, b) + actualResult2, _ := CalculateHash(a, b) + + if expectedResult.Cmp(actualResult) != 0 { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: hashed is: %s", actualResult) + } + if expectedResult.Cmp(actualResult2) != 0 { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: hashed 2 is: %s", actualResult2) + } +} + +func TestModPow1(t *testing.T) { + + base := big.NewInt(10) + exponent := big.NewInt(3) + modulo := big.NewInt(7) + + result := ModPow(base, exponent, modulo) + + if result.Cmp(big.NewInt(6)) != 0 { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected 6, actual: %s", result) + } +} + +func TestModPow2(t *testing.T) { + + base := big.NewInt(30) + exponent := big.NewInt(2) + modulo := big.NewInt(7) + + var result = ModPow(base, exponent, modulo) + + if result.Cmp(big.NewInt(4)) != 0 { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected 4, actual: %s", result) + } +} + +func TestModPowNegativeExp1(t *testing.T) { + + result := ModPow(big.NewInt(16), big.NewInt(-1), big.NewInt(7)) + + if result.Cmp(big.NewInt(4)) != 0 { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected 4, actual: %s", result) + } +} + +func TestModPowNegativeExp2(t *testing.T) { + + result := ModPow(big.NewInt(34), big.NewInt(-2), big.NewInt(9)) + + if result.Cmp(big.NewInt(7)) != 0 { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected 7, actual: %s", result) + } +} + +func TestModInverse1(t *testing.T) { + + base := big.NewInt(5) + modulo := big.NewInt(1) + + var result = ModInverse(base, modulo) + + if result.Cmp(big.NewInt(0)) != 0 { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected 0, actual: %s", result) + } +} + +func TestModInverse2(t *testing.T) { + + base := big.NewInt(3) + modulo := big.NewInt(7) + + var result = ModInverse(base, modulo) + + if result.Cmp(big.NewInt(5)) != 0 { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected 5, actual: %s", result) + } +} + +func TestMultiply(t *testing.T) { + + factor1 := big.NewInt(3) + factor2 := big.NewInt(7) + + var result = Multiply(factor1, factor2) + if result.Cmp(big.NewInt(21)) != 0 { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected 21, actual: %s", result) + } +} + +func TestMod(t *testing.T) { + + result := Mod(big.NewInt(16), big.NewInt(7)) + + if result.Cmp(big.NewInt(2)) != 0 { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected 2, actual: %s", result) + } +} + diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bulletproofs.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bulletproofs.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..37c13c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bulletproofs.go @@ -0,0 +1,1358 @@ +// Copyright 2018 ING Bank N.V. +// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. +// +// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +// (at your option) any later version. +// +// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +// +// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . + +/* +This file contains the implementation of the Bulletproofs scheme proposed in the paper: +Bulletproofs: Short Proofs for Confidential Transactions and More +Benedikt Bunz, Jonathan Bootle, Dan Boneh, Andrew Poelstra, Pieter Wuille and Greg Maxwell +Asiacrypt 2008 +*/ + +package zkproofs + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/sha256" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "io/ioutil" + "math" + "math/big" + + "../byteconversion" +) + +var ( + ORDER = CURVE.N + SEEDH = "BulletproofsDoesNotNeedTrustedSetupH" + SEEDU = "BulletproofsDoesNotNeedTrustedSetupU" + SAVE = true +) + +/* +Bulletproofs parameters. +*/ +type Bp struct { + N int64 // n 位 + G *p256 // 曲线上的点 G 和 H + H *p256 + Gg []*p256 + Hh []*p256 + Zkip bip +} + +/* +Bulletproofs proof. +*/ +type proofBP struct { + V *p256 + A *p256 + S *p256 + T1 *p256 + T2 *p256 + Taux *big.Int + Mu *big.Int + Tprime *big.Int + Proofip proofBip + Commit *p256 +} + +type ( + pstring struct { + X string + Y string + } +) + +type ( + ipstring struct { + N int64 + A string + B string + U pstring + P pstring + Gg pstring + Hh pstring + Ls []pstring + Rs []pstring + } +) + +func (p *proofBP) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) { + type Alias proofBP + var iLs []pstring + var iRs []pstring + var i int + logn := len(p.Proofip.Ls) + iLs = make([]pstring, logn) + iRs = make([]pstring, logn) + i = 0 + for i < logn { + iLs[i] = pstring{X: p.Proofip.Ls[i].X.String(), Y: p.Proofip.Ls[i].Y.String()} + iRs[i] = pstring{X: p.Proofip.Rs[i].X.String(), Y: p.Proofip.Rs[i].Y.String()} + i = i + 1 + } + return json.Marshal(&struct { + V pstring `json:"V"` + A pstring `json:"A"` + S pstring `json:"S"` + T1 pstring `json:"T1"` + T2 pstring `json:"T2"` + Taux string `json:"Taux"` + Mu string `json:"Mu"` + Tprime string `json:"Tprime"` + Commit pstring `json:"Commit"` + Proofip ipstring `json:"Proofip"` + *Alias + }{ + V: pstring{X: p.V.X.String(), Y: p.V.Y.String()}, + A: pstring{X: p.A.X.String(), Y: p.A.Y.String()}, + S: pstring{X: p.S.X.String(), Y: p.S.Y.String()}, + T1: pstring{X: p.T1.X.String(), Y: p.T1.Y.String()}, + T2: pstring{X: p.T2.X.String(), Y: p.T2.Y.String()}, + Mu: p.Mu.String(), + Taux: p.Taux.String(), + Tprime: p.Tprime.String(), + Commit: pstring{X: p.Commit.X.String(), Y: p.Commit.Y.String()}, + Proofip: ipstring{ + N: p.Proofip.N, + A: p.Proofip.A.String(), + B: p.Proofip.B.String(), + U: pstring{X: p.Proofip.U.X.String(), Y: p.Proofip.U.Y.String()}, + P: pstring{X: p.Proofip.P.X.String(), Y: p.Proofip.P.Y.String()}, + Gg: pstring{X: p.Proofip.Gg.X.String(), Y: p.Proofip.Gg.Y.String()}, + Hh: pstring{X: p.Proofip.Hh.X.String(), Y: p.Proofip.Hh.Y.String()}, + Ls: iLs, + Rs: iRs, + }, + Alias: (*Alias)(p), + }) +} + +func (p *proofBP) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error { + type Alias proofBP + aux := &struct { + V pstring `json:"V"` + A pstring `json:"A"` + S pstring `json:"S"` + T1 pstring `json:"T1"` + T2 pstring `json:"T2"` + Taux string `json:"Taux"` + Mu string `json:"Mu"` + Tprime string `json:"Tprime"` + Commit pstring `json:"Commit"` + Proofip ipstring `json:"Proofip"` + *Alias + }{ + Alias: (*Alias)(p), + } + if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &aux); err != nil { + return err + } + valVX, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.V.X, 10) + valVY, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.V.Y, 10) + valAX, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.A.X, 10) + valAY, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.A.Y, 10) + valSX, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.S.X, 10) + valSY, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.S.Y, 10) + valT1X, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.T1.X, 10) + valT1Y, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.T1.Y, 10) + valT2X, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.T2.X, 10) + valT2Y, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.T2.Y, 10) + valCommitX, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Commit.X, 10) + valCommitY, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Commit.Y, 10) + valN := aux.Proofip.N + valA, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Proofip.A, 10) + valB, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Proofip.B, 10) + valUx, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Proofip.U.X, 10) + valUy, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Proofip.U.Y, 10) + valPx, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Proofip.P.X, 10) + valPy, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Proofip.P.Y, 10) + valGgx, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Proofip.Gg.X, 10) + valGgy, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Proofip.Gg.Y, 10) + valHhx, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Proofip.Hh.X, 10) + valHhy, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Proofip.Hh.Y, 10) + p.V = &p256{ + X: valVX, + Y: valVY, + } + p.A = &p256{ + X: valAX, + Y: valAY, + } + p.S = &p256{ + X: valSX, + Y: valSY, + } + p.T1 = &p256{ + X: valT1X, + Y: valT1Y, + } + p.T2 = &p256{ + X: valT2X, + Y: valT2Y, + } + p.Commit = &p256{ + X: valCommitX, + Y: valCommitY, + } + valU := &p256{ + X: valUx, + Y: valUy, + } + valP := &p256{ + X: valPx, + Y: valPy, + } + valGg := &p256{ + X: valGgx, + Y: valGgy, + } + valHh := &p256{ + X: valHhx, + Y: valHhy, + } + p.Taux, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Taux, 10) + p.Mu, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Mu, 10) + p.Tprime, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Tprime, 10) + logn := len(aux.Proofip.Ls) + valLs := make([]*p256, logn) + valRs := make([]*p256, logn) + var ( + i int + valLsx *big.Int + valLsy *big.Int + valRsx *big.Int + valRsy *big.Int + ) + i = 0 + for i < logn { + valLsx, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Proofip.Ls[i].X, 10) + valLsy, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Proofip.Ls[i].Y, 10) + valLs[i] = &p256{X: valLsx, Y: valLsy} + valRsx, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Proofip.Rs[i].X, 10) + valRsy, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Proofip.Rs[i].Y, 10) + valRs[i] = &p256{X: valRsx, Y: valRsy} + i = i + 1 + } + p.Proofip = proofBip{ + N: valN, + A: valA, + B: valB, + U: valU, + P: valP, + Gg: valGg, + Hh: valHh, + Ls: valLs, + Rs: valRs, + } + return nil +} + +type ( + ipgenstring struct { + N int64 + Cc string + Uu pstring + H pstring + Gg []pstring + Hh []pstring + P pstring + } +) + +func (s *Bp) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) { + type Alias Bp + var iHh []pstring + var iGg []pstring + + var i int + n := len(s.Gg) + iGg = make([]pstring, n) + iHh = make([]pstring, n) + i = 0 + for i < n { + iGg[i] = pstring{X: s.Zkip.Gg[i].X.String(), Y: s.Zkip.Gg[i].Y.String()} + iHh[i] = pstring{X: s.Zkip.Hh[i].X.String(), Y: s.Zkip.Hh[i].Y.String()} + i = i + 1 + } + return json.Marshal(&struct { + Zkip ipgenstring `json:"Zkip"` + *Alias + }{ + Zkip: ipgenstring{ + N: s.N, + Cc: s.Zkip.Cc.String(), + Uu: pstring{X: s.Zkip.Uu.X.String(), Y: s.Zkip.Uu.Y.String()}, + H: pstring{X: s.Zkip.H.X.String(), Y: s.Zkip.H.Y.String()}, + Gg: iGg, + Hh: iHh, + P: pstring{X: s.Zkip.P.X.String(), Y: s.Zkip.P.Y.String()}, + }, + Alias: (*Alias)(s), + }) +} + +func (s *Bp) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error { + type Alias Bp + aux := &struct { + Zkip ipgenstring `json:"Zkip"` + *Alias + }{ + Alias: (*Alias)(s), + } + if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &aux); err != nil { + return err + } + n := aux.N + valGg := make([]*p256, n) + valHh := make([]*p256, n) + var ( + i int64 + valGgx *big.Int + valGgy *big.Int + valHhx *big.Int + valHhy *big.Int + ) + i = 0 + for i < n { + valGgx, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Zkip.Gg[i].X, 10) + valGgy, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Zkip.Gg[i].Y, 10) + valGg[i] = &p256{X: valGgx, Y: valGgy} + valHhx, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Zkip.Hh[i].X, 10) + valHhy, _ = new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Zkip.Hh[i].Y, 10) + valHh[i] = &p256{X: valHhx, Y: valHhy} + i = i + 1 + } + valN := aux.N + valCc, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Zkip.Cc, 10) + valUux, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Zkip.Uu.X, 10) + valUuy, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Zkip.Uu.Y, 10) + valHx, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Zkip.H.X, 10) + valHy, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Zkip.H.Y, 10) + valPx, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Zkip.P.X, 10) + valPy, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(aux.Zkip.P.Y, 10) + valUu := &p256{ + X: valUux, + Y: valUuy, + } + valH := &p256{ + X: valHx, + Y: valHy, + } + valP := &p256{ + X: valPx, + Y: valPy, + } + s.Zkip = bip{ + N: valN, + Cc: valCc, + Uu: valUu, + H: valH, + Gg: valGg, + Hh: valHh, + P: valP, + } + return nil +} + +/* +VectorCopy returns a vector composed by copies of a. +*/ +func VectorCopy(a *big.Int, n int64) ([]*big.Int, error) { + var ( + i int64 + result []*big.Int + ) + result = make([]*big.Int, n) + i = 0 + for i < n { + result[i] = a + i = i + 1 + } + return result, nil +} + +/* +VectorCopy returns a vector composed by copies of a. +*/ +func VectorG1Copy(a *p256, n int64) ([]*p256, error) { + var ( + i int64 + result []*p256 + ) + result = make([]*p256, n) + i = 0 + for i < n { + result[i] = a + i = i + 1 + } + return result, nil +} + +/* +VectorConvertToBig converts an array of int64 to an array of big.Int. +*/ +func VectorConvertToBig(a []int64, n int64) ([]*big.Int, error) { + var ( + i int64 + result []*big.Int + ) + result = make([]*big.Int, n) + i = 0 + for i < n { + result[i] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(a[i]) + i = i + 1 + } + return result, nil +} + +/* +VectorAdd computes vector addition componentwisely. +*/ +func VectorAdd(a, b []*big.Int) ([]*big.Int, error) { + var ( + result []*big.Int + i, n, m int64 + ) + n = int64(len(a)) + m = int64(len(b)) + if n != m { + return nil, errors.New("Size of first argument is different from size of second argument.") + } + i = 0 + result = make([]*big.Int, n) + for i < n { + result[i] = Add(a[i], b[i]) + result[i] = Mod(result[i], ORDER) + i = i + 1 + } + return result, nil +} + +/* +VectorSub computes vector addition componentwisely. +*/ +func VectorSub(a, b []*big.Int) ([]*big.Int, error) { + var ( + result []*big.Int + i, n, m int64 + ) + n = int64(len(a)) + m = int64(len(b)) + if n != m { + return nil, errors.New("Size of first argument is different from size of second argument.") + } + i = 0 + result = make([]*big.Int, n) + for i < n { + result[i] = Sub(a[i], b[i]) + result[i] = Mod(result[i], ORDER) + i = i + 1 + } + return result, nil +} + +/* +VectorScalarMul computes vector scalar multiplication componentwisely. +*/ +func VectorScalarMul(a []*big.Int, b *big.Int) ([]*big.Int, error) { + var ( + result []*big.Int + i, n int64 + ) + n = int64(len(a)) + i = 0 + result = make([]*big.Int, n) + for i < n { + result[i] = Multiply(a[i], b) + result[i] = Mod(result[i], ORDER) + i = i + 1 + } + return result, nil +} + +/* +VectorMul computes vector multiplication componentwisely. +*/ +func VectorMul(a, b []*big.Int) ([]*big.Int, error) { + var ( + result []*big.Int + i, n, m int64 + ) + n = int64(len(a)) + m = int64(len(b)) + if n != m { + return nil, errors.New("Size of first argument is different from size of second argument.") + } + i = 0 + result = make([]*big.Int, n) + for i < n { + result[i] = Multiply(a[i], b[i]) + result[i] = Mod(result[i], ORDER) + i = i + 1 + } + return result, nil +} + +/* +VectorECMul computes vector EC addition componentwisely. +*/ +func VectorECAdd(a, b []*p256) ([]*p256, error) { + var ( + result []*p256 + i, n, m int64 + ) + n = int64(len(a)) + m = int64(len(b)) + if n != m { + return nil, errors.New("Size of first argument is different from size of second argument.") + } + result = make([]*p256, n) + i = 0 + for i < n { + result[i] = new(p256).Multiply(a[i], b[i]) + i = i + 1 + } + return result, nil +} + +/* +ScalarProduct return the inner product between a and b. +*/ +func ScalarProduct(a, b []*big.Int) (*big.Int, error) { + var ( + result *big.Int + i, n, m int64 + ) + n = int64(len(a)) + m = int64(len(b)) + if n != m { + return nil, errors.New("Size of first argument is different from size of second argument.") + } + i = 0 + result = GetBigInt("0") + for i < n { + ab := Multiply(a[i], b[i]) + result.Add(result, ab) + result = Mod(result, ORDER) + i = i + 1 + } + return result, nil +} + +/* +VectorExp computes Prod_i^n{a[i]^b[i]}. +*/ +func VectorExp(a []*p256, b []*big.Int) (*p256, error) { + var ( + result *p256 + i, n, m int64 + ) + n = int64(len(a)) + m = int64(len(b)) + if n != m { + return nil, errors.New("Size of first argument is different from size of second argument.") + } + i = 0 + result = new(p256).SetInfinity() + for i < n { + result.Multiply(result, new(p256).ScalarMult(a[i], b[i])) + i = i + 1 + } + return result, nil +} + +/* +VectorScalarExp computes a[i]^b for each i. +*/ +func VectorScalarExp(a []*p256, b *big.Int) ([]*p256, error) { + var ( + result []*p256 + i, n int64 + ) + n = int64(len(a)) + result = make([]*p256, n) + i = 0 + for i < n { + result[i] = new(p256).ScalarMult(a[i], b) + i = i + 1 + } + return result, nil +} + +/* +PowerOf returns a vector composed by powers of x. +*/ +func PowerOf(x *big.Int, n int64) ([]*big.Int, error) { + var ( + i int64 + result []*big.Int + ) + result = make([]*big.Int, n) + current := GetBigInt("1") + i = 0 + for i < n { + result[i] = current + current = Multiply(current, x) + current = Mod(current, ORDER) + i = i + 1 + } + return result, nil +} + +/* +aR = aL - 1^n +*/ +func ComputeAR(x []int64) ([]int64, error) { + var ( + i int64 + result []int64 + ) + result = make([]int64, len(x)) + i = 0 + for i < int64(len(x)) { + if x[i] == 0 { + result[i] = -1 + } else if x[i] == 1 { + result[i] = 0 + } else { + return nil, errors.New("input contains non-binary element") + } + i = i + 1 + } + return result, nil +} + +/* +Hash is responsible for the computing a Zp element given elements from GT and G1. +*/ +func HashBP(A, S *p256) (*big.Int, *big.Int, error) { + + digest1 := sha256.New() + var buffer bytes.Buffer + buffer.WriteString(A.X.String()) + buffer.WriteString(A.Y.String()) + buffer.WriteString(S.X.String()) + buffer.WriteString(S.Y.String()) + digest1.Write([]byte(buffer.String())) + output1 := digest1.Sum(nil) + tmp1 := output1[0:len(output1)] + result1 := new(big.Int).SetBytes(tmp1) + + digest2 := sha256.New() + var buffer2 bytes.Buffer + buffer2.WriteString(A.X.String()) + buffer2.WriteString(A.Y.String()) + buffer2.WriteString(S.X.String()) + buffer2.WriteString(S.Y.String()) + buffer2.WriteString(result1.String()) + digest2.Write([]byte(buffer2.String())) + output2 := digest2.Sum(nil) + tmp2 := output2[0:len(output2)] + result2 := new(big.Int).SetBytes(tmp2) + + return result1, result2, nil +} + +/* +Commitvector computes a commitment to the bit of the secret. +*/ +func CommitVector(aL, aR []int64, alpha *big.Int, G, H *p256, g, h []*p256, n int64) (*p256, error) { + var ( + i int64 + R *p256 + ) + // Compute h^alpha.vg^aL.vh^aR + R = new(p256).ScalarMult(H, alpha) + i = 0 + for i < n { + gaL := new(p256).ScalarMult(g[i], new(big.Int).SetInt64(aL[i])) + haR := new(p256).ScalarMult(h[i], new(big.Int).SetInt64(aR[i])) + R.Multiply(R, gaL) + R.Multiply(R, haR) + i = i + 1 + } + return R, nil +} + +/* + + */ +func CommitVectorBig(aL, aR []*big.Int, alpha *big.Int, G, H *p256, g, h []*p256, n int64) (*p256, error) { + var ( + i int64 + R *p256 + ) + // Compute h^alpha.vg^aL.vh^aR + R = new(p256).ScalarMult(H, alpha) + i = 0 + for i < n { + R.Multiply(R, new(p256).ScalarMult(g[i], aL[i])) + R.Multiply(R, new(p256).ScalarMult(h[i], aR[i])) + i = i + 1 + } + return R, nil +} + +/* +SaveToDisk is responsible for saving the generator to disk, such it is possible +to then later. +*/ +func (zkrp *Bp) SaveToDisk(s string, p *proofBP) error { + data, err := json.Marshal(zkrp) + errw := ioutil.WriteFile(s, data, 0644) + if p != nil { + datap, errp := json.Marshal(p) + errpw := ioutil.WriteFile("proof.dat", datap, 0644) + if errp != nil || errpw != nil { + return errors.New("proof not saved to disk.") + } + } + if err != nil || errw != nil { + return errors.New("parameters not saved to disk.") + } + return nil +} + +/* +LoadGenFromDisk reads the generator from a file. +*/ +func LoadParamFromDisk(s string) (*Bp, error) { + var result Bp + c, err := ioutil.ReadFile(s) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if len(c) > 0 { + json.Unmarshal(c, &result) + return &result, nil + } + return nil, errors.New("Could not load generators.") +} + +/* +LoadProofFromDisk reads the generator from a file. +*/ +func LoadProofFromDisk(s string) (*proofBP, error) { + var result proofBP + c, err := ioutil.ReadFile(s) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if len(c) > 0 { + json.Unmarshal(c, &result) + return &result, nil + } + return nil, errors.New("Could not load proof.") +} + +/* +delta(y,z) = (z-z^2) . < 1^n, y^n > - z^3 . < 1^n, 2^n > +*/ +func (zkrp *Bp) Delta(y, z *big.Int) (*big.Int, error) { + var ( + result *big.Int + ) + // delta(y,z) = (z-z^2) . < 1^n, y^n > - z^3 . < 1^n, 2^n > + z2 := Multiply(z, z) + z2 = Mod(z2, ORDER) + z3 := Multiply(z2, z) + z3 = Mod(z3, ORDER) + + // < 1^n, y^n > + v1, _ := VectorCopy(new(big.Int).SetInt64(1), zkrp.N) + vy, _ := PowerOf(y, zkrp.N) + sp1y, _ := ScalarProduct(v1, vy) + + // < 1^n, 2^n > + p2n, _ := PowerOf(new(big.Int).SetInt64(2), zkrp.N) + sp12, _ := ScalarProduct(v1, p2n) + + result = Sub(z, z2) + result = Mod(result, ORDER) + result = Multiply(result, sp1y) + result = Mod(result, ORDER) + result = Sub(result, Multiply(z3, sp12)) + result = Mod(result, ORDER) + + return result, nil +} + +/* +SetupPre is responsible for computing the common parameters. +*/ +func (zkrp *Bp) SetupPre(a, b int64) { + res, _ := LoadParamFromDisk("setup.dat") + zkrp = res + // Setup Inner Product + zkrp.Zkip.Setup(zkrp.H, zkrp.Gg, zkrp.Hh, new(big.Int).SetInt64(0)) +} + +/* +Setup is responsible for computing the common parameters. +*/ +func (zkrp *Bp) Setup(a, b int64) { + var ( + i int64 + ) + // 计算 G 和 H + zkrp.G = new(p256).ScalarBaseMult(new(big.Int).SetInt64(1)) + zkrp.H, _ = MapToGroup(SEEDH) + // 有 n 位 + zkrp.N = int64(math.Log2(float64(b))) + zkrp.Gg = make([]*p256, zkrp.N) + zkrp.Hh = make([]*p256, zkrp.N) + i = 0 + for i < zkrp.N { + zkrp.Gg[i], _ = MapToGroup(SEEDH + "g" + string(i)) + zkrp.Hh[i], _ = MapToGroup(SEEDH + "h" + string(i)) + i = i + 1 + } + + // Setup Inner Product + zkrp.Zkip.Setup(zkrp.H, zkrp.Gg, zkrp.Hh, new(big.Int).SetInt64(0)) + // zkrp.SaveToDisk("setup.dat", nil) +} + +/* +Prove computes the ZK proof. +*/ +func (zkrp *Bp) Prove(secret *big.Int) (*big.Int, *p256, proofBP, error) { + var ( + i int64 + sL []*big.Int + sR []*big.Int + proof proofBP + ) + ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + // First phase + ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + + // commitment to v and gamma + gamma, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, ORDER) + V, _ := CommitG1(secret, gamma, zkrp.H) + + // aL, aR and commitment: (A, alpha) + // 因式分解得到 aL + aL, _ := Decompose(secret, 2, zkrp.N) + // aR = aL - 1 + aR, _ := ComputeAR(aL) + // 盲因子 alpha + alpha, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, ORDER) + // A 为 aL 的佩德森承诺 + A, _ := CommitVector(aL, aR, alpha, zkrp.G, zkrp.H, zkrp.Gg, zkrp.Hh, zkrp.N) + + // sL, sR and commitment: (S, rho) + rho, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, ORDER) + sL = make([]*big.Int, zkrp.N) + sR = make([]*big.Int, zkrp.N) + i = 0 + for i < zkrp.N { + sL[i], _ = rand.Int(rand.Reader, ORDER) + sR[i], _ = rand.Int(rand.Reader, ORDER) + i = i + 1 + } + // S 为 aR 的佩德森承诺 + S, _ := CommitVectorBig(sL, sR, rho, zkrp.G, zkrp.H, zkrp.Gg, zkrp.Hh, zkrp.N) + + // Fiat-Shamir heuristic to compute challenges y, z + y, z, _ := HashBP(A, S) + + ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + // Second phase + ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + tau1, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, ORDER) // page 20 from eprint version + tau2, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, ORDER) + + // compute t1: < aL - z.1^n, y^n . sR > + < sL, y^n . (aR + z . 1^n) > + vz, _ := VectorCopy(z, zkrp.N) + vy, _ := PowerOf(y, zkrp.N) + + // aL - z.1^n + naL, _ := VectorConvertToBig(aL, zkrp.N) + aLmvz, _ := VectorSub(naL, vz) + + // y^n .sR + ynsR, _ := VectorMul(vy, sR) + + // scalar prod: < aL - z.1^n, y^n . sR > + sp1, _ := ScalarProduct(aLmvz, ynsR) + + // scalar prod: < sL, y^n . (aR + z . 1^n) > + naR, _ := VectorConvertToBig(aR, zkrp.N) + aRzn, _ := VectorAdd(naR, vz) + ynaRzn, _ := VectorMul(vy, aRzn) + + // Add z^2.2^n to the result + // z^2 . 2^n + p2n, _ := PowerOf(new(big.Int).SetInt64(2), zkrp.N) + zsquared := Multiply(z, z) + z22n, _ := VectorScalarMul(p2n, zsquared) + ynaRzn, _ = VectorAdd(ynaRzn, z22n) + sp2, _ := ScalarProduct(sL, ynaRzn) + + // sp1 + sp2 + t1 := Add(sp1, sp2) + t1 = Mod(t1, ORDER) + + // compute t2: < sL, y^n . sR > + t2, _ := ScalarProduct(sL, ynsR) + t2 = Mod(t2, ORDER) + + // compute T1 + T1, _ := CommitG1(t1, tau1, zkrp.H) + + // compute T2 + T2, _ := CommitG1(t2, tau2, zkrp.H) + + // Fiat-Shamir heuristic to compute 'random' challenge x + x, _, _ := HashBP(T1, T2) + + ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + // Third phase // + ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + + // compute bl + sLx, _ := VectorScalarMul(sL, x) + bl, _ := VectorAdd(aLmvz, sLx) + + // compute br + // y^n . ( aR + z.1^n + sR.x ) + sRx, _ := VectorScalarMul(sR, x) + aRzn, _ = VectorAdd(aRzn, sRx) + ynaRzn, _ = VectorMul(vy, aRzn) + // y^n . ( aR + z.1^n sR.x ) + z^2 . 2^n + br, _ := VectorAdd(ynaRzn, z22n) + + // Compute t` = < bl, br > + tprime, _ := ScalarProduct(bl, br) + + // Compute taux = tau2 . x^2 + tau1 . x + z^2 . gamma + taux := Multiply(tau2, Multiply(x, x)) + taux = Add(taux, Multiply(tau1, x)) + taux = Add(taux, Multiply(Multiply(z, z), gamma)) + taux = Mod(taux, ORDER) + + // Compute mu = alpha + rho.x + mu := Multiply(rho, x) + mu = Add(mu, alpha) + mu = Mod(mu, ORDER) + + // Inner Product over (g, h', P.h^-mu, tprime) + // Compute h' + hprime := make([]*p256, zkrp.N) + // Switch generators + yinv := ModInverse(y, ORDER) + expy := yinv + hprime[0] = zkrp.Hh[0] + i = 1 + for i < zkrp.N { + hprime[i] = new(p256).ScalarMult(zkrp.Hh[i], expy) + expy = Multiply(expy, yinv) + i = i + 1 + } + + // Update Inner Product Proof Setup + zkrp.Zkip.Hh = hprime + zkrp.Zkip.Cc = tprime + + commit, _ := CommitInnerProduct(zkrp.Gg, hprime, bl, br) + proofip, _ := zkrp.Zkip.Prove(bl, br, commit) + + proof.V = V + proof.A = A + proof.S = S + proof.T1 = T1 + proof.T2 = T2 + proof.Taux = taux + proof.Mu = mu + proof.Tprime = tprime + proof.Proofip = proofip + proof.Commit = commit + + // zkrp.SaveToDisk("setup.dat", &proof) + return gamma, V, proof, nil +} + +/* +Verify returns true if and only if the proof is valid. +*/ +func (zkrp *Bp) Verify(proof proofBP) (bool, error) { + var ( + i int64 + hprime []*p256 + ) + hprime = make([]*p256, zkrp.N) + y, z, _ := HashBP(proof.A, proof.S) + x, _, _ := HashBP(proof.T1, proof.T2) + + // Switch generators + yinv := ModInverse(y, ORDER) + expy := yinv + hprime[0] = zkrp.Hh[0] + i = 1 + for i < zkrp.N { + hprime[i] = new(p256).ScalarMult(zkrp.Hh[i], expy) + expy = Multiply(expy, yinv) + i = i + 1 + } + + ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + // Check that tprime = t(x) = t0 + t1x + t2x^2 ---------- Condition (65) // + ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + + // Compute left hand side + lhs, _ := CommitG1(proof.Tprime, proof.Taux, zkrp.H) + + // Compute right hand side + z2 := Multiply(z, z) + z2 = Mod(z2, ORDER) + x2 := Multiply(x, x) + x2 = Mod(x2, ORDER) + + rhs := new(p256).ScalarMult(proof.V, z2) + + delta, _ := zkrp.Delta(y, z) + + gdelta := new(p256).ScalarBaseMult(delta) + + rhs.Multiply(rhs, gdelta) + + T1x := new(p256).ScalarMult(proof.T1, x) + T2x2 := new(p256).ScalarMult(proof.T2, x2) + + rhs.Multiply(rhs, T1x) + rhs.Multiply(rhs, T2x2) + + // Subtract lhs and rhs and compare with poitn at infinity + lhs.Neg(lhs) + rhs.Multiply(rhs, lhs) + c65 := rhs.IsZero() // Condition (65), page 20, from eprint version + + // Compute P - lhs #################### Condition (66) ###################### + + // S^x + Sx := new(p256).ScalarMult(proof.S, x) + // A.S^x + ASx := new(p256).Add(proof.A, Sx) + + // g^-z + mz := Sub(ORDER, z) + vmz, _ := VectorCopy(mz, zkrp.N) + gpmz, _ := VectorExp(zkrp.Gg, vmz) + //fmt.Println("############## gpmz ###############") + //fmt.Println(gpmz); + + // z.y^n + vz, _ := VectorCopy(z, zkrp.N) + vy, _ := PowerOf(y, zkrp.N) + zyn, _ := VectorMul(vy, vz) + + p2n, _ := PowerOf(new(big.Int).SetInt64(2), zkrp.N) + zsquared := Multiply(z, z) + z22n, _ := VectorScalarMul(p2n, zsquared) + + // z.y^n + z^2.2^n + zynz22n, _ := VectorAdd(zyn, z22n) + + lP := new(p256) + lP.Add(ASx, gpmz) + + // h'^(z.y^n + z^2.2^n) + hprimeexp, _ := VectorExp(hprime, zynz22n) + + lP.Add(lP, hprimeexp) + + // Compute P - rhs #################### Condition (67) ###################### + + // h^mu + rP := new(p256).ScalarMult(zkrp.H, proof.Mu) + rP.Multiply(rP, proof.Commit) + + // Subtract lhs and rhs and compare with poitn at infinity + lP = lP.Neg(lP) + rP.Add(rP, lP) + c67 := rP.IsZero() + + // Verify Inner Product Proof ################################################ + ok, _ := zkrp.Zkip.Verify(proof.Proofip) + + result := c65 && c67 && ok + + return result, nil +} + +//////////////////////////////////// Inner Product //////////////////////////////////// + +/* +Base struct for the Inner Product Argument. +*/ +type bip struct { + N int64 + Cc *big.Int + Uu *p256 + H *p256 + Gg []*p256 + Hh []*p256 + P *p256 +} + +/* +Struct that contains the Inner Product Proof. +*/ +type proofBip struct { + Ls []*p256 + Rs []*p256 + U *p256 + P *p256 + Gg *p256 + Hh *p256 + A *big.Int + B *big.Int + N int64 +} + +/* +HashIP is responsible for the computing a Zp element given elements from GT and G1. +*/ +func HashIP(g, h []*p256, P *p256, c *big.Int, n int64) (*big.Int, error) { + var ( + i int64 + ) + + digest := sha256.New() + digest.Write([]byte(P.String())) + + i = 0 + for i < n { + digest.Write([]byte(g[i].String())) + digest.Write([]byte(h[i].String())) + i = i + 1 + } + + digest.Write([]byte(c.String())) + output := digest.Sum(nil) + tmp := output[0:len(output)] + result, err := byteconversion.FromByteArray(tmp) + + return result, err +} + +/* +CommitInnerProduct is responsible for calculating g^a.h^b. +*/ +func CommitInnerProduct(g, h []*p256, a, b []*big.Int) (*p256, error) { + var ( + result *p256 + ) + + ga, _ := VectorExp(g, a) + hb, _ := VectorExp(h, b) + result = new(p256).Multiply(ga, hb) + return result, nil +} + +/* +Setup is responsible for computing the inner product basic parameters that are common to both +Prove and Verify algorithms. +*/ +func (zkip *bip) Setup(H *p256, g, h []*p256, c *big.Int) (bip, error) { + var ( + params bip + ) + + zkip.Gg = make([]*p256, zkip.N) + zkip.Hh = make([]*p256, zkip.N) + zkip.Uu, _ = MapToGroup(SEEDU) + zkip.H = H + zkip.Gg = g + zkip.Hh = h + zkip.Cc = c + zkip.P = new(p256).SetInfinity() + + return params, nil +} + +/* +Prove is responsible for the generation of the Inner Product Proof. +*/ +func (zkip *bip) Prove(a, b []*big.Int, P *p256) (proofBip, error) { + var ( + proof proofBip + n, m int64 + Ls []*p256 + Rs []*p256 + ) + + n = int64(len(a)) + m = int64(len(b)) + if n != m { + return proof, errors.New("Size of first array argument must be equal to the second") + } else { + // Fiat-Shamir: + // x = Hash(g,h,P,c) + x, _ := HashIP(zkip.Gg, zkip.Hh, P, zkip.Cc, zkip.N) + // Pprime = P.u^(x.c) + ux := new(p256).ScalarMult(zkip.Uu, x) + uxc := new(p256).ScalarMult(ux, zkip.Cc) + PP := new(p256).Multiply(P, uxc) + // Execute Protocol 2 recursively + zkip.P = PP + proof, err := BIP(a, b, zkip.Gg, zkip.Hh, ux, zkip.P, n, Ls, Rs) + proof.P = PP + return proof, err + } + + return proof, nil +} + +/* +BIP is the main recursive function that will be used to compute the inner product argument. +*/ +func BIP(a, b []*big.Int, g, h []*p256, u, P *p256, n int64, Ls, Rs []*p256) (proofBip, error) { + var ( + proof proofBip + cL, cR, x, xinv, x2, x2inv *big.Int + L, R, Lh, Rh, Pprime *p256 + gprime, hprime, gprime2, hprime2 []*p256 + aprime, bprime, aprime2, bprime2 []*big.Int + ) + + if n == 1 { + // recursion end + proof.A = a[0] + proof.B = b[0] + proof.Gg = g[0] + proof.Hh = h[0] + proof.P = P + proof.U = u + proof.Ls = Ls + proof.Rs = Rs + + } else { + // recursion + + // nprime := n / 2 + nprime := n / 2 + + // Compute cL = < a[:n'], b[n':] > + cL, _ = ScalarProduct(a[:nprime], b[nprime:]) + // Compute cR = < a[n':], b[:n'] > + cR, _ = ScalarProduct(a[nprime:], b[:nprime]) + // Compute L = g[n':]^(a[:n']).h[:n']^(b[n':]).u^cL + L, _ = VectorExp(g[nprime:], a[:nprime]) + Lh, _ = VectorExp(h[:nprime], b[nprime:]) + L.Multiply(L, Lh) + L.Multiply(L, new(p256).ScalarMult(u, cL)) + + // Compute R = g[:n']^(a[n':]).h[n':]^(b[:n']).u^cR + R, _ = VectorExp(g[:nprime], a[nprime:]) + Rh, _ = VectorExp(h[nprime:], b[:nprime]) + R.Multiply(R, Rh) + R.Multiply(R, new(p256).ScalarMult(u, cR)) + + // Fiat-Shamir: + x, _, _ = HashBP(L, R) + xinv = ModInverse(x, ORDER) + + // Compute g' = g[:n']^(x^-1) * g[n':]^(x) + gprime, _ = VectorScalarExp(g[:nprime], xinv) + gprime2, _ = VectorScalarExp(g[nprime:], x) + gprime, _ = VectorECAdd(gprime, gprime2) + // Compute h' = h[:n']^(x) * h[n':]^(x^-1) + hprime, _ = VectorScalarExp(h[:nprime], x) + hprime2, _ = VectorScalarExp(h[nprime:], xinv) + hprime, _ = VectorECAdd(hprime, hprime2) + + // Compute P' = L^(x^2).P.R^(x^-2) + x2 = Mod(Multiply(x, x), ORDER) + x2inv = ModInverse(x2, ORDER) + Pprime = new(p256).ScalarMult(L, x2) + Pprime.Multiply(Pprime, P) + Pprime.Multiply(Pprime, new(p256).ScalarMult(R, x2inv)) + + // Compute a' = a[:n'].x + a[n':].x^(-1) + aprime, _ = VectorScalarMul(a[:nprime], x) + aprime2, _ = VectorScalarMul(a[nprime:], xinv) + aprime, _ = VectorAdd(aprime, aprime2) + // Compute b' = b[:n'].x^(-1) + b[n':].x + bprime, _ = VectorScalarMul(b[:nprime], xinv) + bprime2, _ = VectorScalarMul(b[nprime:], x) + bprime, _ = VectorAdd(bprime, bprime2) + + Ls = append(Ls, L) + Rs = append(Rs, R) + // recursion BIP(g',h',u,P'; a', b') + proof, _ = BIP(aprime, bprime, gprime, hprime, u, Pprime, nprime, Ls, Rs) + } + proof.N = n + return proof, nil +} + +/* +Verify is responsible for the verification of the Inner Product Proof. +*/ +func (zkip *bip) Verify(proof proofBip) (bool, error) { + + logn := len(proof.Ls) + var ( + i int64 + x, xinv, x2, x2inv *big.Int + ngprime, nhprime, ngprime2, nhprime2 []*p256 + ) + + i = 0 + gprime := zkip.Gg + hprime := zkip.Hh + Pprime := zkip.P + nprime := proof.N + for i < int64(logn) { + nprime = nprime / 2 + x, _, _ = HashBP(proof.Ls[i], proof.Rs[i]) + xinv = ModInverse(x, ORDER) + // Compute g' = g[:n']^(x^-1) * g[n':]^(x) + ngprime, _ = VectorScalarExp(gprime[:nprime], xinv) + ngprime2, _ = VectorScalarExp(gprime[nprime:], x) + gprime, _ = VectorECAdd(ngprime, ngprime2) + // Compute h' = h[:n']^(x) * h[n':]^(x^-1) + nhprime, _ = VectorScalarExp(hprime[:nprime], x) + nhprime2, _ = VectorScalarExp(hprime[nprime:], xinv) + hprime, _ = VectorECAdd(nhprime, nhprime2) + // Compute P' = L^(x^2).P.R^(x^-2) + x2 = Mod(Multiply(x, x), ORDER) + x2inv = ModInverse(x2, ORDER) + Pprime.Multiply(Pprime, new(p256).ScalarMult(proof.Ls[i], x2)) + Pprime.Multiply(Pprime, new(p256).ScalarMult(proof.Rs[i], x2inv)) + i = i + 1 + } + + // c == a*b + ab := Multiply(proof.A, proof.B) + ab = Mod(ab, ORDER) + + rhs := new(p256).ScalarMult(gprime[0], proof.A) + hb := new(p256).ScalarMult(hprime[0], proof.B) + rhs.Multiply(rhs, hb) + rhs.Multiply(rhs, new(p256).ScalarMult(proof.U, ab)) + + nP := Pprime.Neg(Pprime) + nP.Multiply(nP, rhs) + c := nP.IsZero() + + return c, nil +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bulletproofs_test.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bulletproofs_test.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..48ab495 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bulletproofs_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,355 @@ +// Copyright 2018 ING Bank N.V. +// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. +// +// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +// (at your option) any later version. +// +// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +// +// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . + +package zkproofs + +import ( + "crypto/rand" + "fmt" + "math/big" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/ing-bank/zkproofs/go-ethereum/crypto/bn256" +) + +/* +Test method VectorCopy, which simply copies the first input argument to size n vector. +*/ +func TestVectorCopy(t *testing.T) { + var ( + result []*big.Int + ) + result, _ = VectorCopy(new(big.Int).SetInt64(1), 3) + ok := (result[0].Cmp(new(big.Int).SetInt64(1)) == 0) + ok = ok && (result[1].Cmp(GetBigInt("1")) == 0) + ok = ok && (result[2].Cmp(GetBigInt("1")) == 0) + if ok != true { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", ok) + } +} + +/* +Test method VectorConvertToBig. +*/ +func TestVectorConvertToBig(t *testing.T) { + var ( + result []*big.Int + a []int64 + ) + a = make([]int64, 3) + a[0] = 3 + a[1] = 4 + a[2] = 5 + result, _ = VectorConvertToBig(a, 3) + ok := (result[0].Cmp(new(big.Int).SetInt64(3)) == 0) + ok = ok && (result[1].Cmp(GetBigInt("4")) == 0) + ok = ok && (result[2].Cmp(GetBigInt("5")) == 0) + if ok != true { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", ok) + } +} + +/* +Scalar Product returns the inner product between 2 vectors. +*/ +func TestScalarProduct(t *testing.T) { + var ( + a, b []*big.Int + ) + a = make([]*big.Int, 3) + b = make([]*big.Int, 3) + a[0] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(7) + a[1] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(7) + a[2] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(7) + b[0] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(3) + b[1] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(3) + b[2] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(3) + result, _ := ScalarProduct(a, b) + ok := (result.Cmp(new(big.Int).SetInt64(63)) == 0) + if ok != true { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", ok) + } +} + +/* +Tests Vector addition. +*/ +func TestVectorAdd(t *testing.T) { + var ( + a, b []*big.Int + ) + a = make([]*big.Int, 3) + b = make([]*big.Int, 3) + a[0] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(7) + a[1] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(8) + a[2] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(9) + b[0] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(3) + b[1] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(30) + b[2] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(40) + result, _ := VectorAdd(a, b) + ok := (result[0].Cmp(new(big.Int).SetInt64(10)) == 0) + ok = ok && (result[1].Cmp(GetBigInt("38")) == 0) + ok = ok && (result[2].Cmp(GetBigInt("49")) == 0) + if ok != true { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", ok) + } +} + +/* +Tests Vector subtraction. +*/ +func TestVectorSub(t *testing.T) { + var ( + a, b []*big.Int + ) + a = make([]*big.Int, 3) + b = make([]*big.Int, 3) + a[0] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(7) + a[1] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(8) + a[2] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(9) + b[0] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(3) + b[1] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(30) + b[2] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(40) + result, _ := VectorSub(a, b) + ok := (result[0].Cmp(new(big.Int).SetInt64(4)) == 0) + ok = ok && (result[1].Cmp(GetBigInt("115792089237316195423570985008687907852837564279074904382605163141518161494315")) == 0) + ok = ok && (result[2].Cmp(GetBigInt("115792089237316195423570985008687907852837564279074904382605163141518161494306")) == 0) + if ok != true { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", ok) + } +} + +/* +Tests Vector componentwise multiplication. +*/ +func TestVectorMul(t *testing.T) { + var ( + a, b []*big.Int + ) + a = make([]*big.Int, 3) + b = make([]*big.Int, 3) + a[0] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(7) + a[1] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(8) + a[2] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(9) + b[0] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(3) + b[1] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(30) + b[2] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(40) + result, _ := VectorMul(a, b) + ok := (result[0].Cmp(new(big.Int).SetInt64(21)) == 0) + ok = ok && (result[1].Cmp(new(big.Int).SetInt64(240)) == 0) + ok = ok && (result[2].Cmp(new(big.Int).SetInt64(360)) == 0) + + if ok != true { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", ok) + } +} + +/* +Test method PowerOf, which must return a vector containing a growing sequence of +powers of 2. +*/ +func TestPowerOf(t *testing.T) { + result, _ := PowerOf(new(big.Int).SetInt64(3), 3) + ok := (result[0].Cmp(new(big.Int).SetInt64(1)) == 0) + ok = ok && (result[1].Cmp(new(big.Int).SetInt64(3)) == 0) + ok = ok && (result[2].Cmp(new(big.Int).SetInt64(9)) == 0) + if ok != true { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", ok) + } +} + +/* +Test Inner Product argument. +*/ +func TestInnerProduct(t *testing.T) { + var ( + zkrp Bp + zkip bip + a []*big.Int + b []*big.Int + ) + // TODO: + // Review if it is the best way, since we maybe could use the + // inner product independently of the range proof. + zkrp.Setup(0, 16) + a = make([]*big.Int, zkrp.N) + a[0] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(2) + a[1] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(-1) + a[2] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(10) + a[3] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(6) + b = make([]*big.Int, zkrp.N) + b[0] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(1) + b[1] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(2) + b[2] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(10) + b[3] = new(big.Int).SetInt64(7) + c := new(big.Int).SetInt64(142) + commit, _ := CommitInnerProduct(zkrp.Gg, zkrp.Hh, a, b) + zkip.Setup(zkrp.H, zkrp.Gg, zkrp.Hh, c) + proof, _ := zkip.Prove(a, b, commit) + ok, _ := zkip.Verify(proof) + if ok != true { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", ok) + } +} + +/* +Test the FALSE case of ZK Range Proof scheme using Bulletproofs. +*/ +func TestFalseBulletproofsZKRP(t *testing.T) { + var ( + zkrp Bp + ) + startTime := time.Now() + zkrp.Setup(0, 4294967296) // ITS BEING USED TO COMPUTE N + setupTime := time.Now() + fmt.Println("Setup time:") + fmt.Println(setupTime.Sub(startTime)) + + x := new(big.Int).SetInt64(4294967296) + proof, _ := zkrp.Prove(x) + proofTime := time.Now() + fmt.Println("Proof time:") + fmt.Println(proofTime.Sub(setupTime)) + + ok, _ := zkrp.Verify(proof) + verifyTime := time.Now() + fmt.Println("Verify time:") + fmt.Println(verifyTime.Sub(proofTime)) + + fmt.Println("Range Proofs invalid test result:") + fmt.Println(ok) + if ok != false { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", ok) + } +} + +/* +Test the TRUE case of ZK Range Proof scheme using Bulletproofs. +*/ +func TestTrueBulletproofsZKRP(t *testing.T) { + var ( + zkrp Bp + ) + startTime := time.Now() + zkrp.Setup(0, 4294967296) // ITS BEING USED TO COMPUTE N + setupTime := time.Now() + fmt.Println("Setup time:") + fmt.Println(setupTime.Sub(startTime)) + + x := new(big.Int).SetInt64(65535) + proof, _ := zkrp.Prove(x) + proofTime := time.Now() + fmt.Println("Proof time:") + fmt.Println(proofTime.Sub(setupTime)) + + ok, _ := zkrp.Verify(proof) + verifyTime := time.Now() + fmt.Println("Verify time:") + fmt.Println(verifyTime.Sub(proofTime)) + + fmt.Println("Range Proofs result:") + fmt.Println(ok) + if ok != true { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", ok) + } +} + +func BenchmarkBulletproofs(b *testing.B) { + var ( + zkrp Bp + proof proofBP + ok bool + ) + b.ResetTimer() + for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ { + zkrp.Setup(0, 4294967296) // ITS BEING USED TO COMPUTE N + x := new(big.Int).SetInt64(4294967295) + proof, _ = zkrp.Prove(x) + ok, _ = zkrp.Verify(proof) + if ok != true { + b.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", ok) + } + } +} + +func BenchmarkScalarMult(b *testing.B) { + var ( + a *big.Int + A *bn256.G1 + ) + b.ResetTimer() + for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ { + a, _ = rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) + A = new(bn256.G1).ScalarBaseMult(a) + } + fmt.Println("A:") + fmt.Println(A) +} + +func TestHashBP(t *testing.T) { + agx, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("110720467414728166769654679803728202169916280248550137472490865118702779748947", 10) + agy, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("103949684536896233354287911519259186718323435572971865592336813380571928560949", 10) + sgx, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("78662919066140655151560869958157053125629409725243565127658074141532489435921", 10) + sgy, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("114946280626097680211499478702679495377587739951564115086530426937068100343655", 10) + pointa := &p256{X: agx, Y: agy} + points := &p256{X: sgx, Y: sgy} + result1, result2, _ := HashBP(pointa, points) + res1, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("103823382860325249552741530200099120077084118788867728791742258217664299339569", 10) + res2, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("8192372577089859289404358830067912230280991346287696886048261417244724213964", 10) + ok1 := (result1.Cmp(res1) != 0) + ok2 := (result2.Cmp(res2) != 0) + ok := ok1 && ok2 + if ok { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", ok) + } +} + +func TestHashBPGx(t *testing.T) { + gx, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("79BE667EF9DCBBAC55A06295CE870B07029BFCDB2DCE28D959F2815B16F81798", 16) + gy, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("483ADA7726A3C4655DA4FBFC0E1108A8FD17B448A68554199C47D08FFB10D4B8", 16) + point := &p256{X: gx, Y: gy} + result1, result2, _ := HashBP(point, point) + res1, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("11897424191990306464486192136408618361228444529783223689021929580052970909263", 10) + res2, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("22166487799255634251145870394406518059682307840904574298117500050508046799269", 10) + ok1 := (result1.Cmp(res1) != 0) + ok2 := (result2.Cmp(res2) != 0) + ok := ok1 && ok2 + if ok { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", ok) + } +} + +func TestInv(t *testing.T) { + y, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("103823382860325249552741530200099120077084118788867728791742258217664299339569", 10) + yinv := ModInverse(y, ORDER) + res, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("38397371868935917445400134055424677162505875368971619911110421656148020877351", 10) + ok := (yinv.Cmp(res) != 0) + if ok { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", ok) + } +} + +func TestHPrime(t *testing.T) { + var zkrp *Bp + var proof *proofBP + zkrp, _ = LoadParamFromDisk("setup.dat") + proof, _ = LoadProofFromDisk("proof.dat") + ok, _ := zkrp.Verify(*proof) + if !ok { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", ok) + } +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/ccs08.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/ccs08.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..687f717 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/ccs08.go @@ -0,0 +1,426 @@ +// Copyright 2018 ING Bank N.V. +// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. +// +// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +// (at your option) any later version. +// +// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +// +// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . + +/* +This file contains the implementation of the ZKRP scheme proposed in the paper: +Efficient Protocols for Set Membership and Range Proofs +Jan Camenisch, Rafik Chaabouni, abhi shelat +Asiacrypt 2008 +*/ + +package zkproofs + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto/rand" + "errors" + "math" + "math/big" + "strconv" + + "../crypto/bn256" +) + +/* +paramsSet contains elements generated by the verifier, which are necessary for the prover. +This must be computed in a trusted setup. +*/ +type paramsSet struct { + signatures map[int64]*bn256.G2 + H *bn256.G2 + // TODO:must protect the private key + kp keypair + // u determines the amount of signatures we need in the public params. + // Each signature can be compressed to just 1 field element of 256 bits. + // Then the parameters have minimum size equal to 256*u bits. + // l determines how many pairings we need to compute, then in order to improve + // verifier`s performance we want to minize it. + // Namely, we have 2*l pairings for the prover and 3*l for the verifier. +} + +/* +paramsUL contains elements generated by the verifier, which are necessary for the prover. +This must be computed in a trusted setup. +*/ +type paramsUL struct { + signatures map[string]*bn256.G2 + H *bn256.G2 + // TODO:must protect the private key + kp keypair + // u determines the amount of signatures we need in the public params. + // Each signature can be compressed to just 1 field element of 256 bits. + // Then the parameters have minimum size equal to 256*u bits. + // l determines how many pairings we need to compute, then in order to improve + // verifier`s performance we want to minize it. + // Namely, we have 2*l pairings for the prover and 3*l for the verifier. + u, l int64 +} + +/* +proofSet contains the necessary elements for the ZK Set Membership proof. +*/ +type proofSet struct { + V *bn256.G2 + D, C *bn256.G2 + a *bn256.GT + s, t, zsig, zv *big.Int + c, m, zr *big.Int +} + +/* +proofUL contains the necessary elements for the ZK proof. +*/ +type proofUL struct { + V []*bn256.G2 + D, C *bn256.G2 + a []*bn256.GT + s, t, zsig, zv []*big.Int + c, m, zr *big.Int +} + +/* +SetupSet generates the signature for the elements in the set. +*/ +func SetupSet(s []int64) (paramsSet, error) { + var ( + i int + p paramsSet + ) + p.kp, _ = keygen() + + p.signatures = make(map[int64]*bn256.G2) + for i = 0; i < len(s); i++ { + sig_i, _ := sign(new(big.Int).SetInt64(int64(s[i])), p.kp.privk) + p.signatures[s[i]] = sig_i + } + //TODO: protect the 'master' key + h := GetBigInt("18560948149108576432482904553159745978835170526553990798435819795989606410925") + p.H = new(bn256.G2).ScalarBaseMult(h) + return p, nil +} + +/* +SetupUL generates the signature for the interval [0,u^l). +The value of u should be roughly b/log(b), but we can choose smaller values in +order to get smaller parameters, at the cost of having worse performance. +*/ +func SetupUL(u, l int64) (paramsUL, error) { + var ( + i int64 + p paramsUL + ) + p.kp, _ = keygen() + + p.signatures = make(map[string]*bn256.G2) + for i = 0; i < u; i++ { + sig_i, _ := sign(new(big.Int).SetInt64(i), p.kp.privk) + p.signatures[strconv.FormatInt(i, 10)] = sig_i + } + //TODO: protect the 'master' key + h := GetBigInt("18560948149108576432482904553159745978835170526553990798435819795989606410925") + p.H = new(bn256.G2).ScalarBaseMult(h) + p.u = u + p.l = l + return p, nil +} + +/* +ProveSet method is used to produce the ZK Set Membership proof. +*/ +func ProveSet(x int64, r *big.Int, p paramsSet) (proofSet, error) { + var ( + v *big.Int + proof_out proofSet + ) + + // Initialize variables + proof_out.D = new(bn256.G2) + proof_out.D.SetInfinity() + proof_out.m, _ = rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) + + D := new(bn256.G2) + v, _ = rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) + A, ok := p.signatures[x] + if ok { + // D = g^s.H^m + D = new(bn256.G2).ScalarMult(p.H, proof_out.m) + proof_out.s, _ = rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) + aux := new(bn256.G2).ScalarBaseMult(proof_out.s) + D.Add(D, aux) + + proof_out.V = new(bn256.G2).ScalarMult(A, v) + proof_out.t, _ = rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) + proof_out.a = bn256.Pair(G1, proof_out.V) + proof_out.a.ScalarMult(proof_out.a, proof_out.s) + proof_out.a.Invert(proof_out.a) + proof_out.a.Add(proof_out.a, new(bn256.GT).ScalarMult(E, proof_out.t)) + } else { + return proof_out, errors.New("Could not generate proof. Element does not belong to the interval.") + } + proof_out.D.Add(proof_out.D, D) + + // Consider passing C as input, + // so that it is possible to delegate the commitment computation to an external party. + proof_out.C, _ = Commit(new(big.Int).SetInt64(x), r, p.H) + // Fiat-Shamir heuristic + proof_out.c, _ = HashSet(proof_out.a, proof_out.D) + proof_out.c = Mod(proof_out.c, bn256.Order) + + proof_out.zr = Sub(proof_out.m, Multiply(r, proof_out.c)) + proof_out.zr = Mod(proof_out.zr, bn256.Order) + proof_out.zsig = Sub(proof_out.s, Multiply(new(big.Int).SetInt64(x), proof_out.c)) + proof_out.zsig = Mod(proof_out.zsig, bn256.Order) + proof_out.zv = Sub(proof_out.t, Multiply(v, proof_out.c)) + proof_out.zv = Mod(proof_out.zv, bn256.Order) + return proof_out, nil +} + +/* +ProveUL method is used to produce the ZKRP proof that secret x belongs to the interval [0,U^L]. +*/ +func ProveUL(x, r *big.Int, p paramsUL) (proofUL, error) { + var ( + i int64 + v []*big.Int + proof_out proofUL + ) + decx, _ := Decompose(x, p.u, p.l) + + // Initialize variables + v = make([]*big.Int, p.l, p.l) + proof_out.V = make([]*bn256.G2, p.l, p.l) + proof_out.a = make([]*bn256.GT, p.l, p.l) + proof_out.s = make([]*big.Int, p.l, p.l) + proof_out.t = make([]*big.Int, p.l, p.l) + proof_out.zsig = make([]*big.Int, p.l, p.l) + proof_out.zv = make([]*big.Int, p.l, p.l) + proof_out.D = new(bn256.G2) + proof_out.D.SetInfinity() + proof_out.m, _ = rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) + + // D = H^m + D := new(bn256.G2).ScalarMult(p.H, proof_out.m) + for i = 0; i < p.l; i++ { + v[i], _ = rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) + A, ok := p.signatures[strconv.FormatInt(decx[i], 10)] + if ok { + proof_out.V[i] = new(bn256.G2).ScalarMult(A, v[i]) + proof_out.s[i], _ = rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) + proof_out.t[i], _ = rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) + proof_out.a[i] = bn256.Pair(G1, proof_out.V[i]) + proof_out.a[i].ScalarMult(proof_out.a[i], proof_out.s[i]) + proof_out.a[i].Invert(proof_out.a[i]) + proof_out.a[i].Add(proof_out.a[i], new(bn256.GT).ScalarMult(E, proof_out.t[i])) + + ui := new(big.Int).Exp(new(big.Int).SetInt64(p.u), new(big.Int).SetInt64(i), nil) + muisi := new(big.Int).Mul(proof_out.s[i], ui) + muisi = Mod(muisi, bn256.Order) + aux := new(bn256.G2).ScalarBaseMult(muisi) + D.Add(D, aux) + } else { + return proof_out, errors.New("Could not generate proof. Element does not belong to the interval.") + } + } + proof_out.D.Add(proof_out.D, D) + + // Consider passing C as input, + // so that it is possible to delegate the commitment computation to an external party. + proof_out.C, _ = Commit(x, r, p.H) + // Fiat-Shamir heuristic + proof_out.c, _ = Hash(proof_out.a, proof_out.D) + proof_out.c = Mod(proof_out.c, bn256.Order) + + proof_out.zr = Sub(proof_out.m, Multiply(r, proof_out.c)) + proof_out.zr = Mod(proof_out.zr, bn256.Order) + for i = 0; i < p.l; i++ { + proof_out.zsig[i] = Sub(proof_out.s[i], Multiply(new(big.Int).SetInt64(decx[i]), proof_out.c)) + proof_out.zsig[i] = Mod(proof_out.zsig[i], bn256.Order) + proof_out.zv[i] = Sub(proof_out.t[i], Multiply(v[i], proof_out.c)) + proof_out.zv[i] = Mod(proof_out.zv[i], bn256.Order) + } + return proof_out, nil +} + +/* +VerifySet is used to validate the ZK Set Membership proof. It returns true iff the proof is valid. +*/ +func VerifySet(proof_out *proofSet, p *paramsSet) (bool, error) { + var ( + D *bn256.G2 + r1, r2 bool + p1, p2 *bn256.GT + ) + // D == C^c.h^ zr.g^zsig ? + D = new(bn256.G2).ScalarMult(proof_out.C, proof_out.c) + D.Add(D, new(bn256.G2).ScalarMult(p.H, proof_out.zr)) + aux := new(bn256.G2).ScalarBaseMult(proof_out.zsig) + D.Add(D, aux) + + DBytes := D.Marshal() + pDBytes := proof_out.D.Marshal() + r1 = bytes.Equal(DBytes, pDBytes) + + r2 = true + // a == [e(V,y)^c].[e(V,g)^-zsig].[e(g,g)^zv] + p1 = bn256.Pair(p.kp.pubk, proof_out.V) + p1.ScalarMult(p1, proof_out.c) + p2 = bn256.Pair(G1, proof_out.V) + p2.ScalarMult(p2, proof_out.zsig) + p2.Invert(p2) + p1.Add(p1, p2) + p1.Add(p1, new(bn256.GT).ScalarMult(E, proof_out.zv)) + + pBytes := p1.Marshal() + aBytes := proof_out.a.Marshal() + r2 = r2 && bytes.Equal(pBytes, aBytes) + return r1 && r2, nil +} + +/* +VerifyUL is used to validate the ZKRP proof. It returns true iff the proof is valid. +*/ +func VerifyUL(proof_out *proofUL, p *paramsUL) (bool, error) { + var ( + i int64 + D *bn256.G2 + r1, r2 bool + p1, p2 *bn256.GT + ) + // D == C^c.h^ zr.g^zsig ? + D = new(bn256.G2).ScalarMult(proof_out.C, proof_out.c) + D.Add(D, new(bn256.G2).ScalarMult(p.H, proof_out.zr)) + for i = 0; i < p.l; i++ { + ui := new(big.Int).Exp(new(big.Int).SetInt64(p.u), new(big.Int).SetInt64(i), nil) + muizsigi := new(big.Int).Mul(proof_out.zsig[i], ui) + muizsigi = Mod(muizsigi, bn256.Order) + aux := new(bn256.G2).ScalarBaseMult(muizsigi) + D.Add(D, aux) + } + + DBytes := D.Marshal() + pDBytes := proof_out.D.Marshal() + r1 = bytes.Equal(DBytes, pDBytes) + + r2 = true + for i = 0; i < p.l; i++ { + // a == [e(V,y)^c].[e(V,g)^-zsig].[e(g,g)^zv] + p1 = bn256.Pair(p.kp.pubk, proof_out.V[i]) + p1.ScalarMult(p1, proof_out.c) + p2 = bn256.Pair(G1, proof_out.V[i]) + p2.ScalarMult(p2, proof_out.zsig[i]) + p2.Invert(p2) + p1.Add(p1, p2) + p1.Add(p1, new(bn256.GT).ScalarMult(E, proof_out.zv[i])) + + pBytes := p1.Marshal() + aBytes := proof_out.a[i].Marshal() + r2 = r2 && bytes.Equal(pBytes, aBytes) + } + return r1 && r2, nil +} + +/* +proof contains the necessary elements for the ZK proof. +*/ +type proof struct { + p1, p2 proofUL +} + +/* +params contains elements generated by the verifier, which are necessary for the prover. +This must be computed in a trusted setup. +*/ +type params struct { + p *paramsUL + a, b int64 +} + +type ccs08 struct { + p *params + x, r *big.Int + proof_out proof + pubk *bn256.G1 +} + +/* +Setup receives integers a and b, and configures the parameters for the rangeproof scheme. +*/ +func (zkrp *ccs08) Setup(a, b int64) error { + // Compute optimal values for u and l + var ( + u, l int64 + logb float64 + p *params + ) + if a > b { + zkrp.p = nil + return errors.New("a must be less than or equal to b") + } + p = new(params) + logb = math.Log(float64(b)) + if logb != 0 { + // TODO: understand how to find optimal parameters + //u = b / int64(logb) + u = 57 + if u != 0 { + l = 0 + for i := b; i > 0; i = i / u { + l = l + 1 + } + params_out, e := SetupUL(u, l) + p.p = ¶ms_out + p.a = a + p.b = b + zkrp.p = p + return e + } else { + zkrp.p = nil + return errors.New("u is zero") + } + } else { + zkrp.p = nil + return errors.New("log(b) is zero") + } +} + +/* +Prove method is responsible for generating the zero knowledge proof. +*/ +func (zkrp *ccs08) Prove() error { + ul := new(big.Int).Exp(new(big.Int).SetInt64(zkrp.p.p.u), new(big.Int).SetInt64(zkrp.p.p.l), nil) + + // x - b + ul + xb := new(big.Int).Sub(zkrp.x, new(big.Int).SetInt64(zkrp.p.b)) + xb.Add(xb, ul) + first, _ := ProveUL(xb, zkrp.r, *zkrp.p.p) + + // x - a + xa := new(big.Int).Sub(zkrp.x, new(big.Int).SetInt64(zkrp.p.a)) + second, _ := ProveUL(xa, zkrp.r, *zkrp.p.p) + + zkrp.proof_out.p1 = first + zkrp.proof_out.p2 = second + return nil +} + +/* +Verify is responsible for validating the proof. +*/ +func (zkrp *ccs08) Verify() (bool, error) { + first, _ := VerifyUL(&zkrp.proof_out.p1, zkrp.p.p) + second, _ := VerifyUL(&zkrp.proof_out.p2, zkrp.p.p) + return first && second, nil +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/ccs08_test.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/ccs08_test.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3b4c08e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/ccs08_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +// Copyright 2018 ING Bank N.V. +// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. +// +// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +// (at your option) any later version. +// +// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +// +// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . + +package zkproofs + +import ( + "testing" + "math/big" + "crypto/rand" + "fmt" + "github.com/ing-bank/zkproofs/go-ethereum/crypto/bn256" + "time" +) + +/* +Tests decomposion into bits. +*/ +func TestDecompose(t *testing.T) { + h := GetBigInt("925") + decx, _ := Decompose(h, 10, 3) + if decx[0] != 5 || decx[1] != 2 || decx[2] != 9 { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %d", decx) + } +} + +/* +Tests Inversion on G1 group. +*/ +func TestNegScalarBaseMulG1(t *testing.T) { + b, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) + pb := new(bn256.G1).ScalarBaseMult(b) + mb := Sub(new(big.Int).SetInt64(0), b) + mpb := new(bn256.G1).ScalarBaseMult(mb) + a := new(bn256.G1).Add(pb, mpb) + aBytes := a.Marshal() + fmt.Println(aBytes) + fmt.Println(a) + for i := 0; i < len(aBytes)-1; i++ { + if aBytes[i] != 0 { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", aBytes[i] == 0) + } + } + if aBytes[len(aBytes)-1] != 1 { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", aBytes[len(aBytes)-1] == 1) + } +} + +/* +Tests Inversion on G2 group. +*/ +func TestNegScalarBaseMulG2(t *testing.T) { + b, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) + pb := new(bn256.G2).ScalarBaseMult(b) + mb := Sub(new(big.Int).SetInt64(0), b) + mpb := new(bn256.G2).ScalarBaseMult(mb) + a := new(bn256.G2).Add(pb, mpb) + if a.IsZero() != true { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", a.IsZero()) + } +} + +/* +Tests Inversion on GFp12 finite field. +*/ +func TestInvertGFp12(t *testing.T) { + b, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) + c, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) + + pb, _ := new(bn256.G1).Unmarshal(new(bn256.G1).ScalarBaseMult(b).Marshal()) + qc, _ := new(bn256.G2).Unmarshal(new(bn256.G2).ScalarBaseMult(c).Marshal()) + + k1 := bn256.Pair(pb, qc) + k2 := new(bn256.GT).Invert(k1) + k3 := new(bn256.GT).Add(k1, k2) + if k3.IsOne() != true { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", k3.IsOne()) + } +} + +/* +Tests the ZK Range Proof building block, where the interval is [0, U^L). +*/ +func TestZKRP_UL(t *testing.T) { + var ( + r *big.Int + ) + p, _ := SetupUL(10, 5) + r, _ = rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) + proof_out, _ := ProveUL(new(big.Int).SetInt64(42176), r, p) + result, _ := VerifyUL(&proof_out, &p) + fmt.Println("ZKRP UL result: ") + fmt.Println(result) + if result != true { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", result) + } +} + +/* +Tests if the Setup algorithm is rejecting wrong input as expected. +*/ +func TestZKRPSetupInput(t *testing.T) { + var ( + zkrp ccs08 + ) + e := zkrp.Setup(1900, 1899) + result := e.Error() != "a must be less than or equal to b" + if result { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", result) + } +} + +/* +Tests the ZK Set Membership (CCS08) protocol. +*/ +func TestZKSet(t *testing.T) { + var ( + r *big.Int + s []int64 + ) + s = make([]int64, 4) + s[0] = 12 + s[1] = 42 + s[2] = 61 + s[3] = 71 + startTime := time.Now() + p, _ := SetupSet(s) + setupTime := time.Now() + fmt.Println(" ############### Setup time:") + fmt.Println(setupTime.Sub(startTime)) + r, _ = rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) + proof_out, _ := ProveSet(12, r, p) + proofTime := time.Now() + fmt.Println("Proof time:") + fmt.Println(proofTime.Sub(setupTime)) + result, _ := VerifySet(&proof_out, &p) + verifyTime := time.Now() + fmt.Println("Verify time:") + fmt.Println(verifyTime.Sub(proofTime)) + fmt.Println("ZK Set Membership result: ") + fmt.Println(result) + if result != true { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", result) + } +} + +/* +Tests the entire ZK Range Proof (CCS08) protocol. +*/ +func TestZKRP(t *testing.T) { + var ( + result bool + zkrp ccs08 + ) + startTime := time.Now() + zkrp.Setup(347184000, 599644800) + setupTime := time.Now() + fmt.Println(" ############### Setup time:") + fmt.Println(setupTime.Sub(startTime)) + zkrp.x = new(big.Int).SetInt64(419835123) + zkrp.r, _ = rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) + e := zkrp.Prove() + proofTime := time.Now() + fmt.Println("Proof time:") + fmt.Println(proofTime.Sub(setupTime)) + if e != nil { + fmt.Println(e.Error()) + } + result, _ = zkrp.Verify() + verifyTime := time.Now() + fmt.Println("Verify time:") + fmt.Println(verifyTime.Sub(proofTime)) + fmt.Println("ZKRP result: ") + fmt.Println(result) + if result != true { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", result) + } +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/p256.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/p256.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d80f936 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/p256.go @@ -0,0 +1,249 @@ +/* +Encapsulates secp256k1 elliptic curve. +*/ + +package zkproofs + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto/sha256" + "errors" + "math/big" + "strconv" + + "../byteconversion" + "../crypto/secp256k1" +) + +var ( + CURVE = secp256k1.S256() + GX = CURVE.Gx + GY = CURVE.Gy +) + +/* +Elliptic Curve Point struct. +*/ +type p256 struct { + X, Y *big.Int +} + +/* +IsZero returns true if and only if the elliptic curve point is the point at infinity. +*/ +func (p *p256) IsZero() bool { + c1 := (p.X == nil || p.Y == nil) + if !c1 { + z := new(big.Int).SetInt64(0) + return p.X.Cmp(z) == 0 && p.Y.Cmp(z) == 0 + } + return true +} + +/* +Neg returns the inverse of the given elliptic curve point. +*/ +func (p *p256) Neg(a *p256) *p256 { + // (X, Y) -> (X, X + Y) + if a.IsZero() { + return p.SetInfinity() + } + one := new(big.Int).SetInt64(1) + mone := new(big.Int).Sub(CURVE.N, one) + p.ScalarMult(p, mone) + return p +} + +/* +Input points must be distinct +*/ +func (p *p256) Add(a, b *p256) *p256 { + if a.IsZero() { + p.X = b.X + p.Y = b.Y + return p + } else if b.IsZero() { + p.X = b.X + p.Y = b.Y + return p + + } + resx, resy := CURVE.Add(a.X, a.Y, b.X, b.Y) + p.X = resx + p.Y = resy + return p +} + +/* +Double returns 2*P, where P is the given elliptic curve point. +*/ +func (p *p256) Double(a *p256) *p256 { + if a.IsZero() { + return p.SetInfinity() + } + resx, resy := CURVE.Double(a.X, a.Y) + p.X = resx + p.Y = resy + return p +} + +/* +ScalarMul encapsulates the scalar Multiplication Algorithm from secp256k1. +*/ +func (p *p256) ScalarMult(a *p256, n *big.Int) *p256 { + if a.IsZero() { + return p.SetInfinity() + } + cmp := n.Cmp(big.NewInt(0)) + if cmp == 0 { + return p.SetInfinity() + } + n = Mod(n, CURVE.N) + bn := n.Bytes() + resx, resy := CURVE.ScalarMult(a.X, a.Y, bn) + p.X = resx + p.Y = resy + return p +} + +/* +ScalarBaseMult returns the Scalar Multiplication by the base generator. +*/ +func (p *p256) ScalarBaseMult(n *big.Int) *p256 { + cmp := n.Cmp(big.NewInt(0)) + if cmp == 0 { + return p.SetInfinity() + } + n = Mod(n, CURVE.N) + bn := n.Bytes() + resx, resy := CURVE.ScalarBaseMult(bn) + p.X = resx + p.Y = resy + return p +} + +/* +Multiply actually is reponsible for the addition of elliptic curve points. +The name here is to maintain compatibility with bn256 interface. +This algorithm verifies if the given elliptic curve points are equal, in which case it +returns the result of Double function, otherwise it returns the result of Add function. +*/ +func (p *p256) Multiply(a, b *p256) *p256 { + if a.IsZero() { + p.X = b.X + p.Y = b.Y + return p + } else if b.IsZero() { + p.X = a.X + p.Y = a.Y + return p + } + if a.X.Cmp(b.X) == 0 && a.Y.Cmp(b.Y) == 0 { + resx, resy := CURVE.Double(a.X, a.Y) + p.X = resx + p.Y = resy + return p + } + resx, resy := CURVE.Add(a.X, a.Y, b.X, b.Y) + p.X = resx + p.Y = resy + return p +} + +/* +SetInfinity sets the given elliptic curve point to the point at infinity. +*/ +func (p *p256) SetInfinity() *p256 { + p.X = nil + p.Y = nil + return p +} + +/* +String returns the readable representation of the given elliptic curve point, i.e. +the tuple formed by X and Y coordinates. +*/ +func (p *p256) String() string { + return "p256(" + p.X.String() + "," + p.Y.String() + ")" +} + +/* +MapToGroup is a hash function that returns a valid elliptic curve point given as +input a string. It is also known as hash-to-point and is used to obtain a generator +that has no discrete logarithm known relation, thus addressing the concept of +NUMS (nothing up my sleeve). +This implementation is based on the paper: +Short signatures from the Weil pairing +Boneh, Lynn and Shacham +Journal of Cryptology, September 2004, Volume 17, Issue 4, pp 297–319 +*/ +func MapToGroup(m string) (*p256, error) { + var ( + i int + buffer bytes.Buffer + ) + i = 0 + for i < 256 { + buffer.Reset() + buffer.WriteString(strconv.Itoa(i)) + buffer.WriteString(m) + x, _ := HashToInt(buffer) + x = Mod(x, CURVE.P) + fx, _ := F(x) + fx = Mod(fx, CURVE.P) + y := fx.ModSqrt(fx, CURVE.P) + if y != nil { + p := &p256{X: x, Y: y} + if p.IsOnCurve() && !p.IsZero() { + return p, nil + } + } + i = i + 1 + } + return nil, errors.New("Failed to Hash-to-point.") +} + +/* +F receives a big integer x as input and return x^3 + 7 mod ORDER. +*/ +func F(x *big.Int) (*big.Int, error) { + // Compute x^2 + x3p7 := Multiply(x, x) + x3p7 = Mod(x3p7, CURVE.P) + // Compute x^3 + x3p7 = Multiply(x3p7, x) + x3p7 = Mod(x3p7, CURVE.P) + // Compute X^3 + 7 + x3p7 = Add(x3p7, new(big.Int).SetInt64(7)) + x3p7 = Mod(x3p7, CURVE.P) + return x3p7, nil +} + +/* +Hash is responsible for the computing a Zp element given the input string. +*/ +func HashToInt(b bytes.Buffer) (*big.Int, error) { + digest := sha256.New() + digest.Write(b.Bytes()) + output := digest.Sum(nil) + tmp := output[0:len(output)] + return byteconversion.FromByteArray(tmp) +} + +/* +IsOnCurve returns TRUE if and only if p has coordinates X and Y that satisfy the +Elliptic Curve equation: y^2 = x^3 + 7. +*/ +func (p *p256) IsOnCurve() bool { + // y² = x³ + 7 + y2 := new(big.Int).Mul(p.Y, p.Y) + y2.Mod(y2, CURVE.P) + + x3 := new(big.Int).Mul(p.X, p.X) + x3.Mul(x3, p.X) + + x3.Add(x3, new(big.Int).SetInt64(7)) + x3.Mod(x3, CURVE.P) + + return x3.Cmp(y2) == 0 +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/p256_test.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/p256_test.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8290f8d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/p256_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ + +package zkproofs + +import ( + "crypto/rand" + "testing" + "math/big" + "github.com/ing-bank/zkproofs/go-ethereum/crypto/secp256k1" +) + +const TestCount = 1000 + +func TestIsZero(t *testing.T) { + curve := secp256k1.S256() + a := make([]byte, 32) + a = curve.N.Bytes() + Ax, Ay := curve.ScalarBaseMult(a) + p1 := p256{X:Ax, Y:Ay} + res := p1.IsZero() + if res != true { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", res) + } +} + +func TestAdd(t * testing.T) { + curve := secp256k1.S256() + a1 := new(big.Int).SetInt64(71).Bytes() + A1x, A1y := curve.ScalarBaseMult(a1) + p1 := &p256{X:A1x, Y:A1y} + a2 := new(big.Int).SetInt64(17).Bytes() + A2x, A2y := curve.ScalarBaseMult(a2) + p2 := &p256{X:A2x, Y:A2y} + p3 := p1.Add(p1, p2) + sa := new(big.Int).SetInt64(-88).Bytes() + sAx, sAy := curve.ScalarBaseMult(sa) + sp := &p256{X:sAx, Y:sAy} + p4 := p3.Add(p3, sp) + res := p4.IsZero() + if res != true { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", res) + } +} + +func TestScalarMultp256(t *testing.T) { + curve := secp256k1.S256() + a1 := new(big.Int).SetInt64(71).Bytes() + Ax, Ay := curve.ScalarBaseMult(a1) + p1 := &p256{X:Ax, Y:Ay} + pr := p1.ScalarMult(p1, curve.N) + res := pr.IsZero() + if res != true { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected true, actual: %t", res) + } +} + +func TestScalarBaseMult(t *testing.T) { + a1 := new(big.Int).SetInt64(71) + p1 := new(p256).ScalarBaseMult(a1) + res := p1.IsZero() + if res != false { + t.Errorf("Assert failure: expected false, actual: %t", res) + } +} + +func TestMapToGroup(t *testing.T) { + curve := secp256k1.S256() + m := "Testing Hash-to-point function:" + p, _ := MapToGroup(m) + p.ScalarMult(p, curve.N) +} + +func BenchmarkScalarMultp256(b *testing.B) { + a := make([]byte, 32) + b.ResetTimer() + for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ { + rand.Read(a) + _ = new(p256).ScalarBaseMult(new(big.Int).SetBytes(a)) + } +} + + + diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/util.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/util.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1a644b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/util.go @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +// Copyright 2018 ING Bank N.V. +// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. +// +// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +// (at your option) any later version. +// +// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +// +// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . + +package zkproofs + +import ( + "crypto/sha256" + "math/big" + + "../byteconversion" + "../crypto/bn256" +) + +//Constants that are going to be used frequently, then we just need to compute them once. +var ( + G1 = new(bn256.G1).ScalarBaseMult(new(big.Int).SetInt64(1)) + G2 = new(bn256.G2).ScalarBaseMult(new(big.Int).SetInt64(1)) + E = bn256.Pair(G1, G2) +) + +/* +Decompose receives as input a bigint x and outputs an array of integers such that +x = sum(xi.u^i), i.e. it returns the decomposition of x into base u. +*/ +func Decompose(x *big.Int, u int64, l int64) ([]int64, error) { + var ( + result []int64 + i int64 + ) + result = make([]int64, l, l) + i = 0 + for i < l { + result[i] = Mod(x, new(big.Int).SetInt64(u)).Int64() + x = new(big.Int).Div(x, new(big.Int).SetInt64(u)) + i = i + 1 + } + return result, nil +} + +/* +Commit method corresponds to the Pedersen commitment scheme. Namely, given input +message x, and randomness r, it outputs g^x.h^r. +*/ +func Commit(x, r *big.Int, h *bn256.G2) (*bn256.G2, error) { + var ( + C *bn256.G2 + ) + C = new(bn256.G2).ScalarBaseMult(x) + C.Add(C, new(bn256.G2).ScalarMult(h, r)) + return C, nil +} + +/* +CommitG1 method corresponds to the Pedersen commitment scheme. Namely, given input +message x, and randomness r, it outputs g^x.h^r. +*/ +func CommitG1(x, r *big.Int, h *p256) (*p256, error) { + var ( + C *p256 + ) + C = new(p256).ScalarBaseMult(x) + Hr := new(p256).ScalarMult(h, r) + C.Add(C, Hr) + return C, nil +} + +func Mult(a *p256, n *big.Int) *p256 { + return new(p256).ScalarMult(a, n) +} + +/* +HashSet is responsible for the computing a Zp element given elements from GT and G2. +*/ +func HashSet(a *bn256.GT, D *bn256.G2) (*big.Int, error) { + digest := sha256.New() + digest.Write([]byte(a.String())) + digest.Write([]byte(D.String())) + output := digest.Sum(nil) + tmp := output[0:len(output)] + return byteconversion.FromByteArray(tmp) +} + +/* +Hash is responsible for the computing a Zp element given elements from GT and G2. +*/ +func Hash(a []*bn256.GT, D *bn256.G2) (*big.Int, error) { + digest := sha256.New() + for i := range a { + digest.Write([]byte(a[i].String())) + } + digest.Write([]byte(D.String())) + output := digest.Sum(nil) + tmp := output[0:len(output)] + return byteconversion.FromByteArray(tmp) +} + +/* +Read big integer in base 10 from string. +*/ +func GetBigInt(value string) *big.Int { + i := new(big.Int) + i.SetString(value, 10) + return i +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/util_test.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/util_test.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b225ca1 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/util_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +// Copyright 2018 ING Bank N.V. +// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. +// +// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by +// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +// (at your option) any later version. +// +// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. +// +// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . + +package zkproofs + From ec407c3c397fa5a6e810cac28af046fb287a160c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2019 19:27:58 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 27/68] streamline confidential tx --- src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/bn256.go | 531 -- src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/bn256_test.go | 304 - src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/constants.go | 44 - src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/curve.go | 286 - src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp12.go | 200 - src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp2.go | 227 - src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp6.go | 296 - src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/main_test.go | 71 - src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/optate.go | 397 -- src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/twist.go | 249 - src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/curve.go | 316 - src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/ext.h | 245 - .../crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/Makefile.am | 207 - .../build-aux/m4/ax_jni_include_dir.m4 | 145 - .../libsecp256k1/build-aux/m4/bitcoin_secp.m4 | 68 - .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/configure.ac | 618 -- .../libsecp256k1/contrib/lax_der_parsing.h | 91 - .../contrib/lax_der_privatekey_parsing.h | 90 - .../libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1.h | 654 --- .../include/secp256k1_bulletproofs.h | 176 - .../include/secp256k1_commitment.h | 164 - .../libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_ecdh.h | 31 - .../include/secp256k1_generator.h | 102 - .../include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h | 144 - .../libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_recovery.h | 110 - .../include/secp256k1_surjectionproof.h | 212 - .../include/secp256k1_whitelist.h | 152 - .../libsecp256k1/sage/group_prover.sage | 322 - .../sage/shallue_van_de_woestijne.sage | 51 - .../libsecp256k1/src/asm/field_10x26_arm.s | 919 --- .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/basic-config.h | 33 - .../crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench.h | 82 - .../libsecp256k1/src/bench_bulletproof.c | 243 - .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_ecdh.c | 54 - .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_ecmult.c | 196 - .../libsecp256k1/src/bench_generator.c | 59 - .../libsecp256k1/src/bench_internal.c | 367 -- .../libsecp256k1/src/bench_rangeproof.c | 64 - .../libsecp256k1/src/bench_recover.c | 60 - .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_sign.c | 56 - .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_verify.c | 112 - .../libsecp256k1/src/bench_whitelist.c | 104 - .../crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecdsa.h | 21 - .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecdsa_impl.h | 313 - .../crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/eckey.h | 25 - .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/eckey_impl.h | 100 - .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult.h | 47 - .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_const.h | 17 - .../libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_const_impl.h | 257 - .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen.h | 43 - .../libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h | 210 - .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_impl.h | 1027 ---- .../crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field.h | 132 - .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_10x26.h | 48 - .../libsecp256k1/src/field_10x26_impl.h | 1161 ---- .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52.h | 47 - .../libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_asm_impl.h | 502 -- .../libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_impl.h | 496 -- .../libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_int128_impl.h | 277 - .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_impl.h | 315 - .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/gen_context.c | 74 - .../crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/group.h | 147 - .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/group_impl.h | 706 --- .../crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/hash.h | 41 - .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/hash_impl.h | 282 - .../src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1.java | 446 -- .../java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Test.java | 226 - .../java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Util.java | 45 - .../java/org/bitcoin/Secp256k1Context.java | 51 - .../src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.c | 377 -- .../src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h | 119 - .../src/java/org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.c | 15 - .../src/java/org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.h | 22 - .../bulletproofs/.inner_product_impl.h.swp | Bin 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.../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_8x32.h | 19 - .../libsecp256k1/src/scalar_8x32_impl.h | 832 --- .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_impl.h | 333 -- .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_low.h | 15 - .../libsecp256k1/src/scalar_low_impl.h | 120 - .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scratch.h | 39 - .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scratch_impl.h | 86 - .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/secp256k1.c | 637 -- .../secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/testrand.h | 41 - .../libsecp256k1/src/testrand_impl.h | 127 - .../crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/tests.c | 5231 ----------------- .../libsecp256k1/src/tests_exhaustive.c | 511 -- .../crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/util.h | 147 - .../crypto/secp256k1/panic_cb.go | 33 - .../crypto/secp256k1/secp256.go | 172 - .../crypto/secp256k1/secp256_test.go | 263 - src/ConfidentialTx/main.go | 63 +- src/ConfidentialTx/main_test.go | 103 + src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bb.go | 35 +- src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bulletproofs.go | 14 +- src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/ccs08.go | 19 +- src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/p256.go | 14 +- src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/util.go | 68 +- 153 files changed, 256 insertions(+), 34060 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/bn256.go delete mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/bn256_test.go delete mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/constants.go delete mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/curve.go delete mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp12.go delete mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp2.go delete mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp6.go delete mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/main_test.go delete mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/optate.go delete mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/twist.go delete mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/curve.go delete mode 100644 src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/ext.h delete mode 100644 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All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -// Package bn256 implements a particular bilinear group at the 128-bit security level. -// -// Bilinear groups are the basis of many of the new cryptographic protocols -// that have been proposed over the past decade. They consist of a triplet of -// groups (G₁, G₂ and GT) such that there exists a function e(g₁ˣ,g₂ʸ)=gTˣʸ -// (where gₓ is a generator of the respective group). That function is called -// a pairing function. -// -// This package specifically implements the Optimal Ate pairing over a 256-bit -// Barreto-Naehrig curve as described in -// http://cryptojedi.org/papers/dclxvi-20100714.pdf. Its output is compatible -// with the implementation described in that paper. -package bn256 - -import ( - "crypto/rand" - "io" - "math/big" -) - -// BUG(agl): this implementation is not constant time. -// TODO(agl): keep GF(p²) elements in Mongomery form. - -// G1 is an abstract cyclic group. The zero value is suitable for use as the -// output of an operation, but cannot be used as an input. -type G1 struct { - p *curvePoint -} - -// RandomG1 returns x and g₁ˣ where x is a random, non-zero number read from r. -func RandomG1(r io.Reader) (*big.Int, *G1, error) { - var k *big.Int - var err error - - for { - k, err = rand.Int(r, Order) - if err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - if k.Sign() > 0 { - break - } - } - - return k, new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(k), nil -} - -func (g *G1) String() string { - return "bn256.G1" + g.p.String() -} - -// CurvePoints returns p's curve points in big integer -func (e *G1) CurvePoints() (*big.Int, *big.Int, *big.Int, *big.Int) { - return e.p.x, e.p.y, e.p.z, e.p.t -} - -// Set to identity element on the group. -func (e *G1) SetInfinity() *G1 { - e.p = newCurvePoint(new(bnPool)) - e.p.SetInfinity() - return e -} - -// ScalarBaseMult sets e to g*k where g is the generator of the group and -// then returns e. -// This method was updated to deal with negative numbers. -func (e *G1) ScalarBaseMult(k *big.Int) *G1 { - if e.p == nil { - e.p = newCurvePoint(nil) - } - cmp := k.Cmp(big.NewInt(0)) - if cmp >=0 { - if cmp == 0 { - e.p.SetInfinity() - } else { - e.p.Mul(curveGen, k, new(bnPool)) - } - } else { - e.p.Negative(e.p.Mul(curveGen, new(big.Int).Abs(k), new(bnPool))) - } - return e -} - -// ScalarMult sets e to a*k and then returns e. -// This method was updated to deal with negative numbers. -func (e *G1) ScalarMult(a *G1, k *big.Int) *G1 { - if e.p == nil { - e.p = newCurvePoint(nil) - } - cmp := k.Cmp(big.NewInt(0)) - if cmp >=0 { - if cmp == 0 { - e.p.SetInfinity() - } else { - e.p.Mul(a.p, k, new(bnPool)) - } - } else { - e.p.Negative(e.p.Mul(a.p, new(big.Int).Abs(k), new(bnPool))) - } - return e -} - -// Add sets e to a+b and then returns e. -// BUG(agl): this function is not complete: a==b fails. -func (e *G1) Add(a, b *G1) *G1 { - if e.p == nil { - e.p = newCurvePoint(nil) - } - e.p.Add(a.p, b.p, new(bnPool)) - return e -} - -// Neg sets e to -a and then returns e. -func (e *G1) Neg(a *G1) *G1 { - if e.p == nil { - e.p = newCurvePoint(nil) - } - e.p.Negative(a.p) - return e -} - -// Marshal converts n to a byte slice. -func (n *G1) Marshal() []byte { - n.p.MakeAffine(nil) - - xBytes := new(big.Int).Mod(n.p.x, P).Bytes() - yBytes := new(big.Int).Mod(n.p.y, P).Bytes() - - // Each value is a 256-bit number. - const numBytes = 256 / 8 - - ret := make([]byte, numBytes*2) - copy(ret[1*numBytes-len(xBytes):], xBytes) - copy(ret[2*numBytes-len(yBytes):], yBytes) - - return ret -} - -// Unmarshal sets e to the result of converting the output of Marshal back into -// a group element and then returns e. -func (e *G1) Unmarshal(m []byte) (*G1, bool) { - // Each value is a 256-bit number. - const numBytes = 256 / 8 - - if len(m) != 2*numBytes { - return nil, false - } - - if e.p == nil { - e.p = newCurvePoint(nil) - } - - e.p.x.SetBytes(m[0*numBytes : 1*numBytes]) - e.p.y.SetBytes(m[1*numBytes : 2*numBytes]) - - if e.p.x.Sign() == 0 && e.p.y.Sign() == 0 { - // This is the point at infinity. - e.p.y.SetInt64(1) - e.p.z.SetInt64(0) - e.p.t.SetInt64(0) - } else { - e.p.z.SetInt64(1) - e.p.t.SetInt64(1) - - if !e.p.IsOnCurve() { - return nil, false - } - } - - return e, true -} - -// G2 is an abstract cyclic group. The zero value is suitable for use as the -// output of an operation, but cannot be used as an input. -type G2 struct { - p *twistPoint -} - -// RandomG1 returns x and g₂ˣ where x is a random, non-zero number read from r. -func RandomG2(r io.Reader) (*big.Int, *G2, error) { - var k *big.Int - var err error - - for { - k, err = rand.Int(r, Order) - if err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - if k.Sign() > 0 { - break - } - } - - return k, new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(k), nil -} - -func (g *G2) String() string { - return "bn256.G2" + g.p.String() -} - -// CurvePoints returns the curve points of p which includes the real -// and imaginary parts of the curve point. -func (e *G2) CurvePoints() (*gfP2, *gfP2, *gfP2, *gfP2) { - return e.p.x, e.p.y, e.p.z, e.p.t -} - -// Set to identity element on the group. -func (e *G2) SetInfinity() *G2 { - e.p = newTwistPoint(new(bnPool)) - e.p.SetInfinity() - return e -} - -// ScalarBaseMult sets e to g*k where g is the generator of the group and -// then returns out. -// This method was updated to deal with negative numbers. -func (e *G2) ScalarBaseMult(k *big.Int) *G2 { - if e.p == nil { - e.p = newTwistPoint(nil) - } - if k.Cmp(big.NewInt(0)) >=0 { - e.p.Mul(twistGen, k, new(bnPool)) - } else { - e.p.Negative(e.p.Mul(twistGen, new(big.Int).Abs(k), new(bnPool)), new(bnPool)) - } - return e -} - -// ScalarMult sets e to a*k and then returns e. -// This method was updated to deal with negative numbers. -func (e *G2) ScalarMult(a *G2, k *big.Int) *G2 { - if e.p == nil { - e.p = newTwistPoint(nil) - } - if k.Cmp(big.NewInt(0)) >=0 { - e.p.Mul(a.p, k, new(bnPool)) - } else { - e.p.Negative(e.p.Mul(a.p, new(big.Int).Abs(k), new(bnPool)), new(bnPool)) - } - return e -} - -// Add sets e to a+b and then returns e. -// BUG(agl): this function is not complete: a==b fails. -func (e *G2) Add(a, b *G2) *G2 { - if e.p == nil { - e.p = newTwistPoint(nil) - } - e.p.Add(a.p, b.p, new(bnPool)) - return e -} - -// Neg sets e to -a and then returns e. -func (e *G2) Neg(a *G2) *G2 { - if e.p == nil { - e.p = newTwistPoint(nil) - } - e.p.Negative(a.p, new(bnPool)) - return e -} - -// Marshal converts n into a byte slice. -func (n *G2) Marshal() []byte { - n.p.MakeAffine(nil) - - xxBytes := new(big.Int).Mod(n.p.x.x, P).Bytes() - xyBytes := new(big.Int).Mod(n.p.x.y, P).Bytes() - yxBytes := new(big.Int).Mod(n.p.y.x, P).Bytes() - yyBytes := new(big.Int).Mod(n.p.y.y, P).Bytes() - - // Each value is a 256-bit number. - const numBytes = 256 / 8 - - ret := make([]byte, numBytes*4) - copy(ret[1*numBytes-len(xxBytes):], xxBytes) - copy(ret[2*numBytes-len(xyBytes):], xyBytes) - copy(ret[3*numBytes-len(yxBytes):], yxBytes) - copy(ret[4*numBytes-len(yyBytes):], yyBytes) - - return ret -} - -// Unmarshal sets e to the result of converting the output of Marshal back into -// a group element and then returns e. -func (e *G2) Unmarshal(m []byte) (*G2, bool) { - // Each value is a 256-bit number. - const numBytes = 256 / 8 - - if len(m) != 4*numBytes { - return nil, false - } - - if e.p == nil { - e.p = newTwistPoint(nil) - } - - e.p.x.x.SetBytes(m[0*numBytes : 1*numBytes]) - e.p.x.y.SetBytes(m[1*numBytes : 2*numBytes]) - e.p.y.x.SetBytes(m[2*numBytes : 3*numBytes]) - e.p.y.y.SetBytes(m[3*numBytes : 4*numBytes]) - - if e.p.x.x.Sign() == 0 && - e.p.x.y.Sign() == 0 && - e.p.y.x.Sign() == 0 && - e.p.y.y.Sign() == 0 { - // This is the point at infinity. - e.p.y.SetOne() - e.p.z.SetZero() - e.p.t.SetZero() - } else { - e.p.z.SetOne() - e.p.t.SetOne() - - if !e.p.IsOnCurve() { - return nil, false - } - } - - return e, true -} - -// GT is an abstract cyclic group. The zero value is suitable for use as the -// output of an operation, but cannot be used as an input. -type GT struct { - p *gfP12 -} - -func (g *GT) String() string { - return "bn256.GT" + g.p.String() -} - -// ScalarMult sets e to a*k and then returns e. -func (e *GT) ScalarMult(a *GT, k *big.Int) *GT { - if e.p == nil { - e.p = newGFp12(nil) - } - e.p.Exp(a.p, k, new(bnPool)) - return e -} - -func (e *GT) Exp(a *GT, k *big.Int) *GT { - var returnValue *GT - if k.Cmp(big.NewInt(0)) >=0 { - returnValue = a.ScalarMult(a, k) - } else { - returnValue = a.Invert(a.ScalarMult(a, new(big.Int).Abs(k))) - } - return returnValue -} - -func (e *GT) Invert(a *GT) *GT { - if e.p == nil { - e.p = newGFp12(nil) - } - e.p.Invert(a.p, new(bnPool)) - return e -} - -// SetZero returns true iff a = 0. -func (e *G1) SetZero() { - e.p.SetInfinity() -} - -// IsZero returns true iff a = 0. -func (e *G1) IsZero() bool { - return e.p.IsInfinity() -} - -// IsZero returns true iff a = 0. -func (e *G2) IsZero() bool { - return e.p.IsInfinity() -} - -// IsZero returns true iff a = 0. -func (e *GT) IsZero() bool { - return e.p.IsZero() -} - -// IsOne returns true iff a = 0. -func (e *GT) IsOne() bool { - return e.p.IsOne() -} - -// Add sets e to a+b and then returns e. -func (e *GT) Add(a, b *GT) *GT { - if e.p == nil { - e.p = newGFp12(nil) - } - e.p.Mul(a.p, b.p, new(bnPool)) - return e -} - -// Neg sets e to -a and then returns e. -func (e *GT) Neg(a *GT) *GT { - if e.p == nil { - e.p = newGFp12(nil) - } - e.p.Invert(a.p, new(bnPool)) - return e -} - - -// Marshal converts n into a byte slice. -func (n *GT) Marshal() []byte { - n.p.Minimal() - - xxxBytes := n.p.x.x.x.Bytes() - xxyBytes := n.p.x.x.y.Bytes() - xyxBytes := n.p.x.y.x.Bytes() - xyyBytes := n.p.x.y.y.Bytes() - xzxBytes := n.p.x.z.x.Bytes() - xzyBytes := n.p.x.z.y.Bytes() - yxxBytes := n.p.y.x.x.Bytes() - yxyBytes := n.p.y.x.y.Bytes() - yyxBytes := n.p.y.y.x.Bytes() - yyyBytes := n.p.y.y.y.Bytes() - yzxBytes := n.p.y.z.x.Bytes() - yzyBytes := n.p.y.z.y.Bytes() - - // Each value is a 256-bit number. - const numBytes = 256 / 8 - - ret := make([]byte, numBytes*12) - copy(ret[1*numBytes-len(xxxBytes):], xxxBytes) - copy(ret[2*numBytes-len(xxyBytes):], xxyBytes) - copy(ret[3*numBytes-len(xyxBytes):], xyxBytes) - copy(ret[4*numBytes-len(xyyBytes):], xyyBytes) - copy(ret[5*numBytes-len(xzxBytes):], xzxBytes) - copy(ret[6*numBytes-len(xzyBytes):], xzyBytes) - copy(ret[7*numBytes-len(yxxBytes):], yxxBytes) - copy(ret[8*numBytes-len(yxyBytes):], yxyBytes) - copy(ret[9*numBytes-len(yyxBytes):], yyxBytes) - copy(ret[10*numBytes-len(yyyBytes):], yyyBytes) - copy(ret[11*numBytes-len(yzxBytes):], yzxBytes) - copy(ret[12*numBytes-len(yzyBytes):], yzyBytes) - - return ret -} - -// Unmarshal sets e to the result of converting the output of Marshal back into -// a group element and then returns e. -func (e *GT) Unmarshal(m []byte) (*GT, bool) { - // Each value is a 256-bit number. - const numBytes = 256 / 8 - - if len(m) != 12*numBytes { - return nil, false - } - - if e.p == nil { - e.p = newGFp12(nil) - } - - e.p.x.x.x.SetBytes(m[0*numBytes : 1*numBytes]) - e.p.x.x.y.SetBytes(m[1*numBytes : 2*numBytes]) - e.p.x.y.x.SetBytes(m[2*numBytes : 3*numBytes]) - e.p.x.y.y.SetBytes(m[3*numBytes : 4*numBytes]) - e.p.x.z.x.SetBytes(m[4*numBytes : 5*numBytes]) - e.p.x.z.y.SetBytes(m[5*numBytes : 6*numBytes]) - e.p.y.x.x.SetBytes(m[6*numBytes : 7*numBytes]) - e.p.y.x.y.SetBytes(m[7*numBytes : 8*numBytes]) - e.p.y.y.x.SetBytes(m[8*numBytes : 9*numBytes]) - e.p.y.y.y.SetBytes(m[9*numBytes : 10*numBytes]) - e.p.y.z.x.SetBytes(m[10*numBytes : 11*numBytes]) - e.p.y.z.y.SetBytes(m[11*numBytes : 12*numBytes]) - - return e, true -} - -// Pair calculates an Optimal Ate pairing. -func Pair(g1 *G1, g2 *G2) *GT { - return >{optimalAte(g2.p, g1.p, new(bnPool))} -} - -// PairingCheck calculates the Optimal Ate pairing for a set of points. -func PairingCheck(a []*G1, b []*G2) bool { - pool := new(bnPool) - - acc := newGFp12(pool) - acc.SetOne() - - for i := 0; i < len(a); i++ { - if a[i].p.IsInfinity() || b[i].p.IsInfinity() { - continue - } - acc.Mul(acc, miller(b[i].p, a[i].p, pool), pool) - } - ret := finalExponentiation(acc, pool) - acc.Put(pool) - - return ret.IsOne() -} - -// bnPool implements a tiny cache of *big.Int objects that's used to reduce the -// number of allocations made during processing. -type bnPool struct { - bns []*big.Int - count int -} - -func (pool *bnPool) Get() *big.Int { - if pool == nil { - return new(big.Int) - } - - pool.count++ - l := len(pool.bns) - if l == 0 { - return new(big.Int) - } - - bn := pool.bns[l-1] - pool.bns = pool.bns[:l-1] - return bn -} - -func (pool *bnPool) Put(bn *big.Int) { - if pool == nil { - return - } - pool.bns = append(pool.bns, bn) - pool.count-- -} - -func (pool *bnPool) Count() int { - return pool.count -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/bn256_test.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/bn256_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index 866065d..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/bn256_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,304 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package bn256 - -import ( - "bytes" - "crypto/rand" - "math/big" - "testing" -) - -func TestGFp2Invert(t *testing.T) { - pool := new(bnPool) - - a := newGFp2(pool) - a.x.SetString("23423492374", 10) - a.y.SetString("12934872398472394827398470", 10) - - inv := newGFp2(pool) - inv.Invert(a, pool) - - b := newGFp2(pool).Mul(inv, a, pool) - if b.x.Int64() != 0 || b.y.Int64() != 1 { - t.Fatalf("bad result for a^-1*a: %s %s", b.x, b.y) - } - - a.Put(pool) - b.Put(pool) - inv.Put(pool) - - if c := pool.Count(); c > 0 { - t.Errorf("Pool count non-zero: %d\n", c) - } -} - -func isZero(n *big.Int) bool { - return new(big.Int).Mod(n, P).Int64() == 0 -} - -func isOne(n *big.Int) bool { - return new(big.Int).Mod(n, P).Int64() == 1 -} - -func TestGFp6Invert(t *testing.T) { - pool := new(bnPool) - - a := newGFp6(pool) - a.x.x.SetString("239487238491", 10) - a.x.y.SetString("2356249827341", 10) - a.y.x.SetString("082659782", 10) - a.y.y.SetString("182703523765", 10) - a.z.x.SetString("978236549263", 10) - a.z.y.SetString("64893242", 10) - - inv := newGFp6(pool) - inv.Invert(a, pool) - - b := newGFp6(pool).Mul(inv, a, pool) - if !isZero(b.x.x) || - !isZero(b.x.y) || - !isZero(b.y.x) || - !isZero(b.y.y) || - !isZero(b.z.x) || - !isOne(b.z.y) { - t.Fatalf("bad result for a^-1*a: %s", b) - } - - a.Put(pool) - b.Put(pool) - inv.Put(pool) - - if c := pool.Count(); c > 0 { - t.Errorf("Pool count non-zero: %d\n", c) - } -} - -func TestGFp12Invert(t *testing.T) { - pool := new(bnPool) - - a := newGFp12(pool) - a.x.x.x.SetString("239846234862342323958623", 10) - a.x.x.y.SetString("2359862352529835623", 10) - a.x.y.x.SetString("928836523", 10) - a.x.y.y.SetString("9856234", 10) - a.x.z.x.SetString("235635286", 10) - a.x.z.y.SetString("5628392833", 10) - a.y.x.x.SetString("252936598265329856238956532167968", 10) - a.y.x.y.SetString("23596239865236954178968", 10) - a.y.y.x.SetString("95421692834", 10) - a.y.y.y.SetString("236548", 10) - a.y.z.x.SetString("924523", 10) - a.y.z.y.SetString("12954623", 10) - - inv := newGFp12(pool) - inv.Invert(a, pool) - - b := newGFp12(pool).Mul(inv, a, pool) - if !isZero(b.x.x.x) || - !isZero(b.x.x.y) || - !isZero(b.x.y.x) || - !isZero(b.x.y.y) || - !isZero(b.x.z.x) || - !isZero(b.x.z.y) || - !isZero(b.y.x.x) || - !isZero(b.y.x.y) || - !isZero(b.y.y.x) || - !isZero(b.y.y.y) || - !isZero(b.y.z.x) || - !isOne(b.y.z.y) { - t.Fatalf("bad result for a^-1*a: %s", b) - } - - a.Put(pool) - b.Put(pool) - inv.Put(pool) - - if c := pool.Count(); c > 0 { - t.Errorf("Pool count non-zero: %d\n", c) - } -} - -func TestCurveImpl(t *testing.T) { - pool := new(bnPool) - - g := &curvePoint{ - pool.Get().SetInt64(1), - pool.Get().SetInt64(-2), - pool.Get().SetInt64(1), - pool.Get().SetInt64(0), - } - - x := pool.Get().SetInt64(32498273234) - X := newCurvePoint(pool).Mul(g, x, pool) - - y := pool.Get().SetInt64(98732423523) - Y := newCurvePoint(pool).Mul(g, y, pool) - - s1 := newCurvePoint(pool).Mul(X, y, pool).MakeAffine(pool) - s2 := newCurvePoint(pool).Mul(Y, x, pool).MakeAffine(pool) - - if s1.x.Cmp(s2.x) != 0 || - s2.x.Cmp(s1.x) != 0 { - t.Errorf("DH points don't match: (%s, %s) (%s, %s)", s1.x, s1.y, s2.x, s2.y) - } - - pool.Put(x) - X.Put(pool) - pool.Put(y) - Y.Put(pool) - s1.Put(pool) - s2.Put(pool) - g.Put(pool) - - if c := pool.Count(); c > 0 { - t.Errorf("Pool count non-zero: %d\n", c) - } -} - -func TestOrderG1(t *testing.T) { - g := new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(Order) - if !g.p.IsInfinity() { - t.Error("G1 has incorrect order") - } - - one := new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(new(big.Int).SetInt64(1)) - g.Add(g, one) - g.p.MakeAffine(nil) - if g.p.x.Cmp(one.p.x) != 0 || g.p.y.Cmp(one.p.y) != 0 { - t.Errorf("1+0 != 1 in G1") - } -} - -func TestOrderG2(t *testing.T) { - g := new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(Order) - if !g.p.IsInfinity() { - t.Error("G2 has incorrect order") - } - - one := new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(new(big.Int).SetInt64(1)) - g.Add(g, one) - g.p.MakeAffine(nil) - if g.p.x.x.Cmp(one.p.x.x) != 0 || - g.p.x.y.Cmp(one.p.x.y) != 0 || - g.p.y.x.Cmp(one.p.y.x) != 0 || - g.p.y.y.Cmp(one.p.y.y) != 0 { - t.Errorf("1+0 != 1 in G2") - } -} - -func TestOrderGT(t *testing.T) { - gt := Pair(&G1{curveGen}, &G2{twistGen}) - g := new(GT).ScalarMult(gt, Order) - if !g.p.IsOne() { - t.Error("GT has incorrect order") - } -} - -func TestBilinearity(t *testing.T) { - for i := 0; i < 2; i++ { - a, p1, _ := RandomG1(rand.Reader) - b, p2, _ := RandomG2(rand.Reader) - e1 := Pair(p1, p2) - - e2 := Pair(&G1{curveGen}, &G2{twistGen}) - e2.ScalarMult(e2, a) - e2.ScalarMult(e2, b) - - minusE2 := new(GT).Neg(e2) - e1.Add(e1, minusE2) - - if !e1.p.IsOne() { - t.Fatalf("bad pairing result: %s", e1) - } - } -} - -func TestG1Marshal(t *testing.T) { - g := new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(new(big.Int).SetInt64(1)) - form := g.Marshal() - _, ok := new(G1).Unmarshal(form) - if !ok { - t.Fatalf("failed to unmarshal") - } - - g.ScalarBaseMult(Order) - form = g.Marshal() - g2, ok := new(G1).Unmarshal(form) - if !ok { - t.Fatalf("failed to unmarshal ∞") - } - if !g2.p.IsInfinity() { - t.Fatalf("∞ unmarshaled incorrectly") - } -} - -func TestG2Marshal(t *testing.T) { - g := new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(new(big.Int).SetInt64(1)) - form := g.Marshal() - _, ok := new(G2).Unmarshal(form) - if !ok { - t.Fatalf("failed to unmarshal") - } - - g.ScalarBaseMult(Order) - form = g.Marshal() - g2, ok := new(G2).Unmarshal(form) - if !ok { - t.Fatalf("failed to unmarshal ∞") - } - if !g2.p.IsInfinity() { - t.Fatalf("∞ unmarshaled incorrectly") - } -} - -func TestG1Identity(t *testing.T) { - g := new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(new(big.Int).SetInt64(0)) - if !g.p.IsInfinity() { - t.Error("failure") - } -} - -func TestG2Identity(t *testing.T) { - g := new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(new(big.Int).SetInt64(0)) - if !g.p.IsInfinity() { - t.Error("failure") - } -} - -func TestTripartiteDiffieHellman(t *testing.T) { - a, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, Order) - b, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, Order) - c, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, Order) - - pa, _ := new(G1).Unmarshal(new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(a).Marshal()) - qa, _ := new(G2).Unmarshal(new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(a).Marshal()) - pb, _ := new(G1).Unmarshal(new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(b).Marshal()) - qb, _ := new(G2).Unmarshal(new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(b).Marshal()) - pc, _ := new(G1).Unmarshal(new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(c).Marshal()) - qc, _ := new(G2).Unmarshal(new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(c).Marshal()) - - k1 := Pair(pb, qc) - k1.ScalarMult(k1, a) - k1Bytes := k1.Marshal() - - k2 := Pair(pc, qa) - k2.ScalarMult(k2, b) - k2Bytes := k2.Marshal() - - k3 := Pair(pa, qb) - k3.ScalarMult(k3, c) - k3Bytes := k3.Marshal() - - if !bytes.Equal(k1Bytes, k2Bytes) || !bytes.Equal(k2Bytes, k3Bytes) { - t.Errorf("keys didn't agree") - } -} - -func BenchmarkPairing(b *testing.B) { - for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ { - Pair(&G1{curveGen}, &G2{twistGen}) - } -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/constants.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/constants.go deleted file mode 100644 index ab649d7..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/constants.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,44 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package bn256 - -import ( - "math/big" -) - -func bigFromBase10(s string) *big.Int { - n, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(s, 10) - return n -} - -// u is the BN parameter that determines the prime: 1868033³. -var u = bigFromBase10("4965661367192848881") - -// p is a prime over which we form a basic field: 36u⁴+36u³+24u²+6u+1. -var P = bigFromBase10("21888242871839275222246405745257275088696311157297823662689037894645226208583") - -// Order is the number of elements in both G₁ and G₂: 36u⁴+36u³+18u²+6u+1. -var Order = bigFromBase10("21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698204186575808495617") - -// xiToPMinus1Over6 is ξ^((p-1)/6) where ξ = i+9. -var xiToPMinus1Over6 = &gfP2{bigFromBase10("16469823323077808223889137241176536799009286646108169935659301613961712198316"), bigFromBase10("8376118865763821496583973867626364092589906065868298776909617916018768340080")} - -// xiToPMinus1Over3 is ξ^((p-1)/3) where ξ = i+9. -var xiToPMinus1Over3 = &gfP2{bigFromBase10("10307601595873709700152284273816112264069230130616436755625194854815875713954"), bigFromBase10("21575463638280843010398324269430826099269044274347216827212613867836435027261")} - -// xiToPMinus1Over2 is ξ^((p-1)/2) where ξ = i+9. -var xiToPMinus1Over2 = &gfP2{bigFromBase10("3505843767911556378687030309984248845540243509899259641013678093033130930403"), bigFromBase10("2821565182194536844548159561693502659359617185244120367078079554186484126554")} - -// xiToPSquaredMinus1Over3 is ξ^((p²-1)/3) where ξ = i+9. -var xiToPSquaredMinus1Over3 = bigFromBase10("21888242871839275220042445260109153167277707414472061641714758635765020556616") - -// xiTo2PSquaredMinus2Over3 is ξ^((2p²-2)/3) where ξ = i+9 (a cubic root of unity, mod p). -var xiTo2PSquaredMinus2Over3 = bigFromBase10("2203960485148121921418603742825762020974279258880205651966") - -// xiToPSquaredMinus1Over6 is ξ^((1p²-1)/6) where ξ = i+9 (a cubic root of -1, mod p). -var xiToPSquaredMinus1Over6 = bigFromBase10("21888242871839275220042445260109153167277707414472061641714758635765020556617") - -// xiTo2PMinus2Over3 is ξ^((2p-2)/3) where ξ = i+9. -var xiTo2PMinus2Over3 = &gfP2{bigFromBase10("19937756971775647987995932169929341994314640652964949448313374472400716661030"), bigFromBase10("2581911344467009335267311115468803099551665605076196740867805258568234346338")} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/curve.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/curve.go deleted file mode 100644 index 2f7594e..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/curve.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,286 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package bn256 - -import ( - "math/big" -) - -// curvePoint implements the elliptic curve y²=x³+3. Points are kept in -// Jacobian form and t=z² when valid. G₁ is the set of points of this curve on -// GF(p). -type curvePoint struct { - x, y, z, t *big.Int -} - -var curveB = new(big.Int).SetInt64(3) - -// curveGen is the generator of G₁. -var curveGen = &curvePoint{ - new(big.Int).SetInt64(1), - new(big.Int).SetInt64(-2), - new(big.Int).SetInt64(1), - new(big.Int).SetInt64(1), -} - -func newCurvePoint(pool *bnPool) *curvePoint { - return &curvePoint{ - pool.Get(), - pool.Get(), - pool.Get(), - pool.Get(), - } -} - -func (c *curvePoint) String() string { - c.MakeAffine(new(bnPool)) - return "(" + c.x.String() + ", " + c.y.String() + ")" -} - -func (c *curvePoint) Put(pool *bnPool) { - pool.Put(c.x) - pool.Put(c.y) - pool.Put(c.z) - pool.Put(c.t) -} - -func (c *curvePoint) Set(a *curvePoint) { - c.x.Set(a.x) - c.y.Set(a.y) - c.z.Set(a.z) - c.t.Set(a.t) -} - -// IsOnCurve returns true iff c is on the curve where c must be in affine form. -func (c *curvePoint) IsOnCurve() bool { - yy := new(big.Int).Mul(c.y, c.y) - xxx := new(big.Int).Mul(c.x, c.x) - xxx.Mul(xxx, c.x) - yy.Sub(yy, xxx) - yy.Sub(yy, curveB) - if yy.Sign() < 0 || yy.Cmp(P) >= 0 { - yy.Mod(yy, P) - } - return yy.Sign() == 0 -} - -func (c *curvePoint) SetInfinity() { - c.z.SetInt64(0) -} - -func (c *curvePoint) IsInfinity() bool { - return c.z.Sign() == 0 -} - -func (c *curvePoint) Add(a, b *curvePoint, pool *bnPool) { - if a.IsInfinity() { - c.Set(b) - return - } - if b.IsInfinity() { - c.Set(a) - return - } - - // See http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-code/shortw/jacobian-0/addition/add-2007-bl.op3 - - // Normalize the points by replacing a = [x1:y1:z1] and b = [x2:y2:z2] - // by [u1:s1:z1·z2] and [u2:s2:z1·z2] - // where u1 = x1·z2², s1 = y1·z2³ and u1 = x2·z1², s2 = y2·z1³ - z1z1 := pool.Get().Mul(a.z, a.z) - z1z1.Mod(z1z1, P) - z2z2 := pool.Get().Mul(b.z, b.z) - z2z2.Mod(z2z2, P) - u1 := pool.Get().Mul(a.x, z2z2) - u1.Mod(u1, P) - u2 := pool.Get().Mul(b.x, z1z1) - u2.Mod(u2, P) - - t := pool.Get().Mul(b.z, z2z2) - t.Mod(t, P) - s1 := pool.Get().Mul(a.y, t) - s1.Mod(s1, P) - - t.Mul(a.z, z1z1) - t.Mod(t, P) - s2 := pool.Get().Mul(b.y, t) - s2.Mod(s2, P) - - // Compute x = (2h)²(s²-u1-u2) - // where s = (s2-s1)/(u2-u1) is the slope of the line through - // (u1,s1) and (u2,s2). The extra factor 2h = 2(u2-u1) comes from the value of z below. - // This is also: - // 4(s2-s1)² - 4h²(u1+u2) = 4(s2-s1)² - 4h³ - 4h²(2u1) - // = r² - j - 2v - // with the notations below. - h := pool.Get().Sub(u2, u1) - xEqual := h.Sign() == 0 - - t.Add(h, h) - // i = 4h² - i := pool.Get().Mul(t, t) - i.Mod(i, P) - // j = 4h³ - j := pool.Get().Mul(h, i) - j.Mod(j, P) - - t.Sub(s2, s1) - yEqual := t.Sign() == 0 - if xEqual && yEqual { - c.Double(a, pool) - return - } - r := pool.Get().Add(t, t) - - v := pool.Get().Mul(u1, i) - v.Mod(v, P) - - // t4 = 4(s2-s1)² - t4 := pool.Get().Mul(r, r) - t4.Mod(t4, P) - t.Add(v, v) - t6 := pool.Get().Sub(t4, j) - c.x.Sub(t6, t) - - // Set y = -(2h)³(s1 + s*(x/4h²-u1)) - // This is also - // y = - 2·s1·j - (s2-s1)(2x - 2i·u1) = r(v-x) - 2·s1·j - t.Sub(v, c.x) // t7 - t4.Mul(s1, j) // t8 - t4.Mod(t4, P) - t6.Add(t4, t4) // t9 - t4.Mul(r, t) // t10 - t4.Mod(t4, P) - c.y.Sub(t4, t6) - - // Set z = 2(u2-u1)·z1·z2 = 2h·z1·z2 - t.Add(a.z, b.z) // t11 - t4.Mul(t, t) // t12 - t4.Mod(t4, P) - t.Sub(t4, z1z1) // t13 - t4.Sub(t, z2z2) // t14 - c.z.Mul(t4, h) - c.z.Mod(c.z, P) - - pool.Put(z1z1) - pool.Put(z2z2) - pool.Put(u1) - pool.Put(u2) - pool.Put(t) - pool.Put(s1) - pool.Put(s2) - pool.Put(h) - pool.Put(i) - pool.Put(j) - pool.Put(r) - pool.Put(v) - pool.Put(t4) - pool.Put(t6) -} - -func (c *curvePoint) Double(a *curvePoint, pool *bnPool) { - // See http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-code/shortw/jacobian-0/doubling/dbl-2009-l.op3 - A := pool.Get().Mul(a.x, a.x) - A.Mod(A, P) - B := pool.Get().Mul(a.y, a.y) - B.Mod(B, P) - C_ := pool.Get().Mul(B, B) - C_.Mod(C_, P) - - t := pool.Get().Add(a.x, B) - t2 := pool.Get().Mul(t, t) - t2.Mod(t2, P) - t.Sub(t2, A) - t2.Sub(t, C_) - d := pool.Get().Add(t2, t2) - t.Add(A, A) - e := pool.Get().Add(t, A) - f := pool.Get().Mul(e, e) - f.Mod(f, P) - - t.Add(d, d) - c.x.Sub(f, t) - - t.Add(C_, C_) - t2.Add(t, t) - t.Add(t2, t2) - c.y.Sub(d, c.x) - t2.Mul(e, c.y) - t2.Mod(t2, P) - c.y.Sub(t2, t) - - t.Mul(a.y, a.z) - t.Mod(t, P) - c.z.Add(t, t) - - pool.Put(A) - pool.Put(B) - pool.Put(C_) - pool.Put(t) - pool.Put(t2) - pool.Put(d) - pool.Put(e) - pool.Put(f) -} - -func (c *curvePoint) Mul(a *curvePoint, scalar *big.Int, pool *bnPool) *curvePoint { - sum := newCurvePoint(pool) - sum.SetInfinity() - t := newCurvePoint(pool) - - for i := scalar.BitLen(); i >= 0; i-- { - t.Double(sum, pool) - if scalar.Bit(i) != 0 { - sum.Add(t, a, pool) - } else { - sum.Set(t) - } - } - - c.Set(sum) - sum.Put(pool) - t.Put(pool) - return c -} - -func (c *curvePoint) MakeAffine(pool *bnPool) *curvePoint { - if words := c.z.Bits(); len(words) == 1 && words[0] == 1 { - return c - } - - if c.IsInfinity() { - c.x.SetInt64(0) - c.y.SetInt64(1) - c.z.SetInt64(0) - c.t.SetInt64(0) - return c - } - - zInv := pool.Get().ModInverse(c.z, P) - t := pool.Get().Mul(c.y, zInv) - t.Mod(t, P) - zInv2 := pool.Get().Mul(zInv, zInv) - zInv2.Mod(zInv2, P) - c.y.Mul(t, zInv2) - c.y.Mod(c.y, P) - t.Mul(c.x, zInv2) - t.Mod(t, P) - c.x.Set(t) - c.z.SetInt64(1) - c.t.SetInt64(1) - - pool.Put(zInv) - pool.Put(t) - pool.Put(zInv2) - - return c -} - -func (c *curvePoint) Negative(a *curvePoint) { - c.x.Set(a.x) - c.y.Neg(a.y) - c.z.Set(a.z) - c.t.SetInt64(0) -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp12.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp12.go deleted file mode 100644 index f084edd..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp12.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,200 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package bn256 - -// For details of the algorithms used, see "Multiplication and Squaring on -// Pairing-Friendly Fields, Devegili et al. -// http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/471.pdf. - -import ( - "math/big" -) - -// gfP12 implements the field of size p¹² as a quadratic extension of gfP6 -// where ω²=τ. -type gfP12 struct { - x, y *gfP6 // value is xω + y -} - -func newGFp12(pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { - return &gfP12{newGFp6(pool), newGFp6(pool)} -} - -func (e *gfP12) String() string { - return "(" + e.x.String() + "," + e.y.String() + ")" -} - -func (e *gfP12) Put(pool *bnPool) { - e.x.Put(pool) - e.y.Put(pool) -} - -func (e *gfP12) Set(a *gfP12) *gfP12 { - e.x.Set(a.x) - e.y.Set(a.y) - return e -} - -func (e *gfP12) SetZero() *gfP12 { - e.x.SetZero() - e.y.SetZero() - return e -} - -func (e *gfP12) SetOne() *gfP12 { - e.x.SetZero() - e.y.SetOne() - return e -} - -func (e *gfP12) Minimal() { - e.x.Minimal() - e.y.Minimal() -} - -func (e *gfP12) IsZero() bool { - e.Minimal() - return e.x.IsZero() && e.y.IsZero() -} - -func (e *gfP12) IsOne() bool { - e.Minimal() - return e.x.IsZero() && e.y.IsOne() -} - -func (e *gfP12) Conjugate(a *gfP12) *gfP12 { - e.x.Negative(a.x) - e.y.Set(a.y) - return a -} - -func (e *gfP12) Negative(a *gfP12) *gfP12 { - e.x.Negative(a.x) - e.y.Negative(a.y) - return e -} - -// Frobenius computes (xω+y)^p = x^p ω·ξ^((p-1)/6) + y^p -func (e *gfP12) Frobenius(a *gfP12, pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { - e.x.Frobenius(a.x, pool) - e.y.Frobenius(a.y, pool) - e.x.MulScalar(e.x, xiToPMinus1Over6, pool) - return e -} - -// FrobeniusP2 computes (xω+y)^p² = x^p² ω·ξ^((p²-1)/6) + y^p² -func (e *gfP12) FrobeniusP2(a *gfP12, pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { - e.x.FrobeniusP2(a.x) - e.x.MulGFP(e.x, xiToPSquaredMinus1Over6) - e.y.FrobeniusP2(a.y) - return e -} - -func (e *gfP12) Add(a, b *gfP12) *gfP12 { - e.x.Add(a.x, b.x) - e.y.Add(a.y, b.y) - return e -} - -func (e *gfP12) Sub(a, b *gfP12) *gfP12 { - e.x.Sub(a.x, b.x) - e.y.Sub(a.y, b.y) - return e -} - -func (e *gfP12) Mul(a, b *gfP12, pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { - tx := newGFp6(pool) - tx.Mul(a.x, b.y, pool) - t := newGFp6(pool) - t.Mul(b.x, a.y, pool) - tx.Add(tx, t) - - ty := newGFp6(pool) - ty.Mul(a.y, b.y, pool) - t.Mul(a.x, b.x, pool) - t.MulTau(t, pool) - e.y.Add(ty, t) - e.x.Set(tx) - - tx.Put(pool) - ty.Put(pool) - t.Put(pool) - return e -} - -func (e *gfP12) MulScalar(a *gfP12, b *gfP6, pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { - e.x.Mul(e.x, b, pool) - e.y.Mul(e.y, b, pool) - return e -} - -func (c *gfP12) Exp(a *gfP12, power *big.Int, pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { - sum := newGFp12(pool) - sum.SetOne() - t := newGFp12(pool) - - for i := power.BitLen() - 1; i >= 0; i-- { - t.Square(sum, pool) - if power.Bit(i) != 0 { - sum.Mul(t, a, pool) - } else { - sum.Set(t) - } - } - - c.Set(sum) - - sum.Put(pool) - t.Put(pool) - - return c -} - -func (e *gfP12) Square(a *gfP12, pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { - // Complex squaring algorithm - v0 := newGFp6(pool) - v0.Mul(a.x, a.y, pool) - - t := newGFp6(pool) - t.MulTau(a.x, pool) - t.Add(a.y, t) - ty := newGFp6(pool) - ty.Add(a.x, a.y) - ty.Mul(ty, t, pool) - ty.Sub(ty, v0) - t.MulTau(v0, pool) - ty.Sub(ty, t) - - e.y.Set(ty) - e.x.Double(v0) - - v0.Put(pool) - t.Put(pool) - ty.Put(pool) - - return e -} - -func (e *gfP12) Invert(a *gfP12, pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { - // See "Implementing cryptographic pairings", M. Scott, section 3.2. - // ftp://136.206.11.249/pub/crypto/pairings.pdf - t1 := newGFp6(pool) - t2 := newGFp6(pool) - - t1.Square(a.x, pool) - t2.Square(a.y, pool) - t1.MulTau(t1, pool) - t1.Sub(t2, t1) - t2.Invert(t1, pool) - - e.x.Negative(a.x) - e.y.Set(a.y) - e.MulScalar(e, t2, pool) - - t1.Put(pool) - t2.Put(pool) - - return e -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp2.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp2.go deleted file mode 100644 index 3981f6c..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp2.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,227 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package bn256 - -// For details of the algorithms used, see "Multiplication and Squaring on -// Pairing-Friendly Fields, Devegili et al. -// http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/471.pdf. - -import ( - "math/big" -) - -// gfP2 implements a field of size p² as a quadratic extension of the base -// field where i²=-1. -type gfP2 struct { - x, y *big.Int // value is xi+y. -} - -func newGFp2(pool *bnPool) *gfP2 { - return &gfP2{pool.Get(), pool.Get()} -} - -func (e *gfP2) String() string { - x := new(big.Int).Mod(e.x, P) - y := new(big.Int).Mod(e.y, P) - return "(" + x.String() + "," + y.String() + ")" -} - -func (e *gfP2) Put(pool *bnPool) { - pool.Put(e.x) - pool.Put(e.y) -} - -func (e *gfP2) Set(a *gfP2) *gfP2 { - e.x.Set(a.x) - e.y.Set(a.y) - return e -} - -func (e *gfP2) SetZero() *gfP2 { - e.x.SetInt64(0) - e.y.SetInt64(0) - return e -} - -func (e *gfP2) SetOne() *gfP2 { - e.x.SetInt64(0) - e.y.SetInt64(1) - return e -} - -func (e *gfP2) Minimal() { - if e.x.Sign() < 0 || e.x.Cmp(P) >= 0 { - e.x.Mod(e.x, P) - } - if e.y.Sign() < 0 || e.y.Cmp(P) >= 0 { - e.y.Mod(e.y, P) - } -} - -func (e *gfP2) IsZero() bool { - return e.x.Sign() == 0 && e.y.Sign() == 0 -} - -func (e *gfP2) IsOne() bool { - if e.x.Sign() != 0 { - return false - } - words := e.y.Bits() - return len(words) == 1 && words[0] == 1 -} - -func (e *gfP2) Conjugate(a *gfP2) *gfP2 { - e.y.Set(a.y) - e.x.Neg(a.x) - return e -} - -func (e *gfP2) Negative(a *gfP2) *gfP2 { - e.x.Neg(a.x) - e.y.Neg(a.y) - return e -} - -func (e *gfP2) Add(a, b *gfP2) *gfP2 { - e.x.Add(a.x, b.x) - e.y.Add(a.y, b.y) - return e -} - -func (e *gfP2) Sub(a, b *gfP2) *gfP2 { - e.x.Sub(a.x, b.x) - e.y.Sub(a.y, b.y) - return e -} - -func (e *gfP2) Double(a *gfP2) *gfP2 { - e.x.Lsh(a.x, 1) - e.y.Lsh(a.y, 1) - return e -} - -func (c *gfP2) Exp(a *gfP2, power *big.Int, pool *bnPool) *gfP2 { - sum := newGFp2(pool) - sum.SetOne() - t := newGFp2(pool) - - for i := power.BitLen() - 1; i >= 0; i-- { - t.Square(sum, pool) - if power.Bit(i) != 0 { - sum.Mul(t, a, pool) - } else { - sum.Set(t) - } - } - - c.Set(sum) - - sum.Put(pool) - t.Put(pool) - - return c -} - -// See "Multiplication and Squaring in Pairing-Friendly Fields", -// http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/471.pdf -func (e *gfP2) Mul(a, b *gfP2, pool *bnPool) *gfP2 { - tx := pool.Get().Mul(a.x, b.y) - t := pool.Get().Mul(b.x, a.y) - tx.Add(tx, t) - tx.Mod(tx, P) - - ty := pool.Get().Mul(a.y, b.y) - t.Mul(a.x, b.x) - ty.Sub(ty, t) - e.y.Mod(ty, P) - e.x.Set(tx) - - pool.Put(tx) - pool.Put(ty) - pool.Put(t) - - return e -} - -func (e *gfP2) MulScalar(a *gfP2, b *big.Int) *gfP2 { - e.x.Mul(a.x, b) - e.y.Mul(a.y, b) - return e -} - -// MulXi sets e=ξa where ξ=i+9 and then returns e. -func (e *gfP2) MulXi(a *gfP2, pool *bnPool) *gfP2 { - // (xi+y)(i+3) = (9x+y)i+(9y-x) - tx := pool.Get().Lsh(a.x, 3) - tx.Add(tx, a.x) - tx.Add(tx, a.y) - - ty := pool.Get().Lsh(a.y, 3) - ty.Add(ty, a.y) - ty.Sub(ty, a.x) - - e.x.Set(tx) - e.y.Set(ty) - - pool.Put(tx) - pool.Put(ty) - - return e -} - -func (e *gfP2) Square(a *gfP2, pool *bnPool) *gfP2 { - // Complex squaring algorithm: - // (xi+b)² = (x+y)(y-x) + 2*i*x*y - t1 := pool.Get().Sub(a.y, a.x) - t2 := pool.Get().Add(a.x, a.y) - ty := pool.Get().Mul(t1, t2) - ty.Mod(ty, P) - - t1.Mul(a.x, a.y) - t1.Lsh(t1, 1) - - e.x.Mod(t1, P) - e.y.Set(ty) - - pool.Put(t1) - pool.Put(t2) - pool.Put(ty) - - return e -} - -func (e *gfP2) Invert(a *gfP2, pool *bnPool) *gfP2 { - // See "Implementing cryptographic pairings", M. Scott, section 3.2. - // ftp://136.206.11.249/pub/crypto/pairings.pdf - t := pool.Get() - t.Mul(a.y, a.y) - t2 := pool.Get() - t2.Mul(a.x, a.x) - t.Add(t, t2) - - inv := pool.Get() - inv.ModInverse(t, P) - - e.x.Neg(a.x) - e.x.Mul(e.x, inv) - e.x.Mod(e.x, P) - - e.y.Mul(a.y, inv) - e.y.Mod(e.y, P) - - pool.Put(t) - pool.Put(t2) - pool.Put(inv) - - return e -} - -func (e *gfP2) Real() *big.Int { - return e.x -} - -func (e *gfP2) Imag() *big.Int { - return e.y -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp6.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp6.go deleted file mode 100644 index 2188566..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/gfp6.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,296 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package bn256 - -// For details of the algorithms used, see "Multiplication and Squaring on -// Pairing-Friendly Fields, Devegili et al. -// http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/471.pdf. - -import ( - "math/big" -) - -// gfP6 implements the field of size p⁶ as a cubic extension of gfP2 where τ³=ξ -// and ξ=i+9. -type gfP6 struct { - x, y, z *gfP2 // value is xτ² + yτ + z -} - -func newGFp6(pool *bnPool) *gfP6 { - return &gfP6{newGFp2(pool), newGFp2(pool), newGFp2(pool)} -} - -func (e *gfP6) String() string { - return "(" + e.x.String() + "," + e.y.String() + "," + e.z.String() + ")" -} - -func (e *gfP6) Put(pool *bnPool) { - e.x.Put(pool) - e.y.Put(pool) - e.z.Put(pool) -} - -func (e *gfP6) Set(a *gfP6) *gfP6 { - e.x.Set(a.x) - e.y.Set(a.y) - e.z.Set(a.z) - return e -} - -func (e *gfP6) SetZero() *gfP6 { - e.x.SetZero() - e.y.SetZero() - e.z.SetZero() - return e -} - -func (e *gfP6) SetOne() *gfP6 { - e.x.SetZero() - e.y.SetZero() - e.z.SetOne() - return e -} - -func (e *gfP6) Minimal() { - e.x.Minimal() - e.y.Minimal() - e.z.Minimal() -} - -func (e *gfP6) IsZero() bool { - return e.x.IsZero() && e.y.IsZero() && e.z.IsZero() -} - -func (e *gfP6) IsOne() bool { - return e.x.IsZero() && e.y.IsZero() && e.z.IsOne() -} - -func (e *gfP6) Negative(a *gfP6) *gfP6 { - e.x.Negative(a.x) - e.y.Negative(a.y) - e.z.Negative(a.z) - return e -} - -func (e *gfP6) Frobenius(a *gfP6, pool *bnPool) *gfP6 { - e.x.Conjugate(a.x) - e.y.Conjugate(a.y) - e.z.Conjugate(a.z) - - e.x.Mul(e.x, xiTo2PMinus2Over3, pool) - e.y.Mul(e.y, xiToPMinus1Over3, pool) - return e -} - -// FrobeniusP2 computes (xτ²+yτ+z)^(p²) = xτ^(2p²) + yτ^(p²) + z -func (e *gfP6) FrobeniusP2(a *gfP6) *gfP6 { - // τ^(2p²) = τ²τ^(2p²-2) = τ²ξ^((2p²-2)/3) - e.x.MulScalar(a.x, xiTo2PSquaredMinus2Over3) - // τ^(p²) = ττ^(p²-1) = τξ^((p²-1)/3) - e.y.MulScalar(a.y, xiToPSquaredMinus1Over3) - e.z.Set(a.z) - return e -} - -func (e *gfP6) Add(a, b *gfP6) *gfP6 { - e.x.Add(a.x, b.x) - e.y.Add(a.y, b.y) - e.z.Add(a.z, b.z) - return e -} - -func (e *gfP6) Sub(a, b *gfP6) *gfP6 { - e.x.Sub(a.x, b.x) - e.y.Sub(a.y, b.y) - e.z.Sub(a.z, b.z) - return e -} - -func (e *gfP6) Double(a *gfP6) *gfP6 { - e.x.Double(a.x) - e.y.Double(a.y) - e.z.Double(a.z) - return e -} - -func (e *gfP6) Mul(a, b *gfP6, pool *bnPool) *gfP6 { - // "Multiplication and Squaring on Pairing-Friendly Fields" - // Section 4, Karatsuba method. - // http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/471.pdf - - v0 := newGFp2(pool) - v0.Mul(a.z, b.z, pool) - v1 := newGFp2(pool) - v1.Mul(a.y, b.y, pool) - v2 := newGFp2(pool) - v2.Mul(a.x, b.x, pool) - - t0 := newGFp2(pool) - t0.Add(a.x, a.y) - t1 := newGFp2(pool) - t1.Add(b.x, b.y) - tz := newGFp2(pool) - tz.Mul(t0, t1, pool) - - tz.Sub(tz, v1) - tz.Sub(tz, v2) - tz.MulXi(tz, pool) - tz.Add(tz, v0) - - t0.Add(a.y, a.z) - t1.Add(b.y, b.z) - ty := newGFp2(pool) - ty.Mul(t0, t1, pool) - ty.Sub(ty, v0) - ty.Sub(ty, v1) - t0.MulXi(v2, pool) - ty.Add(ty, t0) - - t0.Add(a.x, a.z) - t1.Add(b.x, b.z) - tx := newGFp2(pool) - tx.Mul(t0, t1, pool) - tx.Sub(tx, v0) - tx.Add(tx, v1) - tx.Sub(tx, v2) - - e.x.Set(tx) - e.y.Set(ty) - e.z.Set(tz) - - t0.Put(pool) - t1.Put(pool) - tx.Put(pool) - ty.Put(pool) - tz.Put(pool) - v0.Put(pool) - v1.Put(pool) - v2.Put(pool) - return e -} - -func (e *gfP6) MulScalar(a *gfP6, b *gfP2, pool *bnPool) *gfP6 { - e.x.Mul(a.x, b, pool) - e.y.Mul(a.y, b, pool) - e.z.Mul(a.z, b, pool) - return e -} - -func (e *gfP6) MulGFP(a *gfP6, b *big.Int) *gfP6 { - e.x.MulScalar(a.x, b) - e.y.MulScalar(a.y, b) - e.z.MulScalar(a.z, b) - return e -} - -// MulTau computes τ·(aτ²+bτ+c) = bτ²+cτ+aξ -func (e *gfP6) MulTau(a *gfP6, pool *bnPool) { - tz := newGFp2(pool) - tz.MulXi(a.x, pool) - ty := newGFp2(pool) - ty.Set(a.y) - e.y.Set(a.z) - e.x.Set(ty) - e.z.Set(tz) - tz.Put(pool) - ty.Put(pool) -} - -func (e *gfP6) Square(a *gfP6, pool *bnPool) *gfP6 { - v0 := newGFp2(pool).Square(a.z, pool) - v1 := newGFp2(pool).Square(a.y, pool) - v2 := newGFp2(pool).Square(a.x, pool) - - c0 := newGFp2(pool).Add(a.x, a.y) - c0.Square(c0, pool) - c0.Sub(c0, v1) - c0.Sub(c0, v2) - c0.MulXi(c0, pool) - c0.Add(c0, v0) - - c1 := newGFp2(pool).Add(a.y, a.z) - c1.Square(c1, pool) - c1.Sub(c1, v0) - c1.Sub(c1, v1) - xiV2 := newGFp2(pool).MulXi(v2, pool) - c1.Add(c1, xiV2) - - c2 := newGFp2(pool).Add(a.x, a.z) - c2.Square(c2, pool) - c2.Sub(c2, v0) - c2.Add(c2, v1) - c2.Sub(c2, v2) - - e.x.Set(c2) - e.y.Set(c1) - e.z.Set(c0) - - v0.Put(pool) - v1.Put(pool) - v2.Put(pool) - c0.Put(pool) - c1.Put(pool) - c2.Put(pool) - xiV2.Put(pool) - - return e -} - -func (e *gfP6) Invert(a *gfP6, pool *bnPool) *gfP6 { - // See "Implementing cryptographic pairings", M. Scott, section 3.2. - // ftp://136.206.11.249/pub/crypto/pairings.pdf - - // Here we can give a short explanation of how it works: let j be a cubic root of - // unity in GF(p²) so that 1+j+j²=0. - // Then (xτ² + yτ + z)(xj²τ² + yjτ + z)(xjτ² + yj²τ + z) - // = (xτ² + yτ + z)(Cτ²+Bτ+A) - // = (x³ξ²+y³ξ+z³-3ξxyz) = F is an element of the base field (the norm). - // - // On the other hand (xj²τ² + yjτ + z)(xjτ² + yj²τ + z) - // = τ²(y²-ξxz) + τ(ξx²-yz) + (z²-ξxy) - // - // So that's why A = (z²-ξxy), B = (ξx²-yz), C = (y²-ξxz) - t1 := newGFp2(pool) - - A := newGFp2(pool) - A.Square(a.z, pool) - t1.Mul(a.x, a.y, pool) - t1.MulXi(t1, pool) - A.Sub(A, t1) - - B := newGFp2(pool) - B.Square(a.x, pool) - B.MulXi(B, pool) - t1.Mul(a.y, a.z, pool) - B.Sub(B, t1) - - C_ := newGFp2(pool) - C_.Square(a.y, pool) - t1.Mul(a.x, a.z, pool) - C_.Sub(C_, t1) - - F := newGFp2(pool) - F.Mul(C_, a.y, pool) - F.MulXi(F, pool) - t1.Mul(A, a.z, pool) - F.Add(F, t1) - t1.Mul(B, a.x, pool) - t1.MulXi(t1, pool) - F.Add(F, t1) - - F.Invert(F, pool) - - e.x.Mul(C_, F, pool) - e.y.Mul(B, F, pool) - e.z.Mul(A, F, pool) - - t1.Put(pool) - A.Put(pool) - B.Put(pool) - C_.Put(pool) - F.Put(pool) - - return e -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/main_test.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/main_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index 0230f1b..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/main_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,71 +0,0 @@ -package bn256 - -import ( - "testing" - - "crypto/rand" -) - -func TestRandomG2Marshal(t *testing.T) { - for i := 0; i < 10; i++ { - n, g2, err := RandomG2(rand.Reader) - if err != nil { - t.Error(err) - continue - } - t.Logf("%d: %x\n", n, g2.Marshal()) - } -} - -func TestPairings(t *testing.T) { - a1 := new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(bigFromBase10("1")) - a2 := new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(bigFromBase10("2")) - a37 := new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(bigFromBase10("37")) - an1 := new(G1).ScalarBaseMult(bigFromBase10("21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698204186575808495616")) - - b0 := new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(bigFromBase10("0")) - b1 := new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(bigFromBase10("1")) - b2 := new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(bigFromBase10("2")) - b27 := new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(bigFromBase10("27")) - b999 := new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(bigFromBase10("999")) - bn1 := new(G2).ScalarBaseMult(bigFromBase10("21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698204186575808495616")) - - p1 := Pair(a1, b1) - pn1 := Pair(a1, bn1) - np1 := Pair(an1, b1) - if pn1.String() != np1.String() { - t.Error("Pairing mismatch: e(a, -b) != e(-a, b)") - } - if !PairingCheck([]*G1{a1, an1}, []*G2{b1, b1}) { - t.Error("MultiAte check gave false negative!") - } - p0 := new(GT).Add(p1, pn1) - p0_2 := Pair(a1, b0) - if p0.String() != p0_2.String() { - t.Error("Pairing mismatch: e(a, b) * e(a, -b) != 1") - } - p0_3 := new(GT).ScalarMult(p1, bigFromBase10("21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698204186575808495617")) - if p0.String() != p0_3.String() { - t.Error("Pairing mismatch: e(a, b) has wrong order") - } - p2 := Pair(a2, b1) - p2_2 := Pair(a1, b2) - p2_3 := new(GT).ScalarMult(p1, bigFromBase10("2")) - if p2.String() != p2_2.String() { - t.Error("Pairing mismatch: e(a, b * 2) != e(a * 2, b)") - } - if p2.String() != p2_3.String() { - t.Error("Pairing mismatch: e(a, b * 2) != e(a, b) ** 2") - } - if p2.String() == p1.String() { - t.Error("Pairing is degenerate!") - } - if PairingCheck([]*G1{a1, a1}, []*G2{b1, b1}) { - t.Error("MultiAte check gave false positive!") - } - p999 := Pair(a37, b27) - p999_2 := Pair(a1, b999) - if p999.String() != p999_2.String() { - t.Error("Pairing mismatch: e(a * 37, b * 27) != e(a, b * 999)") - } -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/optate.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/optate.go deleted file mode 100644 index 9d69570..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/optate.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,397 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package bn256 - -func lineFunctionAdd(r, p *twistPoint, q *curvePoint, r2 *gfP2, pool *bnPool) (a, b, c *gfP2, rOut *twistPoint) { - // See the mixed addition algorithm from "Faster Computation of the - // Tate Pairing", http://arxiv.org/pdf/0904.0854v3.pdf - - B := newGFp2(pool).Mul(p.x, r.t, pool) - - D := newGFp2(pool).Add(p.y, r.z) - D.Square(D, pool) - D.Sub(D, r2) - D.Sub(D, r.t) - D.Mul(D, r.t, pool) - - H := newGFp2(pool).Sub(B, r.x) - I := newGFp2(pool).Square(H, pool) - - E := newGFp2(pool).Add(I, I) - E.Add(E, E) - - J := newGFp2(pool).Mul(H, E, pool) - - L1 := newGFp2(pool).Sub(D, r.y) - L1.Sub(L1, r.y) - - V := newGFp2(pool).Mul(r.x, E, pool) - - rOut = newTwistPoint(pool) - rOut.x.Square(L1, pool) - rOut.x.Sub(rOut.x, J) - rOut.x.Sub(rOut.x, V) - rOut.x.Sub(rOut.x, V) - - rOut.z.Add(r.z, H) - rOut.z.Square(rOut.z, pool) - rOut.z.Sub(rOut.z, r.t) - rOut.z.Sub(rOut.z, I) - - t := newGFp2(pool).Sub(V, rOut.x) - t.Mul(t, L1, pool) - t2 := newGFp2(pool).Mul(r.y, J, pool) - t2.Add(t2, t2) - rOut.y.Sub(t, t2) - - rOut.t.Square(rOut.z, pool) - - t.Add(p.y, rOut.z) - t.Square(t, pool) - t.Sub(t, r2) - t.Sub(t, rOut.t) - - t2.Mul(L1, p.x, pool) - t2.Add(t2, t2) - a = newGFp2(pool) - a.Sub(t2, t) - - c = newGFp2(pool) - c.MulScalar(rOut.z, q.y) - c.Add(c, c) - - b = newGFp2(pool) - b.SetZero() - b.Sub(b, L1) - b.MulScalar(b, q.x) - b.Add(b, b) - - B.Put(pool) - D.Put(pool) - H.Put(pool) - I.Put(pool) - E.Put(pool) - J.Put(pool) - L1.Put(pool) - V.Put(pool) - t.Put(pool) - t2.Put(pool) - - return -} - -func lineFunctionDouble(r *twistPoint, q *curvePoint, pool *bnPool) (a, b, c *gfP2, rOut *twistPoint) { - // See the doubling algorithm for a=0 from "Faster Computation of the - // Tate Pairing", http://arxiv.org/pdf/0904.0854v3.pdf - - A := newGFp2(pool).Square(r.x, pool) - B := newGFp2(pool).Square(r.y, pool) - C_ := newGFp2(pool).Square(B, pool) - - D := newGFp2(pool).Add(r.x, B) - D.Square(D, pool) - D.Sub(D, A) - D.Sub(D, C_) - D.Add(D, D) - - E := newGFp2(pool).Add(A, A) - E.Add(E, A) - - G := newGFp2(pool).Square(E, pool) - - rOut = newTwistPoint(pool) - rOut.x.Sub(G, D) - rOut.x.Sub(rOut.x, D) - - rOut.z.Add(r.y, r.z) - rOut.z.Square(rOut.z, pool) - rOut.z.Sub(rOut.z, B) - rOut.z.Sub(rOut.z, r.t) - - rOut.y.Sub(D, rOut.x) - rOut.y.Mul(rOut.y, E, pool) - t := newGFp2(pool).Add(C_, C_) - t.Add(t, t) - t.Add(t, t) - rOut.y.Sub(rOut.y, t) - - rOut.t.Square(rOut.z, pool) - - t.Mul(E, r.t, pool) - t.Add(t, t) - b = newGFp2(pool) - b.SetZero() - b.Sub(b, t) - b.MulScalar(b, q.x) - - a = newGFp2(pool) - a.Add(r.x, E) - a.Square(a, pool) - a.Sub(a, A) - a.Sub(a, G) - t.Add(B, B) - t.Add(t, t) - a.Sub(a, t) - - c = newGFp2(pool) - c.Mul(rOut.z, r.t, pool) - c.Add(c, c) - c.MulScalar(c, q.y) - - A.Put(pool) - B.Put(pool) - C_.Put(pool) - D.Put(pool) - E.Put(pool) - G.Put(pool) - t.Put(pool) - - return -} - -func mulLine(ret *gfP12, a, b, c *gfP2, pool *bnPool) { - a2 := newGFp6(pool) - a2.x.SetZero() - a2.y.Set(a) - a2.z.Set(b) - a2.Mul(a2, ret.x, pool) - t3 := newGFp6(pool).MulScalar(ret.y, c, pool) - - t := newGFp2(pool) - t.Add(b, c) - t2 := newGFp6(pool) - t2.x.SetZero() - t2.y.Set(a) - t2.z.Set(t) - ret.x.Add(ret.x, ret.y) - - ret.y.Set(t3) - - ret.x.Mul(ret.x, t2, pool) - ret.x.Sub(ret.x, a2) - ret.x.Sub(ret.x, ret.y) - a2.MulTau(a2, pool) - ret.y.Add(ret.y, a2) - - a2.Put(pool) - t3.Put(pool) - t2.Put(pool) - t.Put(pool) -} - -// sixuPlus2NAF is 6u+2 in non-adjacent form. -var sixuPlus2NAF = []int8{0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, -1, 0, 0, 1, -1, 0, 0, 1, 0, - 0, 1, 1, 0, -1, 0, 0, 1, 0, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, - 1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, 1, - 1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, -1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1} - -// miller implements the Miller loop for calculating the Optimal Ate pairing. -// See algorithm 1 from http://cryptojedi.org/papers/dclxvi-20100714.pdf -func miller(q *twistPoint, p *curvePoint, pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { - ret := newGFp12(pool) - ret.SetOne() - - aAffine := newTwistPoint(pool) - aAffine.Set(q) - aAffine.MakeAffine(pool) - - bAffine := newCurvePoint(pool) - bAffine.Set(p) - bAffine.MakeAffine(pool) - - minusA := newTwistPoint(pool) - minusA.Negative(aAffine, pool) - - r := newTwistPoint(pool) - r.Set(aAffine) - - r2 := newGFp2(pool) - r2.Square(aAffine.y, pool) - - for i := len(sixuPlus2NAF) - 1; i > 0; i-- { - a, b, c, newR := lineFunctionDouble(r, bAffine, pool) - if i != len(sixuPlus2NAF)-1 { - ret.Square(ret, pool) - } - - mulLine(ret, a, b, c, pool) - a.Put(pool) - b.Put(pool) - c.Put(pool) - r.Put(pool) - r = newR - - switch sixuPlus2NAF[i-1] { - case 1: - a, b, c, newR = lineFunctionAdd(r, aAffine, bAffine, r2, pool) - case -1: - a, b, c, newR = lineFunctionAdd(r, minusA, bAffine, r2, pool) - default: - continue - } - - mulLine(ret, a, b, c, pool) - a.Put(pool) - b.Put(pool) - c.Put(pool) - r.Put(pool) - r = newR - } - - // In order to calculate Q1 we have to convert q from the sextic twist - // to the full GF(p^12) group, apply the Frobenius there, and convert - // back. - // - // The twist isomorphism is (x', y') -> (xω², yω³). If we consider just - // x for a moment, then after applying the Frobenius, we have x̄ω^(2p) - // where x̄ is the conjugate of x. If we are going to apply the inverse - // isomorphism we need a value with a single coefficient of ω² so we - // rewrite this as x̄ω^(2p-2)ω². ξ⁶ = ω and, due to the construction of - // p, 2p-2 is a multiple of six. Therefore we can rewrite as - // x̄ξ^((p-1)/3)ω² and applying the inverse isomorphism eliminates the - // ω². - // - // A similar argument can be made for the y value. - - q1 := newTwistPoint(pool) - q1.x.Conjugate(aAffine.x) - q1.x.Mul(q1.x, xiToPMinus1Over3, pool) - q1.y.Conjugate(aAffine.y) - q1.y.Mul(q1.y, xiToPMinus1Over2, pool) - q1.z.SetOne() - q1.t.SetOne() - - // For Q2 we are applying the p² Frobenius. The two conjugations cancel - // out and we are left only with the factors from the isomorphism. In - // the case of x, we end up with a pure number which is why - // xiToPSquaredMinus1Over3 is ∈ GF(p). With y we get a factor of -1. We - // ignore this to end up with -Q2. - - minusQ2 := newTwistPoint(pool) - minusQ2.x.MulScalar(aAffine.x, xiToPSquaredMinus1Over3) - minusQ2.y.Set(aAffine.y) - minusQ2.z.SetOne() - minusQ2.t.SetOne() - - r2.Square(q1.y, pool) - a, b, c, newR := lineFunctionAdd(r, q1, bAffine, r2, pool) - mulLine(ret, a, b, c, pool) - a.Put(pool) - b.Put(pool) - c.Put(pool) - r.Put(pool) - r = newR - - r2.Square(minusQ2.y, pool) - a, b, c, newR = lineFunctionAdd(r, minusQ2, bAffine, r2, pool) - mulLine(ret, a, b, c, pool) - a.Put(pool) - b.Put(pool) - c.Put(pool) - r.Put(pool) - r = newR - - aAffine.Put(pool) - bAffine.Put(pool) - minusA.Put(pool) - r.Put(pool) - r2.Put(pool) - - return ret -} - -// finalExponentiation computes the (p¹²-1)/Order-th power of an element of -// GF(p¹²) to obtain an element of GT (steps 13-15 of algorithm 1 from -// http://cryptojedi.org/papers/dclxvi-20100714.pdf) -func finalExponentiation(in *gfP12, pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { - t1 := newGFp12(pool) - - // This is the p^6-Frobenius - t1.x.Negative(in.x) - t1.y.Set(in.y) - - inv := newGFp12(pool) - inv.Invert(in, pool) - t1.Mul(t1, inv, pool) - - t2 := newGFp12(pool).FrobeniusP2(t1, pool) - t1.Mul(t1, t2, pool) - - fp := newGFp12(pool).Frobenius(t1, pool) - fp2 := newGFp12(pool).FrobeniusP2(t1, pool) - fp3 := newGFp12(pool).Frobenius(fp2, pool) - - fu, fu2, fu3 := newGFp12(pool), newGFp12(pool), newGFp12(pool) - fu.Exp(t1, u, pool) - fu2.Exp(fu, u, pool) - fu3.Exp(fu2, u, pool) - - y3 := newGFp12(pool).Frobenius(fu, pool) - fu2p := newGFp12(pool).Frobenius(fu2, pool) - fu3p := newGFp12(pool).Frobenius(fu3, pool) - y2 := newGFp12(pool).FrobeniusP2(fu2, pool) - - y0 := newGFp12(pool) - y0.Mul(fp, fp2, pool) - y0.Mul(y0, fp3, pool) - - y1, y4, y5 := newGFp12(pool), newGFp12(pool), newGFp12(pool) - y1.Conjugate(t1) - y5.Conjugate(fu2) - y3.Conjugate(y3) - y4.Mul(fu, fu2p, pool) - y4.Conjugate(y4) - - y6 := newGFp12(pool) - y6.Mul(fu3, fu3p, pool) - y6.Conjugate(y6) - - t0 := newGFp12(pool) - t0.Square(y6, pool) - t0.Mul(t0, y4, pool) - t0.Mul(t0, y5, pool) - t1.Mul(y3, y5, pool) - t1.Mul(t1, t0, pool) - t0.Mul(t0, y2, pool) - t1.Square(t1, pool) - t1.Mul(t1, t0, pool) - t1.Square(t1, pool) - t0.Mul(t1, y1, pool) - t1.Mul(t1, y0, pool) - t0.Square(t0, pool) - t0.Mul(t0, t1, pool) - - inv.Put(pool) - t1.Put(pool) - t2.Put(pool) - fp.Put(pool) - fp2.Put(pool) - fp3.Put(pool) - fu.Put(pool) - fu2.Put(pool) - fu3.Put(pool) - fu2p.Put(pool) - fu3p.Put(pool) - y0.Put(pool) - y1.Put(pool) - y2.Put(pool) - y3.Put(pool) - y4.Put(pool) - y5.Put(pool) - y6.Put(pool) - - return t0 -} - -func optimalAte(a *twistPoint, b *curvePoint, pool *bnPool) *gfP12 { - e := miller(a, b, pool) - ret := finalExponentiation(e, pool) - e.Put(pool) - - if a.IsInfinity() || b.IsInfinity() { - ret.SetOne() - } - return ret -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/twist.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/twist.go deleted file mode 100644 index 95b966e..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/bn256/twist.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,249 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package bn256 - -import ( - "math/big" -) - -// twistPoint implements the elliptic curve y²=x³+3/ξ over GF(p²). Points are -// kept in Jacobian form and t=z² when valid. The group G₂ is the set of -// n-torsion points of this curve over GF(p²) (where n = Order) -type twistPoint struct { - x, y, z, t *gfP2 -} - -var twistB = &gfP2{ - bigFromBase10("266929791119991161246907387137283842545076965332900288569378510910307636690"), - bigFromBase10("19485874751759354771024239261021720505790618469301721065564631296452457478373"), -} - -// twistGen is the generator of group G₂. -var twistGen = &twistPoint{ - &gfP2{ - bigFromBase10("11559732032986387107991004021392285783925812861821192530917403151452391805634"), - bigFromBase10("10857046999023057135944570762232829481370756359578518086990519993285655852781"), - }, - &gfP2{ - bigFromBase10("4082367875863433681332203403145435568316851327593401208105741076214120093531"), - bigFromBase10("8495653923123431417604973247489272438418190587263600148770280649306958101930"), - }, - &gfP2{ - bigFromBase10("0"), - bigFromBase10("1"), - }, - &gfP2{ - bigFromBase10("0"), - bigFromBase10("1"), - }, -} - -func newTwistPoint(pool *bnPool) *twistPoint { - return &twistPoint{ - newGFp2(pool), - newGFp2(pool), - newGFp2(pool), - newGFp2(pool), - } -} - -func (c *twistPoint) String() string { - return "(" + c.x.String() + ", " + c.y.String() + ", " + c.z.String() + ")" -} - -func (c *twistPoint) Put(pool *bnPool) { - c.x.Put(pool) - c.y.Put(pool) - c.z.Put(pool) - c.t.Put(pool) -} - -func (c *twistPoint) Set(a *twistPoint) { - c.x.Set(a.x) - c.y.Set(a.y) - c.z.Set(a.z) - c.t.Set(a.t) -} - -// IsOnCurve returns true iff c is on the curve where c must be in affine form. -func (c *twistPoint) IsOnCurve() bool { - pool := new(bnPool) - yy := newGFp2(pool).Square(c.y, pool) - xxx := newGFp2(pool).Square(c.x, pool) - xxx.Mul(xxx, c.x, pool) - yy.Sub(yy, xxx) - yy.Sub(yy, twistB) - yy.Minimal() - return yy.x.Sign() == 0 && yy.y.Sign() == 0 -} - -func (c *twistPoint) SetInfinity() { - c.z.SetZero() -} - -func (c *twistPoint) IsInfinity() bool { - return c.z.IsZero() -} - -func (c *twistPoint) Add(a, b *twistPoint, pool *bnPool) { - // For additional comments, see the same function in curve.go. - - if a.IsInfinity() { - c.Set(b) - return - } - if b.IsInfinity() { - c.Set(a) - return - } - - // See http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-code/shortw/jacobian-0/addition/add-2007-bl.op3 - z1z1 := newGFp2(pool).Square(a.z, pool) - z2z2 := newGFp2(pool).Square(b.z, pool) - u1 := newGFp2(pool).Mul(a.x, z2z2, pool) - u2 := newGFp2(pool).Mul(b.x, z1z1, pool) - - t := newGFp2(pool).Mul(b.z, z2z2, pool) - s1 := newGFp2(pool).Mul(a.y, t, pool) - - t.Mul(a.z, z1z1, pool) - s2 := newGFp2(pool).Mul(b.y, t, pool) - - h := newGFp2(pool).Sub(u2, u1) - xEqual := h.IsZero() - - t.Add(h, h) - i := newGFp2(pool).Square(t, pool) - j := newGFp2(pool).Mul(h, i, pool) - - t.Sub(s2, s1) - yEqual := t.IsZero() - if xEqual && yEqual { - c.Double(a, pool) - return - } - r := newGFp2(pool).Add(t, t) - - v := newGFp2(pool).Mul(u1, i, pool) - - t4 := newGFp2(pool).Square(r, pool) - t.Add(v, v) - t6 := newGFp2(pool).Sub(t4, j) - c.x.Sub(t6, t) - - t.Sub(v, c.x) // t7 - t4.Mul(s1, j, pool) // t8 - t6.Add(t4, t4) // t9 - t4.Mul(r, t, pool) // t10 - c.y.Sub(t4, t6) - - t.Add(a.z, b.z) // t11 - t4.Square(t, pool) // t12 - t.Sub(t4, z1z1) // t13 - t4.Sub(t, z2z2) // t14 - c.z.Mul(t4, h, pool) - - z1z1.Put(pool) - z2z2.Put(pool) - u1.Put(pool) - u2.Put(pool) - t.Put(pool) - s1.Put(pool) - s2.Put(pool) - h.Put(pool) - i.Put(pool) - j.Put(pool) - r.Put(pool) - v.Put(pool) - t4.Put(pool) - t6.Put(pool) -} - -func (c *twistPoint) Double(a *twistPoint, pool *bnPool) { - // See http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-code/shortw/jacobian-0/doubling/dbl-2009-l.op3 - A := newGFp2(pool).Square(a.x, pool) - B := newGFp2(pool).Square(a.y, pool) - C_ := newGFp2(pool).Square(B, pool) - - t := newGFp2(pool).Add(a.x, B) - t2 := newGFp2(pool).Square(t, pool) - t.Sub(t2, A) - t2.Sub(t, C_) - d := newGFp2(pool).Add(t2, t2) - t.Add(A, A) - e := newGFp2(pool).Add(t, A) - f := newGFp2(pool).Square(e, pool) - - t.Add(d, d) - c.x.Sub(f, t) - - t.Add(C_, C_) - t2.Add(t, t) - t.Add(t2, t2) - c.y.Sub(d, c.x) - t2.Mul(e, c.y, pool) - c.y.Sub(t2, t) - - t.Mul(a.y, a.z, pool) - c.z.Add(t, t) - - A.Put(pool) - B.Put(pool) - C_.Put(pool) - t.Put(pool) - t2.Put(pool) - d.Put(pool) - e.Put(pool) - f.Put(pool) -} - -func (c *twistPoint) Mul(a *twistPoint, scalar *big.Int, pool *bnPool) *twistPoint { - sum := newTwistPoint(pool) - sum.SetInfinity() - t := newTwistPoint(pool) - - for i := scalar.BitLen(); i >= 0; i-- { - t.Double(sum, pool) - if scalar.Bit(i) != 0 { - sum.Add(t, a, pool) - } else { - sum.Set(t) - } - } - - c.Set(sum) - sum.Put(pool) - t.Put(pool) - return c -} - -func (c *twistPoint) MakeAffine(pool *bnPool) *twistPoint { - if c.z.IsOne() { - return c - } - - zInv := newGFp2(pool).Invert(c.z, pool) - t := newGFp2(pool).Mul(c.y, zInv, pool) - zInv2 := newGFp2(pool).Square(zInv, pool) - c.y.Mul(t, zInv2, pool) - t.Mul(c.x, zInv2, pool) - c.x.Set(t) - c.z.SetOne() - c.t.SetOne() - - zInv.Put(pool) - t.Put(pool) - zInv2.Put(pool) - - return c -} - -func (c *twistPoint) Negative(a *twistPoint, pool *bnPool) { - c.x.Set(a.x) - c.y.SetZero() - c.y.Sub(c.y, a.y) - c.z.Set(a.z) - c.t.SetZero() -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/curve.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/curve.go deleted file mode 100644 index fa54bf6..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/curve.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,316 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Copyright 2011 ThePiachu. All rights reserved. -// -// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are -// met: -// -// * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -// notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -// * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above -// copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer -// in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -// distribution. -// * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its -// contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from -// this software without specific prior written permission. -// * The name of ThePiachu may not be used to endorse or promote products -// derived from this software without specific prior written permission. -// -// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS -// "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT -// LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR -// A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT -// OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT -// LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -// DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -// THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -// (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE -// OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - -package secp256k1 - -import ( - "crypto/elliptic" - "math/big" - "sync" - "unsafe" - - "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common/math" -) - -/* -#include "libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1.h" -extern int secp256k1_pubkey_scalar_mul(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const unsigned char *point, const unsigned char *scalar); -*/ -import "C" - -// This code is from https://github.com/ThePiachu/GoBit and implements -// several Koblitz elliptic curves over prime fields. -// -// The curve methods, internally, on Jacobian coordinates. For a given -// (x, y) position on the curve, the Jacobian coordinates are (x1, y1, -// z1) where x = x1/z1² and y = y1/z1³. The greatest speedups come -// when the whole calculation can be performed within the transform -// (as in ScalarMult and ScalarBaseMult). But even for Add and Double, -// it's faster to apply and reverse the transform than to operate in -// affine coordinates. - -// A BitCurve represents a Koblitz Curve with a=0. -// See http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw.html -type BitCurve struct { - P *big.Int // the order of the underlying field - N *big.Int // the order of the base point - B *big.Int // the constant of the BitCurve equation - Gx, Gy *big.Int // (x,y) of the base point - BitSize int // the size of the underlying field -} - -func (BitCurve *BitCurve) Params() *elliptic.CurveParams { - return &elliptic.CurveParams{ - P: BitCurve.P, - N: BitCurve.N, - B: BitCurve.B, - Gx: BitCurve.Gx, - Gy: BitCurve.Gy, - BitSize: BitCurve.BitSize, - } -} - -// IsOnBitCurve returns true if the given (x,y) lies on the BitCurve. -func (BitCurve *BitCurve) IsOnCurve(x, y *big.Int) bool { - // y² = x³ + b - y2 := new(big.Int).Mul(y, y) //y² - y2.Mod(y2, BitCurve.P) //y²%P - - x3 := new(big.Int).Mul(x, x) //x² - x3.Mul(x3, x) //x³ - - x3.Add(x3, BitCurve.B) //x³+B - x3.Mod(x3, BitCurve.P) //(x³+B)%P - - return x3.Cmp(y2) == 0 -} - -//TODO: double check if the function is okay -// affineFromJacobian reverses the Jacobian transform. See the comment at the -// top of the file. -func (BitCurve *BitCurve) affineFromJacobian(x, y, z *big.Int) (xOut, yOut *big.Int) { - if z.Sign() == 0 { - return new(big.Int), new(big.Int) - } - - zinv := new(big.Int).ModInverse(z, BitCurve.P) - zinvsq := new(big.Int).Mul(zinv, zinv) - - xOut = new(big.Int).Mul(x, zinvsq) - xOut.Mod(xOut, BitCurve.P) - zinvsq.Mul(zinvsq, zinv) - yOut = new(big.Int).Mul(y, zinvsq) - yOut.Mod(yOut, BitCurve.P) - return -} - -// Add returns the sum of (x1,y1) and (x2,y2) -func (BitCurve *BitCurve) Add(x1, y1, x2, y2 *big.Int) (*big.Int, *big.Int) { - z := new(big.Int).SetInt64(1) - return BitCurve.affineFromJacobian(BitCurve.addJacobian(x1, y1, z, x2, y2, z)) -} - -// addJacobian takes two points in Jacobian coordinates, (x1, y1, z1) and -// (x2, y2, z2) and returns their sum, also in Jacobian form. -func (BitCurve *BitCurve) addJacobian(x1, y1, z1, x2, y2, z2 *big.Int) (*big.Int, *big.Int, *big.Int) { - // See http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-0.html#addition-add-2007-bl - z1z1 := new(big.Int).Mul(z1, z1) - z1z1.Mod(z1z1, BitCurve.P) - z2z2 := new(big.Int).Mul(z2, z2) - z2z2.Mod(z2z2, BitCurve.P) - - u1 := new(big.Int).Mul(x1, z2z2) - u1.Mod(u1, BitCurve.P) - u2 := new(big.Int).Mul(x2, z1z1) - u2.Mod(u2, BitCurve.P) - h := new(big.Int).Sub(u2, u1) - if h.Sign() == -1 { - h.Add(h, BitCurve.P) - } - i := new(big.Int).Lsh(h, 1) - i.Mul(i, i) - j := new(big.Int).Mul(h, i) - - s1 := new(big.Int).Mul(y1, z2) - s1.Mul(s1, z2z2) - s1.Mod(s1, BitCurve.P) - s2 := new(big.Int).Mul(y2, z1) - s2.Mul(s2, z1z1) - s2.Mod(s2, BitCurve.P) - r := new(big.Int).Sub(s2, s1) - if r.Sign() == -1 { - r.Add(r, BitCurve.P) - } - r.Lsh(r, 1) - v := new(big.Int).Mul(u1, i) - - x3 := new(big.Int).Set(r) - x3.Mul(x3, x3) - x3.Sub(x3, j) - x3.Sub(x3, v) - x3.Sub(x3, v) - x3.Mod(x3, BitCurve.P) - - y3 := new(big.Int).Set(r) - v.Sub(v, x3) - y3.Mul(y3, v) - s1.Mul(s1, j) - s1.Lsh(s1, 1) - y3.Sub(y3, s1) - y3.Mod(y3, BitCurve.P) - - z3 := new(big.Int).Add(z1, z2) - z3.Mul(z3, z3) - z3.Sub(z3, z1z1) - if z3.Sign() == -1 { - z3.Add(z3, BitCurve.P) - } - z3.Sub(z3, z2z2) - if z3.Sign() == -1 { - z3.Add(z3, BitCurve.P) - } - z3.Mul(z3, h) - z3.Mod(z3, BitCurve.P) - - return x3, y3, z3 -} - -// Double returns 2*(x,y) -func (BitCurve *BitCurve) Double(x1, y1 *big.Int) (*big.Int, *big.Int) { - z1 := new(big.Int).SetInt64(1) - return BitCurve.affineFromJacobian(BitCurve.doubleJacobian(x1, y1, z1)) -} - -// doubleJacobian takes a point in Jacobian coordinates, (x, y, z), and -// returns its double, also in Jacobian form. -func (BitCurve *BitCurve) doubleJacobian(x, y, z *big.Int) (*big.Int, *big.Int, *big.Int) { - // See http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-0.html#doubling-dbl-2009-l - - a := new(big.Int).Mul(x, x) //X1² - b := new(big.Int).Mul(y, y) //Y1² - c := new(big.Int).Mul(b, b) //B² - - d := new(big.Int).Add(x, b) //X1+B - d.Mul(d, d) //(X1+B)² - d.Sub(d, a) //(X1+B)²-A - d.Sub(d, c) //(X1+B)²-A-C - d.Mul(d, big.NewInt(2)) //2*((X1+B)²-A-C) - - e := new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(3), a) //3*A - f := new(big.Int).Mul(e, e) //E² - - x3 := new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(2), d) //2*D - x3.Sub(f, x3) //F-2*D - x3.Mod(x3, BitCurve.P) - - y3 := new(big.Int).Sub(d, x3) //D-X3 - y3.Mul(e, y3) //E*(D-X3) - y3.Sub(y3, new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(8), c)) //E*(D-X3)-8*C - y3.Mod(y3, BitCurve.P) - - z3 := new(big.Int).Mul(y, z) //Y1*Z1 - z3.Mul(big.NewInt(2), z3) //3*Y1*Z1 - z3.Mod(z3, BitCurve.P) - - return x3, y3, z3 -} - -func (BitCurve *BitCurve) ScalarMult(Bx, By *big.Int, scalar []byte) (*big.Int, *big.Int) { - // Ensure scalar is exactly 32 bytes. We pad always, even if - // scalar is 32 bytes long, to avoid a timing side channel. - if len(scalar) > 32 { - panic("can't handle scalars > 256 bits") - } - // NOTE: potential timing issue - padded := make([]byte, 32) - copy(padded[32-len(scalar):], scalar) - scalar = padded - - // Do the multiplication in C, updating point. - point := make([]byte, 64) - math.ReadBits(Bx, point[:32]) - math.ReadBits(By, point[32:]) - pointPtr := (*C.uchar)(unsafe.Pointer(&point[0])) - scalarPtr := (*C.uchar)(unsafe.Pointer(&scalar[0])) - res := C.secp256k1_pubkey_scalar_mul(context, pointPtr, scalarPtr) - - // Unpack the result and clear temporaries. - x := new(big.Int).SetBytes(point[:32]) - y := new(big.Int).SetBytes(point[32:]) - for i := range point { - point[i] = 0 - } - for i := range padded { - scalar[i] = 0 - } - if res != 1 { - return nil, nil - } - return x, y -} - -// ScalarBaseMult returns k*G, where G is the base point of the group and k is -// an integer in big-endian form. -func (BitCurve *BitCurve) ScalarBaseMult(k []byte) (*big.Int, *big.Int) { - return BitCurve.ScalarMult(BitCurve.Gx, BitCurve.Gy, k) -} - -// Marshal converts a point into the form specified in section 4.3.6 of ANSI -// X9.62. -func (BitCurve *BitCurve) Marshal(x, y *big.Int) []byte { - byteLen := (BitCurve.BitSize + 7) >> 3 - - ret := make([]byte, 1+2*byteLen) - ret[0] = 4 // uncompressed point - - xBytes := x.Bytes() - copy(ret[1+byteLen-len(xBytes):], xBytes) - yBytes := y.Bytes() - copy(ret[1+2*byteLen-len(yBytes):], yBytes) - return ret -} - -// Unmarshal converts a point, serialised by Marshal, into an x, y pair. On -// error, x = nil. -func (BitCurve *BitCurve) Unmarshal(data []byte) (x, y *big.Int) { - byteLen := (BitCurve.BitSize + 7) >> 3 - if len(data) != 1+2*byteLen { - return - } - if data[0] != 4 { // uncompressed form - return - } - x = new(big.Int).SetBytes(data[1 : 1+byteLen]) - y = new(big.Int).SetBytes(data[1+byteLen:]) - return -} - -var ( - initonce sync.Once - theCurve *BitCurve -) - -// S256 returns a BitCurve which implements secp256k1 (see SEC 2 section 2.7.1) -func S256() *BitCurve { - initonce.Do(func() { - // See SEC 2 section 2.7.1 - // curve parameters taken from: - // http://www.secg.org/collateral/sec2_final.pdf - theCurve = new(BitCurve) - theCurve.P, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFC2F", 16) - theCurve.N, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEBAAEDCE6AF48A03BBFD25E8CD0364141", 16) - theCurve.B, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007", 16) - theCurve.Gx, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("79BE667EF9DCBBAC55A06295CE870B07029BFCDB2DCE28D959F2815B16F81798", 16) - theCurve.Gy, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("483ADA7726A3C4655DA4FBFC0E1108A8FD17B448A68554199C47D08FFB10D4B8", 16) - theCurve.BitSize = 256 - }) - return theCurve -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/ext.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/ext.h deleted file mode 100644 index c28de21..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/ext.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,245 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2015 The go-ethereum Authors -// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. -// -// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify -// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by -// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or -// (at your option) any later version. -// -// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, -// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of -// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the -// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. -// -// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License -// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . - -// secp256k1_context_create_sign_verify creates a context for signing and signature verification. -static secp256k1_context* secp256k1_context_create_sign_verify() { - return secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); -} - -// secp256k1_ecdsa_recover_pubkey recovers the public key of an encoded compact signature. -// -// Returns: 1: recovery was successful -// 0: recovery was not successful -// Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) -// Out: pubkey_out: the serialized 65-byte public key of the signer (cannot be NULL) -// In: sigdata: pointer to a 65-byte signature with the recovery id at the end (cannot be NULL) -// msgdata: pointer to a 32-byte message (cannot be NULL) -static int secp256k1_ecdsa_recover_pubkey( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - unsigned char *pubkey_out, - const unsigned char *sigdata, - const unsigned char *msgdata -) { - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature sig; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - - if (!secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &sig, sigdata, (int)sigdata[64])) { - return 0; - } - if (!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &pubkey, &sig, msgdata)) { - return 0; - } - size_t outputlen = 65; - return secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, pubkey_out, &outputlen, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED); -} - -// secp256k1_pubkey_scalar_mul multiplies a point by a scalar in constant time. -// -// Returns: 1: multiplication was successful -// 0: scalar was invalid (zero or overflow) -// Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) -// Out: point: the multiplied point (usually secret) -// In: point: pointer to a 64-byte public point, -// encoded as two 256bit big-endian numbers. -// scalar: a 32-byte scalar with which to multiply the point -int secp256k1_pubkey_scalar_mul(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *point, const unsigned char *scalar) { - int ret = 0; - int overflow = 0; - secp256k1_fe feX, feY; - secp256k1_gej res; - secp256k1_ge ge; - secp256k1_scalar s; - ARG_CHECK(point != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(scalar != NULL); - (void)ctx; - - secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&feX, point); - secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&feY, point+32); - secp256k1_ge_set_xy(&ge, &feX, &feY); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s, scalar, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s)) { - ret = 0; - } else { - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&res, &ge, &s, 256); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&ge, &res); - /* Note: can't use secp256k1_pubkey_save here because it is not constant time. */ - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&ge.x); - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&ge.y); - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(point, &ge.x); - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(point+32, &ge.y); - ret = 1; - } - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&s); - return ret; -} - -void test_rangeproof() { - size_t nbits, n_commits; - //bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t *data; - ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// - bench_bulletproof_t odata; - bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t rp_data; - - odata.blind_gen = secp256k1_generator_const_g; - odata.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - odata.scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(odata.ctx, 1024 * 1024 * 1024); - odata.generators = secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_create(odata.ctx, &odata.blind_gen, 64 * 1024); - - rp_data.common = &odata; - - //run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 8, 1); - ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// - nbits = 8; - n_commits = 1; - ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// - char str[64]; - - (&rp_data)->nbits = nbits; - (&rp_data)->n_commits = n_commits; - (&rp_data)->common->iters = 100; - - (&rp_data)->common->n_proofs = 1; - sprintf(str, "bulletproof_prove, %i, %i, 0, ", (int)nbits, (int) n_commits); - - //run_benchmark(str, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown, (void *)&rp_data, 5, 25); - ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// - if (bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup != NULL) { - bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup(&rp_data); - } - bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(&rp_data); - if (bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown != NULL) { - bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown(&rp_data); - } - ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// - if (bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup != NULL) { - bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup(&rp_data); - } - bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(&rp_data); - if (bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown != NULL) { - bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown(&rp_data); - } - ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// -} - -static void counting_illegal_callback_fn(const char* str, void* data) { - int32_t *p; - (void)str; - p = data; - (*p)++; -} - -typedef struct { - size_t nbits; - secp256k1_context *ctx_none; - secp256k1_context *ctx_both; - secp256k1_scratch *scratch; - secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens; - unsigned char *proof; - size_t plen; - uint64_t value; - const unsigned char **blind_ptr; - secp256k1_generator *value_gen; - const unsigned char *blind; - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *pcommit; -} zkrp_t; - -void myprint(char *message, zkrp_t *dt) { - int i, len; - len = (int) dt->plen; - printf("================== %s =================\n", message); - printf("DT: %p\n", dt); - printf("DT->nbits: %zd\n", dt->nbits); - printf("DT->ctx_none: %p\n", dt->ctx_none); - printf("DT->ctx_both: %p\n", dt->ctx_both); - printf("DT->scratch: %p\n", dt->scratch); - printf("DT->gens: %p\n", dt->gens); - printf("DT->proof: %p\n", dt->proof); - printf("DT->proof:\n"); - printf("["); - for (i=0; iproof[i]); - } - printf("]\n"); - printf("DT->plen: %zd\n", dt->plen); - printf("DT->value: %lu\n", dt->value); - printf("DT->blind: %p\n", dt->blind); - printf("DT->pcommit: %p\n", dt->pcommit); -} - - -// setup should receive as input the range [A,B) -// and output a set of parameters -// - nbits means the interval is given by [0,2^nbits) -// - for now nbits must be in dt -void setup_rangeproof(zkrp_t *dt) { - secp256k1_context *none = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); - secp256k1_context *both = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - secp256k1_scratch *scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(both, 1024 * 1024); - secp256k1_generator *value_gen = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_generator)); - unsigned char blind[32] = " i am not a blinding factor "; - - dt->ctx_none = none; - dt->ctx_both = both; - dt->scratch = scratch; - dt->value_gen = value_gen; - - dt->blind = (unsigned char*)malloc(sizeof(unsigned char) * 32); - strncpy(blind, dt->blind, 32); - - dt->blind_ptr = malloc(sizeof(unsigned char*)); - dt->blind_ptr[0] = dt->blind; - - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate(dt->ctx_both, dt->value_gen, dt->blind) != 0); -} - -void deallocate_memory(zkrp_t *dt) { - // TODO realloc everything.... -} - - -// prove should receive as input parameters and the commitment -// and output the proof -void prove_rangeproof(zkrp_t *dt) { - printf("Prove result: %d\n", (secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(dt->ctx_both, dt->scratch, dt->gens, dt->proof, &(dt->plen), &(dt->value), NULL, dt->blind_ptr, 1, dt->value_gen, dt->nbits, dt->blind, NULL, 0) == 1)); -} - -// verify should receive as input parameters and proof -// and output true or false -int verify_rangeproof(zkrp_t *dt) { - printf("Verification result: %d\n", (secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(dt->ctx_both, dt->scratch, dt->gens, dt->proof, dt->plen, NULL, dt->pcommit, 1, dt->nbits, dt->value_gen, NULL, 0) == 1)); - return 1; -} - -// commit should receive parameters and value as input -// and output the commitment -void commit_rangeproof(zkrp_t *dt) { - secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens; - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *pcommit = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_pedersen_commitment)); - // TODO: value as input - uint64_t value = 255; - - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(dt->ctx_both, pcommit, dt->blind, value, dt->value_gen, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); - - gens = secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_create(dt->ctx_none, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, 256); - CHECK(gens != NULL); - - dt->gens = gens; - dt->proof = (unsigned char*)malloc(2000); - dt->plen = 2000; - dt->value = value; - dt->pcommit = pcommit; -} - diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/Makefile.am b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/Makefile.am deleted file mode 100644 index 9d914c7..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/Makefile.am +++ /dev/null @@ -1,207 +0,0 @@ -ACLOCAL_AMFLAGS = -I build-aux/m4 - -lib_LTLIBRARIES = libsecp256k1.la -if USE_JNI -JNI_LIB = libsecp256k1_jni.la -noinst_LTLIBRARIES = $(JNI_LIB) -else -JNI_LIB = -endif -include_HEADERS = include/secp256k1.h -noinst_HEADERS = -noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_4x64.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_8x32.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_low.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_4x64_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_8x32_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/scalar_low_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/group.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/group_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/num_gmp.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/num_gmp_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/ecdsa.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/ecdsa_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/eckey.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/eckey_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult_const.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult_const_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult_gen.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/ecmult_gen_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/num.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/num_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/field_10x26.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/field_10x26_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/field_5x52.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/field_5x52_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/field_5x52_int128_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/field_5x52_asm_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/java/org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/util.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/scratch.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/scratch_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/testrand.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/testrand_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/hash.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/hash_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/field.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/field_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/bench.h -noinst_HEADERS += contrib/lax_der_parsing.h -noinst_HEADERS += contrib/lax_der_parsing.c -noinst_HEADERS += contrib/lax_der_privatekey_parsing.h -noinst_HEADERS += contrib/lax_der_privatekey_parsing.c - -if USE_EXTERNAL_ASM -COMMON_LIB = libsecp256k1_common.la -noinst_LTLIBRARIES = $(COMMON_LIB) -else -COMMON_LIB = -endif - -pkgconfigdir = $(libdir)/pkgconfig -pkgconfig_DATA = libsecp256k1.pc - -if USE_EXTERNAL_ASM -if USE_ASM_ARM -libsecp256k1_common_la_SOURCES = src/asm/field_10x26_arm.s -endif -endif - -libsecp256k1_la_SOURCES = src/secp256k1.c -libsecp256k1_la_CPPFLAGS = -DSECP256K1_BUILD -I$(top_srcdir)/include -I$(top_srcdir)/src $(SECP_INCLUDES) -libsecp256k1_la_LIBADD = $(JNI_LIB) $(SECP_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) - -libsecp256k1_jni_la_SOURCES = src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.c src/java/org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.c -libsecp256k1_jni_la_CPPFLAGS = -DSECP256K1_BUILD $(JNI_INCLUDES) - -noinst_PROGRAMS = -if USE_BENCHMARK -noinst_PROGRAMS += bench_verify bench_sign bench_internal bench_ecmult -bench_verify_SOURCES = src/bench_verify.c -bench_verify_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) $(SECP_TEST_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) -bench_sign_SOURCES = src/bench_sign.c -bench_sign_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) $(SECP_TEST_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) -bench_internal_SOURCES = src/bench_internal.c -bench_internal_LDADD = $(SECP_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) -bench_internal_CPPFLAGS = -DSECP256K1_BUILD $(SECP_INCLUDES) -bench_ecmult_SOURCES = src/bench_ecmult.c -bench_ecmult_LDADD = $(SECP_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) -bench_ecmult_CPPFLAGS = -DSECP256K1_BUILD $(SECP_INCLUDES) -endif - -TESTS = -if USE_TESTS -noinst_PROGRAMS += tests -tests_SOURCES = src/tests.c -tests_CPPFLAGS = -DSECP256K1_BUILD -I$(top_srcdir)/src -I$(top_srcdir)/include $(SECP_INCLUDES) $(SECP_TEST_INCLUDES) -if !ENABLE_COVERAGE -tests_CPPFLAGS += -DVERIFY -endif -tests_LDADD = $(SECP_LIBS) $(SECP_TEST_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) -tests_LDFLAGS = -static -TESTS += tests -endif - -if USE_EXHAUSTIVE_TESTS -noinst_PROGRAMS += exhaustive_tests -exhaustive_tests_SOURCES = src/tests_exhaustive.c -exhaustive_tests_CPPFLAGS = -DSECP256K1_BUILD -I$(top_srcdir)/src $(SECP_INCLUDES) -if !ENABLE_COVERAGE -exhaustive_tests_CPPFLAGS += -DVERIFY -endif -exhaustive_tests_LDADD = $(SECP_LIBS) -exhaustive_tests_LDFLAGS = -static -TESTS += exhaustive_tests -endif - -JAVAROOT=src/java -JAVAORG=org/bitcoin -JAVA_GUAVA=$(srcdir)/$(JAVAROOT)/guava/guava-18.0.jar -CLASSPATH_ENV=CLASSPATH=$(JAVA_GUAVA) -JAVA_FILES= \ - $(JAVAROOT)/$(JAVAORG)/NativeSecp256k1.java \ - $(JAVAROOT)/$(JAVAORG)/NativeSecp256k1Test.java \ - $(JAVAROOT)/$(JAVAORG)/NativeSecp256k1Util.java \ - $(JAVAROOT)/$(JAVAORG)/Secp256k1Context.java - -if USE_JNI - -$(JAVA_GUAVA): - @echo Guava is missing. Fetch it via: \ - wget https://search.maven.org/remotecontent?filepath=com/google/guava/guava/18.0/guava-18.0.jar -O $(@) - @false - -.stamp-java: $(JAVA_FILES) - @echo Compiling $^ - $(AM_V_at)$(CLASSPATH_ENV) javac $^ - @touch $@ - -if USE_TESTS - -check-java: libsecp256k1.la $(JAVA_GUAVA) .stamp-java - $(AM_V_at)java -Djava.library.path="./:./src:./src/.libs:.libs/" -cp "$(JAVA_GUAVA):$(JAVAROOT)" $(JAVAORG)/NativeSecp256k1Test - -endif -endif - -if USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION -CPPFLAGS_FOR_BUILD +=-I$(top_srcdir) -CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD += -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-function - -gen_context_OBJECTS = gen_context.o -gen_context_BIN = gen_context$(BUILD_EXEEXT) -gen_%.o: src/gen_%.c - $(CC_FOR_BUILD) $(CPPFLAGS_FOR_BUILD) $(CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD) -c $< -o $@ - -$(gen_context_BIN): $(gen_context_OBJECTS) - $(CC_FOR_BUILD) $^ -o $@ - -$(libsecp256k1_la_OBJECTS): src/ecmult_static_context.h -$(tests_OBJECTS): src/ecmult_static_context.h -$(bench_internal_OBJECTS): src/ecmult_static_context.h -$(bench_ecmult_OBJECTS): src/ecmult_static_context.h - -src/ecmult_static_context.h: $(gen_context_BIN) - ./$(gen_context_BIN) - -CLEANFILES = $(gen_context_BIN) src/ecmult_static_context.h $(JAVAROOT)/$(JAVAORG)/*.class .stamp-java -endif - -EXTRA_DIST = autogen.sh src/gen_context.c src/basic-config.h $(JAVA_FILES) - -if ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH -include src/modules/ecdh/Makefile.am.include -endif - -if ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY -include src/modules/recovery/Makefile.am.include -endif - -if ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR -include src/modules/generator/Makefile.am.include -endif - -if ENABLE_MODULE_COMMITMENT -include src/modules/commitment/Makefile.am.include -endif - -if ENABLE_MODULE_RANGEPROOF -include src/modules/rangeproof/Makefile.am.include -endif - -if ENABLE_MODULE_BULLETPROOF -include src/modules/bulletproofs/Makefile.am.include -endif - -if ENABLE_MODULE_WHITELIST -include src/modules/whitelist/Makefile.am.include -endif - -if ENABLE_MODULE_SURJECTIONPROOF -include src/modules/surjection/Makefile.am.include -endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/build-aux/m4/ax_jni_include_dir.m4 b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/build-aux/m4/ax_jni_include_dir.m4 deleted file mode 100644 index cdc78d8..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/build-aux/m4/ax_jni_include_dir.m4 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,145 +0,0 @@ -# =========================================================================== -# https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf-archive/ax_jni_include_dir.html -# =========================================================================== -# -# SYNOPSIS -# -# AX_JNI_INCLUDE_DIR -# -# DESCRIPTION -# -# AX_JNI_INCLUDE_DIR finds include directories needed for compiling -# programs using the JNI interface. -# -# JNI include directories are usually in the Java distribution. This is -# deduced from the value of $JAVA_HOME, $JAVAC, or the path to "javac", in -# that order. When this macro completes, a list of directories is left in -# the variable JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS. -# -# Example usage follows: -# -# AX_JNI_INCLUDE_DIR -# -# for JNI_INCLUDE_DIR in $JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS -# do -# CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I$JNI_INCLUDE_DIR" -# done -# -# If you want to force a specific compiler: -# -# - at the configure.in level, set JAVAC=yourcompiler before calling -# AX_JNI_INCLUDE_DIR -# -# - at the configure level, setenv JAVAC -# -# Note: This macro can work with the autoconf M4 macros for Java programs. -# This particular macro is not part of the original set of macros. -# -# LICENSE -# -# Copyright (c) 2008 Don Anderson -# -# Copying and distribution of this file, with or without modification, are -# permitted in any medium without royalty provided the copyright notice -# and this notice are preserved. This file is offered as-is, without any -# warranty. - -#serial 14 - -AU_ALIAS([AC_JNI_INCLUDE_DIR], [AX_JNI_INCLUDE_DIR]) -AC_DEFUN([AX_JNI_INCLUDE_DIR],[ - -JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS="" - -if test "x$JAVA_HOME" != x; then - _JTOPDIR="$JAVA_HOME" -else - if test "x$JAVAC" = x; then - JAVAC=javac - fi - AC_PATH_PROG([_ACJNI_JAVAC], [$JAVAC], [no]) - if test "x$_ACJNI_JAVAC" = xno; then - AC_MSG_WARN([cannot find JDK; try setting \$JAVAC or \$JAVA_HOME]) - fi - _ACJNI_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS("$_ACJNI_JAVAC") - _JTOPDIR=`echo "$_ACJNI_FOLLOWED" | sed -e 's://*:/:g' -e 's:/[[^/]]*$::'` -fi - -case "$host_os" in - darwin*) # Apple Java headers are inside the Xcode bundle. - macos_version=$(sw_vers -productVersion | sed -n -e 's/^@<:@0-9@:>@*.\(@<:@0-9@:>@*\).@<:@0-9@:>@*/\1/p') - if @<:@ "$macos_version" -gt "7" @:>@; then - _JTOPDIR="$(xcrun --show-sdk-path)/System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework" - _JINC="$_JTOPDIR/Headers" - else - _JTOPDIR="/System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework" - _JINC="$_JTOPDIR/Headers" - fi - ;; - *) _JINC="$_JTOPDIR/include";; -esac -_AS_ECHO_LOG([_JTOPDIR=$_JTOPDIR]) -_AS_ECHO_LOG([_JINC=$_JINC]) - -# On Mac OS X 10.6.4, jni.h is a symlink: -# /System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework/Versions/Current/Headers/jni.h -# -> ../../CurrentJDK/Headers/jni.h. -AC_CACHE_CHECK(jni headers, ac_cv_jni_header_path, -[ - if test -f "$_JINC/jni.h"; then - ac_cv_jni_header_path="$_JINC" - JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS="$JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS $ac_cv_jni_header_path" - else - _JTOPDIR=`echo "$_JTOPDIR" | sed -e 's:/[[^/]]*$::'` - if test -f "$_JTOPDIR/include/jni.h"; then - ac_cv_jni_header_path="$_JTOPDIR/include" - JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS="$JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS $ac_cv_jni_header_path" - else - ac_cv_jni_header_path=none - fi - fi -]) - -# get the likely subdirectories for system specific java includes -case "$host_os" in -bsdi*) _JNI_INC_SUBDIRS="bsdos";; -freebsd*) _JNI_INC_SUBDIRS="freebsd";; -darwin*) _JNI_INC_SUBDIRS="darwin";; -linux*) _JNI_INC_SUBDIRS="linux genunix";; -osf*) _JNI_INC_SUBDIRS="alpha";; -solaris*) _JNI_INC_SUBDIRS="solaris";; -mingw*) _JNI_INC_SUBDIRS="win32";; -cygwin*) _JNI_INC_SUBDIRS="win32";; -*) _JNI_INC_SUBDIRS="genunix";; -esac - -if test "x$ac_cv_jni_header_path" != "xnone"; then - # add any subdirectories that are present - for JINCSUBDIR in $_JNI_INC_SUBDIRS - do - if test -d "$_JTOPDIR/include/$JINCSUBDIR"; then - JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS="$JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS $_JTOPDIR/include/$JINCSUBDIR" - fi - done -fi -]) - -# _ACJNI_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS -# Follows symbolic links on , -# finally setting variable _ACJNI_FOLLOWED -# ---------------------------------------- -AC_DEFUN([_ACJNI_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS],[ -# find the include directory relative to the javac executable -_cur="$1" -while ls -ld "$_cur" 2>/dev/null | grep " -> " >/dev/null; do - AC_MSG_CHECKING([symlink for $_cur]) - _slink=`ls -ld "$_cur" | sed 's/.* -> //'` - case "$_slink" in - /*) _cur="$_slink";; - # 'X' avoids triggering unwanted echo options. - *) _cur=`echo "X$_cur" | sed -e 's/^X//' -e 's:[[^/]]*$::'`"$_slink";; - esac - AC_MSG_RESULT([$_cur]) -done -_ACJNI_FOLLOWED="$_cur" -])# _ACJNI diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/build-aux/m4/bitcoin_secp.m4 b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/build-aux/m4/bitcoin_secp.m4 deleted file mode 100644 index 3b3975c..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/build-aux/m4/bitcoin_secp.m4 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,68 +0,0 @@ -dnl libsecp25k1 helper checks -AC_DEFUN([SECP_INT128_CHECK],[ -has_int128=$ac_cv_type___int128 -]) - -dnl escape "$0x" below using the m4 quadrigaph @S|@, and escape it again with a \ for the shell. -AC_DEFUN([SECP_64BIT_ASM_CHECK],[ -AC_MSG_CHECKING(for x86_64 assembly availability) -AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ - #include ]],[[ - uint64_t a = 11, tmp; - __asm__ __volatile__("movq \@S|@0x100000000,%1; mulq %%rsi" : "+a"(a) : "S"(tmp) : "cc", "%rdx"); - ]])],[has_64bit_asm=yes],[has_64bit_asm=no]) -AC_MSG_RESULT([$has_64bit_asm]) -]) - -dnl -AC_DEFUN([SECP_OPENSSL_CHECK],[ - has_libcrypto=no - m4_ifdef([PKG_CHECK_MODULES],[ - PKG_CHECK_MODULES([CRYPTO], [libcrypto], [has_libcrypto=yes],[has_libcrypto=no]) - if test x"$has_libcrypto" = x"yes"; then - TEMP_LIBS="$LIBS" - LIBS="$LIBS $CRYPTO_LIBS" - AC_CHECK_LIB(crypto, main,[AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRYPTO,1,[Define this symbol if libcrypto is installed])],[has_libcrypto=no]) - LIBS="$TEMP_LIBS" - fi - ]) - if test x$has_libcrypto = xno; then - AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/crypto.h,[ - AC_CHECK_LIB(crypto, main,[ - has_libcrypto=yes - CRYPTO_LIBS=-lcrypto - AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRYPTO,1,[Define this symbol if libcrypto is installed]) - ]) - ]) - LIBS= - fi -if test x"$has_libcrypto" = x"yes" && test x"$has_openssl_ec" = x; then - AC_MSG_CHECKING(for EC functions in libcrypto) - AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ - #include - #include - #include ]],[[ - EC_KEY *eckey = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp256k1); - ECDSA_sign(0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, eckey); - ECDSA_verify(0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, eckey); - EC_KEY_free(eckey); - ECDSA_SIG *sig_openssl; - sig_openssl = ECDSA_SIG_new(); - ECDSA_SIG_free(sig_openssl); - ]])],[has_openssl_ec=yes],[has_openssl_ec=no]) - AC_MSG_RESULT([$has_openssl_ec]) -fi -]) - -dnl -AC_DEFUN([SECP_GMP_CHECK],[ -if test x"$has_gmp" != x"yes"; then - CPPFLAGS_TEMP="$CPPFLAGS" - CPPFLAGS="$GMP_CPPFLAGS $CPPFLAGS" - LIBS_TEMP="$LIBS" - LIBS="$GMP_LIBS $LIBS" - AC_CHECK_HEADER(gmp.h,[AC_CHECK_LIB(gmp, __gmpz_init,[has_gmp=yes; GMP_LIBS="$GMP_LIBS -lgmp"; AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBGMP,1,[Define this symbol if libgmp is installed])])]) - CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS_TEMP" - LIBS="$LIBS_TEMP" -fi -]) diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/configure.ac b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/configure.ac deleted file mode 100644 index d430f8f..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/configure.ac +++ /dev/null @@ -1,618 +0,0 @@ -AC_PREREQ([2.60]) -AC_INIT([libsecp256k1],[0.1]) -AC_CONFIG_AUX_DIR([build-aux]) -AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([build-aux/m4]) -AC_CANONICAL_HOST -AH_TOP([#ifndef LIBSECP256K1_CONFIG_H]) -AH_TOP([#define LIBSECP256K1_CONFIG_H]) -AH_BOTTOM([#endif /*LIBSECP256K1_CONFIG_H*/]) -AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([foreign subdir-objects]) -LT_INIT - -dnl make the compilation flags quiet unless V=1 is used -m4_ifdef([AM_SILENT_RULES], [AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])]) - -PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG - -AC_PATH_TOOL(AR, ar) -AC_PATH_TOOL(RANLIB, ranlib) -AC_PATH_TOOL(STRIP, strip) -AX_PROG_CC_FOR_BUILD - -if test "x$CFLAGS" = "x"; 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Ask - dnl Homebrew where each one is located, then adjust paths accordingly. - - openssl_prefix=`$BREW --prefix openssl 2>/dev/null` - gmp_prefix=`$BREW --prefix gmp 2>/dev/null` - if test x$openssl_prefix != x; then - PKG_CONFIG_PATH="$openssl_prefix/lib/pkgconfig:$PKG_CONFIG_PATH" - export PKG_CONFIG_PATH - fi - if test x$gmp_prefix != x; then - GMP_CPPFLAGS="-I$gmp_prefix/include" - GMP_LIBS="-L$gmp_prefix/lib" - fi - else - AC_PATH_PROG([PORT],port,) - dnl if homebrew isn't installed and macports is, add the macports default paths - dnl as a last resort. - if test x$PORT != x; then - CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -isystem /opt/local/include" - LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/opt/local/lib" - fi - fi - fi - ;; -esac - -CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -W" - -warn_CFLAGS="-std=c89 -pedantic -Wall -Wextra -Wcast-align -Wnested-externs -Wshadow -Wstrict-prototypes -Wno-unused-function -Wno-long-long -Wno-overlength-strings" -saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" -CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $warn_CFLAGS" -AC_MSG_CHECKING([if ${CC} supports ${warn_CFLAGS}]) -AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[char foo;]])], - [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], - [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) - CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" - ]) - -saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" -CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fvisibility=hidden" -AC_MSG_CHECKING([if ${CC} supports -fvisibility=hidden]) -AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[char foo;]])], - [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], - [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) - CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" - ]) - -AC_ARG_ENABLE(benchmark, - AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-benchmark],[compile benchmark (default is yes)]), - [use_benchmark=$enableval], - [use_benchmark=yes]) - -AC_ARG_ENABLE(coverage, - AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-coverage],[enable compiler flags to support kcov coverage analysis]), - [enable_coverage=$enableval], - [enable_coverage=no]) - -AC_ARG_ENABLE(tests, - AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-tests],[compile tests (default is yes)]), - [use_tests=$enableval], - [use_tests=yes]) - -AC_ARG_ENABLE(openssl_tests, - AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-openssl-tests],[enable OpenSSL tests, if OpenSSL is available (default is auto)]), - [enable_openssl_tests=$enableval], - [enable_openssl_tests=auto]) - -AC_ARG_ENABLE(experimental, - AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-experimental],[allow experimental configure options (default is no)]), - [use_experimental=$enableval], - [use_experimental=no]) - -AC_ARG_ENABLE(exhaustive_tests, - AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-exhaustive-tests],[compile exhaustive tests (default is yes)]), - [use_exhaustive_tests=$enableval], - [use_exhaustive_tests=yes]) - -AC_ARG_ENABLE(endomorphism, - AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-endomorphism],[enable endomorphism (default is no)]), - [use_endomorphism=$enableval], - [use_endomorphism=no]) - -AC_ARG_ENABLE(ecmult_static_precomputation, - AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-ecmult-static-precomputation],[enable precomputed ecmult table for signing (default is yes)]), - [use_ecmult_static_precomputation=$enableval], - [use_ecmult_static_precomputation=auto]) - -AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_ecdh, - AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-ecdh],[enable ECDH shared secret computation (experimental)]), - [enable_module_ecdh=$enableval], - [enable_module_ecdh=no]) - -AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_recovery, - AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-recovery],[enable ECDSA pubkey recovery module (default is no)]), - [enable_module_recovery=$enableval], - [enable_module_recovery=no]) - -AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_generator, - AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-generator],[enable NUMS generator module (default is no)]), - [enable_module_generator=$enableval], - [enable_module_generator=no]) - -AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_commitment, - AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-commitment],[enable Pedersen commitments module (default is no)]), - [enable_module_commitment=$enableval], - [enable_module_commitment=no]) - -AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_rangeproof, - AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-rangeproof],[enable zero-knowledge range proofs module (default is no)]), - [enable_module_rangeproof=$enableval], - [enable_module_rangeproof=no]) - -AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_bulletproof, - AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-bulletproof],[enable Pedersen / zero-knowledge bulletproofs module (default is no)]), - [enable_module_bulletproof=$enableval], - [enable_module_bulletproof=no]) - - -AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_whitelist, - AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-whitelist],[enable key whitelisting module (default is no)]), - [enable_module_whitelist=$enableval], - [enable_module_whitelist=no]) - -AC_ARG_ENABLE(jni, - AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-jni],[enable libsecp256k1_jni (default is no)]), - [use_jni=$enableval], - [use_jni=no]) - -AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_surjectionproof, - AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-surjectionproof],[enable surjection proof module (default is no)]), - [enable_module_surjectionproof=$enableval], - [enable_module_surjectionproof=no]) - -AC_ARG_WITH([field], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-field=64bit|32bit|auto], -[Specify Field Implementation. Default is auto])],[req_field=$withval], [req_field=auto]) - -AC_ARG_WITH([bignum], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-bignum=gmp|no|auto], -[Specify Bignum Implementation. Default is auto])],[req_bignum=$withval], [req_bignum=auto]) - -AC_ARG_WITH([scalar], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-scalar=64bit|32bit|auto], -[Specify scalar implementation. Default is auto])],[req_scalar=$withval], [req_scalar=auto]) - -AC_ARG_WITH([asm], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-asm=x86_64|arm|no|auto] -[Specify assembly optimizations to use. Default is auto (experimental: arm)])],[req_asm=$withval], [req_asm=auto]) - -AC_CHECK_TYPES([__int128]) - -AC_MSG_CHECKING([for __builtin_expect]) -AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[void myfunc() {__builtin_expect(0,0);}]])], - [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]);AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BUILTIN_EXPECT,1,[Define this symbol if __builtin_expect is available]) ], - [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) - ]) - -if test x"$enable_coverage" = x"yes"; then - AC_DEFINE(COVERAGE, 1, [Define this symbol to compile out all VERIFY code]) - CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -O0 --coverage" - LDFLAGS="--coverage" -else - CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -O3" -fi - -AC_MSG_CHECKING([for __builtin_popcount]) -AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[void myfunc() {__builtin_popcount(0);}]])], - [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]);AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BUILTIN_POPCOUNT,1,[Define this symbol if __builtin_popcount is available]) ], - [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) - ]) - -if test x"$use_ecmult_static_precomputation" != x"no"; then - save_cross_compiling=$cross_compiling - cross_compiling=no - TEMP_CC="$CC" - CC="$CC_FOR_BUILD" - AC_MSG_CHECKING([native compiler: ${CC_FOR_BUILD}]) - AC_RUN_IFELSE( - [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([], [return 0])], - [working_native_cc=yes], - [working_native_cc=no],[dnl]) - CC="$TEMP_CC" - cross_compiling=$save_cross_compiling - - if test x"$working_native_cc" = x"no"; then - set_precomp=no - if test x"$use_ecmult_static_precomputation" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([${CC_FOR_BUILD} does not produce working binaries. Please set CC_FOR_BUILD]) - else - AC_MSG_RESULT([${CC_FOR_BUILD} does not produce working binaries. Please set CC_FOR_BUILD]) - fi - else - AC_MSG_RESULT([ok]) - set_precomp=yes - fi -else - set_precomp=no -fi - -AC_MSG_CHECKING([for __builtin_clzll]) -AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[void myfunc() { __builtin_clzll(1);}]])], - [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]);AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BUILTIN_CLZLL,1,[Define this symbol if __builtin_clzll is available]) ], - [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) - ]) - -if test x"$req_asm" = x"auto"; then - SECP_64BIT_ASM_CHECK - if test x"$has_64bit_asm" = x"yes"; then - set_asm=x86_64 - fi - if test x"$set_asm" = x; then - set_asm=no - fi -else - set_asm=$req_asm - case $set_asm in - x86_64) - SECP_64BIT_ASM_CHECK - if test x"$has_64bit_asm" != x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([x86_64 assembly optimization requested but not available]) - fi - ;; - arm) - ;; - no) - ;; - *) - AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid assembly optimization selection]) - ;; - esac -fi - -if test x"$req_field" = x"auto"; then - if test x"set_asm" = x"x86_64"; then - set_field=64bit - fi - if test x"$set_field" = x; then - SECP_INT128_CHECK - if test x"$has_int128" = x"yes"; then - set_field=64bit - fi - fi - if test x"$set_field" = x; then - set_field=32bit - fi -else - set_field=$req_field - case $set_field in - 64bit) - if test x"$set_asm" != x"x86_64"; then - SECP_INT128_CHECK - if test x"$has_int128" != x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([64bit field explicitly requested but neither __int128 support or x86_64 assembly available]) - fi - fi - ;; - 32bit) - ;; - *) - AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid field implementation selection]) - ;; - esac -fi - -if test x"$req_scalar" = x"auto"; then - SECP_INT128_CHECK - if test x"$has_int128" = x"yes"; then - set_scalar=64bit - fi - if test x"$set_scalar" = x; then - set_scalar=32bit - fi -else - set_scalar=$req_scalar - case $set_scalar in - 64bit) - SECP_INT128_CHECK - if test x"$has_int128" != x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([64bit scalar explicitly requested but __int128 support not available]) - fi - ;; - 32bit) - ;; - *) - AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid scalar implementation selected]) - ;; - esac -fi - -if test x"$req_bignum" = x"auto"; then - SECP_GMP_CHECK - if test x"$has_gmp" = x"yes"; then - set_bignum=gmp - fi - - if test x"$set_bignum" = x; then - set_bignum=no - fi -else - set_bignum=$req_bignum - case $set_bignum in - gmp) - SECP_GMP_CHECK - if test x"$has_gmp" != x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([gmp bignum explicitly requested but libgmp not available]) - fi - ;; - no) - ;; - *) - AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid bignum implementation selection]) - ;; - esac -fi - -# select assembly optimization -use_external_asm=no - -case $set_asm in -x86_64) - AC_DEFINE(USE_ASM_X86_64, 1, [Define this symbol to enable x86_64 assembly optimizations]) - ;; -arm) - use_external_asm=yes - ;; -no) - ;; -*) - AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid assembly optimizations]) - ;; -esac - -# select field implementation -case $set_field in -64bit) - AC_DEFINE(USE_FIELD_5X52, 1, [Define this symbol to use the FIELD_5X52 implementation]) - ;; -32bit) - AC_DEFINE(USE_FIELD_10X26, 1, [Define this symbol to use the FIELD_10X26 implementation]) - ;; -*) - AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid field implementation]) - ;; -esac - -# select bignum implementation -case $set_bignum in -gmp) - AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBGMP, 1, [Define this symbol if libgmp is installed]) - AC_DEFINE(USE_NUM_GMP, 1, [Define this symbol to use the gmp implementation for num]) - AC_DEFINE(USE_FIELD_INV_NUM, 1, [Define this symbol to use the num-based field inverse implementation]) - AC_DEFINE(USE_SCALAR_INV_NUM, 1, [Define this symbol to use the num-based scalar inverse implementation]) - ;; -no) - AC_DEFINE(USE_NUM_NONE, 1, [Define this symbol to use no num implementation]) - AC_DEFINE(USE_FIELD_INV_BUILTIN, 1, [Define this symbol to use the native field inverse implementation]) - AC_DEFINE(USE_SCALAR_INV_BUILTIN, 1, [Define this symbol to use the native scalar inverse implementation]) - ;; -*) - AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid bignum implementation]) - ;; -esac - -#select scalar implementation -case $set_scalar in -64bit) - AC_DEFINE(USE_SCALAR_4X64, 1, [Define this symbol to use the 4x64 scalar implementation]) - ;; -32bit) - AC_DEFINE(USE_SCALAR_8X32, 1, [Define this symbol to use the 8x32 scalar implementation]) - ;; -*) - AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid scalar implementation]) - ;; -esac - -if test x"$use_tests" = x"yes"; then - SECP_OPENSSL_CHECK - if test x"$has_openssl_ec" = x"yes"; then - if test x"$enable_openssl_tests" != x"no"; then - AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS, 1, [Define this symbol if OpenSSL EC functions are available]) - SECP_TEST_INCLUDES="$SSL_CFLAGS $CRYPTO_CFLAGS" - SECP_TEST_LIBS="$CRYPTO_LIBS" - - case $host in - *mingw*) - SECP_TEST_LIBS="$SECP_TEST_LIBS -lgdi32" - ;; - esac - fi - else - if test x"$enable_openssl_tests" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL tests requested but OpenSSL with EC support is not available]) - fi - fi -else - if test x"$enable_openssl_tests" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL tests requested but tests are not enabled]) - fi -fi - -if test x"$use_jni" != x"no"; then - AX_JNI_INCLUDE_DIR - have_jni_dependencies=yes - if test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"no"; then - have_jni_dependencies=no - fi - if test "x$JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS" = "x"; then - have_jni_dependencies=no - fi - if test "x$have_jni_dependencies" = "xno"; then - if test x"$use_jni" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([jni support explicitly requested but headers/dependencies were not found. Enable ECDH and try again.]) - fi - AC_MSG_WARN([jni headers/dependencies not found. jni support disabled]) - use_jni=no - else - use_jni=yes - for JNI_INCLUDE_DIR in $JNI_INCLUDE_DIRS; do - JNI_INCLUDES="$JNI_INCLUDES -I$JNI_INCLUDE_DIR" - done - fi -fi - -if test x"$set_bignum" = x"gmp"; then - SECP_LIBS="$SECP_LIBS $GMP_LIBS" - SECP_INCLUDES="$SECP_INCLUDES $GMP_CPPFLAGS" -fi - -if test x"$use_endomorphism" = x"yes"; then - AC_DEFINE(USE_ENDOMORPHISM, 1, [Define this symbol to use endomorphism optimization]) -fi - -if test x"$set_precomp" = x"yes"; then - AC_DEFINE(USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION, 1, [Define this symbol to use a statically generated ecmult table]) -fi - -if test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"yes"; then - AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the ECDH module]) -fi - -if test x"$enable_module_recovery" = x"yes"; then - AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the ECDSA pubkey recovery module]) -fi - -if test x"$enable_module_generator" = x"yes"; then - AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the NUMS generator module]) -fi - -if test x"$enable_module_commitment" = x"yes"; then - AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_COMMITMENT, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the Pedersen commitment module]) -fi - -if test x"$enable_module_rangeproof" = x"yes"; then - AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_RANGEPROOF, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the zero knowledge range proof module]) -fi - -if test x"$enable_module_bulletproof" = x"yes"; then - AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_BULLETPROOF, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the Pedersen / zero knowledge bulletproof module]) -fi - -if test x"$enable_module_whitelist" = x"yes"; then - AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_WHITELIST, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the key whitelisting module]) -fi - -if test x"$enable_module_surjectionproof" = x"yes"; then - AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_SURJECTIONPROOF, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the surjection proof module]) -fi - -AC_C_BIGENDIAN() - -if test x"$use_external_asm" = x"yes"; then - AC_DEFINE(USE_EXTERNAL_ASM, 1, [Define this symbol if an external (non-inline) assembly implementation is used]) -fi - -AC_MSG_NOTICE([Using static precomputation: $set_precomp]) -AC_MSG_NOTICE([Using assembly optimizations: $set_asm]) -AC_MSG_NOTICE([Using field implementation: $set_field]) -AC_MSG_NOTICE([Using bignum implementation: $set_bignum]) -AC_MSG_NOTICE([Using scalar implementation: $set_scalar]) -AC_MSG_NOTICE([Using endomorphism optimizations: $use_endomorphism]) -AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building benchmarks: $use_benchmark]) -AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building for coverage analysis: $enable_coverage]) -AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building ECDH module: $enable_module_ecdh]) -AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building ECDSA pubkey recovery module: $enable_module_recovery]) -AC_MSG_NOTICE([Using jni: $use_jni]) - -if test x"$enable_experimental" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_NOTICE([******]) - AC_MSG_NOTICE([WARNING: experimental build]) - AC_MSG_NOTICE([Experimental features do not have stable APIs or properties, and may not be safe for production use.]) - AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building ECDH module: $enable_module_ecdh]) - AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building NUMS generator module: $enable_module_generator]) - AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building Pedersen commitment module: $enable_module_commitment]) - AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building range proof module: $enable_module_rangeproof]) - AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building bulletproof module: $enable_module_bulletproof]) - AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building key whitelisting module: $enable_module_whitelist]) - AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building surjection proof module: $enable_module_surjectionproof]) - AC_MSG_NOTICE([******]) - - if test x"$enable_module_generator" != x"yes"; then - if test x"$enable_module_commitment" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([Commitment module requires the generator module. Use --enable-module-generator to allow.]) - fi - if test x"$enable_module_bulletproof" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([Bulletproof module requires the generator module. Use --enable-module-generator to allow.]) - fi - fi - - if test x"$enable_module_commitment" != x"yes"; then - if test x"$enable_module_rangeproof" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([Rangeproof module requires the commitment module. Use --enable-module-commitment to allow.]) - fi - if test x"$enable_module_bulletproof" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([Bulletproof module requires the commitment module. Use --enable-module-commitment to allow.]) - fi - fi - - if test x"$enable_module_rangeproof" != x"yes"; then - if test x"$enable_module_whitelist" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([Whitelist module requires the rangeproof module. Use --enable-module-rangeproof to allow.]) - fi - if test x"$enable_module_surjectionproof" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([Surjection proof module requires the rangeproof module. Use --enable-module-rangeproof to allow.]) - fi - fi -else - if test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([ECDH module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) - fi - if test x"$set_asm" = x"arm"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([ARM assembly optimization is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) - fi - if test x"$enable_module_generator" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([NUMS generator module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) - fi - if test x"$enable_module_commitment" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([Pedersen commitment module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) - fi - if test x"$enable_module_rangeproof" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([Range proof module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) - fi - if test x"$enable_module_bulletproof" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([Bulletproof module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) - fi - if test x"$enable_module_whitelist" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([Key whitelisting module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) - fi - if test x"$enable_module_surjectionproof" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([Surjection proof module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.]) - fi -fi - -AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([src/libsecp256k1-config.h]) -AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile libsecp256k1.pc]) -AC_SUBST(JNI_INCLUDES) -AC_SUBST(SECP_INCLUDES) -AC_SUBST(SECP_LIBS) -AC_SUBST(SECP_TEST_LIBS) -AC_SUBST(SECP_TEST_INCLUDES) -AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_COVERAGE], [test x"$enable_coverage" = x"yes"]) -AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_TESTS], [test x"$use_tests" != x"no"]) -AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_EXHAUSTIVE_TESTS], [test x"$use_exhaustive_tests" != x"no"]) -AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_BENCHMARK], [test x"$use_benchmark" = x"yes"]) -AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION], [test x"$set_precomp" = x"yes"]) -AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH], [test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"yes"]) -AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY], [test x"$enable_module_recovery" = x"yes"]) -AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR], [test x"$enable_module_generator" = x"yes"]) -AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_COMMITMENT], [test x"$enable_module_commitment" = x"yes"]) -AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_RANGEPROOF], [test x"$enable_module_rangeproof" = x"yes"]) -AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_BULLETPROOF], [test x"$enable_module_bulletproof" = x"yes"]) -AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_WHITELIST], [test x"$enable_module_whitelist" = x"yes"]) -AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_JNI], [test x"$use_jni" == x"yes"]) -AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_EXTERNAL_ASM], [test x"$use_external_asm" = x"yes"]) -AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_ASM_ARM], [test x"$set_asm" = x"arm"]) -AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_SURJECTIONPROOF], [test x"$enable_module_surjectionproof" = x"yes"]) - -dnl make sure nothing new is exported so that we don't break the cache -PKGCONFIG_PATH_TEMP="$PKG_CONFIG_PATH" -unset PKG_CONFIG_PATH -PKG_CONFIG_PATH="$PKGCONFIG_PATH_TEMP" - -AC_OUTPUT diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/contrib/lax_der_parsing.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/contrib/lax_der_parsing.h deleted file mode 100644 index 7eaf63b..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/contrib/lax_der_parsing.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,91 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2015 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -/**** - * Please do not link this file directly. It is not part of the libsecp256k1 - * project and does not promise any stability in its API, functionality or - * presence. Projects which use this code should instead copy this header - * and its accompanying .c file directly into their codebase. - ****/ - -/* This file defines a function that parses DER with various errors and - * violations. This is not a part of the library itself, because the allowed - * violations are chosen arbitrarily and do not follow or establish any - * standard. - * - * In many places it matters that different implementations do not only accept - * the same set of valid signatures, but also reject the same set of signatures. - * The only means to accomplish that is by strictly obeying a standard, and not - * accepting anything else. - * - * Nonetheless, sometimes there is a need for compatibility with systems that - * use signatures which do not strictly obey DER. The snippet below shows how - * certain violations are easily supported. You may need to adapt it. - * - * Do not use this for new systems. Use well-defined DER or compact signatures - * instead if you have the choice (see secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der and - * secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact). - * - * The supported violations are: - * - All numbers are parsed as nonnegative integers, even though X.609-0207 - * section 8.3.3 specifies that integers are always encoded as two's - * complement. - * - Integers can have length 0, even though section 8.3.1 says they can't. - * - Integers with overly long padding are accepted, violation section - * 8.3.2. - * - 127-byte long length descriptors are accepted, even though section - * 8.1.3.5.c says that they are not. - * - Trailing garbage data inside or after the signature is ignored. - * - The length descriptor of the sequence is ignored. - * - * Compared to for example OpenSSL, many violations are NOT supported: - * - Using overly long tag descriptors for the sequence or integers inside, - * violating section 8.1.2.2. - * - Encoding primitive integers as constructed values, violating section - * 8.3.1. - */ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_CONTRIB_LAX_DER_PARSING_H -#define SECP256K1_CONTRIB_LAX_DER_PARSING_H - -#include - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** Parse a signature in "lax DER" format - * - * Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise. - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object - * Out: sig: a pointer to a signature object - * In: input: a pointer to the signature to be parsed - * inputlen: the length of the array pointed to be input - * - * This function will accept any valid DER encoded signature, even if the - * encoded numbers are out of range. In addition, it will accept signatures - * which violate the DER spec in various ways. Its purpose is to allow - * validation of the Bitcoin blockchain, which includes non-DER signatures - * from before the network rules were updated to enforce DER. Note that - * the set of supported violations is a strict subset of what OpenSSL will - * accept. - * - * After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or the - * encoded numbers are out of range, signature validation with it is - * guaranteed to fail for every message and public key. - */ -int ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t inputlen -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* SECP256K1_CONTRIB_LAX_DER_PARSING_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/contrib/lax_der_privatekey_parsing.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/contrib/lax_der_privatekey_parsing.h deleted file mode 100644 index fece261..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/contrib/lax_der_privatekey_parsing.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,90 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014, 2015 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -/**** - * Please do not link this file directly. It is not part of the libsecp256k1 - * project and does not promise any stability in its API, functionality or - * presence. Projects which use this code should instead copy this header - * and its accompanying .c file directly into their codebase. - ****/ - -/* This file contains code snippets that parse DER private keys with - * various errors and violations. This is not a part of the library - * itself, because the allowed violations are chosen arbitrarily and - * do not follow or establish any standard. - * - * It also contains code to serialize private keys in a compatible - * manner. - * - * These functions are meant for compatibility with applications - * that require BER encoded keys. When working with secp256k1-specific - * code, the simple 32-byte private keys normally used by the - * library are sufficient. - */ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_CONTRIB_BER_PRIVATEKEY_H -#define SECP256K1_CONTRIB_BER_PRIVATEKEY_H - -#include - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** Export a private key in DER format. - * - * Returns: 1 if the private key was valid. - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot - * be NULL) - * Out: privkey: pointer to an array for storing the private key in BER. - * Should have space for 279 bytes, and cannot be NULL. - * privkeylen: Pointer to an int where the length of the private key in - * privkey will be stored. - * In: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key to export. - * compressed: 1 if the key should be exported in - * compressed format, 0 otherwise - * - * This function is purely meant for compatibility with applications that - * require BER encoded keys. When working with secp256k1-specific code, the - * simple 32-byte private keys are sufficient. - * - * Note that this function does not guarantee correct DER output. It is - * guaranteed to be parsable by secp256k1_ec_privkey_import_der - */ -SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int ec_privkey_export_der( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - unsigned char *privkey, - size_t *privkeylen, - const unsigned char *seckey, - int compressed -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); - -/** Import a private key in DER format. - * Returns: 1 if a private key was extracted. - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL). - * Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte array for storing the private key. - * (cannot be NULL). - * In: privkey: pointer to a private key in DER format (cannot be NULL). - * privkeylen: length of the DER private key pointed to be privkey. - * - * This function will accept more than just strict DER, and even allow some BER - * violations. The public key stored inside the DER-encoded private key is not - * verified for correctness, nor are the curve parameters. Use this function - * only if you know in advance it is supposed to contain a secp256k1 private - * key. - */ -SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int ec_privkey_import_der( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - unsigned char *seckey, - const unsigned char *privkey, - size_t privkeylen -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* SECP256K1_CONTRIB_BER_PRIVATEKEY_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1.h deleted file mode 100644 index 3c4a311..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,654 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef SECP256K1_H -#define SECP256K1_H - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#include - -/* These rules specify the order of arguments in API calls: - * - * 1. Context pointers go first, followed by output arguments, combined - * output/input arguments, and finally input-only arguments. - * 2. Array lengths always immediately the follow the argument whose length - * they describe, even if this violates rule 1. - * 3. Within the OUT/OUTIN/IN groups, pointers to data that is typically generated - * later go first. This means: signatures, public nonces, private nonces, - * messages, public keys, secret keys, tweaks. - * 4. Arguments that are not data pointers go last, from more complex to less - * complex: function pointers, algorithm names, messages, void pointers, - * counts, flags, booleans. - * 5. Opaque data pointers follow the function pointer they are to be passed to. - */ - -/** Opaque data structure that holds context information (precomputed tables etc.). - * - * The purpose of context structures is to cache large precomputed data tables - * that are expensive to construct, and also to maintain the randomization data - * for blinding. - * - * Do not create a new context object for each operation, as construction is - * far slower than all other API calls (~100 times slower than an ECDSA - * verification). - * - * A constructed context can safely be used from multiple threads - * simultaneously, but API call that take a non-const pointer to a context - * need exclusive access to it. In particular this is the case for - * secp256k1_context_destroy and secp256k1_context_randomize. - * - * Regarding randomization, either do it once at creation time (in which case - * you do not need any locking for the other calls), or use a read-write lock. - */ -typedef struct secp256k1_context_struct secp256k1_context; - -/** Opaque data structure that holds rewriteable "scratch space" - * - * The purpose of this structure is to replace dynamic memory allocations, - * because we target architectures where this may not be available. It is - * essentially a resizable (within specified parameters) block of bytes, - * which is initially created either by memory allocation or TODO as a pointer - * into some fixed rewritable space. - * - * Unlike the context object, this cannot safely be shared between threads - * without additional synchronization logic. - */ -typedef struct secp256k1_scratch_space_struct secp256k1_scratch_space; - -/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed and valid public key. - * - * The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not - * guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is - * however guaranteed to be 64 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved. - * If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage, transmission, or - * comparison, use secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize and secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse. - */ -typedef struct { - unsigned char data[64]; -} secp256k1_pubkey; - -/** Opaque data structured that holds a parsed ECDSA signature. - * - * The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not - * guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is - * however guaranteed to be 64 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved. - * If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage, transmission, or - * comparison, use the secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_* and - * secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_* functions. - */ -typedef struct { - unsigned char data[64]; -} secp256k1_ecdsa_signature; - -/** A pointer to a function to deterministically generate a nonce. - * - * Returns: 1 if a nonce was successfully generated. 0 will cause signing to fail. - * Out: nonce32: pointer to a 32-byte array to be filled by the function. - * In: msg32: the 32-byte message hash being verified (will not be NULL) - * key32: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (will not be NULL) - * algo16: pointer to a 16-byte array describing the signature - * algorithm (will be NULL for ECDSA for compatibility). - * data: Arbitrary data pointer that is passed through. - * attempt: how many iterations we have tried to find a nonce. - * This will almost always be 0, but different attempt values - * are required to result in a different nonce. - * - * Except for test cases, this function should compute some cryptographic hash of - * the message, the algorithm, the key and the attempt. - */ -typedef int (*secp256k1_nonce_function)( - unsigned char *nonce32, - const unsigned char *msg32, - const unsigned char *key32, - const unsigned char *algo16, - void *data, - unsigned int attempt -); - -# if !defined(SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ) -# if defined(__GNUC__)&&defined(__GNUC_MINOR__) -# define SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(_maj,_min) \ - ((__GNUC__<<16)+__GNUC_MINOR__>=((_maj)<<16)+(_min)) -# else -# define SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(_maj,_min) 0 -# endif -# endif - -# if (!defined(__STDC_VERSION__) || (__STDC_VERSION__ < 199901L) ) -# if SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(2,7) -# define SECP256K1_INLINE __inline__ -# elif (defined(_MSC_VER)) -# define SECP256K1_INLINE __inline -# else -# define SECP256K1_INLINE -# endif -# else -# define SECP256K1_INLINE inline -# endif - -#ifndef SECP256K1_API -# if defined(_WIN32) -# ifdef SECP256K1_BUILD -# define SECP256K1_API __declspec(dllexport) -# else -# define SECP256K1_API -# endif -# elif defined(__GNUC__) && defined(SECP256K1_BUILD) -# define SECP256K1_API __attribute__ ((visibility ("default"))) -# else -# define SECP256K1_API -# endif -#endif - -/**Warning attributes - * NONNULL is not used if SECP256K1_BUILD is set to avoid the compiler optimizing out - * some paranoid null checks. */ -# if defined(__GNUC__) && SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 4) -# define SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT __attribute__ ((__warn_unused_result__)) -# else -# define SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT -# endif -# if !defined(SECP256K1_BUILD) && defined(__GNUC__) && SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 4) -# define SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(_x) __attribute__ ((__nonnull__(_x))) -# else -# define SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(_x) -# endif - -/** All flags' lower 8 bits indicate what they're for. Do not use directly. */ -#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_MASK ((1 << 8) - 1) -#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT (1 << 0) -#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION (1 << 1) -/** The higher bits contain the actual data. Do not use directly. */ -#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY (1 << 8) -#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN (1 << 9) -#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION (1 << 8) - -/** Flags to pass to secp256k1_context_create. */ -#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY) -#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN) -#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT) - -/** Flag to pass to secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize and secp256k1_ec_privkey_export. */ -#define SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION) -#define SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION) - -/** Prefix byte used to tag various encoded curvepoints for specific purposes */ -#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_EVEN 0x02 -#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_ODD 0x03 -#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_UNCOMPRESSED 0x04 -#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_HYBRID_EVEN 0x06 -#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_HYBRID_ODD 0x07 - -/** Create a secp256k1 context object. - * - * Returns: a newly created context object. - * In: flags: which parts of the context to initialize. - * - * See also secp256k1_context_randomize. - */ -SECP256K1_API secp256k1_context* secp256k1_context_create( - unsigned int flags -) SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; - -/** Copies a secp256k1 context object. - * - * Returns: a newly created context object. - * Args: ctx: an existing context to copy (cannot be NULL) - */ -SECP256K1_API secp256k1_context* secp256k1_context_clone( - const secp256k1_context* ctx -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; - -/** Destroy a secp256k1 context object. - * - * The context pointer may not be used afterwards. - * Args: ctx: an existing context to destroy (cannot be NULL) - */ -SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_destroy( - secp256k1_context* ctx -); - -/** Set a callback function to be called when an illegal argument is passed to - * an API call. It will only trigger for violations that are mentioned - * explicitly in the header. - * - * The philosophy is that these shouldn't be dealt with through a - * specific return value, as calling code should not have branches to deal with - * the case that this code itself is broken. - * - * On the other hand, during debug stage, one would want to be informed about - * such mistakes, and the default (crashing) may be inadvisable. - * When this callback is triggered, the API function called is guaranteed not - * to cause a crash, though its return value and output arguments are - * undefined. - * - * Args: ctx: an existing context object (cannot be NULL) - * In: fun: a pointer to a function to call when an illegal argument is - * passed to the API, taking a message and an opaque pointer - * (NULL restores a default handler that calls abort). - * data: the opaque pointer to pass to fun above. - */ -SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback( - secp256k1_context* ctx, - void (*fun)(const char* message, void* data), - const void* data -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1); - -/** Set a callback function to be called when an internal consistency check - * fails. The default is crashing. - * - * This can only trigger in case of a hardware failure, miscompilation, - * memory corruption, serious bug in the library, or other error would can - * otherwise result in undefined behaviour. It will not trigger due to mere - * incorrect usage of the API (see secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback - * for that). After this callback returns, anything may happen, including - * crashing. - * - * Args: ctx: an existing context object (cannot be NULL) - * In: fun: a pointer to a function to call when an internal error occurs, - * taking a message and an opaque pointer (NULL restores a default - * handler that calls abort). - * data: the opaque pointer to pass to fun above. - */ -SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_set_error_callback( - secp256k1_context* ctx, - void (*fun)(const char* message, void* data), - const void* data -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1); - -/** Create a secp256k1 scratch space object. - * - * Returns: a newly created scratch space. - * Args: ctx: an existing context object (cannot be NULL) - * In: max_size: maximum amount of memory to allocate - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT secp256k1_scratch_space* secp256k1_scratch_space_create( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - size_t max_size -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1); - -/** Destroy a secp256k1 scratch space. - * - * The pointer may not be used afterwards. - * Args: scratch: space to destroy - */ -SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy( - secp256k1_scratch_space* scratch -); - -/** Parse a variable-length public key into the pubkey object. - * - * Returns: 1 if the public key was fully valid. - * 0 if the public key could not be parsed or is invalid. - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object. - * Out: pubkey: pointer to a pubkey object. If 1 is returned, it is set to a - * parsed version of input. If not, its value is undefined. - * In: input: pointer to a serialized public key - * inputlen: length of the array pointed to by input - * - * This function supports parsing compressed (33 bytes, header byte 0x02 or - * 0x03), uncompressed (65 bytes, header byte 0x04), or hybrid (65 bytes, header - * byte 0x06 or 0x07) format public keys. - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t inputlen -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -/** Serialize a pubkey object into a serialized byte sequence. - * - * Returns: 1 always. - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object. - * Out: output: a pointer to a 65-byte (if compressed==0) or 33-byte (if - * compressed==1) byte array to place the serialized key - * in. - * In/Out: outputlen: a pointer to an integer which is initially set to the - * size of output, and is overwritten with the written - * size. - * In: pubkey: a pointer to a secp256k1_pubkey containing an - * initialized public key. - * flags: SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED if serialization should be in - * compressed format, otherwise SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED. - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - unsigned char *output, - size_t *outputlen, - const secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey, - unsigned int flags -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); - -/** Parse an ECDSA signature in compact (64 bytes) format. - * - * Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise. - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object - * Out: sig: a pointer to a signature object - * In: input64: a pointer to the 64-byte array to parse - * - * The signature must consist of a 32-byte big endian R value, followed by a - * 32-byte big endian S value. If R or S fall outside of [0..order-1], the - * encoding is invalid. R and S with value 0 are allowed in the encoding. - * - * After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or R or - * S are zero, the resulting sig value is guaranteed to fail validation for any - * message and public key. - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig, - const unsigned char *input64 -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -/** Parse a DER ECDSA signature. - * - * Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise. - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object - * Out: sig: a pointer to a signature object - * In: input: a pointer to the signature to be parsed - * inputlen: the length of the array pointed to be input - * - * This function will accept any valid DER encoded signature, even if the - * encoded numbers are out of range. - * - * After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or the - * encoded numbers are out of range, signature validation with it is - * guaranteed to fail for every message and public key. - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t inputlen -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -/** Serialize an ECDSA signature in DER format. - * - * Returns: 1 if enough space was available to serialize, 0 otherwise - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object - * Out: output: a pointer to an array to store the DER serialization - * In/Out: outputlen: a pointer to a length integer. Initially, this integer - * should be set to the length of output. After the call - * it will be set to the length of the serialization (even - * if 0 was returned). - * In: sig: a pointer to an initialized signature object - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - unsigned char *output, - size_t *outputlen, - const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); - -/** Serialize an ECDSA signature in compact (64 byte) format. - * - * Returns: 1 - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object - * Out: output64: a pointer to a 64-byte array to store the compact serialization - * In: sig: a pointer to an initialized signature object - * - * See secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact for details about the encoding. - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - unsigned char *output64, - const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -/** Verify an ECDSA signature. - * - * Returns: 1: correct signature - * 0: incorrect or unparseable signature - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object, initialized for verification. - * In: sig: the signature being verified (cannot be NULL) - * msg32: the 32-byte message hash being verified (cannot be NULL) - * pubkey: pointer to an initialized public key to verify with (cannot be NULL) - * - * To avoid accepting malleable signatures, only ECDSA signatures in lower-S - * form are accepted. - * - * If you need to accept ECDSA signatures from sources that do not obey this - * rule, apply secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize to the signature prior to - * validation, but be aware that doing so results in malleable signatures. - * - * For details, see the comments for that function. - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ecdsa_verify( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig, - const unsigned char *msg32, - const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); - -/** Convert a signature to a normalized lower-S form. - * - * Returns: 1 if sigin was not normalized, 0 if it already was. - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object - * Out: sigout: a pointer to a signature to fill with the normalized form, - * or copy if the input was already normalized. (can be NULL if - * you're only interested in whether the input was already - * normalized). - * In: sigin: a pointer to a signature to check/normalize (cannot be NULL, - * can be identical to sigout) - * - * With ECDSA a third-party can forge a second distinct signature of the same - * message, given a single initial signature, but without knowing the key. This - * is done by negating the S value modulo the order of the curve, 'flipping' - * the sign of the random point R which is not included in the signature. - * - * Forgery of the same message isn't universally problematic, but in systems - * where message malleability or uniqueness of signatures is important this can - * cause issues. This forgery can be blocked by all verifiers forcing signers - * to use a normalized form. - * - * The lower-S form reduces the size of signatures slightly on average when - * variable length encodings (such as DER) are used and is cheap to verify, - * making it a good choice. Security of always using lower-S is assured because - * anyone can trivially modify a signature after the fact to enforce this - * property anyway. - * - * The lower S value is always between 0x1 and - * 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF5D576E7357A4501DDFE92F46681B20A0, - * inclusive. - * - * No other forms of ECDSA malleability are known and none seem likely, but - * there is no formal proof that ECDSA, even with this additional restriction, - * is free of other malleability. Commonly used serialization schemes will also - * accept various non-unique encodings, so care should be taken when this - * property is required for an application. - * - * The secp256k1_ecdsa_sign function will by default create signatures in the - * lower-S form, and secp256k1_ecdsa_verify will not accept others. In case - * signatures come from a system that cannot enforce this property, - * secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize must be called before verification. - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigout, - const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigin -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -/** An implementation of RFC6979 (using HMAC-SHA256) as nonce generation function. - * If a data pointer is passed, it is assumed to be a pointer to 32 bytes of - * extra entropy. - */ -SECP256K1_API extern const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979; - -/** A default safe nonce generation function (currently equal to secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979). */ -SECP256K1_API extern const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_default; - -/** Create an ECDSA signature. - * - * Returns: 1: signature created - * 0: the nonce generation function failed, or the private key was invalid. - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot be NULL) - * Out: sig: pointer to an array where the signature will be placed (cannot be NULL) - * In: msg32: the 32-byte message hash being signed (cannot be NULL) - * seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (cannot be NULL) - * noncefp:pointer to a nonce generation function. If NULL, secp256k1_nonce_function_default is used - * ndata: pointer to arbitrary data used by the nonce generation function (can be NULL) - * - * The created signature is always in lower-S form. See - * secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize for more details. - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig, - const unsigned char *msg32, - const unsigned char *seckey, - secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, - const void *ndata -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); - -/** Verify an ECDSA secret key. - * - * Returns: 1: secret key is valid - * 0: secret key is invalid - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) - * In: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (cannot be NULL) - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - const unsigned char *seckey -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2); - -/** Compute the public key for a secret key. - * - * Returns: 1: secret was valid, public key stores - * 0: secret was invalid, try again - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot be NULL) - * Out: pubkey: pointer to the created public key (cannot be NULL) - * In: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte private key (cannot be NULL) - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, - const unsigned char *seckey -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -/** Negates a private key in place. - * - * Returns: 1 always - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object - * In/Out: seckey: pointer to the 32-byte private key to be negated (cannot be NULL) - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_negate( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - unsigned char *seckey -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2); - -/** Negates a public key in place. - * - * Returns: 1 always - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object - * In/Out: pubkey: pointer to the public key to be negated (cannot be NULL) - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2); - -/** Tweak a private key by adding tweak to it. - * Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for - * uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or if the resulting private key - * would be invalid (only when the tweak is the complement of the - * private key). 1 otherwise. - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL). - * In/Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte private key. - * In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - unsigned char *seckey, - const unsigned char *tweak -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -/** Tweak a public key by adding tweak times the generator to it. - * Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for - * uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or if the resulting public key - * would be invalid (only when the tweak is the complement of the - * corresponding private key). 1 otherwise. - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for validation - * (cannot be NULL). - * In/Out: pubkey: pointer to a public key object. - * In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, - const unsigned char *tweak -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -/** Tweak a private key by multiplying it by a tweak. - * Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for - * uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or equal to zero. 1 otherwise. - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL). - * In/Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte private key. - * In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - unsigned char *seckey, - const unsigned char *tweak -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -/** Tweak a public key by multiplying it by a tweak value. - * Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for - * uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or equal to zero. 1 otherwise. - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for validation - * (cannot be NULL). - * In/Out: pubkey: pointer to a public key obkect. - * In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, - const unsigned char *tweak -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -/** Updates the context randomization to protect against side-channel leakage. - * Returns: 1: randomization successfully updated - * 0: error - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) - * In: seed32: pointer to a 32-byte random seed (NULL resets to initial state) - * - * While secp256k1 code is written to be constant-time no matter what secret - * values are, it's possible that a future compiler may output code which isn't, - * and also that the CPU may not emit the same radio frequencies or draw the same - * amount power for all values. - * - * This function provides a seed which is combined into the blinding value: that - * blinding value is added before each multiplication (and removed afterwards) so - * that it does not affect function results, but shields against attacks which - * rely on any input-dependent behaviour. - * - * You should call this after secp256k1_context_create or - * secp256k1_context_clone, and may call this repeatedly afterwards. - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_context_randomize( - secp256k1_context* ctx, - const unsigned char *seed32 -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1); - -/** Add a number of public keys together. - * Returns: 1: the sum of the public keys is valid. - * 0: the sum of the public keys is not valid. - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object - * Out: out: pointer to a public key object for placing the resulting public key - * (cannot be NULL) - * In: ins: pointer to array of pointers to public keys (cannot be NULL) - * n: the number of public keys to add together (must be at least 1) - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_pubkey *out, - const secp256k1_pubkey * const * ins, - size_t n -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* SECP256K1_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_bulletproofs.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_bulletproofs.h deleted file mode 100644 index 46df2b5..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_bulletproofs.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,176 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef _SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_ -# define _SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_ - -# include "secp256k1.h" -# include "secp256k1_generator.h" -# include "secp256k1_rangeproof.h" - -# ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -# endif - -/** Opaque structure representing a large number of NUMS generators */ -typedef struct secp256k1_bulletproof_generators secp256k1_bulletproof_generators; - -/* Maximum depth of 31 lets us validate an aggregate of 2^25 64-bit proofs */ -#define SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_DEPTH 31 - -/* Size of a hypothetical 31-depth rangeproof, in bytes */ -#define SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_PROOF (160 + 36*32 + 7) - -/** Allocates and initializes a list of NUMS generators, along with precomputation data - * Returns a list of generators, or NULL if allocation failed. - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) - * In: blinding_gen: generator that blinding factors will be multiplied by (cannot be NULL) - * n: number of NUMS generators to produce - */ -SECP256K1_API secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_create( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - const secp256k1_generator *blinding_gen, - size_t n -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1); - -/** Destroys a list of NUMS generators, freeing allocated memory - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) - * gen: pointer to the generator set to be destroyed - */ -SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_destroy( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gen -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1); - -/** Verifies a single bulletproof (aggregate) rangeproof - * Returns: 1: rangeproof was valid - * 0: rangeproof was invalid, or out of memory - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for verification (cannot be NULL) - * scratch: scratch space with enough memory for verification (cannot be NULL) - * gens: generator set with at least 2*nbits*n_commits many generators (cannot be NULL) - * In: proof: byte-serialized rangeproof (cannot be NULL) - * plen: length of the proof - * min_value: array of minimum values to prove ranges above, or NULL for all-zeroes - * commit: array of pedersen commitment that this rangeproof is over (cannot be NULL) - * n_commits: number of commitments in the above array (cannot be 0) - * nbits: number of bits proven for each range - * value_gen: generator multiplied by value in pedersen commitments (cannot be NULL) - * extra_commit: additonal data committed to by the rangeproof (may be NULL if `extra_commit_len` is 0) - * extra_commit_len: length of additional data - */ -SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_scratch_space* scratch, - const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, - const unsigned char* proof, - size_t plen, - const uint64_t* min_value, - const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* commit, - size_t n_commits, - size_t nbits, - const secp256k1_generator* value_gen, - const unsigned char* extra_commit, - size_t extra_commit_len -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(7) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(10); - -/** Batch-verifies multiple bulletproof (aggregate) rangeproofs of the same size using same generator - * Returns: 1: all rangeproofs were valid - * 0: some rangeproof was invalid, or out of memory - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for verification (cannot be NULL) - * scratch: scratch space with enough memory for verification (cannot be NULL) - * gens: generator set with at least 2*nbits*n_commits many generators (cannot be NULL) - * In: proof: array of byte-serialized rangeproofs (cannot be NULL) - * n_proofs: number of proofs in the above array, and number of arrays in the `commit` array - * plen: length of every individual proof - * min_value: array of arrays of minimum values to prove ranges above, or NULL for all-zeroes - * commit: array of arrays of pedersen commitment that the rangeproofs is over (cannot be NULL) - * n_commits: number of commitments in each element of the above array (cannot be 0) - * nbits: number of bits in each proof - * value_gen: generator multiplied by value in pedersen commitments (cannot be NULL) - * extra_commit: additonal data committed to by the rangeproof (may be NULL if `extra_commit_len` is 0) - * extra_commit_len: array of lengths of additional data - */ -SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_scratch_space* scratch, - const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, - const unsigned char* const* proof, - size_t n_proofs, - size_t plen, - const uint64_t* const* min_value, - const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* const* commit, - size_t n_commits, - size_t nbits, - const secp256k1_generator* value_gen, - const unsigned char* const* extra_commit, - size_t *extra_commit_len -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(8); - -/** Extracts the value and blinding factor from a single-commit rangeproof given a secret nonce - * Returns: 1: value and blinding factor were extracted and matched the input commit - * 0: one of the above was not true, extraction failed - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) - * gens: generator set used to make original proof (cannot be NULL) - * Out: value: pointer to value that will be extracted - * blind: pointer to 32-byte array for blinding factor to be extracted - * In: proof: byte-serialized rangeproof (cannot be NULL) - * plen: length of every individual proof - * min_value: minimum value that the proof ranges over - * commit: pedersen commitment that the rangeproof is over (cannot be NULL) - * value_gen: generator multiplied by value in pedersen commitments (cannot be NULL) - * nonce: random 32-byte seed used to derive blinding factors (cannot be NULL) - * extra_commit: additonal data committed to by the rangeproof - * extra_commit_len: length of additional data - */ -SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators* gens, - uint64_t* value, - unsigned char* blind, - const unsigned char* proof, - size_t plen, - uint64_t min_value, - const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* commit, - const secp256k1_generator* value_gen, - const unsigned char* nonce, - const unsigned char* extra_commit, - size_t extra_commit_len -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(8) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(9); - -/** Produces an aggregate Bulletproof rangeproof for a set of Pedersen commitments - * Returns: 1: rangeproof was successfully created - * 0: rangeproof could not be created, or out of memory - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for signing and verification (cannot be NULL) - * scratch: scratch space with enough memory for verification (cannot be NULL) - * gens: generator set with at least 2*nbits*n_commits many generators (cannot be NULL) - * Out: proof: byte-serialized rangeproof (cannot be NULL) - * In/out: plen: pointer to size of `proof`, to be replaced with actual length of proof (cannot be NULL) - * In: value: array of values committed by the Pedersen commitments (cannot be NULL) - * min_value: array of minimum values to prove ranges above, or NULL for all-zeroes - * blind: array of blinding factors of the Pedersen commitments (cannot be NULL) - * n_commits: number of entries in the `value` and `blind` arrays - * value_gen: generator multiplied by value in pedersen commitments (cannot be NULL) - * nbits: number of bits proven for each range - * nonce: random 32-byte seed used to derive blinding factors (cannot be NULL) - * extra_commit: additonal data committed to by the rangeproof - * extra_commit_len: length of additional data - */ -SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_scratch_space* scratch, - const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, - unsigned char* proof, - size_t* plen, - const uint64_t *value, - const uint64_t *min_value, - const unsigned char* const* blind, - size_t n_commits, - const secp256k1_generator* value_gen, - size_t nbits, - const unsigned char* nonce, - const unsigned char* extra_commit, - size_t extra_commit_len -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(6) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(8) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(10) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(12); - -# ifdef __cplusplus -} -# endif - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_commitment.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_commitment.h deleted file mode 100644 index 83b7116..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_commitment.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,164 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef _SECP256K1_COMMITMENT_ -# define _SECP256K1_COMMITMENT_ - -# include "secp256k1.h" -# include "secp256k1_generator.h" - -# ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -# endif - -#include - -/** Opaque data structure that stores a Pedersen commitment - * - * The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not - * guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is - * however guaranteed to be 33 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved. - * If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage or transmission, use - * secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_serialize and secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_parse. - */ -typedef struct { - unsigned char data[33]; -} secp256k1_pedersen_commitment; - -/** Parse a 33-byte commitment into a commitment object. - * - * Returns: 1 if input contains a valid commitment. - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object. - * Out: commit: pointer to the output commitment object - * In: input: pointer to a 33-byte serialized commitment key - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_parse( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* commit, - const unsigned char *input -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -/** Serialize a commitment object into a serialized byte sequence. - * - * Returns: 1 always. - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object. - * Out: output: a pointer to a 33-byte byte array - * In: commit: a pointer to a secp256k1_pedersen_commitment containing an - * initialized commitment - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_serialize( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - unsigned char *output, - const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* commit -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -/** Initialize a context for usage with Pedersen commitments. */ -void secp256k1_pedersen_context_initialize(secp256k1_context* ctx); - -/** Generate a Pedersen commitment. - * Returns 1: Commitment successfully created. - * 0: Error. The blinding factor is larger than the group order - * (probability for random 32 byte number < 2^-127) or results in the - * point at infinity. Retry with a different factor. - * In: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) - * blind: pointer to a 32-byte blinding factor (cannot be NULL) - * value: unsigned 64-bit integer value to commit to. - * value_gen: value generator 'h' - * blind_gen: blinding factor generator 'g' - * Out: commit: pointer to the commitment (cannot be NULL) - * - * Blinding factors can be generated and verified in the same way as secp256k1 private keys for ECDSA. - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_pedersen_commit( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *commit, - const unsigned char *blind, - uint64_t value, - const secp256k1_generator *value_gen, - const secp256k1_generator *blind_gen -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(6); - -/** Computes the sum of multiple positive and negative blinding factors. - * Returns 1: Sum successfully computed. - * 0: Error. A blinding factor is larger than the group order - * (probability for random 32 byte number < 2^-127). Retry with - * different factors. - * In: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) - * blinds: pointer to pointers to 32-byte character arrays for blinding factors. (cannot be NULL) - * n: number of factors pointed to by blinds. - * npositive: how many of the input factors should be treated with a positive sign. - * Out: blind_out: pointer to a 32-byte array for the sum (cannot be NULL) - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_pedersen_blind_sum( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - unsigned char *blind_out, - const unsigned char * const *blinds, - size_t n, - size_t npositive -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -/** Verify a tally of Pedersen commitments - * Returns 1: commitments successfully sum to zero. - * 0: Commitments do not sum to zero or other error. - * In: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) - * pos: pointer to array of pointers to the commitments. (cannot be NULL if `n_pos` is non-zero) - * n_pos: number of commitments pointed to by `pos`. - * neg: pointer to array of pointers to the negative commitments. (cannot be NULL if `n_neg` is non-zero) - * n_neg: number of commitments pointed to by `neg`. - * - * This computes sum(pos[0..n_pos)) - sum(neg[0..n_neg)) == 0. - * - * A Pedersen commitment is xG + vA where G and A are generators for the secp256k1 group and x is a blinding factor, - * while v is the committed value. For a collection of commitments to sum to zero, for each distinct generator - * A all blinding factors and all values must sum to zero. - * - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment * const* pos, - size_t n_pos, - const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment * const* neg, - size_t n_neg -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); - -/** Sets the final Pedersen blinding factor correctly when the generators themselves - * have blinding factors. - * - * Consider a generator of the form A' = A + rG, where A is the "real" generator - * but A' is the generator provided to verifiers. Then a Pedersen commitment - * P = vA' + r'G really has the form vA + (vr + r')G. To get all these (vr + r') - * to sum to zero for multiple commitments, we take three arrays consisting of - * the `v`s, `r`s, and `r'`s, respectively called `value`s, `generator_blind`s - * and `blinding_factor`s, and sum them. - * - * The function then subtracts the sum of all (vr + r') from the last element - * of the `blinding_factor` array, setting the total sum to zero. - * - * Returns 1: Blinding factor successfully computed. - * 0: Error. A blinding_factor or generator_blind are larger than the group - * order (probability for random 32 byte number < 2^-127). Retry with - * different values. - * - * In: ctx: pointer to a context object - * value: array of asset values, `v` in the above paragraph. - * May not be NULL unless `n_total` is 0. - * generator_blind: array of asset blinding factors, `r` in the above paragraph - * May not be NULL unless `n_total` is 0. - * n_total: Total size of the above arrays - * n_inputs: How many of the initial array elements represent commitments that - * will be negated in the final sum - * In/Out: blinding_factor: array of commitment blinding factors, `r'` in the above paragraph - * May not be NULL unless `n_total` is 0. - * the last value will be modified to get the total sum to zero. - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - const uint64_t *value, - const unsigned char* const* generator_blind, - unsigned char* const* blinding_factor, - size_t n_total, - size_t n_inputs -); - -# ifdef __cplusplus -} -# endif - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_ecdh.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_ecdh.h deleted file mode 100644 index 88492dc..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_ecdh.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,31 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef SECP256K1_ECDH_H -#define SECP256K1_ECDH_H - -#include "secp256k1.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** Compute an EC Diffie-Hellman secret in constant time - * Returns: 1: exponentiation was successful - * 0: scalar was invalid (zero or overflow) - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) - * Out: result: a 32-byte array which will be populated by an ECDH - * secret computed from the point and scalar - * In: pubkey: a pointer to a secp256k1_pubkey containing an - * initialized public key - * privkey: a 32-byte scalar with which to multiply the point - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ecdh( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - unsigned char *result, - const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, - const unsigned char *privkey -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* SECP256K1_ECDH_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_generator.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_generator.h deleted file mode 100644 index 3f2baf2..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_generator.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,102 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef _SECP256K1_GENERATOR_ -# define _SECP256K1_GENERATOR_ - -# include "secp256k1.h" - -# ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -# endif - -#include - -/** Opaque data structure that stores a base point - * - * The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not - * guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is - * however guaranteed to be 33 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved. - * If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage or transmission, use - * the secp256k1_generator_serialize_*. - * - * Furthermore, it is guaranteed to identical points will have identical - * representation, so they can be memcmp'ed. - */ -typedef struct { - unsigned char data[33]; -} secp256k1_generator; - -/** Standard secp256k1 generator G */ -extern const secp256k1_generator secp256k1_generator_const_g; - -/** Alternate secp256k1 generator from Elements Alpha */ -extern const secp256k1_generator secp256k1_generator_const_h; - -/** Parse a 33-byte generator byte sequence into a generator object. - * - * Returns: 1 if input contains a valid generator. - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object. - * Out: commit: pointer to the output generator object - * In: input: pointer to a 33-byte serialized generator - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_generator_parse( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_generator* commit, - const unsigned char *input -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -/** Serialize a 33-byte generator into a serialized byte sequence. - * - * Returns: 1 always. - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object. - * Out: output: a pointer to a 33-byte byte array - * In: commit: a pointer to a generator - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_generator_serialize( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - unsigned char *output, - const secp256k1_generator* commit -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -/** Generate a generator for the curve. - * - * Returns: 0 in the highly unlikely case the seed is not acceptable, - * 1 otherwise. - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object - * Out: gen: a generator object - * In: seed32: a 32-byte seed - * - * If succesful, a valid generator will be placed in gen. The produced - * generators are distributed uniformly over the curve, and will not have a - * known dicrete logarithm with respect to any other generator produced, - * or to the base generator G. - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_generator_generate( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_generator* gen, - const unsigned char *seed32 -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -/** Generate a blinded generator for the curve. - * - * Returns: 0 in the highly unlikely case the seed is not acceptable or when - * blind is out of range. 1 otherwise. - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object, initialized for signing - * Out: gen: a generator object - * In: seed32: a 32-byte seed - * blind32: a 32-byte secret value to blind the generator with. - * - * The result is equivalent to first calling secp256k1_generator_generate, - * converting the result to a public key, calling secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add, - * and then converting back to generator form. - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_generator* gen, - const unsigned char *key32, - const unsigned char *blind32 -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); - -# ifdef __cplusplus -} -# endif - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h deleted file mode 100644 index be8d0df..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,144 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef _SECP256K1_RANGEPROOF_ -# define _SECP256K1_RANGEPROOF_ - -# include "secp256k1.h" -# include "secp256k1_generator.h" -# include "secp256k1_commitment.h" - -# ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -# endif - -#include - -/** Verify a proof that a committed value is within a range. - * Returns 1: Value is within the range [0..2^64), the specifically proven range is in the min/max value outputs. - * 0: Proof failed or other error. - * In: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for range-proof and commitment (cannot be NULL) - * commit: the commitment being proved. (cannot be NULL) - * proof: pointer to character array with the proof. (cannot be NULL) - * plen: length of proof in bytes. - * extra_commit: additional data covered in rangeproof signature - * extra_commit_len: length of extra_commit byte array (0 if NULL) - * gen: additional generator 'h' - * Out: min_value: pointer to a unsigned int64 which will be updated with the minimum value that commit could have. (cannot be NULL) - * max_value: pointer to a unsigned int64 which will be updated with the maximum value that commit could have. (cannot be NULL) - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_rangeproof_verify( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - uint64_t *min_value, - uint64_t *max_value, - const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *commit, - const unsigned char *proof, - size_t plen, - const unsigned char *extra_commit, - size_t extra_commit_len, - const secp256k1_generator* gen -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(9); - -/** Verify a range proof proof and rewind the proof to recover information sent by its author. - * Returns 1: Value is within the range [0..2^64), the specifically proven range is in the min/max value outputs, and the value and blinding were recovered. - * 0: Proof failed, rewind failed, or other error. - * In: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for range-proof and Pedersen commitment (cannot be NULL) - * commit: the commitment being proved. (cannot be NULL) - * proof: pointer to character array with the proof. (cannot be NULL) - * plen: length of proof in bytes. - * nonce: 32-byte secret nonce used by the prover (cannot be NULL) - * extra_commit: additional data covered in rangeproof signature - * extra_commit_len: length of extra_commit byte array (0 if NULL) - * gen: additional generator 'h' - * In/Out: blind_out: storage for the 32-byte blinding factor used for the commitment - * value_out: pointer to an unsigned int64 which has the exact value of the commitment. - * message_out: pointer to a 4096 byte character array to receive message data from the proof author. - * outlen: length of message data written to message_out. - * min_value: pointer to an unsigned int64 which will be updated with the minimum value that commit could have. (cannot be NULL) - * max_value: pointer to an unsigned int64 which will be updated with the maximum value that commit could have. (cannot be NULL) - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - unsigned char *blind_out, - uint64_t *value_out, - unsigned char *message_out, - size_t *outlen, - const unsigned char *nonce, - uint64_t *min_value, - uint64_t *max_value, - const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *commit, - const unsigned char *proof, - size_t plen, - const unsigned char *extra_commit, - size_t extra_commit_len, - const secp256k1_generator *gen -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(6) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(7) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(8) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(9) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(10) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(14); - -/** Author a proof that a committed value is within a range. - * Returns 1: Proof successfully created. - * 0: Error - * In: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for range-proof, signing, and Pedersen commitment (cannot be NULL) - * proof: pointer to array to receive the proof, can be up to 5134 bytes. (cannot be NULL) - * min_value: constructs a proof where the verifer can tell the minimum value is at least the specified amount. - * commit: the commitment being proved. - * blind: 32-byte blinding factor used by commit. - * nonce: 32-byte secret nonce used to initialize the proof (value can be reverse-engineered out of the proof if this secret is known.) - * exp: Base-10 exponent. Digits below above will be made public, but the proof will be made smaller. Allowed range is -1 to 18. - * (-1 is a special case that makes the value public. 0 is the most private.) - * min_bits: Number of bits of the value to keep private. (0 = auto/minimal, - 64). - * value: Actual value of the commitment. - * message: pointer to a byte array of data to be embedded in the rangeproof that can be recovered by rewinding the proof - * msg_len: size of the message to be embedded in the rangeproof - * extra_commit: additional data to be covered in rangeproof signature - * extra_commit_len: length of extra_commit byte array (0 if NULL) - * gen: additional generator 'h' - * In/out: plen: point to an integer with the size of the proof buffer and the size of the constructed proof. - * - * If min_value or exp is non-zero then the value must be on the range [0, 2^63) to prevent the proof range from spanning past 2^64. - * - * If exp is -1 the value is revealed by the proof (e.g. it proves that the proof is a blinding of a specific value, without revealing the blinding key.) - * - * This can randomly fail with probability around one in 2^100. If this happens, buy a lottery ticket and retry with a different nonce or blinding. - * - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_rangeproof_sign( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - unsigned char *proof, - size_t *plen, - uint64_t min_value, - const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *commit, - const unsigned char *blind, - const unsigned char *nonce, - int exp, - int min_bits, - uint64_t value, - const unsigned char *message, - size_t msg_len, - const unsigned char *extra_commit, - size_t extra_commit_len, - const secp256k1_generator *gen -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(6) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(7) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(15); - -/** Extract some basic information from a range-proof. - * Returns 1: Information successfully extracted. - * 0: Decode failed. - * In: ctx: pointer to a context object - * proof: pointer to character array with the proof. - * plen: length of proof in bytes. - * Out: exp: Exponent used in the proof (-1 means the value isn't private). - * mantissa: Number of bits covered by the proof. - * min_value: pointer to an unsigned int64 which will be updated with the minimum value that commit could have. (cannot be NULL) - * max_value: pointer to an unsigned int64 which will be updated with the maximum value that commit could have. (cannot be NULL) - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_rangeproof_info( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - int *exp, - int *mantissa, - uint64_t *min_value, - uint64_t *max_value, - const unsigned char *proof, - size_t plen -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5); - -# ifdef __cplusplus -} -# endif - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_recovery.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_recovery.h deleted file mode 100644 index cf6c5ed..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_recovery.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,110 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef SECP256K1_RECOVERY_H -#define SECP256K1_RECOVERY_H - -#include "secp256k1.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** Opaque data structured that holds a parsed ECDSA signature, - * supporting pubkey recovery. - * - * The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not - * guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is - * however guaranteed to be 65 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved. - * If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage or transmission, use - * the secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_* and - * secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_* functions. - * - * Furthermore, it is guaranteed that identical signatures (including their - * recoverability) will have identical representation, so they can be - * memcmp'ed. - */ -typedef struct { - unsigned char data[65]; -} secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature; - -/** Parse a compact ECDSA signature (64 bytes + recovery id). - * - * Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object - * Out: sig: a pointer to a signature object - * In: input64: a pointer to a 64-byte compact signature - * recid: the recovery id (0, 1, 2 or 3) - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature* sig, - const unsigned char *input64, - int recid -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -/** Convert a recoverable signature into a normal signature. - * - * Returns: 1 - * Out: sig: a pointer to a normal signature (cannot be NULL). - * In: sigin: a pointer to a recoverable signature (cannot be NULL). - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig, - const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature* sigin -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -/** Serialize an ECDSA signature in compact format (64 bytes + recovery id). - * - * Returns: 1 - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object - * Out: output64: a pointer to a 64-byte array of the compact signature (cannot be NULL) - * recid: a pointer to an integer to hold the recovery id (can be NULL). - * In: sig: a pointer to an initialized signature object (cannot be NULL) - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - unsigned char *output64, - int *recid, - const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature* sig -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); - -/** Create a recoverable ECDSA signature. - * - * Returns: 1: signature created - * 0: the nonce generation function failed, or the private key was invalid. - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot be NULL) - * Out: sig: pointer to an array where the signature will be placed (cannot be NULL) - * In: msg32: the 32-byte message hash being signed (cannot be NULL) - * seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (cannot be NULL) - * noncefp:pointer to a nonce generation function. If NULL, secp256k1_nonce_function_default is used - * ndata: pointer to arbitrary data used by the nonce generation function (can be NULL) - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *sig, - const unsigned char *msg32, - const unsigned char *seckey, - secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, - const void *ndata -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); - -/** Recover an ECDSA public key from a signature. - * - * Returns: 1: public key successfully recovered (which guarantees a correct signature). - * 0: otherwise. - * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for verification (cannot be NULL) - * Out: pubkey: pointer to the recovered public key (cannot be NULL) - * In: sig: pointer to initialized signature that supports pubkey recovery (cannot be NULL) - * msg32: the 32-byte message hash assumed to be signed (cannot be NULL) - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ecdsa_recover( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, - const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *sig, - const unsigned char *msg32 -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* SECP256K1_RECOVERY_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_surjectionproof.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_surjectionproof.h deleted file mode 100644 index 57f2afb..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_surjectionproof.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,212 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef _SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_ -#define _SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_ - -#include "secp256k1.h" -#include "secp256k1_rangeproof.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** Maximum number of inputs that may be given in a surjection proof */ -#define SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS 256 - -/** Number of bytes a serialized surjection proof requires given the - * number of inputs and the number of used inputs. - */ -#define SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_SERIALIZATION_BYTES(n_inputs, n_used_inputs) \ - (2 + (n_inputs + 7)/8 + 32 * (1 + (n_used_inputs))) - -/** Maximum number of bytes a serialized surjection proof requires. */ -#define SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_SERIALIZATION_BYTES_MAX \ - SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_SERIALIZATION_BYTES(SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS, SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS) - -/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed surjection proof - * - * The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not - * guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. Nor is - * it guaranteed to have any particular size, nor that identical proofs - * will have identical representation. (That is, memcmp may return nonzero - * even for identical proofs.) - * - * To obtain these properties, instead use secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse - * and secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize to encode/decode proofs into a - * well-defined format. - * - * The representation is exposed to allow creation of these objects on the - * stack; please *do not* use these internals directly. - */ -typedef struct { -#ifdef VERIFY - /** Mark whether this proof has gone through `secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize` */ - int initialized; -#endif - /** Total number of input asset tags */ - size_t n_inputs; - /** Bitmap of which input tags are used in the surjection proof */ - unsigned char used_inputs[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS / 8]; - /** Borromean signature: e0, scalars */ - unsigned char data[32 * (1 + SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS)]; -} secp256k1_surjectionproof; - -/** Parse a surjection proof - * - * Returns: 1 when the proof could be parsed, 0 otherwise. - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object - * Out: proof: a pointer to a proof object - * In: input: a pointer to the array to parse - * inputlen: length of the array pointed to by input - * - * The proof must consist of: - * - A 2-byte little-endian total input count `n` - * - A ceil(n/8)-byte bitmap indicating which inputs are used. - * - A big-endian 32-byte borromean signature e0 value - * - `m` big-endian 32-byte borromean signature s values, where `m` - * is the number of set bits in the bitmap - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_surjectionproof *proof, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t inputlen -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -/** Serialize a surjection proof - * - * Returns: 1 if enough space was available to serialize, 0 otherwise - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object - * Out: output: a pointer to an array to store the serialization - * In/Out: outputlen: a pointer to an integer which is initially set to the - * size of output, and is overwritten with the written - * size. - * In: proof: a pointer to an initialized proof object - * - * See secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse for details about the encoding. - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - unsigned char *output, - size_t *outputlen, - const secp256k1_surjectionproof *proof -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); - -/** Data structure that holds a fixed asset tag. - * - * This data type is *not* opaque. It will always be 32 bytes of whatever - * data the API user wants to use as an asset tag. Its contents have no - * semantic meaning to libsecp whatsoever. - */ -typedef struct { - unsigned char data[32]; -} secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag; - -/** Returns the total number of inputs a proof expects to be over. - * - * Returns: the number of inputs for the given proof - * In: ctx: pointer to a context object - * proof: a pointer to a proof object - */ -SECP256K1_API size_t secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_total_inputs( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - const secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2); - -/** Returns the actual number of inputs that a proof uses - * - * Returns: the number of inputs for the given proof - * In: ctx: pointer to a context object - * proof: a pointer to a proof object - */ -SECP256K1_API size_t secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_used_inputs( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - const secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2); - -/** Returns the total size this proof would take, in bytes, when serialized - * - * Returns: the total size - * In: ctx: pointer to a context object - * proof: a pointer to a proof object - */ -SECP256K1_API size_t secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialized_size( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - const secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2); - -/** Surjection proof initialization function; decides on inputs to use - * Returns 0: inputs could not be selected - * n: inputs were selected after n iterations of random selection - * - * In: ctx: pointer to a context object - * fixed_input_tags: fixed input tags `A_i` for all inputs. (If the fixed tag is not known, - * e.g. in a coinjoin with others' inputs, an ephemeral tag can be given; - * this won't match the output tag but might be used in the anonymity set.) - * n_input_tags: the number of entries in the fixed_input_tags array - * n_input_tags_to_use: the number of inputs to select randomly to put in the anonymity set - * fixed_output_tag: fixed output tag - * max_n_iterations: the maximum number of iterations to do before giving up - * random_seed32: a random seed to be used for input selection - * Out: proof: The proof whose bitvector will be initialized. In case of failure, - * the state of the proof is undefined. - * input_index: The index of the actual input that is secretly mapped to the output - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof, - size_t *input_index, - const secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag* fixed_input_tags, - const size_t n_input_tags, - const size_t n_input_tags_to_use, - const secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag* fixed_output_tag, - const size_t n_max_iterations, - const unsigned char *random_seed32 -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(7); - -/** Surjection proof generation function - * Returns 0: proof could not be created - * 1: proof was successfully created - * - * In: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing and verification - * ephemeral_input_tags: the ephemeral asset tag of all inputs - * n_ephemeral_input_tags: the number of entries in the ephemeral_input_tags array - * ephemeral_output_tag: the ephemeral asset tag of the output - * input_index: the index of the input that actually maps to the output - * input_blinding_key: the blinding key of the input - * output_blinding_key: the blinding key of the output - * In/Out: proof: The produced surjection proof. Must have already gone through `secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize` - */ -SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof, - const secp256k1_generator* ephemeral_input_tags, - size_t n_ephemeral_input_tags, - const secp256k1_generator* ephemeral_output_tag, - size_t input_index, - const unsigned char *input_blinding_key, - const unsigned char *output_blinding_key -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(7) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(8); - - -/** Surjection proof verification function - * Returns 0: proof was invalid - * 1: proof was valid - * - * In: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing and verification - * proof: proof to be verified - * ephemeral_input_tags: the ephemeral asset tag of all inputs - * n_ephemeral_input_tags: the number of entries in the ephemeral_input_tags array - * ephemeral_output_tag: the ephemeral asset tag of the output - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - const secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof, - const secp256k1_generator* ephemeral_input_tags, - size_t n_ephemeral_input_tags, - const secp256k1_generator* ephemeral_output_tag -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_whitelist.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_whitelist.h deleted file mode 100644 index c536c11..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1_whitelist.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,152 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2016 Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef _SECP256K1_WHITELIST_ -#define _SECP256K1_WHITELIST_ - -#include "secp256k1.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define SECP256K1_WHITELIST_MAX_N_KEYS 256 - -/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed whitelist proof - * - * The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not - * guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. Nor is - * it guaranteed to have any particular size, nor that identical signatures - * will have identical representation. (That is, memcmp may return nonzero - * even for identical signatures.) - * - * To obtain these properties, instead use secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse - * and secp256k1_whitelist_signature_serialize to encode/decode signatures - * into a well-defined format. - * - * The representation is exposed to allow creation of these objects on the - * stack; please *do not* use these internals directly. To learn the number - * of keys for a signature, use `secp256k1_whitelist_signature_n_keys`. - */ -typedef struct { - size_t n_keys; - /* e0, scalars */ - unsigned char data[32 * (1 + SECP256K1_WHITELIST_MAX_N_KEYS)]; -} secp256k1_whitelist_signature; - -/** Parse a whitelist signature - * - * Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise. - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object - * Out: sig: a pointer to a signature object - * In: input: a pointer to the array to parse - * input_len: the length of the above array - * - * The signature must consist of a 1-byte n_keys value, followed by a 32-byte - * big endian e0 value, followed by n_keys many 32-byte big endian s values. - * If n_keys falls outside of [0..SECP256K1_WHITELIST_MAX_N_KEYS] the encoding - * is invalid. - * - * The total length of the input array must therefore be 33 + 32 * n_keys. - * If the length `input_len` does not match this value, parsing will fail. - * - * After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or any - * scalar values overflow or are zero, the resulting sig value is guaranteed - * to fail validation for any set of keys. - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_whitelist_signature *sig, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t input_len -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); - -/** Returns the number of keys a signature expects to have. - * - * Returns: the number of keys for the given signature - * In: sig: a pointer to a signature object - */ -SECP256K1_API size_t secp256k1_whitelist_signature_n_keys( - const secp256k1_whitelist_signature *sig -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1); - -/** Serialize a whitelist signature - * - * Returns: 1 - * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object - * Out: output64: a pointer to an array to store the serialization - * In/Out: output_len: length of the above array, updated with the actual serialized length - * In: sig: a pointer to an initialized signature object - * - * See secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse for details about the encoding. - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_whitelist_signature_serialize( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - unsigned char *output, - size_t *output_len, - const secp256k1_whitelist_signature *sig -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); - -/** Compute a whitelist signature - * Returns 1: signature was successfully created - * 0: signature was not successfully created - * In: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing and verification - * online_pubkeys: list of all online pubkeys - * offline_pubkeys: list of all offline pubkeys - * n_keys: the number of entries in each of the above two arrays - * sub_pubkey: the key to be whitelisted - * online_seckey: the secret key to the signer's online pubkey - * summed_seckey: the secret key to the sum of (whitelisted key, signer's offline pubkey) - * index: the signer's index in the lists of keys - * noncefp:pointer to a nonce generation function. If NULL, secp256k1_nonce_function_default is used - * ndata: pointer to arbitrary data used by the nonce generation function (can be NULL) - * Out: sig: The produced signature. - * - * The signatures are of the list of all passed pubkeys in the order - * ( whitelist, online_1, offline_1, online_2, offline_2, ... ) - * The verification key list consists of - * online_i + H(offline_i + whitelist)(offline_i + whitelist) - * for each public key pair (offline_i, offline_i). Here H means sha256 of the - * compressed serialization of the key. - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_whitelist_sign( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - secp256k1_whitelist_signature *sig, - const secp256k1_pubkey *online_pubkeys, - const secp256k1_pubkey *offline_pubkeys, - const size_t n_keys, - const secp256k1_pubkey *sub_pubkey, - const unsigned char *online_seckey, - const unsigned char *summed_seckey, - const size_t index, - secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, - const void *noncedata -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(6) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(7) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(8); - -/** Verify a whitelist signature - * Returns 1: signature is valid - * 0: signature is not valid - * In: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing and verification - * sig: the signature to be verified - * online_pubkeys: list of all online pubkeys - * offline_pubkeys: list of all offline pubkeys - * n_keys: the number of entries in each of the above two arrays - * sub_pubkey: the key to be whitelisted - */ -SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_whitelist_verify( - const secp256k1_context* ctx, - const secp256k1_whitelist_signature *sig, - const secp256k1_pubkey *online_pubkeys, - const secp256k1_pubkey *offline_pubkeys, - const size_t n_keys, - const secp256k1_pubkey *sub_pubkey -) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(6); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/sage/group_prover.sage b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/sage/group_prover.sage deleted file mode 100644 index 8521f07..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/sage/group_prover.sage +++ /dev/null @@ -1,322 +0,0 @@ -# This code supports verifying group implementations which have branches -# or conditional statements (like cmovs), by allowing each execution path -# to independently set assumptions on input or intermediary variables. -# -# The general approach is: -# * A constraint is a tuple of two sets of symbolic expressions: -# the first of which are required to evaluate to zero, the second of which -# are required to evaluate to nonzero. -# - A constraint is said to be conflicting if any of its nonzero expressions -# is in the ideal with basis the zero expressions (in other words: when the -# zero expressions imply that one of the nonzero expressions are zero). -# * There is a list of laws that describe the intended behaviour, including -# laws for addition and doubling. Each law is called with the symbolic point -# coordinates as arguments, and returns: -# - A constraint describing the assumptions under which it is applicable, -# called "assumeLaw" -# - A constraint describing the requirements of the law, called "require" -# * Implementations are transliterated into functions that operate as well on -# algebraic input points, and are called once per combination of branches -# executed. Each execution returns: -# - A constraint describing the assumptions this implementation requires -# (such as Z1=1), called "assumeFormula" -# - A constraint describing the assumptions this specific branch requires, -# but which is by construction guaranteed to cover the entire space by -# merging the results from all branches, called "assumeBranch" -# - The result of the computation -# * All combinations of laws with implementation branches are tried, and: -# - If the combination of assumeLaw, assumeFormula, and assumeBranch results -# in a conflict, it means this law does not apply to this branch, and it is -# skipped. -# - For others, we try to prove the require constraints hold, assuming the -# information in assumeLaw + assumeFormula + assumeBranch, and if this does -# not succeed, we fail. -# + To prove an expression is zero, we check whether it belongs to the -# ideal with the assumed zero expressions as basis. This test is exact. -# + To prove an expression is nonzero, we check whether each of its -# factors is contained in the set of nonzero assumptions' factors. -# This test is not exact, so various combinations of original and -# reduced expressions' factors are tried. -# - If we succeed, we print out the assumptions from assumeFormula that -# weren't implied by assumeLaw already. Those from assumeBranch are skipped, -# as we assume that all constraints in it are complementary with each other. -# -# Based on the sage verification scripts used in the Explicit-Formulas Database -# by Tanja Lange and others, see http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD - -class fastfrac: - """Fractions over rings.""" - - def __init__(self,R,top,bot=1): - """Construct a fractional, given a ring, a numerator, and denominator.""" - self.R = R - if parent(top) == ZZ or parent(top) == R: - self.top = R(top) - self.bot = R(bot) - elif top.__class__ == fastfrac: - self.top = top.top - self.bot = top.bot * bot - else: - self.top = R(numerator(top)) - self.bot = R(denominator(top)) * bot - - def iszero(self,I): - """Return whether this fraction is zero given an ideal.""" - return self.top in I and self.bot not in I - - def reduce(self,assumeZero): - zero = self.R.ideal(map(numerator, assumeZero)) - return fastfrac(self.R, zero.reduce(self.top)) / fastfrac(self.R, zero.reduce(self.bot)) - - def __add__(self,other): - """Add two fractions.""" - if parent(other) == ZZ: - return fastfrac(self.R,self.top + self.bot * other,self.bot) - if other.__class__ == fastfrac: - return fastfrac(self.R,self.top * other.bot + self.bot * other.top,self.bot * other.bot) - return NotImplemented - - def __sub__(self,other): - """Subtract two fractions.""" - if parent(other) == ZZ: - return fastfrac(self.R,self.top - self.bot * other,self.bot) - if other.__class__ == fastfrac: - return fastfrac(self.R,self.top * other.bot - self.bot * other.top,self.bot * other.bot) - return NotImplemented - - def __neg__(self): - """Return the negation of a fraction.""" - return fastfrac(self.R,-self.top,self.bot) - - def __mul__(self,other): - """Multiply two fractions.""" - if parent(other) == ZZ: - return fastfrac(self.R,self.top * other,self.bot) - if other.__class__ == fastfrac: - return fastfrac(self.R,self.top * other.top,self.bot * other.bot) - return NotImplemented - - def __rmul__(self,other): - """Multiply something else with a fraction.""" - return self.__mul__(other) - - def __div__(self,other): - """Divide two fractions.""" - if parent(other) == ZZ: - return fastfrac(self.R,self.top,self.bot * other) - if other.__class__ == fastfrac: - return fastfrac(self.R,self.top * other.bot,self.bot * other.top) - return NotImplemented - - def __pow__(self,other): - """Compute a power of a fraction.""" - if parent(other) == ZZ: - if other < 0: - # Negative powers require flipping top and bottom - return fastfrac(self.R,self.bot ^ (-other),self.top ^ (-other)) - else: - return fastfrac(self.R,self.top ^ other,self.bot ^ other) - return NotImplemented - - def __str__(self): - return "fastfrac((" + str(self.top) + ") / (" + str(self.bot) + "))" - def __repr__(self): - return "%s" % self - - def numerator(self): - return self.top - -class constraints: - """A set of constraints, consisting of zero and nonzero expressions. - - Constraints can either be used to express knowledge or a requirement. - - Both the fields zero and nonzero are maps from expressions to description - strings. The expressions that are the keys in zero are required to be zero, - and the expressions that are the keys in nonzero are required to be nonzero. - - Note that (a != 0) and (b != 0) is the same as (a*b != 0), so all keys in - nonzero could be multiplied into a single key. This is often much less - efficient to work with though, so we keep them separate inside the - constraints. This allows higher-level code to do fast checks on the individual - nonzero elements, or combine them if needed for stronger checks. - - We can't multiply the different zero elements, as it would suffice for one of - the factors to be zero, instead of all of them. Instead, the zero elements are - typically combined into an ideal first. - """ - - def __init__(self, **kwargs): - if 'zero' in kwargs: - self.zero = dict(kwargs['zero']) - else: - self.zero = dict() - if 'nonzero' in kwargs: - self.nonzero = dict(kwargs['nonzero']) - else: - self.nonzero = dict() - - def negate(self): - return constraints(zero=self.nonzero, nonzero=self.zero) - - def __add__(self, other): - zero = self.zero.copy() - zero.update(other.zero) - nonzero = self.nonzero.copy() - nonzero.update(other.nonzero) - return constraints(zero=zero, nonzero=nonzero) - - def __str__(self): - return "constraints(zero=%s,nonzero=%s)" % (self.zero, self.nonzero) - - def __repr__(self): - return "%s" % self - - -def conflicts(R, con): - """Check whether any of the passed non-zero assumptions is implied by the zero assumptions""" - zero = R.ideal(map(numerator, con.zero)) - if 1 in zero: - return True - # First a cheap check whether any of the individual nonzero terms conflict on - # their own. - for nonzero in con.nonzero: - if nonzero.iszero(zero): - return True - # It can be the case that entries in the nonzero set do not individually - # conflict with the zero set, but their combination does. For example, knowing - # that either x or y is zero is equivalent to having x*y in the zero set. - # Having x or y individually in the nonzero set is not a conflict, but both - # simultaneously is, so that is the right thing to check for. - if reduce(lambda a,b: a * b, con.nonzero, fastfrac(R, 1)).iszero(zero): - return True - return False - - -def get_nonzero_set(R, assume): - """Calculate a simple set of nonzero expressions""" - zero = R.ideal(map(numerator, assume.zero)) - nonzero = set() - for nz in map(numerator, assume.nonzero): - for (f,n) in nz.factor(): - nonzero.add(f) - rnz = zero.reduce(nz) - for (f,n) in rnz.factor(): - nonzero.add(f) - return nonzero - - -def prove_nonzero(R, exprs, assume): - """Check whether an expression is provably nonzero, given assumptions""" - zero = R.ideal(map(numerator, assume.zero)) - nonzero = get_nonzero_set(R, assume) - expl = set() - ok = True - for expr in exprs: - if numerator(expr) in zero: - return (False, [exprs[expr]]) - allexprs = reduce(lambda a,b: numerator(a)*numerator(b), exprs, 1) - for (f, n) in allexprs.factor(): - if f not in nonzero: - ok = False - if ok: - return (True, None) - ok = True - for (f, n) in zero.reduce(numerator(allexprs)).factor(): - if f not in nonzero: - ok = False - if ok: - return (True, None) - ok = True - for expr in exprs: - for (f,n) in numerator(expr).factor(): - if f not in nonzero: - ok = False - if ok: - return (True, None) - ok = True - for expr in exprs: - for (f,n) in zero.reduce(numerator(expr)).factor(): - if f not in nonzero: - expl.add(exprs[expr]) - if expl: - return (False, list(expl)) - else: - return (True, None) - - -def prove_zero(R, exprs, assume): - """Check whether all of the passed expressions are provably zero, given assumptions""" - r, e = prove_nonzero(R, dict(map(lambda x: (fastfrac(R, x.bot, 1), exprs[x]), exprs)), assume) - if not r: - return (False, map(lambda x: "Possibly zero denominator: %s" % x, e)) - zero = R.ideal(map(numerator, assume.zero)) - nonzero = prod(x for x in assume.nonzero) - expl = [] - for expr in exprs: - if not expr.iszero(zero): - expl.append(exprs[expr]) - if not expl: - return (True, None) - return (False, expl) - - -def describe_extra(R, assume, assumeExtra): - """Describe what assumptions are added, given existing assumptions""" - zerox = assume.zero.copy() - zerox.update(assumeExtra.zero) - zero = R.ideal(map(numerator, assume.zero)) - zeroextra = R.ideal(map(numerator, zerox)) - nonzero = get_nonzero_set(R, assume) - ret = set() - # Iterate over the extra zero expressions - for base in assumeExtra.zero: - if base not in zero: - add = [] - for (f, n) in numerator(base).factor(): - if f not in nonzero: - add += ["%s" % f] - if add: - ret.add((" * ".join(add)) + " = 0 [%s]" % assumeExtra.zero[base]) - # Iterate over the extra nonzero expressions - for nz in assumeExtra.nonzero: - nzr = zeroextra.reduce(numerator(nz)) - if nzr not in zeroextra: - for (f,n) in nzr.factor(): - if zeroextra.reduce(f) not in nonzero: - ret.add("%s != 0" % zeroextra.reduce(f)) - return ", ".join(x for x in ret) - - -def check_symbolic(R, assumeLaw, assumeAssert, assumeBranch, require): - """Check a set of zero and nonzero requirements, given a set of zero and nonzero assumptions""" - assume = assumeLaw + assumeAssert + assumeBranch - - if conflicts(R, assume): - # This formula does not apply - return None - - describe = describe_extra(R, assumeLaw + assumeBranch, assumeAssert) - - ok, msg = prove_zero(R, require.zero, assume) - if not ok: - return "FAIL, %s fails (assuming %s)" % (str(msg), describe) - - res, expl = prove_nonzero(R, require.nonzero, assume) - if not res: - return "FAIL, %s fails (assuming %s)" % (str(expl), describe) - - if describe != "": - return "OK (assuming %s)" % describe - else: - return "OK" - - -def concrete_verify(c): - for k in c.zero: - if k != 0: - return (False, c.zero[k]) - for k in c.nonzero: - if k == 0: - return (False, c.nonzero[k]) - return (True, None) diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/sage/shallue_van_de_woestijne.sage b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/sage/shallue_van_de_woestijne.sage deleted file mode 100644 index 1cc97b6..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/sage/shallue_van_de_woestijne.sage +++ /dev/null @@ -1,51 +0,0 @@ - -### http://www.di.ens.fr/~fouque/pub/latincrypt12.pdf - -# Parameters for secp256k1 -p = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFC2F -a = 0 -b = 7 -F = FiniteField (p) -C = EllipticCurve ([F(a), F(b)]) - -def svdw(t): - sqrt_neg_3 = F(-3).nth_root(2) - - ## Compute candidate x values - w = sqrt_neg_3 * t / (1 + b + t^2) - x = [ F(0), F(0), F(0) ] - x[0] = (-1 + sqrt_neg_3) / 2 - t * w - x[1] = -1 - x[0] - x[2] = 1 + 1 / w^2 - - print - print "On %2d" % t - print " x1 %064x" % x[0] - print " x2 %064x" % x[1] - print " x3 %064x" % x[2] - - ## Select which to use - alph = jacobi_symbol(x[0]^3 + b, p) - beta = jacobi_symbol(x[1]^3 + b, p) - if alph == 1 and beta == 1: - i = 0 - elif alph == 1 and beta == -1: - i = 0 - elif alph == -1 and beta == 1: - i = 1 - elif alph == -1 and beta == -1: - i = 2 - else: - print "Help! I don't understand Python!" - - ## Expand to full point - sign = 1 - 2 * (int(F(t)) % 2) - ret_x = x[i] - ret_y = sign * F(x[i]^3 + b).nth_root(2) - return C.point((ret_x, ret_y)) - - -## main -for i in range(1, 11): - res = svdw(i) - print "Result: %064x %064x" % res.xy() diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/asm/field_10x26_arm.s b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/asm/field_10x26_arm.s deleted file mode 100644 index 5a9cc3f..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/asm/field_10x26_arm.s +++ /dev/null @@ -1,919 +0,0 @@ -@ vim: set tabstop=8 softtabstop=8 shiftwidth=8 noexpandtab syntax=armasm: -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014 Wladimir J. van der Laan * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ -/* -ARM implementation of field_10x26 inner loops. - -Note: - -- To avoid unnecessary loads and make use of available registers, two - 'passes' have every time been interleaved, with the odd passes accumulating c' and d' - which will be added to c and d respectively in the even passes - -*/ - - .syntax unified - .arch armv7-a - @ eabi attributes - see readelf -A - .eabi_attribute 8, 1 @ Tag_ARM_ISA_use = yes - .eabi_attribute 9, 0 @ Tag_Thumb_ISA_use = no - .eabi_attribute 10, 0 @ Tag_FP_arch = none - .eabi_attribute 24, 1 @ Tag_ABI_align_needed = 8-byte - .eabi_attribute 25, 1 @ Tag_ABI_align_preserved = 8-byte, except leaf SP - .eabi_attribute 30, 2 @ Tag_ABI_optimization_goals = Aggressive Speed - .eabi_attribute 34, 1 @ Tag_CPU_unaligned_access = v6 - .text - - @ Field constants - .set field_R0, 0x3d10 - .set field_R1, 0x400 - .set field_not_M, 0xfc000000 @ ~M = ~0x3ffffff - - .align 2 - .global secp256k1_fe_mul_inner - .type secp256k1_fe_mul_inner, %function - @ Arguments: - @ r0 r Restrict: can overlap with a, not with b - @ r1 a - @ r2 b - @ Stack (total 4+10*4 = 44) - @ sp + #0 saved 'r' pointer - @ sp + #4 + 4*X t0,t1,t2,t3,t4,t5,t6,t7,u8,t9 -secp256k1_fe_mul_inner: - stmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10, r11, r14} - sub sp, sp, #48 @ frame=44 + alignment - str r0, [sp, #0] @ save result address, we need it only at the end - - /****************************************** - * Main computation code. - ****************************************** - - Allocation: - r0,r14,r7,r8 scratch - r1 a (pointer) - r2 b (pointer) - r3:r4 c - r5:r6 d - r11:r12 c' - r9:r10 d' - - Note: do not write to r[] here, it may overlap with a[] - */ - - /* A - interleaved with B */ - ldr r7, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0] - ldr r8, [r2, #9*4] @ b[9] - ldr r0, [r1, #1*4] @ a[1] - umull r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d = a[0] * b[9] - ldr r14, [r2, #8*4] @ b[8] - umull r9, r10, r0, r8 @ d' = a[1] * b[9] - ldr r7, [r1, #2*4] @ a[2] - umlal r5, r6, r0, r14 @ d += a[1] * b[8] - ldr r8, [r2, #7*4] @ b[7] - umlal r9, r10, r7, r14 @ d' += a[2] * b[8] - ldr r0, [r1, #3*4] @ a[3] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[2] * b[7] - ldr r14, [r2, #6*4] @ b[6] - umlal r9, r10, r0, r8 @ d' += a[3] * b[7] - ldr r7, [r1, #4*4] @ a[4] - umlal r5, r6, r0, r14 @ d += a[3] * b[6] - ldr r8, [r2, #5*4] @ b[5] - umlal r9, r10, r7, r14 @ d' += a[4] * b[6] - ldr r0, [r1, #5*4] @ a[5] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[4] * b[5] - ldr r14, [r2, #4*4] @ b[4] - umlal r9, r10, r0, r8 @ d' += a[5] * b[5] - ldr r7, [r1, #6*4] @ a[6] - umlal r5, r6, r0, r14 @ d += a[5] * b[4] - ldr r8, [r2, #3*4] @ b[3] - umlal r9, r10, r7, r14 @ d' += a[6] * b[4] - ldr r0, [r1, #7*4] @ a[7] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[6] * b[3] - ldr r14, [r2, #2*4] @ b[2] - umlal r9, r10, r0, r8 @ d' += a[7] * b[3] - ldr r7, [r1, #8*4] @ a[8] - umlal r5, r6, r0, r14 @ d += a[7] * b[2] - ldr r8, [r2, #1*4] @ b[1] - umlal r9, r10, r7, r14 @ d' += a[8] * b[2] - ldr r0, [r1, #9*4] @ a[9] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[8] * b[1] - ldr r14, [r2, #0*4] @ b[0] - umlal r9, r10, r0, r8 @ d' += a[9] * b[1] - ldr r7, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0] - umlal r5, r6, r0, r14 @ d += a[9] * b[0] - @ r7,r14 used in B - - bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ t9 = d & M - str r0, [sp, #4 + 4*9] - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - - /* B */ - umull r3, r4, r7, r14 @ c = a[0] * b[0] - adds r5, r5, r9 @ d += d' - adc r6, r6, r10 - - bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u0 = d & M - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u0 * R0 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t0 = c & M - str r14, [sp, #4 + 0*4] - mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 - orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 - mov r4, r4, lsr #26 - mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u0 * R1 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - /* C - interleaved with D */ - ldr r7, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0] - ldr r8, [r2, #2*4] @ b[2] - ldr r14, [r2, #1*4] @ b[1] - umull r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' = a[0] * b[2] - ldr r0, [r1, #1*4] @ a[1] - umlal r3, r4, r7, r14 @ c += a[0] * b[1] - ldr r8, [r2, #0*4] @ b[0] - umlal r11, r12, r0, r14 @ c' += a[1] * b[1] - ldr r7, [r1, #2*4] @ a[2] - umlal r3, r4, r0, r8 @ c += a[1] * b[0] - ldr r14, [r2, #9*4] @ b[9] - umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[2] * b[0] - ldr r0, [r1, #3*4] @ a[3] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[2] * b[9] - ldr r8, [r2, #8*4] @ b[8] - umull r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' = a[3] * b[9] - ldr r7, [r1, #4*4] @ a[4] - umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[3] * b[8] - ldr r14, [r2, #7*4] @ b[7] - umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[4] * b[8] - ldr r0, [r1, #5*4] @ a[5] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[4] * b[7] - ldr r8, [r2, #6*4] @ b[6] - umlal r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' += a[5] * b[7] - ldr r7, [r1, #6*4] @ a[6] - umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[5] * b[6] - ldr r14, [r2, #5*4] @ b[5] - umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[6] * b[6] - ldr r0, [r1, #7*4] @ a[7] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[6] * b[5] - ldr r8, [r2, #4*4] @ b[4] - umlal r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' += a[7] * b[5] - ldr r7, [r1, #8*4] @ a[8] - umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[7] * b[4] - ldr r14, [r2, #3*4] @ b[3] - umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[8] * b[4] - ldr r0, [r1, #9*4] @ a[9] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[8] * b[3] - ldr r8, [r2, #2*4] @ b[2] - umlal r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' += a[9] * b[3] - umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[9] * b[2] - - bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u1 = d & M - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u1 * R0 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t1 = c & M - str r14, [sp, #4 + 1*4] - mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 - orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 - mov r4, r4, lsr #26 - mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u1 * R1 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - /* D */ - adds r3, r3, r11 @ c += c' - adc r4, r4, r12 - adds r5, r5, r9 @ d += d' - adc r6, r6, r10 - - bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u2 = d & M - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u2 * R0 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t2 = c & M - str r14, [sp, #4 + 2*4] - mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 - orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 - mov r4, r4, lsr #26 - mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u2 * R1 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - /* E - interleaved with F */ - ldr r7, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0] - ldr r8, [r2, #4*4] @ b[4] - umull r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' = a[0] * b[4] - ldr r8, [r2, #3*4] @ b[3] - umlal r3, r4, r7, r8 @ c += a[0] * b[3] - ldr r7, [r1, #1*4] @ a[1] - umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[1] * b[3] - ldr r8, [r2, #2*4] @ b[2] - umlal r3, r4, r7, r8 @ c += a[1] * b[2] - ldr r7, [r1, #2*4] @ a[2] - umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[2] * b[2] - ldr r8, [r2, #1*4] @ b[1] - umlal r3, r4, r7, r8 @ c += a[2] * b[1] - ldr r7, [r1, #3*4] @ a[3] - umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[3] * b[1] - ldr r8, [r2, #0*4] @ b[0] - umlal r3, r4, r7, r8 @ c += a[3] * b[0] - ldr r7, [r1, #4*4] @ a[4] - umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[4] * b[0] - ldr r8, [r2, #9*4] @ b[9] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[4] * b[9] - ldr r7, [r1, #5*4] @ a[5] - umull r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' = a[5] * b[9] - ldr r8, [r2, #8*4] @ b[8] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[5] * b[8] - ldr r7, [r1, #6*4] @ a[6] - umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[6] * b[8] - ldr r8, [r2, #7*4] @ b[7] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[6] * b[7] - ldr r7, [r1, #7*4] @ a[7] - umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[7] * b[7] - ldr r8, [r2, #6*4] @ b[6] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[7] * b[6] - ldr r7, [r1, #8*4] @ a[8] - umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[8] * b[6] - ldr r8, [r2, #5*4] @ b[5] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[8] * b[5] - ldr r7, [r1, #9*4] @ a[9] - umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[9] * b[5] - ldr r8, [r2, #4*4] @ b[4] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[9] * b[4] - - bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u3 = d & M - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u3 * R0 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t3 = c & M - str r14, [sp, #4 + 3*4] - mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 - orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 - mov r4, r4, lsr #26 - mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u3 * R1 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - /* F */ - adds r3, r3, r11 @ c += c' - adc r4, r4, r12 - adds r5, r5, r9 @ d += d' - adc r6, r6, r10 - - bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u4 = d & M - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u4 * R0 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t4 = c & M - str r14, [sp, #4 + 4*4] - mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 - orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 - mov r4, r4, lsr #26 - mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u4 * R1 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - /* G - interleaved with H */ - ldr r7, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0] - ldr r8, [r2, #6*4] @ b[6] - ldr r14, [r2, #5*4] @ b[5] - umull r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' = a[0] * b[6] - ldr r0, [r1, #1*4] @ a[1] - umlal r3, r4, r7, r14 @ c += a[0] * b[5] - ldr r8, [r2, #4*4] @ b[4] - umlal r11, r12, r0, r14 @ c' += a[1] * b[5] - ldr r7, [r1, #2*4] @ a[2] - umlal r3, r4, r0, r8 @ c += a[1] * b[4] - ldr r14, [r2, #3*4] @ b[3] - umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[2] * b[4] - ldr r0, [r1, #3*4] @ a[3] - umlal r3, r4, r7, r14 @ c += a[2] * b[3] - ldr r8, [r2, #2*4] @ b[2] - umlal r11, r12, r0, r14 @ c' += a[3] * b[3] - ldr r7, [r1, #4*4] @ a[4] - umlal r3, r4, r0, r8 @ c += a[3] * b[2] - ldr r14, [r2, #1*4] @ b[1] - umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[4] * b[2] - ldr r0, [r1, #5*4] @ a[5] - umlal r3, r4, r7, r14 @ c += a[4] * b[1] - ldr r8, [r2, #0*4] @ b[0] - umlal r11, r12, r0, r14 @ c' += a[5] * b[1] - ldr r7, [r1, #6*4] @ a[6] - umlal r3, r4, r0, r8 @ c += a[5] * b[0] - ldr r14, [r2, #9*4] @ b[9] - umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[6] * b[0] - ldr r0, [r1, #7*4] @ a[7] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[6] * b[9] - ldr r8, [r2, #8*4] @ b[8] - umull r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' = a[7] * b[9] - ldr r7, [r1, #8*4] @ a[8] - umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[7] * b[8] - ldr r14, [r2, #7*4] @ b[7] - umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[8] * b[8] - ldr r0, [r1, #9*4] @ a[9] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[8] * b[7] - ldr r8, [r2, #6*4] @ b[6] - umlal r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' += a[9] * b[7] - umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[9] * b[6] - - bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u5 = d & M - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u5 * R0 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t5 = c & M - str r14, [sp, #4 + 5*4] - mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 - orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 - mov r4, r4, lsr #26 - mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u5 * R1 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - /* H */ - adds r3, r3, r11 @ c += c' - adc r4, r4, r12 - adds r5, r5, r9 @ d += d' - adc r6, r6, r10 - - bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u6 = d & M - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u6 * R0 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t6 = c & M - str r14, [sp, #4 + 6*4] - mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 - orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 - mov r4, r4, lsr #26 - mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u6 * R1 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - /* I - interleaved with J */ - ldr r8, [r2, #8*4] @ b[8] - ldr r7, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0] - ldr r14, [r2, #7*4] @ b[7] - umull r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' = a[0] * b[8] - ldr r0, [r1, #1*4] @ a[1] - umlal r3, r4, r7, r14 @ c += a[0] * b[7] - ldr r8, [r2, #6*4] @ b[6] - umlal r11, r12, r0, r14 @ c' += a[1] * b[7] - ldr r7, [r1, #2*4] @ a[2] - umlal r3, r4, r0, r8 @ c += a[1] * b[6] - ldr r14, [r2, #5*4] @ b[5] - umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[2] * b[6] - ldr r0, [r1, #3*4] @ a[3] - umlal r3, r4, r7, r14 @ c += a[2] * b[5] - ldr r8, [r2, #4*4] @ b[4] - umlal r11, r12, r0, r14 @ c' += a[3] * b[5] - ldr r7, [r1, #4*4] @ a[4] - umlal r3, r4, r0, r8 @ c += a[3] * b[4] - ldr r14, [r2, #3*4] @ b[3] - umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[4] * b[4] - ldr r0, [r1, #5*4] @ a[5] - umlal r3, r4, r7, r14 @ c += a[4] * b[3] - ldr r8, [r2, #2*4] @ b[2] - umlal r11, r12, r0, r14 @ c' += a[5] * b[3] - ldr r7, [r1, #6*4] @ a[6] - umlal r3, r4, r0, r8 @ c += a[5] * b[2] - ldr r14, [r2, #1*4] @ b[1] - umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[6] * b[2] - ldr r0, [r1, #7*4] @ a[7] - umlal r3, r4, r7, r14 @ c += a[6] * b[1] - ldr r8, [r2, #0*4] @ b[0] - umlal r11, r12, r0, r14 @ c' += a[7] * b[1] - ldr r7, [r1, #8*4] @ a[8] - umlal r3, r4, r0, r8 @ c += a[7] * b[0] - ldr r14, [r2, #9*4] @ b[9] - umlal r11, r12, r7, r8 @ c' += a[8] * b[0] - ldr r0, [r1, #9*4] @ a[9] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[8] * b[9] - ldr r8, [r2, #8*4] @ b[8] - umull r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' = a[9] * b[9] - umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[9] * b[8] - - bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u7 = d & M - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u7 * R0 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t7 = c & M - str r14, [sp, #4 + 7*4] - mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 - orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 - mov r4, r4, lsr #26 - mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u7 * R1 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - /* J */ - adds r3, r3, r11 @ c += c' - adc r4, r4, r12 - adds r5, r5, r9 @ d += d' - adc r6, r6, r10 - - bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u8 = d & M - str r0, [sp, #4 + 8*4] - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u8 * R0 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - /****************************************** - * compute and write back result - ****************************************** - Allocation: - r0 r - r3:r4 c - r5:r6 d - r7 t0 - r8 t1 - r9 t2 - r11 u8 - r12 t9 - r1,r2,r10,r14 scratch - - Note: do not read from a[] after here, it may overlap with r[] - */ - ldr r0, [sp, #0] - add r1, sp, #4 + 3*4 @ r[3..7] = t3..7, r11=u8, r12=t9 - ldmia r1, {r2,r7,r8,r9,r10,r11,r12} - add r1, r0, #3*4 - stmia r1, {r2,r7,r8,r9,r10} - - bic r2, r3, field_not_M @ r[8] = c & M - str r2, [r0, #8*4] - mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 - orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 - mov r4, r4, lsr #26 - mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u8 * R1 - umlal r3, r4, r11, r14 - movw r14, field_R0 @ c += d * R0 - umlal r3, r4, r5, r14 - adds r3, r3, r12 @ c += t9 - adc r4, r4, #0 - - add r1, sp, #4 + 0*4 @ r7,r8,r9 = t0,t1,t2 - ldmia r1, {r7,r8,r9} - - ubfx r2, r3, #0, #22 @ r[9] = c & (M >> 4) - str r2, [r0, #9*4] - mov r3, r3, lsr #22 @ c >>= 22 - orr r3, r3, r4, asl #10 - mov r4, r4, lsr #22 - movw r14, field_R1 << 4 @ c += d * (R1 << 4) - umlal r3, r4, r5, r14 - - movw r14, field_R0 >> 4 @ d = c * (R0 >> 4) + t0 (64x64 multiply+add) - umull r5, r6, r3, r14 @ d = c.lo * (R0 >> 4) - adds r5, r5, r7 @ d.lo += t0 - mla r6, r14, r4, r6 @ d.hi += c.hi * (R0 >> 4) - adc r6, r6, 0 @ d.hi += carry - - bic r2, r5, field_not_M @ r[0] = d & M - str r2, [r0, #0*4] - - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - - movw r14, field_R1 >> 4 @ d += c * (R1 >> 4) + t1 (64x64 multiply+add) - umull r1, r2, r3, r14 @ tmp = c.lo * (R1 >> 4) - adds r5, r5, r8 @ d.lo += t1 - adc r6, r6, #0 @ d.hi += carry - adds r5, r5, r1 @ d.lo += tmp.lo - mla r2, r14, r4, r2 @ tmp.hi += c.hi * (R1 >> 4) - adc r6, r6, r2 @ d.hi += carry + tmp.hi - - bic r2, r5, field_not_M @ r[1] = d & M - str r2, [r0, #1*4] - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 (ignore hi) - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - - add r5, r5, r9 @ d += t2 - str r5, [r0, #2*4] @ r[2] = d - - add sp, sp, #48 - ldmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10, r11, pc} - .size secp256k1_fe_mul_inner, .-secp256k1_fe_mul_inner - - .align 2 - .global secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner - .type secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner, %function - @ Arguments: - @ r0 r Can overlap with a - @ r1 a - @ Stack (total 4+10*4 = 44) - @ sp + #0 saved 'r' pointer - @ sp + #4 + 4*X t0,t1,t2,t3,t4,t5,t6,t7,u8,t9 -secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner: - stmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10, r11, r14} - sub sp, sp, #48 @ frame=44 + alignment - str r0, [sp, #0] @ save result address, we need it only at the end - /****************************************** - * Main computation code. - ****************************************** - - Allocation: - r0,r14,r2,r7,r8 scratch - r1 a (pointer) - r3:r4 c - r5:r6 d - r11:r12 c' - r9:r10 d' - - Note: do not write to r[] here, it may overlap with a[] - */ - /* A interleaved with B */ - ldr r0, [r1, #1*4] @ a[1]*2 - ldr r7, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0] - mov r0, r0, asl #1 - ldr r14, [r1, #9*4] @ a[9] - umull r3, r4, r7, r7 @ c = a[0] * a[0] - ldr r8, [r1, #8*4] @ a[8] - mov r7, r7, asl #1 - umull r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d = a[0]*2 * a[9] - ldr r7, [r1, #2*4] @ a[2]*2 - umull r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' = a[1]*2 * a[9] - ldr r14, [r1, #7*4] @ a[7] - umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[1]*2 * a[8] - mov r7, r7, asl #1 - ldr r0, [r1, #3*4] @ a[3]*2 - umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[2]*2 * a[8] - ldr r8, [r1, #6*4] @ a[6] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[2]*2 * a[7] - mov r0, r0, asl #1 - ldr r7, [r1, #4*4] @ a[4]*2 - umlal r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' += a[3]*2 * a[7] - ldr r14, [r1, #5*4] @ a[5] - mov r7, r7, asl #1 - umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[3]*2 * a[6] - umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[4]*2 * a[6] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[4]*2 * a[5] - umlal r9, r10, r14, r14 @ d' += a[5] * a[5] - - bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ t9 = d & M - str r0, [sp, #4 + 9*4] - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - - /* B */ - adds r5, r5, r9 @ d += d' - adc r6, r6, r10 - - bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u0 = d & M - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u0 * R0 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t0 = c & M - str r14, [sp, #4 + 0*4] - mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 - orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 - mov r4, r4, lsr #26 - mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u0 * R1 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - /* C interleaved with D */ - ldr r0, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0]*2 - ldr r14, [r1, #1*4] @ a[1] - mov r0, r0, asl #1 - ldr r8, [r1, #2*4] @ a[2] - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 @ c += a[0]*2 * a[1] - mov r7, r8, asl #1 @ a[2]*2 - umull r11, r12, r14, r14 @ c' = a[1] * a[1] - ldr r14, [r1, #9*4] @ a[9] - umlal r11, r12, r0, r8 @ c' += a[0]*2 * a[2] - ldr r0, [r1, #3*4] @ a[3]*2 - ldr r8, [r1, #8*4] @ a[8] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[2]*2 * a[9] - mov r0, r0, asl #1 - ldr r7, [r1, #4*4] @ a[4]*2 - umull r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' = a[3]*2 * a[9] - ldr r14, [r1, #7*4] @ a[7] - umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[3]*2 * a[8] - mov r7, r7, asl #1 - ldr r0, [r1, #5*4] @ a[5]*2 - umlal r9, r10, r7, r8 @ d' += a[4]*2 * a[8] - ldr r8, [r1, #6*4] @ a[6] - mov r0, r0, asl #1 - umlal r5, r6, r7, r14 @ d += a[4]*2 * a[7] - umlal r9, r10, r0, r14 @ d' += a[5]*2 * a[7] - umlal r5, r6, r0, r8 @ d += a[5]*2 * a[6] - umlal r9, r10, r8, r8 @ d' += a[6] * a[6] - - bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u1 = d & M - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u1 * R0 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t1 = c & M - str r14, [sp, #4 + 1*4] - mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 - orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 - mov r4, r4, lsr #26 - mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u1 * R1 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - /* D */ - adds r3, r3, r11 @ c += c' - adc r4, r4, r12 - adds r5, r5, r9 @ d += d' - adc r6, r6, r10 - - bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u2 = d & M - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u2 * R0 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t2 = c & M - str r14, [sp, #4 + 2*4] - mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 - orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 - mov r4, r4, lsr #26 - mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u2 * R1 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - /* E interleaved with F */ - ldr r7, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0]*2 - ldr r0, [r1, #1*4] @ a[1]*2 - ldr r14, [r1, #2*4] @ a[2] - mov r7, r7, asl #1 - ldr r8, [r1, #3*4] @ a[3] - ldr r2, [r1, #4*4] - umlal r3, r4, r7, r8 @ c += a[0]*2 * a[3] - mov r0, r0, asl #1 - umull r11, r12, r7, r2 @ c' = a[0]*2 * a[4] - mov r2, r2, asl #1 @ a[4]*2 - umlal r11, r12, r0, r8 @ c' += a[1]*2 * a[3] - ldr r8, [r1, #9*4] @ a[9] - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 @ c += a[1]*2 * a[2] - ldr r0, [r1, #5*4] @ a[5]*2 - umlal r11, r12, r14, r14 @ c' += a[2] * a[2] - ldr r14, [r1, #8*4] @ a[8] - mov r0, r0, asl #1 - umlal r5, r6, r2, r8 @ d += a[4]*2 * a[9] - ldr r7, [r1, #6*4] @ a[6]*2 - umull r9, r10, r0, r8 @ d' = a[5]*2 * a[9] - mov r7, r7, asl #1 - ldr r8, [r1, #7*4] @ a[7] - umlal r5, r6, r0, r14 @ d += a[5]*2 * a[8] - umlal r9, r10, r7, r14 @ d' += a[6]*2 * a[8] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[6]*2 * a[7] - umlal r9, r10, r8, r8 @ d' += a[7] * a[7] - - bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u3 = d & M - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u3 * R0 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t3 = c & M - str r14, [sp, #4 + 3*4] - mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 - orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 - mov r4, r4, lsr #26 - mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u3 * R1 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - /* F */ - adds r3, r3, r11 @ c += c' - adc r4, r4, r12 - adds r5, r5, r9 @ d += d' - adc r6, r6, r10 - - bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u4 = d & M - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u4 * R0 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t4 = c & M - str r14, [sp, #4 + 4*4] - mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 - orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 - mov r4, r4, lsr #26 - mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u4 * R1 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - /* G interleaved with H */ - ldr r7, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0]*2 - ldr r0, [r1, #1*4] @ a[1]*2 - mov r7, r7, asl #1 - ldr r8, [r1, #5*4] @ a[5] - ldr r2, [r1, #6*4] @ a[6] - umlal r3, r4, r7, r8 @ c += a[0]*2 * a[5] - ldr r14, [r1, #4*4] @ a[4] - mov r0, r0, asl #1 - umull r11, r12, r7, r2 @ c' = a[0]*2 * a[6] - ldr r7, [r1, #2*4] @ a[2]*2 - umlal r11, r12, r0, r8 @ c' += a[1]*2 * a[5] - mov r7, r7, asl #1 - ldr r8, [r1, #3*4] @ a[3] - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 @ c += a[1]*2 * a[4] - mov r0, r2, asl #1 @ a[6]*2 - umlal r11, r12, r7, r14 @ c' += a[2]*2 * a[4] - ldr r14, [r1, #9*4] @ a[9] - umlal r3, r4, r7, r8 @ c += a[2]*2 * a[3] - ldr r7, [r1, #7*4] @ a[7]*2 - umlal r11, r12, r8, r8 @ c' += a[3] * a[3] - mov r7, r7, asl #1 - ldr r8, [r1, #8*4] @ a[8] - umlal r5, r6, r0, r14 @ d += a[6]*2 * a[9] - umull r9, r10, r7, r14 @ d' = a[7]*2 * a[9] - umlal r5, r6, r7, r8 @ d += a[7]*2 * a[8] - umlal r9, r10, r8, r8 @ d' += a[8] * a[8] - - bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u5 = d & M - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u5 * R0 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t5 = c & M - str r14, [sp, #4 + 5*4] - mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 - orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 - mov r4, r4, lsr #26 - mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u5 * R1 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - /* H */ - adds r3, r3, r11 @ c += c' - adc r4, r4, r12 - adds r5, r5, r9 @ d += d' - adc r6, r6, r10 - - bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u6 = d & M - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u6 * R0 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t6 = c & M - str r14, [sp, #4 + 6*4] - mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 - orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 - mov r4, r4, lsr #26 - mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u6 * R1 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - /* I interleaved with J */ - ldr r7, [r1, #0*4] @ a[0]*2 - ldr r0, [r1, #1*4] @ a[1]*2 - mov r7, r7, asl #1 - ldr r8, [r1, #7*4] @ a[7] - ldr r2, [r1, #8*4] @ a[8] - umlal r3, r4, r7, r8 @ c += a[0]*2 * a[7] - ldr r14, [r1, #6*4] @ a[6] - mov r0, r0, asl #1 - umull r11, r12, r7, r2 @ c' = a[0]*2 * a[8] - ldr r7, [r1, #2*4] @ a[2]*2 - umlal r11, r12, r0, r8 @ c' += a[1]*2 * a[7] - ldr r8, [r1, #5*4] @ a[5] - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 @ c += a[1]*2 * a[6] - ldr r0, [r1, #3*4] @ a[3]*2 - mov r7, r7, asl #1 - umlal r11, r12, r7, r14 @ c' += a[2]*2 * a[6] - ldr r14, [r1, #4*4] @ a[4] - mov r0, r0, asl #1 - umlal r3, r4, r7, r8 @ c += a[2]*2 * a[5] - mov r2, r2, asl #1 @ a[8]*2 - umlal r11, r12, r0, r8 @ c' += a[3]*2 * a[5] - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 @ c += a[3]*2 * a[4] - umlal r11, r12, r14, r14 @ c' += a[4] * a[4] - ldr r8, [r1, #9*4] @ a[9] - umlal r5, r6, r2, r8 @ d += a[8]*2 * a[9] - @ r8 will be used in J - - bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u7 = d & M - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u7 * R0 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - bic r14, r3, field_not_M @ t7 = c & M - str r14, [sp, #4 + 7*4] - mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 - orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 - mov r4, r4, lsr #26 - mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u7 * R1 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - /* J */ - adds r3, r3, r11 @ c += c' - adc r4, r4, r12 - umlal r5, r6, r8, r8 @ d += a[9] * a[9] - - bic r0, r5, field_not_M @ u8 = d & M - str r0, [sp, #4 + 8*4] - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - movw r14, field_R0 @ c += u8 * R0 - umlal r3, r4, r0, r14 - - /****************************************** - * compute and write back result - ****************************************** - Allocation: - r0 r - r3:r4 c - r5:r6 d - r7 t0 - r8 t1 - r9 t2 - r11 u8 - r12 t9 - r1,r2,r10,r14 scratch - - Note: do not read from a[] after here, it may overlap with r[] - */ - ldr r0, [sp, #0] - add r1, sp, #4 + 3*4 @ r[3..7] = t3..7, r11=u8, r12=t9 - ldmia r1, {r2,r7,r8,r9,r10,r11,r12} - add r1, r0, #3*4 - stmia r1, {r2,r7,r8,r9,r10} - - bic r2, r3, field_not_M @ r[8] = c & M - str r2, [r0, #8*4] - mov r3, r3, lsr #26 @ c >>= 26 - orr r3, r3, r4, asl #6 - mov r4, r4, lsr #26 - mov r14, field_R1 @ c += u8 * R1 - umlal r3, r4, r11, r14 - movw r14, field_R0 @ c += d * R0 - umlal r3, r4, r5, r14 - adds r3, r3, r12 @ c += t9 - adc r4, r4, #0 - - add r1, sp, #4 + 0*4 @ r7,r8,r9 = t0,t1,t2 - ldmia r1, {r7,r8,r9} - - ubfx r2, r3, #0, #22 @ r[9] = c & (M >> 4) - str r2, [r0, #9*4] - mov r3, r3, lsr #22 @ c >>= 22 - orr r3, r3, r4, asl #10 - mov r4, r4, lsr #22 - movw r14, field_R1 << 4 @ c += d * (R1 << 4) - umlal r3, r4, r5, r14 - - movw r14, field_R0 >> 4 @ d = c * (R0 >> 4) + t0 (64x64 multiply+add) - umull r5, r6, r3, r14 @ d = c.lo * (R0 >> 4) - adds r5, r5, r7 @ d.lo += t0 - mla r6, r14, r4, r6 @ d.hi += c.hi * (R0 >> 4) - adc r6, r6, 0 @ d.hi += carry - - bic r2, r5, field_not_M @ r[0] = d & M - str r2, [r0, #0*4] - - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - mov r6, r6, lsr #26 - - movw r14, field_R1 >> 4 @ d += c * (R1 >> 4) + t1 (64x64 multiply+add) - umull r1, r2, r3, r14 @ tmp = c.lo * (R1 >> 4) - adds r5, r5, r8 @ d.lo += t1 - adc r6, r6, #0 @ d.hi += carry - adds r5, r5, r1 @ d.lo += tmp.lo - mla r2, r14, r4, r2 @ tmp.hi += c.hi * (R1 >> 4) - adc r6, r6, r2 @ d.hi += carry + tmp.hi - - bic r2, r5, field_not_M @ r[1] = d & M - str r2, [r0, #1*4] - mov r5, r5, lsr #26 @ d >>= 26 (ignore hi) - orr r5, r5, r6, asl #6 - - add r5, r5, r9 @ d += t2 - str r5, [r0, #2*4] @ r[2] = d - - add sp, sp, #48 - ldmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10, r11, pc} - .size secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner, .-secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner - diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/basic-config.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/basic-config.h deleted file mode 100644 index fc58806..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/basic-config.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_BASIC_CONFIG_H -#define SECP256K1_BASIC_CONFIG_H - -#ifdef USE_BASIC_CONFIG - -#undef USE_ASM_X86_64 -#undef USE_ENDOMORPHISM -#undef USE_FIELD_10X26 -#undef USE_FIELD_5X52 -#undef USE_FIELD_INV_BUILTIN -#undef USE_FIELD_INV_NUM -#undef USE_NUM_GMP -#undef USE_NUM_NONE -#undef USE_SCALAR_4X64 -#undef USE_SCALAR_8X32 -#undef USE_SCALAR_INV_BUILTIN -#undef USE_SCALAR_INV_NUM - -#define USE_NUM_NONE 1 -#define USE_FIELD_INV_BUILTIN 1 -#define USE_SCALAR_INV_BUILTIN 1 -#define USE_FIELD_10X26 1 -#define USE_SCALAR_8X32 1 - -#endif /* USE_BASIC_CONFIG */ - -#endif /* SECP256K1_BASIC_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench.h deleted file mode 100644 index 5b59783..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_BENCH_H -#define SECP256K1_BENCH_H - -#include -#include -#include -#include "sys/time.h" - -static double gettimedouble(void) { - struct timeval tv; - gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); - return tv.tv_usec * 0.000001 + tv.tv_sec; -} - -void print_number(double x) { - double y = x; - int c = 0; - if (y < 0.0) { - y = -y; - } - while (y > 0 && y < 100.0) { - y *= 10.0; - c++; - } - printf("%.*f", c, x); -} - -void run_benchmark(char *name, void (*benchmark)(void*), void (*setup)(void*), void (*teardown)(void*), void* data, int count, int iter) { - int i; - double min = HUGE_VAL; - double sum = 0.0; - double max = 0.0; - for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { - double begin, total; - if (setup != NULL) { - setup(data); - } - begin = gettimedouble(); - benchmark(data); - total = gettimedouble() - begin; - if (teardown != NULL) { - teardown(data); - } - if (total < min) { - min = total; - } - if (total > max) { - max = total; - } - sum += total; - } - printf("%s: min ", name); - print_number(min * 1000000.0 / iter); - printf("us / avg "); - print_number((sum / count) * 1000000.0 / iter); - printf("us / max "); - print_number(max * 1000000.0 / iter); - printf("us\n"); -} - -int have_flag(int argc, char** argv, char *flag) { - char** argm = argv + argc; - argv++; - if (argv == argm) { - return 1; - } - while (argv != NULL && argv != argm) { - if (strcmp(*argv, flag) == 0) { - return 1; - } - argv++; - } - return 0; -} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_BENCH_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_bulletproof.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_bulletproof.c deleted file mode 100644 index 896bd09..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_bulletproof.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,243 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2017 Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#include - -#include "include/secp256k1_generator.h" -#include "include/secp256k1_commitment.h" -#include "include/secp256k1_bulletproofs.h" -#include "util.h" -#include "bench.h" - -#define MAX_PROOF_SIZE 2000 - -typedef struct { - secp256k1_context *ctx; - secp256k1_scratch_space *scratch; - unsigned char nonce[32]; - unsigned char **proof; - secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *generators; - secp256k1_generator *value_gen; - secp256k1_generator blind_gen; - size_t n_proofs; - size_t plen; - size_t iters; -} bench_bulletproof_t; - -typedef struct { - bench_bulletproof_t *common; - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment **commit; - const unsigned char **blind; - size_t *value; - size_t n_commits; - size_t nbits; -} bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t; - -static void bench_bulletproof_common_setup(bench_bulletproof_t *data) { - size_t i; - const unsigned char nonce[32] = "my kingdom for some randomness!!"; - const unsigned char genbd[32] = "yet more blinding, for the asset"; - - memcpy(data->nonce, nonce, 32); - data->proof = (unsigned char **)malloc(data->n_proofs * sizeof(*data->proof)); - data->value_gen = (secp256k1_generator *)malloc(data->n_proofs * sizeof(*data->value_gen)); - for (i = 0; i < data->n_proofs; i++) { - data->proof[i] = (unsigned char *)malloc(MAX_PROOF_SIZE); - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate(data->ctx, &data->value_gen[i], genbd)); - } - data->plen = MAX_PROOF_SIZE; -} - -static void bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup(void* arg) { - bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t *data = (bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t*)arg; - size_t i; - size_t v; - - unsigned char blind[32] = "and my kingdom too for a blinder"; - - bench_bulletproof_common_setup (data->common); - - data->commit = (secp256k1_pedersen_commitment **)malloc(data->common->n_proofs * sizeof(*data->commit)); - data->blind = (const unsigned char **)malloc(data->n_commits * sizeof(*data->blind)); - data->value = (size_t *)malloc(data->n_commits * sizeof(*data->commit)); - - for (i = 0; i < data->common->n_proofs; i++) { - data->commit[i] = (secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *)malloc(data->n_commits * sizeof(*data->commit[i])); - } - - for (i = 0; i < data->n_commits; i++) { - data->blind[i] = malloc(32); - blind[0] = i; - blind[1] = i >> 8; - memcpy((unsigned char*) data->blind[i], blind, 32); - data->value[i] = i * 17; - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(data->common->ctx, &data->commit[0][i], data->blind[i], data->value[i], &data->common->value_gen[0], &data->common->blind_gen)); - } - for (i = 1; i < data->common->n_proofs; i++) { - memcpy(data->commit[i], data->commit[0], data->n_commits * sizeof(*data->commit[0])); - } - - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(data->common->ctx, data->common->scratch, data->common->generators, data->common->proof[0], &data->common->plen, data->value, NULL, data->blind, data->n_commits, data->common->value_gen, data->nbits, data->common->nonce, NULL, 0) == 1); - for (i = 1; i < data->common->n_proofs; i++) { - memcpy(data->common->proof[i], data->common->proof[0], data->common->plen); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(data->common->ctx, data->common->scratch, data->common->generators, data->common->proof[i], data->common->plen, NULL, data->commit[i], data->n_commits, data->nbits, &data->common->value_gen[0], NULL, 0) == 1); - } - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(data->common->ctx, data->common->scratch, data->common->generators, data->common->proof[0], data->common->plen, NULL, data->commit[0], data->n_commits, data->nbits, data->common->value_gen, NULL, 0) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(data->common->ctx, data->common->scratch, data->common->generators, (const unsigned char **) data->common->proof, data->common->n_proofs, data->common->plen, NULL, (const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment **) data->commit, data->n_commits, data->nbits, data->common->value_gen, NULL, 0) == 1); - if (data->n_commits == 1) { - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(data->common->ctx, data->common->generators, &v, blind, data->common->proof[0], data->common->plen, 0, data->commit[0], &data->common->value_gen[0], data->common->nonce, NULL, 0) == 1); - } -} - -static void bench_bulletproof_common_teardown(bench_bulletproof_t *data) { - size_t i; - - for (i = 0; i < data->n_proofs; i++) { - free(data->proof[i]); - } - free(data->proof); - free(data->value_gen); -} - -static void bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown(void* arg) { - bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t *data = (bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t*)arg; - size_t i; - - if (data->blind != NULL) { - for (i = 0; i < data->n_commits; i++) { - free((unsigned char*) data->blind[i]); - } - } - if (data->commit != NULL) { - for (i = 0; i < data->common->n_proofs; i++) { - free(data->commit[i]); - } - free(data->commit); - } - free(data->blind); - free(data->value); - - bench_bulletproof_common_teardown(data->common); -} - -static void bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(void* arg) { - bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t *data = (bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t*)arg; - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < 25; i++) { - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(data->common->ctx, data->common->scratch, data->common->generators, data->common->proof[0], &data->common->plen, data->value, NULL, data->blind, data->n_commits, data->common->value_gen, data->nbits, data->common->nonce, NULL, 0) == 1); - } -} - -static void bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(void* arg) { - size_t i; - bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t *data = (bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < data->common->iters; i++) { - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(data->common->ctx, data->common->scratch, data->common->generators, (const unsigned char **) data->common->proof, data->common->n_proofs, data->common->plen, NULL, (const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment **) data->commit, data->n_commits, data->nbits, data->common->value_gen, NULL, 0) == 1); - } -} - -static void bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind_succeed(void* arg) { - size_t i; - size_t v; - unsigned char blind[32]; - bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t *data = (bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < data->common->iters; i++) { - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(data->common->ctx, data->common->generators, &v, blind, data->common->proof[0], data->common->plen, 0, data->commit[0], &data->common->value_gen[0], data->common->nonce, NULL, 0) == 1); - } -} - -static void bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind_fail(void* arg) { - size_t i; - size_t v; - unsigned char blind[32]; - bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t *data = (bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t*)arg; - - data->common->nonce[0] ^= 1; - for (i = 0; i < data->common->iters; i++) { - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(data->common->ctx, data->common->generators, &v, blind, data->common->proof[0], data->common->plen, 0, data->commit[0], &data->common->value_gen[0], data->common->nonce, NULL, 0) == 0); - } - data->common->nonce[0] ^= 1; -} - -static void run_rangeproof_test(bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t *data, size_t nbits, size_t n_commits) { - char str[64]; - - data->nbits = nbits; - data->n_commits = n_commits; - data->common->iters = 100; - - data->common->n_proofs = 1; - sprintf(str, "bulletproof_prove, %i, %i, 0, ", (int)nbits, (int) n_commits); - run_benchmark(str, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown, (void *)data, 5, 25); - - data->common->n_proofs = 1; - sprintf(str, "bulletproof_verify, %i, %i, 1, ", (int)nbits, (int) n_commits); - run_benchmark(str, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown, (void *)data, 5, data->common->iters); - - if (n_commits == 1) { - sprintf(str, "bulletproof_rewind_succeed, %i, ", (int)nbits); - run_benchmark(str, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind_succeed, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown, (void *)data, 5, data->common->iters); - sprintf(str, "bulletproof_rewind_fail, %i, ", (int)nbits); - run_benchmark(str, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind_fail, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown, (void *)data, 5, data->common->iters); - } - - data->common->n_proofs = 2; - sprintf(str, "bulletproof_verify, %i, %i, 2, ", (int)nbits, (int) n_commits); - run_benchmark(str, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown, (void *)data, 5, data->common->iters); - - data->common->iters = 10; - data->common->n_proofs = 50; - sprintf(str, "bulletproof_verify, %i, %i, 50, ", (int)nbits, (int) n_commits); - run_benchmark(str, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown, (void *)data, 5, data->common->iters); - - data->common->iters = 1; - data->common->n_proofs = 100; - sprintf(str, "bulletproof_verify, %i, %i, 100, ", (int)nbits, (int) n_commits); - run_benchmark(str, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown, (void *)data, 5, data->common->iters); - - data->common->n_proofs = 500; - sprintf(str, "bulletproof_verify, %i, %i, 500, ", (int)nbits, (int) n_commits); - run_benchmark(str, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown, (void *)data, 5, data->common->iters); - - data->common->n_proofs = 1000; - sprintf(str, "bulletproof_verify, %i, %i, 1000, ", (int)nbits, (int) n_commits); - run_benchmark(str, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_setup, bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_teardown, (void *)data, 5, data->common->iters); -} - -/*int main(void) { - bench_bulletproof_t data; - bench_bulletproof_rangeproof_t rp_data; - - data.blind_gen = secp256k1_generator_const_g; - data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - data.scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(data.ctx, 1024 * 1024 * 1024); - data.generators = secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_create(data.ctx, &data.blind_gen, 64 * 1024); - - rp_data.common = &data; - - run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 8, 1); - run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 16, 1); - run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 32, 1); - - run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 64, 1); - run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 64, 2); - run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 64, 4); - run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 64, 8); - run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 64, 16); - run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 64, 32); - run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 64, 64); - run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 64, 128); - run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 64, 256); - run_rangeproof_test(&rp_data, 64, 512); - // to add more, increase the number of generators above in `data.generators = ...` - - secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_destroy(data.ctx, data.generators); - secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy(data.scratch); - secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); - return 0; -}*/ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_ecdh.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_ecdh.c deleted file mode 100644 index 5837f4e..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_ecdh.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2015 Pieter Wuille, Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#include - -#include "include/secp256k1.h" -#include "include/secp256k1_ecdh.h" -#include "util.h" -#include "bench.h" - -typedef struct { - secp256k1_context *ctx; - secp256k1_pubkey point; - unsigned char scalar[32]; -} bench_ecdh_data; - -static void bench_ecdh_setup(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_ecdh_data *data = (bench_ecdh_data*)arg; - const unsigned char point[] = { - 0x03, - 0x54, 0x94, 0xc1, 0x5d, 0x32, 0x09, 0x97, 0x06, - 0xc2, 0x39, 0x5f, 0x94, 0x34, 0x87, 0x45, 0xfd, - 0x75, 0x7c, 0xe3, 0x0e, 0x4e, 0x8c, 0x90, 0xfb, - 0xa2, 0xba, 0xd1, 0x84, 0xf8, 0x83, 0xc6, 0x9f - }; - - /* create a context with no capabilities */ - data->ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT); - for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { - data->scalar[i] = i + 1; - } - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(data->ctx, &data->point, point, sizeof(point)) == 1); -} - -static void bench_ecdh(void* arg) { - int i; - unsigned char res[32]; - bench_ecdh_data *data = (bench_ecdh_data*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(data->ctx, res, &data->point, data->scalar) == 1); - } -} - -int main(void) { - bench_ecdh_data data; - - run_benchmark("ecdh", bench_ecdh, bench_ecdh_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); - return 0; -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_ecmult.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_ecmult.c deleted file mode 100644 index 52d0476..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_ecmult.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,196 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2017 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ -#include - -#include "include/secp256k1.h" - -#include "util.h" -#include "hash_impl.h" -#include "num_impl.h" -#include "field_impl.h" -#include "group_impl.h" -#include "scalar_impl.h" -#include "ecmult_impl.h" -#include "bench.h" -#include "secp256k1.c" - -#define POINTS 32768 -#define ITERS 10000 - -typedef struct { - /* Setup once in advance */ - secp256k1_context* ctx; - secp256k1_scratch_space* scratch; - secp256k1_scalar* scalars; - secp256k1_ge* pubkeys; - secp256k1_scalar* seckeys; - secp256k1_gej* expected_output; - secp256k1_ecmult_multi_func ecmult_multi; - - /* Changes per test */ - size_t count; - int includes_g; - - /* Changes per test iteration */ - size_t offset1; - size_t offset2; - - /* Test output. */ - secp256k1_gej* output; -} bench_data; - -static int bench_callback(secp256k1_scalar* sc, secp256k1_ge* ge, size_t idx, void* arg) { - bench_data* data = (bench_data*)arg; - if (data->includes_g) ++idx; - if (idx == 0) { - *sc = data->scalars[data->offset1]; - *ge = secp256k1_ge_const_g; - } else { - *sc = data->scalars[(data->offset1 + idx) % POINTS]; - *ge = data->pubkeys[(data->offset2 + idx - 1) % POINTS]; - } - return 1; -} - -static void bench_ecmult(void* arg) { - bench_data* data = (bench_data*)arg; - - size_t count = data->count; - int includes_g = data->includes_g; - size_t iters = 1 + ITERS / count; - size_t iter; - - for (iter = 0; iter < iters; ++iter) { - data->ecmult_multi(&data->ctx->ecmult_ctx, data->scratch, &data->output[iter], data->includes_g ? &data->scalars[data->offset1] : NULL, bench_callback, arg, count - includes_g); - data->offset1 = (data->offset1 + count) % POINTS; - data->offset2 = (data->offset2 + count - 1) % POINTS; - } -} - -static void bench_ecmult_setup(void* arg) { - bench_data* data = (bench_data*)arg; - data->offset1 = (data->count * 0x537b7f6f + 0x8f66a481) % POINTS; - data->offset2 = (data->count * 0x7f6f537b + 0x6a1a8f49) % POINTS; -} - -static void bench_ecmult_teardown(void* arg) { - bench_data* data = (bench_data*)arg; - size_t iters = 1 + ITERS / data->count; - size_t iter; - /* Verify the results in teardown, to avoid doing comparisons while benchmarking. */ - for (iter = 0; iter < iters; ++iter) { - secp256k1_gej tmp; - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&tmp, &data->output[iter], &data->expected_output[iter], NULL); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&tmp)); - } -} - -static void generate_scalar(uint32_t num, secp256k1_scalar* scalar) { - secp256k1_sha256 sha256; - unsigned char c[11] = {'e', 'c', 'm', 'u', 'l', 't', 0, 0, 0, 0}; - unsigned char buf[32]; - int overflow = 0; - c[6] = num; - c[7] = num >> 8; - c[8] = num >> 16; - c[9] = num >> 24; - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, c, sizeof(c)); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, buf); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(scalar, buf, &overflow); - CHECK(!overflow); -} - -static void run_test(bench_data* data, size_t count, int includes_g) { - char str[32]; - static const secp256k1_scalar zero = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); - size_t iters = 1 + ITERS / count; - size_t iter; - - data->count = count; - data->includes_g = includes_g; - - /* Compute (the negation of) the expected results directly. */ - data->offset1 = (data->count * 0x537b7f6f + 0x8f66a481) % POINTS; - data->offset2 = (data->count * 0x7f6f537b + 0x6a1a8f49) % POINTS; - for (iter = 0; iter < iters; ++iter) { - secp256k1_scalar tmp; - secp256k1_scalar total = data->scalars[(data->offset1++) % POINTS]; - size_t i = 0; - for (i = 0; i + 1 < count; ++i) { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tmp, &data->seckeys[(data->offset2++) % POINTS], &data->scalars[(data->offset1++) % POINTS]); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&total, &total, &tmp); - } - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&total, &total); - secp256k1_ecmult(&data->ctx->ecmult_ctx, &data->expected_output[iter], NULL, &zero, &total); - } - - /* Run the benchmark. */ - sprintf(str, includes_g ? "ecmult_%ig" : "ecmult_%i", (int)count); - run_benchmark(str, bench_ecmult, bench_ecmult_setup, bench_ecmult_teardown, data, 10, count * (1 + ITERS / count)); -} - -int main(int argc, char **argv) { - bench_data data; - int i, p; - secp256k1_gej* pubkeys_gej; - size_t scratch_size; - - if (argc > 1) { - if(have_flag(argc, argv, "pippenger_wnaf")) { - printf("Using pippenger_wnaf:\n"); - data.ecmult_multi = secp256k1_ecmult_pippenger_batch_single; - } else if(have_flag(argc, argv, "strauss_wnaf")) { - printf("Using strauss_wnaf:\n"); - data.ecmult_multi = secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_batch_single; - } - } else { - data.ecmult_multi = secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var; - } - - /* Allocate stuff */ - data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - scratch_size = secp256k1_strauss_scratch_size(POINTS) + STRAUSS_SCRATCH_OBJECTS*16; - data.scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(data.ctx, scratch_size); - data.scalars = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) * POINTS); - data.seckeys = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) * POINTS); - data.pubkeys = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_ge) * POINTS); - data.expected_output = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_gej) * (ITERS + 1)); - data.output = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_gej) * (ITERS + 1)); - - /* Generate a set of scalars, and private/public keypairs. */ - pubkeys_gej = malloc(sizeof(secp256k1_gej) * POINTS); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pubkeys_gej[0], &secp256k1_ge_const_g); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&data.seckeys[0], 1); - for (i = 0; i < POINTS; ++i) { - generate_scalar(i, &data.scalars[i]); - if (i) { - secp256k1_gej_double_var(&pubkeys_gej[i], &pubkeys_gej[i - 1], NULL); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&data.seckeys[i], &data.seckeys[i - 1], &data.seckeys[i - 1]); - } - } - secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(data.pubkeys, pubkeys_gej, POINTS, &data.ctx->error_callback); - free(pubkeys_gej); - - for (i = 1; i <= 8; ++i) { - run_test(&data, i, 1); - } - - for (p = 0; p <= 11; ++p) { - for (i = 9; i <= 16; ++i) { - run_test(&data, i << p, 1); - } - } - secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); - secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy(data.scratch); - free(data.scalars); - free(data.pubkeys); - free(data.seckeys); - free(data.output); - free(data.expected_output); - - return(0); -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_generator.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_generator.c deleted file mode 100644 index 7d7bb4d..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_generator.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2016 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#include -#include - -#include "include/secp256k1_generator.h" -#include "util.h" -#include "bench.h" - -typedef struct { - secp256k1_context* ctx; - unsigned char key[32]; - unsigned char blind[32]; -} bench_generator_t; - -static void bench_generator_setup(void* arg) { - bench_generator_t *data = (bench_generator_t*)arg; - memset(data->key, 0x31, 32); - memset(data->blind, 0x13, 32); -} - -static void bench_generator_generate(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_generator_t *data = (bench_generator_t*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - secp256k1_generator gen; - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate(data->ctx, &gen, data->key)); - data->key[i & 31]++; - } -} - -static void bench_generator_generate_blinded(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_generator_t *data = (bench_generator_t*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - secp256k1_generator gen; - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(data->ctx, &gen, data->key, data->blind)); - data->key[1 + (i & 30)]++; - data->blind[1 + (i & 30)]++; - } -} - -int main(void) { - bench_generator_t data; - - data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - - run_benchmark("generator_generate", bench_generator_generate, bench_generator_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); - run_benchmark("generator_generate_blinded", bench_generator_generate_blinded, bench_generator_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); - - secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); - return 0; -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_internal.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_internal.c deleted file mode 100644 index 9c0a07f..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_internal.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,367 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ -#include - -#include "include/secp256k1.h" - -#include "util.h" -#include "hash_impl.h" -#include "num_impl.h" -#include "field_impl.h" -#include "group_impl.h" -#include "scalar_impl.h" -#include "ecmult_const_impl.h" -#include "ecmult_impl.h" -#include "bench.h" -#include "secp256k1.c" - -typedef struct { - secp256k1_scalar scalar_x, scalar_y; - secp256k1_fe fe_x, fe_y; - secp256k1_ge ge_x, ge_y; - secp256k1_gej gej_x, gej_y; - unsigned char data[64]; - int wnaf[256]; -} bench_inv; - -void bench_setup(void* arg) { - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - static const unsigned char init_x[32] = { - 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x07, 0x0b, 0x0d, 0x11, 0x13, - 0x17, 0x1d, 0x1f, 0x25, 0x29, 0x2b, 0x2f, 0x35, - 0x3b, 0x3d, 0x43, 0x47, 0x49, 0x4f, 0x53, 0x59, - 0x61, 0x65, 0x67, 0x6b, 0x6d, 0x71, 0x7f, 0x83 - }; - - static const unsigned char init_y[32] = { - 0x82, 0x83, 0x85, 0x87, 0x8b, 0x8d, 0x81, 0x83, - 0x97, 0xad, 0xaf, 0xb5, 0xb9, 0xbb, 0xbf, 0xc5, - 0xdb, 0xdd, 0xe3, 0xe7, 0xe9, 0xef, 0xf3, 0xf9, - 0x11, 0x15, 0x17, 0x1b, 0x1d, 0xb1, 0xbf, 0xd3 - }; - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&data->scalar_x, init_x, NULL); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&data->scalar_y, init_y, NULL); - secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&data->fe_x, init_x); - secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&data->fe_y, init_y); - CHECK(secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&data->ge_x, &data->fe_x, 0)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&data->ge_y, &data->fe_y, 1)); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&data->gej_x, &data->ge_x); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&data->gej_y, &data->ge_y); - memcpy(data->data, init_x, 32); - memcpy(data->data + 32, init_y, 32); -} - -void bench_scalar_add(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 2000000; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); - } -} - -void bench_scalar_negate(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 2000000; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x); - } -} - -void bench_scalar_sqr(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x); - } -} - -void bench_scalar_mul(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); - } -} - -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM -void bench_scalar_split(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar l, r; - secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(&l, &r, &data->scalar_x); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); - } -} -#endif - -void bench_scalar_inverse(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 2000; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_inverse(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); - } -} - -void bench_scalar_inverse_var(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 2000; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); - } -} - -void bench_field_normalize(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 2000000; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&data->fe_x); - } -} - -void bench_field_normalize_weak(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 2000000; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&data->fe_x); - } -} - -void bench_field_mul(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_mul(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_x, &data->fe_y); - } -} - -void bench_field_sqr(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_x); - } -} - -void bench_field_inverse(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_inv(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_x); - secp256k1_fe_add(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_y); - } -} - -void bench_field_inverse_var(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_x); - secp256k1_fe_add(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_y); - } -} - -void bench_field_sqrt(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_x); - secp256k1_fe_add(&data->fe_x, &data->fe_y); - } -} - -void bench_group_double_var(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { - secp256k1_gej_double_var(&data->gej_x, &data->gej_x, NULL); - } -} - -void bench_group_add_var(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&data->gej_x, &data->gej_x, &data->gej_y, NULL); - } -} - -void bench_group_add_affine(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&data->gej_x, &data->gej_x, &data->ge_y); - } -} - -void bench_group_add_affine_var(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&data->gej_x, &data->gej_x, &data->ge_y, NULL); - } -} - -void bench_group_jacobi_var(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(&data->gej_x); - } -} - -void bench_ecmult_wnaf(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(data->wnaf, 256, &data->scalar_x, WINDOW_A); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); - } -} - -void bench_wnaf_const(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - secp256k1_wnaf_const(data->wnaf, data->scalar_x, WINDOW_A, 256); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_x, &data->scalar_y); - } -} - - -void bench_sha256(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - secp256k1_sha256 sha; - - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, data->data, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, data->data); - } -} - -void bench_hmac_sha256(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - secp256k1_hmac_sha256 hmac; - - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hmac, data->data, 32); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, data->data, 32); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hmac, data->data); - } -} - -void bench_rfc6979_hmac_sha256(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 rng; - - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, data->data, 64); - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, data->data, 32); - } -} - -void bench_context_verify(void* arg) { - int i; - (void)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { - secp256k1_context_destroy(secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY)); - } -} - -void bench_context_sign(void* arg) { - int i; - (void)arg; - for (i = 0; i < 200; i++) { - secp256k1_context_destroy(secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN)); - } -} - -#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE -void bench_num_jacobi(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_inv *data = (bench_inv*)arg; - secp256k1_num nx, norder; - - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&nx, &data->scalar_x); - secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(&norder); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&norder, &data->scalar_y); - - for (i = 0; i < 200000; i++) { - secp256k1_num_jacobi(&nx, &norder); - } -} -#endif - -int main(int argc, char **argv) { - bench_inv data; - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "add")) run_benchmark("scalar_add", bench_scalar_add, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 2000000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "negate")) run_benchmark("scalar_negate", bench_scalar_negate, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 2000000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "sqr")) run_benchmark("scalar_sqr", bench_scalar_sqr, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "mul")) run_benchmark("scalar_mul", bench_scalar_mul, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "split")) run_benchmark("scalar_split", bench_scalar_split, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); -#endif - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "inverse")) run_benchmark("scalar_inverse", bench_scalar_inverse, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 2000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "scalar") || have_flag(argc, argv, "inverse")) run_benchmark("scalar_inverse_var", bench_scalar_inverse_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 2000); - - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "normalize")) run_benchmark("field_normalize", bench_field_normalize, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 2000000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "normalize")) run_benchmark("field_normalize_weak", bench_field_normalize_weak, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 2000000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "sqr")) run_benchmark("field_sqr", bench_field_sqr, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "mul")) run_benchmark("field_mul", bench_field_mul, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "inverse")) run_benchmark("field_inverse", bench_field_inverse, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "inverse")) run_benchmark("field_inverse_var", bench_field_inverse_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "field") || have_flag(argc, argv, "sqrt")) run_benchmark("field_sqrt", bench_field_sqrt, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); - - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "double")) run_benchmark("group_double_var", bench_group_double_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "add")) run_benchmark("group_add_var", bench_group_add_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "add")) run_benchmark("group_add_affine", bench_group_add_affine, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "add")) run_benchmark("group_add_affine_var", bench_group_add_affine_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "group") || have_flag(argc, argv, "jacobi")) run_benchmark("group_jacobi_var", bench_group_jacobi_var, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); - - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "ecmult") || have_flag(argc, argv, "wnaf")) run_benchmark("wnaf_const", bench_wnaf_const, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "ecmult") || have_flag(argc, argv, "wnaf")) run_benchmark("ecmult_wnaf", bench_ecmult_wnaf, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); - - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "hash") || have_flag(argc, argv, "sha256")) run_benchmark("hash_sha256", bench_sha256, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "hash") || have_flag(argc, argv, "hmac")) run_benchmark("hash_hmac_sha256", bench_hmac_sha256, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "hash") || have_flag(argc, argv, "rng6979")) run_benchmark("hash_rfc6979_hmac_sha256", bench_rfc6979_hmac_sha256, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); - - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "context") || have_flag(argc, argv, "verify")) run_benchmark("context_verify", bench_context_verify, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20); - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "context") || have_flag(argc, argv, "sign")) run_benchmark("context_sign", bench_context_sign, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200); - -#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE - if (have_flag(argc, argv, "num") || have_flag(argc, argv, "jacobi")) run_benchmark("num_jacobi", bench_num_jacobi, bench_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 200000); -#endif - return 0; -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_rangeproof.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_rangeproof.c deleted file mode 100644 index 67a987c..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_rangeproof.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014, 2015 Pieter Wuille, Gregory Maxwell * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#include - -#include "include/secp256k1_commitment.h" -#include "include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h" -#include "util.h" -#include "bench.h" - -typedef struct { - secp256k1_context* ctx; - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment commit; - unsigned char proof[5134]; - unsigned char blind[32]; - size_t len; - int min_bits; - uint64_t v; -} bench_rangeproof_t; - -static void bench_rangeproof_setup(void* arg) { - int i; - uint64_t minv; - uint64_t maxv; - bench_rangeproof_t *data = (bench_rangeproof_t*)arg; - - data->v = 0; - for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) data->blind[i] = i + 1; - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(data->ctx, &data->commit, data->blind, data->v, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g)); - data->len = 5134; - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(data->ctx, data->proof, &data->len, 0, &data->commit, data->blind, (const unsigned char*)&data->commit, 0, data->min_bits, data->v, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(data->ctx, &minv, &maxv, &data->commit, data->proof, data->len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); -} - -static void bench_rangeproof(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_rangeproof_t *data = (bench_rangeproof_t*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { - int j; - uint64_t minv; - uint64_t maxv; - j = secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(data->ctx, &minv, &maxv, &data->commit, data->proof, data->len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h); - for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { - data->proof[j + 2 + 32 *((data->min_bits + 1) >> 1) - 4] = (i >> 8)&255; - } - } -} - -int main(void) { - bench_rangeproof_t data; - - data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - - data.min_bits = 32; - - run_benchmark("rangeproof_verify_bit", bench_rangeproof, bench_rangeproof_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 1000 * data.min_bits); - - secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); - return 0; -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_recover.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_recover.c deleted file mode 100644 index b806eed..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_recover.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#include "include/secp256k1.h" -#include "include/secp256k1_recovery.h" -#include "util.h" -#include "bench.h" - -typedef struct { - secp256k1_context *ctx; - unsigned char msg[32]; - unsigned char sig[64]; -} bench_recover_data; - -void bench_recover(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_recover_data *data = (bench_recover_data*)arg; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - unsigned char pubkeyc[33]; - - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - int j; - size_t pubkeylen = 33; - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature sig; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(data->ctx, &sig, data->sig, i % 2)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(data->ctx, &pubkey, &sig, data->msg)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(data->ctx, pubkeyc, &pubkeylen, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED)); - for (j = 0; j < 32; j++) { - data->sig[j + 32] = data->msg[j]; /* Move former message to S. */ - data->msg[j] = data->sig[j]; /* Move former R to message. */ - data->sig[j] = pubkeyc[j + 1]; /* Move recovered pubkey X coordinate to R (which must be a valid X coordinate). */ - } - } -} - -void bench_recover_setup(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_recover_data *data = (bench_recover_data*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { - data->msg[i] = 1 + i; - } - for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { - data->sig[i] = 65 + i; - } -} - -int main(void) { - bench_recover_data data; - - data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - - run_benchmark("ecdsa_recover", bench_recover, bench_recover_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); - - secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); - return 0; -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_sign.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_sign.c deleted file mode 100644 index 544b439..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_sign.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,56 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#include "include/secp256k1.h" -#include "util.h" -#include "bench.h" - -typedef struct { - secp256k1_context* ctx; - unsigned char msg[32]; - unsigned char key[32]; -} bench_sign; - -static void bench_sign_setup(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_sign *data = (bench_sign*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { - data->msg[i] = i + 1; - } - for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { - data->key[i] = i + 65; - } -} - -static void bench_sign_run(void* arg) { - int i; - bench_sign *data = (bench_sign*)arg; - - unsigned char sig[74]; - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - size_t siglen = 74; - int j; - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature signature; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(data->ctx, &signature, data->msg, data->key, NULL, NULL)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(data->ctx, sig, &siglen, &signature)); - for (j = 0; j < 32; j++) { - data->msg[j] = sig[j]; - data->key[j] = sig[j + 32]; - } - } -} - -int main(void) { - bench_sign data; - - data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); - - run_benchmark("ecdsa_sign", bench_sign_run, bench_sign_setup, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); - - secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); - return 0; -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_verify.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_verify.c deleted file mode 100644 index 418defa..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_verify.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,112 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#include -#include - -#include "include/secp256k1.h" -#include "util.h" -#include "bench.h" - -#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS -#include -#include -#include -#endif - -typedef struct { - secp256k1_context *ctx; - unsigned char msg[32]; - unsigned char key[32]; - unsigned char sig[72]; - size_t siglen; - unsigned char pubkey[33]; - size_t pubkeylen; -#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS - EC_GROUP* ec_group; -#endif -} benchmark_verify_t; - -static void benchmark_verify(void* arg) { - int i; - benchmark_verify_t* data = (benchmark_verify_t*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; - data->sig[data->siglen - 1] ^= (i & 0xFF); - data->sig[data->siglen - 2] ^= ((i >> 8) & 0xFF); - data->sig[data->siglen - 3] ^= ((i >> 16) & 0xFF); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(data->ctx, &pubkey, data->pubkey, data->pubkeylen) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(data->ctx, &sig, data->sig, data->siglen) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(data->ctx, &sig, data->msg, &pubkey) == (i == 0)); - data->sig[data->siglen - 1] ^= (i & 0xFF); - data->sig[data->siglen - 2] ^= ((i >> 8) & 0xFF); - data->sig[data->siglen - 3] ^= ((i >> 16) & 0xFF); - } -} - -#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS -static void benchmark_verify_openssl(void* arg) { - int i; - benchmark_verify_t* data = (benchmark_verify_t*)arg; - - for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++) { - data->sig[data->siglen - 1] ^= (i & 0xFF); - data->sig[data->siglen - 2] ^= ((i >> 8) & 0xFF); - data->sig[data->siglen - 3] ^= ((i >> 16) & 0xFF); - { - EC_KEY *pkey = EC_KEY_new(); - const unsigned char *pubkey = &data->pubkey[0]; - int result; - - CHECK(pkey != NULL); - result = EC_KEY_set_group(pkey, data->ec_group); - CHECK(result); - result = (o2i_ECPublicKey(&pkey, &pubkey, data->pubkeylen)) != NULL; - CHECK(result); - result = ECDSA_verify(0, &data->msg[0], sizeof(data->msg), &data->sig[0], data->siglen, pkey) == (i == 0); - CHECK(result); - EC_KEY_free(pkey); - } - data->sig[data->siglen - 1] ^= (i & 0xFF); - data->sig[data->siglen - 2] ^= ((i >> 8) & 0xFF); - data->sig[data->siglen - 3] ^= ((i >> 16) & 0xFF); - } -} -#endif - -int main(void) { - int i; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; - benchmark_verify_t data; - - data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - - for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { - data.msg[i] = 1 + i; - } - for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { - data.key[i] = 33 + i; - } - data.siglen = 72; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(data.ctx, &sig, data.msg, data.key, NULL, NULL)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(data.ctx, data.sig, &data.siglen, &sig)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(data.ctx, &pubkey, data.key)); - data.pubkeylen = 33; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(data.ctx, data.pubkey, &data.pubkeylen, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); - - run_benchmark("ecdsa_verify", benchmark_verify, NULL, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); -#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS - data.ec_group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp256k1); - run_benchmark("ecdsa_verify_openssl", benchmark_verify_openssl, NULL, NULL, &data, 10, 20000); - EC_GROUP_free(data.ec_group); -#endif - - secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); - return 0; -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_whitelist.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_whitelist.c deleted file mode 100644 index d011e92..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/bench_whitelist.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,104 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2017 Jonas Nick * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ -#include - -#include "include/secp256k1.h" - -#include "include/secp256k1_whitelist.h" -#include "bench.h" -#include "util.h" -#include "hash_impl.h" -#include "num_impl.h" -#include "scalar_impl.h" -#include "testrand_impl.h" - -#define MAX_N_KEYS 30 - -typedef struct { - secp256k1_context* ctx; - unsigned char online_seckey[MAX_N_KEYS][32]; - unsigned char summed_seckey[MAX_N_KEYS][32]; - secp256k1_pubkey online_pubkeys[MAX_N_KEYS]; - secp256k1_pubkey offline_pubkeys[MAX_N_KEYS]; - unsigned char csub[32]; - secp256k1_pubkey sub_pubkey; - secp256k1_whitelist_signature sig; - size_t n_keys; -} bench_data; - -static void bench_whitelist(void* arg) { - bench_data* data = (bench_data*)arg; - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_verify(data->ctx, &data->sig, data->online_pubkeys, data->offline_pubkeys, data->n_keys, &data->sub_pubkey) == 1); -} - -static void bench_whitelist_setup(void* arg) { - bench_data* data = (bench_data*)arg; - int i = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_sign(data->ctx, &data->sig, data->online_pubkeys, data->offline_pubkeys, data->n_keys, &data->sub_pubkey, data->online_seckey[i], data->summed_seckey[i], i, NULL, NULL)); -} - -static void run_test(bench_data* data) { - char str[32]; - sprintf(str, "whitelist_%i", (int)data->n_keys); - run_benchmark(str, bench_whitelist, bench_whitelist_setup, NULL, data, 100, 1); -} - -void random_scalar_order(secp256k1_scalar *num) { - do { - unsigned char b32[32]; - int overflow = 0; - secp256k1_rand256(b32); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(num, b32, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(num)) { - continue; - } - break; - } while(1); -} - -int main(void) { - bench_data data; - size_t i; - size_t n_keys = 30; - secp256k1_scalar ssub; - - data.ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - - /* Start with subkey */ - random_scalar_order(&ssub); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(data.csub, &ssub); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(data.ctx, data.csub) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(data.ctx, &data.sub_pubkey, data.csub) == 1); - /* Then offline and online whitelist keys */ - for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar son, soff; - - /* Create two keys */ - random_scalar_order(&son); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(data.online_seckey[i], &son); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(data.ctx, data.online_seckey[i]) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(data.ctx, &data.online_pubkeys[i], data.online_seckey[i]) == 1); - - random_scalar_order(&soff); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(data.summed_seckey[i], &soff); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(data.ctx, data.summed_seckey[i]) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(data.ctx, &data.offline_pubkeys[i], data.summed_seckey[i]) == 1); - - /* Make summed_seckey correspond to the sum of offline_pubkey and sub_pubkey */ - secp256k1_scalar_add(&soff, &soff, &ssub); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(data.summed_seckey[i], &soff); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(data.ctx, data.summed_seckey[i]) == 1); - } - - /* Run test */ - for (i = 1; i <= n_keys; ++i) { - data.n_keys = i; - run_test(&data); - } - - secp256k1_context_destroy(data.ctx); - return(0); -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecdsa.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecdsa.h deleted file mode 100644 index 80590c7..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecdsa.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_ECDSA_H -#define SECP256K1_ECDSA_H - -#include - -#include "scalar.h" -#include "group.h" -#include "ecmult.h" - -static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_parse(secp256k1_scalar *r, secp256k1_scalar *s, const unsigned char *sig, size_t size); -static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_serialize(unsigned char *sig, size_t *size, const secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *s); -static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, const secp256k1_scalar* r, const secp256k1_scalar* s, const secp256k1_ge *pubkey, const secp256k1_scalar *message); -static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, secp256k1_scalar* r, secp256k1_scalar* s, const secp256k1_scalar *seckey, const secp256k1_scalar *message, const secp256k1_scalar *nonce, int *recid); - -#endif /* SECP256K1_ECDSA_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecdsa_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecdsa_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index c340004..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecdsa_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,313 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013-2015 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - - -#ifndef SECP256K1_ECDSA_IMPL_H -#define SECP256K1_ECDSA_IMPL_H - -#include "scalar.h" -#include "field.h" -#include "group.h" -#include "ecmult.h" -#include "ecmult_gen.h" -#include "ecdsa.h" - -/** Group order for secp256k1 defined as 'n' in "Standards for Efficient Cryptography" (SEC2) 2.7.1 - * sage: for t in xrange(1023, -1, -1): - * .. p = 2**256 - 2**32 - t - * .. if p.is_prime(): - * .. print '%x'%p - * .. break - * 'fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffefffffc2f' - * sage: a = 0 - * sage: b = 7 - * sage: F = FiniteField (p) - * sage: '%x' % (EllipticCurve ([F (a), F (b)]).order()) - * 'fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffebaaedce6af48a03bbfd25e8cd0364141' - */ -static const secp256k1_fe secp256k1_ecdsa_const_order_as_fe = SECP256K1_FE_CONST( - 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFEUL, - 0xBAAEDCE6UL, 0xAF48A03BUL, 0xBFD25E8CUL, 0xD0364141UL -); - -/** Difference between field and order, values 'p' and 'n' values defined in - * "Standards for Efficient Cryptography" (SEC2) 2.7.1. - * sage: p = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFC2F - * sage: a = 0 - * sage: b = 7 - * sage: F = FiniteField (p) - * sage: '%x' % (p - EllipticCurve ([F (a), F (b)]).order()) - * '14551231950b75fc4402da1722fc9baee' - */ -static const secp256k1_fe secp256k1_ecdsa_const_p_minus_order = SECP256K1_FE_CONST( - 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x45512319UL, 0x50B75FC4UL, 0x402DA172UL, 0x2FC9BAEEUL -); - -static int secp256k1_der_read_len(const unsigned char **sigp, const unsigned char *sigend) { - int lenleft, b1; - size_t ret = 0; - if (*sigp >= sigend) { - return -1; - } - b1 = *((*sigp)++); - if (b1 == 0xFF) { - /* X.690-0207 8.1.3.5.c the value 0xFF shall not be used. */ - return -1; - } - if ((b1 & 0x80) == 0) { - /* X.690-0207 8.1.3.4 short form length octets */ - return b1; - } - if (b1 == 0x80) { - /* Indefinite length is not allowed in DER. */ - return -1; - } - /* X.690-207 8.1.3.5 long form length octets */ - lenleft = b1 & 0x7F; - if (lenleft > sigend - *sigp) { - return -1; - } - if (**sigp == 0) { - /* Not the shortest possible length encoding. */ - return -1; - } - if ((size_t)lenleft > sizeof(size_t)) { - /* The resulting length would exceed the range of a size_t, so - * certainly longer than the passed array size. - */ - return -1; - } - while (lenleft > 0) { - ret = (ret << 8) | **sigp; - if (ret + lenleft > (size_t)(sigend - *sigp)) { - /* Result exceeds the length of the passed array. */ - return -1; - } - (*sigp)++; - lenleft--; - } - if (ret < 128) { - /* Not the shortest possible length encoding. */ - return -1; - } - return ret; -} - -static int secp256k1_der_parse_integer(secp256k1_scalar *r, const unsigned char **sig, const unsigned char *sigend) { - int overflow = 0; - unsigned char ra[32] = {0}; - int rlen; - - if (*sig == sigend || **sig != 0x02) { - /* Not a primitive integer (X.690-0207 8.3.1). */ - return 0; - } - (*sig)++; - rlen = secp256k1_der_read_len(sig, sigend); - if (rlen <= 0 || (*sig) + rlen > sigend) { - /* Exceeds bounds or not at least length 1 (X.690-0207 8.3.1). */ - return 0; - } - if (**sig == 0x00 && rlen > 1 && (((*sig)[1]) & 0x80) == 0x00) { - /* Excessive 0x00 padding. */ - return 0; - } - if (**sig == 0xFF && rlen > 1 && (((*sig)[1]) & 0x80) == 0x80) { - /* Excessive 0xFF padding. */ - return 0; - } - if ((**sig & 0x80) == 0x80) { - /* Negative. */ - overflow = 1; - } - while (rlen > 0 && **sig == 0) { - /* Skip leading zero bytes */ - rlen--; - (*sig)++; - } - if (rlen > 32) { - overflow = 1; - } - if (!overflow) { - memcpy(ra + 32 - rlen, *sig, rlen); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(r, ra, &overflow); - } - if (overflow) { - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(r, 0); - } - (*sig) += rlen; - return 1; -} - -static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_parse(secp256k1_scalar *rr, secp256k1_scalar *rs, const unsigned char *sig, size_t size) { - const unsigned char *sigend = sig + size; - int rlen; - if (sig == sigend || *(sig++) != 0x30) { - /* The encoding doesn't start with a constructed sequence (X.690-0207 8.9.1). */ - return 0; - } - rlen = secp256k1_der_read_len(&sig, sigend); - if (rlen < 0 || sig + rlen > sigend) { - /* Tuple exceeds bounds */ - return 0; - } - if (sig + rlen != sigend) { - /* Garbage after tuple. */ - return 0; - } - - if (!secp256k1_der_parse_integer(rr, &sig, sigend)) { - return 0; - } - if (!secp256k1_der_parse_integer(rs, &sig, sigend)) { - return 0; - } - - if (sig != sigend) { - /* Trailing garbage inside tuple. */ - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_serialize(unsigned char *sig, size_t *size, const secp256k1_scalar* ar, const secp256k1_scalar* as) { - unsigned char r[33] = {0}, s[33] = {0}; - unsigned char *rp = r, *sp = s; - size_t lenR = 33, lenS = 33; - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&r[1], ar); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&s[1], as); - while (lenR > 1 && rp[0] == 0 && rp[1] < 0x80) { lenR--; rp++; } - while (lenS > 1 && sp[0] == 0 && sp[1] < 0x80) { lenS--; sp++; } - if (*size < 6+lenS+lenR) { - *size = 6 + lenS + lenR; - return 0; - } - *size = 6 + lenS + lenR; - sig[0] = 0x30; - sig[1] = 4 + lenS + lenR; - sig[2] = 0x02; - sig[3] = lenR; - memcpy(sig+4, rp, lenR); - sig[4+lenR] = 0x02; - sig[5+lenR] = lenS; - memcpy(sig+lenR+6, sp, lenS); - return 1; -} - -static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, const secp256k1_scalar *sigr, const secp256k1_scalar *sigs, const secp256k1_ge *pubkey, const secp256k1_scalar *message) { - unsigned char c[32]; - secp256k1_scalar sn, u1, u2; -#if !defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) - secp256k1_fe xr; -#endif - secp256k1_gej pubkeyj; - secp256k1_gej pr; - - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigr) || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigs)) { - return 0; - } - - secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&sn, sigs); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&u1, &sn, message); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&u2, &sn, sigr); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pubkeyj, pubkey); - secp256k1_ecmult(ctx, &pr, &pubkeyj, &u2, &u1); - if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&pr)) { - return 0; - } - -#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) -{ - secp256k1_scalar computed_r; - secp256k1_ge pr_ge; - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&pr_ge, &pr); - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pr_ge.x); - - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(c, &pr_ge.x); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&computed_r, c, NULL); - return secp256k1_scalar_eq(sigr, &computed_r); -} -#else - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(c, sigr); - secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&xr, c); - - /** We now have the recomputed R point in pr, and its claimed x coordinate (modulo n) - * in xr. Naively, we would extract the x coordinate from pr (requiring a inversion modulo p), - * compute the remainder modulo n, and compare it to xr. However: - * - * xr == X(pr) mod n - * <=> exists h. (xr + h * n < p && xr + h * n == X(pr)) - * [Since 2 * n > p, h can only be 0 or 1] - * <=> (xr == X(pr)) || (xr + n < p && xr + n == X(pr)) - * [In Jacobian coordinates, X(pr) is pr.x / pr.z^2 mod p] - * <=> (xr == pr.x / pr.z^2 mod p) || (xr + n < p && xr + n == pr.x / pr.z^2 mod p) - * [Multiplying both sides of the equations by pr.z^2 mod p] - * <=> (xr * pr.z^2 mod p == pr.x) || (xr + n < p && (xr + n) * pr.z^2 mod p == pr.x) - * - * Thus, we can avoid the inversion, but we have to check both cases separately. - * secp256k1_gej_eq_x implements the (xr * pr.z^2 mod p == pr.x) test. - */ - if (secp256k1_gej_eq_x_var(&xr, &pr)) { - /* xr * pr.z^2 mod p == pr.x, so the signature is valid. */ - return 1; - } - if (secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(&xr, &secp256k1_ecdsa_const_p_minus_order) >= 0) { - /* xr + n >= p, so we can skip testing the second case. */ - return 0; - } - secp256k1_fe_add(&xr, &secp256k1_ecdsa_const_order_as_fe); - if (secp256k1_gej_eq_x_var(&xr, &pr)) { - /* (xr + n) * pr.z^2 mod p == pr.x, so the signature is valid. */ - return 1; - } - return 0; -#endif -} - -static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, secp256k1_scalar *sigr, secp256k1_scalar *sigs, const secp256k1_scalar *seckey, const secp256k1_scalar *message, const secp256k1_scalar *nonce, int *recid) { - unsigned char b[32]; - secp256k1_gej rp; - secp256k1_ge r; - secp256k1_scalar n; - int overflow = 0; - - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(ctx, &rp, nonce); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&r, &rp); - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&r.x); - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&r.y); - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(b, &r.x); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(sigr, b, &overflow); - /* These two conditions should be checked before calling */ - VERIFY_CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigr)); - VERIFY_CHECK(overflow == 0); - - if (recid) { - /* The overflow condition is cryptographically unreachable as hitting it requires finding the discrete log - * of some P where P.x >= order, and only 1 in about 2^127 points meet this criteria. - */ - *recid = (overflow ? 2 : 0) | (secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r.y) ? 1 : 0); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&n, sigr, seckey); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&n, &n, message); - secp256k1_scalar_inverse(sigs, nonce); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sigs, sigs, &n); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&n); - secp256k1_gej_clear(&rp); - secp256k1_ge_clear(&r); - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigs)) { - return 0; - } - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_high(sigs)) { - secp256k1_scalar_negate(sigs, sigs); - if (recid) { - *recid ^= 1; - } - } - return 1; -} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_ECDSA_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/eckey.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/eckey.h deleted file mode 100644 index b621f1e..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/eckey.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,25 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_ECKEY_H -#define SECP256K1_ECKEY_H - -#include - -#include "group.h" -#include "scalar.h" -#include "ecmult.h" -#include "ecmult_gen.h" - -static int secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(secp256k1_ge *elem, const unsigned char *pub, size_t size); -static int secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(secp256k1_ge *elem, unsigned char *pub, size_t *size, int compressed); - -static int secp256k1_eckey_privkey_tweak_add(secp256k1_scalar *key, const secp256k1_scalar *tweak); -static int secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_add(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_ge *key, const secp256k1_scalar *tweak); -static int secp256k1_eckey_privkey_tweak_mul(secp256k1_scalar *key, const secp256k1_scalar *tweak); -static int secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_mul(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_ge *key, const secp256k1_scalar *tweak); - -#endif /* SECP256K1_ECKEY_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/eckey_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/eckey_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 1ab9a68..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/eckey_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,100 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_ECKEY_IMPL_H -#define SECP256K1_ECKEY_IMPL_H - -#include "eckey.h" - -#include "scalar.h" -#include "field.h" -#include "group.h" -#include "ecmult_gen.h" - -static int secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(secp256k1_ge *elem, const unsigned char *pub, size_t size) { - if (size == 33 && (pub[0] == SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_EVEN || pub[0] == SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_ODD)) { - secp256k1_fe x; - return secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&x, pub+1) && secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(elem, &x, pub[0] == SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_ODD); - } else if (size == 65 && (pub[0] == 0x04 || pub[0] == 0x06 || pub[0] == 0x07)) { - secp256k1_fe x, y; - if (!secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&x, pub+1) || !secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&y, pub+33)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_ge_set_xy(elem, &x, &y); - if ((pub[0] == SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_HYBRID_EVEN || pub[0] == SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_HYBRID_ODD) && - secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&y) != (pub[0] == SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_HYBRID_ODD)) { - return 0; - } - return secp256k1_ge_is_valid_var(elem); - } else { - return 0; - } -} - -static int secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(secp256k1_ge *elem, unsigned char *pub, size_t *size, int compressed) { - if (secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(elem)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&elem->x); - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&elem->y); - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(&pub[1], &elem->x); - if (compressed) { - *size = 33; - pub[0] = secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&elem->y) ? SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_ODD : SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_EVEN; - } else { - *size = 65; - pub[0] = SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_UNCOMPRESSED; - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(&pub[33], &elem->y); - } - return 1; -} - -static int secp256k1_eckey_privkey_tweak_add(secp256k1_scalar *key, const secp256k1_scalar *tweak) { - secp256k1_scalar_add(key, key, tweak); - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(key)) { - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -static int secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_add(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_ge *key, const secp256k1_scalar *tweak) { - secp256k1_gej pt; - secp256k1_scalar one; - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pt, key); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&one, 1); - secp256k1_ecmult(ctx, &pt, &pt, &one, tweak); - - if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&pt)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(key, &pt); - return 1; -} - -static int secp256k1_eckey_privkey_tweak_mul(secp256k1_scalar *key, const secp256k1_scalar *tweak) { - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(tweak)) { - return 0; - } - - secp256k1_scalar_mul(key, key, tweak); - return 1; -} - -static int secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_mul(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_ge *key, const secp256k1_scalar *tweak) { - secp256k1_scalar zero; - secp256k1_gej pt; - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(tweak)) { - return 0; - } - - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&zero, 0); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pt, key); - secp256k1_ecmult(ctx, &pt, &pt, tweak, &zero); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(key, &pt); - return 1; -} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_ECKEY_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult.h deleted file mode 100644 index ea1cd8a..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,47 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014, 2017 Pieter Wuille, Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_ECMULT_H -#define SECP256K1_ECMULT_H - -#include "num.h" -#include "group.h" -#include "scalar.h" -#include "scratch.h" - -typedef struct { - /* For accelerating the computation of a*P + b*G: */ - secp256k1_ge_storage (*pre_g)[]; /* odd multiples of the generator */ -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - secp256k1_ge_storage (*pre_g_128)[]; /* odd multiples of 2^128*generator */ -#endif -} secp256k1_ecmult_context; - -static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_init(secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx); -static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_build(secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, const secp256k1_callback *cb); -static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_clone(secp256k1_ecmult_context *dst, - const secp256k1_ecmult_context *src, const secp256k1_callback *cb); -static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_clear(secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx); -static int secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx); - -/** Double multiply: R = na*A + ng*G */ -static void secp256k1_ecmult(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_scalar *na, const secp256k1_scalar *ng); - -typedef int (secp256k1_ecmult_multi_callback)(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *data); - -/** - * Multi-multiply: R = inp_g_sc * G + sum_i ni * Ai. - * Chooses the right algorithm for a given number of points and scratch space - * size. Resets and overwrites the given scratch space. If the points do not - * fit in the scratch space the algorithm is repeatedly run with batches of - * points. - * Returns: 1 on success (including when inp_g_sc is NULL and n is 0) - * 0 if there is not enough scratch space for a single point or - * callback returns 0 - */ -static int secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_scratch *scratch, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_scalar *inp_g_sc, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_callback cb, void *cbdata, size_t n); - -#endif /* SECP256K1_ECMULT_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_const.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_const.h deleted file mode 100644 index d4804b8..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_const.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,17 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2015 Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_H -#define SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_H - -#include "scalar.h" -#include "group.h" - -/* Here `bits` should be set to the maximum bitlength of the _absolute value_ of `q`, plus - * one because we internally sometimes add 2 to the number during the WNAF conversion. */ -static void secp256k1_ecmult_const(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_scalar *q, int bits); - -#endif /* SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_const_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_const_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 8411752..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_const_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,257 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2015 Pieter Wuille, Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_IMPL_H -#define SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_IMPL_H - -#include "scalar.h" -#include "group.h" -#include "ecmult_const.h" -#include "ecmult_impl.h" - -/* This is like `ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE` but is constant time */ -#define ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(r,pre,n,w) do { \ - int m; \ - int abs_n = (n) * (((n) > 0) * 2 - 1); \ - int idx_n = abs_n / 2; \ - secp256k1_fe neg_y; \ - VERIFY_CHECK(((n) & 1) == 1); \ - VERIFY_CHECK((n) >= -((1 << ((w)-1)) - 1)); \ - VERIFY_CHECK((n) <= ((1 << ((w)-1)) - 1)); \ - VERIFY_SETUP(secp256k1_fe_clear(&(r)->x)); \ - VERIFY_SETUP(secp256k1_fe_clear(&(r)->y)); \ - for (m = 0; m < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(w); m++) { \ - /* This loop is used to avoid secret data in array indices. See - * the comment in ecmult_gen_impl.h for rationale. */ \ - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&(r)->x, &(pre)[m].x, m == idx_n); \ - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&(r)->y, &(pre)[m].y, m == idx_n); \ - } \ - (r)->infinity = 0; \ - secp256k1_fe_negate(&neg_y, &(r)->y, 1); \ - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&(r)->y, &neg_y, (n) != abs_n); \ -} while(0) - - -/** Convert a number to WNAF notation. - * The number becomes represented by sum(2^{wi} * wnaf[i], i=0..WNAF_SIZE(w)+1) - return_val. - * It has the following guarantees: - * - each wnaf[i] an odd integer between -(1 << w) and (1 << w) - * - each wnaf[i] is nonzero - * - the number of words set is always WNAF_SIZE(w) + 1 - * - * Adapted from `The Width-w NAF Method Provides Small Memory and Fast Elliptic Scalar - * Multiplications Secure against Side Channel Attacks`, Okeya and Tagaki. M. Joye (Ed.) - * CT-RSA 2003, LNCS 2612, pp. 328-443, 2003. Springer-Verlagy Berlin Heidelberg 2003 - * - * Numbers reference steps of `Algorithm SPA-resistant Width-w NAF with Odd Scalar` on pp. 335 - */ -static int secp256k1_wnaf_const(int *wnaf, secp256k1_scalar s, int w, int size) { - int global_sign; - int skew = 0; - int word = 0; - - /* 1 2 3 */ - int u_last; - int u; - - int flip; - int bit; - secp256k1_scalar neg_s; - int not_neg_one; - /* Note that we cannot handle even numbers by negating them to be odd, as is - * done in other implementations, since if our scalars were specified to have - * width < 256 for performance reasons, their negations would have width 256 - * and we'd lose any performance benefit. Instead, we use a technique from - * Section 4.2 of the Okeya/Tagaki paper, which is to add either 1 (for even) - * or 2 (for odd) to the number we are encoding, returning a skew value indicating - * this, and having the caller compensate after doing the multiplication. - * - * In fact, we _do_ want to negate numbers to minimize their bit-lengths (and in - * particular, to ensure that the outputs from the endomorphism-split fit into - * 128 bits). If we negate, the parity of our number flips, inverting which of - * {1, 2} we want to add to the scalar when ensuring that it's odd. Further - * complicating things, -1 interacts badly with `secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit` and - * we need to special-case it in this logic. */ - flip = secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s); - /* We add 1 to even numbers, 2 to odd ones, noting that negation flips parity */ - bit = flip ^ !secp256k1_scalar_is_even(&s); - /* We check for negative one, since adding 2 to it will cause an overflow */ - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&neg_s, &s); - not_neg_one = !secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&neg_s); - secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(&s, bit, not_neg_one); - /* If we had negative one, flip == 1, s.d[0] == 0, bit == 1, so caller expects - * that we added two to it and flipped it. In fact for -1 these operations are - * identical. We only flipped, but since skewing is required (in the sense that - * the skew must be 1 or 2, never zero) and flipping is not, we need to change - * our flags to claim that we only skewed. */ - global_sign = secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&s, flip); - global_sign *= not_neg_one * 2 - 1; - skew = 1 << bit; - - /* 4 */ - u_last = secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&s, w); - while (word * w < size) { - int sign; - int even; - - /* 4.1 4.4 */ - u = secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&s, w); - /* 4.2 */ - even = ((u & 1) == 0); - sign = 2 * (u_last > 0) - 1; - u += sign * even; - u_last -= sign * even * (1 << w); - - /* 4.3, adapted for global sign change */ - wnaf[word++] = u_last * global_sign; - - u_last = u; - } - wnaf[word] = u * global_sign; - - VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s)); - VERIFY_CHECK(word == WNAF_SIZE_BITS(size, w)); - return skew; -} - -static void secp256k1_ecmult_const(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_scalar *scalar, int size) { - secp256k1_ge pre_a[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; - secp256k1_ge tmpa; - secp256k1_fe Z; - - int skew_1; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - secp256k1_ge pre_a_lam[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; - int wnaf_lam[1 + WNAF_SIZE(WINDOW_A - 1)]; - int skew_lam; - secp256k1_scalar q_1, q_lam; -#endif - int wnaf_1[1 + WNAF_SIZE(WINDOW_A - 1)]; - - int i; - secp256k1_scalar sc = *scalar; - - /* build wnaf representation for q. */ - int rsize = size; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - if (size > 128) { - rsize = 128; - /* split q into q_1 and q_lam (where q = q_1 + q_lam*lambda, and q_1 and q_lam are ~128 bit) */ - secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(&q_1, &q_lam, &sc); - skew_1 = secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf_1, q_1, WINDOW_A - 1, 128); - skew_lam = secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf_lam, q_lam, WINDOW_A - 1, 128); - } else -#endif - { - skew_1 = secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf_1, sc, WINDOW_A - 1, size); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - skew_lam = 0; -#endif - } - - /* Calculate odd multiples of a. - * All multiples are brought to the same Z 'denominator', which is stored - * in Z. Due to secp256k1' isomorphism we can do all operations pretending - * that the Z coordinate was 1, use affine addition formulae, and correct - * the Z coordinate of the result once at the end. - */ - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(r, a); - secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_globalz_windowa(pre_a, &Z, r); - for (i = 0; i < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A); i++) { - secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&pre_a[i].y); - } -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - if (size > 128) { - for (i = 0; i < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A); i++) { - secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&pre_a_lam[i], &pre_a[i]); - } - } -#endif - - /* first loop iteration (separated out so we can directly set r, rather - * than having it start at infinity, get doubled several times, then have - * its new value added to it) */ - i = wnaf_1[WNAF_SIZE_BITS(rsize, WINDOW_A - 1)]; - VERIFY_CHECK(i != 0); - ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, pre_a, i, WINDOW_A); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(r, &tmpa); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - if (size > 128) { - i = wnaf_lam[WNAF_SIZE_BITS(rsize, WINDOW_A - 1)]; - VERIFY_CHECK(i != 0); - ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, pre_a_lam, i, WINDOW_A); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &tmpa); - } -#endif - /* remaining loop iterations */ - for (i = WNAF_SIZE_BITS(rsize, WINDOW_A - 1) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { - int n; - int j; - for (j = 0; j < WINDOW_A - 1; ++j) { - secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(r, r, NULL); - } - - n = wnaf_1[i]; - ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, pre_a, n, WINDOW_A); - VERIFY_CHECK(n != 0); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &tmpa); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - if (size > 128) { - n = wnaf_lam[i]; - ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, pre_a_lam, n, WINDOW_A); - VERIFY_CHECK(n != 0); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &tmpa); - } -#endif - } - - secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &r->z, &Z); - - { - /* Correct for wNAF skew */ - secp256k1_ge correction = *a; - secp256k1_ge_storage correction_1_stor; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - secp256k1_ge_storage correction_lam_stor; -#endif - secp256k1_ge_storage a2_stor; - secp256k1_gej tmpj; - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&tmpj, &correction); - secp256k1_gej_double_var(&tmpj, &tmpj, NULL); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&correction, &tmpj); - secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&correction_1_stor, a); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - if (size > 128) { - secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&correction_lam_stor, a); - } -#endif - secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&a2_stor, &correction); - - /* For odd numbers this is 2a (so replace it), for even ones a (so no-op) */ - secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&correction_1_stor, &a2_stor, skew_1 == 2); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - if (size > 128) { - secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&correction_lam_stor, &a2_stor, skew_lam == 2); - } -#endif - - /* Apply the correction */ - secp256k1_ge_from_storage(&correction, &correction_1_stor); - secp256k1_ge_neg(&correction, &correction); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &correction); - -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - if (size > 128) { - secp256k1_ge_from_storage(&correction, &correction_lam_stor); - secp256k1_ge_neg(&correction, &correction); - secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&correction, &correction); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &correction); - } -#endif - } -} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen.h deleted file mode 100644 index 7564b70..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_H -#define SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_H - -#include "scalar.h" -#include "group.h" - -typedef struct { - /* For accelerating the computation of a*G: - * To harden against timing attacks, use the following mechanism: - * * Break up the multiplicand into groups of 4 bits, called n_0, n_1, n_2, ..., n_63. - * * Compute sum(n_i * 16^i * G + U_i, i=0..63), where: - * * U_i = U * 2^i (for i=0..62) - * * U_i = U * (1-2^63) (for i=63) - * where U is a point with no known corresponding scalar. Note that sum(U_i, i=0..63) = 0. - * For each i, and each of the 16 possible values of n_i, (n_i * 16^i * G + U_i) is - * precomputed (call it prec(i, n_i)). The formula now becomes sum(prec(i, n_i), i=0..63). - * None of the resulting prec group elements have a known scalar, and neither do any of - * the intermediate sums while computing a*G. - */ - secp256k1_ge_storage (*prec)[64][16]; /* prec[j][i] = 16^j * i * G + U_i */ - secp256k1_scalar blind; - secp256k1_gej initial; -} secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context; - -static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_init(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx); -static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_build(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx, const secp256k1_callback* cb); -static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_clone(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *dst, - const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* src, const secp256k1_callback* cb); -static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_clear(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx); -static int secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx); - -/** Multiply with the generator: R = a*G */ -static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a); - -static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, const unsigned char *seed32); - -#endif /* SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 714f02e..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,210 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014, 2015 Pieter Wuille, Gregory Maxwell * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_IMPL_H -#define SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_IMPL_H - -#include "scalar.h" -#include "group.h" -#include "ecmult_gen.h" -#include "hash_impl.h" -#ifdef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION -#include "ecmult_static_context.h" -#endif -static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_init(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx) { - ctx->prec = NULL; -} - -static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_build(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, const secp256k1_callback* cb) { -#ifndef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION - secp256k1_ge prec[1024]; - secp256k1_gej gj; - secp256k1_gej nums_gej; - int i, j; -#endif - - if (ctx->prec != NULL) { - return; - } -#ifndef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION - ctx->prec = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[64][16])checked_malloc(cb, sizeof(*ctx->prec)); - - /* get the generator */ - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&gj, &secp256k1_ge_const_g); - - /* Construct a group element with no known corresponding scalar (nothing up my sleeve). */ - { - static const unsigned char nums_b32[33] = "The scalar for this x is unknown"; - secp256k1_fe nums_x; - secp256k1_ge nums_ge; - int r; - r = secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&nums_x, nums_b32); - (void)r; - VERIFY_CHECK(r); - r = secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&nums_ge, &nums_x, 0); - (void)r; - VERIFY_CHECK(r); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&nums_gej, &nums_ge); - /* Add G to make the bits in x uniformly distributed. */ - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&nums_gej, &nums_gej, &secp256k1_ge_const_g, NULL); - } - - /* compute prec. */ - { - secp256k1_gej precj[1024]; /* Jacobian versions of prec. */ - secp256k1_gej gbase; - secp256k1_gej numsbase; - gbase = gj; /* 16^j * G */ - numsbase = nums_gej; /* 2^j * nums. */ - for (j = 0; j < 64; j++) { - /* Set precj[j*16 .. j*16+15] to (numsbase, numsbase + gbase, ..., numsbase + 15*gbase). */ - precj[j*16] = numsbase; - for (i = 1; i < 16; i++) { - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&precj[j*16 + i], &precj[j*16 + i - 1], &gbase, NULL); - } - /* Multiply gbase by 16. */ - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { - secp256k1_gej_double_var(&gbase, &gbase, NULL); - } - /* Multiply numbase by 2. */ - secp256k1_gej_double_var(&numsbase, &numsbase, NULL); - if (j == 62) { - /* In the last iteration, numsbase is (1 - 2^j) * nums instead. */ - secp256k1_gej_neg(&numsbase, &numsbase); - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&numsbase, &numsbase, &nums_gej, NULL); - } - } - secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(prec, precj, 1024, cb); - } - for (j = 0; j < 64; j++) { - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&(*ctx->prec)[j][i], &prec[j*16 + i]); - } - } -#else - (void)cb; - ctx->prec = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[64][16])secp256k1_ecmult_static_context; -#endif - secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(ctx, NULL); -} - -static int secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx) { - return ctx->prec != NULL; -} - -static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_clone(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *dst, - const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *src, const secp256k1_callback* cb) { - if (src->prec == NULL) { - dst->prec = NULL; - } else { -#ifndef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION - dst->prec = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[64][16])checked_malloc(cb, sizeof(*dst->prec)); - memcpy(dst->prec, src->prec, sizeof(*dst->prec)); -#else - (void)cb; - dst->prec = src->prec; -#endif - dst->initial = src->initial; - dst->blind = src->blind; - } -} - -static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_clear(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx) { -#ifndef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION - free(ctx->prec); -#endif - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&ctx->blind); - secp256k1_gej_clear(&ctx->initial); - ctx->prec = NULL; -} - -static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_scalar *gn) { - secp256k1_ge add; - secp256k1_ge_storage adds; - secp256k1_scalar gnb; - int bits; - int i, j; - memset(&adds, 0, sizeof(adds)); - *r = ctx->initial; - /* Blind scalar/point multiplication by computing (n-b)G + bG instead of nG. */ - secp256k1_scalar_add(&gnb, gn, &ctx->blind); - add.infinity = 0; - for (j = 0; j < 64; j++) { - bits = secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(&gnb, j * 4, 4); - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - /** This uses a conditional move to avoid any secret data in array indexes. - * _Any_ use of secret indexes has been demonstrated to result in timing - * sidechannels, even when the cache-line access patterns are uniform. - * See also: - * "A word of warning", CHES 2013 Rump Session, by Daniel J. Bernstein and Peter Schwabe - * (https://cryptojedi.org/peter/data/chesrump-20130822.pdf) and - * "Cache Attacks and Countermeasures: the Case of AES", RSA 2006, - * by Dag Arne Osvik, Adi Shamir, and Eran Tromer - * (http://www.tau.ac.il/~tromer/papers/cache.pdf) - */ - secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&adds, &(*ctx->prec)[j][i], i == bits); - } - secp256k1_ge_from_storage(&add, &adds); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &add); - } - bits = 0; - secp256k1_ge_clear(&add); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&gnb); -} - -/* Setup blinding values for secp256k1_ecmult_gen. */ -static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, const unsigned char *seed32) { - secp256k1_scalar b; - secp256k1_gej gb; - secp256k1_fe s; - unsigned char nonce32[32]; - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 rng; - int retry; - unsigned char keydata[64] = {0}; - if (seed32 == NULL) { - /* When seed is NULL, reset the initial point and blinding value. */ - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&ctx->initial, &secp256k1_ge_const_g); - secp256k1_gej_neg(&ctx->initial, &ctx->initial); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ctx->blind, 1); - } - /* The prior blinding value (if not reset) is chained forward by including it in the hash. */ - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(nonce32, &ctx->blind); - /** Using a CSPRNG allows a failure free interface, avoids needing large amounts of random data, - * and guards against weak or adversarial seeds. This is a simpler and safer interface than - * asking the caller for blinding values directly and expecting them to retry on failure. - */ - memcpy(keydata, nonce32, 32); - if (seed32 != NULL) { - memcpy(keydata + 32, seed32, 32); - } - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, keydata, seed32 ? 64 : 32); - memset(keydata, 0, sizeof(keydata)); - /* Retry for out of range results to achieve uniformity. */ - do { - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, nonce32, 32); - retry = !secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&s, nonce32); - retry |= secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&s); - } while (retry); /* This branch true is cryptographically unreachable. Requires sha256_hmac output > Fp. */ - /* Randomize the projection to defend against multiplier sidechannels. */ - secp256k1_gej_rescale(&ctx->initial, &s); - secp256k1_fe_clear(&s); - do { - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, nonce32, 32); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&b, nonce32, &retry); - /* A blinding value of 0 works, but would undermine the projection hardening. */ - retry |= secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&b); - } while (retry); /* This branch true is cryptographically unreachable. Requires sha256_hmac output > order. */ - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(&rng); - memset(nonce32, 0, 32); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(ctx, &gb, &b); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&b, &b); - ctx->blind = b; - ctx->initial = gb; - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&b); - secp256k1_gej_clear(&gb); -} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index d5fb6c5..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1027 +0,0 @@ -/***************************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014, 2017 Pieter Wuille, Andrew Poelstra, Jonas Nick * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php. * - *****************************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_ECMULT_IMPL_H -#define SECP256K1_ECMULT_IMPL_H - -#include -#include - -#include "group.h" -#include "scalar.h" -#include "ecmult.h" - -#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) -/* We need to lower these values for exhaustive tests because - * the tables cannot have infinities in them (this breaks the - * affine-isomorphism stuff which tracks z-ratios) */ -# if EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER > 128 -# define WINDOW_A 5 -# define WINDOW_G 8 -# elif EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER > 8 -# define WINDOW_A 4 -# define WINDOW_G 4 -# else -# define WINDOW_A 2 -# define WINDOW_G 2 -# endif -#else -/* optimal for 128-bit and 256-bit exponents. */ -#define WINDOW_A 5 -/** larger numbers may result in slightly better performance, at the cost of - exponentially larger precomputed tables. */ -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM -/** Two tables for window size 15: 1.375 MiB. */ -#define WINDOW_G 15 -#else -/** One table for window size 16: 1.375 MiB. */ -#define WINDOW_G 16 -#endif -#endif - -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - #define WNAF_BITS 128 -#else - #define WNAF_BITS 256 -#endif -#define WNAF_SIZE_BITS(bits, w) (((bits) + (w) - 1) / (w)) -#define WNAF_SIZE(w) WNAF_SIZE_BITS(WNAF_BITS, w) - -/** The number of entries a table with precomputed multiples needs to have. */ -#define ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(w) (1 << ((w)-2)) - -/* The number of objects allocated on the scratch space for ecmult_multi algorithms */ -#define PIPPENGER_SCRATCH_OBJECTS 6 -#define STRAUSS_SCRATCH_OBJECTS 6 - -#define PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW 12 - -/* Minimum number of points for which pippenger_wnaf is faster than strauss wnaf */ -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - #define ECMULT_PIPPENGER_THRESHOLD 88 -#else - #define ECMULT_PIPPENGER_THRESHOLD 160 -#endif - -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - #define ECMULT_MAX_POINTS_PER_BATCH 5000000 -#else - #define ECMULT_MAX_POINTS_PER_BATCH 10000000 -#endif - -/** Fill a table 'prej' with precomputed odd multiples of a. Prej will contain - * the values [1*a,3*a,...,(2*n-1)*a], so it space for n values. zr[0] will - * contain prej[0].z / a.z. The other zr[i] values = prej[i].z / prej[i-1].z. - * Prej's Z values are undefined, except for the last value. - */ -static void secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table(int n, secp256k1_gej *prej, secp256k1_fe *zr, const secp256k1_gej *a) { - secp256k1_gej d; - secp256k1_ge a_ge, d_ge; - int i; - - VERIFY_CHECK(!a->infinity); - - secp256k1_gej_double_var(&d, a, NULL); - - /* - * Perform the additions on an isomorphism where 'd' is affine: drop the z coordinate - * of 'd', and scale the 1P starting value's x/y coordinates without changing its z. - */ - d_ge.x = d.x; - d_ge.y = d.y; - d_ge.infinity = 0; - - secp256k1_ge_set_gej_zinv(&a_ge, a, &d.z); - prej[0].x = a_ge.x; - prej[0].y = a_ge.y; - prej[0].z = a->z; - prej[0].infinity = 0; - - zr[0] = d.z; - for (i = 1; i < n; i++) { - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&prej[i], &prej[i-1], &d_ge, &zr[i]); - } - - /* - * Each point in 'prej' has a z coordinate too small by a factor of 'd.z'. Only - * the final point's z coordinate is actually used though, so just update that. - */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&prej[n-1].z, &prej[n-1].z, &d.z); -} - -/** Fill a table 'pre' with precomputed odd multiples of a. - * - * There are two versions of this function: - * - secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_globalz_windowa which brings its - * resulting point set to a single constant Z denominator, stores the X and Y - * coordinates as ge_storage points in pre, and stores the global Z in rz. - * It only operates on tables sized for WINDOW_A wnaf multiples. - * - secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_storage_var, which converts its - * resulting point set to actually affine points, and stores those in pre. - * It operates on tables of any size, but uses heap-allocated temporaries. - * - * To compute a*P + b*G, we compute a table for P using the first function, - * and for G using the second (which requires an inverse, but it only needs to - * happen once). - */ -static void secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_globalz_windowa(secp256k1_ge *pre, secp256k1_fe *globalz, const secp256k1_gej *a) { - secp256k1_gej prej[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; - secp256k1_fe zr[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; - - /* Compute the odd multiples in Jacobian form. */ - secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table(ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), prej, zr, a); - /* Bring them to the same Z denominator. */ - secp256k1_ge_globalz_set_table_gej(ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), pre, globalz, prej, zr); -} - -static void secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_storage_var(int n, secp256k1_ge_storage *pre, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_callback *cb) { - secp256k1_gej *prej = (secp256k1_gej*)checked_malloc(cb, sizeof(secp256k1_gej) * n); - secp256k1_ge *prea = (secp256k1_ge*)checked_malloc(cb, sizeof(secp256k1_ge) * n); - secp256k1_fe *zr = (secp256k1_fe*)checked_malloc(cb, sizeof(secp256k1_fe) * n); - int i; - - /* Compute the odd multiples in Jacobian form. */ - secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table(n, prej, zr, a); - /* Convert them in batch to affine coordinates. */ - secp256k1_ge_set_table_gej_var(prea, prej, zr, n); - /* Convert them to compact storage form. */ - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&pre[i], &prea[i]); - } - - free(prea); - free(prej); - free(zr); -} - -/** The following two macro retrieves a particular odd multiple from a table - * of precomputed multiples. */ -#define ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE(r,pre,n,w) do { \ - VERIFY_CHECK(((n) & 1) == 1); \ - VERIFY_CHECK((n) >= -((1 << ((w)-1)) - 1)); \ - VERIFY_CHECK((n) <= ((1 << ((w)-1)) - 1)); \ - if ((n) > 0) { \ - *(r) = (pre)[((n)-1)/2]; \ - } else { \ - secp256k1_ge_neg((r), &(pre)[(-(n)-1)/2]); \ - } \ -} while(0) - -#define ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE_STORAGE(r,pre,n,w) do { \ - VERIFY_CHECK(((n) & 1) == 1); \ - VERIFY_CHECK((n) >= -((1 << ((w)-1)) - 1)); \ - VERIFY_CHECK((n) <= ((1 << ((w)-1)) - 1)); \ - if ((n) > 0) { \ - secp256k1_ge_from_storage((r), &(pre)[((n)-1)/2]); \ - } else { \ - secp256k1_ge_from_storage((r), &(pre)[(-(n)-1)/2]); \ - secp256k1_ge_neg((r), (r)); \ - } \ -} while(0) - -static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_init(secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx) { - ctx->pre_g = NULL; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - ctx->pre_g_128 = NULL; -#endif -} - -static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_build(secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, const secp256k1_callback *cb) { - secp256k1_gej gj; - - if (ctx->pre_g != NULL) { - return; - } - - /* get the generator */ - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&gj, &secp256k1_ge_const_g); - - ctx->pre_g = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[])checked_malloc(cb, sizeof((*ctx->pre_g)[0]) * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_G)); - - /* precompute the tables with odd multiples */ - secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_storage_var(ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_G), *ctx->pre_g, &gj, cb); - -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - { - secp256k1_gej g_128j; - int i; - - ctx->pre_g_128 = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[])checked_malloc(cb, sizeof((*ctx->pre_g_128)[0]) * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_G)); - - /* calculate 2^128*generator */ - g_128j = gj; - for (i = 0; i < 128; i++) { - secp256k1_gej_double_var(&g_128j, &g_128j, NULL); - } - secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_storage_var(ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_G), *ctx->pre_g_128, &g_128j, cb); - } -#endif -} - -static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_clone(secp256k1_ecmult_context *dst, - const secp256k1_ecmult_context *src, const secp256k1_callback *cb) { - if (src->pre_g == NULL) { - dst->pre_g = NULL; - } else { - size_t size = sizeof((*dst->pre_g)[0]) * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_G); - dst->pre_g = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[])checked_malloc(cb, size); - memcpy(dst->pre_g, src->pre_g, size); - } -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - if (src->pre_g_128 == NULL) { - dst->pre_g_128 = NULL; - } else { - size_t size = sizeof((*dst->pre_g_128)[0]) * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_G); - dst->pre_g_128 = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[])checked_malloc(cb, size); - memcpy(dst->pre_g_128, src->pre_g_128, size); - } -#endif -} - -static int secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx) { - return ctx->pre_g != NULL; -} - -static void secp256k1_ecmult_context_clear(secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx) { - free(ctx->pre_g); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - free(ctx->pre_g_128); -#endif - secp256k1_ecmult_context_init(ctx); -} - -/** Convert a number to WNAF notation. The number becomes represented by sum(2^i * wnaf[i], i=0..bits), - * with the following guarantees: - * - each wnaf[i] is either 0, or an odd integer between -(1<<(w-1) - 1) and (1<<(w-1) - 1) - * - two non-zero entries in wnaf are separated by at least w-1 zeroes. - * - the number of set values in wnaf is returned. This number is at most 256, and at most one more - * than the number of bits in the (absolute value) of the input. - */ -static int secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(int *wnaf, int len, const secp256k1_scalar *a, int w) { - secp256k1_scalar s = *a; - int last_set_bit = -1; - int bit = 0; - int sign = 1; - int carry = 0; - - VERIFY_CHECK(wnaf != NULL); - VERIFY_CHECK(0 <= len && len <= 256); - VERIFY_CHECK(a != NULL); - VERIFY_CHECK(2 <= w && w <= 31); - - memset(wnaf, 0, len * sizeof(wnaf[0])); - - if (secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(&s, 255, 1)) { - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s, &s); - sign = -1; - } - - while (bit < len) { - int now; - int word; - if (secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(&s, bit, 1) == (unsigned int)carry) { - bit++; - continue; - } - - now = w; - if (now > len - bit) { - now = len - bit; - } - - word = secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(&s, bit, now) + carry; - - carry = (word >> (w-1)) & 1; - word -= carry << w; - - wnaf[bit] = sign * word; - last_set_bit = bit; - - bit += now; - } -#ifdef VERIFY - CHECK(carry == 0); - while (bit < 256) { - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(&s, bit++, 1) == 0); - } -#endif - return last_set_bit + 1; -} - -struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state { -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - secp256k1_scalar na_1, na_lam; - int wnaf_na_1[130]; - int wnaf_na_lam[130]; - int bits_na_1; - int bits_na_lam; -#else - int wnaf_na[256]; - int bits_na; -#endif - size_t input_pos; -}; - -struct secp256k1_strauss_state { - secp256k1_gej* prej; - secp256k1_fe* zr; - secp256k1_ge* pre_a; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - secp256k1_ge* pre_a_lam; -#endif - struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state* ps; -}; - -static void secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_wnaf(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, const struct secp256k1_strauss_state *state, secp256k1_gej *r, int num, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_scalar *na, const secp256k1_scalar *ng) { - secp256k1_ge tmpa; - secp256k1_fe Z; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - /* Splitted G factors. */ - secp256k1_scalar ng_1, ng_128; - int wnaf_ng_1[129]; - int bits_ng_1 = 0; - int wnaf_ng_128[129]; - int bits_ng_128 = 0; -#else - int wnaf_ng[256]; - int bits_ng = 0; -#endif - int i; - int bits = 0; - int np; - int no = 0; - - for (np = 0; np < num; ++np) { - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&na[np]) || secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&a[np])) { - continue; - } - state->ps[no].input_pos = np; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - /* split na into na_1 and na_lam (where na = na_1 + na_lam*lambda, and na_1 and na_lam are ~128 bit) */ - secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(&state->ps[no].na_1, &state->ps[no].na_lam, &na[np]); - - /* build wnaf representation for na_1 and na_lam. */ - state->ps[no].bits_na_1 = secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(state->ps[no].wnaf_na_1, 130, &state->ps[no].na_1, WINDOW_A); - state->ps[no].bits_na_lam = secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(state->ps[no].wnaf_na_lam, 130, &state->ps[no].na_lam, WINDOW_A); - VERIFY_CHECK(state->ps[no].bits_na_1 <= 130); - VERIFY_CHECK(state->ps[no].bits_na_lam <= 130); - if (state->ps[no].bits_na_1 > bits) { - bits = state->ps[no].bits_na_1; - } - if (state->ps[no].bits_na_lam > bits) { - bits = state->ps[no].bits_na_lam; - } -#else - /* build wnaf representation for na. */ - state->ps[no].bits_na = secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(state->ps[no].wnaf_na, 256, &na[np], WINDOW_A); - if (state->ps[no].bits_na > bits) { - bits = state->ps[no].bits_na; - } -#endif - ++no; - } - - /* Calculate odd multiples of a. - * All multiples are brought to the same Z 'denominator', which is stored - * in Z. Due to secp256k1' isomorphism we can do all operations pretending - * that the Z coordinate was 1, use affine addition formulae, and correct - * the Z coordinate of the result once at the end. - * The exception is the precomputed G table points, which are actually - * affine. Compared to the base used for other points, they have a Z ratio - * of 1/Z, so we can use secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var, which uses the same - * isomorphism to efficiently add with a known Z inverse. - */ - if (no > 0) { - /* Compute the odd multiples in Jacobian form. */ - secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table(ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), state->prej, state->zr, &a[state->ps[0].input_pos]); - for (np = 1; np < no; ++np) { - secp256k1_gej tmp = a[state->ps[np].input_pos]; -#ifdef VERIFY - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&(state->prej[(np - 1) * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) + ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) - 1].z)); -#endif - secp256k1_gej_rescale(&tmp, &(state->prej[(np - 1) * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) + ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) - 1].z)); - secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table(ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), state->prej + np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), state->zr + np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), &tmp); - secp256k1_fe_mul(state->zr + np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), state->zr + np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), &(a[state->ps[np].input_pos].z)); - } - /* Bring them to the same Z denominator. */ - secp256k1_ge_globalz_set_table_gej(ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) * no, state->pre_a, &Z, state->prej, state->zr); - } else { - secp256k1_fe_set_int(&Z, 1); - } - -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - for (np = 0; np < no; ++np) { - for (i = 0; i < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A); i++) { - secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&state->pre_a_lam[np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) + i], &state->pre_a[np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) + i]); - } - } - - if (ng) { - /* split ng into ng_1 and ng_128 (where gn = gn_1 + gn_128*2^128, and gn_1 and gn_128 are ~128 bit) */ - secp256k1_scalar_split_128(&ng_1, &ng_128, ng); - - /* Build wnaf representation for ng_1 and ng_128 */ - bits_ng_1 = secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(wnaf_ng_1, 129, &ng_1, WINDOW_G); - bits_ng_128 = secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(wnaf_ng_128, 129, &ng_128, WINDOW_G); - if (bits_ng_1 > bits) { - bits = bits_ng_1; - } - if (bits_ng_128 > bits) { - bits = bits_ng_128; - } - } -#else - if (ng) { - bits_ng = secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(wnaf_ng, 256, ng, WINDOW_G); - if (bits_ng > bits) { - bits = bits_ng; - } - } -#endif - - secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(r); - - for (i = bits - 1; i >= 0; i--) { - int n; - secp256k1_gej_double_var(r, r, NULL); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - for (np = 0; np < no; ++np) { - if (i < state->ps[np].bits_na_1 && (n = state->ps[np].wnaf_na_1[i])) { - ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, state->pre_a + np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), n, WINDOW_A); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(r, r, &tmpa, NULL); - } - if (i < state->ps[np].bits_na_lam && (n = state->ps[np].wnaf_na_lam[i])) { - ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, state->pre_a_lam + np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), n, WINDOW_A); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(r, r, &tmpa, NULL); - } - } - if (i < bits_ng_1 && (n = wnaf_ng_1[i])) { - ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE_STORAGE(&tmpa, *ctx->pre_g, n, WINDOW_G); - secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(r, r, &tmpa, &Z); - } - if (i < bits_ng_128 && (n = wnaf_ng_128[i])) { - ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE_STORAGE(&tmpa, *ctx->pre_g_128, n, WINDOW_G); - secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(r, r, &tmpa, &Z); - } -#else - for (np = 0; np < no; ++np) { - if (i < state->ps[np].bits_na && (n = state->ps[np].wnaf_na[i])) { - ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, state->pre_a + np * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A), n, WINDOW_A); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(r, r, &tmpa, NULL); - } - } - if (i < bits_ng && (n = wnaf_ng[i])) { - ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE_STORAGE(&tmpa, *ctx->pre_g, n, WINDOW_G); - secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(r, r, &tmpa, &Z); - } -#endif - } - - if (!r->infinity) { - secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &r->z, &Z); - } -} - -static void secp256k1_ecmult(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_scalar *na, const secp256k1_scalar *ng) { - secp256k1_gej prej[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; - secp256k1_fe zr[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; - secp256k1_ge pre_a[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; - struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state ps[1]; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - secp256k1_ge pre_a_lam[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)]; -#endif - struct secp256k1_strauss_state state; - - state.prej = prej; - state.zr = zr; - state.pre_a = pre_a; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - state.pre_a_lam = pre_a_lam; -#endif - state.ps = ps; - secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_wnaf(ctx, &state, r, 1, a, na, ng); -} - -static size_t secp256k1_strauss_scratch_size(size_t n_points) { -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - static const size_t point_size = (2 * sizeof(secp256k1_ge) + sizeof(secp256k1_gej) + sizeof(secp256k1_fe)) * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) + sizeof(struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state) + sizeof(secp256k1_gej) + sizeof(secp256k1_scalar); -#else - static const size_t point_size = (sizeof(secp256k1_ge) + sizeof(secp256k1_gej) + sizeof(secp256k1_fe)) * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) + sizeof(struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state) + sizeof(secp256k1_gej) + sizeof(secp256k1_scalar); -#endif - return n_points*point_size; -} - -static int secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_batch(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_scratch *scratch, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_scalar *inp_g_sc, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_callback cb, void *cbdata, size_t n_points, size_t cb_offset) { - secp256k1_gej* points; - secp256k1_scalar* scalars; - struct secp256k1_strauss_state state; - size_t i; - - secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(r); - if (inp_g_sc == NULL && n_points == 0) { - return 1; - } - - if (!secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(scratch, secp256k1_strauss_scratch_size(n_points), STRAUSS_SCRATCH_OBJECTS)) { - return 0; - } - points = (secp256k1_gej*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_points * sizeof(secp256k1_gej)); - scalars = (secp256k1_scalar*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_points * sizeof(secp256k1_scalar)); - state.prej = (secp256k1_gej*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_points * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) * sizeof(secp256k1_gej)); - state.zr = (secp256k1_fe*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_points * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) * sizeof(secp256k1_fe)); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - state.pre_a = (secp256k1_ge*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_points * 2 * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) * sizeof(secp256k1_ge)); - state.pre_a_lam = state.pre_a + n_points * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A); -#else - state.pre_a = (secp256k1_ge*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_points * ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A) * sizeof(secp256k1_ge)); -#endif - state.ps = (struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_points * sizeof(struct secp256k1_strauss_point_state)); - - for (i = 0; i < n_points; i++) { - secp256k1_ge point; - if (!cb(&scalars[i], &point, i+cb_offset, cbdata)) { - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return 0; - } - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&points[i], &point); - } - secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_wnaf(ctx, &state, r, n_points, points, scalars, inp_g_sc); - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return 1; -} - -/* Wrapper for secp256k1_ecmult_multi_func interface */ -static int secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_batch_single(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *actx, secp256k1_scratch *scratch, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_scalar *inp_g_sc, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_callback cb, void *cbdata, size_t n) { - return secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_batch(actx, scratch, r, inp_g_sc, cb, cbdata, n, 0); -} - -static size_t secp256k1_strauss_max_points(secp256k1_scratch *scratch) { - return secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(scratch, STRAUSS_SCRATCH_OBJECTS) / secp256k1_strauss_scratch_size(1); -} - -/** Convert a number to WNAF notation. - * The number becomes represented by sum(2^{wi} * wnaf[i], i=0..WNAF_SIZE(w)+1) - return_val. - * It has the following guarantees: - * - each wnaf[i] is either 0 or an odd integer between -(1 << w) and (1 << w) - * - the number of words set is always WNAF_SIZE(w) - * - the returned skew is 0 or 1 - */ -static int secp256k1_wnaf_fixed(int *wnaf, const secp256k1_scalar *s, int w) { - int skew = 0; - int pos; - int max_pos; - int last_w; - const secp256k1_scalar *work = s; - - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(s)) { - for (pos = 0; pos < WNAF_SIZE(w); pos++) { - wnaf[pos] = 0; - } - return 0; - } - - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_even(s)) { - skew = 1; - } - - wnaf[0] = secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(work, 0, w) + skew; - /* Compute last window size. Relevant when window size doesn't divide the - * number of bits in the scalar */ - last_w = WNAF_BITS - (WNAF_SIZE(w) - 1) * w; - - /* Store the position of the first nonzero word in max_pos to allow - * skipping leading zeros when calculating the wnaf. */ - for (pos = WNAF_SIZE(w) - 1; pos > 0; pos--) { - int val = secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(work, pos * w, pos == WNAF_SIZE(w)-1 ? last_w : w); - if(val != 0) { - break; - } - wnaf[pos] = 0; - } - max_pos = pos; - pos = 1; - - while (pos <= max_pos) { - int val = secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(work, pos * w, pos == WNAF_SIZE(w)-1 ? last_w : w); - if ((val & 1) == 0) { - wnaf[pos - 1] -= (1 << w); - wnaf[pos] = (val + 1); - } else { - wnaf[pos] = val; - } - /* Set a coefficient to zero if it is 1 or -1 and the proceeding digit - * is strictly negative or strictly positive respectively. Only change - * coefficients at previous positions because above code assumes that - * wnaf[pos - 1] is odd. - */ - if (pos >= 2 && ((wnaf[pos - 1] == 1 && wnaf[pos - 2] < 0) || (wnaf[pos - 1] == -1 && wnaf[pos - 2] > 0))) { - if (wnaf[pos - 1] == 1) { - wnaf[pos - 2] += 1 << w; - } else { - wnaf[pos - 2] -= 1 << w; - } - wnaf[pos - 1] = 0; - } - ++pos; - } - - return skew; -} - -struct secp256k1_pippenger_point_state { - int skew_na; - size_t input_pos; -}; - -struct secp256k1_pippenger_state { - int *wnaf_na; - struct secp256k1_pippenger_point_state* ps; -}; - -/* - * pippenger_wnaf computes the result of a multi-point multiplication as - * follows: The scalars are brought into wnaf with n_wnaf elements each. Then - * for every i < n_wnaf, first each point is added to a "bucket" corresponding - * to the point's wnaf[i]. Second, the buckets are added together such that - * r += 1*bucket[0] + 3*bucket[1] + 5*bucket[2] + ... - */ -static int secp256k1_ecmult_pippenger_wnaf(secp256k1_gej *buckets, int bucket_window, struct secp256k1_pippenger_state *state, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_scalar *sc, const secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t num) { - size_t n_wnaf = WNAF_SIZE(bucket_window+1); - size_t np; - size_t no = 0; - int i; - int j; - - for (np = 0; np < num; ++np) { - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sc[np]) || secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&pt[np])) { - continue; - } - state->ps[no].input_pos = np; - state->ps[no].skew_na = secp256k1_wnaf_fixed(&state->wnaf_na[no*n_wnaf], &sc[np], bucket_window+1); - no++; - } - secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(r); - - if (no == 0) { - return 1; - } - - for (i = n_wnaf - 1; i >= 0; i--) { - secp256k1_gej running_sum; - - for(j = 0; j < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(bucket_window+2); j++) { - secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&buckets[j]); - } - - for (np = 0; np < no; ++np) { - int n = state->wnaf_na[np*n_wnaf + i]; - struct secp256k1_pippenger_point_state point_state = state->ps[np]; - secp256k1_ge tmp; - int idx; - - if (i == 0) { - /* correct for wnaf skew */ - int skew = point_state.skew_na; - if (skew) { - secp256k1_ge_neg(&tmp, &pt[point_state.input_pos]); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&buckets[0], &buckets[0], &tmp, NULL); - } - } - if (n > 0) { - idx = (n - 1)/2; - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&buckets[idx], &buckets[idx], &pt[point_state.input_pos], NULL); - } else if (n < 0) { - idx = -(n + 1)/2; - secp256k1_ge_neg(&tmp, &pt[point_state.input_pos]); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&buckets[idx], &buckets[idx], &tmp, NULL); - } - } - - for(j = 0; j < bucket_window; j++) { - secp256k1_gej_double_var(r, r, NULL); - } - - secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&running_sum); - /* Accumulate the sum: bucket[0] + 3*bucket[1] + 5*bucket[2] + 7*bucket[3] + ... - * = bucket[0] + bucket[1] + bucket[2] + bucket[3] + ... - * + 2 * (bucket[1] + 2*bucket[2] + 3*bucket[3] + ...) - * using an intermediate running sum: - * running_sum = bucket[0] + bucket[1] + bucket[2] + ... - * - * The doubling is done implicitly by deferring the final window doubling (of 'r'). - */ - for(j = ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(bucket_window+2) - 1; j > 0; j--) { - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&running_sum, &running_sum, &buckets[j], NULL); - secp256k1_gej_add_var(r, r, &running_sum, NULL); - } - - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&running_sum, &running_sum, &buckets[0], NULL); - secp256k1_gej_double_var(r, r, NULL); - secp256k1_gej_add_var(r, r, &running_sum, NULL); - } - return 1; -} - -/** - * Returns optimal bucket_window (number of bits of a scalar represented by a - * set of buckets) for a given number of points. - */ -static int secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window(size_t n) { -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - if (n <= 1) { - return 1; - } else if (n <= 4) { - return 2; - } else if (n <= 20) { - return 3; - } else if (n <= 57) { - return 4; - } else if (n <= 136) { - return 5; - } else if (n <= 235) { - return 6; - } else if (n <= 1260) { - return 7; - } else if (n <= 4420) { - return 9; - } else if (n <= 7880) { - return 10; - } else if (n <= 16050) { - return 11; - } else { - return PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW; - } -#else - if (n <= 1) { - return 1; - } else if (n <= 11) { - return 2; - } else if (n <= 45) { - return 3; - } else if (n <= 100) { - return 4; - } else if (n <= 275) { - return 5; - } else if (n <= 625) { - return 6; - } else if (n <= 1850) { - return 7; - } else if (n <= 3400) { - return 8; - } else if (n <= 9630) { - return 9; - } else if (n <= 17900) { - return 10; - } else if (n <= 32800) { - return 11; - } else { - return PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW; - } -#endif -} - -/** - * Returns the maximum optimal number of points for a bucket_window. - */ -static size_t secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(int bucket_window) { - switch(bucket_window) { -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - case 1: return 1; - case 2: return 4; - case 3: return 20; - case 4: return 57; - case 5: return 136; - case 6: return 235; - case 7: return 1260; - case 8: return 1260; - case 9: return 4420; - case 10: return 7880; - case 11: return 16050; - case PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW: return SIZE_MAX; -#else - case 1: return 1; - case 2: return 11; - case 3: return 45; - case 4: return 100; - case 5: return 275; - case 6: return 625; - case 7: return 1850; - case 8: return 3400; - case 9: return 9630; - case 10: return 17900; - case 11: return 32800; - case PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW: return SIZE_MAX; -#endif - } - return 0; -} - - -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_ecmult_endo_split(secp256k1_scalar *s1, secp256k1_scalar *s2, secp256k1_ge *p1, secp256k1_ge *p2) { - secp256k1_scalar tmp = *s1; - secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(s1, s2, &tmp); - secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(p2, p1); - - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_high(s1)) { - secp256k1_scalar_negate(s1, s1); - secp256k1_ge_neg(p1, p1); - } - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_high(s2)) { - secp256k1_scalar_negate(s2, s2); - secp256k1_ge_neg(p2, p2); - } -} -#endif - -/** - * Returns the scratch size required for a given number of points (excluding - * base point G) without considering alignment. - */ -static size_t secp256k1_pippenger_scratch_size(size_t n_points, int bucket_window) { -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - size_t entries = 2*n_points + 2; -#else - size_t entries = n_points + 1; -#endif - size_t entry_size = sizeof(secp256k1_ge) + sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) + sizeof(struct secp256k1_pippenger_point_state) + (WNAF_SIZE(bucket_window+1)+1)*sizeof(int); - return ((1<ps = (struct secp256k1_pippenger_point_state *) secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, entries * sizeof(*state_space->ps)); - state_space->wnaf_na = (int *) secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, entries*(WNAF_SIZE(bucket_window+1)) * sizeof(int)); - buckets = (secp256k1_gej *) secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, (1<ps[i].skew_na = 0; - for(j = 0; j < WNAF_SIZE(bucket_window+1); j++) { - state_space->wnaf_na[i * WNAF_SIZE(bucket_window+1) + j] = 0; - } - } - for(i = 0; i < 1< max_alloc) { - break; - } - space_for_points = max_alloc - space_overhead; - - n_points = space_for_points/entry_size; - n_points = n_points > max_points ? max_points : n_points; - if (n_points > res) { - res = n_points; - } - if (n_points < max_points) { - /* A larger bucket_window may support even more points. But if we - * would choose that then the caller couldn't safely use any number - * smaller than what this function returns */ - break; - } - } - return res; -} - -typedef int (*secp256k1_ecmult_multi_func)(const secp256k1_ecmult_context*, secp256k1_scratch*, secp256k1_gej*, const secp256k1_scalar*, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_callback cb, void*, size_t); -static int secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, secp256k1_scratch *scratch, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_scalar *inp_g_sc, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_callback cb, void *cbdata, size_t n) { - size_t i; - - int (*f)(const secp256k1_ecmult_context*, secp256k1_scratch*, secp256k1_gej*, const secp256k1_scalar*, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_callback cb, void*, size_t, size_t); - size_t max_points; - size_t n_batches; - size_t n_batch_points; - - secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(r); - if (inp_g_sc == NULL && n == 0) { - return 1; - } else if (n == 0) { - secp256k1_scalar szero; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&szero, 0); - secp256k1_ecmult(ctx, r, r, &szero, inp_g_sc); - return 1; - } - - max_points = secp256k1_pippenger_max_points(scratch); - if (max_points == 0) { - return 0; - } else if (max_points > ECMULT_MAX_POINTS_PER_BATCH) { - max_points = ECMULT_MAX_POINTS_PER_BATCH; - } - n_batches = (n+max_points-1)/max_points; - n_batch_points = (n+n_batches-1)/n_batches; - - if (n_batch_points >= ECMULT_PIPPENGER_THRESHOLD) { - f = secp256k1_ecmult_pippenger_batch; - } else { - max_points = secp256k1_strauss_max_points(scratch); - if (max_points == 0) { - return 0; - } - n_batches = (n+max_points-1)/max_points; - n_batch_points = (n+n_batches-1)/n_batches; - f = secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_batch; - } - for(i = 0; i < n_batches; i++) { - size_t nbp = n < n_batch_points ? n : n_batch_points; - size_t offset = n_batch_points*i; - secp256k1_gej tmp; - if (!f(ctx, scratch, &tmp, i == 0 ? inp_g_sc : NULL, cb, cbdata, nbp, offset)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_gej_add_var(r, r, &tmp, NULL); - n -= nbp; - } - return 1; -} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_ECMULT_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field.h deleted file mode 100644 index bb6692a..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,132 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_FIELD_H -#define SECP256K1_FIELD_H - -/** Field element module. - * - * Field elements can be represented in several ways, but code accessing - * it (and implementations) need to take certain properties into account: - * - Each field element can be normalized or not. - * - Each field element has a magnitude, which represents how far away - * its representation is away from normalization. Normalized elements - * always have a magnitude of 1, but a magnitude of 1 doesn't imply - * normality. - */ - -#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H -#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" -#endif - -#if defined(USE_FIELD_10X26) -#include "field_10x26.h" -#elif defined(USE_FIELD_5X52) -#include "field_5x52.h" -#else -#error "Please select field implementation" -#endif - -#include "util.h" - -/** Normalize a field element. */ -static void secp256k1_fe_normalize(secp256k1_fe *r); - -/** Weakly normalize a field element: reduce it magnitude to 1, but don't fully normalize. */ -static void secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(secp256k1_fe *r); - -/** Normalize a field element, without constant-time guarantee. */ -static void secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(secp256k1_fe *r); - -/** Verify whether a field element represents zero i.e. would normalize to a zero value. The field - * implementation may optionally normalize the input, but this should not be relied upon. */ -static int secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero(secp256k1_fe *r); - -/** Verify whether a field element represents zero i.e. would normalize to a zero value. The field - * implementation may optionally normalize the input, but this should not be relied upon. */ -static int secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(secp256k1_fe *r); - -/** Set a field element equal to a small integer. Resulting field element is normalized. */ -static void secp256k1_fe_set_int(secp256k1_fe *r, int a); - -/** Sets a field element equal to zero, initializing all fields. */ -static void secp256k1_fe_clear(secp256k1_fe *a); - -/** Verify whether a field element is zero. Requires the input to be normalized. */ -static int secp256k1_fe_is_zero(const secp256k1_fe *a); - -/** Check the "oddness" of a field element. Requires the input to be normalized. */ -static int secp256k1_fe_is_odd(const secp256k1_fe *a); - -/** Compare two field elements. Requires magnitude-1 inputs. */ -static int secp256k1_fe_equal(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b); - -/** Same as secp256k1_fe_equal, but may be variable time. */ -static int secp256k1_fe_equal_var(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b); - -/** Compare two field elements. Requires both inputs to be normalized */ -static int secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b); - -/** Set a field element equal to 32-byte big endian value. If successful, the resulting field element is normalized. */ -static int secp256k1_fe_set_b32(secp256k1_fe *r, const unsigned char *a); - -/** Convert a field element to a 32-byte big endian value. Requires the input to be normalized */ -static void secp256k1_fe_get_b32(unsigned char *r, const secp256k1_fe *a); - -/** Set a field element equal to the additive inverse of another. Takes a maximum magnitude of the input - * as an argument. The magnitude of the output is one higher. */ -static void secp256k1_fe_negate(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, int m); - -/** Multiplies the passed field element with a small integer constant. Multiplies the magnitude by that - * small integer. */ -static void secp256k1_fe_mul_int(secp256k1_fe *r, int a); - -/** Adds a field element to another. The result has the sum of the inputs' magnitudes as magnitude. */ -static void secp256k1_fe_add(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a); - -/** Sets a field element to be the product of two others. Requires the inputs' magnitudes to be at most 8. - * The output magnitude is 1 (but not guaranteed to be normalized). */ -static void secp256k1_fe_mul(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe * SECP256K1_RESTRICT b); - -/** Sets a field element to be the square of another. Requires the input's magnitude to be at most 8. - * The output magnitude is 1 (but not guaranteed to be normalized). */ -static void secp256k1_fe_sqr(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a); - -/** If a has a square root, it is computed in r and 1 is returned. If a does not - * have a square root, the root of its negation is computed and 0 is returned. - * The input's magnitude can be at most 8. The output magnitude is 1 (but not - * guaranteed to be normalized). The result in r will always be a square - * itself. */ -static int secp256k1_fe_sqrt(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a); - -/** Checks whether a field element is a quadratic residue. */ -static int secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(const secp256k1_fe *a); - -/** Sets a field element to be the (modular) inverse of another. Requires the input's magnitude to be - * at most 8. The output magnitude is 1 (but not guaranteed to be normalized). */ -static void secp256k1_fe_inv(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a); - -/** Potentially faster version of secp256k1_fe_inv, without constant-time guarantee. */ -static void secp256k1_fe_inv_var(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a); - -/** Calculate the (modular) inverses of a batch of field elements. Requires the inputs' magnitudes to be - * at most 8. The output magnitudes are 1 (but not guaranteed to be normalized). The inputs and - * outputs must not overlap in memory. */ -static void secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, size_t len); - -/** Convert a field element to the storage type. */ -static void secp256k1_fe_to_storage(secp256k1_fe_storage *r, const secp256k1_fe *a); - -/** Convert a field element back from the storage type. */ -static void secp256k1_fe_from_storage(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe_storage *a); - -/** If flag is true, set *r equal to *a; otherwise leave it. Constant-time. */ -static void secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(secp256k1_fe_storage *r, const secp256k1_fe_storage *a, int flag); - -/** If flag is true, set *r equal to *a; otherwise leave it. Constant-time. */ -static void secp256k1_fe_cmov(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, int flag); - -#endif /* SECP256K1_FIELD_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_10x26.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_10x26.h deleted file mode 100644 index 727c526..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_10x26.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_H -#define SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_H - -#include - -typedef struct { - /* X = sum(i=0..9, elem[i]*2^26) mod n */ - uint32_t n[10]; -#ifdef VERIFY - int magnitude; - int normalized; -#endif -} secp256k1_fe; - -/* Unpacks a constant into a overlapping multi-limbed FE element. */ -#define SECP256K1_FE_CONST_INNER(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) { \ - (d0) & 0x3FFFFFFUL, \ - (((uint32_t)d0) >> 26) | (((uint32_t)(d1) & 0xFFFFFUL) << 6), \ - (((uint32_t)d1) >> 20) | (((uint32_t)(d2) & 0x3FFFUL) << 12), \ - (((uint32_t)d2) >> 14) | (((uint32_t)(d3) & 0xFFUL) << 18), \ - (((uint32_t)d3) >> 8) | (((uint32_t)(d4) & 0x3UL) << 24), \ - (((uint32_t)d4) >> 2) & 0x3FFFFFFUL, \ - (((uint32_t)d4) >> 28) | (((uint32_t)(d5) & 0x3FFFFFUL) << 4), \ - (((uint32_t)d5) >> 22) | (((uint32_t)(d6) & 0xFFFFUL) << 10), \ - (((uint32_t)d6) >> 16) | (((uint32_t)(d7) & 0x3FFUL) << 16), \ - (((uint32_t)d7) >> 10) \ -} - -#ifdef VERIFY -#define SECP256K1_FE_CONST(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) {SECP256K1_FE_CONST_INNER((d7), (d6), (d5), (d4), (d3), (d2), (d1), (d0)), 1, 1} -#else -#define SECP256K1_FE_CONST(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) {SECP256K1_FE_CONST_INNER((d7), (d6), (d5), (d4), (d3), (d2), (d1), (d0))} -#endif - -typedef struct { - uint32_t n[8]; -} secp256k1_fe_storage; - -#define SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) {{ (d0), (d1), (d2), (d3), (d4), (d5), (d6), (d7) }} -#define SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST_GET(d) d.n[7], d.n[6], d.n[5], d.n[4],d.n[3], d.n[2], d.n[1], d.n[0] - -#endif /* SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_10x26_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_10x26_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 94f8132..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_10x26_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1161 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_IMPL_H -#define SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_IMPL_H - -#include "util.h" -#include "num.h" -#include "field.h" - -#ifdef VERIFY -static void secp256k1_fe_verify(const secp256k1_fe *a) { - const uint32_t *d = a->n; - int m = a->normalized ? 1 : 2 * a->magnitude, r = 1; - r &= (d[0] <= 0x3FFFFFFUL * m); - r &= (d[1] <= 0x3FFFFFFUL * m); - r &= (d[2] <= 0x3FFFFFFUL * m); - r &= (d[3] <= 0x3FFFFFFUL * m); - r &= (d[4] <= 0x3FFFFFFUL * m); - r &= (d[5] <= 0x3FFFFFFUL * m); - r &= (d[6] <= 0x3FFFFFFUL * m); - r &= (d[7] <= 0x3FFFFFFUL * m); - r &= (d[8] <= 0x3FFFFFFUL * m); - r &= (d[9] <= 0x03FFFFFUL * m); - r &= (a->magnitude >= 0); - r &= (a->magnitude <= 32); - if (a->normalized) { - r &= (a->magnitude <= 1); - if (r && (d[9] == 0x03FFFFFUL)) { - uint32_t mid = d[8] & d[7] & d[6] & d[5] & d[4] & d[3] & d[2]; - if (mid == 0x3FFFFFFUL) { - r &= ((d[1] + 0x40UL + ((d[0] + 0x3D1UL) >> 26)) <= 0x3FFFFFFUL); - } - } - } - VERIFY_CHECK(r == 1); -} -#endif - -static void secp256k1_fe_normalize(secp256k1_fe *r) { - uint32_t t0 = r->n[0], t1 = r->n[1], t2 = r->n[2], t3 = r->n[3], t4 = r->n[4], - t5 = r->n[5], t6 = r->n[6], t7 = r->n[7], t8 = r->n[8], t9 = r->n[9]; - - /* Reduce t9 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */ - uint32_t m; - uint32_t x = t9 >> 22; t9 &= 0x03FFFFFUL; - - /* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */ - t0 += x * 0x3D1UL; t1 += (x << 6); - t1 += (t0 >> 26); t0 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t2 += (t1 >> 26); t1 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t3 += (t2 >> 26); t2 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m = t2; - t4 += (t3 >> 26); t3 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t3; - t5 += (t4 >> 26); t4 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t4; - t6 += (t5 >> 26); t5 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t5; - t7 += (t6 >> 26); t6 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t6; - t8 += (t7 >> 26); t7 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t7; - t9 += (t8 >> 26); t8 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t8; - - /* ... except for a possible carry at bit 22 of t9 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */ - VERIFY_CHECK(t9 >> 23 == 0); - - /* At most a single final reduction is needed; check if the value is >= the field characteristic */ - x = (t9 >> 22) | ((t9 == 0x03FFFFFUL) & (m == 0x3FFFFFFUL) - & ((t1 + 0x40UL + ((t0 + 0x3D1UL) >> 26)) > 0x3FFFFFFUL)); - - /* Apply the final reduction (for constant-time behaviour, we do it always) */ - t0 += x * 0x3D1UL; t1 += (x << 6); - t1 += (t0 >> 26); t0 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t2 += (t1 >> 26); t1 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t3 += (t2 >> 26); t2 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t4 += (t3 >> 26); t3 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t5 += (t4 >> 26); t4 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t6 += (t5 >> 26); t5 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t7 += (t6 >> 26); t6 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t8 += (t7 >> 26); t7 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t9 += (t8 >> 26); t8 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - - /* If t9 didn't carry to bit 22 already, then it should have after any final reduction */ - VERIFY_CHECK(t9 >> 22 == x); - - /* Mask off the possible multiple of 2^256 from the final reduction */ - t9 &= 0x03FFFFFUL; - - r->n[0] = t0; r->n[1] = t1; r->n[2] = t2; r->n[3] = t3; r->n[4] = t4; - r->n[5] = t5; r->n[6] = t6; r->n[7] = t7; r->n[8] = t8; r->n[9] = t9; - -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude = 1; - r->normalized = 1; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); -#endif -} - -static void secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(secp256k1_fe *r) { - uint32_t t0 = r->n[0], t1 = r->n[1], t2 = r->n[2], t3 = r->n[3], t4 = r->n[4], - t5 = r->n[5], t6 = r->n[6], t7 = r->n[7], t8 = r->n[8], t9 = r->n[9]; - - /* Reduce t9 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */ - uint32_t x = t9 >> 22; t9 &= 0x03FFFFFUL; - - /* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */ - t0 += x * 0x3D1UL; t1 += (x << 6); - t1 += (t0 >> 26); t0 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t2 += (t1 >> 26); t1 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t3 += (t2 >> 26); t2 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t4 += (t3 >> 26); t3 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t5 += (t4 >> 26); t4 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t6 += (t5 >> 26); t5 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t7 += (t6 >> 26); t6 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t8 += (t7 >> 26); t7 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t9 += (t8 >> 26); t8 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - - /* ... except for a possible carry at bit 22 of t9 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */ - VERIFY_CHECK(t9 >> 23 == 0); - - r->n[0] = t0; r->n[1] = t1; r->n[2] = t2; r->n[3] = t3; r->n[4] = t4; - r->n[5] = t5; r->n[6] = t6; r->n[7] = t7; r->n[8] = t8; r->n[9] = t9; - -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude = 1; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); -#endif -} - -static void secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(secp256k1_fe *r) { - uint32_t t0 = r->n[0], t1 = r->n[1], t2 = r->n[2], t3 = r->n[3], t4 = r->n[4], - t5 = r->n[5], t6 = r->n[6], t7 = r->n[7], t8 = r->n[8], t9 = r->n[9]; - - /* Reduce t9 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */ - uint32_t m; - uint32_t x = t9 >> 22; t9 &= 0x03FFFFFUL; - - /* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */ - t0 += x * 0x3D1UL; t1 += (x << 6); - t1 += (t0 >> 26); t0 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t2 += (t1 >> 26); t1 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t3 += (t2 >> 26); t2 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m = t2; - t4 += (t3 >> 26); t3 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t3; - t5 += (t4 >> 26); t4 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t4; - t6 += (t5 >> 26); t5 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t5; - t7 += (t6 >> 26); t6 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t6; - t8 += (t7 >> 26); t7 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t7; - t9 += (t8 >> 26); t8 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; m &= t8; - - /* ... except for a possible carry at bit 22 of t9 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */ - VERIFY_CHECK(t9 >> 23 == 0); - - /* At most a single final reduction is needed; check if the value is >= the field characteristic */ - x = (t9 >> 22) | ((t9 == 0x03FFFFFUL) & (m == 0x3FFFFFFUL) - & ((t1 + 0x40UL + ((t0 + 0x3D1UL) >> 26)) > 0x3FFFFFFUL)); - - if (x) { - t0 += 0x3D1UL; t1 += (x << 6); - t1 += (t0 >> 26); t0 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t2 += (t1 >> 26); t1 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t3 += (t2 >> 26); t2 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t4 += (t3 >> 26); t3 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t5 += (t4 >> 26); t4 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t6 += (t5 >> 26); t5 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t7 += (t6 >> 26); t6 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t8 += (t7 >> 26); t7 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - t9 += (t8 >> 26); t8 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; - - /* If t9 didn't carry to bit 22 already, then it should have after any final reduction */ - VERIFY_CHECK(t9 >> 22 == x); - - /* Mask off the possible multiple of 2^256 from the final reduction */ - t9 &= 0x03FFFFFUL; - } - - r->n[0] = t0; r->n[1] = t1; r->n[2] = t2; r->n[3] = t3; r->n[4] = t4; - r->n[5] = t5; r->n[6] = t6; r->n[7] = t7; r->n[8] = t8; r->n[9] = t9; - -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude = 1; - r->normalized = 1; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); -#endif -} - -static int secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero(secp256k1_fe *r) { - uint32_t t0 = r->n[0], t1 = r->n[1], t2 = r->n[2], t3 = r->n[3], t4 = r->n[4], - t5 = r->n[5], t6 = r->n[6], t7 = r->n[7], t8 = r->n[8], t9 = r->n[9]; - - /* z0 tracks a possible raw value of 0, z1 tracks a possible raw value of P */ - uint32_t z0, z1; - - /* Reduce t9 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */ - uint32_t x = t9 >> 22; t9 &= 0x03FFFFFUL; - - /* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */ - t0 += x * 0x3D1UL; t1 += (x << 6); - t1 += (t0 >> 26); t0 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 = t0; z1 = t0 ^ 0x3D0UL; - t2 += (t1 >> 26); t1 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t1; z1 &= t1 ^ 0x40UL; - t3 += (t2 >> 26); t2 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t2; z1 &= t2; - t4 += (t3 >> 26); t3 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t3; z1 &= t3; - t5 += (t4 >> 26); t4 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t4; z1 &= t4; - t6 += (t5 >> 26); t5 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t5; z1 &= t5; - t7 += (t6 >> 26); t6 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t6; z1 &= t6; - t8 += (t7 >> 26); t7 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t7; z1 &= t7; - t9 += (t8 >> 26); t8 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t8; z1 &= t8; - z0 |= t9; z1 &= t9 ^ 0x3C00000UL; - - /* ... except for a possible carry at bit 22 of t9 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */ - VERIFY_CHECK(t9 >> 23 == 0); - - return (z0 == 0) | (z1 == 0x3FFFFFFUL); -} - -static int secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(secp256k1_fe *r) { - uint32_t t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8, t9; - uint32_t z0, z1; - uint32_t x; - - t0 = r->n[0]; - t9 = r->n[9]; - - /* Reduce t9 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */ - x = t9 >> 22; - - /* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */ - t0 += x * 0x3D1UL; - - /* z0 tracks a possible raw value of 0, z1 tracks a possible raw value of P */ - z0 = t0 & 0x3FFFFFFUL; - z1 = z0 ^ 0x3D0UL; - - /* Fast return path should catch the majority of cases */ - if ((z0 != 0UL) & (z1 != 0x3FFFFFFUL)) { - return 0; - } - - t1 = r->n[1]; - t2 = r->n[2]; - t3 = r->n[3]; - t4 = r->n[4]; - t5 = r->n[5]; - t6 = r->n[6]; - t7 = r->n[7]; - t8 = r->n[8]; - - t9 &= 0x03FFFFFUL; - t1 += (x << 6); - - t1 += (t0 >> 26); - t2 += (t1 >> 26); t1 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t1; z1 &= t1 ^ 0x40UL; - t3 += (t2 >> 26); t2 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t2; z1 &= t2; - t4 += (t3 >> 26); t3 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t3; z1 &= t3; - t5 += (t4 >> 26); t4 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t4; z1 &= t4; - t6 += (t5 >> 26); t5 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t5; z1 &= t5; - t7 += (t6 >> 26); t6 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t6; z1 &= t6; - t8 += (t7 >> 26); t7 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t7; z1 &= t7; - t9 += (t8 >> 26); t8 &= 0x3FFFFFFUL; z0 |= t8; z1 &= t8; - z0 |= t9; z1 &= t9 ^ 0x3C00000UL; - - /* ... except for a possible carry at bit 22 of t9 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */ - VERIFY_CHECK(t9 >> 23 == 0); - - return (z0 == 0) | (z1 == 0x3FFFFFFUL); -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_set_int(secp256k1_fe *r, int a) { - r->n[0] = a; - r->n[1] = r->n[2] = r->n[3] = r->n[4] = r->n[5] = r->n[6] = r->n[7] = r->n[8] = r->n[9] = 0; -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude = 1; - r->normalized = 1; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); -#endif -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_fe_is_zero(const secp256k1_fe *a) { - const uint32_t *t = a->n; -#ifdef VERIFY - VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized); - secp256k1_fe_verify(a); -#endif - return (t[0] | t[1] | t[2] | t[3] | t[4] | t[5] | t[6] | t[7] | t[8] | t[9]) == 0; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_fe_is_odd(const secp256k1_fe *a) { -#ifdef VERIFY - VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized); - secp256k1_fe_verify(a); -#endif - return a->n[0] & 1; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_clear(secp256k1_fe *a) { - int i; -#ifdef VERIFY - a->magnitude = 0; - a->normalized = 1; -#endif - for (i=0; i<10; i++) { - a->n[i] = 0; - } -} - -static int secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) { - int i; -#ifdef VERIFY - VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized); - VERIFY_CHECK(b->normalized); - secp256k1_fe_verify(a); - secp256k1_fe_verify(b); -#endif - for (i = 9; i >= 0; i--) { - if (a->n[i] > b->n[i]) { - return 1; - } - if (a->n[i] < b->n[i]) { - return -1; - } - } - return 0; -} - -static int secp256k1_fe_set_b32(secp256k1_fe *r, const unsigned char *a) { - r->n[0] = (uint32_t)a[31] | ((uint32_t)a[30] << 8) | ((uint32_t)a[29] << 16) | ((uint32_t)(a[28] & 0x3) << 24); - r->n[1] = (uint32_t)((a[28] >> 2) & 0x3f) | ((uint32_t)a[27] << 6) | ((uint32_t)a[26] << 14) | ((uint32_t)(a[25] & 0xf) << 22); - r->n[2] = (uint32_t)((a[25] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((uint32_t)a[24] << 4) | ((uint32_t)a[23] << 12) | ((uint32_t)(a[22] & 0x3f) << 20); - r->n[3] = (uint32_t)((a[22] >> 6) & 0x3) | ((uint32_t)a[21] << 2) | ((uint32_t)a[20] << 10) | ((uint32_t)a[19] << 18); - r->n[4] = (uint32_t)a[18] | ((uint32_t)a[17] << 8) | ((uint32_t)a[16] << 16) | ((uint32_t)(a[15] & 0x3) << 24); - r->n[5] = (uint32_t)((a[15] >> 2) & 0x3f) | ((uint32_t)a[14] << 6) | ((uint32_t)a[13] << 14) | ((uint32_t)(a[12] & 0xf) << 22); - r->n[6] = (uint32_t)((a[12] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((uint32_t)a[11] << 4) | ((uint32_t)a[10] << 12) | ((uint32_t)(a[9] & 0x3f) << 20); - r->n[7] = (uint32_t)((a[9] >> 6) & 0x3) | ((uint32_t)a[8] << 2) | ((uint32_t)a[7] << 10) | ((uint32_t)a[6] << 18); - r->n[8] = (uint32_t)a[5] | ((uint32_t)a[4] << 8) | ((uint32_t)a[3] << 16) | ((uint32_t)(a[2] & 0x3) << 24); - r->n[9] = (uint32_t)((a[2] >> 2) & 0x3f) | ((uint32_t)a[1] << 6) | ((uint32_t)a[0] << 14); - - if (r->n[9] == 0x3FFFFFUL && (r->n[8] & r->n[7] & r->n[6] & r->n[5] & r->n[4] & r->n[3] & r->n[2]) == 0x3FFFFFFUL && (r->n[1] + 0x40UL + ((r->n[0] + 0x3D1UL) >> 26)) > 0x3FFFFFFUL) { - return 0; - } -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude = 1; - r->normalized = 1; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); -#endif - return 1; -} - -/** Convert a field element to a 32-byte big endian value. Requires the input to be normalized */ -static void secp256k1_fe_get_b32(unsigned char *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { -#ifdef VERIFY - VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized); - secp256k1_fe_verify(a); -#endif - r[0] = (a->n[9] >> 14) & 0xff; - r[1] = (a->n[9] >> 6) & 0xff; - r[2] = ((a->n[9] & 0x3F) << 2) | ((a->n[8] >> 24) & 0x3); - r[3] = (a->n[8] >> 16) & 0xff; - r[4] = (a->n[8] >> 8) & 0xff; - r[5] = a->n[8] & 0xff; - r[6] = (a->n[7] >> 18) & 0xff; - r[7] = (a->n[7] >> 10) & 0xff; - r[8] = (a->n[7] >> 2) & 0xff; - r[9] = ((a->n[7] & 0x3) << 6) | ((a->n[6] >> 20) & 0x3f); - r[10] = (a->n[6] >> 12) & 0xff; - r[11] = (a->n[6] >> 4) & 0xff; - r[12] = ((a->n[6] & 0xf) << 4) | ((a->n[5] >> 22) & 0xf); - r[13] = (a->n[5] >> 14) & 0xff; - r[14] = (a->n[5] >> 6) & 0xff; - r[15] = ((a->n[5] & 0x3f) << 2) | ((a->n[4] >> 24) & 0x3); - r[16] = (a->n[4] >> 16) & 0xff; - r[17] = (a->n[4] >> 8) & 0xff; - r[18] = a->n[4] & 0xff; - r[19] = (a->n[3] >> 18) & 0xff; - r[20] = (a->n[3] >> 10) & 0xff; - r[21] = (a->n[3] >> 2) & 0xff; - r[22] = ((a->n[3] & 0x3) << 6) | ((a->n[2] >> 20) & 0x3f); - r[23] = (a->n[2] >> 12) & 0xff; - r[24] = (a->n[2] >> 4) & 0xff; - r[25] = ((a->n[2] & 0xf) << 4) | ((a->n[1] >> 22) & 0xf); - r[26] = (a->n[1] >> 14) & 0xff; - r[27] = (a->n[1] >> 6) & 0xff; - r[28] = ((a->n[1] & 0x3f) << 2) | ((a->n[0] >> 24) & 0x3); - r[29] = (a->n[0] >> 16) & 0xff; - r[30] = (a->n[0] >> 8) & 0xff; - r[31] = a->n[0] & 0xff; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_negate(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, int m) { -#ifdef VERIFY - VERIFY_CHECK(a->magnitude <= m); - secp256k1_fe_verify(a); -#endif - r->n[0] = 0x3FFFC2FUL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[0]; - r->n[1] = 0x3FFFFBFUL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[1]; - r->n[2] = 0x3FFFFFFUL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[2]; - r->n[3] = 0x3FFFFFFUL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[3]; - r->n[4] = 0x3FFFFFFUL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[4]; - r->n[5] = 0x3FFFFFFUL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[5]; - r->n[6] = 0x3FFFFFFUL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[6]; - r->n[7] = 0x3FFFFFFUL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[7]; - r->n[8] = 0x3FFFFFFUL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[8]; - r->n[9] = 0x03FFFFFUL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[9]; -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude = m + 1; - r->normalized = 0; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); -#endif -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_mul_int(secp256k1_fe *r, int a) { - r->n[0] *= a; - r->n[1] *= a; - r->n[2] *= a; - r->n[3] *= a; - r->n[4] *= a; - r->n[5] *= a; - r->n[6] *= a; - r->n[7] *= a; - r->n[8] *= a; - r->n[9] *= a; -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude *= a; - r->normalized = 0; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); -#endif -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_add(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { -#ifdef VERIFY - secp256k1_fe_verify(a); -#endif - r->n[0] += a->n[0]; - r->n[1] += a->n[1]; - r->n[2] += a->n[2]; - r->n[3] += a->n[3]; - r->n[4] += a->n[4]; - r->n[5] += a->n[5]; - r->n[6] += a->n[6]; - r->n[7] += a->n[7]; - r->n[8] += a->n[8]; - r->n[9] += a->n[9]; -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude += a->magnitude; - r->normalized = 0; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); -#endif -} - -#if defined(USE_EXTERNAL_ASM) - -/* External assembler implementation */ -void secp256k1_fe_mul_inner(uint32_t *r, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t * SECP256K1_RESTRICT b); -void secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner(uint32_t *r, const uint32_t *a); - -#else - -#ifdef VERIFY -#define VERIFY_BITS(x, n) VERIFY_CHECK(((x) >> (n)) == 0) -#else -#define VERIFY_BITS(x, n) do { } while(0) -#endif - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_mul_inner(uint32_t *r, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t * SECP256K1_RESTRICT b) { - uint64_t c, d; - uint64_t u0, u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u7, u8; - uint32_t t9, t1, t0, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7; - const uint32_t M = 0x3FFFFFFUL, R0 = 0x3D10UL, R1 = 0x400UL; - - VERIFY_BITS(a[0], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(a[1], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(a[2], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(a[3], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(a[4], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(a[5], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(a[6], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(a[7], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(a[8], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(a[9], 26); - VERIFY_BITS(b[0], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(b[1], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(b[2], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(b[3], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(b[4], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(b[5], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(b[6], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(b[7], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(b[8], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(b[9], 26); - - /** [... a b c] is a shorthand for ... + a<<52 + b<<26 + c<<0 mod n. - * px is a shorthand for sum(a[i]*b[x-i], i=0..x). - * Note that [x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] = [x*R1 x*R0]. - */ - - d = (uint64_t)a[0] * b[9] - + (uint64_t)a[1] * b[8] - + (uint64_t)a[2] * b[7] - + (uint64_t)a[3] * b[6] - + (uint64_t)a[4] * b[5] - + (uint64_t)a[5] * b[4] - + (uint64_t)a[6] * b[3] - + (uint64_t)a[7] * b[2] - + (uint64_t)a[8] * b[1] - + (uint64_t)a[9] * b[0]; - /* VERIFY_BITS(d, 64); */ - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] = [p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] */ - t9 = d & M; d >>= 26; - VERIFY_BITS(t9, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 38); - /* [d t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] = [p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] */ - - c = (uint64_t)a[0] * b[0]; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 60); - /* [d t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c] = [p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p0] */ - d += (uint64_t)a[1] * b[9] - + (uint64_t)a[2] * b[8] - + (uint64_t)a[3] * b[7] - + (uint64_t)a[4] * b[6] - + (uint64_t)a[5] * b[5] - + (uint64_t)a[6] * b[4] - + (uint64_t)a[7] * b[3] - + (uint64_t)a[8] * b[2] - + (uint64_t)a[9] * b[1]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); - /* [d t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c] = [p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p0] */ - u0 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u0 * R0; - VERIFY_BITS(u0, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 37); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 61); - /* [d u0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-u0*R0] = [p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p0] */ - t0 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u0 * R1; - VERIFY_BITS(t0, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 37); - /* [d u0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-u0*R1 t0-u0*R0] = [p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p0] */ - /* [d 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t0] = [p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p0] */ - - c += (uint64_t)a[0] * b[1] - + (uint64_t)a[1] * b[0]; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 62); - /* [d 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t0] = [p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 p0] */ - d += (uint64_t)a[2] * b[9] - + (uint64_t)a[3] * b[8] - + (uint64_t)a[4] * b[7] - + (uint64_t)a[5] * b[6] - + (uint64_t)a[6] * b[5] - + (uint64_t)a[7] * b[4] - + (uint64_t)a[8] * b[3] - + (uint64_t)a[9] * b[2]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); - /* [d 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t0] = [p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 p0] */ - u1 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u1 * R0; - VERIFY_BITS(u1, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 37); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); - /* [d u1 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-u1*R0 t0] = [p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 p0] */ - t1 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u1 * R1; - VERIFY_BITS(t1, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 38); - /* [d u1 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-u1*R1 t1-u1*R0 t0] = [p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 p0] */ - /* [d 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t1 t0] = [p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 p0] */ - - c += (uint64_t)a[0] * b[2] - + (uint64_t)a[1] * b[1] - + (uint64_t)a[2] * b[0]; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 62); - /* [d 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t1 t0] = [p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 p1 p0] */ - d += (uint64_t)a[3] * b[9] - + (uint64_t)a[4] * b[8] - + (uint64_t)a[5] * b[7] - + (uint64_t)a[6] * b[6] - + (uint64_t)a[7] * b[5] - + (uint64_t)a[8] * b[4] - + (uint64_t)a[9] * b[3]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); - /* [d 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t1 t0] = [p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 p1 p0] */ - u2 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u2 * R0; - VERIFY_BITS(u2, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 37); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); - /* [d u2 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-u2*R0 t1 t0] = [p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 p1 p0] */ - t2 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u2 * R1; - VERIFY_BITS(t2, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 38); - /* [d u2 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 c-u2*R1 t2-u2*R0 t1 t0] = [p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 p1 p0] */ - /* [d 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 c t2 t1 t0] = [p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 p1 p0] */ - - c += (uint64_t)a[0] * b[3] - + (uint64_t)a[1] * b[2] - + (uint64_t)a[2] * b[1] - + (uint64_t)a[3] * b[0]; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); - /* [d 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 c t2 t1 t0] = [p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - d += (uint64_t)a[4] * b[9] - + (uint64_t)a[5] * b[8] - + (uint64_t)a[6] * b[7] - + (uint64_t)a[7] * b[6] - + (uint64_t)a[8] * b[5] - + (uint64_t)a[9] * b[4]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); - /* [d 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 c t2 t1 t0] = [p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - u3 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u3 * R0; - VERIFY_BITS(u3, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 37); - /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ - /* [d u3 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 c-u3*R0 t2 t1 t0] = [p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - t3 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u3 * R1; - VERIFY_BITS(t3, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 39); - /* [d u3 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 c-u3*R1 t3-u3*R0 t2 t1 t0] = [p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - /* [d 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 c t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - - c += (uint64_t)a[0] * b[4] - + (uint64_t)a[1] * b[3] - + (uint64_t)a[2] * b[2] - + (uint64_t)a[3] * b[1] - + (uint64_t)a[4] * b[0]; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 c t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - d += (uint64_t)a[5] * b[9] - + (uint64_t)a[6] * b[8] - + (uint64_t)a[7] * b[7] - + (uint64_t)a[8] * b[6] - + (uint64_t)a[9] * b[5]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 62); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 c t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - u4 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u4 * R0; - VERIFY_BITS(u4, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 36); - /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ - /* [d u4 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 c-u4*R0 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - t4 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u4 * R1; - VERIFY_BITS(t4, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 39); - /* [d u4 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 c-u4*R1 t4-u4*R0 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 c t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - - c += (uint64_t)a[0] * b[5] - + (uint64_t)a[1] * b[4] - + (uint64_t)a[2] * b[3] - + (uint64_t)a[3] * b[2] - + (uint64_t)a[4] * b[1] - + (uint64_t)a[5] * b[0]; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 c t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - d += (uint64_t)a[6] * b[9] - + (uint64_t)a[7] * b[8] - + (uint64_t)a[8] * b[7] - + (uint64_t)a[9] * b[6]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 62); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 c t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - u5 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u5 * R0; - VERIFY_BITS(u5, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 36); - /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ - /* [d u5 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 c-u5*R0 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - t5 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u5 * R1; - VERIFY_BITS(t5, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 39); - /* [d u5 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 c-u5*R1 t5-u5*R0 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 c t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - - c += (uint64_t)a[0] * b[6] - + (uint64_t)a[1] * b[5] - + (uint64_t)a[2] * b[4] - + (uint64_t)a[3] * b[3] - + (uint64_t)a[4] * b[2] - + (uint64_t)a[5] * b[1] - + (uint64_t)a[6] * b[0]; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 c t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - d += (uint64_t)a[7] * b[9] - + (uint64_t)a[8] * b[8] - + (uint64_t)a[9] * b[7]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 61); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 c t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - u6 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u6 * R0; - VERIFY_BITS(u6, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 35); - /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ - /* [d u6 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 c-u6*R0 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - t6 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u6 * R1; - VERIFY_BITS(t6, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 39); - /* [d u6 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 c-u6*R1 t6-u6*R0 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 c t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - - c += (uint64_t)a[0] * b[7] - + (uint64_t)a[1] * b[6] - + (uint64_t)a[2] * b[5] - + (uint64_t)a[3] * b[4] - + (uint64_t)a[4] * b[3] - + (uint64_t)a[5] * b[2] - + (uint64_t)a[6] * b[1] - + (uint64_t)a[7] * b[0]; - /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ - VERIFY_CHECK(c <= 0x8000007C00000007ULL); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 c t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - d += (uint64_t)a[8] * b[9] - + (uint64_t)a[9] * b[8]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 58); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 c t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - u7 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u7 * R0; - VERIFY_BITS(u7, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 32); - /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ - VERIFY_CHECK(c <= 0x800001703FFFC2F7ULL); - /* [d u7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 c-u7*R0 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - t7 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u7 * R1; - VERIFY_BITS(t7, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 38); - /* [d u7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u7*R1 t7-u7*R0 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c t7 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - - c += (uint64_t)a[0] * b[8] - + (uint64_t)a[1] * b[7] - + (uint64_t)a[2] * b[6] - + (uint64_t)a[3] * b[5] - + (uint64_t)a[4] * b[4] - + (uint64_t)a[5] * b[3] - + (uint64_t)a[6] * b[2] - + (uint64_t)a[7] * b[1] - + (uint64_t)a[8] * b[0]; - /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ - VERIFY_CHECK(c <= 0x9000007B80000008ULL); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c t7 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - d += (uint64_t)a[9] * b[9]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 57); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c t7 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - u8 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u8 * R0; - VERIFY_BITS(u8, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 31); - /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ - VERIFY_CHECK(c <= 0x9000016FBFFFC2F8ULL); - /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 t7 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - - r[3] = t3; - VERIFY_BITS(r[3], 26); - /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 t7 t6 t5 t4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[4] = t4; - VERIFY_BITS(r[4], 26); - /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 t7 t6 t5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[5] = t5; - VERIFY_BITS(r[5], 26); - /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 t7 t6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[6] = t6; - VERIFY_BITS(r[6], 26); - /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 t7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[7] = t7; - VERIFY_BITS(r[7], 26); - /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - - r[8] = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u8 * R1; - VERIFY_BITS(r[8], 26); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 39); - /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9+c-u8*R1 r8-u8*R0 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9+c r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - c += d * R0 + t9; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 45); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-d*R0 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[9] = c & (M >> 4); c >>= 22; c += d * (R1 << 4); - VERIFY_BITS(r[9], 22); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 46); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 r9+((c-d*R1<<4)<<22)-d*R0 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -d*R1 r9+(c<<22)-d*R0 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - /* [r9+(c<<22) r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - - d = c * (R0 >> 4) + t0; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 56); - /* [r9+(c<<22) r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 d-c*R0>>4] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[0] = d & M; d >>= 26; - VERIFY_BITS(r[0], 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 30); - /* [r9+(c<<22) r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1+d r0-c*R0>>4] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - d += c * (R1 >> 4) + t1; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 53); - VERIFY_CHECK(d <= 0x10000003FFFFBFULL); - /* [r9+(c<<22) r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 d-c*R1>>4 r0-c*R0>>4] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - /* [r9 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 d r0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[1] = d & M; d >>= 26; - VERIFY_BITS(r[1], 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 27); - VERIFY_CHECK(d <= 0x4000000ULL); - /* [r9 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2+d r1 r0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - d += t2; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 27); - /* [r9 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 d r1 r0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[2] = d; - VERIFY_BITS(r[2], 27); - /* [r9 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 r2 r1 r0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner(uint32_t *r, const uint32_t *a) { - uint64_t c, d; - uint64_t u0, u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u7, u8; - uint32_t t9, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7; - const uint32_t M = 0x3FFFFFFUL, R0 = 0x3D10UL, R1 = 0x400UL; - - VERIFY_BITS(a[0], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(a[1], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(a[2], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(a[3], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(a[4], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(a[5], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(a[6], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(a[7], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(a[8], 30); - VERIFY_BITS(a[9], 26); - - /** [... a b c] is a shorthand for ... + a<<52 + b<<26 + c<<0 mod n. - * px is a shorthand for sum(a[i]*a[x-i], i=0..x). - * Note that [x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] = [x*R1 x*R0]. - */ - - d = (uint64_t)(a[0]*2) * a[9] - + (uint64_t)(a[1]*2) * a[8] - + (uint64_t)(a[2]*2) * a[7] - + (uint64_t)(a[3]*2) * a[6] - + (uint64_t)(a[4]*2) * a[5]; - /* VERIFY_BITS(d, 64); */ - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] = [p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] */ - t9 = d & M; d >>= 26; - VERIFY_BITS(t9, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 38); - /* [d t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] = [p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] */ - - c = (uint64_t)a[0] * a[0]; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 60); - /* [d t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c] = [p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p0] */ - d += (uint64_t)(a[1]*2) * a[9] - + (uint64_t)(a[2]*2) * a[8] - + (uint64_t)(a[3]*2) * a[7] - + (uint64_t)(a[4]*2) * a[6] - + (uint64_t)a[5] * a[5]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); - /* [d t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c] = [p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p0] */ - u0 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u0 * R0; - VERIFY_BITS(u0, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 37); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 61); - /* [d u0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-u0*R0] = [p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p0] */ - t0 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u0 * R1; - VERIFY_BITS(t0, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 37); - /* [d u0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-u0*R1 t0-u0*R0] = [p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p0] */ - /* [d 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t0] = [p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p0] */ - - c += (uint64_t)(a[0]*2) * a[1]; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 62); - /* [d 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t0] = [p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 p0] */ - d += (uint64_t)(a[2]*2) * a[9] - + (uint64_t)(a[3]*2) * a[8] - + (uint64_t)(a[4]*2) * a[7] - + (uint64_t)(a[5]*2) * a[6]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); - /* [d 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t0] = [p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 p0] */ - u1 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u1 * R0; - VERIFY_BITS(u1, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 37); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); - /* [d u1 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-u1*R0 t0] = [p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 p0] */ - t1 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u1 * R1; - VERIFY_BITS(t1, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 38); - /* [d u1 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-u1*R1 t1-u1*R0 t0] = [p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 p0] */ - /* [d 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t1 t0] = [p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 p0] */ - - c += (uint64_t)(a[0]*2) * a[2] - + (uint64_t)a[1] * a[1]; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 62); - /* [d 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t1 t0] = [p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 p1 p0] */ - d += (uint64_t)(a[3]*2) * a[9] - + (uint64_t)(a[4]*2) * a[8] - + (uint64_t)(a[5]*2) * a[7] - + (uint64_t)a[6] * a[6]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); - /* [d 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 c t1 t0] = [p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 p1 p0] */ - u2 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u2 * R0; - VERIFY_BITS(u2, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 37); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); - /* [d u2 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-u2*R0 t1 t0] = [p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 p1 p0] */ - t2 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u2 * R1; - VERIFY_BITS(t2, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 38); - /* [d u2 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 c-u2*R1 t2-u2*R0 t1 t0] = [p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 p1 p0] */ - /* [d 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 c t2 t1 t0] = [p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 p1 p0] */ - - c += (uint64_t)(a[0]*2) * a[3] - + (uint64_t)(a[1]*2) * a[2]; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); - /* [d 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 c t2 t1 t0] = [p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - d += (uint64_t)(a[4]*2) * a[9] - + (uint64_t)(a[5]*2) * a[8] - + (uint64_t)(a[6]*2) * a[7]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); - /* [d 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 c t2 t1 t0] = [p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - u3 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u3 * R0; - VERIFY_BITS(u3, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 37); - /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ - /* [d u3 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 0 c-u3*R0 t2 t1 t0] = [p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - t3 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u3 * R1; - VERIFY_BITS(t3, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 39); - /* [d u3 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 c-u3*R1 t3-u3*R0 t2 t1 t0] = [p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - /* [d 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 c t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 0 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - - c += (uint64_t)(a[0]*2) * a[4] - + (uint64_t)(a[1]*2) * a[3] - + (uint64_t)a[2] * a[2]; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 c t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - d += (uint64_t)(a[5]*2) * a[9] - + (uint64_t)(a[6]*2) * a[8] - + (uint64_t)a[7] * a[7]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 62); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 c t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - u4 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u4 * R0; - VERIFY_BITS(u4, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 36); - /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ - /* [d u4 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 0 c-u4*R0 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - t4 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u4 * R1; - VERIFY_BITS(t4, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 39); - /* [d u4 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 c-u4*R1 t4-u4*R0 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 c t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 0 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - - c += (uint64_t)(a[0]*2) * a[5] - + (uint64_t)(a[1]*2) * a[4] - + (uint64_t)(a[2]*2) * a[3]; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 c t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - d += (uint64_t)(a[6]*2) * a[9] - + (uint64_t)(a[7]*2) * a[8]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 62); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 c t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - u5 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u5 * R0; - VERIFY_BITS(u5, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 36); - /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ - /* [d u5 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 0 c-u5*R0 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - t5 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u5 * R1; - VERIFY_BITS(t5, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 39); - /* [d u5 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 c-u5*R1 t5-u5*R0 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 c t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 0 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - - c += (uint64_t)(a[0]*2) * a[6] - + (uint64_t)(a[1]*2) * a[5] - + (uint64_t)(a[2]*2) * a[4] - + (uint64_t)a[3] * a[3]; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 c t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - d += (uint64_t)(a[7]*2) * a[9] - + (uint64_t)a[8] * a[8]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 61); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 c t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - u6 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u6 * R0; - VERIFY_BITS(u6, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 35); - /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ - /* [d u6 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 0 c-u6*R0 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - t6 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u6 * R1; - VERIFY_BITS(t6, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 39); - /* [d u6 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 c-u6*R1 t6-u6*R0 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 c t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - - c += (uint64_t)(a[0]*2) * a[7] - + (uint64_t)(a[1]*2) * a[6] - + (uint64_t)(a[2]*2) * a[5] - + (uint64_t)(a[3]*2) * a[4]; - /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ - VERIFY_CHECK(c <= 0x8000007C00000007ULL); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 c t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - d += (uint64_t)(a[8]*2) * a[9]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 58); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 c t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - u7 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u7 * R0; - VERIFY_BITS(u7, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 32); - /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ - VERIFY_CHECK(c <= 0x800001703FFFC2F7ULL); - /* [d u7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 0 c-u7*R0 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - t7 = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u7 * R1; - VERIFY_BITS(t7, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 38); - /* [d u7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u7*R1 t7-u7*R0 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c t7 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 0 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - - c += (uint64_t)(a[0]*2) * a[8] - + (uint64_t)(a[1]*2) * a[7] - + (uint64_t)(a[2]*2) * a[6] - + (uint64_t)(a[3]*2) * a[5] - + (uint64_t)a[4] * a[4]; - /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ - VERIFY_CHECK(c <= 0x9000007B80000008ULL); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c t7 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - d += (uint64_t)a[9] * a[9]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 57); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c t7 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - u8 = d & M; d >>= 26; c += u8 * R0; - VERIFY_BITS(u8, 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 31); - /* VERIFY_BITS(c, 64); */ - VERIFY_CHECK(c <= 0x9000016FBFFFC2F8ULL); - /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 t7 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - - r[3] = t3; - VERIFY_BITS(r[3], 26); - /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 t7 t6 t5 t4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[4] = t4; - VERIFY_BITS(r[4], 26); - /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 t7 t6 t5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[5] = t5; - VERIFY_BITS(r[5], 26); - /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 t7 t6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[6] = t6; - VERIFY_BITS(r[6], 26); - /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 t7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[7] = t7; - VERIFY_BITS(r[7], 26); - /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9 c-u8*R0 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - - r[8] = c & M; c >>= 26; c += u8 * R1; - VERIFY_BITS(r[8], 26); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 39); - /* [d u8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9+c-u8*R1 r8-u8*R0 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t9+c r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - c += d * R0 + t9; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 45); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c-d*R0 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[9] = c & (M >> 4); c >>= 22; c += d * (R1 << 4); - VERIFY_BITS(r[9], 22); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 46); - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 r9+((c-d*R1<<4)<<22)-d*R0 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - /* [d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -d*R1 r9+(c<<22)-d*R0 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - /* [r9+(c<<22) r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 t0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - - d = c * (R0 >> 4) + t0; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 56); - /* [r9+(c<<22) r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1 d-c*R0>>4] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[0] = d & M; d >>= 26; - VERIFY_BITS(r[0], 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 30); - /* [r9+(c<<22) r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 t1+d r0-c*R0>>4] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - d += c * (R1 >> 4) + t1; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 53); - VERIFY_CHECK(d <= 0x10000003FFFFBFULL); - /* [r9+(c<<22) r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 d-c*R1>>4 r0-c*R0>>4] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - /* [r9 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2 d r0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[1] = d & M; d >>= 26; - VERIFY_BITS(r[1], 26); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 27); - VERIFY_CHECK(d <= 0x4000000ULL); - /* [r9 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 t2+d r1 r0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - d += t2; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 27); - /* [r9 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 d r1 r0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[2] = d; - VERIFY_BITS(r[2], 27); - /* [r9 r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 r2 r1 r0] = [p18 p17 p16 p15 p14 p13 p12 p11 p10 p9 p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ -} -#endif - -static void secp256k1_fe_mul(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe * SECP256K1_RESTRICT b) { -#ifdef VERIFY - VERIFY_CHECK(a->magnitude <= 8); - VERIFY_CHECK(b->magnitude <= 8); - secp256k1_fe_verify(a); - secp256k1_fe_verify(b); - VERIFY_CHECK(r != b); -#endif - secp256k1_fe_mul_inner(r->n, a->n, b->n); -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude = 1; - r->normalized = 0; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); -#endif -} - -static void secp256k1_fe_sqr(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { -#ifdef VERIFY - VERIFY_CHECK(a->magnitude <= 8); - secp256k1_fe_verify(a); -#endif - secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner(r->n, a->n); -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude = 1; - r->normalized = 0; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); -#endif -} - -static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_cmov(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, int flag) { - uint32_t mask0, mask1; - mask0 = flag + ~((uint32_t)0); - mask1 = ~mask0; - r->n[0] = (r->n[0] & mask0) | (a->n[0] & mask1); - r->n[1] = (r->n[1] & mask0) | (a->n[1] & mask1); - r->n[2] = (r->n[2] & mask0) | (a->n[2] & mask1); - r->n[3] = (r->n[3] & mask0) | (a->n[3] & mask1); - r->n[4] = (r->n[4] & mask0) | (a->n[4] & mask1); - r->n[5] = (r->n[5] & mask0) | (a->n[5] & mask1); - r->n[6] = (r->n[6] & mask0) | (a->n[6] & mask1); - r->n[7] = (r->n[7] & mask0) | (a->n[7] & mask1); - r->n[8] = (r->n[8] & mask0) | (a->n[8] & mask1); - r->n[9] = (r->n[9] & mask0) | (a->n[9] & mask1); -#ifdef VERIFY - if (a->magnitude > r->magnitude) { - r->magnitude = a->magnitude; - } - r->normalized &= a->normalized; -#endif -} - -static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(secp256k1_fe_storage *r, const secp256k1_fe_storage *a, int flag) { - uint32_t mask0, mask1; - mask0 = flag + ~((uint32_t)0); - mask1 = ~mask0; - r->n[0] = (r->n[0] & mask0) | (a->n[0] & mask1); - r->n[1] = (r->n[1] & mask0) | (a->n[1] & mask1); - r->n[2] = (r->n[2] & mask0) | (a->n[2] & mask1); - r->n[3] = (r->n[3] & mask0) | (a->n[3] & mask1); - r->n[4] = (r->n[4] & mask0) | (a->n[4] & mask1); - r->n[5] = (r->n[5] & mask0) | (a->n[5] & mask1); - r->n[6] = (r->n[6] & mask0) | (a->n[6] & mask1); - r->n[7] = (r->n[7] & mask0) | (a->n[7] & mask1); -} - -static void secp256k1_fe_to_storage(secp256k1_fe_storage *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { -#ifdef VERIFY - VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized); -#endif - r->n[0] = a->n[0] | a->n[1] << 26; - r->n[1] = a->n[1] >> 6 | a->n[2] << 20; - r->n[2] = a->n[2] >> 12 | a->n[3] << 14; - r->n[3] = a->n[3] >> 18 | a->n[4] << 8; - r->n[4] = a->n[4] >> 24 | a->n[5] << 2 | a->n[6] << 28; - r->n[5] = a->n[6] >> 4 | a->n[7] << 22; - r->n[6] = a->n[7] >> 10 | a->n[8] << 16; - r->n[7] = a->n[8] >> 16 | a->n[9] << 10; -} - -static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_from_storage(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe_storage *a) { - r->n[0] = a->n[0] & 0x3FFFFFFUL; - r->n[1] = a->n[0] >> 26 | ((a->n[1] << 6) & 0x3FFFFFFUL); - r->n[2] = a->n[1] >> 20 | ((a->n[2] << 12) & 0x3FFFFFFUL); - r->n[3] = a->n[2] >> 14 | ((a->n[3] << 18) & 0x3FFFFFFUL); - r->n[4] = a->n[3] >> 8 | ((a->n[4] << 24) & 0x3FFFFFFUL); - r->n[5] = (a->n[4] >> 2) & 0x3FFFFFFUL; - r->n[6] = a->n[4] >> 28 | ((a->n[5] << 4) & 0x3FFFFFFUL); - r->n[7] = a->n[5] >> 22 | ((a->n[6] << 10) & 0x3FFFFFFUL); - r->n[8] = a->n[6] >> 16 | ((a->n[7] << 16) & 0x3FFFFFFUL); - r->n[9] = a->n[7] >> 10; -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude = 1; - r->normalized = 1; -#endif -} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52.h deleted file mode 100644 index bccd8fe..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,47 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_H -#define SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_H - -#include - -typedef struct { - /* X = sum(i=0..4, elem[i]*2^52) mod n */ - uint64_t n[5]; -#ifdef VERIFY - int magnitude; - int normalized; -#endif -} secp256k1_fe; - -/* Unpacks a constant into a overlapping multi-limbed FE element. */ -#define SECP256K1_FE_CONST_INNER(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) { \ - (d0) | (((uint64_t)(d1) & 0xFFFFFUL) << 32), \ - ((uint64_t)(d1) >> 20) | (((uint64_t)(d2)) << 12) | (((uint64_t)(d3) & 0xFFUL) << 44), \ - ((uint64_t)(d3) >> 8) | (((uint64_t)(d4) & 0xFFFFFFFUL) << 24), \ - ((uint64_t)(d4) >> 28) | (((uint64_t)(d5)) << 4) | (((uint64_t)(d6) & 0xFFFFUL) << 36), \ - ((uint64_t)(d6) >> 16) | (((uint64_t)(d7)) << 16) \ -} - -#ifdef VERIFY -#define SECP256K1_FE_CONST(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) {SECP256K1_FE_CONST_INNER((d7), (d6), (d5), (d4), (d3), (d2), (d1), (d0)), 1, 1} -#else -#define SECP256K1_FE_CONST(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) {SECP256K1_FE_CONST_INNER((d7), (d6), (d5), (d4), (d3), (d2), (d1), (d0))} -#endif - -typedef struct { - uint64_t n[4]; -} secp256k1_fe_storage; - -#define SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) {{ \ - (d0) | (((uint64_t)(d1)) << 32), \ - (d2) | (((uint64_t)(d3)) << 32), \ - (d4) | (((uint64_t)(d5)) << 32), \ - (d6) | (((uint64_t)(d7)) << 32) \ -}} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_asm_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_asm_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 1fc3171..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_asm_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,502 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013-2014 Diederik Huys, Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -/** - * Changelog: - * - March 2013, Diederik Huys: original version - * - November 2014, Pieter Wuille: updated to use Peter Dettman's parallel multiplication algorithm - * - December 2014, Pieter Wuille: converted from YASM to GCC inline assembly - */ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_FIELD_INNER5X52_IMPL_H -#define SECP256K1_FIELD_INNER5X52_IMPL_H - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_mul_inner(uint64_t *r, const uint64_t *a, const uint64_t * SECP256K1_RESTRICT b) { -/** - * Registers: rdx:rax = multiplication accumulator - * r9:r8 = c - * r15:rcx = d - * r10-r14 = a0-a4 - * rbx = b - * rdi = r - * rsi = a / t? - */ - uint64_t tmp1, tmp2, tmp3; -__asm__ __volatile__( - "movq 0(%%rsi),%%r10\n" - "movq 8(%%rsi),%%r11\n" - "movq 16(%%rsi),%%r12\n" - "movq 24(%%rsi),%%r13\n" - "movq 32(%%rsi),%%r14\n" - - /* d += a3 * b0 */ - "movq 0(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r13\n" - "movq %%rax,%%rcx\n" - "movq %%rdx,%%r15\n" - /* d += a2 * b1 */ - "movq 8(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r12\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" - /* d += a1 * b2 */ - "movq 16(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r11\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" - /* d = a0 * b3 */ - "movq 24(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r10\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" - /* c = a4 * b4 */ - "movq 32(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r14\n" - "movq %%rax,%%r8\n" - "movq %%rdx,%%r9\n" - /* d += (c & M) * R */ - "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%rdx\n" - "andq %%rdx,%%rax\n" - "movq $0x1000003d10,%%rdx\n" - "mulq %%rdx\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" - /* c >>= 52 (%%r8 only) */ - "shrdq $52,%%r9,%%r8\n" - /* t3 (tmp1) = d & M */ - "movq %%rcx,%%rsi\n" - "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%rdx\n" - "andq %%rdx,%%rsi\n" - "movq %%rsi,%q1\n" - /* d >>= 52 */ - "shrdq $52,%%r15,%%rcx\n" - "xorq %%r15,%%r15\n" - /* d += a4 * b0 */ - "movq 0(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r14\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" - /* d += a3 * b1 */ - "movq 8(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r13\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" - /* d += a2 * b2 */ - "movq 16(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r12\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" - /* d += a1 * b3 */ - "movq 24(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r11\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" - /* d += a0 * b4 */ - "movq 32(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r10\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" - /* d += c * R */ - "movq %%r8,%%rax\n" - "movq $0x1000003d10,%%rdx\n" - "mulq %%rdx\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" - /* t4 = d & M (%%rsi) */ - "movq %%rcx,%%rsi\n" - "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%rdx\n" - "andq %%rdx,%%rsi\n" - /* d >>= 52 */ - "shrdq $52,%%r15,%%rcx\n" - "xorq %%r15,%%r15\n" - /* tx = t4 >> 48 (tmp3) */ - "movq %%rsi,%%rax\n" - "shrq $48,%%rax\n" - "movq %%rax,%q3\n" - /* t4 &= (M >> 4) (tmp2) */ - "movq $0xffffffffffff,%%rax\n" - "andq %%rax,%%rsi\n" - "movq %%rsi,%q2\n" - /* c = a0 * b0 */ - "movq 0(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r10\n" - "movq %%rax,%%r8\n" - "movq %%rdx,%%r9\n" - /* d += a4 * b1 */ - "movq 8(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r14\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" - /* d += a3 * b2 */ - "movq 16(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r13\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" - /* d += a2 * b3 */ - "movq 24(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r12\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" - /* d += a1 * b4 */ - "movq 32(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r11\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" - /* u0 = d & M (%%rsi) */ - "movq %%rcx,%%rsi\n" - "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%rdx\n" - "andq %%rdx,%%rsi\n" - /* d >>= 52 */ - "shrdq $52,%%r15,%%rcx\n" - "xorq %%r15,%%r15\n" - /* u0 = (u0 << 4) | tx (%%rsi) */ - "shlq $4,%%rsi\n" - "movq %q3,%%rax\n" - "orq %%rax,%%rsi\n" - /* c += u0 * (R >> 4) */ - "movq $0x1000003d1,%%rax\n" - "mulq %%rsi\n" - "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" - /* r[0] = c & M */ - "movq %%r8,%%rax\n" - "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%rdx\n" - "andq %%rdx,%%rax\n" - "movq %%rax,0(%%rdi)\n" - /* c >>= 52 */ - "shrdq $52,%%r9,%%r8\n" - "xorq %%r9,%%r9\n" - /* c += a1 * b0 */ - "movq 0(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r11\n" - "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" - /* c += a0 * b1 */ - "movq 8(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r10\n" - "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" - /* d += a4 * b2 */ - "movq 16(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r14\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" - /* d += a3 * b3 */ - "movq 24(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r13\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" - /* d += a2 * b4 */ - "movq 32(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r12\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" - /* c += (d & M) * R */ - "movq %%rcx,%%rax\n" - "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%rdx\n" - "andq %%rdx,%%rax\n" - "movq $0x1000003d10,%%rdx\n" - "mulq %%rdx\n" - "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" - /* d >>= 52 */ - "shrdq $52,%%r15,%%rcx\n" - "xorq %%r15,%%r15\n" - /* r[1] = c & M */ - "movq %%r8,%%rax\n" - "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%rdx\n" - "andq %%rdx,%%rax\n" - "movq %%rax,8(%%rdi)\n" - /* c >>= 52 */ - "shrdq $52,%%r9,%%r8\n" - "xorq %%r9,%%r9\n" - /* c += a2 * b0 */ - "movq 0(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r12\n" - "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" - /* c += a1 * b1 */ - "movq 8(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r11\n" - "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" - /* c += a0 * b2 (last use of %%r10 = a0) */ - "movq 16(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r10\n" - "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" - /* fetch t3 (%%r10, overwrites a0), t4 (%%rsi) */ - "movq %q2,%%rsi\n" - "movq %q1,%%r10\n" - /* d += a4 * b3 */ - "movq 24(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r14\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" - /* d += a3 * b4 */ - "movq 32(%%rbx),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r13\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rcx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r15\n" - /* c += (d & M) * R */ - "movq %%rcx,%%rax\n" - "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%rdx\n" - "andq %%rdx,%%rax\n" - "movq $0x1000003d10,%%rdx\n" - "mulq %%rdx\n" - "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" - /* d >>= 52 (%%rcx only) */ - "shrdq $52,%%r15,%%rcx\n" - /* r[2] = c & M */ - "movq %%r8,%%rax\n" - "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%rdx\n" - "andq %%rdx,%%rax\n" - "movq %%rax,16(%%rdi)\n" - /* c >>= 52 */ - "shrdq $52,%%r9,%%r8\n" - "xorq %%r9,%%r9\n" - /* c += t3 */ - "addq %%r10,%%r8\n" - /* c += d * R */ - "movq %%rcx,%%rax\n" - "movq $0x1000003d10,%%rdx\n" - "mulq %%rdx\n" - "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" - /* r[3] = c & M */ - "movq %%r8,%%rax\n" - "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%rdx\n" - "andq %%rdx,%%rax\n" - "movq %%rax,24(%%rdi)\n" - /* c >>= 52 (%%r8 only) */ - "shrdq $52,%%r9,%%r8\n" - /* c += t4 (%%r8 only) */ - "addq %%rsi,%%r8\n" - /* r[4] = c */ - "movq %%r8,32(%%rdi)\n" -: "+S"(a), "=m"(tmp1), "=m"(tmp2), "=m"(tmp3) -: "b"(b), "D"(r) -: "%rax", "%rcx", "%rdx", "%r8", "%r9", "%r10", "%r11", "%r12", "%r13", "%r14", "%r15", "cc", "memory" -); -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner(uint64_t *r, const uint64_t *a) { -/** - * Registers: rdx:rax = multiplication accumulator - * r9:r8 = c - * rcx:rbx = d - * r10-r14 = a0-a4 - * r15 = M (0xfffffffffffff) - * rdi = r - * rsi = a / t? - */ - uint64_t tmp1, tmp2, tmp3; -__asm__ __volatile__( - "movq 0(%%rsi),%%r10\n" - "movq 8(%%rsi),%%r11\n" - "movq 16(%%rsi),%%r12\n" - "movq 24(%%rsi),%%r13\n" - "movq 32(%%rsi),%%r14\n" - "movq $0xfffffffffffff,%%r15\n" - - /* d = (a0*2) * a3 */ - "leaq (%%r10,%%r10,1),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r13\n" - "movq %%rax,%%rbx\n" - "movq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" - /* d += (a1*2) * a2 */ - "leaq (%%r11,%%r11,1),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r12\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" - /* c = a4 * a4 */ - "movq %%r14,%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r14\n" - "movq %%rax,%%r8\n" - "movq %%rdx,%%r9\n" - /* d += (c & M) * R */ - "andq %%r15,%%rax\n" - "movq $0x1000003d10,%%rdx\n" - "mulq %%rdx\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" - /* c >>= 52 (%%r8 only) */ - "shrdq $52,%%r9,%%r8\n" - /* t3 (tmp1) = d & M */ - "movq %%rbx,%%rsi\n" - "andq %%r15,%%rsi\n" - "movq %%rsi,%q1\n" - /* d >>= 52 */ - "shrdq $52,%%rcx,%%rbx\n" - "xorq %%rcx,%%rcx\n" - /* a4 *= 2 */ - "addq %%r14,%%r14\n" - /* d += a0 * a4 */ - "movq %%r10,%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r14\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" - /* d+= (a1*2) * a3 */ - "leaq (%%r11,%%r11,1),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r13\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" - /* d += a2 * a2 */ - "movq %%r12,%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r12\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" - /* d += c * R */ - "movq %%r8,%%rax\n" - "movq $0x1000003d10,%%rdx\n" - "mulq %%rdx\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" - /* t4 = d & M (%%rsi) */ - "movq %%rbx,%%rsi\n" - "andq %%r15,%%rsi\n" - /* d >>= 52 */ - "shrdq $52,%%rcx,%%rbx\n" - "xorq %%rcx,%%rcx\n" - /* tx = t4 >> 48 (tmp3) */ - "movq %%rsi,%%rax\n" - "shrq $48,%%rax\n" - "movq %%rax,%q3\n" - /* t4 &= (M >> 4) (tmp2) */ - "movq $0xffffffffffff,%%rax\n" - "andq %%rax,%%rsi\n" - "movq %%rsi,%q2\n" - /* c = a0 * a0 */ - "movq %%r10,%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r10\n" - "movq %%rax,%%r8\n" - "movq %%rdx,%%r9\n" - /* d += a1 * a4 */ - "movq %%r11,%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r14\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" - /* d += (a2*2) * a3 */ - "leaq (%%r12,%%r12,1),%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r13\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" - /* u0 = d & M (%%rsi) */ - "movq %%rbx,%%rsi\n" - "andq %%r15,%%rsi\n" - /* d >>= 52 */ - "shrdq $52,%%rcx,%%rbx\n" - "xorq %%rcx,%%rcx\n" - /* u0 = (u0 << 4) | tx (%%rsi) */ - "shlq $4,%%rsi\n" - "movq %q3,%%rax\n" - "orq %%rax,%%rsi\n" - /* c += u0 * (R >> 4) */ - "movq $0x1000003d1,%%rax\n" - "mulq %%rsi\n" - "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" - /* r[0] = c & M */ - "movq %%r8,%%rax\n" - "andq %%r15,%%rax\n" - "movq %%rax,0(%%rdi)\n" - /* c >>= 52 */ - "shrdq $52,%%r9,%%r8\n" - "xorq %%r9,%%r9\n" - /* a0 *= 2 */ - "addq %%r10,%%r10\n" - /* c += a0 * a1 */ - "movq %%r10,%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r11\n" - "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" - /* d += a2 * a4 */ - "movq %%r12,%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r14\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" - /* d += a3 * a3 */ - "movq %%r13,%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r13\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" - /* c += (d & M) * R */ - "movq %%rbx,%%rax\n" - "andq %%r15,%%rax\n" - "movq $0x1000003d10,%%rdx\n" - "mulq %%rdx\n" - "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" - /* d >>= 52 */ - "shrdq $52,%%rcx,%%rbx\n" - "xorq %%rcx,%%rcx\n" - /* r[1] = c & M */ - "movq %%r8,%%rax\n" - "andq %%r15,%%rax\n" - "movq %%rax,8(%%rdi)\n" - /* c >>= 52 */ - "shrdq $52,%%r9,%%r8\n" - "xorq %%r9,%%r9\n" - /* c += a0 * a2 (last use of %%r10) */ - "movq %%r10,%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r12\n" - "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" - /* fetch t3 (%%r10, overwrites a0),t4 (%%rsi) */ - "movq %q2,%%rsi\n" - "movq %q1,%%r10\n" - /* c += a1 * a1 */ - "movq %%r11,%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r11\n" - "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" - /* d += a3 * a4 */ - "movq %%r13,%%rax\n" - "mulq %%r14\n" - "addq %%rax,%%rbx\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%rcx\n" - /* c += (d & M) * R */ - "movq %%rbx,%%rax\n" - "andq %%r15,%%rax\n" - "movq $0x1000003d10,%%rdx\n" - "mulq %%rdx\n" - "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" - /* d >>= 52 (%%rbx only) */ - "shrdq $52,%%rcx,%%rbx\n" - /* r[2] = c & M */ - "movq %%r8,%%rax\n" - "andq %%r15,%%rax\n" - "movq %%rax,16(%%rdi)\n" - /* c >>= 52 */ - "shrdq $52,%%r9,%%r8\n" - "xorq %%r9,%%r9\n" - /* c += t3 */ - "addq %%r10,%%r8\n" - /* c += d * R */ - "movq %%rbx,%%rax\n" - "movq $0x1000003d10,%%rdx\n" - "mulq %%rdx\n" - "addq %%rax,%%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx,%%r9\n" - /* r[3] = c & M */ - "movq %%r8,%%rax\n" - "andq %%r15,%%rax\n" - "movq %%rax,24(%%rdi)\n" - /* c >>= 52 (%%r8 only) */ - "shrdq $52,%%r9,%%r8\n" - /* c += t4 (%%r8 only) */ - "addq %%rsi,%%r8\n" - /* r[4] = c */ - "movq %%r8,32(%%rdi)\n" -: "+S"(a), "=m"(tmp1), "=m"(tmp2), "=m"(tmp3) -: "D"(r) -: "%rax", "%rbx", "%rcx", "%rdx", "%r8", "%r9", "%r10", "%r11", "%r12", "%r13", "%r14", "%r15", "cc", "memory" -); -} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_FIELD_INNER5X52_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 957c61b..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,496 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_IMPL_H -#define SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_IMPL_H - -#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H -#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" -#endif - -#include "util.h" -#include "num.h" -#include "field.h" - -#if defined(USE_ASM_X86_64) -#include "field_5x52_asm_impl.h" -#else -#include "field_5x52_int128_impl.h" -#endif - -/** Implements arithmetic modulo FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFE FFFFFC2F, - * represented as 5 uint64_t's in base 2^52. The values are allowed to contain >52 each. In particular, - * each FieldElem has a 'magnitude' associated with it. Internally, a magnitude M means each element - * is at most M*(2^53-1), except the most significant one, which is limited to M*(2^49-1). All operations - * accept any input with magnitude at most M, and have different rules for propagating magnitude to their - * output. - */ - -#ifdef VERIFY -static void secp256k1_fe_verify(const secp256k1_fe *a) { - const uint64_t *d = a->n; - int m = a->normalized ? 1 : 2 * a->magnitude, r = 1; - /* secp256k1 'p' value defined in "Standards for Efficient Cryptography" (SEC2) 2.7.1. */ - r &= (d[0] <= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * m); - r &= (d[1] <= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * m); - r &= (d[2] <= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * m); - r &= (d[3] <= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * m); - r &= (d[4] <= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL * m); - r &= (a->magnitude >= 0); - r &= (a->magnitude <= 2048); - if (a->normalized) { - r &= (a->magnitude <= 1); - if (r && (d[4] == 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL) && ((d[3] & d[2] & d[1]) == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL)) { - r &= (d[0] < 0xFFFFEFFFFFC2FULL); - } - } - VERIFY_CHECK(r == 1); -} -#endif - -static void secp256k1_fe_normalize(secp256k1_fe *r) { - uint64_t t0 = r->n[0], t1 = r->n[1], t2 = r->n[2], t3 = r->n[3], t4 = r->n[4]; - - /* Reduce t4 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */ - uint64_t m; - uint64_t x = t4 >> 48; t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - - /* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */ - t0 += x * 0x1000003D1ULL; - t1 += (t0 >> 52); t0 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; m = t1; - t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; m &= t2; - t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; m &= t3; - - /* ... except for a possible carry at bit 48 of t4 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */ - VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 49 == 0); - - /* At most a single final reduction is needed; check if the value is >= the field characteristic */ - x = (t4 >> 48) | ((t4 == 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL) & (m == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) - & (t0 >= 0xFFFFEFFFFFC2FULL)); - - /* Apply the final reduction (for constant-time behaviour, we do it always) */ - t0 += x * 0x1000003D1ULL; - t1 += (t0 >> 52); t0 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - - /* If t4 didn't carry to bit 48 already, then it should have after any final reduction */ - VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 48 == x); - - /* Mask off the possible multiple of 2^256 from the final reduction */ - t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - - r->n[0] = t0; r->n[1] = t1; r->n[2] = t2; r->n[3] = t3; r->n[4] = t4; - -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude = 1; - r->normalized = 1; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); -#endif -} - -static void secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(secp256k1_fe *r) { - uint64_t t0 = r->n[0], t1 = r->n[1], t2 = r->n[2], t3 = r->n[3], t4 = r->n[4]; - - /* Reduce t4 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */ - uint64_t x = t4 >> 48; t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - - /* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */ - t0 += x * 0x1000003D1ULL; - t1 += (t0 >> 52); t0 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - - /* ... except for a possible carry at bit 48 of t4 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */ - VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 49 == 0); - - r->n[0] = t0; r->n[1] = t1; r->n[2] = t2; r->n[3] = t3; r->n[4] = t4; - -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude = 1; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); -#endif -} - -static void secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(secp256k1_fe *r) { - uint64_t t0 = r->n[0], t1 = r->n[1], t2 = r->n[2], t3 = r->n[3], t4 = r->n[4]; - - /* Reduce t4 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */ - uint64_t m; - uint64_t x = t4 >> 48; t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - - /* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */ - t0 += x * 0x1000003D1ULL; - t1 += (t0 >> 52); t0 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; m = t1; - t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; m &= t2; - t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; m &= t3; - - /* ... except for a possible carry at bit 48 of t4 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */ - VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 49 == 0); - - /* At most a single final reduction is needed; check if the value is >= the field characteristic */ - x = (t4 >> 48) | ((t4 == 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL) & (m == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) - & (t0 >= 0xFFFFEFFFFFC2FULL)); - - if (x) { - t0 += 0x1000003D1ULL; - t1 += (t0 >> 52); t0 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - - /* If t4 didn't carry to bit 48 already, then it should have after any final reduction */ - VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 48 == x); - - /* Mask off the possible multiple of 2^256 from the final reduction */ - t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - } - - r->n[0] = t0; r->n[1] = t1; r->n[2] = t2; r->n[3] = t3; r->n[4] = t4; - -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude = 1; - r->normalized = 1; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); -#endif -} - -static int secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero(secp256k1_fe *r) { - uint64_t t0 = r->n[0], t1 = r->n[1], t2 = r->n[2], t3 = r->n[3], t4 = r->n[4]; - - /* z0 tracks a possible raw value of 0, z1 tracks a possible raw value of P */ - uint64_t z0, z1; - - /* Reduce t4 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */ - uint64_t x = t4 >> 48; t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - - /* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */ - t0 += x * 0x1000003D1ULL; - t1 += (t0 >> 52); t0 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 = t0; z1 = t0 ^ 0x1000003D0ULL; - t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 |= t1; z1 &= t1; - t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 |= t2; z1 &= t2; - t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 |= t3; z1 &= t3; - z0 |= t4; z1 &= t4 ^ 0xF000000000000ULL; - - /* ... except for a possible carry at bit 48 of t4 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */ - VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 49 == 0); - - return (z0 == 0) | (z1 == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL); -} - -static int secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(secp256k1_fe *r) { - uint64_t t0, t1, t2, t3, t4; - uint64_t z0, z1; - uint64_t x; - - t0 = r->n[0]; - t4 = r->n[4]; - - /* Reduce t4 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */ - x = t4 >> 48; - - /* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */ - t0 += x * 0x1000003D1ULL; - - /* z0 tracks a possible raw value of 0, z1 tracks a possible raw value of P */ - z0 = t0 & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - z1 = z0 ^ 0x1000003D0ULL; - - /* Fast return path should catch the majority of cases */ - if ((z0 != 0ULL) & (z1 != 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL)) { - return 0; - } - - t1 = r->n[1]; - t2 = r->n[2]; - t3 = r->n[3]; - - t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - - t1 += (t0 >> 52); - t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 |= t1; z1 &= t1; - t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 |= t2; z1 &= t2; - t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 |= t3; z1 &= t3; - z0 |= t4; z1 &= t4 ^ 0xF000000000000ULL; - - /* ... except for a possible carry at bit 48 of t4 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */ - VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 49 == 0); - - return (z0 == 0) | (z1 == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL); -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_set_int(secp256k1_fe *r, int a) { - r->n[0] = a; - r->n[1] = r->n[2] = r->n[3] = r->n[4] = 0; -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude = 1; - r->normalized = 1; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); -#endif -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_fe_is_zero(const secp256k1_fe *a) { - const uint64_t *t = a->n; -#ifdef VERIFY - VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized); - secp256k1_fe_verify(a); -#endif - return (t[0] | t[1] | t[2] | t[3] | t[4]) == 0; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_fe_is_odd(const secp256k1_fe *a) { -#ifdef VERIFY - VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized); - secp256k1_fe_verify(a); -#endif - return a->n[0] & 1; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_clear(secp256k1_fe *a) { - int i; -#ifdef VERIFY - a->magnitude = 0; - a->normalized = 1; -#endif - for (i=0; i<5; i++) { - a->n[i] = 0; - } -} - -static int secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) { - int i; -#ifdef VERIFY - VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized); - VERIFY_CHECK(b->normalized); - secp256k1_fe_verify(a); - secp256k1_fe_verify(b); -#endif - for (i = 4; i >= 0; i--) { - if (a->n[i] > b->n[i]) { - return 1; - } - if (a->n[i] < b->n[i]) { - return -1; - } - } - return 0; -} - -static int secp256k1_fe_set_b32(secp256k1_fe *r, const unsigned char *a) { - r->n[0] = (uint64_t)a[31] - | ((uint64_t)a[30] << 8) - | ((uint64_t)a[29] << 16) - | ((uint64_t)a[28] << 24) - | ((uint64_t)a[27] << 32) - | ((uint64_t)a[26] << 40) - | ((uint64_t)(a[25] & 0xF) << 48); - r->n[1] = (uint64_t)((a[25] >> 4) & 0xF) - | ((uint64_t)a[24] << 4) - | ((uint64_t)a[23] << 12) - | ((uint64_t)a[22] << 20) - | ((uint64_t)a[21] << 28) - | ((uint64_t)a[20] << 36) - | ((uint64_t)a[19] << 44); - r->n[2] = (uint64_t)a[18] - | ((uint64_t)a[17] << 8) - | ((uint64_t)a[16] << 16) - | ((uint64_t)a[15] << 24) - | ((uint64_t)a[14] << 32) - | ((uint64_t)a[13] << 40) - | ((uint64_t)(a[12] & 0xF) << 48); - r->n[3] = (uint64_t)((a[12] >> 4) & 0xF) - | ((uint64_t)a[11] << 4) - | ((uint64_t)a[10] << 12) - | ((uint64_t)a[9] << 20) - | ((uint64_t)a[8] << 28) - | ((uint64_t)a[7] << 36) - | ((uint64_t)a[6] << 44); - r->n[4] = (uint64_t)a[5] - | ((uint64_t)a[4] << 8) - | ((uint64_t)a[3] << 16) - | ((uint64_t)a[2] << 24) - | ((uint64_t)a[1] << 32) - | ((uint64_t)a[0] << 40); - if (r->n[4] == 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL && (r->n[3] & r->n[2] & r->n[1]) == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL && r->n[0] >= 0xFFFFEFFFFFC2FULL) { - return 0; - } -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude = 1; - r->normalized = 1; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); -#endif - return 1; -} - -/** Convert a field element to a 32-byte big endian value. Requires the input to be normalized */ -static void secp256k1_fe_get_b32(unsigned char *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { -#ifdef VERIFY - VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized); - secp256k1_fe_verify(a); -#endif - r[0] = (a->n[4] >> 40) & 0xFF; - r[1] = (a->n[4] >> 32) & 0xFF; - r[2] = (a->n[4] >> 24) & 0xFF; - r[3] = (a->n[4] >> 16) & 0xFF; - r[4] = (a->n[4] >> 8) & 0xFF; - r[5] = a->n[4] & 0xFF; - r[6] = (a->n[3] >> 44) & 0xFF; - r[7] = (a->n[3] >> 36) & 0xFF; - r[8] = (a->n[3] >> 28) & 0xFF; - r[9] = (a->n[3] >> 20) & 0xFF; - r[10] = (a->n[3] >> 12) & 0xFF; - r[11] = (a->n[3] >> 4) & 0xFF; - r[12] = ((a->n[2] >> 48) & 0xF) | ((a->n[3] & 0xF) << 4); - r[13] = (a->n[2] >> 40) & 0xFF; - r[14] = (a->n[2] >> 32) & 0xFF; - r[15] = (a->n[2] >> 24) & 0xFF; - r[16] = (a->n[2] >> 16) & 0xFF; - r[17] = (a->n[2] >> 8) & 0xFF; - r[18] = a->n[2] & 0xFF; - r[19] = (a->n[1] >> 44) & 0xFF; - r[20] = (a->n[1] >> 36) & 0xFF; - r[21] = (a->n[1] >> 28) & 0xFF; - r[22] = (a->n[1] >> 20) & 0xFF; - r[23] = (a->n[1] >> 12) & 0xFF; - r[24] = (a->n[1] >> 4) & 0xFF; - r[25] = ((a->n[0] >> 48) & 0xF) | ((a->n[1] & 0xF) << 4); - r[26] = (a->n[0] >> 40) & 0xFF; - r[27] = (a->n[0] >> 32) & 0xFF; - r[28] = (a->n[0] >> 24) & 0xFF; - r[29] = (a->n[0] >> 16) & 0xFF; - r[30] = (a->n[0] >> 8) & 0xFF; - r[31] = a->n[0] & 0xFF; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_negate(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, int m) { -#ifdef VERIFY - VERIFY_CHECK(a->magnitude <= m); - secp256k1_fe_verify(a); -#endif - r->n[0] = 0xFFFFEFFFFFC2FULL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[0]; - r->n[1] = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[1]; - r->n[2] = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[2]; - r->n[3] = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[3]; - r->n[4] = 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[4]; -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude = m + 1; - r->normalized = 0; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); -#endif -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_mul_int(secp256k1_fe *r, int a) { - r->n[0] *= a; - r->n[1] *= a; - r->n[2] *= a; - r->n[3] *= a; - r->n[4] *= a; -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude *= a; - r->normalized = 0; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); -#endif -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_add(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { -#ifdef VERIFY - secp256k1_fe_verify(a); -#endif - r->n[0] += a->n[0]; - r->n[1] += a->n[1]; - r->n[2] += a->n[2]; - r->n[3] += a->n[3]; - r->n[4] += a->n[4]; -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude += a->magnitude; - r->normalized = 0; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); -#endif -} - -static void secp256k1_fe_mul(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe * SECP256K1_RESTRICT b) { -#ifdef VERIFY - VERIFY_CHECK(a->magnitude <= 8); - VERIFY_CHECK(b->magnitude <= 8); - secp256k1_fe_verify(a); - secp256k1_fe_verify(b); - VERIFY_CHECK(r != b); -#endif - secp256k1_fe_mul_inner(r->n, a->n, b->n); -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude = 1; - r->normalized = 0; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); -#endif -} - -static void secp256k1_fe_sqr(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { -#ifdef VERIFY - VERIFY_CHECK(a->magnitude <= 8); - secp256k1_fe_verify(a); -#endif - secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner(r->n, a->n); -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude = 1; - r->normalized = 0; - secp256k1_fe_verify(r); -#endif -} - -static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_cmov(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, int flag) { - uint64_t mask0, mask1; - mask0 = flag + ~((uint64_t)0); - mask1 = ~mask0; - r->n[0] = (r->n[0] & mask0) | (a->n[0] & mask1); - r->n[1] = (r->n[1] & mask0) | (a->n[1] & mask1); - r->n[2] = (r->n[2] & mask0) | (a->n[2] & mask1); - r->n[3] = (r->n[3] & mask0) | (a->n[3] & mask1); - r->n[4] = (r->n[4] & mask0) | (a->n[4] & mask1); -#ifdef VERIFY - if (a->magnitude > r->magnitude) { - r->magnitude = a->magnitude; - } - r->normalized &= a->normalized; -#endif -} - -static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(secp256k1_fe_storage *r, const secp256k1_fe_storage *a, int flag) { - uint64_t mask0, mask1; - mask0 = flag + ~((uint64_t)0); - mask1 = ~mask0; - r->n[0] = (r->n[0] & mask0) | (a->n[0] & mask1); - r->n[1] = (r->n[1] & mask0) | (a->n[1] & mask1); - r->n[2] = (r->n[2] & mask0) | (a->n[2] & mask1); - r->n[3] = (r->n[3] & mask0) | (a->n[3] & mask1); -} - -static void secp256k1_fe_to_storage(secp256k1_fe_storage *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { -#ifdef VERIFY - VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized); -#endif - r->n[0] = a->n[0] | a->n[1] << 52; - r->n[1] = a->n[1] >> 12 | a->n[2] << 40; - r->n[2] = a->n[2] >> 24 | a->n[3] << 28; - r->n[3] = a->n[3] >> 36 | a->n[4] << 16; -} - -static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_from_storage(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe_storage *a) { - r->n[0] = a->n[0] & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - r->n[1] = a->n[0] >> 52 | ((a->n[1] << 12) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL); - r->n[2] = a->n[1] >> 40 | ((a->n[2] << 24) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL); - r->n[3] = a->n[2] >> 28 | ((a->n[3] << 36) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL); - r->n[4] = a->n[3] >> 16; -#ifdef VERIFY - r->magnitude = 1; - r->normalized = 1; -#endif -} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_int128_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_int128_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 95a0d17..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_5x52_int128_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,277 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_FIELD_INNER5X52_IMPL_H -#define SECP256K1_FIELD_INNER5X52_IMPL_H - -#include - -#ifdef VERIFY -#define VERIFY_BITS(x, n) VERIFY_CHECK(((x) >> (n)) == 0) -#else -#define VERIFY_BITS(x, n) do { } while(0) -#endif - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_mul_inner(uint64_t *r, const uint64_t *a, const uint64_t * SECP256K1_RESTRICT b) { - uint128_t c, d; - uint64_t t3, t4, tx, u0; - uint64_t a0 = a[0], a1 = a[1], a2 = a[2], a3 = a[3], a4 = a[4]; - const uint64_t M = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, R = 0x1000003D10ULL; - - VERIFY_BITS(a[0], 56); - VERIFY_BITS(a[1], 56); - VERIFY_BITS(a[2], 56); - VERIFY_BITS(a[3], 56); - VERIFY_BITS(a[4], 52); - VERIFY_BITS(b[0], 56); - VERIFY_BITS(b[1], 56); - VERIFY_BITS(b[2], 56); - VERIFY_BITS(b[3], 56); - VERIFY_BITS(b[4], 52); - VERIFY_CHECK(r != b); - - /* [... a b c] is a shorthand for ... + a<<104 + b<<52 + c<<0 mod n. - * px is a shorthand for sum(a[i]*b[x-i], i=0..x). - * Note that [x 0 0 0 0 0] = [x*R]. - */ - - d = (uint128_t)a0 * b[3] - + (uint128_t)a1 * b[2] - + (uint128_t)a2 * b[1] - + (uint128_t)a3 * b[0]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 114); - /* [d 0 0 0] = [p3 0 0 0] */ - c = (uint128_t)a4 * b[4]; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 112); - /* [c 0 0 0 0 d 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 0 p3 0 0 0] */ - d += (c & M) * R; c >>= 52; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 115); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 60); - /* [c 0 0 0 0 0 d 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 0 p3 0 0 0] */ - t3 = d & M; d >>= 52; - VERIFY_BITS(t3, 52); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); - /* [c 0 0 0 0 d t3 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 0 p3 0 0 0] */ - - d += (uint128_t)a0 * b[4] - + (uint128_t)a1 * b[3] - + (uint128_t)a2 * b[2] - + (uint128_t)a3 * b[1] - + (uint128_t)a4 * b[0]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 115); - /* [c 0 0 0 0 d t3 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 p4 p3 0 0 0] */ - d += c * R; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 116); - /* [d t3 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 p4 p3 0 0 0] */ - t4 = d & M; d >>= 52; - VERIFY_BITS(t4, 52); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 64); - /* [d t4 t3 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 p4 p3 0 0 0] */ - tx = (t4 >> 48); t4 &= (M >> 4); - VERIFY_BITS(tx, 4); - VERIFY_BITS(t4, 48); - /* [d t4+(tx<<48) t3 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 p4 p3 0 0 0] */ - - c = (uint128_t)a0 * b[0]; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 112); - /* [d t4+(tx<<48) t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 0 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ - d += (uint128_t)a1 * b[4] - + (uint128_t)a2 * b[3] - + (uint128_t)a3 * b[2] - + (uint128_t)a4 * b[1]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 115); - /* [d t4+(tx<<48) t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ - u0 = d & M; d >>= 52; - VERIFY_BITS(u0, 52); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); - /* [d u0 t4+(tx<<48) t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ - /* [d 0 t4+(tx<<48)+(u0<<52) t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ - u0 = (u0 << 4) | tx; - VERIFY_BITS(u0, 56); - /* [d 0 t4+(u0<<48) t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ - c += (uint128_t)u0 * (R >> 4); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 115); - /* [d 0 t4 t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ - r[0] = c & M; c >>= 52; - VERIFY_BITS(r[0], 52); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 61); - /* [d 0 t4 t3 0 c r0] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ - - c += (uint128_t)a0 * b[1] - + (uint128_t)a1 * b[0]; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 114); - /* [d 0 t4 t3 0 c r0] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 p1 p0] */ - d += (uint128_t)a2 * b[4] - + (uint128_t)a3 * b[3] - + (uint128_t)a4 * b[2]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 114); - /* [d 0 t4 t3 0 c r0] = [p8 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 0 p1 p0] */ - c += (d & M) * R; d >>= 52; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 115); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 62); - /* [d 0 0 t4 t3 0 c r0] = [p8 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 0 p1 p0] */ - r[1] = c & M; c >>= 52; - VERIFY_BITS(r[1], 52); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); - /* [d 0 0 t4 t3 c r1 r0] = [p8 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 0 p1 p0] */ - - c += (uint128_t)a0 * b[2] - + (uint128_t)a1 * b[1] - + (uint128_t)a2 * b[0]; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 114); - /* [d 0 0 t4 t3 c r1 r0] = [p8 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - d += (uint128_t)a3 * b[4] - + (uint128_t)a4 * b[3]; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 114); - /* [d 0 0 t4 t3 c t1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - c += (d & M) * R; d >>= 52; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 115); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 62); - /* [d 0 0 0 t4 t3 c r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - - /* [d 0 0 0 t4 t3 c r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[2] = c & M; c >>= 52; - VERIFY_BITS(r[2], 52); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); - /* [d 0 0 0 t4 t3+c r2 r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - c += d * R + t3; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 100); - /* [t4 c r2 r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[3] = c & M; c >>= 52; - VERIFY_BITS(r[3], 52); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 48); - /* [t4+c r3 r2 r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - c += t4; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 49); - /* [c r3 r2 r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[4] = c; - VERIFY_BITS(r[4], 49); - /* [r4 r3 r2 r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner(uint64_t *r, const uint64_t *a) { - uint128_t c, d; - uint64_t a0 = a[0], a1 = a[1], a2 = a[2], a3 = a[3], a4 = a[4]; - int64_t t3, t4, tx, u0; - const uint64_t M = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, R = 0x1000003D10ULL; - - VERIFY_BITS(a[0], 56); - VERIFY_BITS(a[1], 56); - VERIFY_BITS(a[2], 56); - VERIFY_BITS(a[3], 56); - VERIFY_BITS(a[4], 52); - - /** [... a b c] is a shorthand for ... + a<<104 + b<<52 + c<<0 mod n. - * px is a shorthand for sum(a[i]*a[x-i], i=0..x). - * Note that [x 0 0 0 0 0] = [x*R]. - */ - - d = (uint128_t)(a0*2) * a3 - + (uint128_t)(a1*2) * a2; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 114); - /* [d 0 0 0] = [p3 0 0 0] */ - c = (uint128_t)a4 * a4; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 112); - /* [c 0 0 0 0 d 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 0 p3 0 0 0] */ - d += (c & M) * R; c >>= 52; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 115); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 60); - /* [c 0 0 0 0 0 d 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 0 p3 0 0 0] */ - t3 = d & M; d >>= 52; - VERIFY_BITS(t3, 52); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 63); - /* [c 0 0 0 0 d t3 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 0 p3 0 0 0] */ - - a4 *= 2; - d += (uint128_t)a0 * a4 - + (uint128_t)(a1*2) * a3 - + (uint128_t)a2 * a2; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 115); - /* [c 0 0 0 0 d t3 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 p4 p3 0 0 0] */ - d += c * R; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 116); - /* [d t3 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 p4 p3 0 0 0] */ - t4 = d & M; d >>= 52; - VERIFY_BITS(t4, 52); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 64); - /* [d t4 t3 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 p4 p3 0 0 0] */ - tx = (t4 >> 48); t4 &= (M >> 4); - VERIFY_BITS(tx, 4); - VERIFY_BITS(t4, 48); - /* [d t4+(tx<<48) t3 0 0 0] = [p8 0 0 0 p4 p3 0 0 0] */ - - c = (uint128_t)a0 * a0; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 112); - /* [d t4+(tx<<48) t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 0 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ - d += (uint128_t)a1 * a4 - + (uint128_t)(a2*2) * a3; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 114); - /* [d t4+(tx<<48) t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ - u0 = d & M; d >>= 52; - VERIFY_BITS(u0, 52); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 62); - /* [d u0 t4+(tx<<48) t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ - /* [d 0 t4+(tx<<48)+(u0<<52) t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ - u0 = (u0 << 4) | tx; - VERIFY_BITS(u0, 56); - /* [d 0 t4+(u0<<48) t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ - c += (uint128_t)u0 * (R >> 4); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 113); - /* [d 0 t4 t3 0 0 c] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ - r[0] = c & M; c >>= 52; - VERIFY_BITS(r[0], 52); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 61); - /* [d 0 t4 t3 0 c r0] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 0 p0] */ - - a0 *= 2; - c += (uint128_t)a0 * a1; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 114); - /* [d 0 t4 t3 0 c r0] = [p8 0 0 p5 p4 p3 0 p1 p0] */ - d += (uint128_t)a2 * a4 - + (uint128_t)a3 * a3; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 114); - /* [d 0 t4 t3 0 c r0] = [p8 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 0 p1 p0] */ - c += (d & M) * R; d >>= 52; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 115); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 62); - /* [d 0 0 t4 t3 0 c r0] = [p8 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 0 p1 p0] */ - r[1] = c & M; c >>= 52; - VERIFY_BITS(r[1], 52); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); - /* [d 0 0 t4 t3 c r1 r0] = [p8 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 0 p1 p0] */ - - c += (uint128_t)a0 * a2 - + (uint128_t)a1 * a1; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 114); - /* [d 0 0 t4 t3 c r1 r0] = [p8 0 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - d += (uint128_t)a3 * a4; - VERIFY_BITS(d, 114); - /* [d 0 0 t4 t3 c r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - c += (d & M) * R; d >>= 52; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 115); - VERIFY_BITS(d, 62); - /* [d 0 0 0 t4 t3 c r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[2] = c & M; c >>= 52; - VERIFY_BITS(r[2], 52); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 63); - /* [d 0 0 0 t4 t3+c r2 r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - - c += d * R + t3; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 100); - /* [t4 c r2 r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[3] = c & M; c >>= 52; - VERIFY_BITS(r[3], 52); - VERIFY_BITS(c, 48); - /* [t4+c r3 r2 r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - c += t4; - VERIFY_BITS(c, 49); - /* [c r3 r2 r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ - r[4] = c; - VERIFY_BITS(r[4], 49); - /* [r4 r3 r2 r1 r0] = [p8 p7 p6 p5 p4 p3 p2 p1 p0] */ -} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_FIELD_INNER5X52_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 2042864..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/field_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,315 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_FIELD_IMPL_H -#define SECP256K1_FIELD_IMPL_H - -#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H -#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" -#endif - -#include "util.h" - -#if defined(USE_FIELD_10X26) -#include "field_10x26_impl.h" -#elif defined(USE_FIELD_5X52) -#include "field_5x52_impl.h" -#else -#error "Please select field implementation" -#endif - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_fe_equal(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) { - secp256k1_fe na; - secp256k1_fe_negate(&na, a, 1); - secp256k1_fe_add(&na, b); - return secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero(&na); -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_fe_equal_var(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) { - secp256k1_fe na; - secp256k1_fe_negate(&na, a, 1); - secp256k1_fe_add(&na, b); - return secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&na); -} - -static int secp256k1_fe_sqrt(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { - /** Given that p is congruent to 3 mod 4, we can compute the square root of - * a mod p as the (p+1)/4'th power of a. - * - * As (p+1)/4 is an even number, it will have the same result for a and for - * (-a). Only one of these two numbers actually has a square root however, - * so we test at the end by squaring and comparing to the input. - * Also because (p+1)/4 is an even number, the computed square root is - * itself always a square (a ** ((p+1)/4) is the square of a ** ((p+1)/8)). - */ - secp256k1_fe x2, x3, x6, x9, x11, x22, x44, x88, x176, x220, x223, t1; - int j; - - /** The binary representation of (p + 1)/4 has 3 blocks of 1s, with lengths in - * { 2, 22, 223 }. Use an addition chain to calculate 2^n - 1 for each block: - * 1, [2], 3, 6, 9, 11, [22], 44, 88, 176, 220, [223] - */ - - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x2, a); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x2, &x2, a); - - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x3, &x2); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, &x3, a); - - x6 = x3; - for (j=0; j<3; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x6, &x6); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x6, &x6, &x3); - - x9 = x6; - for (j=0; j<3; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x9, &x9); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x9, &x9, &x3); - - x11 = x9; - for (j=0; j<2; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x11, &x11); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x11, &x11, &x2); - - x22 = x11; - for (j=0; j<11; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x22, &x22); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x22, &x22, &x11); - - x44 = x22; - for (j=0; j<22; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x44, &x44); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x44, &x44, &x22); - - x88 = x44; - for (j=0; j<44; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x88, &x88); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x88, &x88, &x44); - - x176 = x88; - for (j=0; j<88; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x176, &x176); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x176, &x176, &x88); - - x220 = x176; - for (j=0; j<44; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x220, &x220); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x220, &x220, &x44); - - x223 = x220; - for (j=0; j<3; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x223, &x223); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x223, &x223, &x3); - - /* The final result is then assembled using a sliding window over the blocks. */ - - t1 = x223; - for (j=0; j<23; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t1, &t1); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&t1, &t1, &x22); - for (j=0; j<6; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t1, &t1); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&t1, &t1, &x2); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t1, &t1); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(r, &t1); - - /* Check that a square root was actually calculated */ - - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t1, r); - return secp256k1_fe_equal(&t1, a); -} - -static void secp256k1_fe_inv(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { - secp256k1_fe x2, x3, x6, x9, x11, x22, x44, x88, x176, x220, x223, t1; - int j; - - /** The binary representation of (p - 2) has 5 blocks of 1s, with lengths in - * { 1, 2, 22, 223 }. Use an addition chain to calculate 2^n - 1 for each block: - * [1], [2], 3, 6, 9, 11, [22], 44, 88, 176, 220, [223] - */ - - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x2, a); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x2, &x2, a); - - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x3, &x2); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, &x3, a); - - x6 = x3; - for (j=0; j<3; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x6, &x6); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x6, &x6, &x3); - - x9 = x6; - for (j=0; j<3; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x9, &x9); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x9, &x9, &x3); - - x11 = x9; - for (j=0; j<2; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x11, &x11); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x11, &x11, &x2); - - x22 = x11; - for (j=0; j<11; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x22, &x22); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x22, &x22, &x11); - - x44 = x22; - for (j=0; j<22; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x44, &x44); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x44, &x44, &x22); - - x88 = x44; - for (j=0; j<44; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x88, &x88); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x88, &x88, &x44); - - x176 = x88; - for (j=0; j<88; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x176, &x176); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x176, &x176, &x88); - - x220 = x176; - for (j=0; j<44; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x220, &x220); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x220, &x220, &x44); - - x223 = x220; - for (j=0; j<3; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x223, &x223); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x223, &x223, &x3); - - /* The final result is then assembled using a sliding window over the blocks. */ - - t1 = x223; - for (j=0; j<23; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t1, &t1); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&t1, &t1, &x22); - for (j=0; j<5; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t1, &t1); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&t1, &t1, a); - for (j=0; j<3; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t1, &t1); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&t1, &t1, &x2); - for (j=0; j<2; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t1, &t1); - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(r, a, &t1); -} - -static void secp256k1_fe_inv_var(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) { -#if defined(USE_FIELD_INV_BUILTIN) - secp256k1_fe_inv(r, a); -#elif defined(USE_FIELD_INV_NUM) - secp256k1_num n, m; - static const secp256k1_fe negone = SECP256K1_FE_CONST( - 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, - 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFEUL, 0xFFFFFC2EUL - ); - /* secp256k1 field prime, value p defined in "Standards for Efficient Cryptography" (SEC2) 2.7.1. */ - static const unsigned char prime[32] = { - 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, - 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, - 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, - 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFE,0xFF,0xFF,0xFC,0x2F - }; - unsigned char b[32]; - int res; - secp256k1_fe c = *a; - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&c); - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(b, &c); - secp256k1_num_set_bin(&n, b, 32); - secp256k1_num_set_bin(&m, prime, 32); - secp256k1_num_mod_inverse(&n, &n, &m); - secp256k1_num_get_bin(b, 32, &n); - res = secp256k1_fe_set_b32(r, b); - (void)res; - VERIFY_CHECK(res); - /* Verify the result is the (unique) valid inverse using non-GMP code. */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&c, &c, r); - secp256k1_fe_add(&c, &negone); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&c)); -#else -#error "Please select field inverse implementation" -#endif -} - -static void secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, size_t len) { - secp256k1_fe u; - size_t i; - if (len < 1) { - return; - } - - VERIFY_CHECK((r + len <= a) || (a + len <= r)); - - r[0] = a[0]; - - i = 0; - while (++i < len) { - secp256k1_fe_mul(&r[i], &r[i - 1], &a[i]); - } - - secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&u, &r[--i]); - - while (i > 0) { - size_t j = i--; - secp256k1_fe_mul(&r[j], &r[i], &u); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&u, &u, &a[j]); - } - - r[0] = u; -} - -static int secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(const secp256k1_fe *a) { -#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE - unsigned char b[32]; - secp256k1_num n; - secp256k1_num m; - /* secp256k1 field prime, value p defined in "Standards for Efficient Cryptography" (SEC2) 2.7.1. */ - static const unsigned char prime[32] = { - 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, - 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, - 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, - 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFE,0xFF,0xFF,0xFC,0x2F - }; - - secp256k1_fe c = *a; - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&c); - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(b, &c); - secp256k1_num_set_bin(&n, b, 32); - secp256k1_num_set_bin(&m, prime, 32); - return secp256k1_num_jacobi(&n, &m) >= 0; -#else - secp256k1_fe r; - return secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&r, a); -#endif -} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_FIELD_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/gen_context.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/gen_context.c deleted file mode 100644 index 87d296e..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/gen_context.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,74 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014, 2015 Thomas Daede, Cory Fields * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#define USE_BASIC_CONFIG 1 - -#include "basic-config.h" -#include "include/secp256k1.h" -#include "field_impl.h" -#include "scalar_impl.h" -#include "group_impl.h" -#include "ecmult_gen_impl.h" - -static void default_error_callback_fn(const char* str, void* data) { - (void)data; - fprintf(stderr, "[libsecp256k1] internal consistency check failed: %s\n", str); - abort(); -} - -static const secp256k1_callback default_error_callback = { - default_error_callback_fn, - NULL -}; - -int main(int argc, char **argv) { - secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context ctx; - int inner; - int outer; - FILE* fp; - - (void)argc; - (void)argv; - - fp = fopen("src/ecmult_static_context.h","w"); - if (fp == NULL) { - fprintf(stderr, "Could not open src/ecmult_static_context.h for writing!\n"); - return -1; - } - - fprintf(fp, "#ifndef _SECP256K1_ECMULT_STATIC_CONTEXT_\n"); - fprintf(fp, "#define _SECP256K1_ECMULT_STATIC_CONTEXT_\n"); - fprintf(fp, "#include \"src/group.h\"\n"); - fprintf(fp, "#define SC SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST\n"); - fprintf(fp, "static const secp256k1_ge_storage secp256k1_ecmult_static_context[64][16] = {\n"); - - secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_init(&ctx); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_build(&ctx, &default_error_callback); - for(outer = 0; outer != 64; outer++) { - fprintf(fp,"{\n"); - for(inner = 0; inner != 16; inner++) { - fprintf(fp," SC(%uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu, %uu)", SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST_GET((*ctx.prec)[outer][inner])); - if (inner != 15) { - fprintf(fp,",\n"); - } else { - fprintf(fp,"\n"); - } - } - if (outer != 63) { - fprintf(fp,"},\n"); - } else { - fprintf(fp,"}\n"); - } - } - fprintf(fp,"};\n"); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_clear(&ctx); - - fprintf(fp, "#undef SC\n"); - fprintf(fp, "#endif\n"); - fclose(fp); - - return 0; -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/group.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/group.h deleted file mode 100644 index 3947ea2..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/group.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,147 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_GROUP_H -#define SECP256K1_GROUP_H - -#include "num.h" -#include "field.h" - -/** A group element of the secp256k1 curve, in affine coordinates. */ -typedef struct { - secp256k1_fe x; - secp256k1_fe y; - int infinity; /* whether this represents the point at infinity */ -} secp256k1_ge; - -#define SECP256K1_GE_CONST(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p) {SECP256K1_FE_CONST((a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f),(g),(h)), SECP256K1_FE_CONST((i),(j),(k),(l),(m),(n),(o),(p)), 0} -#define SECP256K1_GE_CONST_INFINITY {SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), 1} - -/** A group element of the secp256k1 curve, in jacobian coordinates. */ -typedef struct { - secp256k1_fe x; /* actual X: x/z^2 */ - secp256k1_fe y; /* actual Y: y/z^3 */ - secp256k1_fe z; - int infinity; /* whether this represents the point at infinity */ -} secp256k1_gej; - -#define SECP256K1_GEJ_CONST(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p) {SECP256K1_FE_CONST((a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f),(g),(h)), SECP256K1_FE_CONST((i),(j),(k),(l),(m),(n),(o),(p)), SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1), 0} -#define SECP256K1_GEJ_CONST_INFINITY {SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), 1} - -typedef struct { - secp256k1_fe_storage x; - secp256k1_fe_storage y; -} secp256k1_ge_storage; - -#define SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p) {SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST((a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f),(g),(h)), SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST((i),(j),(k),(l),(m),(n),(o),(p))} - -#define SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST_GET(t) SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST_GET(t.x), SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST_GET(t.y) - -/** Set a group element equal to the point with given X and Y coordinates */ -static void secp256k1_ge_set_xy(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_fe *x, const secp256k1_fe *y); - -/** Set a group element (affine) equal to the point with the given X coordinate - * and a Y coordinate that is a quadratic residue modulo p. The return value - * is true iff a coordinate with the given X coordinate exists. - */ -static int secp256k1_ge_set_xquad(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_fe *x); - -/** Set a group element (affine) equal to the point with the given X coordinate, and given oddness - * for Y. Return value indicates whether the result is valid. */ -static int secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_fe *x, int odd); - -/** Check whether a group element is the point at infinity. */ -static int secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(const secp256k1_ge *a); - -/** Check whether a group element is valid (i.e., on the curve). */ -static int secp256k1_ge_is_valid_var(const secp256k1_ge *a); - -static void secp256k1_ge_neg(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge *a); - -/** Set a group element equal to another which is given in jacobian coordinates */ -static void secp256k1_ge_set_gej(secp256k1_ge *r, secp256k1_gej *a); - -/** Set a batch of group elements equal to the inputs given in jacobian coordinates */ -static void secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, size_t len, const secp256k1_callback *cb); - -/** Set a batch of group elements equal to the inputs given in jacobian - * coordinates (with known z-ratios). zr must contain the known z-ratios such - * that mul(a[i].z, zr[i+1]) == a[i+1].z. zr[0] is ignored. */ -static void secp256k1_ge_set_table_gej_var(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_fe *zr, size_t len); - -/** Bring a batch inputs given in jacobian coordinates (with known z-ratios) to - * the same global z "denominator". zr must contain the known z-ratios such - * that mul(a[i].z, zr[i+1]) == a[i+1].z. zr[0] is ignored. The x and y - * coordinates of the result are stored in r, the common z coordinate is - * stored in globalz. */ -static void secp256k1_ge_globalz_set_table_gej(size_t len, secp256k1_ge *r, secp256k1_fe *globalz, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_fe *zr); - -/** Set a group element (affine) equal to the point at infinity. */ -static void secp256k1_ge_set_infinity(secp256k1_ge *r); - -/** Set a group element (jacobian) equal to the point at infinity. */ -static void secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(secp256k1_gej *r); - -/** Set a group element (jacobian) equal to another which is given in affine coordinates. */ -static void secp256k1_gej_set_ge(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_ge *a); - -/** Compare the X coordinate of a group element (jacobian). */ -static int secp256k1_gej_eq_x_var(const secp256k1_fe *x, const secp256k1_gej *a); - -/** Set r equal to the inverse of a (i.e., mirrored around the X axis) */ -static void secp256k1_gej_neg(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a); - -/** Check whether a group element is the point at infinity. */ -static int secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(const secp256k1_gej *a); - -/** Check whether a group element's y coordinate is a quadratic residue. */ -static int secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(const secp256k1_gej *a); - -/** Set r equal to the double of a. If rzr is not-NULL, r->z = a->z * *rzr (where infinity means an implicit z = 0). - * a may not be zero. Constant time. */ -static void secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, secp256k1_fe *rzr); - -/** Set r equal to the double of a. If rzr is not-NULL, r->z = a->z * *rzr (where infinity means an implicit z = 0). */ -static void secp256k1_gej_double_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, secp256k1_fe *rzr); - -/** Set r equal to the sum of a and b. If rzr is non-NULL, r->z = a->z * *rzr (a cannot be infinity in that case). */ -static void secp256k1_gej_add_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_gej *b, secp256k1_fe *rzr); - -/** Set r equal to the sum of a and b (with b given in affine coordinates, and not infinity). */ -static void secp256k1_gej_add_ge(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_ge *b); - -/** Set r equal to the sum of a and b (with b given in affine coordinates). This is more efficient - than secp256k1_gej_add_var. It is identical to secp256k1_gej_add_ge but without constant-time - guarantee, and b is allowed to be infinity. If rzr is non-NULL, r->z = a->z * *rzr (a cannot be infinity in that case). */ -static void secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_ge *b, secp256k1_fe *rzr); - -/** Set r equal to the sum of a and b (with the inverse of b's Z coordinate passed as bzinv). */ -static void secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_ge *b, const secp256k1_fe *bzinv); - -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM -/** Set r to be equal to lambda times a, where lambda is chosen in a way such that this is very fast. */ -static void secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge *a); -#endif - -/** Clear a secp256k1_gej to prevent leaking sensitive information. */ -static void secp256k1_gej_clear(secp256k1_gej *r); - -/** Clear a secp256k1_ge to prevent leaking sensitive information. */ -static void secp256k1_ge_clear(secp256k1_ge *r); - -/** Convert a group element to the storage type. */ -static void secp256k1_ge_to_storage(secp256k1_ge_storage *r, const secp256k1_ge *a); - -/** Convert a group element back from the storage type. */ -static void secp256k1_ge_from_storage(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge_storage *a); - -/** If flag is true, set *r equal to *a; otherwise leave it. Constant-time. */ -static void secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(secp256k1_ge_storage *r, const secp256k1_ge_storage *a, int flag); - -/** Rescale a jacobian point by b which must be non-zero. Constant-time. */ -static void secp256k1_gej_rescale(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_fe *b); - -#endif /* SECP256K1_GROUP_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/group_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/group_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index b1ace87..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/group_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,706 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_GROUP_IMPL_H -#define SECP256K1_GROUP_IMPL_H - -#include "num.h" -#include "field.h" -#include "group.h" - -/* These points can be generated in sage as follows: - * - * 0. Setup a worksheet with the following parameters. - * b = 4 # whatever CURVE_B will be set to - * F = FiniteField (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFC2F) - * C = EllipticCurve ([F (0), F (b)]) - * - * 1. Determine all the small orders available to you. (If there are - * no satisfactory ones, go back and change b.) - * print C.order().factor(limit=1000) - * - * 2. Choose an order as one of the prime factors listed in the above step. - * (You can also multiply some to get a composite order, though the - * tests will crash trying to invert scalars during signing.) We take a - * random point and scale it to drop its order to the desired value. - * There is some probability this won't work; just try again. - * order = 199 - * P = C.random_point() - * P = (int(P.order()) / int(order)) * P - * assert(P.order() == order) - * - * 3. Print the values. You'll need to use a vim macro or something to - * split the hex output into 4-byte chunks. - * print "%x %x" % P.xy() - */ -#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) -# if EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 199 -const secp256k1_ge secp256k1_ge_const_g = SECP256K1_GE_CONST( - 0xFA7CC9A7, 0x0737F2DB, 0xA749DD39, 0x2B4FB069, - 0x3B017A7D, 0xA808C2F1, 0xFB12940C, 0x9EA66C18, - 0x78AC123A, 0x5ED8AEF3, 0x8732BC91, 0x1F3A2868, - 0x48DF246C, 0x808DAE72, 0xCFE52572, 0x7F0501ED -); - -const int CURVE_B = 4; -# elif EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 13 -const secp256k1_ge secp256k1_ge_const_g = SECP256K1_GE_CONST( - 0xedc60018, 0xa51a786b, 0x2ea91f4d, 0x4c9416c0, - 0x9de54c3b, 0xa1316554, 0x6cf4345c, 0x7277ef15, - 0x54cb1b6b, 0xdc8c1273, 0x087844ea, 0x43f4603e, - 0x0eaf9a43, 0xf6effe55, 0x939f806d, 0x37adf8ac -); -const int CURVE_B = 2; -# else -# error No known generator for the specified exhaustive test group order. -# endif -#else -/** Generator for secp256k1, value 'g' defined in - * "Standards for Efficient Cryptography" (SEC2) 2.7.1. - */ -static const secp256k1_ge secp256k1_ge_const_g = SECP256K1_GE_CONST( - 0x79BE667EUL, 0xF9DCBBACUL, 0x55A06295UL, 0xCE870B07UL, - 0x029BFCDBUL, 0x2DCE28D9UL, 0x59F2815BUL, 0x16F81798UL, - 0x483ADA77UL, 0x26A3C465UL, 0x5DA4FBFCUL, 0x0E1108A8UL, - 0xFD17B448UL, 0xA6855419UL, 0x9C47D08FUL, 0xFB10D4B8UL -); - -const int CURVE_B = 7; -#endif - -static void secp256k1_ge_set_gej_zinv(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_fe *zi) { - secp256k1_fe zi2; - secp256k1_fe zi3; - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&zi2, zi); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&zi3, &zi2, zi); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->x, &a->x, &zi2); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &a->y, &zi3); - r->infinity = a->infinity; -} - -static void secp256k1_ge_set_xy(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_fe *x, const secp256k1_fe *y) { - r->infinity = 0; - r->x = *x; - r->y = *y; -} - -static int secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(const secp256k1_ge *a) { - return a->infinity; -} - -static void secp256k1_ge_neg(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge *a) { - *r = *a; - secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&r->y); - secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &r->y, 1); -} - -static void secp256k1_ge_set_gej(secp256k1_ge *r, secp256k1_gej *a) { - secp256k1_fe z2, z3; - r->infinity = a->infinity; - secp256k1_fe_inv(&a->z, &a->z); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z2, &a->z); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&z3, &a->z, &z2); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&a->x, &a->x, &z2); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&a->y, &a->y, &z3); - secp256k1_fe_set_int(&a->z, 1); - r->x = a->x; - r->y = a->y; -} - -static void secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(secp256k1_ge *r, secp256k1_gej *a) { - secp256k1_fe z2, z3; - r->infinity = a->infinity; - if (a->infinity) { - return; - } - secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&a->z, &a->z); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z2, &a->z); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&z3, &a->z, &z2); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&a->x, &a->x, &z2); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&a->y, &a->y, &z3); - secp256k1_fe_set_int(&a->z, 1); - r->x = a->x; - r->y = a->y; -} - -static void secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, size_t len, const secp256k1_callback *cb) { - secp256k1_fe *az; - secp256k1_fe *azi; - size_t i; - size_t count = 0; - az = (secp256k1_fe *)checked_malloc(cb, sizeof(secp256k1_fe) * len); - for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { - if (!a[i].infinity) { - az[count++] = a[i].z; - } - } - - azi = (secp256k1_fe *)checked_malloc(cb, sizeof(secp256k1_fe) * count); - secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(azi, az, count); - free(az); - - count = 0; - for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { - r[i].infinity = a[i].infinity; - if (!a[i].infinity) { - secp256k1_ge_set_gej_zinv(&r[i], &a[i], &azi[count++]); - } - } - free(azi); -} - -static void secp256k1_ge_set_table_gej_var(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_fe *zr, size_t len) { - size_t i = len - 1; - secp256k1_fe zi; - - if (len > 0) { - /* Compute the inverse of the last z coordinate, and use it to compute the last affine output. */ - secp256k1_fe_inv(&zi, &a[i].z); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej_zinv(&r[i], &a[i], &zi); - - /* Work out way backwards, using the z-ratios to scale the x/y values. */ - while (i > 0) { - secp256k1_fe_mul(&zi, &zi, &zr[i]); - i--; - secp256k1_ge_set_gej_zinv(&r[i], &a[i], &zi); - } - } -} - -static void secp256k1_ge_globalz_set_table_gej(size_t len, secp256k1_ge *r, secp256k1_fe *globalz, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_fe *zr) { - size_t i = len - 1; - secp256k1_fe zs; - - if (len > 0) { - /* The z of the final point gives us the "global Z" for the table. */ - r[i].x = a[i].x; - r[i].y = a[i].y; - *globalz = a[i].z; - r[i].infinity = 0; - zs = zr[i]; - - /* Work our way backwards, using the z-ratios to scale the x/y values. */ - while (i > 0) { - if (i != len - 1) { - secp256k1_fe_mul(&zs, &zs, &zr[i]); - } - i--; - secp256k1_ge_set_gej_zinv(&r[i], &a[i], &zs); - } - } -} - -static void secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(secp256k1_gej *r) { - r->infinity = 1; - secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->x); - secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->y); - secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->z); -} - -static void secp256k1_ge_set_infinity(secp256k1_ge *r) { - r->infinity = 1; - secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->x); - secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->y); -} - -static void secp256k1_gej_clear(secp256k1_gej *r) { - r->infinity = 0; - secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->x); - secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->y); - secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->z); -} - -static void secp256k1_ge_clear(secp256k1_ge *r) { - r->infinity = 0; - secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->x); - secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->y); -} - -static int secp256k1_ge_set_xquad(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_fe *x) { - secp256k1_fe x2, x3, c; - r->x = *x; - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x2, x); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, x, &x2); - r->infinity = 0; - secp256k1_fe_set_int(&c, CURVE_B); - secp256k1_fe_add(&c, &x3); - return secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&r->y, &c); -} - -static int secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_fe *x, int odd) { - if (!secp256k1_ge_set_xquad(r, x)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&r->y); - if (secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r->y) != odd) { - secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &r->y, 1); - } - return 1; - -} - -static void secp256k1_gej_set_ge(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_ge *a) { - r->infinity = a->infinity; - r->x = a->x; - r->y = a->y; - secp256k1_fe_set_int(&r->z, 1); -} - -static int secp256k1_gej_eq_x_var(const secp256k1_fe *x, const secp256k1_gej *a) { - secp256k1_fe r, r2; - VERIFY_CHECK(!a->infinity); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&r, &a->z); secp256k1_fe_mul(&r, &r, x); - r2 = a->x; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&r2); - return secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&r, &r2); -} - -static void secp256k1_gej_neg(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a) { - r->infinity = a->infinity; - r->x = a->x; - r->y = a->y; - r->z = a->z; - secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&r->y); - secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &r->y, 1); -} - -static int secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(const secp256k1_gej *a) { - return a->infinity; -} - -static int secp256k1_gej_is_valid_var(const secp256k1_gej *a) { - secp256k1_fe y2, x3, z2, z6; - if (a->infinity) { - return 0; - } - /** y^2 = x^3 + 7 - * (Y/Z^3)^2 = (X/Z^2)^3 + 7 - * Y^2 / Z^6 = X^3 / Z^6 + 7 - * Y^2 = X^3 + 7*Z^6 - */ - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&y2, &a->y); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x3, &a->x); secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, &x3, &a->x); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z2, &a->z); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z6, &z2); secp256k1_fe_mul(&z6, &z6, &z2); - secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&z6, CURVE_B); - secp256k1_fe_add(&x3, &z6); - secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&x3); - return secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&y2, &x3); -} - -static int secp256k1_ge_is_valid_var(const secp256k1_ge *a) { - secp256k1_fe y2, x3, c; - if (a->infinity) { - return 0; - } - /* y^2 = x^3 + 7 */ - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&y2, &a->y); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x3, &a->x); secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, &x3, &a->x); - secp256k1_fe_set_int(&c, CURVE_B); - secp256k1_fe_add(&x3, &c); - secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&x3); - return secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&y2, &x3); -} - -static void secp256k1_gej_double_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, secp256k1_fe *rzr) { - /* Operations: 3 mul, 4 sqr, 0 normalize, 12 mul_int/add/negate. - * - * Note that there is an implementation described at - * https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-0.html#doubling-dbl-2009-l - * which trades a multiply for a square, but in practice this is actually slower, - * mainly because it requires more normalizations. - */ - secp256k1_fe t1,t2,t3,t4; - /** For secp256k1, 2Q is infinity if and only if Q is infinity. This is because if 2Q = infinity, - * Q must equal -Q, or that Q.y == -(Q.y), or Q.y is 0. For a point on y^2 = x^3 + 7 to have - * y=0, x^3 must be -7 mod p. However, -7 has no cube root mod p. - * - * Having said this, if this function receives a point on a sextic twist, e.g. by - * a fault attack, it is possible for y to be 0. This happens for y^2 = x^3 + 6, - * since -6 does have a cube root mod p. For this point, this function will not set - * the infinity flag even though the point doubles to infinity, and the result - * point will be gibberish (z = 0 but infinity = 0). - */ - r->infinity = a->infinity; - if (r->infinity) { - if (rzr != NULL) { - secp256k1_fe_set_int(rzr, 1); - } - return; - } - - if (rzr != NULL) { - *rzr = a->y; - secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(rzr); - secp256k1_fe_mul_int(rzr, 2); - } - - secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &a->z, &a->y); - secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->z, 2); /* Z' = 2*Y*Z (2) */ - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t1, &a->x); - secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&t1, 3); /* T1 = 3*X^2 (3) */ - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t2, &t1); /* T2 = 9*X^4 (1) */ - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t3, &a->y); - secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&t3, 2); /* T3 = 2*Y^2 (2) */ - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t4, &t3); - secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&t4, 2); /* T4 = 8*Y^4 (2) */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&t3, &t3, &a->x); /* T3 = 2*X*Y^2 (1) */ - r->x = t3; - secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->x, 4); /* X' = 8*X*Y^2 (4) */ - secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->x, &r->x, 4); /* X' = -8*X*Y^2 (5) */ - secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &t2); /* X' = 9*X^4 - 8*X*Y^2 (6) */ - secp256k1_fe_negate(&t2, &t2, 1); /* T2 = -9*X^4 (2) */ - secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&t3, 6); /* T3 = 12*X*Y^2 (6) */ - secp256k1_fe_add(&t3, &t2); /* T3 = 12*X*Y^2 - 9*X^4 (8) */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &t1, &t3); /* Y' = 36*X^3*Y^2 - 27*X^6 (1) */ - secp256k1_fe_negate(&t2, &t4, 2); /* T2 = -8*Y^4 (3) */ - secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &t2); /* Y' = 36*X^3*Y^2 - 27*X^6 - 8*Y^4 (4) */ -} - -static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, secp256k1_fe *rzr) { - VERIFY_CHECK(!secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(a)); - secp256k1_gej_double_var(r, a, rzr); -} - -static void secp256k1_gej_add_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_gej *b, secp256k1_fe *rzr) { - /* Operations: 12 mul, 4 sqr, 2 normalize, 12 mul_int/add/negate */ - secp256k1_fe z22, z12, u1, u2, s1, s2, h, i, i2, h2, h3, t; - - if (a->infinity) { - VERIFY_CHECK(rzr == NULL); - *r = *b; - return; - } - - if (b->infinity) { - if (rzr != NULL) { - secp256k1_fe_set_int(rzr, 1); - } - *r = *a; - return; - } - - r->infinity = 0; - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z22, &b->z); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z12, &a->z); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&u1, &a->x, &z22); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&u2, &b->x, &z12); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&s1, &a->y, &z22); secp256k1_fe_mul(&s1, &s1, &b->z); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &b->y, &z12); secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &s2, &a->z); - secp256k1_fe_negate(&h, &u1, 1); secp256k1_fe_add(&h, &u2); - secp256k1_fe_negate(&i, &s1, 1); secp256k1_fe_add(&i, &s2); - if (secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&h)) { - if (secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&i)) { - secp256k1_gej_double_var(r, a, rzr); - } else { - if (rzr != NULL) { - secp256k1_fe_set_int(rzr, 0); - } - r->infinity = 1; - } - return; - } - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&i2, &i); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&h2, &h); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&h3, &h, &h2); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&h, &h, &b->z); - if (rzr != NULL) { - *rzr = h; - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &a->z, &h); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&t, &u1, &h2); - r->x = t; secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->x, 2); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &h3); secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->x, &r->x, 3); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &i2); - secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &r->x, 5); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &t); secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &r->y, &i); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&h3, &h3, &s1); secp256k1_fe_negate(&h3, &h3, 1); - secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &h3); -} - -static void secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_ge *b, secp256k1_fe *rzr) { - /* 8 mul, 3 sqr, 4 normalize, 12 mul_int/add/negate */ - secp256k1_fe z12, u1, u2, s1, s2, h, i, i2, h2, h3, t; - if (a->infinity) { - VERIFY_CHECK(rzr == NULL); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(r, b); - return; - } - if (b->infinity) { - if (rzr != NULL) { - secp256k1_fe_set_int(rzr, 1); - } - *r = *a; - return; - } - r->infinity = 0; - - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z12, &a->z); - u1 = a->x; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&u1); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&u2, &b->x, &z12); - s1 = a->y; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&s1); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &b->y, &z12); secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &s2, &a->z); - secp256k1_fe_negate(&h, &u1, 1); secp256k1_fe_add(&h, &u2); - secp256k1_fe_negate(&i, &s1, 1); secp256k1_fe_add(&i, &s2); - if (secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&h)) { - if (secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&i)) { - secp256k1_gej_double_var(r, a, rzr); - } else { - if (rzr != NULL) { - secp256k1_fe_set_int(rzr, 0); - } - r->infinity = 1; - } - return; - } - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&i2, &i); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&h2, &h); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&h3, &h, &h2); - if (rzr != NULL) { - *rzr = h; - } - secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &a->z, &h); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&t, &u1, &h2); - r->x = t; secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->x, 2); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &h3); secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->x, &r->x, 3); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &i2); - secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &r->x, 5); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &t); secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &r->y, &i); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&h3, &h3, &s1); secp256k1_fe_negate(&h3, &h3, 1); - secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &h3); -} - -static void secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_ge *b, const secp256k1_fe *bzinv) { - /* 9 mul, 3 sqr, 4 normalize, 12 mul_int/add/negate */ - secp256k1_fe az, z12, u1, u2, s1, s2, h, i, i2, h2, h3, t; - - if (b->infinity) { - *r = *a; - return; - } - if (a->infinity) { - secp256k1_fe bzinv2, bzinv3; - r->infinity = b->infinity; - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&bzinv2, bzinv); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&bzinv3, &bzinv2, bzinv); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->x, &b->x, &bzinv2); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &b->y, &bzinv3); - secp256k1_fe_set_int(&r->z, 1); - return; - } - r->infinity = 0; - - /** We need to calculate (rx,ry,rz) = (ax,ay,az) + (bx,by,1/bzinv). Due to - * secp256k1's isomorphism we can multiply the Z coordinates on both sides - * by bzinv, and get: (rx,ry,rz*bzinv) = (ax,ay,az*bzinv) + (bx,by,1). - * This means that (rx,ry,rz) can be calculated as - * (ax,ay,az*bzinv) + (bx,by,1), when not applying the bzinv factor to rz. - * The variable az below holds the modified Z coordinate for a, which is used - * for the computation of rx and ry, but not for rz. - */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&az, &a->z, bzinv); - - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z12, &az); - u1 = a->x; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&u1); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&u2, &b->x, &z12); - s1 = a->y; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&s1); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &b->y, &z12); secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &s2, &az); - secp256k1_fe_negate(&h, &u1, 1); secp256k1_fe_add(&h, &u2); - secp256k1_fe_negate(&i, &s1, 1); secp256k1_fe_add(&i, &s2); - if (secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&h)) { - if (secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&i)) { - secp256k1_gej_double_var(r, a, NULL); - } else { - r->infinity = 1; - } - return; - } - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&i2, &i); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&h2, &h); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&h3, &h, &h2); - r->z = a->z; secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &r->z, &h); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&t, &u1, &h2); - r->x = t; secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->x, 2); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &h3); secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->x, &r->x, 3); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &i2); - secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &r->x, 5); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &t); secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &r->y, &i); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&h3, &h3, &s1); secp256k1_fe_negate(&h3, &h3, 1); - secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &h3); -} - - -static void secp256k1_gej_add_ge(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_ge *b) { - /* Operations: 7 mul, 5 sqr, 4 normalize, 21 mul_int/add/negate/cmov */ - static const secp256k1_fe fe_1 = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); - secp256k1_fe zz, u1, u2, s1, s2, t, tt, m, n, q, rr; - secp256k1_fe m_alt, rr_alt; - int infinity, degenerate; - VERIFY_CHECK(!b->infinity); - VERIFY_CHECK(a->infinity == 0 || a->infinity == 1); - - /** In: - * Eric Brier and Marc Joye, Weierstrass Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks. - * In D. Naccache and P. Paillier, Eds., Public Key Cryptography, vol. 2274 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 335-345. Springer-Verlag, 2002. - * we find as solution for a unified addition/doubling formula: - * lambda = ((x1 + x2)^2 - x1 * x2 + a) / (y1 + y2), with a = 0 for secp256k1's curve equation. - * x3 = lambda^2 - (x1 + x2) - * 2*y3 = lambda * (x1 + x2 - 2 * x3) - (y1 + y2). - * - * Substituting x_i = Xi / Zi^2 and yi = Yi / Zi^3, for i=1,2,3, gives: - * U1 = X1*Z2^2, U2 = X2*Z1^2 - * S1 = Y1*Z2^3, S2 = Y2*Z1^3 - * Z = Z1*Z2 - * T = U1+U2 - * M = S1+S2 - * Q = T*M^2 - * R = T^2-U1*U2 - * X3 = 4*(R^2-Q) - * Y3 = 4*(R*(3*Q-2*R^2)-M^4) - * Z3 = 2*M*Z - * (Note that the paper uses xi = Xi / Zi and yi = Yi / Zi instead.) - * - * This formula has the benefit of being the same for both addition - * of distinct points and doubling. However, it breaks down in the - * case that either point is infinity, or that y1 = -y2. We handle - * these cases in the following ways: - * - * - If b is infinity we simply bail by means of a VERIFY_CHECK. - * - * - If a is infinity, we detect this, and at the end of the - * computation replace the result (which will be meaningless, - * but we compute to be constant-time) with b.x : b.y : 1. - * - * - If a = -b, we have y1 = -y2, which is a degenerate case. - * But here the answer is infinity, so we simply set the - * infinity flag of the result, overriding the computed values - * without even needing to cmov. - * - * - If y1 = -y2 but x1 != x2, which does occur thanks to certain - * properties of our curve (specifically, 1 has nontrivial cube - * roots in our field, and the curve equation has no x coefficient) - * then the answer is not infinity but also not given by the above - * equation. In this case, we cmov in place an alternate expression - * for lambda. Specifically (y1 - y2)/(x1 - x2). Where both these - * expressions for lambda are defined, they are equal, and can be - * obtained from each other by multiplication by (y1 + y2)/(y1 + y2) - * then substitution of x^3 + 7 for y^2 (using the curve equation). - * For all pairs of nonzero points (a, b) at least one is defined, - * so this covers everything. - */ - - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&zz, &a->z); /* z = Z1^2 */ - u1 = a->x; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&u1); /* u1 = U1 = X1*Z2^2 (1) */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&u2, &b->x, &zz); /* u2 = U2 = X2*Z1^2 (1) */ - s1 = a->y; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&s1); /* s1 = S1 = Y1*Z2^3 (1) */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &b->y, &zz); /* s2 = Y2*Z1^2 (1) */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &s2, &a->z); /* s2 = S2 = Y2*Z1^3 (1) */ - t = u1; secp256k1_fe_add(&t, &u2); /* t = T = U1+U2 (2) */ - m = s1; secp256k1_fe_add(&m, &s2); /* m = M = S1+S2 (2) */ - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&rr, &t); /* rr = T^2 (1) */ - secp256k1_fe_negate(&m_alt, &u2, 1); /* Malt = -X2*Z1^2 */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&tt, &u1, &m_alt); /* tt = -U1*U2 (2) */ - secp256k1_fe_add(&rr, &tt); /* rr = R = T^2-U1*U2 (3) */ - /** If lambda = R/M = 0/0 we have a problem (except in the "trivial" - * case that Z = z1z2 = 0, and this is special-cased later on). */ - degenerate = secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero(&m) & - secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero(&rr); - /* This only occurs when y1 == -y2 and x1^3 == x2^3, but x1 != x2. - * This means either x1 == beta*x2 or beta*x1 == x2, where beta is - * a nontrivial cube root of one. In either case, an alternate - * non-indeterminate expression for lambda is (y1 - y2)/(x1 - x2), - * so we set R/M equal to this. */ - rr_alt = s1; - secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&rr_alt, 2); /* rr = Y1*Z2^3 - Y2*Z1^3 (2) */ - secp256k1_fe_add(&m_alt, &u1); /* Malt = X1*Z2^2 - X2*Z1^2 */ - - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&rr_alt, &rr, !degenerate); - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&m_alt, &m, !degenerate); - /* Now Ralt / Malt = lambda and is guaranteed not to be 0/0. - * From here on out Ralt and Malt represent the numerator - * and denominator of lambda; R and M represent the explicit - * expressions x1^2 + x2^2 + x1x2 and y1 + y2. */ - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&n, &m_alt); /* n = Malt^2 (1) */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&q, &n, &t); /* q = Q = T*Malt^2 (1) */ - /* These two lines use the observation that either M == Malt or M == 0, - * so M^3 * Malt is either Malt^4 (which is computed by squaring), or - * zero (which is "computed" by cmov). So the cost is one squaring - * versus two multiplications. */ - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&n, &n); - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&n, &m, degenerate); /* n = M^3 * Malt (2) */ - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t, &rr_alt); /* t = Ralt^2 (1) */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &a->z, &m_alt); /* r->z = Malt*Z (1) */ - infinity = secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero(&r->z) * (1 - a->infinity); - secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->z, 2); /* r->z = Z3 = 2*Malt*Z (2) */ - secp256k1_fe_negate(&q, &q, 1); /* q = -Q (2) */ - secp256k1_fe_add(&t, &q); /* t = Ralt^2-Q (3) */ - secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&t); - r->x = t; /* r->x = Ralt^2-Q (1) */ - secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&t, 2); /* t = 2*x3 (2) */ - secp256k1_fe_add(&t, &q); /* t = 2*x3 - Q: (4) */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&t, &t, &rr_alt); /* t = Ralt*(2*x3 - Q) (1) */ - secp256k1_fe_add(&t, &n); /* t = Ralt*(2*x3 - Q) + M^3*Malt (3) */ - secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &t, 3); /* r->y = Ralt*(Q - 2x3) - M^3*Malt (4) */ - secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&r->y); - secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->x, 4); /* r->x = X3 = 4*(Ralt^2-Q) */ - secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->y, 4); /* r->y = Y3 = 4*Ralt*(Q - 2x3) - 4*M^3*Malt (4) */ - - /** In case a->infinity == 1, replace r with (b->x, b->y, 1). */ - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&r->x, &b->x, a->infinity); - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&r->y, &b->y, a->infinity); - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&r->z, &fe_1, a->infinity); - r->infinity = infinity; -} - -static void secp256k1_gej_rescale(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_fe *s) { - /* Operations: 4 mul, 1 sqr */ - secp256k1_fe zz; - VERIFY_CHECK(!secp256k1_fe_is_zero(s)); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&zz, s); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->x, &r->x, &zz); /* r->x *= s^2 */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &r->y, &zz); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &r->y, s); /* r->y *= s^3 */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &r->z, s); /* r->z *= s */ -} - -static void secp256k1_ge_to_storage(secp256k1_ge_storage *r, const secp256k1_ge *a) { - secp256k1_fe x, y; - VERIFY_CHECK(!a->infinity); - x = a->x; - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&x); - y = a->y; - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&y); - secp256k1_fe_to_storage(&r->x, &x); - secp256k1_fe_to_storage(&r->y, &y); -} - -static void secp256k1_ge_from_storage(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge_storage *a) { - secp256k1_fe_from_storage(&r->x, &a->x); - secp256k1_fe_from_storage(&r->y, &a->y); - r->infinity = 0; -} - -static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(secp256k1_ge_storage *r, const secp256k1_ge_storage *a, int flag) { - secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&r->x, &a->x, flag); - secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&r->y, &a->y, flag); -} - -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM -static void secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge *a) { - static const secp256k1_fe beta = SECP256K1_FE_CONST( - 0x7ae96a2bul, 0x657c0710ul, 0x6e64479eul, 0xac3434e9ul, - 0x9cf04975ul, 0x12f58995ul, 0xc1396c28ul, 0x719501eeul - ); - *r = *a; - secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->x, &r->x, &beta); -} -#endif - -static int secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(const secp256k1_gej *a) { - secp256k1_fe yz; - - if (a->infinity) { - return 0; - } - - /* We rely on the fact that the Jacobi symbol of 1 / a->z^3 is the same as - * that of a->z. Thus a->y / a->z^3 is a quadratic residue iff a->y * a->z - is */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&yz, &a->y, &a->z); - return secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(&yz); -} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_GROUP_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/hash.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/hash.h deleted file mode 100644 index de26e4b..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/hash.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_HASH_H -#define SECP256K1_HASH_H - -#include -#include - -typedef struct { - uint32_t s[8]; - uint32_t buf[16]; /* In big endian */ - size_t bytes; -} secp256k1_sha256; - -static void secp256k1_sha256_initialize(secp256k1_sha256 *hash); -static void secp256k1_sha256_write(secp256k1_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *data, size_t size); -static void secp256k1_sha256_finalize(secp256k1_sha256 *hash, unsigned char *out32); - -typedef struct { - secp256k1_sha256 inner, outer; -} secp256k1_hmac_sha256; - -static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *key, size_t size); -static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *data, size_t size); -static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, unsigned char *out32); - -typedef struct { - unsigned char v[32]; - unsigned char k[32]; - int retry; -} secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256; - -static void secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 *rng, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); -static void secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 *rng, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen); -static void secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 *rng); - -#endif /* SECP256K1_HASH_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/hash_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/hash_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 009f26b..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/hash_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,282 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_HASH_IMPL_H -#define SECP256K1_HASH_IMPL_H - -#include "hash.h" - -#include -#include -#include - -#define Ch(x,y,z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) -#define Maj(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((z) & ((x) | (y)))) -#define Sigma0(x) (((x) >> 2 | (x) << 30) ^ ((x) >> 13 | (x) << 19) ^ ((x) >> 22 | (x) << 10)) -#define Sigma1(x) (((x) >> 6 | (x) << 26) ^ ((x) >> 11 | (x) << 21) ^ ((x) >> 25 | (x) << 7)) -#define sigma0(x) (((x) >> 7 | (x) << 25) ^ ((x) >> 18 | (x) << 14) ^ ((x) >> 3)) -#define sigma1(x) (((x) >> 17 | (x) << 15) ^ ((x) >> 19 | (x) << 13) ^ ((x) >> 10)) - -#define Round(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,k,w) do { \ - uint32_t t1 = (h) + Sigma1(e) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + (k) + (w); \ - uint32_t t2 = Sigma0(a) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \ - (d) += t1; \ - (h) = t1 + t2; \ -} while(0) - -#ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN -#define BE32(x) (x) -#else -#define BE32(p) ((((p) & 0xFF) << 24) | (((p) & 0xFF00) << 8) | (((p) & 0xFF0000) >> 8) | (((p) & 0xFF000000) >> 24)) -#endif - -static void secp256k1_sha256_initialize(secp256k1_sha256 *hash) { - hash->s[0] = 0x6a09e667ul; - hash->s[1] = 0xbb67ae85ul; - hash->s[2] = 0x3c6ef372ul; - hash->s[3] = 0xa54ff53aul; - hash->s[4] = 0x510e527ful; - hash->s[5] = 0x9b05688cul; - hash->s[6] = 0x1f83d9abul; - hash->s[7] = 0x5be0cd19ul; - hash->bytes = 0; -} - -/** Perform one SHA-256 transformation, processing 16 big endian 32-bit words. */ -static void secp256k1_sha256_transform(uint32_t* s, const uint32_t* chunk) { - uint32_t a = s[0], b = s[1], c = s[2], d = s[3], e = s[4], f = s[5], g = s[6], h = s[7]; - uint32_t w0, w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w8, w9, w10, w11, w12, w13, w14, w15; - - Round(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, 0x428a2f98, w0 = BE32(chunk[0])); - Round(h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, 0x71374491, w1 = BE32(chunk[1])); - Round(g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, 0xb5c0fbcf, w2 = BE32(chunk[2])); - Round(f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, 0xe9b5dba5, w3 = BE32(chunk[3])); - Round(e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, 0x3956c25b, w4 = BE32(chunk[4])); - Round(d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, 0x59f111f1, w5 = BE32(chunk[5])); - Round(c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, 0x923f82a4, w6 = BE32(chunk[6])); - Round(b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, 0xab1c5ed5, w7 = BE32(chunk[7])); - Round(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, 0xd807aa98, w8 = BE32(chunk[8])); - Round(h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, 0x12835b01, w9 = BE32(chunk[9])); - Round(g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, 0x243185be, w10 = BE32(chunk[10])); - Round(f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, 0x550c7dc3, w11 = BE32(chunk[11])); - Round(e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, 0x72be5d74, w12 = BE32(chunk[12])); - Round(d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, 0x80deb1fe, w13 = BE32(chunk[13])); - Round(c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, 0x9bdc06a7, w14 = BE32(chunk[14])); - Round(b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, 0xc19bf174, w15 = BE32(chunk[15])); - - Round(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, 0xe49b69c1, w0 += sigma1(w14) + w9 + sigma0(w1)); - Round(h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, 0xefbe4786, w1 += sigma1(w15) + w10 + sigma0(w2)); - Round(g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, 0x0fc19dc6, w2 += sigma1(w0) + w11 + sigma0(w3)); - Round(f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, 0x240ca1cc, w3 += sigma1(w1) + w12 + sigma0(w4)); - Round(e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, 0x2de92c6f, w4 += sigma1(w2) + w13 + sigma0(w5)); - Round(d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, 0x4a7484aa, w5 += sigma1(w3) + w14 + sigma0(w6)); - Round(c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, 0x5cb0a9dc, w6 += sigma1(w4) + w15 + sigma0(w7)); - Round(b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, 0x76f988da, w7 += sigma1(w5) + w0 + sigma0(w8)); - Round(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, 0x983e5152, w8 += sigma1(w6) + w1 + sigma0(w9)); - Round(h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, 0xa831c66d, w9 += sigma1(w7) + w2 + sigma0(w10)); - Round(g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, 0xb00327c8, w10 += sigma1(w8) + w3 + sigma0(w11)); - Round(f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, 0xbf597fc7, w11 += sigma1(w9) + w4 + sigma0(w12)); - Round(e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, 0xc6e00bf3, w12 += sigma1(w10) + w5 + sigma0(w13)); - Round(d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, 0xd5a79147, w13 += sigma1(w11) + w6 + sigma0(w14)); - Round(c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, 0x06ca6351, w14 += sigma1(w12) + w7 + sigma0(w15)); - Round(b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, 0x14292967, w15 += sigma1(w13) + w8 + sigma0(w0)); - - Round(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, 0x27b70a85, w0 += sigma1(w14) + w9 + sigma0(w1)); - Round(h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, 0x2e1b2138, w1 += sigma1(w15) + w10 + sigma0(w2)); - Round(g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, 0x4d2c6dfc, w2 += sigma1(w0) + w11 + sigma0(w3)); - Round(f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, 0x53380d13, w3 += sigma1(w1) + w12 + sigma0(w4)); - Round(e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, 0x650a7354, w4 += sigma1(w2) + w13 + sigma0(w5)); - Round(d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, 0x766a0abb, w5 += sigma1(w3) + w14 + sigma0(w6)); - Round(c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, 0x81c2c92e, w6 += sigma1(w4) + w15 + sigma0(w7)); - Round(b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, 0x92722c85, w7 += sigma1(w5) + w0 + sigma0(w8)); - Round(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, 0xa2bfe8a1, w8 += sigma1(w6) + w1 + sigma0(w9)); - Round(h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, 0xa81a664b, w9 += sigma1(w7) + w2 + sigma0(w10)); - Round(g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, 0xc24b8b70, w10 += sigma1(w8) + w3 + sigma0(w11)); - Round(f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, 0xc76c51a3, w11 += sigma1(w9) + w4 + sigma0(w12)); - Round(e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, 0xd192e819, w12 += sigma1(w10) + w5 + sigma0(w13)); - Round(d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, 0xd6990624, w13 += sigma1(w11) + w6 + sigma0(w14)); - Round(c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, 0xf40e3585, w14 += sigma1(w12) + w7 + sigma0(w15)); - Round(b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, 0x106aa070, w15 += sigma1(w13) + w8 + sigma0(w0)); - - Round(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, 0x19a4c116, w0 += sigma1(w14) + w9 + sigma0(w1)); - Round(h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, 0x1e376c08, w1 += sigma1(w15) + w10 + sigma0(w2)); - Round(g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, 0x2748774c, w2 += sigma1(w0) + w11 + sigma0(w3)); - Round(f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, 0x34b0bcb5, w3 += sigma1(w1) + w12 + sigma0(w4)); - Round(e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, 0x391c0cb3, w4 += sigma1(w2) + w13 + sigma0(w5)); - Round(d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, 0x4ed8aa4a, w5 += sigma1(w3) + w14 + sigma0(w6)); - Round(c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, 0x5b9cca4f, w6 += sigma1(w4) + w15 + sigma0(w7)); - Round(b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, 0x682e6ff3, w7 += sigma1(w5) + w0 + sigma0(w8)); - Round(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, 0x748f82ee, w8 += sigma1(w6) + w1 + sigma0(w9)); - Round(h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, 0x78a5636f, w9 += sigma1(w7) + w2 + sigma0(w10)); - Round(g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, 0x84c87814, w10 += sigma1(w8) + w3 + sigma0(w11)); - Round(f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, 0x8cc70208, w11 += sigma1(w9) + w4 + sigma0(w12)); - Round(e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, 0x90befffa, w12 += sigma1(w10) + w5 + sigma0(w13)); - Round(d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, 0xa4506ceb, w13 += sigma1(w11) + w6 + sigma0(w14)); - Round(c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, 0xbef9a3f7, w14 + sigma1(w12) + w7 + sigma0(w15)); - Round(b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, 0xc67178f2, w15 + sigma1(w13) + w8 + sigma0(w0)); - - s[0] += a; - s[1] += b; - s[2] += c; - s[3] += d; - s[4] += e; - s[5] += f; - s[6] += g; - s[7] += h; -} - -static void secp256k1_sha256_write(secp256k1_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *data, size_t len) { - size_t bufsize = hash->bytes & 0x3F; - hash->bytes += len; - while (bufsize + len >= 64) { - /* Fill the buffer, and process it. */ - size_t chunk_len = 64 - bufsize; - memcpy(((unsigned char*)hash->buf) + bufsize, data, chunk_len); - data += chunk_len; - len -= chunk_len; - secp256k1_sha256_transform(hash->s, hash->buf); - bufsize = 0; - } - if (len) { - /* Fill the buffer with what remains. */ - memcpy(((unsigned char*)hash->buf) + bufsize, data, len); - } -} - -static void secp256k1_sha256_finalize(secp256k1_sha256 *hash, unsigned char *out32) { - static const unsigned char pad[64] = {0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; - uint32_t sizedesc[2]; - uint32_t out[8]; - int i = 0; - sizedesc[0] = BE32(hash->bytes >> 29); - sizedesc[1] = BE32(hash->bytes << 3); - secp256k1_sha256_write(hash, pad, 1 + ((119 - (hash->bytes % 64)) % 64)); - secp256k1_sha256_write(hash, (const unsigned char*)sizedesc, 8); - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - out[i] = BE32(hash->s[i]); - hash->s[i] = 0; - } - memcpy(out32, (const unsigned char*)out, 32); -} - -static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) { - size_t n; - unsigned char rkey[64]; - if (keylen <= sizeof(rkey)) { - memcpy(rkey, key, keylen); - memset(rkey + keylen, 0, sizeof(rkey) - keylen); - } else { - secp256k1_sha256 sha256; - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, key, keylen); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, rkey); - memset(rkey + 32, 0, 32); - } - - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&hash->outer); - for (n = 0; n < sizeof(rkey); n++) { - rkey[n] ^= 0x5c; - } - secp256k1_sha256_write(&hash->outer, rkey, sizeof(rkey)); - - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&hash->inner); - for (n = 0; n < sizeof(rkey); n++) { - rkey[n] ^= 0x5c ^ 0x36; - } - secp256k1_sha256_write(&hash->inner, rkey, sizeof(rkey)); - memset(rkey, 0, sizeof(rkey)); -} - -static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *data, size_t size) { - secp256k1_sha256_write(&hash->inner, data, size); -} - -static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, unsigned char *out32) { - unsigned char temp[32]; - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&hash->inner, temp); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&hash->outer, temp, 32); - memset(temp, 0, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&hash->outer, out32); -} - - -static void secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 *rng, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) { - secp256k1_hmac_sha256 hmac; - static const unsigned char zero[1] = {0x00}; - static const unsigned char one[1] = {0x01}; - - memset(rng->v, 0x01, 32); /* RFC6979 3.2.b. */ - memset(rng->k, 0x00, 32); /* RFC6979 3.2.c. */ - - /* RFC6979 3.2.d. */ - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hmac, rng->k, 32); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, rng->v, 32); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, zero, 1); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, key, keylen); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hmac, rng->k); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hmac, rng->k, 32); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, rng->v, 32); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hmac, rng->v); - - /* RFC6979 3.2.f. */ - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hmac, rng->k, 32); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, rng->v, 32); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, one, 1); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, key, keylen); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hmac, rng->k); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hmac, rng->k, 32); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, rng->v, 32); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hmac, rng->v); - rng->retry = 0; -} - -static void secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 *rng, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) { - /* RFC6979 3.2.h. */ - static const unsigned char zero[1] = {0x00}; - if (rng->retry) { - secp256k1_hmac_sha256 hmac; - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hmac, rng->k, 32); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, rng->v, 32); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, zero, 1); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hmac, rng->k); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hmac, rng->k, 32); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, rng->v, 32); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hmac, rng->v); - } - - while (outlen > 0) { - secp256k1_hmac_sha256 hmac; - int now = outlen; - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hmac, rng->k, 32); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hmac, rng->v, 32); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hmac, rng->v); - if (now > 32) { - now = 32; - } - memcpy(out, rng->v, now); - out += now; - outlen -= now; - } - - rng->retry = 1; -} - -static void secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 *rng) { - memset(rng->k, 0, 32); - memset(rng->v, 0, 32); - rng->retry = 0; -} - -#undef BE32 -#undef Round -#undef sigma1 -#undef sigma0 -#undef Sigma1 -#undef Sigma0 -#undef Maj -#undef Ch - -#endif /* SECP256K1_HASH_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1.java b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1.java deleted file mode 100644 index 1c67802..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1.java +++ /dev/null @@ -1,446 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright 2013 Google Inc. - * Copyright 2014-2016 the libsecp256k1 contributors - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); - * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, - * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ - -package org.bitcoin; - -import java.nio.ByteBuffer; -import java.nio.ByteOrder; - -import java.math.BigInteger; -import com.google.common.base.Preconditions; -import java.util.concurrent.locks.Lock; -import java.util.concurrent.locks.ReentrantReadWriteLock; -import static org.bitcoin.NativeSecp256k1Util.*; - -/** - *

This class holds native methods to handle ECDSA verification.

- * - *

You can find an example library that can be used for this at https://github.com/bitcoin/secp256k1

- * - *

To build secp256k1 for use with bitcoinj, run - * `./configure --enable-jni --enable-experimental --enable-module-ecdh` - * and `make` then copy `.libs/libsecp256k1.so` to your system library path - * or point the JVM to the folder containing it with -Djava.library.path - *

- */ -public class NativeSecp256k1 { - - private static final ReentrantReadWriteLock rwl = new ReentrantReadWriteLock(); - private static final Lock r = rwl.readLock(); - private static final Lock w = rwl.writeLock(); - private static ThreadLocal nativeECDSABuffer = new ThreadLocal(); - /** - * Verifies the given secp256k1 signature in native code. - * Calling when enabled == false is undefined (probably library not loaded) - * - * @param data The data which was signed, must be exactly 32 bytes - * @param signature The signature - * @param pub The public key which did the signing - */ - public static boolean verify(byte[] data, byte[] signature, byte[] pub) throws AssertFailException{ - Preconditions.checkArgument(data.length == 32 && signature.length <= 520 && pub.length <= 520); - - ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get(); - if (byteBuff == null || byteBuff.capacity() < 520) { - byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(520); - byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder()); - nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff); - } - byteBuff.rewind(); - byteBuff.put(data); - byteBuff.put(signature); - byteBuff.put(pub); - - byte[][] retByteArray; - - r.lock(); - try { - return secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(byteBuff, Secp256k1Context.getContext(), signature.length, pub.length) == 1; - } finally { - r.unlock(); - } - } - - /** - * libsecp256k1 Create an ECDSA signature. - * - * @param data Message hash, 32 bytes - * @param key Secret key, 32 bytes - * - * Return values - * @param sig byte array of signature - */ - public static byte[] sign(byte[] data, byte[] sec) throws AssertFailException{ - Preconditions.checkArgument(data.length == 32 && sec.length <= 32); - - ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get(); - if (byteBuff == null || byteBuff.capacity() < 32 + 32) { - byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(32 + 32); - byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder()); - nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff); - } - byteBuff.rewind(); - byteBuff.put(data); - byteBuff.put(sec); - - byte[][] retByteArray; - - r.lock(); - try { - retByteArray = secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(byteBuff, Secp256k1Context.getContext()); - } finally { - r.unlock(); - } - - byte[] sigArr = retByteArray[0]; - int sigLen = new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][0] }).intValue(); - int retVal = new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][1] }).intValue(); - - assertEquals(sigArr.length, sigLen, "Got bad signature length."); - - return retVal == 0 ? new byte[0] : sigArr; - } - - /** - * libsecp256k1 Seckey Verify - returns 1 if valid, 0 if invalid - * - * @param seckey ECDSA Secret key, 32 bytes - */ - public static boolean secKeyVerify(byte[] seckey) { - Preconditions.checkArgument(seckey.length == 32); - - ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get(); - if (byteBuff == null || byteBuff.capacity() < seckey.length) { - byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(seckey.length); - byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder()); - nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff); - } - byteBuff.rewind(); - byteBuff.put(seckey); - - r.lock(); - try { - return secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(byteBuff,Secp256k1Context.getContext()) == 1; - } finally { - r.unlock(); - } - } - - - /** - * libsecp256k1 Compute Pubkey - computes public key from secret key - * - * @param seckey ECDSA Secret key, 32 bytes - * - * Return values - * @param pubkey ECDSA Public key, 33 or 65 bytes - */ - //TODO add a 'compressed' arg - public static byte[] computePubkey(byte[] seckey) throws AssertFailException{ - Preconditions.checkArgument(seckey.length == 32); - - ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get(); - if (byteBuff == null || byteBuff.capacity() < seckey.length) { - byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(seckey.length); - byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder()); - nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff); - } - byteBuff.rewind(); - byteBuff.put(seckey); - - byte[][] retByteArray; - - r.lock(); - try { - retByteArray = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(byteBuff, Secp256k1Context.getContext()); - } finally { - r.unlock(); - } - - byte[] pubArr = retByteArray[0]; - int pubLen = new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][0] }).intValue(); - int retVal = new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][1] }).intValue(); - - assertEquals(pubArr.length, pubLen, "Got bad pubkey length."); - - return retVal == 0 ? new byte[0]: pubArr; - } - - /** - * libsecp256k1 Cleanup - This destroys the secp256k1 context object - * This should be called at the end of the program for proper cleanup of the context. - */ - public static synchronized void cleanup() { - w.lock(); - try { - secp256k1_destroy_context(Secp256k1Context.getContext()); - } finally { - w.unlock(); - } - } - - public static long cloneContext() { - r.lock(); - try { - return secp256k1_ctx_clone(Secp256k1Context.getContext()); - } finally { r.unlock(); } - } - - /** - * libsecp256k1 PrivKey Tweak-Mul - Tweak privkey by multiplying to it - * - * @param tweak some bytes to tweak with - * @param seckey 32-byte seckey - */ - public static byte[] privKeyTweakMul(byte[] privkey, byte[] tweak) throws AssertFailException{ - Preconditions.checkArgument(privkey.length == 32); - - ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get(); - if (byteBuff == null || byteBuff.capacity() < privkey.length + tweak.length) { - byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(privkey.length + tweak.length); - byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder()); - nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff); - } - byteBuff.rewind(); - byteBuff.put(privkey); - byteBuff.put(tweak); - - byte[][] retByteArray; - r.lock(); - try { - retByteArray = secp256k1_privkey_tweak_mul(byteBuff,Secp256k1Context.getContext()); - } finally { - r.unlock(); - } - - byte[] privArr = retByteArray[0]; - - int privLen = (byte) new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][0] }).intValue() & 0xFF; - int retVal = new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][1] }).intValue(); - - assertEquals(privArr.length, privLen, "Got bad pubkey length."); - - assertEquals(retVal, 1, "Failed return value check."); - - return privArr; - } - - /** - * libsecp256k1 PrivKey Tweak-Add - Tweak privkey by adding to it - * - * @param tweak some bytes to tweak with - * @param seckey 32-byte seckey - */ - public static byte[] privKeyTweakAdd(byte[] privkey, byte[] tweak) throws AssertFailException{ - Preconditions.checkArgument(privkey.length == 32); - - ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get(); - if (byteBuff == null || byteBuff.capacity() < privkey.length + tweak.length) { - byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(privkey.length + tweak.length); - byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder()); - nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff); - } - byteBuff.rewind(); - byteBuff.put(privkey); - byteBuff.put(tweak); - - byte[][] retByteArray; - r.lock(); - try { - retByteArray = secp256k1_privkey_tweak_add(byteBuff,Secp256k1Context.getContext()); - } finally { - r.unlock(); - } - - byte[] privArr = retByteArray[0]; - - int privLen = (byte) new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][0] }).intValue() & 0xFF; - int retVal = new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][1] }).intValue(); - - assertEquals(privArr.length, privLen, "Got bad pubkey length."); - - assertEquals(retVal, 1, "Failed return value check."); - - return privArr; - } - - /** - * libsecp256k1 PubKey Tweak-Add - Tweak pubkey by adding to it - * - * @param tweak some bytes to tweak with - * @param pubkey 32-byte seckey - */ - public static byte[] pubKeyTweakAdd(byte[] pubkey, byte[] tweak) throws AssertFailException{ - Preconditions.checkArgument(pubkey.length == 33 || pubkey.length == 65); - - ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get(); - if (byteBuff == null || byteBuff.capacity() < pubkey.length + tweak.length) { - byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(pubkey.length + tweak.length); - byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder()); - nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff); - } - byteBuff.rewind(); - byteBuff.put(pubkey); - byteBuff.put(tweak); - - byte[][] retByteArray; - r.lock(); - try { - retByteArray = secp256k1_pubkey_tweak_add(byteBuff,Secp256k1Context.getContext(), pubkey.length); - } finally { - r.unlock(); - } - - byte[] pubArr = retByteArray[0]; - - int pubLen = (byte) new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][0] }).intValue() & 0xFF; - int retVal = new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][1] }).intValue(); - - assertEquals(pubArr.length, pubLen, "Got bad pubkey length."); - - assertEquals(retVal, 1, "Failed return value check."); - - return pubArr; - } - - /** - * libsecp256k1 PubKey Tweak-Mul - Tweak pubkey by multiplying to it - * - * @param tweak some bytes to tweak with - * @param pubkey 32-byte seckey - */ - public static byte[] pubKeyTweakMul(byte[] pubkey, byte[] tweak) throws AssertFailException{ - Preconditions.checkArgument(pubkey.length == 33 || pubkey.length == 65); - - ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get(); - if (byteBuff == null || byteBuff.capacity() < pubkey.length + tweak.length) { - byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(pubkey.length + tweak.length); - byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder()); - nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff); - } - byteBuff.rewind(); - byteBuff.put(pubkey); - byteBuff.put(tweak); - - byte[][] retByteArray; - r.lock(); - try { - retByteArray = secp256k1_pubkey_tweak_mul(byteBuff,Secp256k1Context.getContext(), pubkey.length); - } finally { - r.unlock(); - } - - byte[] pubArr = retByteArray[0]; - - int pubLen = (byte) new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][0] }).intValue() & 0xFF; - int retVal = new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][1] }).intValue(); - - assertEquals(pubArr.length, pubLen, "Got bad pubkey length."); - - assertEquals(retVal, 1, "Failed return value check."); - - return pubArr; - } - - /** - * libsecp256k1 create ECDH secret - constant time ECDH calculation - * - * @param seckey byte array of secret key used in exponentiaion - * @param pubkey byte array of public key used in exponentiaion - */ - public static byte[] createECDHSecret(byte[] seckey, byte[] pubkey) throws AssertFailException{ - Preconditions.checkArgument(seckey.length <= 32 && pubkey.length <= 65); - - ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get(); - if (byteBuff == null || byteBuff.capacity() < 32 + pubkey.length) { - byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(32 + pubkey.length); - byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder()); - nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff); - } - byteBuff.rewind(); - byteBuff.put(seckey); - byteBuff.put(pubkey); - - byte[][] retByteArray; - r.lock(); - try { - retByteArray = secp256k1_ecdh(byteBuff, Secp256k1Context.getContext(), pubkey.length); - } finally { - r.unlock(); - } - - byte[] resArr = retByteArray[0]; - int retVal = new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][0] }).intValue(); - - assertEquals(resArr.length, 32, "Got bad result length."); - assertEquals(retVal, 1, "Failed return value check."); - - return resArr; - } - - /** - * libsecp256k1 randomize - updates the context randomization - * - * @param seed 32-byte random seed - */ - public static synchronized boolean randomize(byte[] seed) throws AssertFailException{ - Preconditions.checkArgument(seed.length == 32 || seed == null); - - ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get(); - if (byteBuff == null || byteBuff.capacity() < seed.length) { - byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(seed.length); - byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder()); - nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff); - } - byteBuff.rewind(); - byteBuff.put(seed); - - w.lock(); - try { - return secp256k1_context_randomize(byteBuff, Secp256k1Context.getContext()) == 1; - } finally { - w.unlock(); - } - } - - private static native long secp256k1_ctx_clone(long context); - - private static native int secp256k1_context_randomize(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context); - - private static native byte[][] secp256k1_privkey_tweak_add(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context); - - private static native byte[][] secp256k1_privkey_tweak_mul(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context); - - private static native byte[][] secp256k1_pubkey_tweak_add(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context, int pubLen); - - private static native byte[][] secp256k1_pubkey_tweak_mul(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context, int pubLen); - - private static native void secp256k1_destroy_context(long context); - - private static native int secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context, int sigLen, int pubLen); - - private static native byte[][] secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context); - - private static native int secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context); - - private static native byte[][] secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context); - - private static native byte[][] secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context, int inputLen); - - private static native byte[][] secp256k1_ecdh(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context, int inputLen); - -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Test.java b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Test.java deleted file mode 100644 index d766a10..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Test.java +++ /dev/null @@ -1,226 +0,0 @@ -package org.bitcoin; - -import com.google.common.io.BaseEncoding; -import java.util.Arrays; -import java.math.BigInteger; -import javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter; -import static org.bitcoin.NativeSecp256k1Util.*; - -/** - * This class holds test cases defined for testing this library. - */ -public class NativeSecp256k1Test { - - //TODO improve comments/add more tests - /** - * This tests verify() for a valid signature - */ - public static void testVerifyPos() throws AssertFailException{ - boolean result = false; - byte[] data = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("CF80CD8AED482D5D1527D7DC72FCEFF84E6326592848447D2DC0B0E87DFC9A90".toLowerCase()); //sha256hash of "testing" - byte[] sig = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("3044022079BE667EF9DCBBAC55A06295CE870B07029BFCDB2DCE28D959F2815B16F817980220294F14E883B3F525B5367756C2A11EF6CF84B730B36C17CB0C56F0AAB2C98589".toLowerCase()); - byte[] pub = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("040A629506E1B65CD9D2E0BA9C75DF9C4FED0DB16DC9625ED14397F0AFC836FAE595DC53F8B0EFE61E703075BD9B143BAC75EC0E19F82A2208CAEB32BE53414C40".toLowerCase()); - - result = NativeSecp256k1.verify( data, sig, pub); - assertEquals( result, true , "testVerifyPos"); - } - - /** - * This tests verify() for a non-valid signature - */ - public static void testVerifyNeg() throws AssertFailException{ - boolean result = false; - byte[] data = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("CF80CD8AED482D5D1527D7DC72FCEFF84E6326592848447D2DC0B0E87DFC9A91".toLowerCase()); //sha256hash of "testing" - byte[] sig = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("3044022079BE667EF9DCBBAC55A06295CE870B07029BFCDB2DCE28D959F2815B16F817980220294F14E883B3F525B5367756C2A11EF6CF84B730B36C17CB0C56F0AAB2C98589".toLowerCase()); - byte[] pub = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("040A629506E1B65CD9D2E0BA9C75DF9C4FED0DB16DC9625ED14397F0AFC836FAE595DC53F8B0EFE61E703075BD9B143BAC75EC0E19F82A2208CAEB32BE53414C40".toLowerCase()); - - result = NativeSecp256k1.verify( data, sig, pub); - //System.out.println(" TEST " + new BigInteger(1, resultbytes).toString(16)); - assertEquals( result, false , "testVerifyNeg"); - } - - /** - * This tests secret key verify() for a valid secretkey - */ - public static void testSecKeyVerifyPos() throws AssertFailException{ - boolean result = false; - byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("67E56582298859DDAE725F972992A07C6C4FB9F62A8FFF58CE3CA926A1063530".toLowerCase()); - - result = NativeSecp256k1.secKeyVerify( sec ); - //System.out.println(" TEST " + new BigInteger(1, resultbytes).toString(16)); - assertEquals( result, true , "testSecKeyVerifyPos"); - } - - /** - * This tests secret key verify() for an invalid secretkey - */ - public static void testSecKeyVerifyNeg() throws AssertFailException{ - boolean result = false; - byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF".toLowerCase()); - - result = NativeSecp256k1.secKeyVerify( sec ); - //System.out.println(" TEST " + new BigInteger(1, resultbytes).toString(16)); - assertEquals( result, false , "testSecKeyVerifyNeg"); - } - - /** - * This tests public key create() for a valid secretkey - */ - public static void testPubKeyCreatePos() throws AssertFailException{ - byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("67E56582298859DDAE725F972992A07C6C4FB9F62A8FFF58CE3CA926A1063530".toLowerCase()); - - byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.computePubkey( sec); - String pubkeyString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr); - assertEquals( pubkeyString , "04C591A8FF19AC9C4E4E5793673B83123437E975285E7B442F4EE2654DFFCA5E2D2103ED494718C697AC9AEBCFD19612E224DB46661011863ED2FC54E71861E2A6" , "testPubKeyCreatePos"); - } - - /** - * This tests public key create() for a invalid secretkey - */ - public static void testPubKeyCreateNeg() throws AssertFailException{ - byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF".toLowerCase()); - - byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.computePubkey( sec); - String pubkeyString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr); - assertEquals( pubkeyString, "" , "testPubKeyCreateNeg"); - } - - /** - * This tests sign() for a valid secretkey - */ - public static void testSignPos() throws AssertFailException{ - - byte[] data = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("CF80CD8AED482D5D1527D7DC72FCEFF84E6326592848447D2DC0B0E87DFC9A90".toLowerCase()); //sha256hash of "testing" - byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("67E56582298859DDAE725F972992A07C6C4FB9F62A8FFF58CE3CA926A1063530".toLowerCase()); - - byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.sign(data, sec); - String sigString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr); - assertEquals( sigString, "30440220182A108E1448DC8F1FB467D06A0F3BB8EA0533584CB954EF8DA112F1D60E39A202201C66F36DA211C087F3AF88B50EDF4F9BDAA6CF5FD6817E74DCA34DB12390C6E9" , "testSignPos"); - } - - /** - * This tests sign() for a invalid secretkey - */ - public static void testSignNeg() throws AssertFailException{ - byte[] data = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("CF80CD8AED482D5D1527D7DC72FCEFF84E6326592848447D2DC0B0E87DFC9A90".toLowerCase()); //sha256hash of "testing" - byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF".toLowerCase()); - - byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.sign(data, sec); - String sigString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr); - assertEquals( sigString, "" , "testSignNeg"); - } - - /** - * This tests private key tweak-add - */ - public static void testPrivKeyTweakAdd_1() throws AssertFailException { - byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("67E56582298859DDAE725F972992A07C6C4FB9F62A8FFF58CE3CA926A1063530".toLowerCase()); - byte[] data = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("3982F19BEF1615BCCFBB05E321C10E1D4CBA3DF0E841C2E41EEB6016347653C3".toLowerCase()); //sha256hash of "tweak" - - byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.privKeyTweakAdd( sec , data ); - String sigString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr); - assertEquals( sigString , "A168571E189E6F9A7E2D657A4B53AE99B909F7E712D1C23CED28093CD57C88F3" , "testPrivKeyAdd_1"); - } - - /** - * This tests private key tweak-mul - */ - public static void testPrivKeyTweakMul_1() throws AssertFailException { - byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("67E56582298859DDAE725F972992A07C6C4FB9F62A8FFF58CE3CA926A1063530".toLowerCase()); - byte[] data = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("3982F19BEF1615BCCFBB05E321C10E1D4CBA3DF0E841C2E41EEB6016347653C3".toLowerCase()); //sha256hash of "tweak" - - byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.privKeyTweakMul( sec , data ); - String sigString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr); - assertEquals( sigString , "97F8184235F101550F3C71C927507651BD3F1CDB4A5A33B8986ACF0DEE20FFFC" , "testPrivKeyMul_1"); - } - - /** - * This tests private key tweak-add uncompressed - */ - public static void testPrivKeyTweakAdd_2() throws AssertFailException { - byte[] pub = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("040A629506E1B65CD9D2E0BA9C75DF9C4FED0DB16DC9625ED14397F0AFC836FAE595DC53F8B0EFE61E703075BD9B143BAC75EC0E19F82A2208CAEB32BE53414C40".toLowerCase()); - byte[] data = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("3982F19BEF1615BCCFBB05E321C10E1D4CBA3DF0E841C2E41EEB6016347653C3".toLowerCase()); //sha256hash of "tweak" - - byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.pubKeyTweakAdd( pub , data ); - String sigString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr); - assertEquals( sigString , "0411C6790F4B663CCE607BAAE08C43557EDC1A4D11D88DFCB3D841D0C6A941AF525A268E2A863C148555C48FB5FBA368E88718A46E205FABC3DBA2CCFFAB0796EF" , "testPrivKeyAdd_2"); - } - - /** - * This tests private key tweak-mul uncompressed - */ - public static void testPrivKeyTweakMul_2() throws AssertFailException { - byte[] pub = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("040A629506E1B65CD9D2E0BA9C75DF9C4FED0DB16DC9625ED14397F0AFC836FAE595DC53F8B0EFE61E703075BD9B143BAC75EC0E19F82A2208CAEB32BE53414C40".toLowerCase()); - byte[] data = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("3982F19BEF1615BCCFBB05E321C10E1D4CBA3DF0E841C2E41EEB6016347653C3".toLowerCase()); //sha256hash of "tweak" - - byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.pubKeyTweakMul( pub , data ); - String sigString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr); - assertEquals( sigString , "04E0FE6FE55EBCA626B98A807F6CAF654139E14E5E3698F01A9A658E21DC1D2791EC060D4F412A794D5370F672BC94B722640B5F76914151CFCA6E712CA48CC589" , "testPrivKeyMul_2"); - } - - /** - * This tests seed randomization - */ - public static void testRandomize() throws AssertFailException { - byte[] seed = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("A441B15FE9A3CF56661190A0B93B9DEC7D04127288CC87250967CF3B52894D11".toLowerCase()); //sha256hash of "random" - boolean result = NativeSecp256k1.randomize(seed); - assertEquals( result, true, "testRandomize"); - } - - public static void testCreateECDHSecret() throws AssertFailException{ - - byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("67E56582298859DDAE725F972992A07C6C4FB9F62A8FFF58CE3CA926A1063530".toLowerCase()); - byte[] pub = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("040A629506E1B65CD9D2E0BA9C75DF9C4FED0DB16DC9625ED14397F0AFC836FAE595DC53F8B0EFE61E703075BD9B143BAC75EC0E19F82A2208CAEB32BE53414C40".toLowerCase()); - - byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.createECDHSecret(sec, pub); - String ecdhString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr); - assertEquals( ecdhString, "2A2A67007A926E6594AF3EB564FC74005B37A9C8AEF2033C4552051B5C87F043" , "testCreateECDHSecret"); - } - - public static void main(String[] args) throws AssertFailException{ - - - System.out.println("\n libsecp256k1 enabled: " + Secp256k1Context.isEnabled() + "\n"); - - assertEquals( Secp256k1Context.isEnabled(), true, "isEnabled" ); - - //Test verify() success/fail - testVerifyPos(); - testVerifyNeg(); - - //Test secKeyVerify() success/fail - testSecKeyVerifyPos(); - testSecKeyVerifyNeg(); - - //Test computePubkey() success/fail - testPubKeyCreatePos(); - testPubKeyCreateNeg(); - - //Test sign() success/fail - testSignPos(); - testSignNeg(); - - //Test privKeyTweakAdd() 1 - testPrivKeyTweakAdd_1(); - - //Test privKeyTweakMul() 2 - testPrivKeyTweakMul_1(); - - //Test privKeyTweakAdd() 3 - testPrivKeyTweakAdd_2(); - - //Test privKeyTweakMul() 4 - testPrivKeyTweakMul_2(); - - //Test randomize() - testRandomize(); - - //Test ECDH - testCreateECDHSecret(); - - NativeSecp256k1.cleanup(); - - System.out.println(" All tests passed." ); - - } -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Util.java b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Util.java deleted file mode 100644 index 04732ba..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Util.java +++ /dev/null @@ -1,45 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright 2014-2016 the libsecp256k1 contributors - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); - * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, - * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ - -package org.bitcoin; - -public class NativeSecp256k1Util{ - - public static void assertEquals( int val, int val2, String message ) throws AssertFailException{ - if( val != val2 ) - throw new AssertFailException("FAIL: " + message); - } - - public static void assertEquals( boolean val, boolean val2, String message ) throws AssertFailException{ - if( val != val2 ) - throw new AssertFailException("FAIL: " + message); - else - System.out.println("PASS: " + message); - } - - public static void assertEquals( String val, String val2, String message ) throws AssertFailException{ - if( !val.equals(val2) ) - throw new AssertFailException("FAIL: " + message); - else - System.out.println("PASS: " + message); - } - - public static class AssertFailException extends Exception { - public AssertFailException(String message) { - super( message ); - } - } -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/Secp256k1Context.java b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/Secp256k1Context.java deleted file mode 100644 index 216c986..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org/bitcoin/Secp256k1Context.java +++ /dev/null @@ -1,51 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright 2014-2016 the libsecp256k1 contributors - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); - * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, - * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ - -package org.bitcoin; - -/** - * This class holds the context reference used in native methods - * to handle ECDSA operations. - */ -public class Secp256k1Context { - private static final boolean enabled; //true if the library is loaded - private static final long context; //ref to pointer to context obj - - static { //static initializer - boolean isEnabled = true; - long contextRef = -1; - try { - System.loadLibrary("secp256k1"); - contextRef = secp256k1_init_context(); - } catch (UnsatisfiedLinkError e) { - System.out.println("UnsatisfiedLinkError: " + e.toString()); - isEnabled = false; - } - enabled = isEnabled; - context = contextRef; - } - - public static boolean isEnabled() { - return enabled; - } - - public static long getContext() { - if(!enabled) return -1; //sanity check - return context; - } - - private static native long secp256k1_init_context(); -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.c deleted file mode 100644 index bcef7b3..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,377 +0,0 @@ -#include -#include -#include -#include "org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h" -#include "include/secp256k1.h" -#include "include/secp256k1_ecdh.h" -#include "include/secp256k1_recovery.h" - - -SECP256K1_API jlong JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ctx_1clone - (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jlong ctx_l) -{ - const secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; - - jlong ctx_clone_l = (uintptr_t) secp256k1_context_clone(ctx); - - (void)classObject;(void)env; - - return ctx_clone_l; - -} - -SECP256K1_API jint JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1context_1randomize - (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l) -{ - secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; - - const unsigned char* seed = (unsigned char*) (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject); - - (void)classObject; - - return secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, seed); - -} - -SECP256K1_API void JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1destroy_1context - (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jlong ctx_l) -{ - secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; - - secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx); - - (void)classObject;(void)env; -} - -SECP256K1_API jint JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ecdsa_1verify - (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l, jint siglen, jint publen) -{ - secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; - - unsigned char* data = (unsigned char*) (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject); - const unsigned char* sigdata = { (unsigned char*) (data + 32) }; - const unsigned char* pubdata = { (unsigned char*) (data + siglen + 32) }; - - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - - int ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigdata, siglen); - - if( ret ) { - ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pubdata, publen); - - if( ret ) { - ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, data, &pubkey); - } - } - - (void)classObject; - - return ret; -} - -SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ecdsa_1sign - (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l) -{ - secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; - unsigned char* data = (unsigned char*) (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject); - unsigned char* secKey = (unsigned char*) (data + 32); - - jobjectArray retArray; - jbyteArray sigArray, intsByteArray; - unsigned char intsarray[2]; - - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig[72]; - - int ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, sig, data, secKey, NULL, NULL ); - - unsigned char outputSer[72]; - size_t outputLen = 72; - - if( ret ) { - int ret2 = secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx,outputSer, &outputLen, sig ); (void)ret2; - } - - intsarray[0] = outputLen; - intsarray[1] = ret; - - retArray = (*env)->NewObjectArray(env, 2, - (*env)->FindClass(env, "[B"), - (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 1)); - - sigArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, outputLen); - (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, sigArray, 0, outputLen, (jbyte*)outputSer); - (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 0, sigArray); - - intsByteArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 2); - (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, intsByteArray, 0, 2, (jbyte*)intsarray); - (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 1, intsByteArray); - - (void)classObject; - - return retArray; -} - -SECP256K1_API jint JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ec_1seckey_1verify - (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l) -{ - secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; - unsigned char* secKey = (unsigned char*) (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject); - - (void)classObject; - - return secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, secKey); -} - -SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ec_1pubkey_1create - (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l) -{ - secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; - const unsigned char* secKey = (unsigned char*) (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject); - - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - - jobjectArray retArray; - jbyteArray pubkeyArray, intsByteArray; - unsigned char intsarray[2]; - - int ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, secKey); - - unsigned char outputSer[65]; - size_t outputLen = 65; - - if( ret ) { - int ret2 = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx,outputSer, &outputLen, &pubkey,SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED );(void)ret2; - } - - intsarray[0] = outputLen; - intsarray[1] = ret; - - retArray = (*env)->NewObjectArray(env, 2, - (*env)->FindClass(env, "[B"), - (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 1)); - - pubkeyArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, outputLen); - (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, pubkeyArray, 0, outputLen, (jbyte*)outputSer); - (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 0, pubkeyArray); - - intsByteArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 2); - (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, intsByteArray, 0, 2, (jbyte*)intsarray); - (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 1, intsByteArray); - - (void)classObject; - - return retArray; - -} - -SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1privkey_1tweak_1add - (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l) -{ - secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; - unsigned char* privkey = (unsigned char*) (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject); - const unsigned char* tweak = (unsigned char*) (privkey + 32); - - jobjectArray retArray; - jbyteArray privArray, intsByteArray; - unsigned char intsarray[2]; - - int privkeylen = 32; - - int ret = secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, privkey, tweak); - - intsarray[0] = privkeylen; - intsarray[1] = ret; - - retArray = (*env)->NewObjectArray(env, 2, - (*env)->FindClass(env, "[B"), - (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 1)); - - privArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, privkeylen); - (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, privArray, 0, privkeylen, (jbyte*)privkey); - (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 0, privArray); - - intsByteArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 2); - (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, intsByteArray, 0, 2, (jbyte*)intsarray); - (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 1, intsByteArray); - - (void)classObject; - - return retArray; -} - -SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1privkey_1tweak_1mul - (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l) -{ - secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; - unsigned char* privkey = (unsigned char*) (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject); - const unsigned char* tweak = (unsigned char*) (privkey + 32); - - jobjectArray retArray; - jbyteArray privArray, intsByteArray; - unsigned char intsarray[2]; - - int privkeylen = 32; - - int ret = secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(ctx, privkey, tweak); - - intsarray[0] = privkeylen; - intsarray[1] = ret; - - retArray = (*env)->NewObjectArray(env, 2, - (*env)->FindClass(env, "[B"), - (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 1)); - - privArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, privkeylen); - (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, privArray, 0, privkeylen, (jbyte*)privkey); - (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 0, privArray); - - intsByteArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 2); - (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, intsByteArray, 0, 2, (jbyte*)intsarray); - (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 1, intsByteArray); - - (void)classObject; - - return retArray; -} - -SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1pubkey_1tweak_1add - (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l, jint publen) -{ - secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; -/* secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey = (secp256k1_pubkey*) (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject);*/ - unsigned char* pkey = (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject); - const unsigned char* tweak = (unsigned char*) (pkey + publen); - - jobjectArray retArray; - jbyteArray pubArray, intsByteArray; - unsigned char intsarray[2]; - unsigned char outputSer[65]; - size_t outputLen = 65; - - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - int ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pkey, publen); - - if( ret ) { - ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, tweak); - } - - if( ret ) { - int ret2 = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx,outputSer, &outputLen, &pubkey,SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED );(void)ret2; - } - - intsarray[0] = outputLen; - intsarray[1] = ret; - - retArray = (*env)->NewObjectArray(env, 2, - (*env)->FindClass(env, "[B"), - (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 1)); - - pubArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, outputLen); - (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, pubArray, 0, outputLen, (jbyte*)outputSer); - (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 0, pubArray); - - intsByteArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 2); - (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, intsByteArray, 0, 2, (jbyte*)intsarray); - (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 1, intsByteArray); - - (void)classObject; - - return retArray; -} - -SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1pubkey_1tweak_1mul - (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l, jint publen) -{ - secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; - unsigned char* pkey = (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject); - const unsigned char* tweak = (unsigned char*) (pkey + publen); - - jobjectArray retArray; - jbyteArray pubArray, intsByteArray; - unsigned char intsarray[2]; - unsigned char outputSer[65]; - size_t outputLen = 65; - - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - int ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pkey, publen); - - if ( ret ) { - ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, &pubkey, tweak); - } - - if( ret ) { - int ret2 = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx,outputSer, &outputLen, &pubkey,SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED );(void)ret2; - } - - intsarray[0] = outputLen; - intsarray[1] = ret; - - retArray = (*env)->NewObjectArray(env, 2, - (*env)->FindClass(env, "[B"), - (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 1)); - - pubArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, outputLen); - (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, pubArray, 0, outputLen, (jbyte*)outputSer); - (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 0, pubArray); - - intsByteArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 2); - (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, intsByteArray, 0, 2, (jbyte*)intsarray); - (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 1, intsByteArray); - - (void)classObject; - - return retArray; -} - -SECP256K1_API jlong JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ecdsa_1pubkey_1combine - (JNIEnv * env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l, jint numkeys) -{ - (void)classObject;(void)env;(void)byteBufferObject;(void)ctx_l;(void)numkeys; - - return 0; -} - -SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ecdh - (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l, jint publen) -{ - secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l; - const unsigned char* secdata = (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject); - const unsigned char* pubdata = (const unsigned char*) (secdata + 32); - - jobjectArray retArray; - jbyteArray outArray, intsByteArray; - unsigned char intsarray[1]; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - unsigned char nonce_res[32]; - size_t outputLen = 32; - - int ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pubdata, publen); - - if (ret) { - ret = secp256k1_ecdh( - ctx, - nonce_res, - &pubkey, - secdata - ); - } - - intsarray[0] = ret; - - retArray = (*env)->NewObjectArray(env, 2, - (*env)->FindClass(env, "[B"), - (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 1)); - - outArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, outputLen); - (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, outArray, 0, 32, (jbyte*)nonce_res); - (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 0, outArray); - - intsByteArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 1); - (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, intsByteArray, 0, 1, (jbyte*)intsarray); - (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 1, intsByteArray); - - (void)classObject; - - return retArray; -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h deleted file mode 100644 index fe613c9..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,119 +0,0 @@ -/* DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE - it is machine generated */ -#include -#include "include/secp256k1.h" -/* Header for class org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 */ - -#ifndef _Included_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 -#define _Included_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif -/* - * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 - * Method: secp256k1_ctx_clone - * Signature: (J)J - */ -SECP256K1_API jlong JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ctx_1clone - (JNIEnv *, jclass, jlong); - -/* - * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 - * Method: secp256k1_context_randomize - * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;J)I - */ -SECP256K1_API jint JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1context_1randomize - (JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong); - -/* - * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 - * Method: secp256k1_privkey_tweak_add - * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;J)[[B - */ -SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1privkey_1tweak_1add - (JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong); - -/* - * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 - * Method: secp256k1_privkey_tweak_mul - * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;J)[[B - */ -SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1privkey_1tweak_1mul - (JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong); - -/* - * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 - * Method: secp256k1_pubkey_tweak_add - * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;JI)[[B - */ -SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1pubkey_1tweak_1add - (JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong, jint); - -/* - * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 - * Method: secp256k1_pubkey_tweak_mul - * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;JI)[[B - */ -SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1pubkey_1tweak_1mul - (JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong, jint); - -/* - * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 - * Method: secp256k1_destroy_context - * Signature: (J)V - */ -SECP256K1_API void JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1destroy_1context - (JNIEnv *, jclass, jlong); - -/* - * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 - * Method: secp256k1_ecdsa_verify - * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;JII)I - */ -SECP256K1_API jint JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ecdsa_1verify - (JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong, jint, jint); - -/* - * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 - * Method: secp256k1_ecdsa_sign - * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;J)[[B - */ -SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ecdsa_1sign - (JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong); - -/* - * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 - * Method: secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify - * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;J)I - */ -SECP256K1_API jint JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ec_1seckey_1verify - (JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong); - -/* - * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 - * Method: secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create - * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;J)[[B - */ -SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ec_1pubkey_1create - (JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong); - -/* - * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 - * Method: secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse - * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;JI)[[B - */ -SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ec_1pubkey_1parse - (JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong, jint); - -/* - * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1 - * Method: secp256k1_ecdh - * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;JI)[[B - */ -SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ecdh - (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l, jint publen); - - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.c deleted file mode 100644 index a52939e..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -#include -#include -#include "org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.h" -#include "include/secp256k1.h" - -SECP256K1_API jlong JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context_secp256k1_1init_1context - (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject) -{ - secp256k1_context *ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - - (void)classObject;(void)env; - - return (uintptr_t)ctx; -} - diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.h deleted file mode 100644 index 0d2bc84..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/java/org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,22 +0,0 @@ -/* DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE - it is machine generated */ -#include -#include "include/secp256k1.h" -/* Header for class org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context */ - -#ifndef _Included_org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context -#define _Included_org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif -/* - * Class: org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context - * Method: secp256k1_init_context - * Signature: ()J - */ -SECP256K1_API jlong JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_Secp256k1Context_secp256k1_1init_1context - (JNIEnv *, jclass); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/.inner_product_impl.h.swp b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/.inner_product_impl.h.swp deleted file mode 100644 index 484ada5fc740e5a8309442762be2dc17612b4707..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 GIT binary patch literal 0 HcmV?d00001 literal 16384 zcmeHOTZ|i58J-qenqE=L<%x2Vh>g8#uh-u6LeectHpynmX4l$Fs&08@#&iUs*-}!Inc(yiicJ>UrXMDoI>z#)2>mO{c-hO>xJbTzMc)eqXb)Q;x zed&J1IXf0{r_PIaAG$}%8yfYf?pV6t4=@pmOJ3 z7t6(Vw-kj=sqNQ0E{{sJ{sF@CcxYmDz2n5DXb0|iYv^{_*NlOTfdK|?F(xZz>6!=j z?_;;`T^VT2zGMt!3}g&s3}g&s3}g&s3}g&s4E%pH5C=CIk70_}>S>+7>a?U!}?-TM0HhT31(?RV+xzZ`1+r*2&w|&#z4kE#z4kE#z4kE z#z4kE#z4kE#z4kE#=w7t0lRJ(wCDdgZFKSbf3pAo-fe~v06E~LTMgqW;Pb$FUXfFk2;HYTylXvDJ@7wP6! z@97M)?{N%MK8=w)jIq|(FuBw2xUuQju3NL6ixwoV`R*F#rY0%8CPb6;E@r|>wBvWe zh!>7`7>jyQxw)ts`XQKC8iE;p{inSVQL4Wh~l0> 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ztwjFyv~l}HrYCV{QLQF^23_HCE&V>K#l<<(vGC7w8SPX~9wJJs%_=n<8W5EYi zsjkC9pUGB|Mle6G^NyXJB|WKzq(h{7*^n)j?6I{+n+Hx?s|VLs4;hBUHrGvIWiQ!f zx^RIEJ0FqdtWNScC0CL36AAQAiYMzQ#d#JBu%)0Tb=G;C-8<5xWpde`7fUwfpdzPx zcQThMdEZFINWbFb!B4ugY}Ym55kDoxWp6y?*_*1?cs*&OI0?SaMQg*)axp9Uq^-w_ z#qg`ukxrBD(VFq}m55+lf!sh@csJIK95vQaGX=I6XY!es&1!AaWpnM4#FI!Cq}Q8Y z(`V>9`6WHzlew4D=Zrp2%hkt*8I_A3&w72_!sbGgDkgqwg7CuUlt*{?=>C)IYu3Xj*Vorh9DDTW(F4}W6U}utC)z%Ye}pBY z$}e)5a71n0a#xQYJKa3;2f~A|t5kotX$}U1#h}mqFo>kX7X#VB>*Ws4@j5wvbE&2$ zi~VkYv7-I#7on1(6)6Z3VIdM4aXQ>QL1EBV16y)R=RiZQ735?)_)^)o{h{zXsL|NZ pYS14_(djBOoH8|P^<{d = c`. - * where `G_i` and `H_i` are standard NUMS generators. - * - * Verification of the proof comes down to a single multiexponentiation of the form - * - * P + (c - a_1*b_1 - a_2*b_2)*x*G - * - sum_{i=1}^n [s'_i*G_i + s_i*H_i] - * + sum_{i=1}^log2(n) [x_i^-2 L_i + x_i^2 R_i] - * - * which will equal infinity if the inner product proof is correct. Here - * - `G` is the standard secp generator - * - `x` is a hash of `commit` and is used to rerandomize `c`. See Protocol 2 vs Protocol 1 in the paper. - * - `x_i = H(x_{i-1} || L_i || R_i)`, where `x_{-1}` is passed through the `commit` variable and - * must be a commitment to `P` and `c`. - * - `s_i` and `s'_i` are computed as follows. - * - * Letting `i_j` be defined as 1 if `i & 2^j == 1`, and -1 otherwise, - * - For `i` from `1` to `n/2`, `s'_i = a_1 * prod_{j=1}^log2(n) x_j^i_j` - * - For `i` from `n/2 + 1` to `n`, `s'_i = a_2 * prod_{j=1}^log2(n) x_j^i_j` - * - For `i` from `1` to `n/2`, `s_i = b_1 * prod_{j=1}^log2(n) x_j^-i_j` - * - For `i` from `n/2 + 1` to `n`, `s_i = b_2 * prod_{j=1}^log2(n) x_j^-i_j` - * - * Observe that these can be computed iteratively by labelling the coefficients `s_i` for `i` - * from `0` to `2n-1` rather than 1-indexing and distinguishing between `s_i'`s and `s_i`s: - * - * Start with `s_0 = a_1 * prod_{j=1}^log2(n) x_j^-1`, then for later `s_i`s, - * - For `i` from `1` to `n/2 - 1`, multiply some earlier `s'_j` by some `x_k^2` - * - For `i = n/2`, multiply `s_{i-1} by `a_2/a_1`. - * - For `i` from `n/2 + 1` to `n - 1`, multiply some earlier `s'_j` by some `x_k^2` - * - For `i = n`, multiply `s'_{i-1}` by `b_1/a_2` to get `s_i`. - * - For `i` from `n + 1` to `3n/2 - 1`, multiply some earlier `s_j` by some `x_k^-2` - * - For `i = 3n/2`, multiply `s_{i-1}` by `b_2/b_1`. - * - For `i` from `3n/2 + 1` to `2n - 1`, multiply some earlier `s_j` by some `x_k^-2` - * where of course, the indices `j` and `k` must be chosen carefully. - * - * The bulk of `secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_vfy_ecmult_callback` involves computing - * these indices, given `a_2/a_1`, `b_1/a_1`, `b_2/b_1`, and the `x_k^2`s as input. It - * computes `x_k^-2` as a side-effect of its other computation. - */ - -typedef int (secp256k1_bulletproof_vfy_callback)(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, secp256k1_scalar *randomizer, size_t idx, void *data); - -/* used by callers to wrap a proof with surrounding context */ -typedef struct { - const unsigned char *proof; - secp256k1_scalar p_offs; - secp256k1_scalar yinv; - unsigned char commit[32]; - secp256k1_bulletproof_vfy_callback *rangeproof_cb; - void *rangeproof_cb_data; - size_t n_extra_rangeproof_points; -} secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_context; - -/* used internally */ -typedef struct { - const secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_context *proof; - secp256k1_scalar abinv[IP_AB_SCALARS]; - secp256k1_scalar xsq[SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_DEPTH + 1]; - secp256k1_scalar xsqinv[SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_DEPTH + 1]; - secp256k1_scalar xsqinvy[SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_DEPTH + 1]; - secp256k1_scalar xcache[SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_DEPTH + 1]; - secp256k1_scalar xsqinv_mask; - const unsigned char *serialized_lr; -} secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_vfy_data; - -/* used by callers to modify the multiexp */ -typedef struct { - size_t n_proofs; - secp256k1_scalar p_offs; - const secp256k1_ge *g; - const secp256k1_ge *geng; - const secp256k1_ge *genh; - size_t vec_len; - size_t lg_vec_len; - int shared_g; - secp256k1_scalar *randomizer; - secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_vfy_data *proof; -} secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_vfy_ecmult_context; - -size_t secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_proof_length(size_t n) { - if (n < IP_AB_SCALARS / 2) { - return 32 * (1 + 2 * n); - } else { - size_t bit_count = POPCOUNT(n); - size_t log = secp256k1_floor_lg(2 * n / IP_AB_SCALARS); - return 32 * (1 + 2 * (bit_count - 1 + log) + IP_AB_SCALARS) + (2*log + 7) / 8; - } -} - -/* Our ecmult_multi function takes `(c - a*b)*x` directly and multiplies this by `G`. For every other - * (scalar, point) pair it calls the following callback function, which takes an index and outputs a - * pair. The function therefore has three regimes: - * - * For the first `n` invocations, it returns `(s'_i, G_i)` for `i` from 1 to `n`. - * For the next `n` invocations, it returns `(s_i, H_i)` for `i` from 1 to `n`. - * For the next `2*log2(n)` invocations it returns `(x_i^-2, L_i)` and `(x_i^2, R_i)`, - * alternating between the two choices, for `i` from 1 to `log2(n)`. - * - * For the remaining invocations it passes through to another callback, `rangeproof_cb_data` which - * computes `P`. The reason for this is that in practice `P` is usually defined by another multiexp - * rather than being a known point, and it is more efficient to compute one exponentiation. - * - * Inline we refer to the first `2n` coefficients as `s_i` for `i` from 0 to `2n-1`, since that - * is the more convenient indexing. In particular we describe (a) how the indices `j` and `k`, - * from the big comment block above, are chosen; and (b) when/how each `x_k^-2` is computed. - */ -static int secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_vfy_ecmult_callback(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *data) { - secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_vfy_ecmult_context *ctx = (secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_vfy_ecmult_context *) data; - - /* First 2N points use the standard Gi, Hi generators, and the scalars can be aggregated across proofs. - * Inside this if clause, `idx` corresponds to the index `i` in the big comment, and runs from 0 to `2n-1`. - * Also `ctx->vec_len` corresponds to `n`. */ - if (idx < 2 * ctx->vec_len) { - /* Number of `a` scalars in the proof (same as number of `b` scalars in the proof). Will - * be 2 except for very small proofs that have fewer than 2 scalars as input. */ - const size_t grouping = ctx->vec_len < IP_AB_SCALARS / 2 ? ctx->vec_len : IP_AB_SCALARS / 2; - const size_t lg_grouping = secp256k1_floor_lg(grouping); - size_t i; - VERIFY_CHECK(lg_grouping == 0 || lg_grouping == 1); /* TODO support higher IP_AB_SCALARS */ - - /* Determine whether we're multiplying by `G_i`s or `H_i`s. */ - if (idx < ctx->vec_len) { - *pt = ctx->geng[idx]; - } else { - *pt = ctx->genh[idx - ctx->vec_len]; - } - - secp256k1_scalar_clear(sc); - /* Loop over all the different inner product proofs we might be doing at once. Since they - * share generators `G_i` and `H_i`, we compute all of their scalars at once and add them. - * For each proof we start with the "seed value" `ctx->proof[i].xcache[0]` (see next comment - * for its meaning) from which every other scalar derived. We expect the caller to have - * randomized this to ensure that this wanton addition cannot enable cancellation attacks. - */ - for (i = 0; i < ctx->n_proofs; i++) { - /* To recall from the introductory comment: most `s_i` values are computed by taking an - * earlier `s_j` value and multiplying it by some `x_k^2`. - * - * We now explain the index `j`: it is the largest number with one fewer 1-bits than `i`. - * Alternately, the most recently returned `s_j` where `j` has one fewer 1-bits than `i`. - * - * To ensure that `s_j` is available when we need it, on each iteration we define the - * variable `cache_idx` which simply counts the 1-bits in `i`; before returning `s_i` - * we store it in `ctx->proof[i].xcache[cache_idx]`. Then later, when we want "most - * recently returned `s_j` with one fewer 1-bits than `i`, it'll be sitting right - * there in `ctx->proof[i].xcache[cache_idx - 1]`. - * - * Note that `ctx->proof[i].xcache[0]` will always equal `-a_1 * prod_{i=1}^{n-1} x_i^-2`, - * and we expect the caller to have set this. - */ - const size_t cache_idx = POPCOUNT(idx); - secp256k1_scalar term; - VERIFY_CHECK(cache_idx < SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_DEPTH); - /* For the special case `cache_idx == 0` (which is true iff `idx == 0`) there is nothing to do. */ - if (cache_idx > 0) { - /* Otherwise, check if this is one of the special indices where we transition from `a_1` to `a_2`, - * from `a_2` to `b_1`, or from `b_1` to `b_2`. (For small proofs there is only one transition, - * from `a` to `b`.) */ - if (idx % (ctx->vec_len / grouping) == 0) { - const size_t abinv_idx = idx / (ctx->vec_len / grouping) - 1; - size_t prev_cache_idx; - /* Check if it's the even specialer index where we're transitioning from `a`s to `b`s, from - * `G`s to `H`s, and from `x_k^2`s to `x_k^-2`s. In rangeproof and circuit applications, - * the caller secretly has a variable `y` such that `H_i` is really `y^-i H_i` for `i` ranging - * from 0 to `n-1`. Rather than forcing the caller to tweak every `H_i` herself, which would - * be very slow and prevent precomputation, we instead multiply our cached `x_k^-2` values - * by `y^(-2^k)` respectively, which will ultimately result in every `s_i` we return having - * been multiplied by `y^-i`. - * - * This is an underhanded trick but the result is that all `n` powers of `y^-i` show up - * in the right place, and we only need log-many scalar squarings and multiplications. - */ - if (idx == ctx->vec_len) { - secp256k1_scalar yinvn = ctx->proof[i].proof->yinv; - size_t j; - prev_cache_idx = POPCOUNT(idx - 1); - for (j = 0; j < (size_t) CTZ(idx) - lg_grouping; j++) { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->proof[i].xsqinvy[j], &ctx->proof[i].xsqinv[j], &yinvn); - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&yinvn, &yinvn); - } - if (lg_grouping == 1) { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->proof[i].abinv[2], &ctx->proof[i].abinv[2], &yinvn); - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&yinvn, &yinvn); - } - } else { - prev_cache_idx = cache_idx - 1; - } - /* Regardless of specialness, we multiply by `a_2/a_1` or whatever the appropriate multiplier - * is. We expect the caller to have given these to us in the `ctx->proof[i].abinv` array. */ - secp256k1_scalar_mul( - &ctx->proof[i].xcache[cache_idx], - &ctx->proof[i].xcache[prev_cache_idx], - &ctx->proof[i].abinv[abinv_idx] - ); - /* If it's *not* a special index, just multiply by the appropriate `x_k^2`, or `x_k^-2` in case - * we're in the `H_i` half of the multiexp. At this point we can explain the index `k`, which - * is computed in the variable `xsq_idx` (`xsqinv_idx` respectively). In light of our discussion - * of `j`, we see that this should be "the least significant bit that's 1 in `i` but not `i-1`." - * In other words, it is the number of trailing 0 bits in the index `i`. */ - } else if (idx < ctx->vec_len) { - const size_t xsq_idx = CTZ(idx); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->proof[i].xcache[cache_idx], &ctx->proof[i].xcache[cache_idx - 1], &ctx->proof[i].xsq[xsq_idx]); - } else { - const size_t xsqinv_idx = CTZ(idx); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->proof[i].xcache[cache_idx], &ctx->proof[i].xcache[cache_idx - 1], &ctx->proof[i].xsqinvy[xsqinv_idx]); - } - } - term = ctx->proof[i].xcache[cache_idx]; - - /* One last trick: compute `x_k^-2` while computing the `G_i` scalars, so that they'll be - * available when we need them for the `H_i` scalars. We can do this for every `i` value - * that has exactly one 0-bit, i.e. which is a product of all `x_i`s and one `x_k^-1`. By - * multiplying that by the special value `prod_{i=1}^n x_i^-1` we obtain simply `x_k^-2`. - * We expect the caller to give us this special value in `ctx->proof[i].xsqinv_mask`. */ - if (idx < ctx->vec_len / grouping && POPCOUNT(idx) == ctx->lg_vec_len - 1) { - const size_t xsqinv_idx = CTZ(~idx); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->proof[i].xsqinv[xsqinv_idx], &ctx->proof[i].xcache[cache_idx], &ctx->proof[i].xsqinv_mask); - } - - /* Finally, if the caller, in its computation of `P`, wants to multiply `G_i` or `H_i` by some scalar, - * we add that to our sum as well. Again, we trust the randomization in `xcache[0]` to prevent any - * cancellation attacks here. */ - if (ctx->proof[i].proof->rangeproof_cb != NULL) { - secp256k1_scalar rangeproof_offset; - if ((ctx->proof[i].proof->rangeproof_cb)(&rangeproof_offset, NULL, &ctx->randomizer[i], idx, ctx->proof[i].proof->rangeproof_cb_data) == 0) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_scalar_add(&term, &term, &rangeproof_offset); - } - - secp256k1_scalar_add(sc, sc, &term); - } - /* Next 2lgN points are the L and R vectors */ - } else if (idx < 2 * (ctx->vec_len + ctx->lg_vec_len * ctx->n_proofs)) { - size_t real_idx = idx - 2 * ctx->vec_len; - const size_t proof_idx = real_idx / (2 * ctx->lg_vec_len); - real_idx = real_idx % (2 * ctx->lg_vec_len); - secp256k1_bulletproof_deserialize_point( - pt, - ctx->proof[proof_idx].serialized_lr, - real_idx, - 2 * ctx->lg_vec_len - ); - if (idx % 2 == 0) { - *sc = ctx->proof[proof_idx].xsq[real_idx / 2]; - } else { - *sc = ctx->proof[proof_idx].xsqinv[real_idx / 2]; - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->randomizer[proof_idx]); - /* After the G's, H's, L's and R's, do the blinding_gen */ - } else if (idx == 2 * (ctx->vec_len + ctx->lg_vec_len * ctx->n_proofs)) { - *sc = ctx->p_offs; - *pt = *ctx->g; - /* Remaining points are whatever the rangeproof wants */ - } else if (ctx->shared_g && idx == 2 * (ctx->vec_len + ctx->lg_vec_len * ctx->n_proofs) + 1) { - /* Special case: the first extra point is independent of the proof, for both rangeproof and circuit */ - size_t i; - secp256k1_scalar_clear(sc); - for (i = 0; i < ctx->n_proofs; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar term; - if ((ctx->proof[i].proof->rangeproof_cb)(&term, pt, &ctx->randomizer[i], 2 * (ctx->vec_len + ctx->lg_vec_len), ctx->proof[i].proof->rangeproof_cb_data) == 0) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_scalar_add(sc, sc, &term); - } - } else { - size_t proof_idx = 0; - size_t real_idx = idx - 2 * (ctx->vec_len + ctx->lg_vec_len * ctx->n_proofs) - 1 - !!ctx->shared_g; - while (real_idx >= ctx->proof[proof_idx].proof->n_extra_rangeproof_points - !!ctx->shared_g) { - real_idx -= ctx->proof[proof_idx].proof->n_extra_rangeproof_points - !!ctx->shared_g; - proof_idx++; - VERIFY_CHECK(proof_idx < ctx->n_proofs); - } - if ((ctx->proof[proof_idx].proof->rangeproof_cb)(sc, pt, &ctx->randomizer[proof_idx], 2 * (ctx->vec_len + ctx->lg_vec_len), ctx->proof[proof_idx].proof->rangeproof_cb_data) == 0) { - return 0; - } - } - - return 1; -} - -/* nb For security it is essential that `commit_inp` already commit to all data - * needed to compute `P`. We do not hash it in during verification since `P` - * may be specified indirectly as a bunch of scalar offsets. - */ -static int secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ecmult_ctx, secp256k1_scratch *scratch, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, size_t vec_len, const secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_context *proof, size_t n_proofs, size_t plen, int shared_g) { - secp256k1_sha256 sha256; - secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_vfy_ecmult_context ecmult_data; - unsigned char commit[32]; - size_t total_n_points = 2 * vec_len + !!shared_g + 1; /* +1 for shared G (value_gen), +1 for H (blinding_gen) */ - secp256k1_gej r; - secp256k1_scalar zero; - size_t i; - - if (plen != secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_proof_length(vec_len)) { - return 0; - } - - if (n_proofs == 0) { - return 1; - } - - if (!secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(scratch, n_proofs * (sizeof(*ecmult_data.randomizer) + sizeof(*ecmult_data.proof)), 2)) { - return 0; - } - - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&zero); - ecmult_data.n_proofs = n_proofs; - ecmult_data.g = gens->blinding_gen; - ecmult_data.geng = gens->gens; - ecmult_data.genh = gens->gens + gens->n / 2; - ecmult_data.vec_len = vec_len; - ecmult_data.lg_vec_len = secp256k1_floor_lg(2 * vec_len / IP_AB_SCALARS); - ecmult_data.shared_g = shared_g; - ecmult_data.randomizer = (secp256k1_scalar *)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_proofs * sizeof(*ecmult_data.randomizer)); - ecmult_data.proof = (secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_vfy_data *)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_proofs * sizeof(*ecmult_data.proof)); - /* Seed RNG for per-proof randomizers */ - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - for (i = 0; i < n_proofs; i++) { - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, proof[i].proof, plen); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, proof[i].commit, 32); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(commit, &proof[i].p_offs); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); - } - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); - - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&ecmult_data.p_offs); - for (i = 0; i < n_proofs; i++) { - const unsigned char *serproof = proof[i].proof; - unsigned char proof_commit[32]; - secp256k1_scalar dot; - secp256k1_scalar ab[IP_AB_SCALARS]; - secp256k1_scalar negprod; - secp256k1_scalar x; - int overflow; - size_t j; - const size_t n_ab = 2 * vec_len < IP_AB_SCALARS ? 2 * vec_len : IP_AB_SCALARS; - - total_n_points += 2 * ecmult_data.lg_vec_len + proof[i].n_extra_rangeproof_points - !!shared_g; /* -1 for shared G */ - - /* Extract dot product, will always be the first 32 bytes */ - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&dot, serproof, &overflow); - if (overflow) { - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return 0; - } - /* Commit to dot product */ - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, proof[i].commit, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, serproof, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, proof_commit); - serproof += 32; - - /* Extract a, b */ - for (j = 0; j < n_ab; j++) { - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ab[j], serproof, &overflow); - if (overflow) { - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return 0; - } - /* TODO our verifier currently bombs out with zeros because it uses - * scalar inverses gratuitously. Fix that. */ - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ab[j])) { - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return 0; - } - serproof += 32; - } - secp256k1_scalar_dot_product(&negprod, &ab[0], &ab[n_ab / 2], n_ab / 2); - - ecmult_data.proof[i].proof = &proof[i]; - /* set per-proof randomizer */ - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ecmult_data.randomizer[i], commit, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ecmult_data.randomizer[i])) { - /* cryptographically unreachable */ - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return 0; - } - - /* Compute x*(dot - a*b) for each proof; add it and p_offs to the p_offs accumulator */ - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&x, proof_commit, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&x)) { - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return 0; - } - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&negprod, &negprod); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&negprod, &negprod, &dot); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x, &x, &negprod); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&x, &x, &proof[i].p_offs); - - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x, &x, &ecmult_data.randomizer[i]); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&ecmult_data.p_offs, &ecmult_data.p_offs, &x); - - /* Special-case: trivial proofs are valid iff the explicitly revealed scalars - * dot to the explicitly revealed dot product. */ - if (2 * vec_len <= IP_AB_SCALARS) { - if (!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&negprod)) { - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return 0; - } - /* remaining data does not (and cannot) be computed for proofs with no a's or b's. */ - if (vec_len == 0) { - continue; - } - } - - /* Compute the inverse product and the array of squares; the rest will be filled - * in by the callback during the multiexp. */ - ecmult_data.proof[i].serialized_lr = serproof; /* bookmark L/R location in proof */ - negprod = ab[n_ab - 1]; - ab[n_ab - 1] = ecmult_data.randomizer[i]; /* build r * x1 * x2 * ... * xn in last slot of `ab` array */ - for (j = 0; j < ecmult_data.lg_vec_len; j++) { - secp256k1_scalar xi; - const size_t lidx = 2 * j; - const size_t ridx = 2 * j + 1; - const size_t bitveclen = (2 * ecmult_data.lg_vec_len + 7) / 8; - const unsigned char lrparity = 2 * !!(serproof[lidx / 8] & (1 << (lidx % 8))) + !!(serproof[ridx / 8] & (1 << (ridx % 8))); - /* Map commit -> H(commit || LR parity || Lx || Rx), compute xi from it */ - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, proof_commit, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &lrparity, 1); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &serproof[32 * lidx + bitveclen], 32); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &serproof[32 * ridx + bitveclen], 32); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, proof_commit); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&xi, proof_commit, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&xi)) { - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return 0; - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ab[n_ab - 1], &ab[n_ab - 1], &xi); - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&ecmult_data.proof[i].xsq[j], &xi); - } - /* Compute inverse of all a's and b's, except the last b whose inverse is not needed. - * Also compute the inverse of (-r * x1 * ... * xn) which will be needed */ - secp256k1_scalar_inverse_all_var(ecmult_data.proof[i].abinv, ab, n_ab); - ab[n_ab - 1] = negprod; - - /* Compute (-a0 * r * x1 * ... * xn)^-1 which will be used to mask out individual x_i^-2's */ - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&ecmult_data.proof[i].xsqinv_mask, &ecmult_data.proof[i].abinv[0]); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ecmult_data.proof[i].xsqinv_mask, &ecmult_data.proof[i].xsqinv_mask, &ecmult_data.proof[i].abinv[n_ab - 1]); - - /* Compute each scalar times the previous' inverse, which is used to switch between a's and b's */ - for (j = n_ab - 1; j > 0; j--) { - size_t prev_idx; - if (j == n_ab / 2) { - prev_idx = j - 1; /* we go from a_n to b_0 */ - } else { - prev_idx = j & (j - 1); /* but from a_i' to a_i, where i' is i with its lowest set bit unset */ - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul( - &ecmult_data.proof[i].abinv[j - 1], - &ecmult_data.proof[i].abinv[prev_idx], - &ab[j] - ); - } - - /* Extract -a0 * r * (x1 * ... * xn)^-1 which is our first coefficient. Use negprod as a dummy */ - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&negprod, &ecmult_data.randomizer[i], &ab[0]); /* r*a */ - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&negprod, &negprod); /* (r*a)^2 */ - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ecmult_data.proof[i].xcache[0], &ecmult_data.proof[i].xsqinv_mask, &negprod); /* -a * r * (x1 * x2 * ... * xn)^-1 */ - } - - /* Do the multiexp */ - if (secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, NULL, secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_vfy_ecmult_callback, (void *) &ecmult_data, total_n_points) != 1) { - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return 0; - } - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r); -} - -typedef struct { - secp256k1_scalar x[SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_DEPTH]; - secp256k1_scalar xinv[SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_DEPTH]; - secp256k1_scalar yinv; - secp256k1_scalar yinvn; - const secp256k1_ge *geng; - const secp256k1_ge *genh; - const secp256k1_ge *g; - const secp256k1_scalar *a; - const secp256k1_scalar *b; - secp256k1_scalar g_sc; - size_t grouping; - size_t n; -} secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_context; - -/* At each level i of recursion (i from 0 upto lg(vector size) - 1) - * L = a_even . G_odd + b_odd . H_even (18) - * which, by expanding the generators into the original G's and H's - * and setting n = (1 << i), can be computed as follows: - * - * For j from 1 to [vector size], - * 1. Use H[j] or G[j] as generator, starting with H and switching - * every n. - * 2. Start with b1 with H and a0 with G, and increment by 2 each switch. - * 3. For k = 1, 2, 4, ..., n/2, use the same algorithm to choose - * between a and b to choose between x and x^-1, except using - * k in place of n. With H's choose x then x^-1, with G's choose - * x^-1 then x. - * - * For R everything is the same except swap G/H and a/b and x/x^-1. - */ -static int secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_callback_l(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *data) { - secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_context *ctx = (secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_context *) data; - const size_t ab_idx = (idx / ctx->grouping) ^ 1; - size_t i; - - /* Special-case the primary generator */ - if (idx == ctx->n) { - *pt = *ctx->g; - *sc = ctx->g_sc; - return 1; - } - - /* steps 1/2 */ - if ((idx / ctx->grouping) % 2 == 0) { - *pt = ctx->genh[idx]; - *sc = ctx->b[ab_idx]; - /* Map h -> h' (eqn 59) */ - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->yinvn); - } else { - *pt = ctx->geng[idx]; - *sc = ctx->a[ab_idx]; - } - - /* step 3 */ - for (i = 0; (1u << i) < ctx->grouping; i++) { - size_t grouping = (1u << i); - if ((((idx / grouping) % 2) ^ ((idx / ctx->grouping) % 2)) == 0) { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->x[i]); - } else { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->xinv[i]); - } - } - - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->yinvn, &ctx->yinvn, &ctx->yinv); - return 1; -} - -/* Identical code except `== 0` changed to `== 1` twice, and the - * `+ 1` from Step 1/2 was moved to the other if branch. */ -static int secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_callback_r(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *data) { - secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_context *ctx = (secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_context *) data; - const size_t ab_idx = (idx / ctx->grouping) ^ 1; - size_t i; - - /* Special-case the primary generator */ - if (idx == ctx->n) { - *pt = *ctx->g; - *sc = ctx->g_sc; - return 1; - } - - /* steps 1/2 */ - if ((idx / ctx->grouping) % 2 == 1) { - *pt = ctx->genh[idx]; - *sc = ctx->b[ab_idx]; - /* Map h -> h' (eqn 59) */ - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->yinvn); - } else { - *pt = ctx->geng[idx]; - *sc = ctx->a[ab_idx]; - } - - /* step 3 */ - for (i = 0; (1u << i) < ctx->grouping; i++) { - size_t grouping = (1u << i); - if ((((idx / grouping) % 2) ^ ((idx / ctx->grouping) % 2)) == 1) { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->x[i]); - } else { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->xinv[i]); - } - } - - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->yinvn, &ctx->yinvn, &ctx->yinv); - return 1; -} - -static int secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_callback_g(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *data) { - secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_context *ctx = (secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_context *) data; - size_t i; - - *pt = ctx->geng[idx]; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(sc, 1); - for (i = 0; (1u << i) <= ctx->grouping; i++) { - if (idx & (1u << i)) { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->x[i]); - } else { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->xinv[i]); - } - } - return 1; -} - -static int secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_callback_h(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *data) { - secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_context *ctx = (secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_context *) data; - size_t i; - - *pt = ctx->genh[idx]; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(sc, 1); - for (i = 0; (1u << i) <= ctx->grouping; i++) { - if (idx & (1u << i)) { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->xinv[i]); - } else { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->x[i]); - } - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->yinvn); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->yinvn, &ctx->yinvn, &ctx->yinv); - return 1; -} - -/* These proofs are not zero-knowledge. There is no need to worry about constant timeness. - * `commit_inp` must contain 256 bits of randomness, it is used immediately as a randomizer. - */ -static int secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_real_prove_impl(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ecmult_ctx, secp256k1_scratch *scratch, secp256k1_ge *out_pt, size_t *pt_idx, const secp256k1_ge *g, secp256k1_ge *geng, secp256k1_ge *genh, secp256k1_scalar *a_arr, secp256k1_scalar *b_arr, const secp256k1_scalar *yinv, const secp256k1_scalar *ux, const size_t n, unsigned char *commit) { - size_t i; - size_t halfwidth; - - secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_context pfdata; - pfdata.yinv = *yinv; - pfdata.g = g; - pfdata.geng = geng; - pfdata.genh = genh; - pfdata.a = a_arr; - pfdata.b = b_arr; - pfdata.n = n; - - /* Protocol 1: Iterate, halving vector size until it is 1 */ - for (halfwidth = n / 2, i = 0; halfwidth > IP_AB_SCALARS / 4; halfwidth /= 2, i++) { - secp256k1_gej tmplj, tmprj; - size_t j; - int overflow; - - pfdata.grouping = 1u << i; - - /* L */ - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&pfdata.g_sc); - for (j = 0; j < halfwidth; j++) { - secp256k1_scalar prod; - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&prod, &a_arr[2*j], &b_arr[2*j + 1]); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&pfdata.g_sc, &pfdata.g_sc, &prod); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&pfdata.g_sc, &pfdata.g_sc, ux); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&pfdata.yinvn, 1); - secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(ecmult_ctx, scratch, &tmplj, NULL, &secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_callback_l, (void *) &pfdata, n + 1); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&out_pt[(*pt_idx)++], &tmplj); - - /* R */ - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&pfdata.g_sc); - for (j = 0; j < halfwidth; j++) { - secp256k1_scalar prod; - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&prod, &a_arr[2*j + 1], &b_arr[2*j]); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&pfdata.g_sc, &pfdata.g_sc, &prod); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&pfdata.g_sc, &pfdata.g_sc, ux); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&pfdata.yinvn, 1); - secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(ecmult_ctx, scratch, &tmprj, NULL, &secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_callback_r, (void *) &pfdata, n + 1); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&out_pt[(*pt_idx)++], &tmprj); - - /* x, x^2, x^-1, x^-2 */ - secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(commit, &out_pt[*pt_idx - 2], &out_pt[*pt_idx] - 1); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&pfdata.x[i], commit, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&pfdata.x[i])) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&pfdata.xinv[i], &pfdata.x[i]); - - /* update scalar array */ - for (j = 0; j < halfwidth; j++) { - secp256k1_scalar tmps; - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&a_arr[2*j], &a_arr[2*j], &pfdata.x[i]); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tmps, &a_arr[2*j + 1], &pfdata.xinv[i]); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&a_arr[j], &a_arr[2*j], &tmps); - - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&b_arr[2*j], &b_arr[2*j], &pfdata.xinv[i]); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tmps, &b_arr[2*j + 1], &pfdata.x[i]); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&b_arr[j], &b_arr[2*j], &tmps); - - } - - /* Combine G generators and recurse, if that would be more optimal */ - if ((n > 2048 && i == 3) || (n > 128 && i == 2) || (n > 32 && i == 1)) { - secp256k1_scalar yinv2; - - for (j = 0; j < halfwidth; j++) { - secp256k1_gej rj; - secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(ecmult_ctx, scratch, &rj, NULL, &secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_callback_g, (void *) &pfdata, 2u << i); - pfdata.geng += 2u << i; - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&geng[j], &rj); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&pfdata.yinvn, 1); - secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(ecmult_ctx, scratch, &rj, NULL, &secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_pf_ecmult_callback_h, (void *) &pfdata, 2u << i); - pfdata.genh += 2u << i; - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&genh[j], &rj); - } - - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&yinv2, yinv); - for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&yinv2, &yinv2); - } - if (!secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_real_prove_impl(ecmult_ctx, scratch, out_pt, pt_idx, g, geng, genh, a_arr, b_arr, &yinv2, ux, halfwidth, commit)) { - return 0; - } - break; - } - } - return 1; -} - -static int secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_prove_impl(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ecmult_ctx, secp256k1_scratch *scratch, unsigned char *proof, size_t *proof_len, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, const secp256k1_scalar *yinv, const size_t n, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_callback *cb, void *cb_data, const unsigned char *commit_inp) { - secp256k1_sha256 sha256; - size_t i; - unsigned char commit[32]; - secp256k1_scalar *a_arr; - secp256k1_scalar *b_arr; - secp256k1_ge *out_pt; - secp256k1_ge *geng; - secp256k1_ge *genh; - secp256k1_scalar ux; - int overflow; - size_t pt_idx = 0; - secp256k1_scalar dot; - size_t half_n_ab = n < IP_AB_SCALARS / 2 ? n : IP_AB_SCALARS / 2; - - if (*proof_len < secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_proof_length(n)) { - return 0; - } - *proof_len = secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_proof_length(n); - - /* Special-case lengths 0 and 1 whose proofs are just expliict lists of scalars */ - if (n <= IP_AB_SCALARS / 2) { - secp256k1_scalar a[IP_AB_SCALARS / 2]; - secp256k1_scalar b[IP_AB_SCALARS / 2]; - - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - cb(&a[i], NULL, 2*i, cb_data); - cb(&b[i], NULL, 2*i+1, cb_data); - } - - secp256k1_scalar_dot_product(&dot, a, b, n); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(proof, &dot); - - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&proof[32 * (i + 1)], &a[i]); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&proof[32 * (i + n + 1)], &b[i]); - } - VERIFY_CHECK(*proof_len == 32 * (2 * n + 1)); - return 1; - } - - /* setup for nontrivial proofs */ - if (!secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(scratch, 2 * n * (sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) + sizeof(secp256k1_ge)) + 2 * secp256k1_floor_lg(n) * sizeof(secp256k1_ge), 5)) { - return 0; - } - - a_arr = (secp256k1_scalar*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n * sizeof(secp256k1_scalar)); - b_arr = (secp256k1_scalar*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n * sizeof(secp256k1_scalar)); - geng = (secp256k1_ge*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n * sizeof(secp256k1_ge)); - genh = (secp256k1_ge*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n * sizeof(secp256k1_ge)); - out_pt = (secp256k1_ge*)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, 2 * secp256k1_floor_lg(n) * sizeof(secp256k1_ge)); - VERIFY_CHECK(a_arr != NULL); - VERIFY_CHECK(b_arr != NULL); - VERIFY_CHECK(gens != NULL); - - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - cb(&a_arr[i], NULL, 2*i, cb_data); - cb(&b_arr[i], NULL, 2*i+1, cb_data); - geng[i] = gens->gens[i]; - genh[i] = gens->gens[i + gens->n/2]; - } - - /* Record final dot product */ - secp256k1_scalar_dot_product(&dot, a_arr, b_arr, n); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(proof, &dot); - - /* Protocol 2: hash dot product to obtain G-randomizer */ - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit_inp, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, proof, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); - - proof += 32; - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ux, commit, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ux)) { - /* cryptographically unreachable */ - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return 0; - } - - if (!secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_real_prove_impl(ecmult_ctx, scratch, out_pt, &pt_idx, gens->blinding_gen, geng, genh, a_arr, b_arr, yinv, &ux, n, commit)) { - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return 0; - } - - /* Final a/b values */ - for (i = 0; i < half_n_ab; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&proof[32 * i], &a_arr[i]); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&proof[32 * (i + half_n_ab)], &b_arr[i]); - } - proof += 64 * half_n_ab; - secp256k1_bulletproof_serialize_points(proof, out_pt, pt_idx); - - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return 1; -} - -#undef IP_AB_SCALARS - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/main_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/main_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index f175ba0..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/main_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,240 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2018 Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_BULLETPROOF_MAIN_IMPL -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_BULLETPROOF_MAIN_IMPL - -#include "group.h" -#include "scalar.h" - -#include "modules/commitment/main_impl.h" - -struct secp256k1_bulletproof_generators { - size_t n; - /* `G_i`, `H_i` generators, `n` each of them which are generated when creating this struct */ - secp256k1_ge *gens; - /* `H` "alternate" generator, used in Pedersen commitments. Passed in by caller to - * `secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_create`; stored in this structure to allow consistent - * generators between functions using `secp256k1_bulletproof_generators` and functions - * using the Pedersen commitment module. */ - secp256k1_ge *blinding_gen; -}; - -#include "modules/bulletproofs/inner_product_impl.h" -#include "modules/bulletproofs/rangeproof_impl.h" -#include "modules/bulletproofs/util.h" - - -// This is out setup -secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_create(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_generator *blinding_gen, size_t n) { - secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *ret; - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 rng; - unsigned char seed[64]; - secp256k1_gej precompj; - size_t i; - - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(blinding_gen != NULL); - - ret = (secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, sizeof(*ret)); - if (ret == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - ret->gens = (secp256k1_ge *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, (n + 1) * sizeof(*ret->gens)); - if (ret->gens == NULL) { - free(ret); - return NULL; - } - ret->blinding_gen = &ret->gens[n]; - ret->n = n; - - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(&seed[0], &secp256k1_ge_const_g.x); - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(&seed[32], &secp256k1_ge_const_g.y); - - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, seed, 64); - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - unsigned char tmp[32] = { 0 }; - secp256k1_generator gen; - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, tmp, 32); - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate(ctx, &gen, tmp)); - secp256k1_generator_load(&ret->gens[i], &gen); - - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&precompj, &ret->gens[i]); - } - - secp256k1_generator_load(&ret->blinding_gen[0], blinding_gen); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&precompj, &ret->blinding_gen[0]); - - return ret; -} - -void secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_destroy(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens) { - (void) ctx; - if (gens != NULL) { - free(gens->gens); - free(gens); - } -} - -int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_scratch_space *scratch, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, const unsigned char *proof, size_t plen, - const uint64_t *min_value, const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* commit, size_t n_commits, size_t nbits, const secp256k1_generator *value_gen, const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len) { - int ret; - size_t i; - secp256k1_ge *commitp; - secp256k1_ge value_genp; - const secp256k1_ge *commitp_ptr; - const uint64_t *minvalue_ptr; - - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(scratch != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(gens != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(gens->n >= 2 * nbits * n_commits); - ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(commit != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(n_commits > 0); - ARG_CHECK(nbits > 0); - ARG_CHECK(nbits <= 64); - ARG_CHECK(value_gen != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(extra_commit != NULL || extra_commit_len == 0); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); - - if (!secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(scratch, 2 * n_commits * sizeof(secp256k1_ge), 1)) { - return 0; - } - - commitp = (secp256k1_ge *)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_commits * sizeof(secp256k1_ge)); - for (i = 0; i < n_commits; i++) { - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_load(&commitp[i], &commit[i]); - } - secp256k1_generator_load(&value_genp, value_gen); - - commitp_ptr = commitp; - minvalue_ptr = min_value; - ret = secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &proof, 1, plen, nbits, &minvalue_ptr, &commitp_ptr, n_commits, &value_genp, gens, &extra_commit, &extra_commit_len); - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return ret; -} - -int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_scratch_space *scratch, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, const unsigned char* const* proof, size_t n_proofs, size_t plen, const uint64_t* const* min_value, const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* const* commit, size_t n_commits, size_t nbits, const secp256k1_generator *value_gen, const unsigned char* const* extra_commit, size_t *extra_commit_len) { - int ret; - secp256k1_ge **commitp; - secp256k1_ge *value_genp; - size_t i; - - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(scratch != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(gens != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(gens->n >= 2 * nbits * n_commits); - ARG_CHECK(commit != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(n_proofs > 0); - ARG_CHECK(n_commits > 0); - ARG_CHECK(nbits > 0); - ARG_CHECK(nbits <= 64); - ARG_CHECK(value_gen != NULL); - ARG_CHECK((extra_commit_len == NULL) == (extra_commit == NULL)); - if (extra_commit != NULL) { - for (i = 0; i < n_proofs; i++) { - ARG_CHECK(extra_commit[i] != NULL || extra_commit_len[i] == 0); - } - } - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); - - if (!secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(scratch, n_proofs * (sizeof(*value_genp) + sizeof(*commitp) + n_commits * sizeof(**commitp)), 1 + n_proofs)) { - return 0; - } - - commitp = (secp256k1_ge **)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_proofs * sizeof(*commitp)); - value_genp = (secp256k1_ge *)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_proofs * sizeof(*value_genp)); - for (i = 0; i < n_proofs; i++) { - size_t j; - commitp[i] = (secp256k1_ge *)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_commits * sizeof(*commitp[i])); - for (j = 0; j < n_commits; j++) { - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_load(&commitp[i][j], &commit[i][j]); - } - secp256k1_generator_load(&value_genp[i], &value_gen[i]); - } - - ret = secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, proof, n_proofs, plen, nbits, min_value, (const secp256k1_ge **) commitp, n_commits, value_genp, gens, extra_commit, extra_commit_len); - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return ret; -} - -int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, uint64_t *value, unsigned char *blind, const unsigned char *proof, size_t plen, uint64_t min_value, const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* commit, const secp256k1_generator *value_gen, const unsigned char *nonce, const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len) { - secp256k1_scalar blinds; - int ret; - - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(value != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(blind != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(gens != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(commit != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(value_gen != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(nonce != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(extra_commit != NULL || extra_commit_len == 0); - - ret = secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind_impl(value, &blinds, proof, plen, min_value, commit, value_gen, gens->blinding_gen, nonce, extra_commit, extra_commit_len); - if (ret == 1) { - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(blind, &blinds); - } - return ret; -} - -// Put everything inside a struct, so that we can receive as input this struct and the commitment to the value -int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_scratch_space *scratch, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, unsigned char *proof, size_t *plen, const uint64_t *value, const uint64_t *min_value, const unsigned char* const* blind, size_t n_commits, const secp256k1_generator *value_gen, size_t nbits, const unsigned char *nonce, const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len) { - int ret; - secp256k1_ge *commitp; - secp256k1_scalar *blinds; - secp256k1_ge value_genp; - size_t i; - - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(scratch != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(gens != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(gens->n >= 2 * nbits * n_commits); - ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(plen != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(value != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(blind != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(value_gen != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(nonce != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(n_commits > 0 && n_commits); - ARG_CHECK(nbits <= 64); - if (nbits < 64) { - for (i = 0; i < n_commits; i++) { - ARG_CHECK(value[i] < (1ull << nbits)); - ARG_CHECK(blind[i] != NULL); - } - } - ARG_CHECK(extra_commit != NULL || extra_commit_len == 0); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); - - if (!secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(scratch, n_commits * (sizeof(*commitp) + sizeof(*blinds)), 2)) { - return 0; - } - commitp = (secp256k1_ge *)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_commits * sizeof(*commitp)); - blinds = (secp256k1_scalar *)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_commits * sizeof(*blinds)); - - secp256k1_generator_load(&value_genp, value_gen); - for (i = 0; i < n_commits; i++) { - int overflow; - secp256k1_gej commitj; - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&blinds[i], blind[i], &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&blinds[i])) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_pedersen_ecmult(&commitj, &blinds[i], value[i], &value_genp, &gens->blinding_gen[0]); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&commitp[i], &commitj); - } - - ret = secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, proof, plen, nbits, value, min_value, blinds, commitp, n_commits, &value_genp, gens, nonce, extra_commit, extra_commit_len); - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return ret; -} - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/rangeproof_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/rangeproof_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 6287edb..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/rangeproof_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,792 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2018 Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_BULLETPROOF_RANGEPROOF_IMPL -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_BULLETPROOF_RANGEPROOF_IMPL - -#include "modules/bulletproofs/inner_product_impl.h" -#include "modules/bulletproofs/util.h" -#include "group.h" - -#define MAX_NBITS 64 - -typedef struct { - secp256k1_scalar yinv; - secp256k1_scalar yinvn; - secp256k1_scalar z; - secp256k1_scalar z_randomized; - secp256k1_scalar zsq; - secp256k1_scalar g_exponent; - secp256k1_scalar negz; - secp256k1_scalar x; - secp256k1_ge a; - secp256k1_ge s; - size_t n; - /* eq (61) stuff */ - size_t count; - secp256k1_scalar randomizer61; - secp256k1_scalar y; - secp256k1_scalar t; - const secp256k1_ge *asset; - const secp256k1_ge *commit; - const uint64_t *min_value; - size_t n_commits; - secp256k1_ge t1; - secp256k1_ge t2; -} secp256k1_bulletproof_vfy_ecmult_context; - -static int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_vfy_callback(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, secp256k1_scalar *randomizer, size_t idx, void *data) { - secp256k1_bulletproof_vfy_ecmult_context *ctx = (secp256k1_bulletproof_vfy_ecmult_context *) data; - - if (idx == 0) { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->g_exponent, &ctx->negz, randomizer); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->z_randomized, &ctx->z, randomizer); - } - - if (idx < ctx->n) { - *sc = ctx->g_exponent; - } else if (idx < 2 * ctx->n) { - const size_t nbits = ctx->n / ctx->n_commits; - const size_t commit_idx = (idx - ctx->n) / nbits; - const size_t bit_idx = (idx - ctx->n) % nbits; - - if (bit_idx == 0) { - size_t i; - secp256k1_scalar tmp; - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tmp, &ctx->z, &ctx->yinvn); - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&ctx->zsq, &ctx->z); - for (i = 0; i < commit_idx; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->zsq, &ctx->zsq, &tmp); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->zsq, &ctx->zsq, randomizer); - } - secp256k1_scalar_add(sc, &ctx->zsq, &ctx->z_randomized); - - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->zsq, &ctx->zsq, &ctx->yinv); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&ctx->zsq, &ctx->zsq, &ctx->zsq); - } else { - switch(ctx->count) { - /* S^x in eq (62) */ - case 2: - *sc = ctx->x; - *pt = ctx->s; - break; - /* A in eq (62) */ - case 1: - *pt = ctx->a; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(sc, 1); - break; - /* G^[k(y, z) + sum_i y^i - t] from eq (61) */ - case 0: { - size_t i; - secp256k1_scalar yn; - secp256k1_scalar twosum; - secp256k1_scalar tmp; - - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&twosum); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&yn); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&tmp, 1); - - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&ctx->zsq, &ctx->z); /* need to re-set this */ - secp256k1_scalar_negate(sc, &ctx->zsq); /* -z^2 */ - secp256k1_scalar_add(sc, sc, &ctx->z); /* z - z^2 */ - - for (i = 0; i < ctx->n_commits; i++) { - const size_t nbits = ctx->n / ctx->n_commits; - secp256k1_scalar negzn; - secp256k1_scalar twon; - size_t j; - - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&twon); - for (j = 0; j < nbits; j++) { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&yn, &yn, &ctx->y); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&twon, &twon, &twon); - - secp256k1_scalar_add(&yn, &yn, &tmp); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&twon, &twon, &tmp); - } - - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&negzn, &ctx->zsq, &ctx->negz); - for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&negzn, &negzn, &ctx->z); - } - if (ctx->min_value != NULL) { - secp256k1_scalar mv; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&mv, ctx->min_value[i]); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&mv, &mv, &ctx->negz); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&mv, &mv, &ctx->z); - for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&negzn, &negzn, &ctx->z); - } - secp256k1_scalar_add(&twosum, &twosum, &mv); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&twon, &twon, &negzn); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&twosum, &twosum, &twon); - } /* yn = 1 + y + ... + y^(n-1); twosum = (z^3 + ... + z^{2 + n_commits})(1 + 2 + ... + 2^(n-1)) */ - - - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &yn); /* (z - z^2)(1 + ... + y^(n-1)) */ - secp256k1_scalar_add(sc, sc, &twosum); /* (z - z^2)(1 + ... + y^(n-1)) - z^3(1 + ... + 2^(n-1)) */ - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&tmp, &ctx->t); - secp256k1_scalar_add(sc, sc, &tmp); /* (z - z^2)(1 + ... + y^n) - z^3(1 + ... + 2^n) - t */ - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->randomizer61); - *pt = *ctx->asset; - break; - } - /* T1^x in eq (61) */ - case 3: - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, &ctx->x, &ctx->randomizer61); - *pt = ctx->t1; - break; - /* T2^x^2 in eq (61) */ - case 4: - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(sc, &ctx->x); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, &ctx->randomizer61); - *pt = ctx->t2; - break; - /* V^z^2 in eq (61) */ - default: - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx->count < 5 + ctx->n_commits); - - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, &ctx->zsq, &ctx->randomizer61); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ctx->zsq, &ctx->zsq, &ctx->z); - *pt = ctx->commit[ctx->count - 5]; - break; - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, randomizer); - ctx->count++; - } - return 1; -} - -static int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_impl(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ecmult_ctx, secp256k1_scratch *scratch, const unsigned char* const* proof, const size_t n_proofs, const size_t plen, size_t nbits, const uint64_t* const* min_value, const secp256k1_ge* const* commitp, size_t n_commits, const secp256k1_ge *value_gen, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, const unsigned char* const* extra_commit, size_t *extra_commit_len) { - secp256k1_bulletproof_vfy_ecmult_context *ecmult_data; - secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_context *innp_ctx; - int ret; - size_t i; - int same_generators = 1; - - /* sanity-check input */ - if (POPCOUNT(nbits) != 1 || nbits > MAX_NBITS) { - return 0; - } - if (plen < 64 + 128 + 1) { /* inner product argument will do a more precise check */ - return 0; - } - if (plen > SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_PROOF) { - return 0; - } - - if (!secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(scratch, n_proofs * (sizeof(*ecmult_data) + sizeof(*innp_ctx)), 2)) { - return 0; - } - ecmult_data = (secp256k1_bulletproof_vfy_ecmult_context *)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_proofs * sizeof(*ecmult_data)); - innp_ctx = (secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_context *)secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, n_proofs * sizeof(*innp_ctx)); - - /* In general you cannot memcmp secp256k1_ge's like this because their field - * elements may represent the same number differently. In this case it is ok - * because (a) a false positive here is no big deal, it will add one mult per - * proof to he giant ecmult_multi at the end but not change any semantics; - * and (b) typically this list of generators was deterministically decoded - * from a list of secp256k1_generators which have a compact encoding, so that - * equal group elements actually will compare equal. */ - for (i = 1; i < n_proofs; i++) { - if (memcmp(&value_gen[i], &value_gen[i - 1], sizeof(value_gen[i])) != 0) { - same_generators = 0; - } - } - - for (i = 0; i < n_proofs; i++) { - secp256k1_sha256 sha256; - unsigned char commit[32] = {0}; - unsigned char randomizer61[32] = {0}; /* randomizer for eq (61) so we can add it to eq (62) to save a separate multiexp */ - secp256k1_scalar taux, mu; - secp256k1_ge age, sge; - int overflow; - size_t j; - - /* Commit to all input data: min value, pedersen commit, asset generator, extra_commit */ - if (min_value != NULL && min_value[i] != NULL) { - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); - for (j = 0; j < n_commits; j++) { - unsigned char vbuf[8]; - vbuf[0] = min_value[i][j]; - vbuf[1] = min_value[i][j] >> 8; - vbuf[2] = min_value[i][j] >> 16; - vbuf[3] = min_value[i][j] >> 24; - vbuf[4] = min_value[i][j] >> 32; - vbuf[5] = min_value[i][j] >> 40; - vbuf[6] = min_value[i][j] >> 48; - vbuf[7] = min_value[i][j] >> 56; - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, vbuf, 8); - } - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); - } - for (j = 0; j < n_commits; j++) { - secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(commit, &commitp[i][j], &value_gen[i]); - } - if (extra_commit != NULL && extra_commit[i] != NULL) { - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, extra_commit[i], extra_commit_len[i]); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); - } - - /* Compute y, z, x */ - secp256k1_bulletproof_deserialize_point(&age, &proof[i][64], 0, 4); - secp256k1_bulletproof_deserialize_point(&sge, &proof[i][64], 1, 4); - - secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(commit, &age, &sge); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ecmult_data[i].y, commit, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ecmult_data[i].y)) { - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return 0; - } - secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(commit, &age, &sge); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ecmult_data[i].z, commit, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ecmult_data[i].z)) { - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return 0; - } - - secp256k1_bulletproof_deserialize_point(&ecmult_data[i].t1, &proof[i][64], 2, 4); - secp256k1_bulletproof_deserialize_point(&ecmult_data[i].t2, &proof[i][64], 3, 4); - - secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(commit, &ecmult_data[i].t1, &ecmult_data[i].t2); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ecmult_data[i].x, commit, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ecmult_data[i].x)) { - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return 0; - } - - /* compute exponent offsets */ - secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&ecmult_data[i].yinv, &ecmult_data[i].y); /* TODO somehow batch this w the inner-product argument inverse */ - ecmult_data[i].yinvn = ecmult_data[i].yinv; - for (j = 0; j < secp256k1_floor_lg(nbits); j++) { - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&ecmult_data[i].yinvn, &ecmult_data[i].yinvn); - } - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&ecmult_data[i].zsq, &ecmult_data[i].z); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&ecmult_data[i].negz, &ecmult_data[i].z); - - /* Update commit with remaining data for the inner product proof */ - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &proof[i][0], 64); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); - - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, randomizer61); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ecmult_data[i].randomizer61, randomizer61, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ecmult_data[i].randomizer61)) { - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return 0; - } - - /* Deserialize everything else */ - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&taux, &proof[i][0], &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&taux)) { - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return 0; - } - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&mu, &proof[i][32], &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&mu)) { - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return 0; - } - /* A little sketchy, we read t (l(x) . r(x)) off the front of the inner product proof, - * which we otherwise treat as a black box */ - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ecmult_data[i].t, &proof[i][64 + 128 + 1], &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ecmult_data[i].t)) { - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return 0; - } - - /* Verify inner product proof */ - ecmult_data[i].a = age; - ecmult_data[i].s = sge; - ecmult_data[i].n = nbits * n_commits; - ecmult_data[i].count = 0; - ecmult_data[i].asset = &value_gen[i]; - ecmult_data[i].min_value = min_value == NULL ? NULL : min_value[i]; - ecmult_data[i].commit = commitp[i]; - ecmult_data[i].n_commits = n_commits; - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&taux, &taux, &ecmult_data[i].randomizer61); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&mu, &mu, &taux); - - innp_ctx[i].proof = &proof[i][64 + 128 + 1]; - innp_ctx[i].p_offs = mu; - memcpy(innp_ctx[i].commit, commit, 32); - innp_ctx[i].yinv = ecmult_data[i].yinv; - innp_ctx[i].rangeproof_cb = secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_vfy_callback; - innp_ctx[i].rangeproof_cb_data = (void *) &ecmult_data[i]; - innp_ctx[i].n_extra_rangeproof_points = 5 + n_commits; - } - - ret = secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(ecmult_ctx, scratch, gens, nbits * n_commits, innp_ctx, n_proofs, plen - (64 + 128 + 1), same_generators); - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - return ret; -} - -typedef struct { - const unsigned char *nonce; - secp256k1_scalar y; - secp256k1_scalar z; - secp256k1_scalar yn; - secp256k1_scalar z22n; - const uint64_t *val; - const uint64_t *min_val; - size_t n_vals; - size_t nbits; - size_t count; -} secp256k1_bulletproof_lr_generator; - -static void secp256k1_lr_generator_init(secp256k1_bulletproof_lr_generator *generator, const unsigned char *nonce, const secp256k1_scalar *y, const secp256k1_scalar *z, size_t nbits, const uint64_t *val, const uint64_t *min_val, size_t n_vals) { - generator->nonce = nonce; - generator->y = *y; - generator->z = *z; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&generator->yn, 1); - generator->nbits = nbits; - generator->val = val; - generator->min_val = min_val; - generator->n_vals = n_vals; - generator->count = 0; -} - -static void secp256k1_lr_generate(secp256k1_bulletproof_lr_generator *generator, secp256k1_scalar *lout, secp256k1_scalar *rout, const secp256k1_scalar *x) { - const size_t commit_idx = generator->count / generator->nbits; - const size_t bit_idx = generator->count % generator->nbits; - const uint64_t mv = generator->min_val == NULL ? 0 : generator->min_val[commit_idx]; - const int bit = ((generator->val[commit_idx] - mv)>> bit_idx) & 1; - secp256k1_scalar sl, sr; - secp256k1_scalar negz; - - if (bit_idx == 0) { - size_t i; - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&generator->z22n, &generator->z); - for (i = 0; i < commit_idx; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&generator->z22n, &generator->z22n, &generator->z); - } - } - - secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(&sl, &sr, generator->nonce, generator->count + 2); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&sl, &sl, x); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&sr, &sr, x); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(lout, bit); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&negz, &generator->z); - secp256k1_scalar_add(lout, lout, &negz); - secp256k1_scalar_add(lout, lout, &sl); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(rout, 1 - bit); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(rout, rout); - secp256k1_scalar_add(rout, rout, &generator->z); - secp256k1_scalar_add(rout, rout, &sr); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(rout, rout, &generator->yn); - secp256k1_scalar_add(rout, rout, &generator->z22n); - - generator->count++; - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&generator->yn, &generator->yn, &generator->y); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&generator->z22n, &generator->z22n, &generator->z22n); -} - -typedef struct { - secp256k1_scalar x; - secp256k1_scalar cache; - secp256k1_bulletproof_lr_generator lr_gen; -} secp256k1_bulletproof_abgh_data; - -static int secp256k1_bulletproof_abgh_callback(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *data) { - secp256k1_bulletproof_abgh_data *ctx = (secp256k1_bulletproof_abgh_data *) data; - const int is_g = idx % 2 == 0; - - (void) pt; - if (is_g) { - secp256k1_lr_generate(&ctx->lr_gen, sc, &ctx->cache, &ctx->x); - } else { - *sc = ctx->cache; - } - - return 1; -} - -/* Proof format: t, tau_x, mu, a, b, A, S, T_1, T_2, {L_i}, {R_i} - * 5 scalar + [4 + 2log(n)] ge - * - * The non-bold `h` in the Bulletproofs paper corresponds to our gens->blinding_gen - * while the non-bold `g` corresponds to the asset type `value_gen`. - */ -static int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove_impl(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ecmult_ctx, secp256k1_scratch *scratch, unsigned char *proof, size_t *plen, const size_t nbits, const uint64_t *value, const uint64_t *min_value, const secp256k1_scalar *blind, const secp256k1_ge *commitp, size_t n_commits, const secp256k1_ge *value_gen, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens, const unsigned char *nonce, const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len) { - secp256k1_bulletproof_lr_generator lr_gen; - secp256k1_bulletproof_abgh_data abgh_data; - secp256k1_scalar zero; - secp256k1_sha256 sha256; - unsigned char commit[32] = {0}; - secp256k1_scalar alpha, rho; - secp256k1_scalar t0, t1, t2; - secp256k1_scalar tau1, tau2, taux, mu; - secp256k1_scalar y; - secp256k1_scalar z, zsq; - secp256k1_scalar x, xsq; - secp256k1_scalar tmps; - secp256k1_gej aj, sj; - secp256k1_gej tmpj; - size_t i, j; - int overflow; - /* inner product proof variables */ - secp256k1_ge out_pt[4]; - - if (POPCOUNT(nbits) != 1 || nbits > MAX_NBITS) { - return 0; - } - for (i = 0; i < n_commits; i++) { - uint64_t mv = min_value == NULL ? 0 : min_value[i]; - if (mv > value[i]) { - return 0; - } - if (nbits < 64 && (value[i] - mv) >= (1ull << nbits)) { - return 0; - } - } - if (*plen < 128 + 64 + 1) { /* inner product argument will check and assign plen */ - return 0; - } - - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&zero); - - /* Commit to all input data: min value, pedersen commit, asset generator, extra_commit */ - if (min_value != NULL) { - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); - for (i = 0; i < n_commits; i++) { - unsigned char vbuf[8]; - vbuf[0] = min_value[i]; - vbuf[1] = min_value[i] >> 8; - vbuf[2] = min_value[i] >> 16; - vbuf[3] = min_value[i] >> 24; - vbuf[4] = min_value[i] >> 32; - vbuf[5] = min_value[i] >> 40; - vbuf[6] = min_value[i] >> 48; - vbuf[7] = min_value[i] >> 56; - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, vbuf, 8); - } - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); - } - for (i = 0; i < n_commits; i++) { - secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(commit, &commitp[i], value_gen); /* TODO be less stupid about this */ - } - if (extra_commit != NULL) { - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, extra_commit, extra_commit_len); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); - } - - secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(&alpha, &rho, nonce, 0); - secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(&tau1, &tau2, nonce, 1); - /* Encrypt value into alpha, so it will be recoverable from -mu by someone who knows `nonce` */ - if (n_commits == 1) { - secp256k1_scalar vals; - secp256k1_scalar_set_u64(&vals, value[0]); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&vals, &vals); /* Negate so it'll be positive in -mu */ - secp256k1_scalar_add(&alpha, &alpha, &vals); - } - - /* Compute A and S */ - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&aj, &gens->blinding_gen[0], &alpha, 256); - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&sj, &gens->blinding_gen[0], &rho, 256); - for (i = 0; i < n_commits; i++) { - for (j = 0; j < nbits; j++) { - secp256k1_scalar sl, sr; - uint64_t mv = min_value == NULL ? 0 : min_value[i]; - size_t al = !!((value[i] - mv) & (1ull << j)); - secp256k1_ge aterm = gens->gens[i * nbits + j + gens->n/2]; - secp256k1_ge sterm; - secp256k1_gej stermj; - - secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(&sl, &sr, nonce, i * nbits + j + 2); - - secp256k1_ge_neg(&aterm, &aterm); - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&aterm.x, &gens->gens[i * nbits + j].x, al); - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&aterm.y, &gens->gens[i * nbits + j].y, al); - - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&aj, &aj, &aterm); - - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&stermj, &gens->gens[i * nbits + j], &sl, 256); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&sterm, &stermj); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&sj, &sj, &sterm); - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&stermj, &gens->gens[i * nbits + j + gens->n/2], &sr, 256); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&sterm, &stermj); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&sj, &sj, &sterm); - } - } - - /* get challenges y and z */ - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&out_pt[0], &aj); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&out_pt[1], &sj); - - secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(commit, &out_pt[0], &out_pt[1]); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&y, commit, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&y)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(commit, &out_pt[0], &out_pt[1]); /* TODO rehashing A and S to get a second challenge is overkill */ - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&z, commit, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&z)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&zsq, &z); - - /* Compute coefficients t0, t1, t2 of the polynomial */ - /* t0 = l(0) dot r(0) */ - secp256k1_lr_generator_init(&lr_gen, nonce, &y, &z, nbits, value, min_value, n_commits); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&t0); - for (i = 0; i < nbits * n_commits; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar l, r; - secp256k1_lr_generate(&lr_gen, &l, &r, &zero); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&l, &l, &r); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&t0, &t0, &l); - } - - /* A = t0 + t1 + t2 = l(1) dot r(1) */ - secp256k1_lr_generator_init(&lr_gen, nonce, &y, &z, nbits, value, min_value, n_commits); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&t1); - for (i = 0; i < nbits * n_commits; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar one; - secp256k1_scalar l, r; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&one, 1); - secp256k1_lr_generate(&lr_gen, &l, &r, &one); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&l, &l, &r); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&t1, &t1, &l); - } - - /* B = t0 - t1 + t2 = l(-1) dot r(-1) */ - secp256k1_lr_generator_init(&lr_gen, nonce, &y, &z, nbits, value, min_value, n_commits); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&t2); - for (i = 0; i < nbits * n_commits; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar negone; - secp256k1_scalar l, r; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&negone, 1); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&negone, &negone); - secp256k1_lr_generate(&lr_gen, &l, &r, &negone); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&l, &l, &r); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&t2, &t2, &l); - } - - /* t1 = (A - B)/2 */ - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&tmps, 2); - secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&tmps, &tmps); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&t2, &t2); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&t1, &t1, &t2); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&t1, &t1, &tmps); - - /* t2 = -(-B + t0) + t1 */ - secp256k1_scalar_add(&t2, &t2, &t0); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&t2, &t2); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&t2, &t2, &t1); - - /* Compute Ti = t_i*A + tau_i*G for i = 1,2 */ - /* TODO surely we can improve this */ - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&tmpj, value_gen, &t1, 256); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&out_pt[2], &tmpj); - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&tmpj, &gens->blinding_gen[0], &tau1, 256); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&tmpj, &tmpj, &out_pt[2]); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&out_pt[2], &tmpj); - - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&tmpj, value_gen, &t2, 256); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&out_pt[3], &tmpj); - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&tmpj, &gens->blinding_gen[0], &tau2, 256); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&tmpj, &tmpj, &out_pt[3]); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&out_pt[3], &tmpj); - - /* get challenge x */ - secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(commit, &out_pt[2], &out_pt[3]); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&x, commit, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&x)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&xsq, &x); - - /* compute tau_x and mu */ - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&taux, &tau1, &x); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tmps, &tau2, &xsq); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&taux, &taux, &tmps); - for (i = 0; i < n_commits; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tmps, &zsq, &blind[i]); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&taux, &taux, &tmps); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&zsq, &zsq, &z); - } - - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&mu, &rho, &x); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&mu, &mu, &alpha); - - /* Negate taux and mu so the verifier doesn't have to */ - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&taux, &taux); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&mu, &mu); - - /* Encode rangeproof stuff */ - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&proof[0], &taux); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&proof[32], &mu); - secp256k1_bulletproof_serialize_points(&proof[64], out_pt, 4); - - /* Mix this into the hash so the input to the inner product proof is fixed */ - /* TODO is this necessary? revisit */ - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, proof, 64); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); - - /* Compute l and r, do inner product proof */ - abgh_data.x = x; - secp256k1_lr_generator_init(&abgh_data.lr_gen, nonce, &y, &z, nbits, value, min_value, n_commits); - *plen -= 64 + 128 + 1; - secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&y, &y); - if (secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_prove_impl(ecmult_ctx, scratch, &proof[64 + 128 + 1], plen, gens, &y, nbits * n_commits, secp256k1_bulletproof_abgh_callback, (void *) &abgh_data, commit) == 0) { - return 0; - } - *plen += 64 + 128 + 1; - - return 1; -} - -static int secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind_impl(uint64_t *value, secp256k1_scalar *blind, const unsigned char *proof, const size_t plen, uint64_t min_value, const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *pcommit, const secp256k1_generator *value_gen, const secp256k1_ge *blind_gen, const unsigned char *nonce, const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len) { - secp256k1_sha256 sha256; - static const unsigned char zero24[24] = { 0 }; - unsigned char commit[32] = { 0 }; - unsigned char lrparity; - secp256k1_scalar taux, mu; - secp256k1_scalar alpha, rho, tau1, tau2; - secp256k1_scalar x, z; - secp256k1_ge commitp, value_genp; - secp256k1_gej rewind_commitj; - int overflow; - - if (plen < 64 + 128 + 1 || plen > SECP256K1_BULLETPROOF_MAX_PROOF) { - return 0; - } - - /* Extract data from beginning of proof */ - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&taux, &proof[0], &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&taux)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&mu, &proof[32], &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&mu)) { - return 0; - } - - secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(&alpha, &rho, nonce, 0); - secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(&tau1, &tau2, nonce, 1); - - if (min_value > 0) { - unsigned char vbuf[8]; - vbuf[0] = min_value; - vbuf[1] = min_value >> 8; - vbuf[2] = min_value >> 16; - vbuf[3] = min_value >> 24; - vbuf[4] = min_value >> 32; - vbuf[5] = min_value >> 40; - vbuf[6] = min_value >> 48; - vbuf[7] = min_value >> 56; - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, vbuf, 8); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); - } - - /* This breaks the abstraction of both the Pedersen commitment and the generator - * type by directly reading the parity bit and x-coordinate from the data. But - * the alternative using the _load functions is to do two full point decompression, - * and in my benchmarks we save ~80% of the rewinding time by avoiding this. -asp */ - lrparity = 2 * !!(pcommit->data[0] & 1) + !!(value_gen->data[0] & 1); - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &lrparity, 1); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &pcommit->data[1], 32); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &value_gen->data[1], 32); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); - - if (extra_commit != NULL) { - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, extra_commit, extra_commit_len); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); - } - - /* Extract A and S to compute y and z */ - lrparity = 2 * !!(proof[64] & 1) + !!(proof[64] & 2); - /* y */ - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &lrparity, 1); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &proof[65], 64); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); - - /* z */ - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &lrparity, 1); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &proof[65], 64); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&z, commit, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&z)) { - return 0; - } - - /* x */ - lrparity = 2 * !!(proof[64] & 4) + !!(proof[64] & 8); - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &lrparity, 1); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &proof[129], 64); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&x, commit, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&x)) { - return 0; - } - - /* Compute candidate mu and add to (negated) mu from proof to get value */ - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&rho, &rho, &x); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&mu, &mu, &rho); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&mu, &mu, &alpha); - - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(commit, &mu); - if (memcmp(commit, zero24, 24) != 0) { - return 0; - } - *value = commit[31] + ((uint64_t) commit[30] << 8) + - ((uint64_t) commit[29] << 16) + ((uint64_t) commit[28] << 24) + - ((uint64_t) commit[27] << 32) + ((uint64_t) commit[26] << 40) + - ((uint64_t) commit[25] << 48) + ((uint64_t) commit[24] << 56); - - /* Derive blinding factor */ - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tau1, &tau1, &x); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tau2, &tau2, &x); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tau2, &tau2, &x); - - secp256k1_scalar_add(&taux, &taux, &tau1); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&taux, &taux, &tau2); - - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&z, &z); - secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&z, &z); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(blind, &taux, &z); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(blind, blind); - - /* Check blinding factor */ - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_load(&commitp, pcommit); - secp256k1_generator_load(&value_genp, value_gen); - - secp256k1_pedersen_ecmult(&rewind_commitj, blind, *value, &value_genp, blind_gen); - secp256k1_gej_neg(&rewind_commitj, &rewind_commitj); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&rewind_commitj, &rewind_commitj, &commitp, NULL); - - return secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&rewind_commitj); -} - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/tests_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/tests_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 8702e3d..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/tests_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,608 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2018 Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_BULLETPROOF_TESTS -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_BULLETPROOF_TESTS - -#include - -#include "group.h" -#include "scalar.h" -#include "testrand.h" -#include "util.h" - -#include "include/secp256k1_bulletproofs.h" - -static void test_bulletproof_api(void) { - secp256k1_context *none = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); - secp256k1_context *sign = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); - secp256k1_context *vrfy = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - secp256k1_context *both = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - secp256k1_scratch *scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(ctx, 1024 * 1024); - secp256k1_generator value_gen; - secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens; - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment pcommit[4]; - const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *pcommit_arr[1]; - unsigned char proof[2000]; - const unsigned char *proof_ptr = proof; - const unsigned char blind[32] = " i am not a blinding factor "; - const unsigned char *blind_ptr[4]; - size_t blindlen = sizeof(blind); - size_t plen = sizeof(proof); - uint64_t value[4] = { 1234, 4567, 8910, 1112 } ; - uint64_t min_value[4] = { 1000, 4567, 0, 5000 } ; - const uint64_t *mv_ptr = min_value; - unsigned char rewind_blind[32]; - size_t rewind_v; - - int32_t ecount = 0; - - blind_ptr[0] = blind; - blind_ptr[1] = blind; - blind_ptr[2] = blind; - blind_ptr[3] = blind; - pcommit_arr[0] = pcommit; - - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate(both, &value_gen, blind) != 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(both, &pcommit[0], blind, value[0], &value_gen, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(both, &pcommit[1], blind, value[1], &value_gen, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(both, &pcommit[2], blind, value[2], &value_gen, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(both, &pcommit[3], blind, value[3], &value_gen, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); - - /* generators */ - gens = secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_create(none, NULL, 256); - CHECK(gens == NULL && ecount == 1); - gens = secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_create(none, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, 256); - CHECK(gens != NULL && ecount == 1); - - /* rangeproof_prove */ - ecount = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(none, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(sign, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(vrfy, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - plen = 2000; - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 2, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - plen = 2000; - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 4, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); /* too few gens */ - CHECK(ecount == 4); - - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, min_value, blind_ptr, 2, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 1); /* mv = v, ok */ - CHECK(ecount == 4); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, &value[1], &min_value[1], blind_ptr, 2, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 1); /* mv = 0, ok */ - CHECK(ecount == 4); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, &value[2], &min_value[2], blind_ptr, 2, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); /* mv > v, !ok */ - CHECK(ecount == 4); - - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, NULL, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 5); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, NULL, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 6); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, NULL, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 7); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, NULL, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 8); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, NULL, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 9); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, NULL, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 10); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 0, &value_gen, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 11); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, NULL, 64, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 12); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 0, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 13); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 65, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 14); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, -1, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 15); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, NULL, NULL, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 16); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, NULL, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, blind, 0) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 16); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove(both, scratch, gens, proof, &plen, value, min_value, blind_ptr, 1, &value_gen, 64, blind, blind, 32) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 16); - - /* rangeproof_verify */ - ecount = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(none, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(sign, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(vrfy, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 63, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen - 1, min_value, pcommit, 1, 63, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, 0, min_value, pcommit, 1, 63, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 31) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, NULL, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 2, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 4, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, NULL, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 4); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, NULL, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 5); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, NULL, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 6); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, NULL, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 6); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, NULL, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 7); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 0, 64, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 8); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 65, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 9); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 0, &value_gen, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 10); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, NULL, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 11); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, NULL, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 12); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify(both, scratch, gens, proof, plen, min_value, pcommit, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 12); - - /* verify_multi */ - ecount = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(none, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(sign, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(vrfy, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, NULL, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, NULL, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 4); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, NULL, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 5); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 0, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 6); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, NULL, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 6); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, NULL, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 7); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, NULL, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 8); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, NULL, &blindlen) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 9); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 10); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 64, &value_gen, NULL, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 10); - - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 0, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 11); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 65, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 12); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 63, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 12); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 1, 0, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 13); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 2, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 13); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_multi(both, scratch, gens, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, &mv_ptr, pcommit_arr, 4, 64, &value_gen, blind_ptr, &blindlen) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 14); - - /* Rewind */ - ecount = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, proof, plen, min_value[0], pcommit, &value_gen, blind, blind, 32) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, NULL, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, proof, plen, min_value[0], pcommit, &value_gen, blind, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, NULL, rewind_blind, proof, plen, min_value[0], pcommit, &value_gen, blind, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, NULL, proof, plen, min_value[0], pcommit, &value_gen, blind, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, NULL, plen, min_value[0], pcommit, &value_gen, blind, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 4); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, proof, 0, min_value[0], pcommit, &value_gen, blind, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 4); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, proof, plen, 0, pcommit, &value_gen, blind, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 4); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, proof, plen, min_value[0], NULL, &value_gen, blind, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 5); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, proof, plen, min_value[0], pcommit, NULL, blind, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 6); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, proof, plen, min_value[0], pcommit, &value_gen, NULL, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 7); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, proof, plen, min_value[0], pcommit, &value_gen, blind, NULL, 32) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 8); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, proof, plen, min_value[0], pcommit, &value_gen, blind, blind, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 8); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind(none, gens, &rewind_v, rewind_blind, proof, plen, min_value[0], pcommit, &value_gen, blind, NULL, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 8); - - secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_destroy(none, gens); - secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_destroy(none, NULL); - secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); - secp256k1_context_destroy(none); - secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); - secp256k1_context_destroy(vrfy); - secp256k1_context_destroy(both); -} - -#define MAX_WIDTH (1ul << 20) -typedef struct { - const secp256k1_scalar *a; - const secp256k1_scalar *b; - const secp256k1_ge *g; - const secp256k1_ge *h; - size_t n; -} test_bulletproof_ecmult_context; - -static int test_bulletproof_ecmult_callback(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *data) { - test_bulletproof_ecmult_context *ecctx = (test_bulletproof_ecmult_context *) data; - if (idx < ecctx->n) { - *sc = ecctx->a[idx]; - *pt = ecctx->g[idx]; - } else { - VERIFY_CHECK(idx < 2*ecctx->n); - *sc = ecctx->b[idx - ecctx->n]; - *pt = ecctx->h[idx - ecctx->n]; - } - return 1; -} - -typedef struct { - secp256k1_scalar offs; - secp256k1_scalar ext_sc; - secp256k1_scalar skew_sc; - secp256k1_ge ext_pt; - secp256k1_ge p; - size_t n; - int parity; -} test_bulletproof_offset_context; - -static int test_bulletproof_offset_vfy_callback(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, secp256k1_scalar *randomizer, size_t idx, void *data) { - test_bulletproof_offset_context *ecctx = (test_bulletproof_offset_context *) data; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ecctx->offs, 1); - if (idx < 2 * ecctx->n) { - secp256k1_scalar idxsc; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&idxsc, idx); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, &ecctx->skew_sc, &idxsc); - } else { - if (ecctx->parity) { - *sc = ecctx->ext_sc; - *pt = ecctx->ext_pt; - } else { - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(sc, 1); - *pt = ecctx->p; - } - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(sc, sc, randomizer); - ecctx->parity = !ecctx->parity; - return 1; -} - -typedef struct { - const secp256k1_scalar *a_arr; - const secp256k1_scalar *b_arr; -} secp256k1_bulletproof_ip_test_abgh_data; - - -static int secp256k1_bulletproof_ip_test_abgh_callback(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *data) { - secp256k1_bulletproof_ip_test_abgh_data *cbctx = (secp256k1_bulletproof_ip_test_abgh_data *) data; - const int is_g = idx % 2 == 0; - - (void) pt; - if (is_g) { - *sc = cbctx->a_arr[idx / 2]; - } else { - *sc = cbctx->b_arr[idx / 2]; - } - return 1; -} - -void test_bulletproof_inner_product(size_t n, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens) { - const secp256k1_scalar zero = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0); - secp256k1_gej pj; - secp256k1_gej tmpj, tmpj2; - secp256k1_scalar *a_arr = (secp256k1_scalar *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, n * sizeof(*a_arr)); - secp256k1_scalar *b_arr = (secp256k1_scalar *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, n * sizeof(*b_arr)); - unsigned char commit[32] = "hash of P, c, etc. all that jazz"; - secp256k1_scalar one; - size_t j; - test_bulletproof_offset_context offs_ctx; - secp256k1_bulletproof_ip_test_abgh_data abgh_data; - secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_context innp_ctx; - unsigned char proof[2000]; - size_t plen = sizeof(proof); - - secp256k1_scratch *scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(ctx, 100000 + 256 * (2 * n + 2)); - - for (j = 0; j < n; j++) { - random_scalar_order(&a_arr[j]); - random_scalar_order(&b_arr[j]); - } - - abgh_data.a_arr = a_arr; - abgh_data.b_arr = b_arr; - - random_group_element_test(&offs_ctx.ext_pt); - random_scalar_order(&offs_ctx.ext_sc); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&offs_ctx.skew_sc); - offs_ctx.n = n; - - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&one, 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_prove_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, proof, &plen, gens, &one, n, secp256k1_bulletproof_ip_test_abgh_callback, (void *) &abgh_data, commit) == 1); - - innp_ctx.proof = proof; - memcpy(innp_ctx.commit, commit, 32); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&innp_ctx.yinv, 1); - innp_ctx.n_extra_rangeproof_points = 1; - innp_ctx.rangeproof_cb = test_bulletproof_offset_vfy_callback; - innp_ctx.rangeproof_cb_data = (void *) &offs_ctx; - - /* Manually do the multiexp to obtain the point P which commits to the inner product. - * The prover never computes this because it is implicit in the range/circuit proofs. */ - { - test_bulletproof_ecmult_context ecmult_data; - ecmult_data.n = n; - ecmult_data.a = a_arr; - ecmult_data.b = b_arr; - ecmult_data.g = gens->gens; - ecmult_data.h = gens->gens + gens->n/2; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &pj, &zero, test_bulletproof_ecmult_callback, (void*) &ecmult_data, 2 * n)); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&offs_ctx.p, &pj); - } - - /* Check proof with no offsets or other baubles */ - offs_ctx.parity = 0; - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&innp_ctx.p_offs); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, gens, n, &innp_ctx, 1, plen, 1) == 1); - - /* skew P by a random amount and instruct the verifier to offset it */ - random_scalar_order(&innp_ctx.p_offs); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&tmpj2, &gens->blinding_gen[0]); - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &tmpj, &tmpj2, &innp_ctx.p_offs, &zero); - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&pj, &pj, &tmpj, NULL); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&offs_ctx.p, &pj); - - /* wrong p_offs should fail */ - offs_ctx.parity = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, gens, n, &innp_ctx, 1, plen, 1) == 0); - - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&innp_ctx.p_offs, &innp_ctx.p_offs); - - offs_ctx.parity = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, gens, n, &innp_ctx, 1, plen, 1) == 1); - /* check that verification did not trash anything */ - offs_ctx.parity = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, gens, n, &innp_ctx, 1, plen, 1) == 1); - /* check that adding a no-op rangeproof skew function doesn't break anything */ - offs_ctx.parity = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, gens, n, &innp_ctx, 1, plen, 1) == 1); - - /* Offset P by some random point and then try to undo this in the verification */ - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&tmpj2, &offs_ctx.ext_pt); - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &tmpj, &tmpj2, &offs_ctx.ext_sc, &zero); - secp256k1_gej_neg(&tmpj, &tmpj); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&tmpj, &tmpj, &offs_ctx.p, NULL); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&offs_ctx.p, &tmpj); - offs_ctx.parity = 0; - innp_ctx.n_extra_rangeproof_points = 2; - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, gens, n, &innp_ctx, 1, plen, 1) == 1); - - /* Offset each basis by some random point and try to undo this in the verification */ - secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&tmpj2); - for (j = 0; j < n; j++) { - size_t k; - /* Offset by k-times the kth G basis and (k+n)-times the kth H basis */ - for (k = 0; k < j; k++) { - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&tmpj2, &tmpj2, &gens->gens[j], NULL); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&tmpj2, &tmpj2, &gens->gens[j + gens->n/2], NULL); - } - for (k = 0; k < n; k++) { - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&tmpj2, &tmpj2, &gens->gens[j + gens->n/2], NULL); - } - } - random_scalar_order(&offs_ctx.skew_sc); - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &tmpj, &tmpj2, &offs_ctx.skew_sc, &zero); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&tmpj, &tmpj, &offs_ctx.p, NULL); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&offs_ctx.p, &tmpj); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&offs_ctx.skew_sc, &offs_ctx.skew_sc); - - offs_ctx.parity = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, gens, n, &innp_ctx, 1, plen, 1) == 1); - - /* Try to validate the same proof twice */ -{ - test_bulletproof_offset_context offs_ctxs[2]; - secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_context innp_ctxs[2]; - offs_ctx.parity = 1; /* set parity to 1 so the common point will be returned first, as required by the multi-proof verifier */ - memcpy(&innp_ctxs[0], &innp_ctx, sizeof(innp_ctx)); - memcpy(&innp_ctxs[1], &innp_ctx, sizeof(innp_ctx)); - memcpy(&offs_ctxs[0], &offs_ctx, sizeof(offs_ctx)); - memcpy(&offs_ctxs[1], &offs_ctx, sizeof(offs_ctx)); - innp_ctxs[0].rangeproof_cb_data = (void *)&offs_ctxs[0]; - innp_ctxs[1].rangeproof_cb_data = (void *)&offs_ctxs[1]; - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, gens, n, innp_ctxs, 2, plen, 1) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_inner_product_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, gens, n, innp_ctxs, 2, plen, 0) == 1); -} - - free(a_arr); - free(b_arr); - secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); -} - -void test_bulletproof_rangeproof(size_t nbits, size_t expected_size, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens) { - secp256k1_scalar blind; - secp256k1_scalar blind_recovered; - unsigned char proof[1024]; - unsigned char proof2[1024]; - unsigned char proof3[1024]; - const unsigned char *proof_ptr[3]; - size_t plen = sizeof(proof); - uint64_t v = 123456; - uint64_t v_recovered; - secp256k1_gej commitj; - secp256k1_ge commitp; - secp256k1_ge commitp2; - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment pcommit; - const secp256k1_ge *commitp_ptr[3]; - secp256k1_ge value_gen[3]; - unsigned char nonce[32] = "my kingdom for some randomness!!"; - - secp256k1_scratch *scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(ctx, 10000000); - - if (v >> nbits > 0) { - v = 0; - } - - proof_ptr[0] = proof; - proof_ptr[1] = proof2; - proof_ptr[2] = proof3; - - secp256k1_generator_load(&value_gen[0], &secp256k1_generator_const_g); - secp256k1_generator_load(&value_gen[1], &secp256k1_generator_const_g); - secp256k1_generator_load(&value_gen[2], &secp256k1_generator_const_h); - random_scalar_order(&blind); - - secp256k1_pedersen_ecmult(&commitj, &blind, v, &value_gen[0], &gens->blinding_gen[0]); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&commitp, &commitj); - secp256k1_pedersen_ecmult(&commitj, &blind, v, &value_gen[2], &gens->blinding_gen[0]); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&commitp2, &commitj); - commitp_ptr[0] = commitp_ptr[1] = &commitp; - commitp_ptr[2] = &commitp2; - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_save(&pcommit, &commitp); - - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, proof, &plen, nbits, &v, NULL, &blind, &commitp, 1, &value_gen[0], gens, nonce, NULL, 0) == 1); - CHECK(plen == expected_size); - nonce[0] ^= 1; - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, proof2, &plen, nbits, &v, NULL, &blind, &commitp, 1, &value_gen[1], gens, nonce, NULL, 0) == 1); - CHECK(plen == expected_size); - nonce[0] ^= 2; - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, proof3, &plen, nbits, &v, NULL, &blind, &commitp2, 1, &value_gen[2], gens, nonce, NULL, 0) == 1); - CHECK(plen == expected_size); - nonce[0] ^= 3; - /* Verify once */ - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, proof_ptr, 1, plen, nbits, NULL, commitp_ptr, 1, value_gen, gens, NULL, 0) == 1); - /* Verify twice at once to test batch validation */ - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, proof_ptr, 2, plen, nbits, NULL, commitp_ptr, 1, value_gen, gens, NULL, 0) == 1); - /* Verify thrice at once where one has a different asset type */ - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, proof_ptr, 3, plen, nbits, NULL, commitp_ptr, 1, value_gen, gens, NULL, 0) == 1); - - /* Rewind */ - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind_impl(&v_recovered, &blind_recovered, proof, plen, 0, &pcommit, &secp256k1_generator_const_g, gens->blinding_gen, nonce, NULL, 0) == 1); - CHECK(v_recovered == v); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&blind_recovered, &blind) == 1); - - nonce[0] ^= 111; - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_rewind_impl(&v_recovered, &blind_recovered, proof, plen, 0, &pcommit, &secp256k1_generator_const_g, gens->blinding_gen, nonce, NULL, 0) == 0); - - secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); -} - -void test_bulletproof_rangeproof_aggregate(size_t nbits, size_t n_commits, size_t expected_size, const secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens) { - unsigned char proof[1024]; - const unsigned char *proof_ptr = proof; - size_t plen = sizeof(proof); - secp256k1_scalar *blind = (secp256k1_scalar *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, n_commits * sizeof(*blind)); - uint64_t *v = (uint64_t *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, n_commits * sizeof(*v)); - secp256k1_ge *commitp = (secp256k1_ge *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, n_commits * sizeof(*commitp)); - const secp256k1_ge *constptr = commitp; - secp256k1_ge value_gen; - unsigned char commit[32] = {0}; - unsigned char nonce[32] = "mary, mary quite contrary how do"; - size_t i; - - secp256k1_scratch *scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(ctx, 10000000); - - secp256k1_generator_load(&value_gen, &secp256k1_generator_const_g); - for (i = 0; i < n_commits; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar vs; - secp256k1_gej commitj; - - v[i] = 223 * i; /* dice-roll random # */ - if (v[i] >> nbits > 0) { - v[i] = 0; - } - secp256k1_scalar_set_u64(&vs, v[i]); - random_scalar_order(&blind[i]); - secp256k1_pedersen_ecmult(&commitj, &blind[i], v[i], &value_gen, &gens->blinding_gen[0]); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&commitp[i], &commitj); - - secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(commit, &commitp[i], &value_gen); - } - - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_prove_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, proof, &plen, nbits, v, NULL, blind, commitp, n_commits, &value_gen, gens, nonce, NULL, 0) == 1); - CHECK(plen == expected_size); - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_rangeproof_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &proof_ptr, 1, plen, nbits, NULL, &constptr, n_commits, &value_gen, gens, NULL, 0) == 1); - - secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); - free(commitp); - free(v); - free(blind); -} - -void run_bulletproofs_tests(void) { - size_t i; - - /* Make a ton of generators */ - secp256k1_bulletproof_generators *gens = secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_create(ctx, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, 32768); - test_bulletproof_api(); - - /* sanity checks */ - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_proof_length(0) == 32); /* encoding of 1 */ - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_proof_length(1) == 96); /* encoding a*b, a, b */ - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_proof_length(2) == 160); /* dot prod, a, b, L, R, parity of L, R */ - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_proof_length(4) == 225); /* dot prod, a, b, a, b, L, R, parity of L, R */ - CHECK(secp256k1_bulletproof_innerproduct_proof_length(8) == 289); /* dot prod, a, b, a, b, L, R, L, R, parity of L, R */ - - test_bulletproof_inner_product(0, gens); - test_bulletproof_inner_product(1, gens); - test_bulletproof_inner_product(2, gens); - test_bulletproof_inner_product(4, gens); - test_bulletproof_inner_product(8, gens); - for (i = 0; i < (size_t) count; i++) { - test_bulletproof_inner_product(32, gens); - test_bulletproof_inner_product(64, gens); - } - test_bulletproof_inner_product(1024, gens); - - test_bulletproof_rangeproof(1, 289, gens); - test_bulletproof_rangeproof(2, 353, gens); - test_bulletproof_rangeproof(16, 546, gens); - test_bulletproof_rangeproof(32, 610, gens); - test_bulletproof_rangeproof(64, 675, gens); - - test_bulletproof_rangeproof_aggregate(64, 1, 675, gens); - test_bulletproof_rangeproof_aggregate(8, 2, 546, gens); - test_bulletproof_rangeproof_aggregate(8, 4, 610, gens); - - secp256k1_bulletproof_generators_destroy(ctx, gens); -} -#undef MAX_WIDTH - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/util.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/util.h deleted file mode 100644 index b1b4d11..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/util.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,116 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2018 Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_BULLETPROOF_UTIL -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_BULLETPROOF_UTIL - -/* floor(log2(n)) which returns 0 for 0, since this is used to estimate proof sizes */ -SECP256K1_INLINE static size_t secp256k1_floor_lg(size_t n) { - switch (n) { - case 0: return 0; - case 1: return 0; - case 2: return 1; - case 3: return 1; - case 4: return 2; - case 5: return 2; - case 6: return 2; - case 7: return 2; - case 8: return 3; - default: { - size_t i = 0; - while (n > 1) { - n /= 2; - i++; - } - return i; - } - } -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_dot_product(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b, size_t n) { - secp256k1_scalar_clear(r); - while(n--) { - secp256k1_scalar term; - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&term, &a[n], &b[n]); - secp256k1_scalar_add(r, r, &term); - } -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_inverse_all_var(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, size_t len) { - secp256k1_scalar u; - size_t i; - if (len < 1) { - return; - } - - VERIFY_CHECK((r + len <= a) || (a + len <= r)); - - r[0] = a[0]; - - i = 0; - while (++i < len) { - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r[i], &r[i - 1], &a[i]); - } - - secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&u, &r[--i]); - - while (i > 0) { - size_t j = i--; - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r[j], &r[i], &u); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&u, &u, &a[j]); - } - - r[0] = u; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_bulletproof_serialize_points(unsigned char *out, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t n) { - const size_t bitveclen = (n + 7) / 8; - size_t i; - - memset(out, 0, bitveclen); - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - secp256k1_fe pointx; - pointx = pt[i].x; - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pointx); - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(&out[bitveclen + i*32], &pointx); - if (!secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(&pt[i].y)) { - out[i/8] |= (1ull << (i % 8)); - } - } -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_bulletproof_deserialize_point(secp256k1_ge *pt, const unsigned char *data, size_t i, size_t n) { - const size_t bitveclen = (n + 7) / 8; - const size_t offset = bitveclen + i*32; - secp256k1_fe fe; - - secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&fe, &data[offset]); - secp256k1_ge_set_xquad(pt, &fe); - if (data[i / 8] & (1 << (i % 8))) { - secp256k1_ge_neg(pt, pt); - } -} - -static void secp256k1_bulletproof_update_commit(unsigned char *commit, const secp256k1_ge *lpt, const secp256k1_ge *rpt) { - secp256k1_fe pointx; - secp256k1_sha256 sha256; - unsigned char lrparity; - lrparity = (!secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(&lpt->y) << 1) + !secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(&rpt->y); - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, &lrparity, 1); - pointx = lpt->x; - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pointx); - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(commit, &pointx); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); - pointx = rpt->x; - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pointx); - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(commit, &pointx); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, commit, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, commit); -} - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/.main_impl.h.swp b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/.main_impl.h.swp deleted file mode 100644 index 047e28ca33add74fd1d5e44756f7c56f18e52b85..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 GIT binary patch literal 0 HcmV?d00001 literal 16384 zcmeHOYm6L65gwbw1nh)_#}9;r+O~4pTkq}eogHI*K7(_2F(y9S@*^m+oMCRKXLruK zGn;wb-Z`-YfB1=z!b2h^h=3FULP+_OAVGLUf`9-)_!VA4fTbV^fARwz|9|!^hS3E|!0&D|jL!g{20Fk3Fb~v$8n6X0 zfKS|N7!Ly<1nva30e{?K7{3L64g3mt2v`E%3H)X|o&moEP6Bn{4&c={8^#}i?*d;3 zz6=C_4J-o|@bfnr#?!!KKm;5Dsz3$U1AOlm!?^ZF!*~JsD)1@bqd*fl2P^=00^5L> zw;9IwfiD3bZ~)i}yaL5M0ru{CUf-a`6^qU7WY*=k8Fhd@h%X?=^6KfT= z+;%-XJnvqpunB*a2Tt4XP0otGjvug+%jQ^pmbvT@^YF80&m?pZkB?vopbEOx#P!&H=BMO z`(nwWT4rUX!g_?U;kuil{kc zkcg{b}=vCVIJ%H&;sU7bbDvm@_NK`ydWxuW{w-655x(nW3S~l zTFeSCQotdO&3bOs0ykw7q!~zPi>?8_^D&Ie!tMed#ev80GknF&Mw?qfX#(q_j7IjO z&7jw+$rHLjQRUlLQi7EXh2}-{5CYp{S_(oB=+c9v2BE(%GDB;X!z}1~BkZ{B;Qf6e zAZ^noUnxxlM46Ssby#Vq9tT9G8=9`?xSkuWqr=K%vQ7KBrV{Z+CvIb}1}oqVP8GTA zxDm^balI~Xq)F0^(t#K`*+9t{T9Ukj5u61RFiX4T7Y_V+U`2jl(q~3Eh!iPR?@!7pIpiH9fr%QH@Ek}A=b>j@Rop*TWm z+IOonB-v~5rX|t+eEkBOVD+_o7bi(&2NDN2I*1Y7a_ZIEmlEch|1IrzEkqa_XkKrP zG0IJLNN$X@`M$KJ~x%p7qJr<3QQ*s{%4I(3_T>hSu2s|Hmwi8=c?PE*)P zeb$Ec@%*48O)aGfBLp)IMnPppiXroq2kj;yVH9%wfvMBMwjTq1yW+%{+PCr>?a?8H$9x891P z?!j8E*XvdNF84w|4jR1b2Tgol-oQORCnq1SZmQi@w_2t^d;t-2;4a4$>c*HyAR=2# zkcGYz^(Ycnec<^y1>l^L48PO0ymdNO7!!Qv{qB0;Hd_(wZIaE@r}s_apS#)7fH(bM zoh?~wJ>G6p+&AhfQz-v>Tn6R;&mrHu7r83s|H=FPmy!3s2)qD%1-J}^z#{NI;CA4z z$oYQ?dC%*a8^9 zH<15d1p;6Zco%Rpa2@&ov%oVz7dQh<0)Iyh;6>n@z|+7AKy`uVk@tTV_$2Tca1giy zxCXs`5qJ{#2=E|q3OE5Q0i^dupt$~*HL#m|w(AU!b+jv1xmA+h#+`vfpr0b@P|{|Q z6BuBUoW@DaYRZ`Pyk|y!gkr!H6DPA|F_Z&J1EmSH<7|@uqTDe`AW?$gNXg?4$TcBi z@6*DQd47+93u{>@Bf#&qEmR7U(<2{PSJ|0(ISLSD3tF&aPT+T#8&w&_*(C0;Q@dX~ zkRMuC5|5r?Dl!C5x)3!)r-Ap(v5*F(M|2G+8i|cf!2&8AD2$0QE3%k|bR7X}I5{hs zQMw@MY=&6EjqVZ!8W~@X8$m2Y!Z{s+76q(HOvG%f0rHjLuB@b5LnL>9Kuk~Q8k~(P zt)xpW=|)o~Dl-y7`W?kqh@4VVK$TPs*c_@XNhmdxMH(#$W6Ya%zPgzXG9U`7B6^)h zYcsPT|JRC4b8A`C94HfyRwOM*ynmlorpVsGAT@ZHW!50`OF_j)>`)n9)0$^XBCu(d zybTnor3c$&sakArDpiY#=%rNqL1pP=iiu~0CDuiHKq8IK3ls9g4F8)@ZFDh)P7V_i z;>aF(Bz1Gj7w59Z(fx93wCR3gL2}e%a#JDw2E}r0zI-i7dR=msBMV7lw^G$c6#?Zv zdTfyAs-jU+9xC_Mhx+nbN?A~LpwzB!kX#8qCCm8_U0|2SmAO}IJ5Z_6);v(0MNpsA za<#$r)5G+k51CODIUPRg$F?ik7b0YZx^Hr1W{N4QqzaA|Dz1wSD3)??2^%y7&U$S3I{d1f6(@8g{wO`Nu8iGGu}QEKvfQ-Tg-3p)DE z(T&+wVgX0If@&fIw3P?ci;Tsf#1JLj5yd*Z#dDo?6LDO7eN$UV^B!VANL|(D!Nf9_ zFYe?P++=?!Fw-A*cR?x6pWO;Hd^J#j}yhVms67E(QyfuL-I z7>Kq+gHVBsimrH#g^+Sxgll+3#n&1<3}vJ!ZMWao>$&vDi-QHK{&uX0GKv8XeZe-p zvXt9-%mz}dvG`)kNqYR72th`pH=Zz|+}nXP=EQ5pzHW4ux$H3BxMBgt>(^{t)z5S= KD$E9D)bC#suh+o< diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/Makefile.am.include b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/Makefile.am.include deleted file mode 100644 index 132d6fe..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/Makefile.am.include +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ -include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_commitment.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/commitment/main_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/commitment/pedersen_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/commitment/tests_impl.h diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/main_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/main_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index ffaec06..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/main_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,186 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Gregory Maxwell * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_COMMITMENT_MAIN -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_COMMITMENT_MAIN - -#include "group.h" - -#include "modules/commitment/pedersen_impl.h" - -static void secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_load(secp256k1_ge* ge, const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* commit) { - secp256k1_fe fe; - secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&fe, &commit->data[1]); - secp256k1_ge_set_xquad(ge, &fe); - if (commit->data[0] & 1) { - secp256k1_ge_neg(ge, ge); - } -} - -static void secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_save(secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* commit, secp256k1_ge* ge) { - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&ge->x); - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(&commit->data[1], &ge->x); - commit->data[0] = 9 ^ secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(&ge->y); -} - -int secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_parse(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* commit, const unsigned char *input) { - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(commit != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(input != NULL); - (void) ctx; - if ((input[0] & 0xFE) != 8) { - return 0; - } - memcpy(commit->data, input, sizeof(commit->data)); - return 1; -} - -int secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_serialize(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output, const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment* commit) { - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(output != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(commit != NULL); - memcpy(output, commit->data, sizeof(commit->data)); - return 1; -} - -/* Generates a pedersen commitment: *commit = blind * G + value * G2. The blinding factor is 32 bytes.*/ -int secp256k1_pedersen_commit(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *commit, const unsigned char *blind, uint64_t value, const secp256k1_generator* value_gen, const secp256k1_generator* blind_gen) { - secp256k1_ge value_genp; - secp256k1_ge blind_genp; - secp256k1_gej rj; - secp256k1_ge r; - secp256k1_scalar sec; - int overflow; - int ret = 0; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(commit != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(blind != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(value_gen != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(blind_gen != NULL); - secp256k1_generator_load(&value_genp, value_gen); - secp256k1_generator_load(&blind_genp, blind_gen); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, blind, &overflow); - if (!overflow) { - secp256k1_pedersen_ecmult(&rj, &sec, value, &value_genp, &blind_genp); - if (!secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&rj)) { - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&r, &rj); - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_save(commit, &r); - ret = 1; - } - secp256k1_gej_clear(&rj); - secp256k1_ge_clear(&r); - } - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); - return ret; -} - -/** Takes a list of n pointers to 32 byte blinding values, the first negs of which are treated with positive sign and the rest - * negative, then calculates an additional blinding value that adds to zero. - */ -int secp256k1_pedersen_blind_sum(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *blind_out, const unsigned char * const *blinds, size_t n, size_t npositive) { - secp256k1_scalar acc; - secp256k1_scalar x; - size_t i; - int overflow; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(blind_out != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(blinds != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(npositive <= n); - (void) ctx; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&acc, 0); - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&x, blinds[i], &overflow); - if (overflow) { - return 0; - } - if (i >= npositive) { - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&x, &x); - } - secp256k1_scalar_add(&acc, &acc, &x); - } - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(blind_out, &acc); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&acc); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&x); - return 1; -} - -/* Takes two lists of commitments and sums the first set and subtracts the second and verifies that they sum to excess. */ -int secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment * const* pos, size_t n_pos, const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment * const* neg, size_t n_neg) { - secp256k1_gej accj; - secp256k1_ge add; - size_t i; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(!n_pos || (pos != NULL)); - ARG_CHECK(!n_neg || (neg != NULL)); - (void) ctx; - secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&accj); - for (i = 0; i < n_pos; i++) { - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_load(&add, neg[i]); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&accj, &accj, &add, NULL); - } - secp256k1_gej_neg(&accj, &accj); - for (i = 0; i < n_neg; i++) { - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_load(&add, pos[i]); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&accj, &accj, &add, NULL); - } - return secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&accj); -} - -int secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const uint64_t *value, const unsigned char* const* generator_blind, unsigned char* const* blinding_factor, size_t n_total, size_t n_inputs) { - secp256k1_scalar sum; - secp256k1_scalar tmp; - size_t i; - - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(n_total == 0 || value != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(n_total == 0 || generator_blind != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(n_total == 0 || blinding_factor != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(n_total > n_inputs); - (void) ctx; - - if (n_total == 0) { - return 1; - } - - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sum, 0); - for (i = 0; i < n_total; i++) { - int overflow = 0; - secp256k1_scalar addend; - secp256k1_scalar_set_u64(&addend, value[i]); /* s = v */ - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&tmp, generator_blind[i], &overflow); - if (overflow == 1) { - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&tmp); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&addend); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sum); - return 0; - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&addend, &addend, &tmp); /* s = vr */ - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&tmp, blinding_factor[i], &overflow); - if (overflow == 1) { - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&tmp); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&addend); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sum); - return 0; - } - secp256k1_scalar_add(&addend, &addend, &tmp); /* s = vr + r' */ - secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&addend, i < n_inputs); /* s is negated if it's an input */ - secp256k1_scalar_add(&sum, &sum, &addend); /* sum += s */ - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&addend); - } - - /* Right now tmp has the last pedersen blinding factor. Subtract the sum from it. */ - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&sum, &sum); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&tmp, &tmp, &sum); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(blinding_factor[n_total - 1], &tmp); - - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&tmp); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sum); - return 1; -} - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/pedersen_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/pedersen_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index a6d9dfb..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/pedersen_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@ -/*********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2015 Gregory Maxwell * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php. * - ***********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_COMMITMENT_PEDERSEN -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_COMMITMENT_PEDERSEN - -#include - -#include "ecmult_const.h" -#include "group.h" -#include "scalar.h" - -/* sec * G + value * G2. */ -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_pedersen_ecmult(secp256k1_gej *rj, const secp256k1_scalar *sec, uint64_t value, const secp256k1_ge* value_gen, const secp256k1_ge* blind_gen) { - secp256k1_scalar vs; - secp256k1_gej bj; - secp256k1_ge bp; - - secp256k1_scalar_set_u64(&vs, value); - secp256k1_ecmult_const(rj, value_gen, &vs, 64); - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&bj, blind_gen, sec, 256); - - /* zero blinding factor indicates that we are not trying to be zero-knowledge, - * so not being constant-time in this case is OK. */ - if (!secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&bj)) { - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&bp, &bj); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(rj, rj, &bp); - } - - secp256k1_gej_clear(&bj); - secp256k1_ge_clear(&bp); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&vs); -} - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/tests_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/tests_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index fe4f925..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/commitment/tests_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,230 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2015 Gregory Maxwell * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_COMMITMENT_TESTS -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_COMMITMENT_TESTS - -#include - -#include "group.h" -#include "scalar.h" -#include "testrand.h" -#include "util.h" - -#include "include/secp256k1_commitment.h" - -static void test_commitment_api(void) { - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment commit; - const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *commit_ptr = &commit; - unsigned char blind[32]; - unsigned char blind_out[32]; - const unsigned char *blind_ptr = blind; - unsigned char *blind_out_ptr = blind_out; - uint64_t val = secp256k1_rand32(); - - secp256k1_context *none = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); - secp256k1_context *sign = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); - secp256k1_context *vrfy = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - secp256k1_context *both = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - int32_t ecount; - - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - - secp256k1_rand256(blind); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(none, &commit, blind, val, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(vrfy, &commit, blind, val, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(sign, &commit, blind, val, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g) != 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(sign, NULL, blind, val, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(sign, &commit, NULL, val, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 4); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(sign, &commit, blind, val, NULL, &secp256k1_generator_const_g) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 5); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(sign, &commit, blind, val, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 6); - - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_sum(none, blind_out, &blind_ptr, 1, 1) != 0); - CHECK(ecount == 6); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_sum(none, NULL, &blind_ptr, 1, 1) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 7); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_sum(none, blind_out, NULL, 1, 1) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 8); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_sum(none, blind_out, &blind_ptr, 0, 1) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 9); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_sum(none, blind_out, &blind_ptr, 0, 0) != 0); - CHECK(ecount == 9); - - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(sign, &commit, blind, val, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g) != 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(none, &commit_ptr, 1, &commit_ptr, 1) != 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(none, NULL, 0, &commit_ptr, 1) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(none, &commit_ptr, 1, NULL, 0) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(none, NULL, 0, NULL, 0) != 0); - CHECK(ecount == 9); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(none, NULL, 1, &commit_ptr, 1) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 10); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(none, &commit_ptr, 1, NULL, 1) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 11); - - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum(none, &val, &blind_ptr, &blind_out_ptr, 1, 0) != 0); - CHECK(ecount == 11); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum(none, &val, &blind_ptr, &blind_out_ptr, 1, 1) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 12); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum(none, &val, &blind_ptr, &blind_out_ptr, 0, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 13); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum(none, NULL, &blind_ptr, &blind_out_ptr, 1, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 14); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum(none, &val, NULL, &blind_out_ptr, 1, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 15); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum(none, &val, &blind_ptr, NULL, 1, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 16); - - secp256k1_context_destroy(none); - secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); - secp256k1_context_destroy(vrfy); - secp256k1_context_destroy(both); -} - -static void test_pedersen(void) { - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment commits[19]; - const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *cptr[19]; - unsigned char blinds[32*19]; - const unsigned char *bptr[19]; - secp256k1_scalar s; - uint64_t values[19]; - int64_t totalv; - int i; - int inputs; - int outputs; - int total; - inputs = (secp256k1_rand32() & 7) + 1; - outputs = (secp256k1_rand32() & 7) + 2; - total = inputs + outputs; - for (i = 0; i < 19; i++) { - cptr[i] = &commits[i]; - bptr[i] = &blinds[i * 32]; - } - totalv = 0; - for (i = 0; i < inputs; i++) { - values[i] = secp256k1_rands64(0, INT64_MAX - totalv); - totalv += values[i]; - } - for (i = 0; i < outputs - 1; i++) { - values[i + inputs] = secp256k1_rands64(0, totalv); - totalv -= values[i + inputs]; - } - values[total - 1] = totalv; - - for (i = 0; i < total - 1; i++) { - random_scalar_order(&s); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&blinds[i * 32], &s); - } - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_sum(ctx, &blinds[(total - 1) * 32], bptr, total - 1, inputs)); - for (i = 0; i < total; i++) { - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(ctx, &commits[i], &blinds[i * 32], values[i], &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g)); - } - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(ctx, cptr, inputs, &cptr[inputs], outputs)); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(ctx, &cptr[inputs], outputs, cptr, inputs)); - if (inputs > 0 && values[0] > 0) { - CHECK(!secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(ctx, cptr, inputs - 1, &cptr[inputs], outputs)); - } - random_scalar_order(&s); - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&blinds[i * 32], &s); - } - values[0] = INT64_MAX; - values[1] = 0; - values[2] = 1; - for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(ctx, &commits[i], &blinds[i * 32], values[i], &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g)); - } - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(ctx, &cptr[0], 1, &cptr[0], 1)); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(ctx, &cptr[1], 1, &cptr[1], 1)); -} - -#define MAX_N_GENS 30 -void test_multiple_generators(void) { - const size_t n_inputs = (secp256k1_rand32() % (MAX_N_GENS / 2)) + 1; - const size_t n_outputs = (secp256k1_rand32() % (MAX_N_GENS / 2)) + 1; - const size_t n_generators = n_inputs + n_outputs; - unsigned char *generator_blind[MAX_N_GENS]; - unsigned char *pedersen_blind[MAX_N_GENS]; - secp256k1_generator generator[MAX_N_GENS]; - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment commit[MAX_N_GENS]; - const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *commit_ptr[MAX_N_GENS]; - size_t i; - int64_t total_value; - uint64_t value[MAX_N_GENS]; - - secp256k1_scalar s; - - unsigned char generator_seed[32]; - random_scalar_order(&s); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(generator_seed, &s); - /* Create all the needed generators */ - for (i = 0; i < n_generators; i++) { - generator_blind[i] = (unsigned char*) malloc(32); - pedersen_blind[i] = (unsigned char*) malloc(32); - - random_scalar_order(&s); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(generator_blind[i], &s); - random_scalar_order(&s); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(pedersen_blind[i], &s); - - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(ctx, &generator[i], generator_seed, generator_blind[i])); - - commit_ptr[i] = &commit[i]; - } - - /* Compute all the values -- can be positive or negative */ - total_value = 0; - for (i = 0; i < n_outputs; i++) { - value[n_inputs + i] = secp256k1_rands64(0, INT64_MAX - total_value); - total_value += value[n_inputs + i]; - } - for (i = 0; i < n_inputs - 1; i++) { - value[i] = secp256k1_rands64(0, total_value); - total_value -= value[i]; - } - value[i] = total_value; - - /* Correct for blinding factors and do the commitments */ - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum(ctx, value, (const unsigned char * const *) generator_blind, pedersen_blind, n_generators, n_inputs)); - for (i = 0; i < n_generators; i++) { - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(ctx, &commit[i], pedersen_blind[i], value[i], &generator[i], &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - } - - /* Verify */ - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(ctx, &commit_ptr[0], n_inputs, &commit_ptr[n_inputs], n_outputs)); - - /* Cleanup */ - for (i = 0; i < n_generators; i++) { - free(generator_blind[i]); - free(pedersen_blind[i]); - } -} -#undef MAX_N_GENS - -void run_commitment_tests(void) { - int i; - test_commitment_api(); - for (i = 0; i < 10*count; i++) { - test_pedersen(); - } - test_multiple_generators(); -} - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/Makefile.am.include b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/Makefile.am.include deleted file mode 100644 index e3088b4..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/Makefile.am.include +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ -include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_ecdh.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/ecdh/main_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/ecdh/tests_impl.h -if USE_BENCHMARK -noinst_PROGRAMS += bench_ecdh -bench_ecdh_SOURCES = src/bench_ecdh.c -bench_ecdh_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) -endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/main_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/main_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index df3ec5c..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/main_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2015 Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_ECDH_MAIN_H -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_ECDH_MAIN_H - -#include "include/secp256k1_ecdh.h" -#include "ecmult_const_impl.h" - -int secp256k1_ecdh(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *result, const secp256k1_pubkey *point, const unsigned char *scalar) { - int ret = 0; - int overflow = 0; - secp256k1_gej res; - secp256k1_ge pt; - secp256k1_scalar s; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(result != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(point != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(scalar != NULL); - - secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &pt, point); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s, scalar, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s)) { - ret = 0; - } else { - unsigned char x[32]; - unsigned char y[1]; - secp256k1_sha256 sha; - - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&res, &pt, &s, 256); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&pt, &res); - /* Compute a hash of the point in compressed form - * Note we cannot use secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize here since it does not - * expect its output to be secret and has a timing sidechannel. */ - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pt.x); - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pt.y); - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(x, &pt.x); - y[0] = 0x02 | secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&pt.y); - - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, y, sizeof(y)); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, x, sizeof(x)); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, result); - ret = 1; - } - - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&s); - return ret; -} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_MODULE_ECDH_MAIN_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/tests_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/tests_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 0c53f8e..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/ecdh/tests_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,105 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2015 Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_ECDH_TESTS_H -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_ECDH_TESTS_H - -void test_ecdh_api(void) { - /* Setup context that just counts errors */ - secp256k1_context *tctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); - secp256k1_pubkey point; - unsigned char res[32]; - unsigned char s_one[32] = { 0 }; - int32_t ecount = 0; - s_one[31] = 1; - - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(tctx, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(tctx, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(tctx, &point, s_one) == 1); - - /* Check all NULLs are detected */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(tctx, res, &point, s_one) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(tctx, NULL, &point, s_one) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(tctx, res, NULL, s_one) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(tctx, res, &point, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(tctx, res, &point, s_one) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - - /* Cleanup */ - secp256k1_context_destroy(tctx); -} - -void test_ecdh_generator_basepoint(void) { - unsigned char s_one[32] = { 0 }; - secp256k1_pubkey point[2]; - int i; - - s_one[31] = 1; - /* Check against pubkey creation when the basepoint is the generator */ - for (i = 0; i < 100; ++i) { - secp256k1_sha256 sha; - unsigned char s_b32[32]; - unsigned char output_ecdh[32]; - unsigned char output_ser[32]; - unsigned char point_ser[33]; - size_t point_ser_len = sizeof(point_ser); - secp256k1_scalar s; - - random_scalar_order(&s); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(s_b32, &s); - - /* compute using ECDH function */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &point[0], s_one) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, output_ecdh, &point[0], s_b32) == 1); - /* compute "explicitly" */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &point[1], s_b32) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, point_ser, &point_ser_len, &point[1], SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); - CHECK(point_ser_len == sizeof(point_ser)); - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, point_ser, point_ser_len); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, output_ser); - /* compare */ - CHECK(memcmp(output_ecdh, output_ser, sizeof(output_ser)) == 0); - } -} - -void test_bad_scalar(void) { - unsigned char s_zero[32] = { 0 }; - unsigned char s_overflow[32] = { - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, - 0xba, 0xae, 0xdc, 0xe6, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xa0, 0x3b, - 0xbf, 0xd2, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xd0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x41 - }; - unsigned char s_rand[32] = { 0 }; - unsigned char output[32]; - secp256k1_scalar rand; - secp256k1_pubkey point; - - /* Create random point */ - random_scalar_order(&rand); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(s_rand, &rand); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &point, s_rand) == 1); - - /* Try to multiply it by bad values */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, output, &point, s_zero) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, output, &point, s_overflow) == 0); - /* ...and a good one */ - s_overflow[31] -= 1; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, output, &point, s_overflow) == 1); -} - -void run_ecdh_tests(void) { - test_ecdh_api(); - test_ecdh_generator_basepoint(); - test_bad_scalar(); -} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_MODULE_ECDH_TESTS_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/generator/.main_impl.h.swp b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/generator/.main_impl.h.swp deleted file mode 100644 index 85d9619c0145c3a42f8b1f4a11c9611b9fef6125..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 GIT binary patch literal 0 HcmV?d00001 literal 16384 zcmeHN>#y8K6*n!EN1K2e5PSeMNuphyT%A|yVcN(g~?{bp?M`fhHL61DIl zw)ERw&zy7S%x})vGiS%r&aNCI?TV)0dY7Vn^V~D%7aw?9dFVZg!sy5hX&`EDdnIz^ zqb7Ixh_Z64-j?>}w4P1`s|SOz?*%4}s+>iWM7P8TxYKNOc z9#kV{4{MF)1-Rf$tn}6jDmH@O5AvSOE&a9zcv80p6I4;3`%X@r6q# zRWhkja)3-0#HU_eCq*)*imXlQ^;wO*Rzp2stEB>``;4pyuFnZ&elT!-acYCC!_=5U zaw=aUrccqY_=+1-ZDFf0Gd5Z9r6L-6M5;cLZ7TM2=G&wuq|53=_aQ!}g{gJva7GXU z2M8^~qcY*ev7ZW}09}T13&?b8EaatgspRQ^m>Yph3C^;R8lmon8@YiWm53b-h9k~o zg=qyFjJQ7WM}y@2N|qHT2nUa5I7k}TtK$p>HI#}z!6QA>Ba|lIr!I|CA2Ecg5Vzt^ z6bLy#c6lH72S{sm+Mehu7%#(Ybvk@D3Zsi5SIY~9Sh89qA2B1>CZ^X5LfDzQoJLKN z;1Y*}e0iXU)HFS@Cu>f+EDTwB$-~JVawr&G95FHW^)PPPW#k{}L1zJ`a%l(o$K zi6cEFLYvfECB(Vqh))Lpv`Gh#6K!J4-)&9&UWiLHIRgj^G^x~<#SQtXNdvXEG-FFM zP4P(^rKy$`YgwYaEL|s*B&YEU6AZZ0pc$_L#4;$7d zj-eJReKw(P5081ZP|}+Pyi1{-)WXJot={Tbtl4Zar$cSaGVMmg)S9(U!)EQ4W@#<0 z*0CI$S~Y63TAOwn9jDgT8kc$Drt4bUY&%qM zS@n9`Y_=PXy58y7^%m9Ij$`Q>ty}H=70T>@GIc+E-5)!+4A;7z=MM4ak}o@=o7K9xaZ&t@Mdqi+rQL4ovS@JjwvC3n!5fg8Mc)5euh_HYce>Z(G zFL}ehS;4z=KFS+1KpYuFZ5cQX8A`egQb&fZF2l3ap2n+|i8)8cG?hvD5K1AeMX+>E}z7ldR#Y-oj7>rXxBL0J>EUFbo#_8NOhgKoq_*TUMJV(~*+C}+yCmD3~&96mNfMiL$I{z?}3wwNcTzbTfdgh)Hf!Eh5x z(>}-Qx*!(AO|sHirD|}#NPQ8K;fJJ{)GMh z&w%d%-vyorTEP2&e~7(5@Oj{~z-NHJVBdcYcnSCl@CiTzuEXCy0KZRs|F!Txzj6k0 z266^+266^+266`OX$JN(ktUtXLC$g-(=Aw`LCZ#te>3VTWugBI^Q7@!ydo+NYOdVt`t{V^l=@1kmspwY2 zxB9mrG0qbQ;xs-SPww%H?884Q)BIpI)rfxwkaE1q^*C>3V8flHUE_k=3Xk!}3_6fX zCZTw1<8$)J^f>MW4+7-H<|$9yaeWv6#>oE-l4c+&xlHqvB-2gsE>o&oSe*{jQv~~9 hmSpS2-gm~2P`vYSh}>^xN=Xy5IE4W^kv8M|MQLK zoAG#FSt=f#nxVCPk>I+MkoTT><@o-sXUT2%62i@p`KBu^>t2c9*fbNi2u(gVFSTHNPhr(pOio^T5RH$1IUJy|NW z?WOKb;2VXGYldwe6q?-OJ`=7VF$TKb@!I)TCVzFS6u7<>*h$J-DS9>c3_U>axqI>Y zmP3_ZDWDWk3Md7X0!jg;fKosyaGfb2yshLM%6wx|?jyTl(e{8G@ZIf%yaBupbbtfEBv1f$1G|82z%M%q z`4+egdfUt%NKBf9xRSU0@pcc{?Fr0~dh{ zzzV>CAz%k^X&WJ*03QPea0vMQ7DB!U-T=-4CEz~b(pLBa9GC&7f$hLgHxu#^@FuVb z>;oPFe!Yp1Pl5A*0Xz-t1b)F{#LvK2!27_m%WZ)parPmD)AOT5BZ%v02~idE4fAI>K#%wSgJ zZ&=27rCO9>t!h;Gcy&pJty)nlBkzc(u8mhK6(+-_s#P!YT1|$FwF);Y8XF!ZvWS7e zArylet`i7)<*bO_o^M5ziRbcP9|#RIx*ix$NJ6zYb; 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- -/** Alternate secp256k1 generator, used in Elements Alpha. - * Computed as the hash of the above G, DER-encoded with 0x04 (uncompressed pubkey) as its flag byte. - * import hashlib - * C = EllipticCurve ([F (0), F (7)]) - * G_bytes = '0479be667ef9dcbbac55a06295ce870b07029bfcdb2dce28d959f2815b16f81798483ada7726a3c4655da4fbfc0e1108a8fd17b448a68554199c47d08ffb10d4b8'.decode('hex') - * H = C.lift_x(int(hashlib.sha256(G_bytes).hexdigest(),16)) - */ -const secp256k1_generator secp256k1_generator_const_h = { - { 0x0b, - 0x50, 0x92, 0x9b, 0x74, 0xc1, 0xa0, 0x49, 0x54, - 0xb7, 0x8b, 0x4b, 0x60, 0x35, 0xe9, 0x7a, 0x5e, - 0x07, 0x8a, 0x5a, 0x0f, 0x28, 0xec, 0x96, 0xd5, - 0x47, 0xbf, 0xee, 0x9a, 0xce, 0x80, 0x3a, 0xc0 - } -}; - -static void secp256k1_generator_load(secp256k1_ge* ge, const secp256k1_generator* gen) { - secp256k1_fe fe; - secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&fe, &gen->data[1]); - secp256k1_ge_set_xquad(ge, &fe); - if (gen->data[0] & 1) { - secp256k1_ge_neg(ge, ge); - } -} - -static void secp256k1_generator_save(secp256k1_generator* commit, secp256k1_ge* ge) { - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&ge->x); - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(&commit->data[1], &ge->x); - commit->data[0] = 11 ^ secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(&ge->y); -} - -int secp256k1_generator_parse(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_generator* gen, const unsigned char *input) { - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(gen != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(input != NULL); - if ((input[0] & 0xFE) != 10) { - return 0; - } - memcpy(gen->data, input, sizeof(gen->data)); - return 1; -} - -int secp256k1_generator_serialize(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output, const secp256k1_generator* gen) { - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(output != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(gen != NULL); - memcpy(output, gen->data, sizeof(gen->data)); - return 1; -} - -static void shallue_van_de_woestijne(secp256k1_ge* ge, const secp256k1_fe* t) { - /* Implements the algorithm from: - * Indifferentiable Hashing to Barreto-Naehrig Curves - * Pierre-Alain Fouque and Mehdi Tibouchi - * Latincrypt 2012 - */ - - /* Basic algorithm: - - c = sqrt(-3) - d = (c - 1)/2 - - w = c * t / (1 + b + t^2) [with b = 7] - x1 = d - t*w - x2 = -(x1 + 1) - x3 = 1 + 1/w^2 - - To avoid the 2 divisions, compute the above in numerator/denominator form: - wn = c * t - wd = 1 + 7 + t^2 - x1n = d*wd - t*wn - x1d = wd - x2n = -(x1n + wd) - x2d = wd - x3n = wd^2 + c^2 + t^2 - x3d = (c * t)^2 - - The joint denominator j = wd * c^2 * t^2, and - 1 / x1d = 1/j * c^2 * t^2 - 1 / x2d = x3d = 1/j * wd - */ - - static const secp256k1_fe c = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0x0a2d2ba9, 0x3507f1df, 0x233770c2, 0xa797962c, 0xc61f6d15, 0xda14ecd4, 0x7d8d27ae, 0x1cd5f852); - static const secp256k1_fe d = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0x851695d4, 0x9a83f8ef, 0x919bb861, 0x53cbcb16, 0x630fb68a, 0xed0a766a, 0x3ec693d6, 0x8e6afa40); - static const secp256k1_fe b = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7); - static const secp256k1_fe b_plus_one = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8); - - secp256k1_fe wn, wd, x1n, x2n, x3n, x3d, jinv, tmp, x1, x2, x3, alphain, betain, gammain, y1, y2, y3; - int alphaquad, betaquad; - - secp256k1_fe_mul(&wn, &c, t); /* mag 1 */ - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&wd, t); /* mag 1 */ - secp256k1_fe_add(&wd, &b_plus_one); /* mag 2 */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&tmp, t, &wn); /* mag 1 */ - secp256k1_fe_negate(&tmp, &tmp, 1); /* mag 2 */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x1n, &d, &wd); /* mag 1 */ - secp256k1_fe_add(&x1n, &tmp); /* mag 3 */ - x2n = x1n; /* mag 3 */ - secp256k1_fe_add(&x2n, &wd); /* mag 5 */ - secp256k1_fe_negate(&x2n, &x2n, 5); /* mag 6 */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3d, &c, t); /* mag 1 */ - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x3d, &x3d); /* mag 1 */ - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x3n, &wd); /* mag 1 */ - secp256k1_fe_add(&x3n, &x3d); /* mag 2 */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&jinv, &x3d, &wd); /* mag 1 */ - secp256k1_fe_inv(&jinv, &jinv); /* mag 1 */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x1, &x1n, &x3d); /* mag 1 */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x1, &x1, &jinv); /* mag 1 */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x2, &x2n, &x3d); /* mag 1 */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x2, &x2, &jinv); /* mag 1 */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, &x3n, &wd); /* mag 1 */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, &x3, &jinv); /* mag 1 */ - - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&alphain, &x1); /* mag 1 */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&alphain, &alphain, &x1); /* mag 1 */ - secp256k1_fe_add(&alphain, &b); /* mag 2 */ - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&betain, &x2); /* mag 1 */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&betain, &betain, &x2); /* mag 1 */ - secp256k1_fe_add(&betain, &b); /* mag 2 */ - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&gammain, &x3); /* mag 1 */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&gammain, &gammain, &x3); /* mag 1 */ - secp256k1_fe_add(&gammain, &b); /* mag 2 */ - - alphaquad = secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&y1, &alphain); - betaquad = secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&y2, &betain); - secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&y3, &gammain); - - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&x1, &x2, (!alphaquad) & betaquad); - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&y1, &y2, (!alphaquad) & betaquad); - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&x1, &x3, (!alphaquad) & !betaquad); - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&y1, &y3, (!alphaquad) & !betaquad); - - secp256k1_ge_set_xy(ge, &x1, &y1); - - /* The linked algorithm from the paper uses the Jacobi symbol of t to - * determine the Jacobi symbol of the produced y coordinate. Since the - * rest of the algorithm only uses t^2, we can safely use another criterion - * as long as negation of t results in negation of the y coordinate. Here - * we choose to use t's oddness, as it is faster to determine. */ - secp256k1_fe_negate(&tmp, &ge->y, 1); - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&ge->y, &tmp, secp256k1_fe_is_odd(t)); -} - -static int secp256k1_generator_generate_internal(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_generator* gen, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *blind32) { - static const unsigned char prefix1[17] = "1st generation: "; - static const unsigned char prefix2[17] = "2nd generation: "; - secp256k1_fe t = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4); - secp256k1_ge add; - secp256k1_gej accum; - int overflow; - secp256k1_sha256 sha256; - unsigned char b32[32]; - int ret = 1; - - if (blind32) { - secp256k1_scalar blind; - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&blind, blind32, &overflow); - ret = !overflow; - CHECK(ret); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &accum, &blind); - } - - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, prefix1, 16); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, key32, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, b32); - ret &= secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&t, b32); - CHECK(ret); - shallue_van_de_woestijne(&add, &t); - if (blind32) { - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&accum, &accum, &add); - } else { - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&accum, &add); - } - - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, prefix2, 16); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256, key32, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256, b32); - ret &= secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&t, b32); - CHECK(ret); - shallue_van_de_woestijne(&add, &t); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&accum, &accum, &add); - - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&add, &accum); - secp256k1_generator_save(gen, &add); - return ret; -} - -int secp256k1_generator_generate(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_generator* gen, const unsigned char *key32) { - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(gen != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(key32 != NULL); - return secp256k1_generator_generate_internal(ctx, gen, key32, NULL); -} - -int secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_generator* gen, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *blind32) { - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(gen != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(key32 != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(blind32 != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); - return secp256k1_generator_generate_internal(ctx, gen, key32, blind32); -} - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/generator/tests_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/generator/tests_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 8b1a5ac..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/generator/tests_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,199 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2016 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_GENERATOR_TESTS -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_GENERATOR_TESTS - -#include -#include - -#include "group.h" -#include "scalar.h" -#include "testrand.h" -#include "util.h" - -#include "include/secp256k1_generator.h" - -void test_generator_api(void) { - unsigned char key[32]; - unsigned char blind[32]; - unsigned char sergen[33]; - secp256k1_context *none = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); - secp256k1_context *sign = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); - secp256k1_context *vrfy = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - secp256k1_generator gen; - int32_t ecount = 0; - - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_rand256(key); - secp256k1_rand256(blind); - - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate(none, &gen, key) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate(none, NULL, key) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate(none, &gen, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(sign, &gen, key, blind) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(vrfy, &gen, key, blind) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(none, &gen, key, blind) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 4); - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(vrfy, NULL, key, blind) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 5); - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(vrfy, &gen, NULL, blind) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 6); - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(vrfy, &gen, key, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 7); - - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_serialize(none, sergen, &gen) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 7); - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_serialize(none, NULL, &gen) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 8); - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_serialize(none, sergen, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 9); - - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_serialize(none, sergen, &gen) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_parse(none, &gen, sergen) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 9); - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_parse(none, NULL, sergen) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 10); - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_parse(none, &gen, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 11); - - secp256k1_context_destroy(none); - secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); - secp256k1_context_destroy(vrfy); -} - -void test_shallue_van_de_woestijne(void) { - /* Matches with the output of the shallue_van_de_woestijne.sage SAGE program */ - static const secp256k1_ge_storage results[32] = { - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xedd1fd3e, 0x327ce90c, 0xc7a35426, 0x14289aee, 0x9682003e, 0x9cf7dcc9, 0xcf2ca974, 0x3be5aa0c, 0x0225f529, 0xee75acaf, 0xccfc4560, 0x26c5e46b, 0xf80237a3, 0x3924655a, 0x16f90e88, 0x085ed52a), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xedd1fd3e, 0x327ce90c, 0xc7a35426, 0x14289aee, 0x9682003e, 0x9cf7dcc9, 0xcf2ca974, 0x3be5aa0c, 0xfdda0ad6, 0x118a5350, 0x3303ba9f, 0xd93a1b94, 0x07fdc85c, 0xc6db9aa5, 0xe906f176, 0xf7a12705), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x2c5cdc9c, 0x338152fa, 0x85de92cb, 0x1bee9907, 0x765a922e, 0x4f037cce, 0x14ecdbf2, 0x2f78fe15, 0x56716069, 0x6818286b, 0x72f01a3e, 0x5e8caca7, 0x36249160, 0xc7ded69d, 0xd51913c3, 0x03a2fa97), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x2c5cdc9c, 0x338152fa, 0x85de92cb, 0x1bee9907, 0x765a922e, 0x4f037cce, 0x14ecdbf2, 0x2f78fe15, 0xa98e9f96, 0x97e7d794, 0x8d0fe5c1, 0xa1735358, 0xc9db6e9f, 0x38212962, 0x2ae6ec3b, 0xfc5d0198), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x531f7239, 0xaebc780e, 0x179fbf8d, 0x412a1b01, 0x511f0abc, 0xe0c46151, 0x8b38db84, 0xcc2467f3, 0x82387d45, 0xec7bd5cc, 0x61fcb9df, 0x41cddd7b, 0x217d8114, 0x3577dc8f, 0x23de356a, 0x7e97704e), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x531f7239, 0xaebc780e, 0x179fbf8d, 0x412a1b01, 0x511f0abc, 0xe0c46151, 0x8b38db84, 0xcc2467f3, 0x7dc782ba, 0x13842a33, 0x9e034620, 0xbe322284, 0xde827eeb, 0xca882370, 0xdc21ca94, 0x81688be1), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x2c5cdc9c, 0x338152fa, 0x85de92cb, 0x1bee9907, 0x765a922e, 0x4f037cce, 0x14ecdbf2, 0x2f78fe15, 0x56716069, 0x6818286b, 0x72f01a3e, 0x5e8caca7, 0x36249160, 0xc7ded69d, 0xd51913c3, 0x03a2fa97), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x2c5cdc9c, 0x338152fa, 0x85de92cb, 0x1bee9907, 0x765a922e, 0x4f037cce, 0x14ecdbf2, 0x2f78fe15, 0xa98e9f96, 0x97e7d794, 0x8d0fe5c1, 0xa1735358, 0xc9db6e9f, 0x38212962, 0x2ae6ec3b, 0xfc5d0198), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x5e5936b1, 0x81db0b65, 0x8e33a8c6, 0x1aa687dd, 0x31d11e15, 0x85e35664, 0x6b4c2071, 0xcde7e942, 0x88bb5332, 0xa8e05654, 0x78d4f60c, 0x0cd979ec, 0x938558f2, 0xcac11216, 0x7c387a56, 0xe3a6d5f3), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x5e5936b1, 0x81db0b65, 0x8e33a8c6, 0x1aa687dd, 0x31d11e15, 0x85e35664, 0x6b4c2071, 0xcde7e942, 0x7744accd, 0x571fa9ab, 0x872b09f3, 0xf3268613, 0x6c7aa70d, 0x353eede9, 0x83c785a8, 0x1c59263c), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x657d438f, 0xfac34a50, 0x463fd07c, 0x3f09f320, 0x4c98e8ed, 0x6927e330, 0xc0c7735f, 0x76d32f6d, 0x577c2b11, 0xcaca2f6f, 0xd60bcaf0, 0x3e7cebe9, 0x5da6e1f4, 0xbb557f12, 0x2a397331, 0x81df897f), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x657d438f, 0xfac34a50, 0x463fd07c, 0x3f09f320, 0x4c98e8ed, 0x6927e330, 0xc0c7735f, 0x76d32f6d, 0xa883d4ee, 0x3535d090, 0x29f4350f, 0xc1831416, 0xa2591e0b, 0x44aa80ed, 0xd5c68ccd, 0x7e2072b0), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xbe0bc11b, 0x2bc639cb, 0xc28f72a8, 0xd07c21cc, 0xbc06cfa7, 0x4c2ff25e, 0x630c9740, 0x23128eab, 0x6f062fc8, 0x75148197, 0xd10375c3, 0xcc3fadb6, 0x20277e9c, 0x00579c55, 0xeddd7f95, 0xe95604db), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xbe0bc11b, 0x2bc639cb, 0xc28f72a8, 0xd07c21cc, 0xbc06cfa7, 0x4c2ff25e, 0x630c9740, 0x23128eab, 0x90f9d037, 0x8aeb7e68, 0x2efc8a3c, 0x33c05249, 0xdfd88163, 0xffa863aa, 0x12228069, 0x16a9f754), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xedd1fd3e, 0x327ce90c, 0xc7a35426, 0x14289aee, 0x9682003e, 0x9cf7dcc9, 0xcf2ca974, 0x3be5aa0c, 0xfdda0ad6, 0x118a5350, 0x3303ba9f, 0xd93a1b94, 0x07fdc85c, 0xc6db9aa5, 0xe906f176, 0xf7a12705), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xedd1fd3e, 0x327ce90c, 0xc7a35426, 0x14289aee, 0x9682003e, 0x9cf7dcc9, 0xcf2ca974, 0x3be5aa0c, 0x0225f529, 0xee75acaf, 0xccfc4560, 0x26c5e46b, 0xf80237a3, 0x3924655a, 0x16f90e88, 0x085ed52a), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xaee172d4, 0xce7c5010, 0xdb20a88f, 0x469598c1, 0xd7f7926f, 0xabb85cb5, 0x339f1403, 0x87e6b494, 0x38065980, 0x4de81b35, 0x098c7190, 0xe3380f9d, 0x95b2ed6c, 0x6c869e85, 0xc772bc5a, 0x7bc3d9d5), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xaee172d4, 0xce7c5010, 0xdb20a88f, 0x469598c1, 0xd7f7926f, 0xabb85cb5, 0x339f1403, 0x87e6b494, 0xc7f9a67f, 0xb217e4ca, 0xf6738e6f, 0x1cc7f062, 0x6a4d1293, 0x9379617a, 0x388d43a4, 0x843c225a), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xc28f5c28, 0xf5c28f5c, 0x28f5c28f, 0x5c28f5c2, 0x8f5c28f5, 0xc28f5c28, 0xf5c28f5b, 0x6666635a, 0x0c4da840, 0x1b2cf5be, 0x4604e6ec, 0xf92b2780, 0x063a5351, 0xe294bf65, 0xbb2f8b61, 0x00902db7), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xc28f5c28, 0xf5c28f5c, 0x28f5c28f, 0x5c28f5c2, 0x8f5c28f5, 0xc28f5c28, 0xf5c28f5b, 0x6666635a, 0xf3b257bf, 0xe4d30a41, 0xb9fb1913, 0x06d4d87f, 0xf9c5acae, 0x1d6b409a, 0x44d0749d, 0xff6fce78), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xecf56be6, 0x9c8fde26, 0x152832c6, 0xe043b3d5, 0xaf9a723f, 0x789854a0, 0xcb1b810d, 0xe2614ece, 0x66127ae4, 0xe4c17a75, 0x60a727e6, 0xffd2ea7f, 0xaed99088, 0xbec465c6, 0xbde56791, 0x37ed5572), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xecf56be6, 0x9c8fde26, 0x152832c6, 0xe043b3d5, 0xaf9a723f, 0x789854a0, 0xcb1b810d, 0xe2614ece, 0x99ed851b, 0x1b3e858a, 0x9f58d819, 0x002d1580, 0x51266f77, 0x413b9a39, 0x421a986d, 0xc812a6bd), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xba72860f, 0x10fcd142, 0x23f71e3c, 0x228deb9a, 0xc46c5ff5, 0x90b884e5, 0xcc60d51e, 0x0629d16e, 0x67999f31, 0x5a74ada3, 0x526832cf, 0x76b9fec3, 0xa348cc97, 0x33c3aa67, 0x02bd2516, 0x7814f635), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xba72860f, 0x10fcd142, 0x23f71e3c, 0x228deb9a, 0xc46c5ff5, 0x90b884e5, 0xcc60d51e, 0x0629d16e, 0x986660ce, 0xa58b525c, 0xad97cd30, 0x8946013c, 0x5cb73368, 0xcc3c5598, 0xfd42dae8, 0x87eb05fa), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x92ef5657, 0xdba51cc7, 0xf3e1b442, 0xa6a0916b, 0x8ce03079, 0x2ef5657d, 0xba51cc7e, 0xab2beb65, 0x782c65d2, 0x3f1e0eb2, 0x9179a994, 0xe5e8ff80, 0x5a0d50d9, 0xdeeaed90, 0xcec96ca5, 0x973e2ad3), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x92ef5657, 0xdba51cc7, 0xf3e1b442, 0xa6a0916b, 0x8ce03079, 0x2ef5657d, 0xba51cc7e, 0xab2beb65, 0x87d39a2d, 0xc0e1f14d, 0x6e86566b, 0x1a17007f, 0xa5f2af26, 0x2115126f, 0x31369359, 0x68c1d15c), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x9468ad22, 0xf921fc78, 0x8de3f1b0, 0x586c58eb, 0x5e6f0270, 0xe950b602, 0x7ada90d9, 0xd71ae323, 0x922a0c6a, 0x9ccc31d9, 0xc3bf87fd, 0x88381739, 0x35fe393f, 0xa64dfdec, 0x29f2846d, 0x12918d86), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x9468ad22, 0xf921fc78, 0x8de3f1b0, 0x586c58eb, 0x5e6f0270, 0xe950b602, 0x7ada90d9, 0xd71ae323, 0x6dd5f395, 0x6333ce26, 0x3c407802, 0x77c7e8c6, 0xca01c6c0, 0x59b20213, 0xd60d7b91, 0xed6e6ea9), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x76ddc7f5, 0xe029e59e, 0x22b0e54f, 0xa811db94, 0x5a209c4f, 0x5e912ca2, 0x8b4da6a7, 0x4c1e00a2, 0x1e8f516c, 0x91c20437, 0x50f6e24e, 0x8c2cf202, 0xacf68291, 0xbf8b66eb, 0xf7335b62, 0xec2c88fe), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x76ddc7f5, 0xe029e59e, 0x22b0e54f, 0xa811db94, 0x5a209c4f, 0x5e912ca2, 0x8b4da6a7, 0x4c1e00a2, 0xe170ae93, 0x6e3dfbc8, 0xaf091db1, 0x73d30dfd, 0x53097d6e, 0x40749914, 0x08cca49c, 0x13d37331), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xf75763bc, 0x2907e79b, 0x125e33c3, 0x9a027f48, 0x0f8c6409, 0x2153432f, 0x967bc2b1, 0x1d1f5cf0, 0xb4a8edc6, 0x36391b39, 0x9bc219c0, 0x3d033128, 0xdbcd463e, 0xd2506394, 0x061b87a5, 0x9e510235), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xf75763bc, 0x2907e79b, 0x125e33c3, 0x9a027f48, 0x0f8c6409, 0x2153432f, 0x967bc2b1, 0x1d1f5cf0, 0x4b571239, 0xc9c6e4c6, 0x643de63f, 0xc2fcced7, 0x2432b9c1, 0x2daf9c6b, 0xf9e47859, 0x61aef9fa), - }; - - secp256k1_ge ge; - secp256k1_fe fe; - secp256k1_ge_storage ges; - int i, s; - for (i = 1; i <= 16; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_set_int(&fe, i); - - for (s = 0; s < 2; s++) { - if (s) { - secp256k1_fe_negate(&fe, &fe, 1); - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&fe); - } - shallue_van_de_woestijne(&ge, &fe); - secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&ges, &ge); - - CHECK(memcmp(&ges, &results[i * 2 + s - 2], sizeof(secp256k1_ge_storage)) == 0); - } - } -} - -void test_generator_generate(void) { - static const secp256k1_ge_storage results[32] = { - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x806cd8ed, 0xd6c153e3, 0x4aa9b9a0, 0x8755c4be, 0x4718b1ef, 0xb26cb93f, 0xfdd99e1b, 0x21f2af8e, 0xc7062208, 0xcc649a03, 0x1bdc1a33, 0x9d01f115, 0x4bcd0dca, 0xfe0b875d, 0x62f35f73, 0x28673006), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xd91b15ec, 0x47a811f4, 0xaa189561, 0xd13f5c4d, 0x4e81f10d, 0xc7dc551f, 0x4fea9b84, 0x610314c4, 0x9b0ada1e, 0xb38efd67, 0x8bff0b6c, 0x7d7315f7, 0xb49b8cc5, 0xa679fad4, 0xc94f9dc6, 0x9da66382), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x11c00de6, 0xf885035e, 0x76051430, 0xa3c38b2a, 0x5f86ab8c, 0xf66dae58, 0x04ea7307, 0x348b19bf, 0xe0858ae7, 0x61dcb1ba, 0xff247e37, 0xd38fcd88, 0xf3bd7911, 0xaa4ed6e0, 0x28d792dd, 0x3ee1ac09), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x986b99eb, 0x3130e7f0, 0xe779f674, 0xb85cb514, 0x46a676bf, 0xb1dfb603, 0x4c4bb639, 0x7c406210, 0xdf900609, 0x8b3ef1e0, 0x30e32fb0, 0xd97a4329, 0xff98aed0, 0xcd278c3f, 0xe6078467, 0xfbd12f35), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xae528146, 0x03fdf91e, 0xc592977e, 0x12461dc7, 0xb9e038f8, 0x048dcb62, 0xea264756, 0xd459ae42, 0x80ef658d, 0x92becb84, 0xdba8e4f9, 0x560d7a72, 0xbaf4c393, 0xfbcf6007, 0x11039f1c, 0x224faaad), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x00df3d91, 0x35975eee, 0x91fab903, 0xe3128e4a, 0xca071dde, 0x270814e5, 0xcbda69ec, 0xcad58f46, 0x11b590aa, 0x92d89969, 0x2dbd932f, 0x08013b8b, 0x45afabc6, 0x43677db2, 0x143e0c0f, 0x5865fb03), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x1168155b, 0x987e9bc8, 0x84c5f3f4, 0x92ebf784, 0xcc8c6735, 0x39d8e5e8, 0xa967115a, 0x2949da9b, 0x0858a470, 0xf403ca97, 0xb1827f6f, 0x544c2c67, 0x08f6cb83, 0xc510c317, 0x96c981ed, 0xb9f61780), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xe8d7c0cf, 0x2bb4194c, 0x97bf2a36, 0xbd115ba0, 0x81a9afe8, 0x7663fa3c, 0x9c3cd253, 0x79fe2571, 0x2028ad04, 0xefa00119, 0x5a25d598, 0x67e79502, 0x49de7c61, 0x4751cd9d, 0x4fb317f6, 0xf76f1110), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x9532c491, 0xa64851dd, 0xcd0d3e5a, 0x93e17267, 0xa10aca95, 0xa23781aa, 0x5087f340, 0xc45fecc3, 0xb691ddc2, 0x3143a7b6, 0x09969302, 0x258affb8, 0x5bbf8666, 0xe1192319, 0xeb174d88, 0x308bd57a), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x6b20b6e2, 0x1ba6cc44, 0x3f2c3a0c, 0x5283ba44, 0xbee43a0a, 0x2799a6cf, 0xbecc0f8a, 0xf8c583ac, 0xf7021e76, 0xd51291a6, 0xf9396215, 0x686f25aa, 0xbec36282, 0x5e11eeea, 0x6e51a6e6, 0xd7d7c006), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xde27e6ff, 0x219b3ab1, 0x2b0a9e4e, 0x51fc6092, 0x96e55af6, 0xc6f717d6, 0x12cd6cce, 0x65d6c8f2, 0x48166884, 0x4dc13fd2, 0xed7a7d81, 0x66a0839a, 0x8a960863, 0xfe0001c1, 0x35d206fd, 0x63b87c09), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x79a96fb8, 0xd88a08d3, 0x055d38d1, 0x3346b0d4, 0x47d838ca, 0xfcc8fa40, 0x6d3a7157, 0xef84e7e3, 0x6bab9c45, 0x2871b51d, 0xb0df2369, 0xe7860e01, 0x2e37ffea, 0x6689fd1a, 0x9c6fe9cf, 0xb940acea), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x06c4d4cb, 0xd32c0ddb, 0x67e988c6, 0x2bdbe6ad, 0xa39b80cc, 0x61afb347, 0x234abe27, 0xa689618c, 0x5b355949, 0xf904fe08, 0x569b2313, 0xe8f19f8d, 0xc5b79e27, 0x70da0832, 0x5fb7a229, 0x238ca6b6), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x7027e566, 0x3e727c28, 0x42aa14e5, 0x52c2d2ec, 0x1d8beaa9, 0x8a22ceab, 0x15ccafc3, 0xb4f06249, 0x9b3dffbc, 0xdbd5e045, 0x6931fd03, 0x8b1c6a9b, 0x4c168c6d, 0xa6553897, 0xfe11ce49, 0xac728139), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xee3520c3, 0x9f2b954d, 0xf8e15547, 0xdaeb6cc8, 0x04c8f3b0, 0x9301f53e, 0xe0c11ea1, 0xeace539d, 0x244ff873, 0x7e060c98, 0xe843c353, 0xcd35d2e4, 0x3cd8b082, 0xcffbc9ae, 0x81eafa70, 0x332f9748), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xdaecd756, 0xf5b706a4, 0xc14e1095, 0x3e2f70df, 0xa81276e7, 0x71806b89, 0x4d8a5502, 0xa0ef4998, 0xbac906c0, 0x948b1d48, 0xe023f439, 0xfd3770b8, 0x837f60cc, 0x40552a51, 0x433d0b79, 0x6610da27), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x55e1ca28, 0x750fe2d0, 0x57f7449b, 0x3f49d999, 0x3b9616dd, 0x5387bc2e, 0x6e6698f8, 0xc4ea49f4, 0xe339e0e9, 0xa4c7fa99, 0xd063e062, 0x6582bce2, 0x33c6b1ee, 0x17a5b47f, 0x6d43ecf8, 0x98b40120), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xdd82cac2, 0x9e0e0135, 0x4964d3bc, 0x27469233, 0xf13bbd5e, 0xd7aff24b, 0x4902fca8, 0x17294b12, 0x561ab1d6, 0xcd9bcb6e, 0x805585cf, 0x3df8714c, 0x1bfa6304, 0x5efbf122, 0x1a3d8fd9, 0x3827764a), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xda5cbfb7, 0x3522e9c7, 0xcb594436, 0x83677038, 0x0eaa64a9, 0x2eca3888, 0x0fe4c9d6, 0xdeb22dbf, 0x4f46de68, 0x0447c780, 0xc54a314b, 0x5389a926, 0xbba8910b, 0x869fc6cd, 0x42ee82e8, 0x5895e42a), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x4e09830e, 0xc8894c58, 0x4e6278de, 0x167a96b0, 0x20d60463, 0xee48f788, 0x4974d66e, 0x871e35e9, 0x21259c4d, 0x332ca932, 0x2e187df9, 0xe7afbc23, 0x9d171ebc, 0x7d9e2560, 0x503f50b1, 0x9fe45834), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xabfff6ca, 0x41dcfd17, 0x03cae629, 0x9d127971, 0xf19ee000, 0x2db332e6, 0x5cc209a3, 0xc21b8f54, 0x65991d60, 0xee54f5cc, 0xddf7a732, 0xa76b0303, 0xb9f519a6, 0x22ea0390, 0x8af23ffa, 0x35ae6632), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xc6c9b92c, 0x91e045a5, 0xa1913277, 0x44d6fce2, 0x11b12c7c, 0x9b3112d6, 0xc61e14a6, 0xd6b1ae12, 0x04ab0396, 0xebdc4c6a, 0xc213cc3e, 0x077a2e80, 0xb4ba7b2b, 0x33907d56, 0x2c98ccf7, 0xb82a2e9f), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x66f6e6d9, 0xc4bb9a5f, 0x99085781, 0x83cb9362, 0x2ea437d8, 0xccd31969, 0xffadca3a, 0xff1d3935, 0x50a5b06e, 0x39e039d7, 0x1dfb2723, 0x18db74e5, 0x5af64da1, 0xdfc34586, 0x6aac3bd0, 0x5792a890), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x58ded03c, 0x98e1a890, 0x63fc7793, 0xe3ecd896, 0x235e75c9, 0x82e7008f, 0xddbf3ca8, 0x5b7e9ecb, 0x34594776, 0x58ab6821, 0xaf43a453, 0xa946fda9, 0x13d24999, 0xccf22df8, 0xd291ef59, 0xb08975c0), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x74557864, 0x4f2b0486, 0xd5beea7c, 0x2d258ccb, 0x78a870e1, 0x848982d8, 0xed3f91a4, 0x9db83a36, 0xd84e940e, 0x1d33c28a, 0x62398ec8, 0xc493aee7, 0x7c2ba722, 0x42dee7ae, 0x3c35c256, 0xad00cf42), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x7fc7963a, 0x16abc8fb, 0x5d61eb61, 0x0fc50a68, 0x754470d2, 0xf43df3be, 0x52228f66, 0x522fe61b, 0x499f9e7f, 0x462c6545, 0x29687af4, 0x9f7c732d, 0x48801ce5, 0x21acd546, 0xc6fb903c, 0x7c265032), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xb2f6257c, 0xc58df82f, 0xb9ba4f36, 0x7ededf03, 0xf8ea10f3, 0x104d7ae6, 0x233b7ac4, 0x725e11de, 0x9c7a32df, 0x4842f33d, 0xaad84f0b, 0x62e88b40, 0x46ddcbde, 0xbbeec6f8, 0x93bfde27, 0x0561dc73), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0xe2cdfd27, 0x8a8e22be, 0xabf08b79, 0x1bc6ae38, 0x41d22a9a, 0x9472e266, 0x1a7c6e83, 0xa2f74725, 0x0e26c103, 0xe0dd93b2, 0x3724f3b7, 0x8bb7366e, 0x2c245768, 0xd64f3283, 0xd8316e8a, 0x1383b977), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x757c13e7, 0xe866017e, 0xe6af61d7, 0x161d208a, 0xc438f712, 0x242fcd23, 0x63a10e59, 0xd67e41fb, 0xb550c6a9, 0x4ddb15f3, 0xfeea4bfe, 0xd2faa19f, 0x2aa2fbd3, 0x0c6ae785, 0xe357f365, 0xb30d12e0), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x528d525e, 0xac30095b, 0x5e5f83ca, 0x4d3dea63, 0xeb608f2d, 0x18dd25a7, 0x2529c8e5, 0x1ae5f9f1, 0xfde2860b, 0x492a4106, 0x9f356c05, 0x3ebc045e, 0x4ad08b79, 0x3e264935, 0xf25785a9, 0x8690b5ee), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x150df593, 0x5b6956a0, 0x0cfed843, 0xb9d6ffce, 0x4f790022, 0xea18730f, 0xc495111d, 0x91568e55, 0x6700a2ca, 0x9ff4ed32, 0xc1697312, 0x4eb51ce3, 0x5656344b, 0x65a1e3d5, 0xd6c1f7ce, 0x29233f82), - SECP256K1_GE_STORAGE_CONST(0x38e02eaf, 0x2c8774fd, 0x58b8b373, 0x732457f1, 0x16dbe53b, 0xea5683d9, 0xada20dd7, 0x14ce20a6, 0x6ac5362e, 0xbb425416, 0x8250f43f, 0xa4ee2b63, 0x0406324f, 0x1c876d60, 0xebe5be2c, 0x6eb1515b), - }; - secp256k1_generator gen; - secp256k1_ge ge; - secp256k1_ge_storage ges; - int i; - unsigned char v[32]; - static const unsigned char s[32] = {0}; - secp256k1_scalar sc; - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sc, s, NULL); - for (i = 1; i <= 32; i++) { - memset(v, 0, 31); - v[31] = i; - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(ctx, &gen, v, s)); - secp256k1_generator_load(&ge, &gen); - secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&ges, &ge); - CHECK(memcmp(&ges, &results[i - 1], sizeof(secp256k1_ge_storage)) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate(ctx, &gen, v)); - secp256k1_generator_load(&ge, &gen); - secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&ges, &ge); - CHECK(memcmp(&ges, &results[i - 1], sizeof(secp256k1_ge_storage)) == 0); - } -} - -void run_generator_tests(void) { - test_shallue_van_de_woestijne(); - test_generator_api(); - test_generator_generate(); -} - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/.borromean.h.swp b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/.borromean.h.swp deleted file mode 100644 index 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a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/Makefile.am.include +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13 +0,0 @@ -include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/rangeproof/main_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/rangeproof/borromean.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/rangeproof/borromean_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/rangeproof/rangeproof.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/rangeproof/rangeproof_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/rangeproof/tests_impl.h -if USE_BENCHMARK -noinst_PROGRAMS += bench_rangeproof -bench_rangeproof_SOURCES = src/bench_rangeproof.c -bench_rangeproof_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) -bench_rangeproof_LDFLAGS = -static -endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/borromean.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/borromean.h deleted file mode 100644 index 8f8cfed..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/borromean.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,24 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014, 2015 Gregory Maxwell * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - - -#ifndef _SECP256K1_BORROMEAN_H_ -#define _SECP256K1_BORROMEAN_H_ - -#include "scalar.h" -#include "field.h" -#include "group.h" -#include "ecmult.h" -#include "ecmult_gen.h" - -int secp256k1_borromean_verify(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ecmult_ctx, secp256k1_scalar *evalues, const unsigned char *e0, const secp256k1_scalar *s, - const secp256k1_gej *pubs, const size_t *rsizes, size_t nrings, const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen); - -int secp256k1_borromean_sign(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ecmult_ctx, const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ecmult_gen_ctx, - unsigned char *e0, secp256k1_scalar *s, const secp256k1_gej *pubs, const secp256k1_scalar *k, const secp256k1_scalar *sec, - const size_t *rsizes, const size_t *secidx, size_t nrings, const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen); - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/borromean_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/borromean_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 3a82f09..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/borromean_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,204 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014, 2015 Gregory Maxwell * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - - -#ifndef _SECP256K1_BORROMEAN_IMPL_H_ -#define _SECP256K1_BORROMEAN_IMPL_H_ - -#include "scalar.h" -#include "field.h" -#include "group.h" -#include "hash.h" -#include "eckey.h" -#include "ecmult.h" -#include "ecmult_gen.h" -#include "borromean.h" - -#include -#include - -#ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN -#define BE32(x) (x) -#else -#define BE32(p) ((((p) & 0xFF) << 24) | (((p) & 0xFF00) << 8) | (((p) & 0xFF0000) >> 8) | (((p) & 0xFF000000) >> 24)) -#endif - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_borromean_hash(unsigned char *hash, const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen, const unsigned char *e, size_t elen, - size_t ridx, size_t eidx) { - uint32_t ring; - uint32_t epos; - secp256k1_sha256 sha256_en; - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256_en); - ring = BE32((uint32_t)ridx); - epos = BE32((uint32_t)eidx); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_en, e, elen); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_en, m, mlen); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_en, (unsigned char*)&ring, 4); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_en, (unsigned char*)&epos, 4); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256_en, hash); -} - -/** "Borromean" ring signature. - * Verifies nrings concurrent ring signatures all sharing a challenge value. - * Signature is one s value per pubkey and a hash. - * Verification equation: - * | m = H(P_{0..}||message) (Message must contain pubkeys or a pubkey commitment) - * | For each ring i: - * | | en = to_scalar(H(e0||m||i||0)) - * | | For each pubkey j: - * | | | r = s_i_j G + en * P_i_j - * | | | e = H(r||m||i||j) - * | | | en = to_scalar(e) - * | | r_i = r - * | return e_0 ==== H(r_{0..i}||m) - */ -int secp256k1_borromean_verify(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ecmult_ctx, secp256k1_scalar *evalues, const unsigned char *e0, - const secp256k1_scalar *s, const secp256k1_gej *pubs, const size_t *rsizes, size_t nrings, const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) { - secp256k1_gej rgej; - secp256k1_ge rge; - secp256k1_scalar ens; - secp256k1_sha256 sha256_e0; - unsigned char tmp[33]; - size_t i; - size_t j; - size_t count; - size_t size; - int overflow; - VERIFY_CHECK(ecmult_ctx != NULL); - VERIFY_CHECK(e0 != NULL); - VERIFY_CHECK(s != NULL); - VERIFY_CHECK(pubs != NULL); - VERIFY_CHECK(rsizes != NULL); - VERIFY_CHECK(nrings > 0); - VERIFY_CHECK(m != NULL); - count = 0; - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256_e0); - for (i = 0; i < nrings; i++) { - VERIFY_CHECK(INT_MAX - count > rsizes[i]); - secp256k1_borromean_hash(tmp, m, mlen, e0, 32, i, 0); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ens, tmp, &overflow); - for (j = 0; j < rsizes[i]; j++) { - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s[count]) || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ens) || secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&pubs[count])) { - return 0; - } - if (evalues) { - /*If requested, save the challenges for proof rewind.*/ - evalues[count] = ens; - } - secp256k1_ecmult(ecmult_ctx, &rgej, &pubs[count], &ens, &s[count]); - if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&rgej)) { - return 0; - } - /* OPT: loop can be hoisted and split to use batch inversion across all the rings; this would make it much faster. */ - secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&rge, &rgej); - secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&rge, tmp, &size, 1); - if (j != rsizes[i] - 1) { - secp256k1_borromean_hash(tmp, m, mlen, tmp, 33, i, j + 1); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ens, tmp, &overflow); - } else { - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_e0, tmp, size); - } - count++; - } - } - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_e0, m, mlen); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256_e0, tmp); - return memcmp(e0, tmp, 32) == 0; -} - -int secp256k1_borromean_sign(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ecmult_ctx, const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ecmult_gen_ctx, - unsigned char *e0, secp256k1_scalar *s, const secp256k1_gej *pubs, const secp256k1_scalar *k, const secp256k1_scalar *sec, - const size_t *rsizes, const size_t *secidx, size_t nrings, const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) { - secp256k1_gej rgej; - secp256k1_ge rge; - secp256k1_scalar ens; - secp256k1_sha256 sha256_e0; - unsigned char tmp[33]; - size_t i; - size_t j; - size_t count; - size_t size; - int overflow; - VERIFY_CHECK(ecmult_ctx != NULL); - VERIFY_CHECK(ecmult_gen_ctx != NULL); - VERIFY_CHECK(e0 != NULL); - VERIFY_CHECK(s != NULL); - VERIFY_CHECK(pubs != NULL); - VERIFY_CHECK(k != NULL); - VERIFY_CHECK(sec != NULL); - VERIFY_CHECK(rsizes != NULL); - VERIFY_CHECK(secidx != NULL); - VERIFY_CHECK(nrings > 0); - VERIFY_CHECK(m != NULL); - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256_e0); - count = 0; - for (i = 0; i < nrings; i++) { - VERIFY_CHECK(INT_MAX - count > rsizes[i]); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(ecmult_gen_ctx, &rgej, &k[i]); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&rge, &rgej); - if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&rgej)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&rge, tmp, &size, 1); - for (j = secidx[i] + 1; j < rsizes[i]; j++) { - secp256k1_borromean_hash(tmp, m, mlen, tmp, 33, i, j); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ens, tmp, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ens)) { - return 0; - } - /** The signing algorithm as a whole is not memory uniform so there is likely a cache sidechannel that - * leaks which members are non-forgeries. That the forgeries themselves are variable time may leave - * an additional privacy impacting timing side-channel, but not a key loss one. - */ - secp256k1_ecmult(ecmult_ctx, &rgej, &pubs[count + j], &ens, &s[count + j]); - if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&rgej)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&rge, &rgej); - secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&rge, tmp, &size, 1); - } - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_e0, tmp, size); - count += rsizes[i]; - } - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_e0, m, mlen); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256_e0, e0); - count = 0; - for (i = 0; i < nrings; i++) { - VERIFY_CHECK(INT_MAX - count > rsizes[i]); - secp256k1_borromean_hash(tmp, m, mlen, e0, 32, i, 0); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ens, tmp, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ens)) { - return 0; - } - for (j = 0; j < secidx[i]; j++) { - secp256k1_ecmult(ecmult_ctx, &rgej, &pubs[count + j], &ens, &s[count + j]); - if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&rgej)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&rge, &rgej); - secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&rge, tmp, &size, 1); - secp256k1_borromean_hash(tmp, m, mlen, tmp, 33, i, j + 1); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&ens, tmp, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&ens)) { - return 0; - } - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&s[count + j], &ens, &sec[i]); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s[count + j], &s[count + j]); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&s[count + j], &s[count + j], &k[i]); - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s[count + j])) { - return 0; - } - count += rsizes[i]; - } - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&ens); - secp256k1_ge_clear(&rge); - secp256k1_gej_clear(&rgej); - memset(tmp, 0, 33); - return 1; -} - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/main_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/main_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 9eebe38..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/main_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,95 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Gregory Maxwell * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_RANGEPROOF_MAIN -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_RANGEPROOF_MAIN - -#include "group.h" - -#include "modules/commitment/main_impl.h" - -#include "modules/rangeproof/borromean_impl.h" -#include "modules/rangeproof/rangeproof_impl.h" - -int secp256k1_rangeproof_info(const secp256k1_context* ctx, int *exp, int *mantissa, - uint64_t *min_value, uint64_t *max_value, const unsigned char *proof, size_t plen) { - size_t offset; - uint64_t scale; - ARG_CHECK(exp != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(mantissa != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(min_value != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(max_value != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); - offset = 0; - scale = 1; - (void)ctx; - return secp256k1_rangeproof_getheader_impl(&offset, exp, mantissa, &scale, min_value, max_value, proof, plen); -} - -int secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(const secp256k1_context* ctx, - unsigned char *blind_out, uint64_t *value_out, unsigned char *message_out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *nonce, - uint64_t *min_value, uint64_t *max_value, - const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *commit, const unsigned char *proof, size_t plen, const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len, const secp256k1_generator* gen) { - secp256k1_ge commitp; - secp256k1_ge genp; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(commit != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(min_value != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(max_value != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(message_out != NULL || outlen == NULL); - ARG_CHECK(nonce != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(extra_commit != NULL || extra_commit_len == 0); - ARG_CHECK(gen != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_load(&commitp, commit); - secp256k1_generator_load(&genp, gen); - return secp256k1_rangeproof_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, - blind_out, value_out, message_out, outlen, nonce, min_value, max_value, &commitp, proof, plen, extra_commit, extra_commit_len, &genp); -} - -int secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, uint64_t *min_value, uint64_t *max_value, - const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *commit, const unsigned char *proof, size_t plen, const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len, const secp256k1_generator* gen) { - secp256k1_ge commitp; - secp256k1_ge genp; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(commit != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(min_value != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(max_value != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(extra_commit != NULL || extra_commit_len == 0); - ARG_CHECK(gen != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_load(&commitp, commit); - secp256k1_generator_load(&genp, gen); - return secp256k1_rangeproof_verify_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, NULL, - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, min_value, max_value, &commitp, proof, plen, extra_commit, extra_commit_len, &genp); -} - -int secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *proof, size_t *plen, uint64_t min_value, - const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment *commit, const unsigned char *blind, const unsigned char *nonce, int exp, int min_bits, uint64_t value, - const unsigned char *message, size_t msg_len, const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len, const secp256k1_generator* gen){ - secp256k1_ge commitp; - secp256k1_ge genp; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(plen != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(commit != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(blind != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(nonce != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(message != NULL || msg_len == 0); - ARG_CHECK(extra_commit != NULL || extra_commit_len == 0); - ARG_CHECK(gen != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_load(&commitp, commit); - secp256k1_generator_load(&genp, gen); - return secp256k1_rangeproof_sign_impl(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, - proof, plen, min_value, &commitp, blind, nonce, exp, min_bits, value, message, msg_len, extra_commit, extra_commit_len, &genp); -} - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/rangeproof.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/rangeproof.h deleted file mode 100644 index 840a09a..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/rangeproof.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2015 Gregory Maxwell * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef _SECP256K1_RANGEPROOF_H_ -#define _SECP256K1_RANGEPROOF_H_ - -#include "scalar.h" -#include "group.h" -#include "ecmult.h" -#include "ecmult_gen.h" - -static int secp256k1_rangeproof_verify_impl(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ecmult_ctx, - const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ecmult_gen_ctx, - unsigned char *blindout, uint64_t *value_out, unsigned char *message_out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *nonce, - uint64_t *min_value, uint64_t *max_value, const secp256k1_ge *commit, const unsigned char *proof, size_t plen, - const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len, const secp256k1_ge* genp); - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/rangeproof_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/rangeproof_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 8b78c95..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/rangeproof_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,685 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2015 Gregory Maxwell * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef _SECP256K1_RANGEPROOF_IMPL_H_ -#define _SECP256K1_RANGEPROOF_IMPL_H_ - -#include "eckey.h" -#include "scalar.h" -#include "group.h" -#include "rangeproof.h" -#include "hash_impl.h" -#include "util.h" - -#include "modules/commitment/pedersen_impl.h" -#include "modules/rangeproof/borromean.h" - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_rangeproof_pub_expand(secp256k1_gej *pubs, - int exp, size_t *rsizes, size_t rings, const secp256k1_ge* genp) { - secp256k1_gej base; - size_t i; - size_t j; - size_t npub; - VERIFY_CHECK(exp < 19); - if (exp < 0) { - exp = 0; - } - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&base, genp); - secp256k1_gej_neg(&base, &base); - while (exp--) { - /* Multiplication by 10 */ - secp256k1_gej tmp; - secp256k1_gej_double_var(&tmp, &base, NULL); - secp256k1_gej_double_var(&base, &tmp, NULL); - secp256k1_gej_double_var(&base, &base, NULL); - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&base, &base, &tmp, NULL); - } - npub = 0; - for (i = 0; i < rings; i++) { - for (j = 1; j < rsizes[i]; j++) { - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&pubs[npub + j], &pubs[npub + j - 1], &base, NULL); - } - if (i < rings - 1) { - secp256k1_gej_double_var(&base, &base, NULL); - secp256k1_gej_double_var(&base, &base, NULL); - } - npub += rsizes[i]; - } -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_rangeproof_serialize_point(unsigned char* data, const secp256k1_ge *point) { - secp256k1_fe pointx; - pointx = point->x; - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&pointx); - data[0] = !secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(&point->y); - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(data + 1, &pointx); -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_rangeproof_genrand(secp256k1_scalar *sec, secp256k1_scalar *s, unsigned char *message, - size_t *rsizes, size_t rings, const unsigned char *nonce, const secp256k1_ge *commit, const unsigned char *proof, size_t len, const secp256k1_ge* genp) { - unsigned char tmp[32]; - unsigned char rngseed[32 + 33 + 33 + 10]; - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 rng; - secp256k1_scalar acc; - int overflow; - int ret; - size_t i; - size_t j; - int b; - size_t npub; - VERIFY_CHECK(len <= 10); - memcpy(rngseed, nonce, 32); - secp256k1_rangeproof_serialize_point(rngseed + 32, commit); - secp256k1_rangeproof_serialize_point(rngseed + 32 + 33, genp); - memcpy(rngseed + 33 + 33 + 32, proof, len); - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, rngseed, 32 + 33 + 33 + len); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&acc); - npub = 0; - ret = 1; - for (i = 0; i < rings; i++) { - if (i < rings - 1) { - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, tmp, 32); - do { - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, tmp, 32); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec[i], tmp, &overflow); - } while (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec[i])); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&acc, &acc, &sec[i]); - } else { - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&acc, &acc); - sec[i] = acc; - } - for (j = 0; j < rsizes[i]; j++) { - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, tmp, 32); - if (message) { - for (b = 0; b < 32; b++) { - tmp[b] ^= message[(i * 4 + j) * 32 + b]; - message[(i * 4 + j) * 32 + b] = tmp[b]; - } - } - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s[npub], tmp, &overflow); - ret &= !(overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s[npub])); - npub++; - } - } - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(&rng); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&acc); - memset(tmp, 0, 32); - return ret; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_range_proveparams(uint64_t *v, size_t *rings, size_t *rsizes, size_t *npub, size_t *secidx, uint64_t *min_value, - int *mantissa, uint64_t *scale, int *exp, int *min_bits, uint64_t value) { - size_t i; - *rings = 1; - rsizes[0] = 1; - secidx[0] = 0; - *scale = 1; - *mantissa = 0; - *npub = 0; - if (*min_value == UINT64_MAX) { - /* If the minimum value is the maximal representable value, then we cannot code a range. */ - *exp = -1; - } - if (*exp >= 0) { - int max_bits; - uint64_t v2; - if ((*min_value && value > INT64_MAX) || (value && *min_value >= INT64_MAX)) { - /* If either value or min_value is >= 2^63-1 then the other must by zero to avoid overflowing the proven range. */ - return 0; - } - max_bits = *min_value ? secp256k1_clz64_var(*min_value) : 64; - if (*min_bits > max_bits) { - *min_bits = max_bits; - } - if (*min_bits > 61 || value > INT64_MAX) { - /** Ten is not a power of two, so dividing by ten and then representing in base-2 times ten - * expands the representable range. The verifier requires the proven range is within 0..2**64. - * For very large numbers (all over 2**63) we must change our exponent to compensate. - * Rather than handling it precisely, this just disables use of the exponent for big values. - */ - *exp = 0; - } - /* Mask off the least significant digits, as requested. */ - *v = value - *min_value; - /* If the user has asked for more bits of proof then there is room for in the exponent, reduce the exponent. */ - v2 = *min_bits ? (UINT64_MAX>>(64-*min_bits)) : 0; - for (i = 0; (int) i < *exp && (v2 <= UINT64_MAX / 10); i++) { - *v /= 10; - v2 *= 10; - } - *exp = i; - v2 = *v; - for (i = 0; (int) i < *exp; i++) { - v2 *= 10; - *scale *= 10; - } - /* If the masked number isn't precise, compute the public offset. */ - *min_value = value - v2; - /* How many bits do we need to represent our value? */ - *mantissa = *v ? 64 - secp256k1_clz64_var(*v) : 1; - if (*min_bits > *mantissa) { - /* If the user asked for more precision, give it to them. */ - *mantissa = *min_bits; - } - /* Digits in radix-4, except for the last digit if our mantissa length is odd. */ - *rings = (*mantissa + 1) >> 1; - for (i = 0; i < *rings; i++) { - rsizes[i] = ((i < *rings - 1) | (!(*mantissa&1))) ? 4 : 2; - *npub += rsizes[i]; - secidx[i] = (*v >> (i*2)) & 3; - } - VERIFY_CHECK(*mantissa>0); - VERIFY_CHECK((*v & ~(UINT64_MAX>>(64-*mantissa))) == 0); /* Did this get all the bits? */ - } else { - /* A proof for an exact value. */ - *exp = 0; - *min_value = value; - *v = 0; - *npub = 2; - } - VERIFY_CHECK(*v * *scale + *min_value == value); - VERIFY_CHECK(*rings > 0); - VERIFY_CHECK(*rings <= 32); - VERIFY_CHECK(*npub <= 128); - return 1; -} - -/* strawman interface, writes proof in proof, a buffer of plen, proves with respect to min_value the range for commit which has the provided blinding factor and value. */ -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_rangeproof_sign_impl(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ecmult_ctx, - const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ecmult_gen_ctx, - unsigned char *proof, size_t *plen, uint64_t min_value, - const secp256k1_ge *commit, const unsigned char *blind, const unsigned char *nonce, int exp, int min_bits, uint64_t value, - const unsigned char *message, size_t msg_len, const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len, const secp256k1_ge* genp){ - secp256k1_gej pubs[128]; /* Candidate digits for our proof, most inferred. */ - secp256k1_scalar s[128]; /* Signatures in our proof, most forged. */ - secp256k1_scalar sec[32]; /* Blinding factors for the correct digits. */ - secp256k1_scalar k[32]; /* Nonces for our non-forged signatures. */ - secp256k1_scalar stmp; - secp256k1_sha256 sha256_m; - unsigned char prep[4096]; - unsigned char tmp[33]; - unsigned char *signs; /* Location of sign flags in the proof. */ - uint64_t v; - uint64_t scale; /* scale = 10^exp. */ - int mantissa; /* Number of bits proven in the blinded value. */ - size_t rings; /* How many digits will our proof cover. */ - size_t rsizes[32]; /* How many possible values there are for each place. */ - size_t secidx[32]; /* Which digit is the correct one. */ - size_t len; /* Number of bytes used so far. */ - size_t i; - int overflow; - size_t npub; - len = 0; - if (*plen < 65 || min_value > value || min_bits > 64 || min_bits < 0 || exp < -1 || exp > 18) { - return 0; - } - if (!secp256k1_range_proveparams(&v, &rings, rsizes, &npub, secidx, &min_value, &mantissa, &scale, &exp, &min_bits, value)) { - return 0; - } - proof[len] = (rsizes[0] > 1 ? (64 | exp) : 0) | (min_value ? 32 : 0); - len++; - if (rsizes[0] > 1) { - VERIFY_CHECK(mantissa > 0 && mantissa <= 64); - proof[len] = mantissa - 1; - len++; - } - if (min_value) { - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - proof[len + i] = (min_value >> ((7-i) * 8)) & 255; - } - len += 8; - } - /* Do we have enough room in the proof for the message? Each ring gives us 128 bytes, but the - * final ring is used to encode the blinding factor and the value, so we can't use that. (Well, - * technically there are 64 bytes available if we avoided the other data, but this is difficult - * because it's not always in the same place. */ - if (msg_len > 0 && msg_len > 128 * (rings - 1)) { - return 0; - } - /* Do we have enough room for the proof? */ - if (*plen - len < 32 * (npub + rings - 1) + 32 + ((rings+6) >> 3)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256_m); - secp256k1_rangeproof_serialize_point(tmp, commit); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, tmp, 33); - secp256k1_rangeproof_serialize_point(tmp, genp); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, tmp, 33); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, proof, len); - - memset(prep, 0, 4096); - if (message != NULL) { - memcpy(prep, message, msg_len); - } - /* Note, the data corresponding to the blinding factors must be zero. */ - if (rsizes[rings - 1] > 1) { - size_t idx; - /* Value encoding sidechannel. */ - idx = rsizes[rings - 1] - 1; - idx -= secidx[rings - 1] == idx; - idx = ((rings - 1) * 4 + idx) * 32; - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - prep[8 + i + idx] = prep[16 + i + idx] = prep[24 + i + idx] = (v >> (56 - i * 8)) & 255; - prep[i + idx] = 0; - } - prep[idx] = 128; - } - if (!secp256k1_rangeproof_genrand(sec, s, prep, rsizes, rings, nonce, commit, proof, len, genp)) { - return 0; - } - memset(prep, 0, 4096); - for (i = 0; i < rings; i++) { - /* Sign will overwrite the non-forged signature, move that random value into the nonce. */ - k[i] = s[i * 4 + secidx[i]]; - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&s[i * 4 + secidx[i]]); - } - /** Genrand returns the last blinding factor as -sum(rest), - * adding in the blinding factor for our commitment, results in the blinding factor for - * the commitment to the last digit that the verifier can compute for itself by subtracting - * all the digits in the proof from the commitment. This lets the prover skip sending the - * blinded value for one digit. - */ - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&stmp, blind, &overflow); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&sec[rings - 1], &sec[rings - 1], &stmp); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec[rings - 1])) { - return 0; - } - signs = &proof[len]; - /* We need one sign bit for each blinded value we send. */ - for (i = 0; i < (rings + 6) >> 3; i++) { - signs[i] = 0; - len++; - } - npub = 0; - for (i = 0; i < rings; i++) { - /*OPT: Use the precomputed gen2 basis?*/ - secp256k1_pedersen_ecmult(&pubs[npub], &sec[i], ((uint64_t)secidx[i] * scale) << (i*2), genp, &secp256k1_ge_const_g); - if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&pubs[npub])) { - return 0; - } - if (i < rings - 1) { - unsigned char tmpc[33]; - secp256k1_ge c; - unsigned char quadness; - /*OPT: split loop and batch invert.*/ - /*OPT: do not compute full pubs[npub] in ge form; we only need x */ - secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&c, &pubs[npub]); - secp256k1_rangeproof_serialize_point(tmpc, &c); - quadness = tmpc[0]; - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, tmpc, 33); - signs[i>>3] |= quadness << (i&7); - memcpy(&proof[len], tmpc + 1, 32); - len += 32; - } - npub += rsizes[i]; - } - secp256k1_rangeproof_pub_expand(pubs, exp, rsizes, rings, genp); - if (extra_commit != NULL) { - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, extra_commit, extra_commit_len); - } - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256_m, tmp); - if (!secp256k1_borromean_sign(ecmult_ctx, ecmult_gen_ctx, &proof[len], s, pubs, k, sec, rsizes, secidx, rings, tmp, 32)) { - return 0; - } - len += 32; - for (i = 0; i < npub; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&proof[len],&s[i]); - len += 32; - } - VERIFY_CHECK(len <= *plen); - *plen = len; - memset(prep, 0, 4096); - return 1; -} - -/* Computes blinding factor x given k, s, and the challenge e. */ -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_rangeproof_recover_x(secp256k1_scalar *x, const secp256k1_scalar *k, const secp256k1_scalar *e, - const secp256k1_scalar *s) { - secp256k1_scalar stmp; - secp256k1_scalar_negate(x, s); - secp256k1_scalar_add(x, x, k); - secp256k1_scalar_inverse(&stmp, e); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(x, x, &stmp); -} - -/* Computes ring's nonce given the blinding factor x, the challenge e, and the signature s. */ -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_rangeproof_recover_k(secp256k1_scalar *k, const secp256k1_scalar *x, const secp256k1_scalar *e, - const secp256k1_scalar *s) { - secp256k1_scalar stmp; - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&stmp, x, e); - secp256k1_scalar_add(k, s, &stmp); -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_rangeproof_ch32xor(unsigned char *x, const unsigned char *y) { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { - x[i] ^= y[i]; - } -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind_inner(secp256k1_scalar *blind, uint64_t *v, - unsigned char *m, size_t *mlen, secp256k1_scalar *ev, secp256k1_scalar *s, - size_t *rsizes, size_t rings, const unsigned char *nonce, const secp256k1_ge *commit, const unsigned char *proof, size_t len, const secp256k1_ge *genp) { - secp256k1_scalar s_orig[128]; - secp256k1_scalar sec[32]; - secp256k1_scalar stmp; - unsigned char prep[4096]; - unsigned char tmp[32]; - uint64_t value; - size_t offset; - size_t i; - size_t j; - int b; - size_t skip1; - size_t skip2; - size_t npub; - npub = ((rings - 1) << 2) + rsizes[rings-1]; - VERIFY_CHECK(npub <= 128); - VERIFY_CHECK(npub >= 1); - memset(prep, 0, 4096); - /* Reconstruct the provers random values. */ - secp256k1_rangeproof_genrand(sec, s_orig, prep, rsizes, rings, nonce, commit, proof, len, genp); - *v = UINT64_MAX; - secp256k1_scalar_clear(blind); - if (rings == 1 && rsizes[0] == 1) { - /* With only a single proof, we can only recover the blinding factor. */ - secp256k1_rangeproof_recover_x(blind, &s_orig[0], &ev[0], &s[0]); - if (v) { - *v = 0; - } - if (mlen) { - *mlen = 0; - } - return 1; - } - npub = (rings - 1) << 2; - for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { - size_t idx; - /* Look for a value encoding in the last ring. */ - idx = npub + rsizes[rings - 1] - 1 - j; - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(tmp, &s[idx]); - secp256k1_rangeproof_ch32xor(tmp, &prep[idx * 32]); - if ((tmp[0] & 128) && (memcmp(&tmp[16], &tmp[24], 8) == 0) && (memcmp(&tmp[8], &tmp[16], 8) == 0)) { - value = 0; - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - value = (value << 8) + tmp[24 + i]; - } - if (v) { - *v = value; - } - memcpy(&prep[idx * 32], tmp, 32); - break; - } - } - if (j > 1) { - /* Couldn't extract a value. */ - if (mlen) { - *mlen = 0; - } - return 0; - } - skip1 = rsizes[rings - 1] - 1 - j; - skip2 = ((value >> ((rings - 1) << 1)) & 3); - if (skip1 == skip2) { - /*Value is in wrong position.*/ - if (mlen) { - *mlen = 0; - } - return 0; - } - skip1 += (rings - 1) << 2; - skip2 += (rings - 1) << 2; - /* Like in the rsize[] == 1 case, Having figured out which s is the one which was not forged, we can recover the blinding factor. */ - secp256k1_rangeproof_recover_x(&stmp, &s_orig[skip2], &ev[skip2], &s[skip2]); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&sec[rings - 1], &sec[rings - 1]); - secp256k1_scalar_add(blind, &stmp, &sec[rings - 1]); - if (!m || !mlen || *mlen == 0) { - if (mlen) { - *mlen = 0; - } - /* FIXME: cleanup in early out/failure cases. */ - return 1; - } - offset = 0; - npub = 0; - for (i = 0; i < rings; i++) { - size_t idx; - idx = (value >> (i << 1)) & 3; - for (j = 0; j < rsizes[i]; j++) { - if (npub == skip1 || npub == skip2) { - npub++; - continue; - } - if (idx == j) { - /** For the non-forged signatures the signature is calculated instead of random, instead we recover the prover's nonces. - * this could just as well recover the blinding factors and messages could be put there as is done for recovering the - * blinding factor in the last ring, but it takes an inversion to recover x so it's faster to put the message data in k. - */ - secp256k1_rangeproof_recover_k(&stmp, &sec[i], &ev[npub], &s[npub]); - } else { - stmp = s[npub]; - } - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(tmp, &stmp); - secp256k1_rangeproof_ch32xor(tmp, &prep[npub * 32]); - for (b = 0; b < 32 && offset < *mlen; b++) { - m[offset] = tmp[b]; - offset++; - } - npub++; - } - } - *mlen = offset; - memset(prep, 0, 4096); - for (i = 0; i < 128; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&s_orig[i]); - } - for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec[i]); - } - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&stmp); - return 1; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_rangeproof_getheader_impl(size_t *offset, int *exp, int *mantissa, uint64_t *scale, - uint64_t *min_value, uint64_t *max_value, const unsigned char *proof, size_t plen) { - int i; - int has_nz_range; - int has_min; - if (plen < 65 || ((proof[*offset] & 128) != 0)) { - return 0; - } - has_nz_range = proof[*offset] & 64; - has_min = proof[*offset] & 32; - *exp = -1; - *mantissa = 0; - if (has_nz_range) { - *exp = proof[*offset] & 31; - *offset += 1; - if (*exp > 18) { - return 0; - } - *mantissa = proof[*offset] + 1; - if (*mantissa > 64) { - return 0; - } - *max_value = UINT64_MAX>>(64-*mantissa); - } else { - *max_value = 0; - } - *offset += 1; - *scale = 1; - for (i = 0; i < *exp; i++) { - if (*max_value > UINT64_MAX / 10) { - return 0; - } - *max_value *= 10; - *scale *= 10; - } - *min_value = 0; - if (has_min) { - if(plen - *offset < 8) { - return 0; - } - /*FIXME: Compact minvalue encoding?*/ - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - *min_value = (*min_value << 8) | proof[*offset + i]; - } - *offset += 8; - } - if (*max_value > UINT64_MAX - *min_value) { - return 0; - } - *max_value += *min_value; - return 1; -} - -/* Verifies range proof (len plen) for commit, the min/max values proven are put in the min/max arguments; returns 0 on failure 1 on success.*/ -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_rangeproof_verify_impl(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ecmult_ctx, - const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ecmult_gen_ctx, - unsigned char *blindout, uint64_t *value_out, unsigned char *message_out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *nonce, - uint64_t *min_value, uint64_t *max_value, const secp256k1_ge *commit, const unsigned char *proof, size_t plen, const unsigned char *extra_commit, size_t extra_commit_len, const secp256k1_ge* genp) { - secp256k1_gej accj; - secp256k1_gej pubs[128]; - secp256k1_ge c; - secp256k1_scalar s[128]; - secp256k1_scalar evalues[128]; /* Challenges, only used during proof rewind. */ - secp256k1_sha256 sha256_m; - size_t rsizes[32]; - int ret; - size_t i; - int exp; - int mantissa; - size_t offset; - size_t rings; - int overflow; - size_t npub; - int offset_post_header; - uint64_t scale; - unsigned char signs[31]; - unsigned char m[33]; - const unsigned char *e0; - offset = 0; - if (!secp256k1_rangeproof_getheader_impl(&offset, &exp, &mantissa, &scale, min_value, max_value, proof, plen)) { - return 0; - } - offset_post_header = offset; - rings = 1; - rsizes[0] = 1; - npub = 1; - if (mantissa != 0) { - rings = (mantissa >> 1); - for (i = 0; i < rings; i++) { - rsizes[i] = 4; - } - npub = (mantissa >> 1) << 2; - if (mantissa & 1) { - rsizes[rings] = 2; - npub += rsizes[rings]; - rings++; - } - } - VERIFY_CHECK(rings <= 32); - if (plen - offset < 32 * (npub + rings - 1) + 32 + ((rings+6) >> 3)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256_m); - secp256k1_rangeproof_serialize_point(m, commit); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, m, 33); - secp256k1_rangeproof_serialize_point(m, genp); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, m, 33); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, proof, offset); - for(i = 0; i < rings - 1; i++) { - signs[i] = (proof[offset + ( i>> 3)] & (1 << (i & 7))) != 0; - } - offset += (rings + 6) >> 3; - if ((rings - 1) & 7) { - /* Number of coded blinded points is not a multiple of 8, force extra sign bits to 0 to reject mutation. */ - if ((proof[offset - 1] >> ((rings - 1) & 7)) != 0) { - return 0; - } - } - npub = 0; - secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&accj); - if (*min_value) { - secp256k1_scalar mvs; - secp256k1_scalar_set_u64(&mvs, *min_value); - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&accj, genp, &mvs, 64); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&mvs); - } - for(i = 0; i < rings - 1; i++) { - secp256k1_fe fe; - secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&fe, &proof[offset]); - secp256k1_ge_set_xquad(&c, &fe); - if (signs[i]) { - secp256k1_ge_neg(&c, &c); - } - /* Not using secp256k1_rangeproof_serialize_point as we almost have it - * serialized form already. */ - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, &signs[i], 1); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, &proof[offset], 32); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pubs[npub], &c); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&accj, &accj, &c, NULL); - offset += 32; - npub += rsizes[i]; - } - secp256k1_gej_neg(&accj, &accj); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&pubs[npub], &accj, commit, NULL); - if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&pubs[npub])) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_rangeproof_pub_expand(pubs, exp, rsizes, rings, genp); - npub += rsizes[rings - 1]; - e0 = &proof[offset]; - offset += 32; - for (i = 0; i < npub; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s[i], &proof[offset], &overflow); - if (overflow) { - return 0; - } - offset += 32; - } - if (offset != plen) { - /*Extra data found, reject.*/ - return 0; - } - if (extra_commit != NULL) { - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_m, extra_commit, extra_commit_len); - } - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256_m, m); - ret = secp256k1_borromean_verify(ecmult_ctx, nonce ? evalues : NULL, e0, s, pubs, rsizes, rings, m, 32); - if (ret && nonce) { - /* Given the nonce, try rewinding the witness to recover its initial state. */ - secp256k1_scalar blind; - uint64_t vv; - if (!ecmult_gen_ctx) { - return 0; - } - if (!secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind_inner(&blind, &vv, message_out, outlen, evalues, s, rsizes, rings, nonce, commit, proof, offset_post_header, genp)) { - return 0; - } - /* Unwind apparently successful, see if the commitment can be reconstructed. */ - /* FIXME: should check vv is in the mantissa's range. */ - vv = (vv * scale) + *min_value; - secp256k1_pedersen_ecmult(&accj, &blind, vv, genp, &secp256k1_ge_const_g); - if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&accj)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_gej_neg(&accj, &accj); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&accj, &accj, commit, NULL); - if (!secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&accj)) { - return 0; - } - if (blindout) { - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(blindout, &blind); - } - if (value_out) { - *value_out = vv; - } - } - return ret; -} - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/tests_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/tests_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 921498d..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/rangeproof/tests_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,439 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2015 Gregory Maxwell * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_RANGEPROOF_TESTS -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_RANGEPROOF_TESTS - -#include - -#include "group.h" -#include "scalar.h" -#include "testrand.h" -#include "util.h" - -#include "include/secp256k1_commitment.h" -#include "include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h" - -static void test_rangeproof_api(const secp256k1_context *none, const secp256k1_context *sign, const secp256k1_context *vrfy, const secp256k1_context *both, const int32_t *ecount) { - unsigned char proof[5134]; - unsigned char blind[32]; - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment commit; - uint64_t vmin = secp256k1_rand32(); - uint64_t val = vmin + secp256k1_rand32(); - size_t len = sizeof(proof); - /* we'll switch to dylan thomas for this one */ - const unsigned char message[68] = "My tears are like the quiet drift / Of petals from some magic rose;"; - size_t mlen = sizeof(message); - const unsigned char ext_commit[72] = "And all my grief flows from the rift / Of unremembered skies and snows."; - size_t ext_commit_len = sizeof(ext_commit); - - secp256k1_rand256(blind); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(ctx, &commit, blind, val, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g)); - - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(none, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(sign, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(vrfy, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 3); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 3); - - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, NULL, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 4); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, NULL, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 5); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, NULL, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 6); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, NULL, commit.data, 0, 0, val, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 7); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, NULL, 0, 0, val, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 8); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, vmin - 1, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 8); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, NULL, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 9); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, NULL, 0, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 9); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, NULL, 0, NULL, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 10); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 10); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 11); - - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(both, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, val, message, mlen, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); - { - int exp; - int mantissa; - uint64_t min_value; - uint64_t max_value; - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_info(none, &exp, &mantissa, &min_value, &max_value, proof, len) != 0); - CHECK(exp == 0); - CHECK(((uint64_t) 1 << mantissa) > val - vmin); - CHECK(((uint64_t) 1 << (mantissa - 1)) <= val - vmin); - CHECK(min_value == vmin); - CHECK(max_value >= val); - - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_info(none, NULL, &mantissa, &min_value, &max_value, proof, len) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 12); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_info(none, &exp, NULL, &min_value, &max_value, proof, len) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 13); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_info(none, &exp, &mantissa, NULL, &max_value, proof, len) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 14); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_info(none, &exp, &mantissa, &min_value, NULL, proof, len) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 15); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_info(none, &exp, &mantissa, &min_value, &max_value, NULL, len) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 16); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_info(none, &exp, &mantissa, &min_value, &max_value, proof, 0) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 16); - } - { - uint64_t min_value; - uint64_t max_value; - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(none, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 17); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(sign, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 18); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(vrfy, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 18); - - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(vrfy, NULL, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 19); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(vrfy, &min_value, NULL, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 20); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(vrfy, &min_value, &max_value, NULL, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 21); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(vrfy, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, NULL, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 22); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(vrfy, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, 0, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 22); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(vrfy, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, NULL, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 23); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(vrfy, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 23); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(vrfy, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 24); - } - { - unsigned char blind_out[32]; - unsigned char message_out[68]; - uint64_t value_out; - uint64_t min_value; - uint64_t max_value; - size_t message_len = sizeof(message_out); - - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(none, blind_out, &value_out, message_out, &message_len, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 25); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(sign, blind_out, &value_out, message_out, &message_len, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 26); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(vrfy, blind_out, &value_out, message_out, &message_len, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 27); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, message_out, &message_len, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 27); - - CHECK(min_value == vmin); - CHECK(max_value >= val); - CHECK(value_out == val); - CHECK(message_len == sizeof(message_out)); - CHECK(memcmp(message, message_out, sizeof(message_out)) == 0); - - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, NULL, &value_out, message_out, &message_len, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 27); /* blindout may be NULL */ - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, NULL, message_out, &message_len, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 27); /* valueout may be NULL */ - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, &message_len, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 28); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, 0, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) != 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 28); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, 0, NULL, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 29); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, 0, commit.data, NULL, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 30); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, 0, commit.data, &min_value, NULL, &commit, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 31); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, 0, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, NULL, proof, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 32); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, 0, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, NULL, len, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 33); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, 0, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, 0, ext_commit, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 33); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, 0, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, NULL, ext_commit_len, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 34); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, 0, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 34); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(both, blind_out, &value_out, NULL, 0, commit.data, &min_value, &max_value, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(*ecount == 35); - } -} - -static void test_api(void) { - secp256k1_context *none = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); - secp256k1_context *sign = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); - secp256k1_context *vrfy = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - secp256k1_context *both = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - int32_t ecount; - int i; - - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - - for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { - ecount = 0; - test_rangeproof_api(none, sign, vrfy, both, &ecount); - } - - secp256k1_context_destroy(none); - secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); - secp256k1_context_destroy(vrfy); - secp256k1_context_destroy(both); -} - -static void test_borromean(void) { - unsigned char e0[32]; - secp256k1_scalar s[64]; - secp256k1_gej pubs[64]; - secp256k1_scalar k[8]; - secp256k1_scalar sec[8]; - secp256k1_ge ge; - secp256k1_scalar one; - unsigned char m[32]; - size_t rsizes[8]; - size_t secidx[8]; - size_t nrings; - size_t i; - size_t j; - int c; - secp256k1_rand256_test(m); - nrings = 1 + (secp256k1_rand32()&7); - c = 0; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&one, 1); - if (secp256k1_rand32()&1) { - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&one, &one); - } - for (i = 0; i < nrings; i++) { - rsizes[i] = 1 + (secp256k1_rand32()&7); - secidx[i] = secp256k1_rand32() % rsizes[i]; - random_scalar_order(&sec[i]); - random_scalar_order(&k[i]); - if(secp256k1_rand32()&7) { - sec[i] = one; - } - if(secp256k1_rand32()&7) { - k[i] = one; - } - for (j = 0; j < rsizes[i]; j++) { - random_scalar_order(&s[c + j]); - if(secp256k1_rand32()&7) { - s[i] = one; - } - if (j == secidx[i]) { - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pubs[c + j], &sec[i]); - } else { - random_group_element_test(&ge); - random_group_element_jacobian_test(&pubs[c + j],&ge); - } - } - c += rsizes[i]; - } - CHECK(secp256k1_borromean_sign(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, e0, s, pubs, k, sec, rsizes, secidx, nrings, m, 32)); - CHECK(secp256k1_borromean_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, NULL, e0, s, pubs, rsizes, nrings, m, 32)); - i = secp256k1_rand32() % c; - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s[i],&s[i]); - CHECK(!secp256k1_borromean_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, NULL, e0, s, pubs, rsizes, nrings, m, 32)); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s[i],&s[i]); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&one, 1); - for(j = 0; j < 4; j++) { - i = secp256k1_rand32() % c; - if (secp256k1_rand32() & 1) { - secp256k1_gej_double_var(&pubs[i],&pubs[i], NULL); - } else { - secp256k1_scalar_add(&s[i],&s[i],&one); - } - CHECK(!secp256k1_borromean_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, NULL, e0, s, pubs, rsizes, nrings, m, 32)); - } -} - -static void test_rangeproof(void) { - const uint64_t testvs[11] = {0, 1, 5, 11, 65535, 65537, INT32_MAX, UINT32_MAX, INT64_MAX - 1, INT64_MAX, UINT64_MAX}; - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment commit; - secp256k1_pedersen_commitment commit2; - unsigned char proof[5134 + 1]; /* One additional byte to test if trailing bytes are rejected */ - unsigned char blind[32]; - unsigned char blindout[32]; - unsigned char message[4096]; - size_t mlen; - uint64_t v; - uint64_t vout; - uint64_t vmin; - uint64_t minv; - uint64_t maxv; - size_t len; - size_t i; - size_t j; - size_t k; - /* Short message is a Simone de Beauvoir quote */ - const unsigned char message_short[120] = "When I see my own likeness in the depths of someone else's consciousness, I always experience a moment of panic."; - /* Long message is 0xA5 with a bunch of this quote in the middle */ - unsigned char message_long[3968]; - memset(message_long, 0xa5, sizeof(message_long)); - for (i = 1200; i < 3600; i += 120) { - memcpy(&message_long[i], message_short, sizeof(message_short)); - } - - secp256k1_rand256(blind); - for (i = 0; i < 11; i++) { - v = testvs[i]; - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(ctx, &commit, blind, v, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g)); - for (vmin = 0; vmin < (i<9 && i > 0 ? 2 : 1); vmin++) { - const unsigned char *input_message = NULL; - size_t input_message_len = 0; - /* vmin is always either 0 or 1; if it is 1, then we have no room for a message. - * If it's 0, we use "minimum encoding" and only have room for a small message when - * `testvs[i]` is >= 4; for a large message when it's >= 2^32. */ - if (vmin == 0 && i > 2) { - input_message = message_short; - input_message_len = sizeof(message_short); - } - if (vmin == 0 && i > 7) { - input_message = message_long; - input_message_len = sizeof(message_long); - } - len = 5134; - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(ctx, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 0, v, input_message, input_message_len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - CHECK(len <= 5134); - mlen = 4096; - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(ctx, blindout, &vout, message, &mlen, commit.data, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - if (input_message != NULL) { - CHECK(memcmp(message, input_message, input_message_len) == 0); - } - for (j = input_message_len; j < mlen; j++) { - CHECK(message[j] == 0); - } - CHECK(mlen <= 4096); - CHECK(memcmp(blindout, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(vout == v); - CHECK(minv <= v); - CHECK(maxv >= v); - len = 5134; - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(ctx, proof, &len, v, &commit, blind, commit.data, -1, 64, v, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - CHECK(len <= 73); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(ctx, blindout, &vout, NULL, NULL, commit.data, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - CHECK(memcmp(blindout, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(vout == v); - CHECK(minv == v); - CHECK(maxv == v); - - /* Check with a committed message */ - len = 5134; - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(ctx, proof, &len, v, &commit, blind, commit.data, -1, 64, v, NULL, 0, message_short, sizeof(message_short), &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - CHECK(len <= 73); - CHECK(!secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(ctx, blindout, &vout, NULL, NULL, commit.data, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - CHECK(!secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(ctx, blindout, &vout, NULL, NULL, commit.data, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, message_long, sizeof(message_long), &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(ctx, blindout, &vout, NULL, NULL, commit.data, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, message_short, sizeof(message_short), &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - CHECK(memcmp(blindout, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(vout == v); - CHECK(minv == v); - CHECK(maxv == v); - } - } - secp256k1_rand256(blind); - v = INT64_MAX - 1; - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(ctx, &commit, blind, v, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g)); - for (i = 0; i < 19; i++) { - len = 5134; - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(ctx, proof, &len, 0, &commit, blind, commit.data, i, 0, v, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(ctx, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - CHECK(len <= 5134); - CHECK(minv <= v); - CHECK(maxv >= v); - /* Make sure it fails when validating with a committed message */ - CHECK(!secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(ctx, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, message_short, sizeof(message_short), &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - } - secp256k1_rand256(blind); - { - /*Malleability test.*/ - v = secp256k1_rands64(0, 255); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(ctx, &commit, blind, v, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g)); - len = 5134; - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(ctx, proof, &len, 0, &commit, blind, commit.data, 0, 3, v, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - CHECK(len <= 5134); - /* Test if trailing bytes are rejected. */ - proof[len] = v; - CHECK(!secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(ctx, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len + 1, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - for (i = 0; i < len*8; i++) { - proof[i >> 3] ^= 1 << (i & 7); - CHECK(!secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(ctx, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - proof[i >> 3] ^= 1 << (i & 7); - } - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(ctx, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - CHECK(minv <= v); - CHECK(maxv >= v); - } - memcpy(&commit2, &commit, sizeof(commit)); - for (i = 0; i < 10 * (size_t) count; i++) { - int exp; - int min_bits; - v = secp256k1_rands64(0, UINT64_MAX >> (secp256k1_rand32()&63)); - vmin = 0; - if ((v < INT64_MAX) && (secp256k1_rand32()&1)) { - vmin = secp256k1_rands64(0, v); - } - secp256k1_rand256(blind); - CHECK(secp256k1_pedersen_commit(ctx, &commit, blind, v, &secp256k1_generator_const_h, &secp256k1_generator_const_g)); - len = 5134; - exp = (int)secp256k1_rands64(0,18)-(int)secp256k1_rands64(0,18); - if (exp < 0) { - exp = -exp; - } - min_bits = (int)secp256k1_rands64(0,64)-(int)secp256k1_rands64(0,64); - if (min_bits < 0) { - min_bits = -min_bits; - } - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(ctx, proof, &len, vmin, &commit, blind, commit.data, exp, min_bits, v, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - CHECK(len <= 5134); - mlen = 4096; - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(ctx, blindout, &vout, message, &mlen, commit.data, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - for (j = 0; j < mlen; j++) { - CHECK(message[j] == 0); - } - CHECK(mlen <= 4096); - CHECK(memcmp(blindout, blind, 32) == 0); - CHECK(vout == v); - CHECK(minv <= v); - CHECK(maxv >= v); - CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(ctx, blindout, &vout, NULL, NULL, commit.data, &minv, &maxv, &commit, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - memcpy(&commit2, &commit, sizeof(commit)); - } - for (j = 0; j < 10; j++) { - for (i = 0; i < 96; i++) { - secp256k1_rand256(&proof[i * 32]); - } - for (k = 0; k < 128; k++) { - len = k; - CHECK(!secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(ctx, &minv, &maxv, &commit2, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - } - len = secp256k1_rands64(0, 3072); - CHECK(!secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(ctx, &minv, &maxv, &commit2, proof, len, NULL, 0, &secp256k1_generator_const_h)); - } -} - -void run_rangeproof_tests(void) { - int i; - test_api(); - for (i = 0; i < 10*count; i++) { - test_borromean(); - } - test_rangeproof(); -} - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/Makefile.am.include b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/Makefile.am.include deleted file mode 100644 index bf23c26..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/Makefile.am.include +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ -include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_recovery.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/recovery/tests_impl.h -if USE_BENCHMARK -noinst_PROGRAMS += bench_recover -bench_recover_SOURCES = src/bench_recover.c -bench_recover_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB) -endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h deleted file mode 100755 index 2f6691c..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,193 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013-2015 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_RECOVERY_MAIN_H -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_RECOVERY_MAIN_H - -#include "include/secp256k1_recovery.h" - -static void secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_load(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_scalar* r, secp256k1_scalar* s, int* recid, const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature* sig) { - (void)ctx; - if (sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) == 32) { - /* When the secp256k1_scalar type is exactly 32 byte, use its - * representation inside secp256k1_ecdsa_signature, as conversion is very fast. - * Note that secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save must use the same representation. */ - memcpy(r, &sig->data[0], 32); - memcpy(s, &sig->data[32], 32); - } else { - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(r, &sig->data[0], NULL); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(s, &sig->data[32], NULL); - } - *recid = sig->data[64]; -} - -static void secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_save(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature* sig, const secp256k1_scalar* r, const secp256k1_scalar* s, int recid) { - if (sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) == 32) { - memcpy(&sig->data[0], r, 32); - memcpy(&sig->data[32], s, 32); - } else { - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&sig->data[0], r); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&sig->data[32], s); - } - sig->data[64] = recid; -} - -int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature* sig, const unsigned char *input64, int recid) { - secp256k1_scalar r, s; - int ret = 1; - int overflow = 0; - - (void)ctx; - ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(input64 != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(recid >= 0 && recid <= 3); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&r, &input64[0], &overflow); - ret &= !overflow; - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s, &input64[32], &overflow); - ret &= !overflow; - if (ret) { - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_save(sig, &r, &s, recid); - } else { - memset(sig, 0, sizeof(*sig)); - } - return ret; -} - -int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output64, int *recid, const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature* sig) { - secp256k1_scalar r, s; - - (void)ctx; - ARG_CHECK(output64 != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(recid != NULL); - - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, recid, sig); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&output64[0], &r); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&output64[32], &s); - return 1; -} - -int secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig, const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature* sigin) { - secp256k1_scalar r, s; - int recid; - - (void)ctx; - ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(sigin != NULL); - - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, &recid, sigin); - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(sig, &r, &s); - return 1; -} - -static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_recover(const secp256k1_ecmult_context *ctx, const secp256k1_scalar *sigr, const secp256k1_scalar* sigs, secp256k1_ge *pubkey, const secp256k1_scalar *message, int recid) { - unsigned char brx[32]; - secp256k1_fe fx; - secp256k1_ge x; - secp256k1_gej xj; - secp256k1_scalar rn, u1, u2; - secp256k1_gej qj; - int r; - - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigr) || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigs)) { - return 0; - } - - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(brx, sigr); - r = secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&fx, brx); - (void)r; - VERIFY_CHECK(r); /* brx comes from a scalar, so is less than the order; certainly less than p */ - if (recid & 2) { - if (secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(&fx, &secp256k1_ecdsa_const_p_minus_order) >= 0) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_fe_add(&fx, &secp256k1_ecdsa_const_order_as_fe); - } - if (!secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&x, &fx, recid & 1)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&xj, &x); - secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&rn, sigr); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&u1, &rn, message); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&u1, &u1); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&u2, &rn, sigs); - secp256k1_ecmult(ctx, &qj, &xj, &u2, &u1); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(pubkey, &qj); - return !secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&qj); -} - -int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *signature, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *seckey, secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, const void* noncedata) { - secp256k1_scalar r, s; - secp256k1_scalar sec, non, msg; - int recid; - int ret = 0; - int overflow = 0; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); - ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(signature != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); - if (noncefp == NULL) { - noncefp = secp256k1_nonce_function_default; - } - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, &overflow); - /* Fail if the secret key is invalid. */ - if (!overflow && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec)) { - unsigned char nonce32[32]; - unsigned int count = 0; - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&msg, msg32, NULL); - while (1) { - ret = noncefp(nonce32, msg32, seckey, NULL, (void*)noncedata, count); - if (!ret) { - break; - } - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&non, nonce32, &overflow); - if (!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&non) && !overflow) { - if (secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &r, &s, &sec, &msg, &non, &recid)) { - break; - } - } - count++; - } - memset(nonce32, 0, 32); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&msg); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&non); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); - } - if (ret) { - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_save(signature, &r, &s, recid); - } else { - memset(signature, 0, sizeof(*signature)); - } - return ret; -} - -int secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, const secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature *signature, const unsigned char *msg32) { - secp256k1_ge q; - secp256k1_scalar r, s; - secp256k1_scalar m; - int recid; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); - ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(signature != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); - - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, &recid, signature); - VERIFY_CHECK(recid >= 0 && recid < 4); /* should have been caught in parse_compact */ - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&m, msg32, NULL); - if (secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_recover(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &r, &s, &q, &m, recid)) { - secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &q); - return 1; - } else { - memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey)); - return 0; - } -} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_MODULE_RECOVERY_MAIN_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/tests_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/tests_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 5c9bbe8..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/tests_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,393 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013-2015 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_RECOVERY_TESTS_H -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_RECOVERY_TESTS_H - -static int recovery_test_nonce_function(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *algo16, void *data, unsigned int counter) { - (void) msg32; - (void) key32; - (void) algo16; - (void) data; - - /* On the first run, return 0 to force a second run */ - if (counter == 0) { - memset(nonce32, 0, 32); - return 1; - } - /* On the second run, return an overflow to force a third run */ - if (counter == 1) { - memset(nonce32, 0xff, 32); - return 1; - } - /* On the next run, return a valid nonce, but flip a coin as to whether or not to fail signing. */ - memset(nonce32, 1, 32); - return secp256k1_rand_bits(1); -} - -void test_ecdsa_recovery_api(void) { - /* Setup contexts that just count errors */ - secp256k1_context *none = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); - secp256k1_context *sign = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); - secp256k1_context *vrfy = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - secp256k1_context *both = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - secp256k1_pubkey recpubkey; - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature normal_sig; - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature recsig; - unsigned char privkey[32] = { 1 }; - unsigned char message[32] = { 2 }; - int32_t ecount = 0; - int recid = 0; - unsigned char sig[74]; - unsigned char zero_privkey[32] = { 0 }; - unsigned char over_privkey[32] = { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff }; - - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - - /* Construct and verify corresponding public key. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, privkey) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, privkey) == 1); - - /* Check bad contexts and NULLs for signing */ - ecount = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(none, &recsig, message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(sign, &recsig, message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(vrfy, &recsig, message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(both, &recsig, message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(both, NULL, message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(both, &recsig, NULL, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 4); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(both, &recsig, message, NULL, NULL, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 5); - /* This will fail or succeed randomly, and in either case will not ARG_CHECK failure */ - secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(both, &recsig, message, privkey, recovery_test_nonce_function, NULL); - CHECK(ecount == 5); - /* These will all fail, but not in ARG_CHECK way */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(both, &recsig, message, zero_privkey, NULL, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(both, &recsig, message, over_privkey, NULL, NULL) == 0); - /* This one will succeed. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(both, &recsig, message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 5); - - /* Check signing with a goofy nonce function */ - - /* Check bad contexts and NULLs for recovery */ - ecount = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(none, &recpubkey, &recsig, message) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(sign, &recpubkey, &recsig, message) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(vrfy, &recpubkey, &recsig, message) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(both, &recpubkey, &recsig, message) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(both, NULL, &recsig, message) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(both, &recpubkey, NULL, message) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 4); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(both, &recpubkey, &recsig, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 5); - - /* Check NULLs for conversion */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(both, &normal_sig, message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); - ecount = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(both, NULL, &recsig) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(both, &normal_sig, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(both, &normal_sig, &recsig) == 1); - - /* Check NULLs for de/serialization */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(both, &recsig, message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); - ecount = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(both, NULL, &recid, &recsig) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(both, sig, NULL, &recsig) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(both, sig, &recid, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(both, sig, &recid, &recsig) == 1); - - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(both, NULL, sig, recid) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 4); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(both, &recsig, NULL, recid) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 5); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(both, &recsig, sig, -1) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 6); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(both, &recsig, sig, 5) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 7); - /* overflow in signature will fail but not affect ecount */ - memcpy(sig, over_privkey, 32); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(both, &recsig, sig, recid) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 7); - - /* cleanup */ - secp256k1_context_destroy(none); - secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); - secp256k1_context_destroy(vrfy); - secp256k1_context_destroy(both); -} - -void test_ecdsa_recovery_end_to_end(void) { - unsigned char extra[32] = {0x00}; - unsigned char privkey[32]; - unsigned char message[32]; - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature signature[5]; - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature rsignature[5]; - unsigned char sig[74]; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - secp256k1_pubkey recpubkey; - int recid = 0; - - /* Generate a random key and message. */ - { - secp256k1_scalar msg, key; - random_scalar_order_test(&msg); - random_scalar_order_test(&key); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(privkey, &key); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(message, &msg); - } - - /* Construct and verify corresponding public key. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, privkey) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, privkey) == 1); - - /* Serialize/parse compact and verify/recover. */ - extra[0] = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(ctx, &rsignature[0], message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &signature[0], message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(ctx, &rsignature[4], message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(ctx, &rsignature[1], message, privkey, NULL, extra) == 1); - extra[31] = 1; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(ctx, &rsignature[2], message, privkey, NULL, extra) == 1); - extra[31] = 0; - extra[0] = 1; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(ctx, &rsignature[3], message, privkey, NULL, extra) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, sig, &recid, &rsignature[4]) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(ctx, &signature[4], &rsignature[4]) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&signature[4], &signature[0], 64) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[4], message, &pubkey) == 1); - memset(&rsignature[4], 0, sizeof(rsignature[4])); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsignature[4], sig, recid) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(ctx, &signature[4], &rsignature[4]) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[4], message, &pubkey) == 1); - /* Parse compact (with recovery id) and recover. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsignature[4], sig, recid) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &recpubkey, &rsignature[4], message) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, &recpubkey, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); - /* Serialize/destroy/parse signature and verify again. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, sig, &recid, &rsignature[4]) == 1); - sig[secp256k1_rand_bits(6)] += 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsignature[4], sig, recid) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(ctx, &signature[4], &rsignature[4]) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[4], message, &pubkey) == 0); - /* Recover again */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &recpubkey, &rsignature[4], message) == 0 || - memcmp(&pubkey, &recpubkey, sizeof(pubkey)) != 0); -} - -/* Tests several edge cases. */ -void test_ecdsa_recovery_edge_cases(void) { - const unsigned char msg32[32] = { - 'T', 'h', 'i', 's', ' ', 'i', 's', ' ', - 'a', ' ', 'v', 'e', 'r', 'y', ' ', 's', - 'e', 'c', 'r', 'e', 't', ' ', 'm', 'e', - 's', 's', 'a', 'g', 'e', '.', '.', '.' - }; - const unsigned char sig64[64] = { - /* Generated by signing the above message with nonce 'This is the nonce we will use...' - * and secret key 0 (which is not valid), resulting in recid 0. */ - 0x67, 0xCB, 0x28, 0x5F, 0x9C, 0xD1, 0x94, 0xE8, - 0x40, 0xD6, 0x29, 0x39, 0x7A, 0xF5, 0x56, 0x96, - 0x62, 0xFD, 0xE4, 0x46, 0x49, 0x99, 0x59, 0x63, - 0x17, 0x9A, 0x7D, 0xD1, 0x7B, 0xD2, 0x35, 0x32, - 0x4B, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0xF3, 0x4C, 0xE1, 0xF6, 0x8E, - 0x69, 0x4F, 0xF6, 0xF1, 0x1A, 0xC7, 0x51, 0xDD, - 0x7D, 0xD7, 0x3E, 0x38, 0x7E, 0xE4, 0xFC, 0x86, - 0x6E, 0x1B, 0xE8, 0xEC, 0xC7, 0xDD, 0x95, 0x57 - }; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - /* signature (r,s) = (4,4), which can be recovered with all 4 recids. */ - const unsigned char sigb64[64] = { - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, - }; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkeyb; - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature rsig; - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; - int recid; - - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsig, sig64, 0)); - CHECK(!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &pubkey, &rsig, msg32)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsig, sig64, 1)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &pubkey, &rsig, msg32)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsig, sig64, 2)); - CHECK(!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &pubkey, &rsig, msg32)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsig, sig64, 3)); - CHECK(!secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &pubkey, &rsig, msg32)); - - for (recid = 0; recid < 4; recid++) { - int i; - int recid2; - /* (4,4) encoded in DER. */ - unsigned char sigbder[8] = {0x30, 0x06, 0x02, 0x01, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x04}; - unsigned char sigcder_zr[7] = {0x30, 0x05, 0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01}; - unsigned char sigcder_zs[7] = {0x30, 0x05, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x00}; - unsigned char sigbderalt1[39] = { - 0x30, 0x25, 0x02, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x04, - }; - unsigned char sigbderalt2[39] = { - 0x30, 0x25, 0x02, 0x01, 0x04, 0x02, 0x20, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, - }; - unsigned char sigbderalt3[40] = { - 0x30, 0x26, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x04, - }; - unsigned char sigbderalt4[40] = { - 0x30, 0x26, 0x02, 0x01, 0x04, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, - }; - /* (order + r,4) encoded in DER. */ - unsigned char sigbderlong[40] = { - 0x30, 0x26, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, - 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, - 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xBA, 0xAE, 0xDC, - 0xE6, 0xAF, 0x48, 0xA0, 0x3B, 0xBF, 0xD2, 0x5E, - 0x8C, 0xD0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x45, 0x02, 0x01, 0x04 - }; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsig, sigb64, recid) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &pubkeyb, &rsig, msg32) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbder, sizeof(sigbder)) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pubkeyb) == 1); - for (recid2 = 0; recid2 < 4; recid2++) { - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey2b; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsig, sigb64, recid2) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &pubkey2b, &rsig, msg32) == 1); - /* Verifying with (order + r,4) should always fail. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbderlong, sizeof(sigbderlong)) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pubkeyb) == 0); - } - /* DER parsing tests. */ - /* Zero length r/s. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigcder_zr, sizeof(sigcder_zr)) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigcder_zs, sizeof(sigcder_zs)) == 0); - /* Leading zeros. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbderalt1, sizeof(sigbderalt1)) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbderalt2, sizeof(sigbderalt2)) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbderalt3, sizeof(sigbderalt3)) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbderalt4, sizeof(sigbderalt4)) == 0); - sigbderalt3[4] = 1; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbderalt3, sizeof(sigbderalt3)) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pubkeyb) == 0); - sigbderalt4[7] = 1; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbderalt4, sizeof(sigbderalt4)) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pubkeyb) == 0); - /* Damage signature. */ - sigbder[7]++; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbder, sizeof(sigbder)) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pubkeyb) == 0); - sigbder[7]--; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbder, 6) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbder, sizeof(sigbder) - 1) == 0); - for(i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - int c; - unsigned char orig = sigbder[i]; - /*Try every single-byte change.*/ - for (c = 0; c < 256; c++) { - if (c == orig ) { - continue; - } - sigbder[i] = c; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigbder, sizeof(sigbder)) == 0 || secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pubkeyb) == 0); - } - sigbder[i] = orig; - } - } - - /* Test r/s equal to zero */ - { - /* (1,1) encoded in DER. */ - unsigned char sigcder[8] = {0x30, 0x06, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01}; - unsigned char sigc64[64] = { - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, - }; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkeyc; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsig, sigc64, 0) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &pubkeyc, &rsig, msg32) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigcder, sizeof(sigcder)) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pubkeyc) == 1); - sigcder[4] = 0; - sigc64[31] = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsig, sigc64, 0) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &pubkeyb, &rsig, msg32) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigcder, sizeof(sigcder)) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pubkeyc) == 0); - sigcder[4] = 1; - sigcder[7] = 0; - sigc64[31] = 1; - sigc64[63] = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &rsig, sigc64, 0) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(ctx, &pubkeyb, &rsig, msg32) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, sigcder, sizeof(sigcder)) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pubkeyc) == 0); - } -} - -void run_recovery_tests(void) { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { - test_ecdsa_recovery_api(); - } - for (i = 0; i < 64*count; i++) { - test_ecdsa_recovery_end_to_end(); - } - test_ecdsa_recovery_edge_cases(); -} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_MODULE_RECOVERY_TESTS_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/Makefile.am.include b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/Makefile.am.include deleted file mode 100644 index 51ece21..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/Makefile.am.include +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ -include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_surjectionproof.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/surjection/main_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/surjection/surjection.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/surjection/surjection_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/surjection/tests_impl.h - diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/main_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/main_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index c67d4c0..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/main_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,338 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2016 Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ -#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_SURJECTION_MAIN -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_SURJECTION_MAIN - -#include -#include - -#include "modules/rangeproof/borromean.h" -#include "modules/surjection/surjection_impl.h" -#include "hash.h" -#include "include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h" -#include "include/secp256k1_surjectionproof.h" - -static size_t secp256k1_count_bits_set(const unsigned char* data, size_t count) { - size_t ret = 0; - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { -#ifdef HAVE_BUILTIN_POPCOUNT - ret += __builtin_popcount(data[i]); -#else - ret += !!(data[i] & 0x1); - ret += !!(data[i] & 0x2); - ret += !!(data[i] & 0x4); - ret += !!(data[i] & 0x8); - ret += !!(data[i] & 0x10); - ret += !!(data[i] & 0x20); - ret += !!(data[i] & 0x40); - ret += !!(data[i] & 0x80); -#endif - } - return ret; -} - -int secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_surjectionproof *proof, const unsigned char *input, size_t inputlen) { - size_t n_inputs; - size_t signature_len; - - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(input != NULL); - (void) ctx; - - if (inputlen < 2) { - return 0; - } - n_inputs = ((size_t) (input[1] << 8)) + input[0]; - if (n_inputs > SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS) { - return 0; - } - if (inputlen < 2 + (n_inputs + 7) / 8) { - return 0; - } - - signature_len = 32 * (1 + secp256k1_count_bits_set(&input[2], (n_inputs + 7) / 8)); - if (inputlen != 2 + (n_inputs + 7) / 8 + signature_len) { - return 0; - } - proof->n_inputs = n_inputs; - memcpy(proof->used_inputs, &input[2], (n_inputs + 7) / 8); - memcpy(proof->data, &input[2 + (n_inputs + 7) / 8], signature_len); - - return 1; -} - -int secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *outputlen, const secp256k1_surjectionproof *proof) { - size_t signature_len; - size_t serialized_len; - - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(output != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(outputlen != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); - (void) ctx; - - signature_len = 32 * (1 + secp256k1_count_bits_set(proof->used_inputs, (proof->n_inputs + 7) / 8)); - serialized_len = 2 + (proof->n_inputs + 7) / 8 + signature_len; - if (*outputlen < serialized_len) { - return 0; - } - - output[0] = proof->n_inputs % 0x100; - output[1] = proof->n_inputs / 0x100; - memcpy(&output[2], proof->used_inputs, (proof->n_inputs + 7) / 8); - memcpy(&output[2 + (proof->n_inputs + 7) / 8], proof->data, signature_len); - *outputlen = serialized_len; - - return 1; -} - -size_t secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_total_inputs(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof) { - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); - (void) ctx; - return proof->n_inputs; -} - -size_t secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_used_inputs(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof) { - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); - (void) ctx; - return secp256k1_count_bits_set(proof->used_inputs, (proof->n_inputs + 7) / 8); -} - -size_t secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialized_size(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof) { - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); - return 2 + (proof->n_inputs + 7) / 8 + 32 * (1 + secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_used_inputs(ctx, proof)); -} - -typedef struct { - unsigned char state[32]; - size_t state_i; -} secp256k1_surjectionproof_csprng; - -static void secp256k1_surjectionproof_csprng_init(secp256k1_surjectionproof_csprng *csprng, const unsigned char* state) { - memcpy(csprng->state, state, 32); - csprng->state_i = 0; -} - -static size_t secp256k1_surjectionproof_csprng_next(secp256k1_surjectionproof_csprng *csprng, size_t rand_max) { - /* The number of random bytes to read for each random sample */ - const size_t increment = rand_max > 256 ? 2 : 1; - /* The maximum value expressable by the number of random bytes we read */ - const size_t selection_range = rand_max > 256 ? 0xffff : 0xff; - /* The largest multiple of rand_max that fits within selection_range */ - const size_t limit = ((selection_range + 1) / rand_max) * rand_max; - - while (1) { - size_t val; - if (csprng->state_i + increment >= 32) { - secp256k1_sha256 sha; - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, csprng->state, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, csprng->state); - csprng->state_i = 0; - } - val = csprng->state[csprng->state_i]; - if (increment > 1) { - val = (val << 8) + csprng->state[csprng->state_i + 1]; - } - csprng->state_i += increment; - /* Accept only values below our limit. Values equal to or above the limit are - * biased because they comprise only a subset of the range (0, rand_max - 1) */ - if (val < limit) { - return val % rand_max; - } - } -} - -int secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof, size_t *input_index, const secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag* fixed_input_tags, const size_t n_input_tags, const size_t n_input_tags_to_use, const secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag* fixed_output_tag, const size_t n_max_iterations, const unsigned char *random_seed32) { - secp256k1_surjectionproof_csprng csprng; - size_t n_iterations = 0; - - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(input_index != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(fixed_input_tags != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(fixed_output_tag != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(random_seed32 != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(n_input_tags <= SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS); - ARG_CHECK(n_input_tags_to_use <= n_input_tags); - (void) ctx; - - secp256k1_surjectionproof_csprng_init(&csprng, random_seed32); - memset(proof->data, 0, sizeof(proof->data)); - proof->n_inputs = n_input_tags; - - while (1) { - int has_output_tag = 0; - size_t i; - - /* obtain a random set of indices */ - memset(proof->used_inputs, 0, sizeof(proof->used_inputs)); - for (i = 0; i < n_input_tags_to_use; i++) { - while (1) { - size_t next_input_index; - next_input_index = secp256k1_surjectionproof_csprng_next(&csprng, n_input_tags); - if (memcmp(&fixed_input_tags[next_input_index], fixed_output_tag, sizeof(*fixed_output_tag)) == 0) { - *input_index = next_input_index; - has_output_tag = 1; - } - - if (!(proof->used_inputs[next_input_index / 8] & (1 << (next_input_index % 8)))) { - proof->used_inputs[next_input_index / 8] |= (1 << (next_input_index % 8)); - break; - } - } - } - - /* Check if we succeeded */ - n_iterations++; - if (has_output_tag) { -#ifdef VERIFY - proof->initialized = 1; -#endif - return n_iterations; - } - if (n_iterations >= n_max_iterations) { -#ifdef VERIFY - proof->initialized = 0; -#endif - return 0; - } - } -} - -int secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof, const secp256k1_generator* ephemeral_input_tags, size_t n_ephemeral_input_tags, const secp256k1_generator* ephemeral_output_tag, size_t input_index, const unsigned char *input_blinding_key, const unsigned char *output_blinding_key) { - secp256k1_scalar blinding_key; - secp256k1_scalar tmps; - secp256k1_scalar nonce; - int overflow = 0; - size_t rsizes[1]; /* array needed for borromean sig API */ - size_t indices[1]; /* array needed for borromean sig API */ - size_t i; - size_t n_total_pubkeys; - size_t n_used_pubkeys; - size_t ring_input_index = 0; - secp256k1_gej ring_pubkeys[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS]; - secp256k1_scalar borromean_s[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS]; - secp256k1_ge inputs[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS]; - secp256k1_ge output; - unsigned char msg32[32]; - - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); - ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(ephemeral_input_tags != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(ephemeral_output_tag != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(input_blinding_key != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(output_blinding_key != NULL); -#ifdef VERIFY - CHECK(proof->initialized == 1); -#endif - - /* Compute secret key */ - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&tmps, input_blinding_key, &overflow); - if (overflow) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&blinding_key, output_blinding_key, &overflow); - if (overflow) { - return 0; - } - /* The only time the input may equal the output is if neither one was blinded in the first place, - * i.e. both blinding keys are zero. Otherwise this is a privacy leak. */ - if (secp256k1_scalar_eq(&tmps, &blinding_key) && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&blinding_key)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&tmps, &tmps); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&blinding_key, &blinding_key, &tmps); - - /* Compute public keys */ - n_total_pubkeys = secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_total_inputs(ctx, proof); - n_used_pubkeys = secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_used_inputs(ctx, proof); - if (n_used_pubkeys > n_total_pubkeys || n_total_pubkeys != n_ephemeral_input_tags) { - return 0; - } - - secp256k1_generator_load(&output, ephemeral_output_tag); - for (i = 0; i < n_total_pubkeys; i++) { - secp256k1_generator_load(&inputs[i], &ephemeral_input_tags[i]); - } - - secp256k1_surjection_compute_public_keys(ring_pubkeys, n_used_pubkeys, inputs, n_total_pubkeys, proof->used_inputs, &output, input_index, &ring_input_index); - - /* Produce signature */ - rsizes[0] = (int) n_used_pubkeys; - indices[0] = (int) ring_input_index; - secp256k1_surjection_genmessage(msg32, inputs, n_total_pubkeys, &output); - if (secp256k1_surjection_genrand(borromean_s, n_used_pubkeys, &blinding_key) == 0) { - return 0; - } - /* Borromean sign will overwrite one of the s values we just generated, so use - * it as a nonce instead. This avoids extra random generation and also is an - * homage to the rangeproof code which does this very cleverly to encode messages. */ - nonce = borromean_s[ring_input_index]; - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&borromean_s[ring_input_index]); - if (secp256k1_borromean_sign(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &proof->data[0], borromean_s, ring_pubkeys, &nonce, &blinding_key, rsizes, indices, 1, msg32, 32) == 0) { - return 0; - } - for (i = 0; i < n_used_pubkeys; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&proof->data[32 + 32 * i], &borromean_s[i]); - } - return 1; -} - -int secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const secp256k1_surjectionproof* proof, const secp256k1_generator* ephemeral_input_tags, size_t n_ephemeral_input_tags, const secp256k1_generator* ephemeral_output_tag) { - size_t rsizes[1]; /* array needed for borromean sig API */ - size_t i; - size_t n_total_pubkeys; - size_t n_used_pubkeys; - secp256k1_gej ring_pubkeys[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS]; - secp256k1_scalar borromean_s[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS]; - secp256k1_ge inputs[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS]; - secp256k1_ge output; - unsigned char msg32[32]; - - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); - ARG_CHECK(proof != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(ephemeral_input_tags != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(ephemeral_output_tag != NULL); - - /* Compute public keys */ - n_total_pubkeys = secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_total_inputs(ctx, proof); - n_used_pubkeys = secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_used_inputs(ctx, proof); - if (n_used_pubkeys == 0 || n_used_pubkeys > n_total_pubkeys || n_total_pubkeys != n_ephemeral_input_tags) { - return 0; - } - - secp256k1_generator_load(&output, ephemeral_output_tag); - for (i = 0; i < n_total_pubkeys; i++) { - secp256k1_generator_load(&inputs[i], &ephemeral_input_tags[i]); - } - - if (secp256k1_surjection_compute_public_keys(ring_pubkeys, n_used_pubkeys, inputs, n_total_pubkeys, proof->used_inputs, &output, 0, NULL) == 0) { - return 0; - } - - /* Verify signature */ - rsizes[0] = (int) n_used_pubkeys; - for (i = 0; i < n_used_pubkeys; i++) { - int overflow = 0; - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&borromean_s[i], &proof->data[32 + 32 * i], &overflow); - if (overflow == 1) { - return 0; - } - } - secp256k1_surjection_genmessage(msg32, inputs, n_total_pubkeys, &output); - return secp256k1_borromean_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, NULL, &proof->data[0], borromean_s, ring_pubkeys, rsizes, 1, msg32, 32); -} - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection.h deleted file mode 100644 index 20ac493..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2016 Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef _SECP256K1_SURJECTION_H_ -#define _SECP256K1_SURJECTION_H_ - -#include "group.h" -#include "scalar.h" - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_surjection_genmessage(unsigned char *msg32, secp256k1_ge *ephemeral_input_tags, size_t n_input_tags, secp256k1_ge *ephemeral_output_tag); - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_surjection_genrand(secp256k1_scalar *s, size_t ns, const secp256k1_scalar *blinding_key); - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_surjection_compute_public_keys(secp256k1_gej *pubkeys, size_t n_pubkeys, const secp256k1_ge *input_tags, size_t n_input_tags, const unsigned char *used_tags, const secp256k1_ge *output_tag, size_t input_index, size_t *ring_input_index); - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection.md b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection.md deleted file mode 100644 index e7bd4db..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,108 +0,0 @@ -Surjection Proof Module -=========================== - -This module implements a scheme by which a given point can be proven to be -equal to one of a set of points, plus a known difference. This is used in -Confidential Assets when reblinding "asset commitments", which are NUMS -points, to prove that the underlying NUMS point does not change during -reblinding. - -Assets are represented, in general, by a 32-byte seed (a hash of some -transaction data) which is hashed to form a NUMS generator, which appears -on the blockchain only in blinded form. We refer to the seed as an -"asset ID" and the blinded generator as an "(ephemeral) asset commitment". -These asset commitments are unique per-output, and their NUMS components -are in general known only to the holder of the output. - -The result is that within a transaction, all outputs are able to have -a new uniformly-random asset commitment which cannot be associated with -any individual input asset id, but verifiers are nonetheless assured that -all assets coming out of a transaction are ones that went in. - -### Terminology - -Assets are identified by a 32-byte "asset ID". In this library these IDs -are used as input to a point-valued hash function `H`. We usually refer -to the hash output as `A`, since this output is the only thing that appears -in the algebra. - -Then transaction outputs have "asset commitments", which are curvepoints -of the form `A + rG`, where `A` is the hash of the asset ID and `r` is -some random "blinding factor". - -### Design Rationale - -Confidential Assets essentially works by replacing the second NUMS generator -`H` in Confidental Transactions with a per-asset unique NUMS generator. This -allows the same verification equation (the sum of all blinded inputs must -equal the sum of all blinded outputs) to imply that quantity of *every* asset -type is preserved in each transaction. - -It turns out that even if outputs are reblinded by the addition of `rG` for -some known `r`, this verification equation has the same meaning, with one -caveat: verifiers must be assured that the reblinding preserves the original -generators (and does not, for example, negate them). - -This assurance is what surjection proofs provide. - -### Limitations - -The naive scheme works as follows: every output asset is shown to have come -from some input asset. However, the proofs scale with the number of input -assets, so for all outputs the total size of all surjection proofs is `O(mn)` -for `m`, `n` the number of inputs and outputs. - -We therefore restrict the number of inputs that each output may have come -from to 3 (well, some fixed number, which is passed into the API), which -provides a weaker form of blinding, but gives `O(n)` scaling. Over many -transactions, the privacy afforded by this increases exponentially. - -### Our Scheme - -Our scheme works as follows. Proofs are generated in two steps, "initialization" -which selects a subset of inputs and "generation" which does the mathematical -part of proof generation. - -Every input has an asset commitment for which we know the blinding key and -underlying asset ID. - -#### Initialization - -The initialization function takes a list of input asset IDs and one output -asset ID. It chooses an input subset of some fixed size repeatedly until it -the output ID appears at least once in its subset. - -It stores a bitmap representing this subset in the proof object and returns -the number of iterations it needed to choose the subset. The reciprocal of -this represents the probability that a uniformly random input-output -mapping would correspond to the actual input-output mapping, and therefore -gives a measure of privacy. (Lower iteration counts are better.) - -It also informs the caller the index of the input whose ID matches the output. - -As the API works on only a single output at a time, the total probability -should be computed by multiplying together the counts for each output. - -#### Generation - -The generation function takes a list of input asset commitments, an output -asset commitment, the input index returned by the initialization step, and -blinding keys for (a) the output commitment, (b) the input commitment. Here -"the input commitment" refers specifically to the input whose index was -chosen during initialization. - -Next, it computes a ring signature over the differences between the output -commitment and every input commitment chosen during initialization. Since -the discrete log of one of these is the difference between the output and -input blinding keys, it is possible to create a ring signature over every -differences will be the blinding factor of the output. We create such a -signature, which completes the proof. - -#### Verification - -Verification takes a surjection proof object, a list of input commitments, -and an output commitment. The proof object contains a ring signature and -a bitmap describing which input commitments to use, and verification -succeeds iff the signature verifies. - - diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index f58026d..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/surjection_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,86 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2016 Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef _SECP256K1_SURJECTION_IMPL_H_ -#define _SECP256K1_SURJECTION_IMPL_H_ - -#include -#include - -#include "eckey.h" -#include "group.h" -#include "scalar.h" -#include "hash.h" - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_surjection_genmessage(unsigned char *msg32, secp256k1_ge *ephemeral_input_tags, size_t n_input_tags, secp256k1_ge *ephemeral_output_tag) { - /* compute message */ - size_t i; - unsigned char pk_ser[33]; - size_t pk_len = sizeof(pk_ser); - secp256k1_sha256 sha256_en; - - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256_en); - for (i = 0; i < n_input_tags; i++) { - secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&ephemeral_input_tags[i], pk_ser, &pk_len, 1); - assert(pk_len == sizeof(pk_ser)); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_en, pk_ser, pk_len); - } - secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(ephemeral_output_tag, pk_ser, &pk_len, 1); - assert(pk_len == sizeof(pk_ser)); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_en, pk_ser, pk_len); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256_en, msg32); -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_surjection_genrand(secp256k1_scalar *s, size_t ns, const secp256k1_scalar *blinding_key) { - size_t i; - unsigned char sec_input[36]; - secp256k1_sha256 sha256_en; - - /* compute s values */ - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&sec_input[4], blinding_key); - for (i = 0; i < ns; i++) { - int overflow = 0; - sec_input[0] = i; - sec_input[1] = i >> 8; - sec_input[2] = i >> 16; - sec_input[3] = i >> 24; - - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256_en); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_en, sec_input, 36); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256_en, sec_input); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s[i], sec_input, &overflow); - if (overflow == 1) { - memset(sec_input, 0, 32); - return 0; - } - } - memset(sec_input, 0, 32); - return 1; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_surjection_compute_public_keys(secp256k1_gej *pubkeys, size_t n_pubkeys, const secp256k1_ge *input_tags, size_t n_input_tags, const unsigned char *used_tags, const secp256k1_ge *output_tag, size_t input_index, size_t *ring_input_index) { - size_t i; - size_t j = 0; - for (i = 0; i < n_input_tags; i++) { - if (used_tags[i / 8] & (1 << (i % 8))) { - secp256k1_ge tmpge; - secp256k1_ge_neg(&tmpge, &input_tags[i]); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pubkeys[j], &tmpge); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&pubkeys[j], &pubkeys[j], output_tag, NULL); - if (ring_input_index != NULL && input_index == i) { - *ring_input_index = j; - } - j++; - if (j > n_pubkeys) { - return 0; - } - } - } - return 1; -} - - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/tests_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/tests_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index a0856e2..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/surjection/tests_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,494 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2016 Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_SURJECTIONPROOF_TESTS -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_SURJECTIONPROOF_TESTS - -#include "testrand.h" -#include "group.h" -#include "include/secp256k1_generator.h" -#include "include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h" -#include "include/secp256k1_surjectionproof.h" - -static void test_surjectionproof_api(void) { - unsigned char seed[32]; - secp256k1_context *none = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); - secp256k1_context *sign = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); - secp256k1_context *vrfy = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - secp256k1_context *both = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag fixed_input_tags[10]; - secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag fixed_output_tag; - secp256k1_generator ephemeral_input_tags[10]; - secp256k1_generator ephemeral_output_tag; - unsigned char input_blinding_key[10][32]; - unsigned char output_blinding_key[32]; - unsigned char serialized_proof[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_SERIALIZATION_BYTES_MAX]; - size_t serialized_len; - secp256k1_surjectionproof proof; - size_t n_inputs = sizeof(fixed_input_tags) / sizeof(fixed_input_tags[0]); - size_t input_index; - int32_t ecount = 0; - size_t i; - - secp256k1_rand256(seed); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(both, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - - for (i = 0; i < n_inputs; i++) { - secp256k1_rand256(input_blinding_key[i]); - secp256k1_rand256(fixed_input_tags[i].data); - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(ctx, &ephemeral_input_tags[i], fixed_input_tags[i].data, input_blinding_key[i])); - } - secp256k1_rand256(output_blinding_key); - memcpy(&fixed_output_tag, &fixed_input_tags[0], sizeof(fixed_input_tags[0])); - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(ctx, &ephemeral_output_tag, fixed_output_tag.data, output_blinding_key)); - - /* check initialize */ - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 0, &fixed_input_tags[0], 100, seed) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 3, &fixed_input_tags[0], 100, seed) != 0); - CHECK(ecount == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, NULL, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 3, &fixed_input_tags[0], 100, seed) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, NULL, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 3, &fixed_input_tags[0], 100, seed) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, &input_index, NULL, n_inputs, 3, &fixed_input_tags[0], 100, seed) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS + 1, 3, &fixed_input_tags[0], 100, seed) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 4); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_inputs, &fixed_input_tags[0], 100, seed) != 0); - CHECK(ecount == 4); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_inputs + 1, &fixed_input_tags[0], 100, seed) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 5); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 3, NULL, 100, seed) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 6); - CHECK((secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 0, &fixed_input_tags[0], 0, seed) & 1) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 6); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 0, &fixed_input_tags[0], 100, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 7); - - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(none, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 3, &fixed_input_tags[0], 100, seed) != 0); - /* check generate */ - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(none, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 8); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(vrfy, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 9); - - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(sign, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 10); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) != 0); - CHECK(ecount == 10); - - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, NULL, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 11); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, NULL, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 12); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs + 1, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 12); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs - 1, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 12); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, 0, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 12); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, NULL, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 13); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, 1, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) != 0); - CHECK(ecount == 13); /* the above line "succeeds" but generates an invalid proof as the input_index is wrong. it is fairly expensive to detect this. should we? */ - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, n_inputs + 1, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) != 0); - CHECK(ecount == 13); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, NULL, output_blinding_key) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 14); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 15); - - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(both, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag, 0, input_blinding_key[0], output_blinding_key) != 0); - /* check verify */ - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(none, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 16); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(sign, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 17); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(vrfy, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag) != 0); - CHECK(ecount == 17); - - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(vrfy, NULL, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 18); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(vrfy, &proof, NULL, n_inputs, &ephemeral_output_tag) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 19); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(vrfy, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs - 1, &ephemeral_output_tag) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 19); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(vrfy, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs + 1, &ephemeral_output_tag) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 19); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(vrfy, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 20); - - /* Check serialize */ - serialized_len = sizeof(serialized_proof); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize(none, serialized_proof, &serialized_len, &proof) != 0); - CHECK(ecount == 20); - serialized_len = sizeof(serialized_proof); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize(none, NULL, &serialized_len, &proof) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 21); - serialized_len = sizeof(serialized_proof); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize(none, serialized_proof, NULL, &proof) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 22); - serialized_len = sizeof(serialized_proof); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize(none, serialized_proof, &serialized_len, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 23); - - serialized_len = sizeof(serialized_proof); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize(none, serialized_proof, &serialized_len, &proof) != 0); - /* Check parse */ - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse(none, &proof, serialized_proof, serialized_len) != 0); - CHECK(ecount == 23); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse(none, NULL, serialized_proof, serialized_len) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 24); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse(none, &proof, NULL, serialized_len) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 25); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse(none, &proof, serialized_proof, 0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 25); - - secp256k1_context_destroy(none); - secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); - secp256k1_context_destroy(vrfy); - secp256k1_context_destroy(both); -} - -static void test_input_selection(size_t n_inputs) { - unsigned char seed[32]; - size_t i; - size_t result; - size_t input_index; - size_t try_count = n_inputs * 100; - secp256k1_surjectionproof proof; - secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag fixed_input_tags[1000]; - const size_t max_n_inputs = sizeof(fixed_input_tags) / sizeof(fixed_input_tags[0]) - 1; - - CHECK(n_inputs < max_n_inputs); - secp256k1_rand256(seed); - - for (i = 0; i < n_inputs + 1; i++) { - secp256k1_rand256(fixed_input_tags[i].data); - } - - /* cannot match output when told to use zero keys */ - result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(ctx, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 0, &fixed_input_tags[0], try_count, seed); - CHECK(result == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_used_inputs(ctx, &proof) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_total_inputs(ctx, &proof) == n_inputs); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialized_size(ctx, &proof) == 34 + (n_inputs + 7) / 8); - if (n_inputs > 0) { - /* succeed in 100*n_inputs tries (probability of failure e^-100) */ - result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(ctx, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 1, &fixed_input_tags[0], try_count, seed); - CHECK(result > 0); - CHECK(result < n_inputs * 10); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_used_inputs(ctx, &proof) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_total_inputs(ctx, &proof) == n_inputs); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialized_size(ctx, &proof) == 66 + (n_inputs + 7) / 8); - CHECK(input_index == 0); - } - - if (n_inputs >= 3) { - /* succeed in 10*n_inputs tries (probability of failure e^-10) */ - result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(ctx, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 3, &fixed_input_tags[1], try_count, seed); - CHECK(result > 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_used_inputs(ctx, &proof) == 3); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_total_inputs(ctx, &proof) == n_inputs); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialized_size(ctx, &proof) == 130 + (n_inputs + 7) / 8); - CHECK(input_index == 1); - - /* fail, key not found */ - result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(ctx, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, 3, &fixed_input_tags[n_inputs], try_count, seed); - CHECK(result == 0); - - /* succeed on first try when told to use all keys */ - result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(ctx, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_inputs, &fixed_input_tags[0], try_count, seed); - CHECK(result == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_used_inputs(ctx, &proof) == n_inputs); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_total_inputs(ctx, &proof) == n_inputs); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialized_size(ctx, &proof) == 2 + 32 * (n_inputs + 1) + (n_inputs + 7) / 8); - CHECK(input_index == 0); - - /* succeed in less than 64 tries when told to use half keys. (probability of failure 2^-64) */ - result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(ctx, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_inputs / 2, &fixed_input_tags[0], 64, seed); - CHECK(result > 0); - CHECK(result < 64); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_used_inputs(ctx, &proof) == n_inputs / 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_n_total_inputs(ctx, &proof) == n_inputs); - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialized_size(ctx, &proof) == 2 + 32 * (n_inputs / 2 + 1) + (n_inputs + 7) / 8); - CHECK(input_index == 0); - } -} - -/** Runs surjectionproof_initilize multiple times and records the number of times each input was used. - */ -static void test_input_selection_distribution_helper(const secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag* fixed_input_tags, const size_t n_input_tags, const size_t n_input_tags_to_use, size_t *used_inputs) { - secp256k1_surjectionproof proof; - size_t input_index; - size_t i; - size_t j; - unsigned char seed[32]; - size_t result; - for (i = 0; i < n_input_tags; i++) { - used_inputs[i] = 0; - } - for(j = 0; j < 10000; j++) { - secp256k1_rand256(seed); - result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(ctx, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_input_tags, n_input_tags_to_use, &fixed_input_tags[0], 64, seed); - CHECK(result > 0); - - for (i = 0; i < n_input_tags; i++) { - if (proof.used_inputs[i / 8] & (1 << (i % 8))) { - used_inputs[i] += 1; - } - } - } -} - -/** Probabilistic test of the distribution of used_inputs after surjectionproof_initialize. - * Each confidence interval assertion fails incorrectly with a probability of 2^-128. - */ -static void test_input_selection_distribution(void) { - size_t i; - size_t n_input_tags_to_use; - const size_t n_inputs = 4; - secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag fixed_input_tags[4]; - size_t used_inputs[4]; - - for (i = 0; i < n_inputs; i++) { - secp256k1_rand256(fixed_input_tags[i].data); - } - - /* If there is one input tag to use, initialize must choose the one equal to fixed_output_tag. */ - n_input_tags_to_use = 1; - test_input_selection_distribution_helper(fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_input_tags_to_use, used_inputs); - CHECK(used_inputs[0] == 10000); - CHECK(used_inputs[1] == 0); - CHECK(used_inputs[2] == 0); - CHECK(used_inputs[3] == 0); - - n_input_tags_to_use = 2; - /* The input equal to the fixed_output_tag must be included in all used_inputs sets. - * For each fixed_input_tag != fixed_output_tag the probability that it's included - * in the used_inputs set is P(used_input|not fixed_output_tag) = 1/3. - */ - test_input_selection_distribution_helper(fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_input_tags_to_use, used_inputs); - CHECK(used_inputs[0] == 10000); - CHECK(used_inputs[1] > 2725 && used_inputs[1] < 3961); - CHECK(used_inputs[2] > 2725 && used_inputs[2] < 3961); - CHECK(used_inputs[3] > 2725 && used_inputs[3] < 3961); - - n_input_tags_to_use = 3; - /* P(used_input|not fixed_output_tag) = 2/3 */ - test_input_selection_distribution_helper(fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_input_tags_to_use, used_inputs); - CHECK(used_inputs[0] == 10000); - CHECK(used_inputs[1] > 6039 && used_inputs[1] < 7275); - CHECK(used_inputs[2] > 6039 && used_inputs[2] < 7275); - CHECK(used_inputs[3] > 6039 && used_inputs[3] < 7275); - - - n_input_tags_to_use = 1; - /* Create second input tag that is equal to the output tag. Therefore, when using only - * one input we have P(used_input|fixed_output_tag) = 1/2 and P(used_input|not fixed_output_tag) = 0 - */ - memcpy(fixed_input_tags[0].data, fixed_input_tags[1].data, 32); - test_input_selection_distribution_helper(fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_input_tags_to_use, used_inputs); - CHECK(used_inputs[0] > 4345 && used_inputs[0] < 5655); - CHECK(used_inputs[1] > 4345 && used_inputs[1] < 5655); - CHECK(used_inputs[2] == 0); - CHECK(used_inputs[3] == 0); - - n_input_tags_to_use = 2; - /* When choosing 2 inputs in initialization there are 5 possible combinations of - * input indexes {(0, 1), (1, 2), (0, 3), (1, 3), (0, 2)}. Therefore we have - * P(used_input|fixed_output_tag) = 3/5 and P(used_input|not fixed_output_tag) = 2/5. - */ - test_input_selection_distribution_helper(fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_input_tags_to_use, used_inputs); - CHECK(used_inputs[0] > 5352 && used_inputs[0] < 6637); - CHECK(used_inputs[1] > 5352 && used_inputs[1] < 6637); - CHECK(used_inputs[2] > 3363 && used_inputs[2] < 4648); - CHECK(used_inputs[3] > 3363 && used_inputs[3] < 4648); - - n_input_tags_to_use = 3; - /* There are 4 combinations, each with all inputs except one. Therefore we have - * P(used_input|fixed_output_tag) = 3/4 and P(used_input|not fixed_output_tag) = 3/4. - */ - test_input_selection_distribution_helper(fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_input_tags_to_use, used_inputs); - CHECK(used_inputs[0] > 6918 && used_inputs[0] < 8053); - CHECK(used_inputs[1] > 6918 && used_inputs[1] < 8053); - CHECK(used_inputs[2] > 6918 && used_inputs[2] < 8053); - CHECK(used_inputs[3] > 6918 && used_inputs[3] < 8053); -} - -static void test_gen_verify(size_t n_inputs, size_t n_used) { - unsigned char seed[32]; - secp256k1_surjectionproof proof; - unsigned char serialized_proof[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_SERIALIZATION_BYTES_MAX]; - unsigned char serialized_proof_trailing[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_SERIALIZATION_BYTES_MAX + 1]; - size_t serialized_len = SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_SERIALIZATION_BYTES_MAX; - secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag fixed_input_tags[1000]; - secp256k1_generator ephemeral_input_tags[1000]; - unsigned char *input_blinding_key[1000]; - const size_t max_n_inputs = sizeof(fixed_input_tags) / sizeof(fixed_input_tags[0]) - 1; - size_t try_count = n_inputs * 100; - size_t key_index; - size_t input_index; - size_t i; - int result; - - /* setup */ - CHECK(n_used <= n_inputs); - CHECK(n_inputs < max_n_inputs); - secp256k1_rand256(seed); - - key_index = (((size_t) seed[0] << 8) + seed[1]) % n_inputs; - - for (i = 0; i < n_inputs + 1; i++) { - input_blinding_key[i] = malloc(32); - secp256k1_rand256(input_blinding_key[i]); - /* choose random fixed tag, except that for the output one copy from the key_index */ - if (i < n_inputs) { - secp256k1_rand256(fixed_input_tags[i].data); - } else { - memcpy(&fixed_input_tags[i], &fixed_input_tags[key_index], sizeof(fixed_input_tags[i])); - } - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(ctx, &ephemeral_input_tags[i], fixed_input_tags[i].data, input_blinding_key[i])); - } - - /* test */ - result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(ctx, &proof, &input_index, fixed_input_tags, n_inputs, n_used, &fixed_input_tags[key_index], try_count, seed); - if (n_used == 0) { - CHECK(result == 0); - return; - } - CHECK(result > 0); - CHECK(input_index == key_index); - - result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(ctx, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_input_tags[n_inputs], input_index, input_blinding_key[input_index], input_blinding_key[n_inputs]); - CHECK(result == 1); - - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize(ctx, serialized_proof, &serialized_len, &proof)); - CHECK(serialized_len == secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialized_size(ctx, &proof)); - CHECK(serialized_len == SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_SERIALIZATION_BYTES(n_inputs, n_used)); - - /* trailing garbage */ - memcpy(&serialized_proof_trailing, &serialized_proof, serialized_len); - serialized_proof_trailing[serialized_len] = seed[0]; - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse(ctx, &proof, serialized_proof, serialized_len + 1) == 0); - - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse(ctx, &proof, serialized_proof, serialized_len)); - result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(ctx, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_input_tags[n_inputs]); - CHECK(result == 1); - /* various fail cases */ - if (n_inputs > 1) { - result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(ctx, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_input_tags[n_inputs - 1]); - CHECK(result == 0); - - /* number of entries in ephemeral_input_tags array is less than proof.n_inputs */ - n_inputs -= 1; - result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(ctx, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_input_tags[n_inputs], input_index, input_blinding_key[input_index], input_blinding_key[n_inputs]); - CHECK(result == 0); - result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(ctx, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_inputs, &ephemeral_input_tags[n_inputs - 1]); - CHECK(result == 0); - n_inputs += 1; - } - - /* cleanup */ - for (i = 0; i < n_inputs + 1; i++) { - free(input_blinding_key[i]); - } -} - -/* check that a proof with empty n_used_inputs is invalid */ -static void test_no_used_inputs_verify(void) { - secp256k1_surjectionproof proof; - secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag fixed_input_tag; - secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag fixed_output_tag; - secp256k1_generator ephemeral_input_tags[1]; - size_t n_ephemeral_input_tags = 1; - secp256k1_generator ephemeral_output_tag; - unsigned char blinding_key[32]; - secp256k1_ge inputs[1]; - secp256k1_ge output; - secp256k1_sha256 sha256_e0; - int result; - - /* Create proof that doesn't use inputs. secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize - * will not work here since it insists on selecting an input that matches the output. */ - proof.n_inputs = 1; - memset(proof.used_inputs, 0, SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS / 8); - - /* create different fixed input and output tags */ - secp256k1_rand256(fixed_input_tag.data); - secp256k1_rand256(fixed_output_tag.data); - - /* blind fixed output tags with random blinding key */ - secp256k1_rand256(blinding_key); - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(ctx, &ephemeral_input_tags[0], fixed_input_tag.data, blinding_key)); - CHECK(secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(ctx, &ephemeral_output_tag, fixed_output_tag.data, blinding_key)); - - /* create "borromean signature" which is just a hash of metadata (pubkeys, etc) in this case */ - secp256k1_generator_load(&output, &ephemeral_output_tag); - secp256k1_generator_load(&inputs[0], &ephemeral_input_tags[0]); - secp256k1_surjection_genmessage(proof.data, inputs, 1, &output); - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256_e0); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha256_e0, proof.data, 32); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha256_e0, proof.data); - - result = secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(ctx, &proof, ephemeral_input_tags, n_ephemeral_input_tags, &ephemeral_output_tag); - CHECK(result == 0); -} - -void test_bad_serialize(void) { - secp256k1_surjectionproof proof; - unsigned char serialized_proof[SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_SERIALIZATION_BYTES_MAX]; - size_t serialized_len; - - proof.n_inputs = 0; - serialized_len = 2 + 31; - /* e0 is one byte too short */ - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize(ctx, serialized_proof, &serialized_len, &proof) == 0); -} - -void test_bad_parse(void) { - secp256k1_surjectionproof proof; - unsigned char serialized_proof0[] = { 0x00 }; - unsigned char serialized_proof1[] = { 0x01, 0x00 }; - unsigned char serialized_proof2[33] = { 0 }; - - /* Missing total input count */ - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse(ctx, &proof, serialized_proof0, sizeof(serialized_proof0)) == 0); - /* Missing bitmap */ - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse(ctx, &proof, serialized_proof1, sizeof(serialized_proof1)) == 0); - /* Missing e0 value */ - CHECK(secp256k1_surjectionproof_parse(ctx, &proof, serialized_proof2, sizeof(serialized_proof2)) == 0); -} - -void run_surjection_tests(void) { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { - test_surjectionproof_api(); - } - - test_input_selection(0); - test_input_selection(1); - test_input_selection(5); - test_input_selection(100); - test_input_selection(SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS); - - test_input_selection_distribution(); - test_gen_verify(10, 3); - test_gen_verify(SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS, SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS); - test_no_used_inputs_verify(); - test_bad_serialize(); - test_bad_parse(); -} - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/Makefile.am.include b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/Makefile.am.include deleted file mode 100644 index 0dc5a64..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/Makefile.am.include +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ -include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_whitelist.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/whitelist/whitelist_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/whitelist/main_impl.h -noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/whitelist/tests_impl.h -if USE_BENCHMARK -noinst_PROGRAMS += bench_whitelist -bench_whitelist_SOURCES = src/bench_whitelist.c -bench_whitelist_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) -bench_generator_LDFLAGS = -static -endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/main_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/main_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 0b2d6c9..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/main_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,174 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2016 Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_WHITELIST_MAIN -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_WHITELIST_MAIN - -#include "include/secp256k1_whitelist.h" -#include "modules/whitelist/whitelist_impl.h" - -#define MAX_KEYS SECP256K1_WHITELIST_MAX_N_KEYS /* shorter alias */ - -int secp256k1_whitelist_sign(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_whitelist_signature *sig, const secp256k1_pubkey *online_pubkeys, const secp256k1_pubkey *offline_pubkeys, const size_t n_keys, const secp256k1_pubkey *sub_pubkey, const unsigned char *online_seckey, const unsigned char *summed_seckey, const size_t index, secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, const void *noncedata) { - secp256k1_gej pubs[MAX_KEYS]; - secp256k1_scalar s[MAX_KEYS]; - secp256k1_scalar sec, non; - unsigned char msg32[32]; - int ret; - - if (noncefp == NULL) { - noncefp = secp256k1_nonce_function_default; - } - - /* Sanity checks */ - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); - ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(online_pubkeys != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(offline_pubkeys != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(n_keys <= MAX_KEYS); - ARG_CHECK(sub_pubkey != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(online_seckey != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(summed_seckey != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(index < n_keys); - - /* Compute pubkeys: online_pubkey + tweaked(offline_pubkey + address), and message */ - ret = secp256k1_whitelist_compute_keys_and_message(ctx, msg32, pubs, online_pubkeys, offline_pubkeys, n_keys, sub_pubkey); - - /* Compute signing key: online_seckey + tweaked(summed_seckey) */ - if (ret) { - ret = secp256k1_whitelist_compute_tweaked_privkey(ctx, &sec, online_seckey, summed_seckey); - } - /* Compute nonce and random s-values */ - if (ret) { - unsigned char seckey32[32]; - unsigned int count = 0; - int overflow = 0; - - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(seckey32, &sec); - while (1) { - size_t i; - unsigned char nonce32[32]; - int done; - ret = noncefp(nonce32, msg32, seckey32, NULL, (void*)noncedata, count); - if (!ret) { - break; - } - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&non, nonce32, &overflow); - memset(nonce32, 0, 32); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&non)) { - count++; - continue; - } - done = 1; - for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) { - msg32[0] ^= i + 1; - msg32[1] ^= (i + 1) / 0x100; - ret = noncefp(&sig->data[32 * (i + 1)], msg32, seckey32, NULL, (void*)noncedata, count); - if (!ret) { - break; - } - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s[i], &sig->data[32 * (i + 1)], &overflow); - msg32[0] ^= i + 1; - msg32[1] ^= (i + 1) / 0x100; - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s[i])) { - count++; - done = 0; - break; - } - } - if (done) { - break; - } - } - memset(seckey32, 0, 32); - } - /* Actually sign */ - if (ret) { - sig->n_keys = n_keys; - ret = secp256k1_borromean_sign(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &sig->data[0], s, pubs, &non, &sec, &n_keys, &index, 1, msg32, 32); - /* Signing will change s[index], so update in the sig structure */ - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&sig->data[32 * (index + 1)], &s[index]); - } - - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&non); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); - return ret; -} - -int secp256k1_whitelist_verify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const secp256k1_whitelist_signature *sig, const secp256k1_pubkey *online_pubkeys, const secp256k1_pubkey *offline_pubkeys, const size_t n_keys, const secp256k1_pubkey *sub_pubkey) { - secp256k1_scalar s[MAX_KEYS]; - secp256k1_gej pubs[MAX_KEYS]; - unsigned char msg32[32]; - size_t i; - - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); - ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(online_pubkeys != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(offline_pubkeys != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(sub_pubkey != NULL); - - if (sig->n_keys > MAX_KEYS || sig->n_keys != n_keys) { - return 0; - } - for (i = 0; i < sig->n_keys; i++) { - int overflow = 0; - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s[i], &sig->data[32 * (i + 1)], &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s[i])) { - return 0; - } - } - - /* Compute pubkeys: online_pubkey + tweaked(offline_pubkey + address), and message */ - if (!secp256k1_whitelist_compute_keys_and_message(ctx, msg32, pubs, online_pubkeys, offline_pubkeys, sig->n_keys, sub_pubkey)) { - return 0; - } - /* Do verification */ - return secp256k1_borromean_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, NULL, &sig->data[0], s, pubs, &sig->n_keys, 1, msg32, 32); -} - -size_t secp256k1_whitelist_signature_n_keys(const secp256k1_whitelist_signature *sig) { - return sig->n_keys; -} - -int secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_whitelist_signature *sig, const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len) { - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(input != NULL); - - if (input_len == 0) { - return 0; - } - - sig->n_keys = input[0]; - if (sig->n_keys >= MAX_KEYS || input_len != 1 + 32 * (sig->n_keys + 1)) { - return 0; - } - memcpy(&sig->data[0], &input[1], 32 * (sig->n_keys + 1)); - - return 1; -} - -int secp256k1_whitelist_signature_serialize(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *output_len, const secp256k1_whitelist_signature *sig) { - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(output != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(output_len != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); - - if (*output_len < 1 + 32 * (sig->n_keys + 1)) { - return 0; - } - - output[0] = sig->n_keys; - memcpy(&output[1], &sig->data[0], 32 * (sig->n_keys + 1)); - *output_len = 1 + 32 * (sig->n_keys + 1); - - return 1; -} - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/tests_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/tests_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 7cf1fb0..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/tests_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,151 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014-2016 Pieter Wuille, Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_WHITELIST_TESTS -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_WHITELIST_TESTS - -#include "include/secp256k1_whitelist.h" - -void test_whitelist_end_to_end(const size_t n_keys) { - unsigned char **online_seckey = (unsigned char **) malloc(n_keys * sizeof(*online_seckey)); - unsigned char **summed_seckey = (unsigned char **) malloc(n_keys * sizeof(*summed_seckey)); - secp256k1_pubkey *online_pubkeys = (secp256k1_pubkey *) malloc(n_keys * sizeof(*online_pubkeys)); - secp256k1_pubkey *offline_pubkeys = (secp256k1_pubkey *) malloc(n_keys * sizeof(*offline_pubkeys)); - - secp256k1_scalar ssub; - unsigned char csub[32]; - secp256k1_pubkey sub_pubkey; - - /* Generate random keys */ - size_t i; - /* Start with subkey */ - random_scalar_order_test(&ssub); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(csub, &ssub); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, csub) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &sub_pubkey, csub) == 1); - /* Then offline and online whitelist keys */ - for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar son, soff; - - online_seckey[i] = (unsigned char *) malloc(32); - summed_seckey[i] = (unsigned char *) malloc(32); - - /* Create two keys */ - random_scalar_order_test(&son); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(online_seckey[i], &son); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, online_seckey[i]) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &online_pubkeys[i], online_seckey[i]) == 1); - - random_scalar_order_test(&soff); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(summed_seckey[i], &soff); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, summed_seckey[i]) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &offline_pubkeys[i], summed_seckey[i]) == 1); - - /* Make summed_seckey correspond to the sum of offline_pubkey and sub_pubkey */ - secp256k1_scalar_add(&soff, &soff, &ssub); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(summed_seckey[i], &soff); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, summed_seckey[i]) == 1); - } - - /* Sign/verify with each one */ - for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) { - unsigned char serialized[32 + 4 + 32 * SECP256K1_WHITELIST_MAX_N_KEYS] = {0}; - size_t slen = sizeof(serialized); - secp256k1_whitelist_signature sig; - secp256k1_whitelist_signature sig1; - - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_sign(ctx, &sig, online_pubkeys, offline_pubkeys, n_keys, &sub_pubkey, online_seckey[i], summed_seckey[i], i, NULL, NULL)); - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_verify(ctx, &sig, online_pubkeys, offline_pubkeys, n_keys, &sub_pubkey) == 1); - /* Check that exchanging keys causes a failure */ - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_verify(ctx, &sig, offline_pubkeys, online_pubkeys, n_keys, &sub_pubkey) != 1); - /* Serialization round trip */ - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_serialize(ctx, serialized, &slen, &sig) == 1); - CHECK(slen == 33 + 32 * n_keys); - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse(ctx, &sig1, serialized, slen) == 1); - /* (Check various bad-length conditions) */ - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse(ctx, &sig1, serialized, slen + 32) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse(ctx, &sig1, serialized, slen + 1) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse(ctx, &sig1, serialized, slen - 1) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse(ctx, &sig1, serialized, 0) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_verify(ctx, &sig1, online_pubkeys, offline_pubkeys, n_keys, &sub_pubkey) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_verify(ctx, &sig1, offline_pubkeys, online_pubkeys, n_keys, &sub_pubkey) != 1); - - /* Test n_keys */ - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_n_keys(&sig) == n_keys); - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_n_keys(&sig1) == n_keys); - - /* Test bad number of keys in signature */ - sig.n_keys = n_keys + 1; - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_verify(ctx, &sig, offline_pubkeys, online_pubkeys, n_keys, &sub_pubkey) != 1); - sig.n_keys = n_keys; - } - - for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) { - free(online_seckey[i]); - free(summed_seckey[i]); - } - free(online_seckey); - free(summed_seckey); - free(online_pubkeys); - free(offline_pubkeys); -} - -void test_whitelist_bad_parse(void) { - secp256k1_whitelist_signature sig; - - const unsigned char serialized0[] = { 1+32*(0+1) }; - const unsigned char serialized1[] = { - 0x00, - 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, - 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, - 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, - 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06 - }; - const unsigned char serialized2[] = { - 0x01, - 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, - 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, - 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, - 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 - }; - - /* Empty input */ - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse(ctx, &sig, serialized0, 0) == 0); - /* Misses one byte of e0 */ - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse(ctx, &sig, serialized1, sizeof(serialized1)) == 0); - /* Enough bytes for e0, but there is no s value */ - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse(ctx, &sig, serialized2, sizeof(serialized2)) == 0); -} - -void test_whitelist_bad_serialize(void) { - unsigned char serialized[] = { - 0x00, - 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, - 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, - 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, - 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 - }; - size_t serialized_len; - secp256k1_whitelist_signature sig; - - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_parse(ctx, &sig, serialized, sizeof(serialized)) == 1); - serialized_len = sizeof(serialized) - 1; - /* Output buffer is one byte too short */ - CHECK(secp256k1_whitelist_signature_serialize(ctx, serialized, &serialized_len, &sig) == 0); -} - -void run_whitelist_tests(void) { - int i; - test_whitelist_bad_parse(); - test_whitelist_bad_serialize(); - for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { - test_whitelist_end_to_end(1); - test_whitelist_end_to_end(10); - test_whitelist_end_to_end(50); - } -} - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/whitelist.md b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/whitelist.md deleted file mode 100644 index 15ab998..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/whitelist.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,96 +0,0 @@ -Address Whitelisting Module -=========================== - -This module implements a scheme by which members of some group, having fixed -signing keys, can prove control of an arbitrary other key without associating -their own identity (only that they belong to the group) to the new key. The -application is to patch ring-signature-like behaviour onto systems such as -Bitcoin or PGP which do not directly support this. - -We refer to such delegation as "whitelisting" because we expect it to be used -to build a dynamic whitelist of authorized keys. - -For example, imagine a private sidechain with a fixed membership set but -stronger privacy properties than Bitcoin. When moving coins from this system -to Bitcoin, it is desirable that the destination Bitcoin addresses be provably -in control of some user of the sidechain. This prevents malicious or erroneous -behaviour on the sidechain, which can likely be resolved by its participants, -from translating to theft on the wider Bitcoin network, which is irreversible. - -### Unused Schemes and Design Rationale - -#### Direct Signing - -An obvious scheme for such delegation is to simply have participants sign the -key they want to whitelist. To avoid revealing their specific identity, they -could use a ring signature. The problem with this is that it really only proves -that a participant *signed off* on a key, not that they control it. Thus any -security failure that allows text substitution could be used to subvert this -and redirect coins to an attacker-controlled address. - -#### Signing with Difference-of-Keys - -A less obvious scheme is to have a participant sign an arbitrary message with -the sum of her key `P` and the whitelisted key `W`. Such a signature with the key -`P + W` proves knowledge of either (a) discrete logarithms of both `P` and `W`; -or (b) neither. This makes directly attacking participants' signing schemes much -harder, but allows an attacker to whitelist arbitrary "garbage" keys by computing -`W` as the difference between an attacker-controlled key and `P`. For Bitcoin, -the effect of garbage keys is to "burn" stolen coins, destroying them. - -In an important sense, this "burning coins" attack is a good thing: it enables -*offline delegation*. That is, the key `P` does not need to be available at the -time of delegation. Instead, participants could choose `S = P + W`, sign with -this to delegate, and only later compute the discrete logarithm of `W = P - S`. -This allows `P` to be in cold storage or be otherwise inaccessible, improving -the overall system security. - -#### Signing with Tweaked-Difference-of-Keys - -A modification of this scheme, which prevents this "garbage key" attack, is to -instead have participants sign some message with the key `P + H(W)W`, for `H` -some random-oracle hash that maps group elements to scalars. This key, and its -discrete logarithm, cannot be known until after `W` is chosen, so `W` cannot -be selected as the difference between it and `P`. (Note that `P` could still -be some chosen difference; however `P` is a fixed key and must be verified -out-of-band to have come from a legitimate participant anyway.) - -This scheme is almost what we want, but it no longer supports offline -delegation. However, we can get this back by introducing a new key, `P'`, -and signing with the key `P + H(W + P')(W + P')`. This gives us the best -of both worlds: `P'` does not need to be online to delegate, allowing it -to be securely stored and preventing real-time attacks; `P` does need to -be online, but its compromise only allows an attacker to whitelist "garbage -keys", not attacker-controlled ones. - -### Our Scheme - -Our scheme works as follows: each participant `i` chooses two keys, `P_i` and `Q_i`. -We refer to `P_i` as the "online key" and `Q_i` as the "offline key". To whitelist -a key `W`, the participant computes the key `L_j = P_j + H(W + Q_j)(W + Q_j)` for -every participant `j`. Then she will know the discrete logarithm of `L_i` for her -own `i`. - -Next, she signs a message containing every `P_i` and `Q_i` as well as `W` with -a ring signature over all the keys `L_j`. This proves that she knows the discrete -logarithm of some `L_i` (though it is zero-knowledge which one), and therefore -knows: -1. The discrete logarithms of all of `W`, `P_i` and `Q_i`; or -2. The discrete logarithm of `P_i` but of *neither* `W` nor `Q_i`. -In other words, compromise of the online key `P_i` allows an attacker to whitelist -"garbage keys" for which nobody knows the discrete logarithm; to whitelist an -attacker-controlled key, he must compromise both `P_i` and `Q_i`. This is difficult -because by design, only the sum `S = W + Q_i` is used when signing; then by choosing -`S` freely, a participant can delegate without the secret key to `Q_i` ever being online. -(Later, when she wants to actually use `W`, she will need to compute its key as the -difference between `S` and `Q_i`; but this can be done offline and much later -and with more expensive security requirements.) - -The message to be signed contains all public keys to prevent a class of attacks -centered around choosing keys to match pre-computed signatures. In our proposed -use case, whitelisted keys already must be computed before they are signed, and -the remaining public keys are verified out-of-band when setting up the system, -so there is no direct benefit to this. We do it only to reduce fragility and -increase safety of unforeseen uses. - - diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/whitelist_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/whitelist_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index ff8d87f..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/modules/whitelist/whitelist_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,129 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2016 Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef _SECP256K1_WHITELIST_IMPL_H_ -#define _SECP256K1_WHITELIST_IMPL_H_ - -static int secp256k1_whitelist_hash_pubkey(secp256k1_scalar* output, secp256k1_gej* pubkey) { - unsigned char h[32]; - unsigned char c[33]; - secp256k1_sha256 sha; - int overflow = 0; - size_t size = 33; - secp256k1_ge ge; - - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&ge, pubkey); - - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha); - if (!secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&ge, c, &size, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, c, size); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, h); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(output, h, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(output)) { - /* This return path is mathematically impossible to hit */ - secp256k1_scalar_clear(output); - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -static int secp256k1_whitelist_tweak_pubkey(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_gej* pub_tweaked) { - secp256k1_scalar tweak; - secp256k1_scalar zero; - int ret; - - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&zero, 0); - - ret = secp256k1_whitelist_hash_pubkey(&tweak, pub_tweaked); - if (ret) { - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, pub_tweaked, pub_tweaked, &tweak, &zero); - } - return ret; -} - -static int secp256k1_whitelist_compute_tweaked_privkey(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_scalar* skey, const unsigned char *online_key, const unsigned char *summed_key) { - secp256k1_scalar tweak; - int ret = 1; - int overflow = 0; - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(skey, summed_key, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(skey)) { - ret = 0; - } - if (ret) { - secp256k1_gej pkeyj; - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pkeyj, skey); - ret = secp256k1_whitelist_hash_pubkey(&tweak, &pkeyj); - } - if (ret) { - secp256k1_scalar sonline; - secp256k1_scalar_mul(skey, skey, &tweak); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sonline, online_key, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sonline)) { - ret = 0; - } - secp256k1_scalar_add(skey, skey, &sonline); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sonline); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&tweak); - } - - if (!ret) { - secp256k1_scalar_clear(skey); - } - return ret; -} - -/* Takes a list of pubkeys and combines them to form the public keys needed - * for the ring signature; also produce a commitment to every one that will - * be our "message". */ -static int secp256k1_whitelist_compute_keys_and_message(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *msg32, secp256k1_gej *keys, const secp256k1_pubkey *online_pubkeys, const secp256k1_pubkey *offline_pubkeys, const int n_keys, const secp256k1_pubkey *sub_pubkey) { - unsigned char c[33]; - size_t size = 33; - secp256k1_sha256 sha; - int i; - secp256k1_ge subkey_ge; - - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha); - secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &subkey_ge, sub_pubkey); - - /* commit to sub-key */ - if (!secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&subkey_ge, c, &size, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, c, size); - for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) { - secp256k1_ge offline_ge; - secp256k1_ge online_ge; - secp256k1_gej tweaked_gej; - - /* commit to fixed keys */ - secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &offline_ge, &offline_pubkeys[i]); - if (!secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&offline_ge, c, &size, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, c, size); - secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &online_ge, &online_pubkeys[i]); - if (!secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&online_ge, c, &size, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, c, size); - - /* compute tweaked keys */ - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&tweaked_gej, &offline_ge); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&tweaked_gej, &tweaked_gej, &subkey_ge, NULL); - secp256k1_whitelist_tweak_pubkey(ctx, &tweaked_gej); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&keys[i], &tweaked_gej, &online_ge, NULL); - } - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, msg32); - return 1; -} - - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num.h deleted file mode 100644 index 49f2dd7..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,74 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_NUM_H -#define SECP256K1_NUM_H - -#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE - -#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H -#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" -#endif - -#if defined(USE_NUM_GMP) -#include "num_gmp.h" -#else -#error "Please select num implementation" -#endif - -/** Copy a number. */ -static void secp256k1_num_copy(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a); - -/** Convert a number's absolute value to a binary big-endian string. - * There must be enough place. */ -static void secp256k1_num_get_bin(unsigned char *r, unsigned int rlen, const secp256k1_num *a); - -/** Set a number to the value of a binary big-endian string. */ -static void secp256k1_num_set_bin(secp256k1_num *r, const unsigned char *a, unsigned int alen); - -/** Compute a modular inverse. The input must be less than the modulus. */ -static void secp256k1_num_mod_inverse(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *m); - -/** Compute the jacobi symbol (a|b). b must be positive and odd. */ -static int secp256k1_num_jacobi(const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b); - -/** Compare the absolute value of two numbers. */ -static int secp256k1_num_cmp(const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b); - -/** Test whether two number are equal (including sign). */ -static int secp256k1_num_eq(const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b); - -/** Add two (signed) numbers. */ -static void secp256k1_num_add(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b); - -/** Subtract two (signed) numbers. */ -static void secp256k1_num_sub(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b); - -/** Multiply two (signed) numbers. */ -static void secp256k1_num_mul(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b); - -/** Replace a number by its remainder modulo m. M's sign is ignored. The result is a number between 0 and m-1, - even if r was negative. */ -static void secp256k1_num_mod(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *m); - -/** Right-shift the passed number by bits bits. */ -static void secp256k1_num_shift(secp256k1_num *r, int bits); - -/** Check whether a number is zero. */ -static int secp256k1_num_is_zero(const secp256k1_num *a); - -/** Check whether a number is one. */ -static int secp256k1_num_is_one(const secp256k1_num *a); - -/** Check whether a number is strictly negative. */ -static int secp256k1_num_is_neg(const secp256k1_num *a); - -/** Change a number's sign. */ -static void secp256k1_num_negate(secp256k1_num *r); - -#endif - -#endif /* SECP256K1_NUM_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_gmp.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_gmp.h deleted file mode 100644 index 3619844..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_gmp.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_NUM_REPR_H -#define SECP256K1_NUM_REPR_H - -#include - -#define NUM_LIMBS ((256+GMP_NUMB_BITS-1)/GMP_NUMB_BITS) - -typedef struct { - mp_limb_t data[2*NUM_LIMBS]; - int neg; - int limbs; -} secp256k1_num; - -#endif /* SECP256K1_NUM_REPR_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_gmp_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_gmp_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 0ae2a8b..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_gmp_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,288 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_NUM_REPR_IMPL_H -#define SECP256K1_NUM_REPR_IMPL_H - -#include -#include -#include - -#include "util.h" -#include "num.h" - -#ifdef VERIFY -static void secp256k1_num_sanity(const secp256k1_num *a) { - VERIFY_CHECK(a->limbs == 1 || (a->limbs > 1 && a->data[a->limbs-1] != 0)); -} -#else -#define secp256k1_num_sanity(a) do { } while(0) -#endif - -static void secp256k1_num_copy(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a) { - *r = *a; -} - -static void secp256k1_num_get_bin(unsigned char *r, unsigned int rlen, const secp256k1_num *a) { - unsigned char tmp[65]; - int len = 0; - int shift = 0; - if (a->limbs>1 || a->data[0] != 0) { - len = mpn_get_str(tmp, 256, (mp_limb_t*)a->data, a->limbs); - } - while (shift < len && tmp[shift] == 0) shift++; - VERIFY_CHECK(len-shift <= (int)rlen); - memset(r, 0, rlen - len + shift); - if (len > shift) { - memcpy(r + rlen - len + shift, tmp + shift, len - shift); - } - memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); -} - -static void secp256k1_num_set_bin(secp256k1_num *r, const unsigned char *a, unsigned int alen) { - int len; - VERIFY_CHECK(alen > 0); - VERIFY_CHECK(alen <= 64); - len = mpn_set_str(r->data, a, alen, 256); - if (len == 0) { - r->data[0] = 0; - len = 1; - } - VERIFY_CHECK(len <= NUM_LIMBS*2); - r->limbs = len; - r->neg = 0; - while (r->limbs > 1 && r->data[r->limbs-1]==0) { - r->limbs--; - } -} - -static void secp256k1_num_add_abs(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b) { - mp_limb_t c = mpn_add(r->data, a->data, a->limbs, b->data, b->limbs); - r->limbs = a->limbs; - if (c != 0) { - VERIFY_CHECK(r->limbs < 2*NUM_LIMBS); - r->data[r->limbs++] = c; - } -} - -static void secp256k1_num_sub_abs(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b) { - mp_limb_t c = mpn_sub(r->data, a->data, a->limbs, b->data, b->limbs); - (void)c; - VERIFY_CHECK(c == 0); - r->limbs = a->limbs; - while (r->limbs > 1 && r->data[r->limbs-1]==0) { - r->limbs--; - } -} - -static void secp256k1_num_mod(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *m) { - secp256k1_num_sanity(r); - secp256k1_num_sanity(m); - - if (r->limbs >= m->limbs) { - mp_limb_t t[2*NUM_LIMBS]; - mpn_tdiv_qr(t, r->data, 0, r->data, r->limbs, m->data, m->limbs); - memset(t, 0, sizeof(t)); - r->limbs = m->limbs; - while (r->limbs > 1 && r->data[r->limbs-1]==0) { - r->limbs--; - } - } - - if (r->neg && (r->limbs > 1 || r->data[0] != 0)) { - secp256k1_num_sub_abs(r, m, r); - r->neg = 0; - } -} - -static void secp256k1_num_mod_inverse(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *m) { - int i; - mp_limb_t g[NUM_LIMBS+1]; - mp_limb_t u[NUM_LIMBS+1]; - mp_limb_t v[NUM_LIMBS+1]; - mp_size_t sn; - mp_size_t gn; - secp256k1_num_sanity(a); - secp256k1_num_sanity(m); - - /** mpn_gcdext computes: (G,S) = gcdext(U,V), where - * * G = gcd(U,V) - * * G = U*S + V*T - * * U has equal or more limbs than V, and V has no padding - * If we set U to be (a padded version of) a, and V = m: - * G = a*S + m*T - * G = a*S mod m - * Assuming G=1: - * S = 1/a mod m - */ - VERIFY_CHECK(m->limbs <= NUM_LIMBS); - VERIFY_CHECK(m->data[m->limbs-1] != 0); - for (i = 0; i < m->limbs; i++) { - u[i] = (i < a->limbs) ? a->data[i] : 0; - v[i] = m->data[i]; - } - sn = NUM_LIMBS+1; - gn = mpn_gcdext(g, r->data, &sn, u, m->limbs, v, m->limbs); - (void)gn; - VERIFY_CHECK(gn == 1); - VERIFY_CHECK(g[0] == 1); - r->neg = a->neg ^ m->neg; - if (sn < 0) { - mpn_sub(r->data, m->data, m->limbs, r->data, -sn); - r->limbs = m->limbs; - while (r->limbs > 1 && r->data[r->limbs-1]==0) { - r->limbs--; - } - } else { - r->limbs = sn; - } - memset(g, 0, sizeof(g)); - memset(u, 0, sizeof(u)); - memset(v, 0, sizeof(v)); -} - -static int secp256k1_num_jacobi(const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b) { - int ret; - mpz_t ga, gb; - secp256k1_num_sanity(a); - secp256k1_num_sanity(b); - VERIFY_CHECK(!b->neg && (b->limbs > 0) && (b->data[0] & 1)); - - mpz_inits(ga, gb, NULL); - - mpz_import(gb, b->limbs, -1, sizeof(mp_limb_t), 0, 0, b->data); - mpz_import(ga, a->limbs, -1, sizeof(mp_limb_t), 0, 0, a->data); - if (a->neg) { - mpz_neg(ga, ga); - } - - ret = mpz_jacobi(ga, gb); - - mpz_clears(ga, gb, NULL); - - return ret; -} - -static int secp256k1_num_is_one(const secp256k1_num *a) { - return (a->limbs == 1 && a->data[0] == 1); -} - -static int secp256k1_num_is_zero(const secp256k1_num *a) { - return (a->limbs == 1 && a->data[0] == 0); -} - -static int secp256k1_num_is_neg(const secp256k1_num *a) { - return (a->limbs > 1 || a->data[0] != 0) && a->neg; -} - -static int secp256k1_num_cmp(const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b) { - if (a->limbs > b->limbs) { - return 1; - } - if (a->limbs < b->limbs) { - return -1; - } - return mpn_cmp(a->data, b->data, a->limbs); -} - -static int secp256k1_num_eq(const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b) { - if (a->limbs > b->limbs) { - return 0; - } - if (a->limbs < b->limbs) { - return 0; - } - if ((a->neg && !secp256k1_num_is_zero(a)) != (b->neg && !secp256k1_num_is_zero(b))) { - return 0; - } - return mpn_cmp(a->data, b->data, a->limbs) == 0; -} - -static void secp256k1_num_subadd(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b, int bneg) { - if (!(b->neg ^ bneg ^ a->neg)) { /* a and b have the same sign */ - r->neg = a->neg; - if (a->limbs >= b->limbs) { - secp256k1_num_add_abs(r, a, b); - } else { - secp256k1_num_add_abs(r, b, a); - } - } else { - if (secp256k1_num_cmp(a, b) > 0) { - r->neg = a->neg; - secp256k1_num_sub_abs(r, a, b); - } else { - r->neg = b->neg ^ bneg; - secp256k1_num_sub_abs(r, b, a); - } - } -} - -static void secp256k1_num_add(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b) { - secp256k1_num_sanity(a); - secp256k1_num_sanity(b); - secp256k1_num_subadd(r, a, b, 0); -} - -static void secp256k1_num_sub(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b) { - secp256k1_num_sanity(a); - secp256k1_num_sanity(b); - secp256k1_num_subadd(r, a, b, 1); -} - -static void secp256k1_num_mul(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_num *a, const secp256k1_num *b) { - mp_limb_t tmp[2*NUM_LIMBS+1]; - secp256k1_num_sanity(a); - secp256k1_num_sanity(b); - - VERIFY_CHECK(a->limbs + b->limbs <= 2*NUM_LIMBS+1); - if ((a->limbs==1 && a->data[0]==0) || (b->limbs==1 && b->data[0]==0)) { - r->limbs = 1; - r->neg = 0; - r->data[0] = 0; - return; - } - if (a->limbs >= b->limbs) { - mpn_mul(tmp, a->data, a->limbs, b->data, b->limbs); - } else { - mpn_mul(tmp, b->data, b->limbs, a->data, a->limbs); - } - r->limbs = a->limbs + b->limbs; - if (r->limbs > 1 && tmp[r->limbs - 1]==0) { - r->limbs--; - } - VERIFY_CHECK(r->limbs <= 2*NUM_LIMBS); - mpn_copyi(r->data, tmp, r->limbs); - r->neg = a->neg ^ b->neg; - memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); -} - -static void secp256k1_num_shift(secp256k1_num *r, int bits) { - if (bits % GMP_NUMB_BITS) { - /* Shift within limbs. */ - mpn_rshift(r->data, r->data, r->limbs, bits % GMP_NUMB_BITS); - } - if (bits >= GMP_NUMB_BITS) { - int i; - /* Shift full limbs. */ - for (i = 0; i < r->limbs; i++) { - int index = i + (bits / GMP_NUMB_BITS); - if (index < r->limbs && index < 2*NUM_LIMBS) { - r->data[i] = r->data[index]; - } else { - r->data[i] = 0; - } - } - } - while (r->limbs>1 && r->data[r->limbs-1]==0) { - r->limbs--; - } -} - -static void secp256k1_num_negate(secp256k1_num *r) { - r->neg ^= 1; -} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_NUM_REPR_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index c45193b..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/num_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,24 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_NUM_IMPL_H -#define SECP256K1_NUM_IMPL_H - -#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H -#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" -#endif - -#include "num.h" - -#if defined(USE_NUM_GMP) -#include "num_gmp_impl.h" -#elif defined(USE_NUM_NONE) -/* Nothing. */ -#else -#error "Please select num implementation" -#endif - -#endif /* SECP256K1_NUM_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar.h deleted file mode 100644 index 57389da..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,112 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_SCALAR_H -#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_H - -#include "num.h" - -#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H -#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" -#endif - -#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) -#include "scalar_low.h" -#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_4X64) -#include "scalar_4x64.h" -#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_8X32) -#include "scalar_8x32.h" -#else -#error "Please select scalar implementation" -#endif - -/** Clear a scalar to prevent the leak of sensitive data. */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_clear(secp256k1_scalar *r); - -/** Access bits from a scalar. All requested bits must belong to the same 32-bit limb. */ -static unsigned int secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(const secp256k1_scalar *a, unsigned int offset, unsigned int count); - -/** Access bits from a scalar. Not constant time. */ -static unsigned int secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(const secp256k1_scalar *a, unsigned int offset, unsigned int count); - -/** Set a scalar from a big endian byte array. */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(secp256k1_scalar *r, const unsigned char *bin, int *overflow); - -/** Set a scalar to an unsigned integer. */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_set_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int v); - -/** Set a scalar to an unsigned 64-bit integer */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_set_u64(secp256k1_scalar *r, uint64_t v); - -/** Convert a scalar to a byte array. */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(unsigned char *bin, const secp256k1_scalar* a); - -/** Add two scalars together (modulo the group order). Returns whether it overflowed. */ -static int secp256k1_scalar_add(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b); - -/** Conditionally add a power of two to a scalar. The result is not allowed to overflow. */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int bit, int flag); - -/** Multiply two scalars (modulo the group order). */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_mul(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b); - -/** Shift a scalar right by some amount strictly between 0 and 16, returning - * the low bits that were shifted off */ -static int secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, int n); - -/** Compute the square of a scalar (modulo the group order). */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_sqr(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a); - -/** Compute the inverse of a scalar (modulo the group order). */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_inverse(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a); - -/** Compute the inverse of a scalar (modulo the group order), without constant-time guarantee. */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a); - -/** Compute the complement of a scalar (modulo the group order). */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a); - -/** Check whether a scalar equals zero. */ -static int secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(const secp256k1_scalar *a); - -/** Check whether a scalar equals one. */ -static int secp256k1_scalar_is_one(const secp256k1_scalar *a); - -/** Check whether a scalar, considered as an nonnegative integer, is even. */ -static int secp256k1_scalar_is_even(const secp256k1_scalar *a); - -/** Check whether a scalar is higher than the group order divided by 2. */ -static int secp256k1_scalar_is_high(const secp256k1_scalar *a); - -/** Conditionally negate a number, in constant time. - * Returns -1 if the number was negated, 1 otherwise */ -static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *a, int flag); - -#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE -/** Convert a scalar to a number. */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_get_num(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a); - -/** Get the order of the group as a number. */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(secp256k1_num *r); -#endif - -/** Compare two scalars. */ -static int secp256k1_scalar_eq(const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b); - -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM -/** Find r1 and r2 such that r1+r2*2^128 = a. */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_split_128(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a); -/** Find r1 and r2 such that r1+r2*lambda = a, and r1 and r2 are maximum 128 bits long (see secp256k1_gej_mul_lambda). */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a); -#endif - -/** Multiply a and b (without taking the modulus!), divide by 2**shift, and round to the nearest integer. Shift must be at least 256. */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b, unsigned int shift); - -/** Generate two scalars from a 32-byte seed and an integer using the chacha20 stream cipher */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const unsigned char *seed, uint64_t idx); - -#endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_4x64.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_4x64.h deleted file mode 100644 index 19c7495..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_4x64.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H -#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H - -#include - -/** A scalar modulo the group order of the secp256k1 curve. */ -typedef struct { - uint64_t d[4]; -} secp256k1_scalar; - -#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) {{((uint64_t)(d1)) << 32 | (d0), ((uint64_t)(d3)) << 32 | (d2), ((uint64_t)(d5)) << 32 | (d4), ((uint64_t)(d7)) << 32 | (d6)}} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_4x64_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_4x64_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 2673caa..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_4x64_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1049 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H -#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H - -#include "scalar.h" -#include - -/* Limbs of the secp256k1 order. */ -#define SECP256K1_N_0 ((uint64_t)0xBFD25E8CD0364141ULL) -#define SECP256K1_N_1 ((uint64_t)0xBAAEDCE6AF48A03BULL) -#define SECP256K1_N_2 ((uint64_t)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEULL) -#define SECP256K1_N_3 ((uint64_t)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) - -/* Limbs of 2^256 minus the secp256k1 order. */ -#define SECP256K1_N_C_0 (~SECP256K1_N_0 + 1) -#define SECP256K1_N_C_1 (~SECP256K1_N_1) -#define SECP256K1_N_C_2 (1) - -/* Limbs of half the secp256k1 order. */ -#define SECP256K1_N_H_0 ((uint64_t)0xDFE92F46681B20A0ULL) -#define SECP256K1_N_H_1 ((uint64_t)0x5D576E7357A4501DULL) -#define SECP256K1_N_H_2 ((uint64_t)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) -#define SECP256K1_N_H_3 ((uint64_t)0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_clear(secp256k1_scalar *r) { - r->d[0] = 0; - r->d[1] = 0; - r->d[2] = 0; - r->d[3] = 0; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_set_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int v) { - r->d[0] = v; - r->d[1] = 0; - r->d[2] = 0; - r->d[3] = 0; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_set_u64(secp256k1_scalar *r, uint64_t v) { - r->d[0] = v; - r->d[1] = 0; - r->d[2] = 0; - r->d[3] = 0; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static unsigned int secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(const secp256k1_scalar *a, unsigned int offset, unsigned int count) { - VERIFY_CHECK((offset + count - 1) >> 6 == offset >> 6); - return (a->d[offset >> 6] >> (offset & 0x3F)) & ((((uint64_t)1) << count) - 1); -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static unsigned int secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(const secp256k1_scalar *a, unsigned int offset, unsigned int count) { - VERIFY_CHECK(count < 32); - VERIFY_CHECK(offset + count <= 256); - if ((offset + count - 1) >> 6 == offset >> 6) { - return secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(a, offset, count); - } else { - VERIFY_CHECK((offset >> 6) + 1 < 4); - return ((a->d[offset >> 6] >> (offset & 0x3F)) | (a->d[(offset >> 6) + 1] << (64 - (offset & 0x3F)))) & ((((uint64_t)1) << count) - 1); - } -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - int yes = 0; - int no = 0; - no |= (a->d[3] < SECP256K1_N_3); /* No need for a > check. */ - no |= (a->d[2] < SECP256K1_N_2); - yes |= (a->d[2] > SECP256K1_N_2) & ~no; - no |= (a->d[1] < SECP256K1_N_1); - yes |= (a->d[1] > SECP256K1_N_1) & ~no; - yes |= (a->d[0] >= SECP256K1_N_0) & ~no; - return yes; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_reduce(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int overflow) { - uint128_t t; - VERIFY_CHECK(overflow <= 1); - t = (uint128_t)r->d[0] + overflow * SECP256K1_N_C_0; - r->d[0] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 64; - t += (uint128_t)r->d[1] + overflow * SECP256K1_N_C_1; - r->d[1] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 64; - t += (uint128_t)r->d[2] + overflow * SECP256K1_N_C_2; - r->d[2] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 64; - t += (uint64_t)r->d[3]; - r->d[3] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; - return overflow; -} - -static int secp256k1_scalar_add(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { - int overflow; - uint128_t t = (uint128_t)a->d[0] + b->d[0]; - r->d[0] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 64; - t += (uint128_t)a->d[1] + b->d[1]; - r->d[1] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 64; - t += (uint128_t)a->d[2] + b->d[2]; - r->d[2] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 64; - t += (uint128_t)a->d[3] + b->d[3]; - r->d[3] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 64; - overflow = t + secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r); - VERIFY_CHECK(overflow == 0 || overflow == 1); - secp256k1_scalar_reduce(r, overflow); - return overflow; -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int bit, int flag) { - uint128_t t; - VERIFY_CHECK(bit < 256); - bit += ((uint32_t) flag - 1) & 0x100; /* forcing (bit >> 6) > 3 makes this a noop */ - t = (uint128_t)r->d[0] + (((uint64_t)((bit >> 6) == 0)) << (bit & 0x3F)); - r->d[0] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 64; - t += (uint128_t)r->d[1] + (((uint64_t)((bit >> 6) == 1)) << (bit & 0x3F)); - r->d[1] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 64; - t += (uint128_t)r->d[2] + (((uint64_t)((bit >> 6) == 2)) << (bit & 0x3F)); - r->d[2] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 64; - t += (uint128_t)r->d[3] + (((uint64_t)((bit >> 6) == 3)) << (bit & 0x3F)); - r->d[3] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; -#ifdef VERIFY - VERIFY_CHECK((t >> 64) == 0); - VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r) == 0); -#endif -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(secp256k1_scalar *r, const unsigned char *b32, int *overflow) { - int over; - r->d[0] = (uint64_t)b32[31] | (uint64_t)b32[30] << 8 | (uint64_t)b32[29] << 16 | (uint64_t)b32[28] << 24 | (uint64_t)b32[27] << 32 | (uint64_t)b32[26] << 40 | (uint64_t)b32[25] << 48 | (uint64_t)b32[24] << 56; - r->d[1] = (uint64_t)b32[23] | (uint64_t)b32[22] << 8 | (uint64_t)b32[21] << 16 | (uint64_t)b32[20] << 24 | (uint64_t)b32[19] << 32 | (uint64_t)b32[18] << 40 | (uint64_t)b32[17] << 48 | (uint64_t)b32[16] << 56; - r->d[2] = (uint64_t)b32[15] | (uint64_t)b32[14] << 8 | (uint64_t)b32[13] << 16 | (uint64_t)b32[12] << 24 | (uint64_t)b32[11] << 32 | (uint64_t)b32[10] << 40 | (uint64_t)b32[9] << 48 | (uint64_t)b32[8] << 56; - r->d[3] = (uint64_t)b32[7] | (uint64_t)b32[6] << 8 | (uint64_t)b32[5] << 16 | (uint64_t)b32[4] << 24 | (uint64_t)b32[3] << 32 | (uint64_t)b32[2] << 40 | (uint64_t)b32[1] << 48 | (uint64_t)b32[0] << 56; - over = secp256k1_scalar_reduce(r, secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r)); - if (overflow) { - *overflow = over; - } -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(unsigned char *bin, const secp256k1_scalar* a) { - bin[0] = a->d[3] >> 56; bin[1] = a->d[3] >> 48; bin[2] = a->d[3] >> 40; bin[3] = a->d[3] >> 32; bin[4] = a->d[3] >> 24; bin[5] = a->d[3] >> 16; bin[6] = a->d[3] >> 8; bin[7] = a->d[3]; - bin[8] = a->d[2] >> 56; bin[9] = a->d[2] >> 48; bin[10] = a->d[2] >> 40; bin[11] = a->d[2] >> 32; bin[12] = a->d[2] >> 24; bin[13] = a->d[2] >> 16; bin[14] = a->d[2] >> 8; bin[15] = a->d[2]; - bin[16] = a->d[1] >> 56; bin[17] = a->d[1] >> 48; bin[18] = a->d[1] >> 40; bin[19] = a->d[1] >> 32; bin[20] = a->d[1] >> 24; bin[21] = a->d[1] >> 16; bin[22] = a->d[1] >> 8; bin[23] = a->d[1]; - bin[24] = a->d[0] >> 56; bin[25] = a->d[0] >> 48; bin[26] = a->d[0] >> 40; bin[27] = a->d[0] >> 32; bin[28] = a->d[0] >> 24; bin[29] = a->d[0] >> 16; bin[30] = a->d[0] >> 8; bin[31] = a->d[0]; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - return (a->d[0] | a->d[1] | a->d[2] | a->d[3]) == 0; -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - uint64_t nonzero = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(a) == 0); - uint128_t t = (uint128_t)(~a->d[0]) + SECP256K1_N_0 + 1; - r->d[0] = t & nonzero; t >>= 64; - t += (uint128_t)(~a->d[1]) + SECP256K1_N_1; - r->d[1] = t & nonzero; t >>= 64; - t += (uint128_t)(~a->d[2]) + SECP256K1_N_2; - r->d[2] = t & nonzero; t >>= 64; - t += (uint128_t)(~a->d[3]) + SECP256K1_N_3; - r->d[3] = t & nonzero; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_one(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - return ((a->d[0] ^ 1) | a->d[1] | a->d[2] | a->d[3]) == 0; -} - -static int secp256k1_scalar_is_high(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - int yes = 0; - int no = 0; - no |= (a->d[3] < SECP256K1_N_H_3); - yes |= (a->d[3] > SECP256K1_N_H_3) & ~no; - no |= (a->d[2] < SECP256K1_N_H_2) & ~yes; /* No need for a > check. */ - no |= (a->d[1] < SECP256K1_N_H_1) & ~yes; - yes |= (a->d[1] > SECP256K1_N_H_1) & ~no; - yes |= (a->d[0] > SECP256K1_N_H_0) & ~no; - return yes; -} - -static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { - /* If we are flag = 0, mask = 00...00 and this is a no-op; - * if we are flag = 1, mask = 11...11 and this is identical to secp256k1_scalar_negate */ - uint64_t mask = !flag - 1; - uint64_t nonzero = (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(r) != 0) - 1; - uint128_t t = (uint128_t)(r->d[0] ^ mask) + ((SECP256K1_N_0 + 1) & mask); - r->d[0] = t & nonzero; t >>= 64; - t += (uint128_t)(r->d[1] ^ mask) + (SECP256K1_N_1 & mask); - r->d[1] = t & nonzero; t >>= 64; - t += (uint128_t)(r->d[2] ^ mask) + (SECP256K1_N_2 & mask); - r->d[2] = t & nonzero; t >>= 64; - t += (uint128_t)(r->d[3] ^ mask) + (SECP256K1_N_3 & mask); - r->d[3] = t & nonzero; - return 2 * (mask == 0) - 1; -} - -/* Inspired by the macros in OpenSSL's crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c. */ - -/** Add a*b to the number defined by (c0,c1,c2). c2 must never overflow. */ -#define muladd(a,b) { \ - uint64_t tl, th; \ - { \ - uint128_t t = (uint128_t)a * b; \ - th = t >> 64; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE */ \ - tl = t; \ - } \ - c0 += tl; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - th += (c0 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF */ \ - c1 += th; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c2 += (c1 < th) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified in the next line) */ \ - VERIFY_CHECK((c1 >= th) || (c2 != 0)); \ -} - -/** Add a*b to the number defined by (c0,c1). c1 must never overflow. */ -#define muladd_fast(a,b) { \ - uint64_t tl, th; \ - { \ - uint128_t t = (uint128_t)a * b; \ - th = t >> 64; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE */ \ - tl = t; \ - } \ - c0 += tl; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - th += (c0 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF */ \ - c1 += th; /* never overflows by contract (verified in the next line) */ \ - VERIFY_CHECK(c1 >= th); \ -} - -/** Add 2*a*b to the number defined by (c0,c1,c2). c2 must never overflow. */ -#define muladd2(a,b) { \ - uint64_t tl, th, th2, tl2; \ - { \ - uint128_t t = (uint128_t)a * b; \ - th = t >> 64; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE */ \ - tl = t; \ - } \ - th2 = th + th; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE (in case th was 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) */ \ - c2 += (th2 < th) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ - VERIFY_CHECK((th2 >= th) || (c2 != 0)); \ - tl2 = tl + tl; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE (in case the lowest 63 bits of tl were 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) */ \ - th2 += (tl2 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF */ \ - c0 += tl2; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - th2 += (c0 < tl2) ? 1 : 0; /* second overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c2 += (c0 < tl2) & (th2 == 0); /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ - VERIFY_CHECK((c0 >= tl2) || (th2 != 0) || (c2 != 0)); \ - c1 += th2; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c2 += (c1 < th2) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ - VERIFY_CHECK((c1 >= th2) || (c2 != 0)); \ -} - -/** Add a to the number defined by (c0,c1,c2). c2 must never overflow. */ -#define sumadd(a) { \ - unsigned int over; \ - c0 += (a); /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - over = (c0 < (a)) ? 1 : 0; \ - c1 += over; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c2 += (c1 < over) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract */ \ -} - -/** Add a to the number defined by (c0,c1). c1 must never overflow, c2 must be zero. */ -#define sumadd_fast(a) { \ - c0 += (a); /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c1 += (c0 < (a)) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ - VERIFY_CHECK((c1 != 0) | (c0 >= (a))); \ - VERIFY_CHECK(c2 == 0); \ -} - -/** Extract the lowest 64 bits of (c0,c1,c2) into n, and left shift the number 64 bits. */ -#define extract(n) { \ - (n) = c0; \ - c0 = c1; \ - c1 = c2; \ - c2 = 0; \ -} - -/** Extract the lowest 64 bits of (c0,c1,c2) into n, and left shift the number 64 bits. c2 is required to be zero. */ -#define extract_fast(n) { \ - (n) = c0; \ - c0 = c1; \ - c1 = 0; \ - VERIFY_CHECK(c2 == 0); \ -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(secp256k1_scalar *r, const uint64_t *l) { -#ifdef USE_ASM_X86_64 - /* Reduce 512 bits into 385. */ - uint64_t m0, m1, m2, m3, m4, m5, m6; - uint64_t p0, p1, p2, p3, p4; - uint64_t c; - - __asm__ __volatile__( - /* Preload. */ - "movq 32(%%rsi), %%r11\n" - "movq 40(%%rsi), %%r12\n" - "movq 48(%%rsi), %%r13\n" - "movq 56(%%rsi), %%r14\n" - /* Initialize r8,r9,r10 */ - "movq 0(%%rsi), %%r8\n" - "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n" - "xorq %%r10, %%r10\n" - /* (r8,r9) += n0 * c0 */ - "movq %8, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r11\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" - /* extract m0 */ - "movq %%r8, %q0\n" - "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" - /* (r9,r10) += l1 */ - "addq 8(%%rsi), %%r9\n" - "adcq $0, %%r10\n" - /* (r9,r10,r8) += n1 * c0 */ - "movq %8, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r12\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - /* (r9,r10,r8) += n0 * c1 */ - "movq %9, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r11\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - /* extract m1 */ - "movq %%r9, %q1\n" - "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n" - /* (r10,r8,r9) += l2 */ - "addq 16(%%rsi), %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - /* (r10,r8,r9) += n2 * c0 */ - "movq %8, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r13\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - /* (r10,r8,r9) += n1 * c1 */ - "movq %9, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r12\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - /* (r10,r8,r9) += n0 */ - "addq %%r11, %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - /* extract m2 */ - "movq %%r10, %q2\n" - "xorq %%r10, %%r10\n" - /* (r8,r9,r10) += l3 */ - "addq 24(%%rsi), %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - "adcq $0, %%r10\n" - /* (r8,r9,r10) += n3 * c0 */ - "movq %8, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r14\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" - "adcq $0, %%r10\n" - /* (r8,r9,r10) += n2 * c1 */ - "movq %9, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r13\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" - "adcq $0, %%r10\n" - /* (r8,r9,r10) += n1 */ - "addq %%r12, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - "adcq $0, %%r10\n" - /* extract m3 */ - "movq %%r8, %q3\n" - "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" - /* (r9,r10,r8) += n3 * c1 */ - "movq %9, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r14\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - /* (r9,r10,r8) += n2 */ - "addq %%r13, %%r9\n" - "adcq $0, %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - /* extract m4 */ - "movq %%r9, %q4\n" - /* (r10,r8) += n3 */ - "addq %%r14, %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - /* extract m5 */ - "movq %%r10, %q5\n" - /* extract m6 */ - "movq %%r8, %q6\n" - : "=g"(m0), "=g"(m1), "=g"(m2), "=g"(m3), "=g"(m4), "=g"(m5), "=g"(m6) - : "S"(l), "n"(SECP256K1_N_C_0), "n"(SECP256K1_N_C_1) - : "rax", "rdx", "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13", "r14", "cc"); - - /* Reduce 385 bits into 258. */ - __asm__ __volatile__( - /* Preload */ - "movq %q9, %%r11\n" - "movq %q10, %%r12\n" - "movq %q11, %%r13\n" - /* Initialize (r8,r9,r10) */ - "movq %q5, %%r8\n" - "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n" - "xorq %%r10, %%r10\n" - /* (r8,r9) += m4 * c0 */ - "movq %12, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r11\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" - /* extract p0 */ - "movq %%r8, %q0\n" - "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" - /* (r9,r10) += m1 */ - "addq %q6, %%r9\n" - "adcq $0, %%r10\n" - /* (r9,r10,r8) += m5 * c0 */ - "movq %12, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r12\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - /* (r9,r10,r8) += m4 * c1 */ - "movq %13, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r11\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - /* extract p1 */ - "movq %%r9, %q1\n" - "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n" - /* (r10,r8,r9) += m2 */ - "addq %q7, %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - /* (r10,r8,r9) += m6 * c0 */ - "movq %12, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r13\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - /* (r10,r8,r9) += m5 * c1 */ - "movq %13, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r12\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - /* (r10,r8,r9) += m4 */ - "addq %%r11, %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - /* extract p2 */ - "movq %%r10, %q2\n" - /* (r8,r9) += m3 */ - "addq %q8, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - /* (r8,r9) += m6 * c1 */ - "movq %13, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r13\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" - /* (r8,r9) += m5 */ - "addq %%r12, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - /* extract p3 */ - "movq %%r8, %q3\n" - /* (r9) += m6 */ - "addq %%r13, %%r9\n" - /* extract p4 */ - "movq %%r9, %q4\n" - : "=&g"(p0), "=&g"(p1), "=&g"(p2), "=g"(p3), "=g"(p4) - : "g"(m0), "g"(m1), "g"(m2), "g"(m3), "g"(m4), "g"(m5), "g"(m6), "n"(SECP256K1_N_C_0), "n"(SECP256K1_N_C_1) - : "rax", "rdx", "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13", "cc"); - - /* Reduce 258 bits into 256. */ - __asm__ __volatile__( - /* Preload */ - "movq %q5, %%r10\n" - /* (rax,rdx) = p4 * c0 */ - "movq %7, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r10\n" - /* (rax,rdx) += p0 */ - "addq %q1, %%rax\n" - "adcq $0, %%rdx\n" - /* extract r0 */ - "movq %%rax, 0(%q6)\n" - /* Move to (r8,r9) */ - "movq %%rdx, %%r8\n" - "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n" - /* (r8,r9) += p1 */ - "addq %q2, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - /* (r8,r9) += p4 * c1 */ - "movq %8, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r10\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" - /* Extract r1 */ - "movq %%r8, 8(%q6)\n" - "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" - /* (r9,r8) += p4 */ - "addq %%r10, %%r9\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - /* (r9,r8) += p2 */ - "addq %q3, %%r9\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - /* Extract r2 */ - "movq %%r9, 16(%q6)\n" - "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n" - /* (r8,r9) += p3 */ - "addq %q4, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - /* Extract r3 */ - "movq %%r8, 24(%q6)\n" - /* Extract c */ - "movq %%r9, %q0\n" - : "=g"(c) - : "g"(p0), "g"(p1), "g"(p2), "g"(p3), "g"(p4), "D"(r), "n"(SECP256K1_N_C_0), "n"(SECP256K1_N_C_1) - : "rax", "rdx", "r8", "r9", "r10", "cc", "memory"); -#else - uint128_t c; - uint64_t c0, c1, c2; - uint64_t n0 = l[4], n1 = l[5], n2 = l[6], n3 = l[7]; - uint64_t m0, m1, m2, m3, m4, m5; - uint32_t m6; - uint64_t p0, p1, p2, p3; - uint32_t p4; - - /* Reduce 512 bits into 385. */ - /* m[0..6] = l[0..3] + n[0..3] * SECP256K1_N_C. */ - c0 = l[0]; c1 = 0; c2 = 0; - muladd_fast(n0, SECP256K1_N_C_0); - extract_fast(m0); - sumadd_fast(l[1]); - muladd(n1, SECP256K1_N_C_0); - muladd(n0, SECP256K1_N_C_1); - extract(m1); - sumadd(l[2]); - muladd(n2, SECP256K1_N_C_0); - muladd(n1, SECP256K1_N_C_1); - sumadd(n0); - extract(m2); - sumadd(l[3]); - muladd(n3, SECP256K1_N_C_0); - muladd(n2, SECP256K1_N_C_1); - sumadd(n1); - extract(m3); - muladd(n3, SECP256K1_N_C_1); - sumadd(n2); - extract(m4); - sumadd_fast(n3); - extract_fast(m5); - VERIFY_CHECK(c0 <= 1); - m6 = c0; - - /* Reduce 385 bits into 258. */ - /* p[0..4] = m[0..3] + m[4..6] * SECP256K1_N_C. */ - c0 = m0; c1 = 0; c2 = 0; - muladd_fast(m4, SECP256K1_N_C_0); - extract_fast(p0); - sumadd_fast(m1); - muladd(m5, SECP256K1_N_C_0); - muladd(m4, SECP256K1_N_C_1); - extract(p1); - sumadd(m2); - muladd(m6, SECP256K1_N_C_0); - muladd(m5, SECP256K1_N_C_1); - sumadd(m4); - extract(p2); - sumadd_fast(m3); - muladd_fast(m6, SECP256K1_N_C_1); - sumadd_fast(m5); - extract_fast(p3); - p4 = c0 + m6; - VERIFY_CHECK(p4 <= 2); - - /* Reduce 258 bits into 256. */ - /* r[0..3] = p[0..3] + p[4] * SECP256K1_N_C. */ - c = p0 + (uint128_t)SECP256K1_N_C_0 * p4; - r->d[0] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; c >>= 64; - c += p1 + (uint128_t)SECP256K1_N_C_1 * p4; - r->d[1] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; c >>= 64; - c += p2 + (uint128_t)p4; - r->d[2] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; c >>= 64; - c += p3; - r->d[3] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; c >>= 64; -#endif - - /* Final reduction of r. */ - secp256k1_scalar_reduce(r, c + secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r)); -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_mul_512(uint64_t l[8], const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { -#ifdef USE_ASM_X86_64 - const uint64_t *pb = b->d; - __asm__ __volatile__( - /* Preload */ - "movq 0(%%rdi), %%r15\n" - "movq 8(%%rdi), %%rbx\n" - "movq 16(%%rdi), %%rcx\n" - "movq 0(%%rdx), %%r11\n" - "movq 8(%%rdx), %%r12\n" - "movq 16(%%rdx), %%r13\n" - "movq 24(%%rdx), %%r14\n" - /* (rax,rdx) = a0 * b0 */ - "movq %%r15, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r11\n" - /* Extract l0 */ - "movq %%rax, 0(%%rsi)\n" - /* (r8,r9,r10) = (rdx) */ - "movq %%rdx, %%r8\n" - "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n" - "xorq %%r10, %%r10\n" - /* (r8,r9,r10) += a0 * b1 */ - "movq %%r15, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r12\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" - "adcq $0, %%r10\n" - /* (r8,r9,r10) += a1 * b0 */ - "movq %%rbx, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r11\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" - "adcq $0, %%r10\n" - /* Extract l1 */ - "movq %%r8, 8(%%rsi)\n" - "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" - /* (r9,r10,r8) += a0 * b2 */ - "movq %%r15, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r13\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - /* (r9,r10,r8) += a1 * b1 */ - "movq %%rbx, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r12\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - /* (r9,r10,r8) += a2 * b0 */ - "movq %%rcx, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r11\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - /* Extract l2 */ - "movq %%r9, 16(%%rsi)\n" - "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n" - /* (r10,r8,r9) += a0 * b3 */ - "movq %%r15, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r14\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - /* Preload a3 */ - "movq 24(%%rdi), %%r15\n" - /* (r10,r8,r9) += a1 * b2 */ - "movq %%rbx, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r13\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - /* (r10,r8,r9) += a2 * b1 */ - "movq %%rcx, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r12\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - /* (r10,r8,r9) += a3 * b0 */ - "movq %%r15, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r11\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - /* Extract l3 */ - "movq %%r10, 24(%%rsi)\n" - "xorq %%r10, %%r10\n" - /* (r8,r9,r10) += a1 * b3 */ - "movq %%rbx, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r14\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" - "adcq $0, %%r10\n" - /* (r8,r9,r10) += a2 * b2 */ - "movq %%rcx, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r13\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" - "adcq $0, %%r10\n" - /* (r8,r9,r10) += a3 * b1 */ - "movq %%r15, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r12\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" - "adcq $0, %%r10\n" - /* Extract l4 */ - "movq %%r8, 32(%%rsi)\n" - "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" - /* (r9,r10,r8) += a2 * b3 */ - "movq %%rcx, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r14\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - /* (r9,r10,r8) += a3 * b2 */ - "movq %%r15, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r13\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - /* Extract l5 */ - "movq %%r9, 40(%%rsi)\n" - /* (r10,r8) += a3 * b3 */ - "movq %%r15, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r14\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" - /* Extract l6 */ - "movq %%r10, 48(%%rsi)\n" - /* Extract l7 */ - "movq %%r8, 56(%%rsi)\n" - : "+d"(pb) - : "S"(l), "D"(a->d) - : "rax", "rbx", "rcx", "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13", "r14", "r15", "cc", "memory"); -#else - /* 160 bit accumulator. */ - uint64_t c0 = 0, c1 = 0; - uint32_t c2 = 0; - - /* l[0..7] = a[0..3] * b[0..3]. */ - muladd_fast(a->d[0], b->d[0]); - extract_fast(l[0]); - muladd(a->d[0], b->d[1]); - muladd(a->d[1], b->d[0]); - extract(l[1]); - muladd(a->d[0], b->d[2]); - muladd(a->d[1], b->d[1]); - muladd(a->d[2], b->d[0]); - extract(l[2]); - muladd(a->d[0], b->d[3]); - muladd(a->d[1], b->d[2]); - muladd(a->d[2], b->d[1]); - muladd(a->d[3], b->d[0]); - extract(l[3]); - muladd(a->d[1], b->d[3]); - muladd(a->d[2], b->d[2]); - muladd(a->d[3], b->d[1]); - extract(l[4]); - muladd(a->d[2], b->d[3]); - muladd(a->d[3], b->d[2]); - extract(l[5]); - muladd_fast(a->d[3], b->d[3]); - extract_fast(l[6]); - VERIFY_CHECK(c1 == 0); - l[7] = c0; -#endif -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_sqr_512(uint64_t l[8], const secp256k1_scalar *a) { -#ifdef USE_ASM_X86_64 - __asm__ __volatile__( - /* Preload */ - "movq 0(%%rdi), %%r11\n" - "movq 8(%%rdi), %%r12\n" - "movq 16(%%rdi), %%r13\n" - "movq 24(%%rdi), %%r14\n" - /* (rax,rdx) = a0 * a0 */ - "movq %%r11, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r11\n" - /* Extract l0 */ - "movq %%rax, 0(%%rsi)\n" - /* (r8,r9,r10) = (rdx,0) */ - "movq %%rdx, %%r8\n" - "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n" - "xorq %%r10, %%r10\n" - /* (r8,r9,r10) += 2 * a0 * a1 */ - "movq %%r11, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r12\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" - "adcq $0, %%r10\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" - "adcq $0, %%r10\n" - /* Extract l1 */ - "movq %%r8, 8(%%rsi)\n" - "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" - /* (r9,r10,r8) += 2 * a0 * a2 */ - "movq %%r11, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r13\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - /* (r9,r10,r8) += a1 * a1 */ - "movq %%r12, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r12\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - /* Extract l2 */ - "movq %%r9, 16(%%rsi)\n" - "xorq %%r9, %%r9\n" - /* (r10,r8,r9) += 2 * a0 * a3 */ - "movq %%r11, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r14\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - /* (r10,r8,r9) += 2 * a1 * a2 */ - "movq %%r12, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r13\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" - "adcq $0, %%r9\n" - /* Extract l3 */ - "movq %%r10, 24(%%rsi)\n" - "xorq %%r10, %%r10\n" - /* (r8,r9,r10) += 2 * a1 * a3 */ - "movq %%r12, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r14\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" - "adcq $0, %%r10\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" - "adcq $0, %%r10\n" - /* (r8,r9,r10) += a2 * a2 */ - "movq %%r13, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r13\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r8\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r9\n" - "adcq $0, %%r10\n" - /* Extract l4 */ - "movq %%r8, 32(%%rsi)\n" - "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" - /* (r9,r10,r8) += 2 * a2 * a3 */ - "movq %%r13, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r14\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r9\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r10\n" - "adcq $0, %%r8\n" - /* Extract l5 */ - "movq %%r9, 40(%%rsi)\n" - /* (r10,r8) += a3 * a3 */ - "movq %%r14, %%rax\n" - "mulq %%r14\n" - "addq %%rax, %%r10\n" - "adcq %%rdx, %%r8\n" - /* Extract l6 */ - "movq %%r10, 48(%%rsi)\n" - /* Extract l7 */ - "movq %%r8, 56(%%rsi)\n" - : - : "S"(l), "D"(a->d) - : "rax", "rdx", "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13", "r14", "cc", "memory"); -#else - /* 160 bit accumulator. */ - uint64_t c0 = 0, c1 = 0; - uint32_t c2 = 0; - - /* l[0..7] = a[0..3] * b[0..3]. */ - muladd_fast(a->d[0], a->d[0]); - extract_fast(l[0]); - muladd2(a->d[0], a->d[1]); - extract(l[1]); - muladd2(a->d[0], a->d[2]); - muladd(a->d[1], a->d[1]); - extract(l[2]); - muladd2(a->d[0], a->d[3]); - muladd2(a->d[1], a->d[2]); - extract(l[3]); - muladd2(a->d[1], a->d[3]); - muladd(a->d[2], a->d[2]); - extract(l[4]); - muladd2(a->d[2], a->d[3]); - extract(l[5]); - muladd_fast(a->d[3], a->d[3]); - extract_fast(l[6]); - VERIFY_CHECK(c1 == 0); - l[7] = c0; -#endif -} - -#undef sumadd -#undef sumadd_fast -#undef muladd -#undef muladd_fast -#undef muladd2 -#undef extract -#undef extract_fast - -static void secp256k1_scalar_mul(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { - uint64_t l[8]; - secp256k1_scalar_mul_512(l, a, b); - secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(r, l); -} - -static int secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, int n) { - int ret; - VERIFY_CHECK(n > 0); - VERIFY_CHECK(n < 16); - ret = r->d[0] & ((1 << n) - 1); - r->d[0] = (r->d[0] >> n) + (r->d[1] << (64 - n)); - r->d[1] = (r->d[1] >> n) + (r->d[2] << (64 - n)); - r->d[2] = (r->d[2] >> n) + (r->d[3] << (64 - n)); - r->d[3] = (r->d[3] >> n); - return ret; -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_sqr(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - uint64_t l[8]; - secp256k1_scalar_sqr_512(l, a); - secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(r, l); -} - -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM -static void secp256k1_scalar_split_128(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - r1->d[0] = a->d[0]; - r1->d[1] = a->d[1]; - r1->d[2] = 0; - r1->d[3] = 0; - r2->d[0] = a->d[2]; - r2->d[1] = a->d[3]; - r2->d[2] = 0; - r2->d[3] = 0; -} -#endif - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_eq(const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { - return ((a->d[0] ^ b->d[0]) | (a->d[1] ^ b->d[1]) | (a->d[2] ^ b->d[2]) | (a->d[3] ^ b->d[3])) == 0; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b, unsigned int shift) { - uint64_t l[8]; - unsigned int shiftlimbs; - unsigned int shiftlow; - unsigned int shifthigh; - VERIFY_CHECK(shift >= 256); - secp256k1_scalar_mul_512(l, a, b); - shiftlimbs = shift >> 6; - shiftlow = shift & 0x3F; - shifthigh = 64 - shiftlow; - r->d[0] = shift < 512 ? (l[0 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow | (shift < 448 && shiftlow ? (l[1 + shiftlimbs] << shifthigh) : 0)) : 0; - r->d[1] = shift < 448 ? (l[1 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow | (shift < 384 && shiftlow ? (l[2 + shiftlimbs] << shifthigh) : 0)) : 0; - r->d[2] = shift < 384 ? (l[2 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow | (shift < 320 && shiftlow ? (l[3 + shiftlimbs] << shifthigh) : 0)) : 0; - r->d[3] = shift < 320 ? (l[3 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow) : 0; - secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(r, 0, (l[(shift - 1) >> 6] >> ((shift - 1) & 0x3f)) & 1); -} - -#define ROTL32(x,n) ((x) << (n) | (x) >> (32-(n))) -#define QUARTERROUND(a,b,c,d) \ - a += b; d = ROTL32(d ^ a, 16); \ - c += d; b = ROTL32(b ^ c, 12); \ - a += b; d = ROTL32(d ^ a, 8); \ - c += d; b = ROTL32(b ^ c, 7); - -#ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN -#define LE32(p) ((((p) & 0xFF) << 24) | (((p) & 0xFF00) << 8) | (((p) & 0xFF0000) >> 8) | (((p) & 0xFF000000) >> 24)) -#define BE32(p) (p) -#else -#define BE32(p) ((((p) & 0xFF) << 24) | (((p) & 0xFF00) << 8) | (((p) & 0xFF0000) >> 8) | (((p) & 0xFF000000) >> 24)) -#define LE32(p) (p) -#endif - -static void secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const unsigned char *seed, uint64_t idx) { - size_t n; - size_t over_count = 0; - uint32_t seed32[8]; - uint32_t x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12, x13, x14, x15; - int over1, over2; - - memcpy((void *) seed32, (const void *) seed, 32); - do { - x0 = 0x61707865; - x1 = 0x3320646e; - x2 = 0x79622d32; - x3 = 0x6b206574; - x4 = LE32(seed32[0]); - x5 = LE32(seed32[1]); - x6 = LE32(seed32[2]); - x7 = LE32(seed32[3]); - x8 = LE32(seed32[4]); - x9 = LE32(seed32[5]); - x10 = LE32(seed32[6]); - x11 = LE32(seed32[7]); - x12 = idx; - x13 = idx >> 32; - x14 = 0; - x15 = over_count; - - n = 10; - while (n--) { - QUARTERROUND(x0, x4, x8,x12) - QUARTERROUND(x1, x5, x9,x13) - QUARTERROUND(x2, x6,x10,x14) - QUARTERROUND(x3, x7,x11,x15) - QUARTERROUND(x0, x5,x10,x15) - QUARTERROUND(x1, x6,x11,x12) - QUARTERROUND(x2, x7, x8,x13) - QUARTERROUND(x3, x4, x9,x14) - } - - x0 += 0x61707865; - x1 += 0x3320646e; - x2 += 0x79622d32; - x3 += 0x6b206574; - x4 += LE32(seed32[0]); - x5 += LE32(seed32[1]); - x6 += LE32(seed32[2]); - x7 += LE32(seed32[3]); - x8 += LE32(seed32[4]); - x9 += LE32(seed32[5]); - x10 += LE32(seed32[6]); - x11 += LE32(seed32[7]); - x12 += idx; - x13 += idx >> 32; - x14 += 0; - x15 += over_count; - - r1->d[3] = BE32((uint64_t) x0) << 32 | BE32(x1); - r1->d[2] = BE32((uint64_t) x2) << 32 | BE32(x3); - r1->d[1] = BE32((uint64_t) x4) << 32 | BE32(x5); - r1->d[0] = BE32((uint64_t) x6) << 32 | BE32(x7); - r2->d[3] = BE32((uint64_t) x8) << 32 | BE32(x9); - r2->d[2] = BE32((uint64_t) x10) << 32 | BE32(x11); - r2->d[1] = BE32((uint64_t) x12) << 32 | BE32(x13); - r2->d[0] = BE32((uint64_t) x14) << 32 | BE32(x15); - - over1 = secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r1); - over2 = secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r2); - over_count++; - } while (over1 | over2); -} - -#undef ROTL32 -#undef QUARTERROUND -#undef BE32 -#undef LE32 - -#endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_8x32.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_8x32.h deleted file mode 100644 index 2c9a348..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_8x32.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H -#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H - -#include - -/** A scalar modulo the group order of the secp256k1 curve. */ -typedef struct { - uint32_t d[8]; -} secp256k1_scalar; - -#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) {{(d0), (d1), (d2), (d3), (d4), (d5), (d6), (d7)}} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_8x32_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_8x32_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 9cf5c54..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_8x32_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,832 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H -#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H - -#include - -/* Limbs of the secp256k1 order. */ -#define SECP256K1_N_0 ((uint32_t)0xD0364141UL) -#define SECP256K1_N_1 ((uint32_t)0xBFD25E8CUL) -#define SECP256K1_N_2 ((uint32_t)0xAF48A03BUL) -#define SECP256K1_N_3 ((uint32_t)0xBAAEDCE6UL) -#define SECP256K1_N_4 ((uint32_t)0xFFFFFFFEUL) -#define SECP256K1_N_5 ((uint32_t)0xFFFFFFFFUL) -#define SECP256K1_N_6 ((uint32_t)0xFFFFFFFFUL) -#define SECP256K1_N_7 ((uint32_t)0xFFFFFFFFUL) - -/* Limbs of 2^256 minus the secp256k1 order. */ -#define SECP256K1_N_C_0 (~SECP256K1_N_0 + 1) -#define SECP256K1_N_C_1 (~SECP256K1_N_1) -#define SECP256K1_N_C_2 (~SECP256K1_N_2) -#define SECP256K1_N_C_3 (~SECP256K1_N_3) -#define SECP256K1_N_C_4 (1) - -/* Limbs of half the secp256k1 order. */ -#define SECP256K1_N_H_0 ((uint32_t)0x681B20A0UL) -#define SECP256K1_N_H_1 ((uint32_t)0xDFE92F46UL) -#define SECP256K1_N_H_2 ((uint32_t)0x57A4501DUL) -#define SECP256K1_N_H_3 ((uint32_t)0x5D576E73UL) -#define SECP256K1_N_H_4 ((uint32_t)0xFFFFFFFFUL) -#define SECP256K1_N_H_5 ((uint32_t)0xFFFFFFFFUL) -#define SECP256K1_N_H_6 ((uint32_t)0xFFFFFFFFUL) -#define SECP256K1_N_H_7 ((uint32_t)0x7FFFFFFFUL) - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_clear(secp256k1_scalar *r) { - r->d[0] = 0; - r->d[1] = 0; - r->d[2] = 0; - r->d[3] = 0; - r->d[4] = 0; - r->d[5] = 0; - r->d[6] = 0; - r->d[7] = 0; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_set_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int v) { - r->d[0] = v; - r->d[1] = 0; - r->d[2] = 0; - r->d[3] = 0; - r->d[4] = 0; - r->d[5] = 0; - r->d[6] = 0; - r->d[7] = 0; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_set_u64(secp256k1_scalar *r, uint64_t v) { - r->d[0] = v; - r->d[1] = v >> 32; - r->d[2] = 0; - r->d[3] = 0; - r->d[4] = 0; - r->d[5] = 0; - r->d[6] = 0; - r->d[7] = 0; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static unsigned int secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(const secp256k1_scalar *a, unsigned int offset, unsigned int count) { - VERIFY_CHECK((offset + count - 1) >> 5 == offset >> 5); - return (a->d[offset >> 5] >> (offset & 0x1F)) & ((1 << count) - 1); -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static unsigned int secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(const secp256k1_scalar *a, unsigned int offset, unsigned int count) { - VERIFY_CHECK(count < 32); - VERIFY_CHECK(offset + count <= 256); - if ((offset + count - 1) >> 5 == offset >> 5) { - return secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(a, offset, count); - } else { - VERIFY_CHECK((offset >> 5) + 1 < 8); - return ((a->d[offset >> 5] >> (offset & 0x1F)) | (a->d[(offset >> 5) + 1] << (32 - (offset & 0x1F)))) & ((((uint32_t)1) << count) - 1); - } -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - int yes = 0; - int no = 0; - no |= (a->d[7] < SECP256K1_N_7); /* No need for a > check. */ - no |= (a->d[6] < SECP256K1_N_6); /* No need for a > check. */ - no |= (a->d[5] < SECP256K1_N_5); /* No need for a > check. */ - no |= (a->d[4] < SECP256K1_N_4); - yes |= (a->d[4] > SECP256K1_N_4) & ~no; - no |= (a->d[3] < SECP256K1_N_3) & ~yes; - yes |= (a->d[3] > SECP256K1_N_3) & ~no; - no |= (a->d[2] < SECP256K1_N_2) & ~yes; - yes |= (a->d[2] > SECP256K1_N_2) & ~no; - no |= (a->d[1] < SECP256K1_N_1) & ~yes; - yes |= (a->d[1] > SECP256K1_N_1) & ~no; - yes |= (a->d[0] >= SECP256K1_N_0) & ~no; - return yes; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_reduce(secp256k1_scalar *r, uint32_t overflow) { - uint64_t t; - VERIFY_CHECK(overflow <= 1); - t = (uint64_t)r->d[0] + overflow * SECP256K1_N_C_0; - r->d[0] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)r->d[1] + overflow * SECP256K1_N_C_1; - r->d[1] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)r->d[2] + overflow * SECP256K1_N_C_2; - r->d[2] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)r->d[3] + overflow * SECP256K1_N_C_3; - r->d[3] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)r->d[4] + overflow * SECP256K1_N_C_4; - r->d[4] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)r->d[5]; - r->d[5] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)r->d[6]; - r->d[6] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)r->d[7]; - r->d[7] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; - return overflow; -} - -static int secp256k1_scalar_add(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { - int overflow; - uint64_t t = (uint64_t)a->d[0] + b->d[0]; - r->d[0] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)a->d[1] + b->d[1]; - r->d[1] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)a->d[2] + b->d[2]; - r->d[2] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)a->d[3] + b->d[3]; - r->d[3] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)a->d[4] + b->d[4]; - r->d[4] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)a->d[5] + b->d[5]; - r->d[5] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)a->d[6] + b->d[6]; - r->d[6] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)a->d[7] + b->d[7]; - r->d[7] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; - overflow = t + secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r); - VERIFY_CHECK(overflow == 0 || overflow == 1); - secp256k1_scalar_reduce(r, overflow); - return overflow; -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int bit, int flag) { - uint64_t t; - VERIFY_CHECK(bit < 256); - bit += ((uint32_t) flag - 1) & 0x100; /* forcing (bit >> 5) > 7 makes this a noop */ - t = (uint64_t)r->d[0] + (((uint32_t)((bit >> 5) == 0)) << (bit & 0x1F)); - r->d[0] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)r->d[1] + (((uint32_t)((bit >> 5) == 1)) << (bit & 0x1F)); - r->d[1] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)r->d[2] + (((uint32_t)((bit >> 5) == 2)) << (bit & 0x1F)); - r->d[2] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)r->d[3] + (((uint32_t)((bit >> 5) == 3)) << (bit & 0x1F)); - r->d[3] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)r->d[4] + (((uint32_t)((bit >> 5) == 4)) << (bit & 0x1F)); - r->d[4] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)r->d[5] + (((uint32_t)((bit >> 5) == 5)) << (bit & 0x1F)); - r->d[5] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)r->d[6] + (((uint32_t)((bit >> 5) == 6)) << (bit & 0x1F)); - r->d[6] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)r->d[7] + (((uint32_t)((bit >> 5) == 7)) << (bit & 0x1F)); - r->d[7] = t & 0xFFFFFFFFULL; -#ifdef VERIFY - VERIFY_CHECK((t >> 32) == 0); - VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r) == 0); -#endif -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(secp256k1_scalar *r, const unsigned char *b32, int *overflow) { - int over; - r->d[0] = (uint32_t)b32[31] | (uint32_t)b32[30] << 8 | (uint32_t)b32[29] << 16 | (uint32_t)b32[28] << 24; - r->d[1] = (uint32_t)b32[27] | (uint32_t)b32[26] << 8 | (uint32_t)b32[25] << 16 | (uint32_t)b32[24] << 24; - r->d[2] = (uint32_t)b32[23] | (uint32_t)b32[22] << 8 | (uint32_t)b32[21] << 16 | (uint32_t)b32[20] << 24; - r->d[3] = (uint32_t)b32[19] | (uint32_t)b32[18] << 8 | (uint32_t)b32[17] << 16 | (uint32_t)b32[16] << 24; - r->d[4] = (uint32_t)b32[15] | (uint32_t)b32[14] << 8 | (uint32_t)b32[13] << 16 | (uint32_t)b32[12] << 24; - r->d[5] = (uint32_t)b32[11] | (uint32_t)b32[10] << 8 | (uint32_t)b32[9] << 16 | (uint32_t)b32[8] << 24; - r->d[6] = (uint32_t)b32[7] | (uint32_t)b32[6] << 8 | (uint32_t)b32[5] << 16 | (uint32_t)b32[4] << 24; - r->d[7] = (uint32_t)b32[3] | (uint32_t)b32[2] << 8 | (uint32_t)b32[1] << 16 | (uint32_t)b32[0] << 24; - over = secp256k1_scalar_reduce(r, secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r)); - if (overflow) { - *overflow = over; - } -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(unsigned char *bin, const secp256k1_scalar* a) { - bin[0] = a->d[7] >> 24; bin[1] = a->d[7] >> 16; bin[2] = a->d[7] >> 8; bin[3] = a->d[7]; - bin[4] = a->d[6] >> 24; bin[5] = a->d[6] >> 16; bin[6] = a->d[6] >> 8; bin[7] = a->d[6]; - bin[8] = a->d[5] >> 24; bin[9] = a->d[5] >> 16; bin[10] = a->d[5] >> 8; bin[11] = a->d[5]; - bin[12] = a->d[4] >> 24; bin[13] = a->d[4] >> 16; bin[14] = a->d[4] >> 8; bin[15] = a->d[4]; - bin[16] = a->d[3] >> 24; bin[17] = a->d[3] >> 16; bin[18] = a->d[3] >> 8; bin[19] = a->d[3]; - bin[20] = a->d[2] >> 24; bin[21] = a->d[2] >> 16; bin[22] = a->d[2] >> 8; bin[23] = a->d[2]; - bin[24] = a->d[1] >> 24; bin[25] = a->d[1] >> 16; bin[26] = a->d[1] >> 8; bin[27] = a->d[1]; - bin[28] = a->d[0] >> 24; bin[29] = a->d[0] >> 16; bin[30] = a->d[0] >> 8; bin[31] = a->d[0]; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - return (a->d[0] | a->d[1] | a->d[2] | a->d[3] | a->d[4] | a->d[5] | a->d[6] | a->d[7]) == 0; -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - uint32_t nonzero = 0xFFFFFFFFUL * (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(a) == 0); - uint64_t t = (uint64_t)(~a->d[0]) + SECP256K1_N_0 + 1; - r->d[0] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)(~a->d[1]) + SECP256K1_N_1; - r->d[1] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)(~a->d[2]) + SECP256K1_N_2; - r->d[2] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)(~a->d[3]) + SECP256K1_N_3; - r->d[3] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)(~a->d[4]) + SECP256K1_N_4; - r->d[4] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)(~a->d[5]) + SECP256K1_N_5; - r->d[5] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)(~a->d[6]) + SECP256K1_N_6; - r->d[6] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)(~a->d[7]) + SECP256K1_N_7; - r->d[7] = t & nonzero; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_one(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - return ((a->d[0] ^ 1) | a->d[1] | a->d[2] | a->d[3] | a->d[4] | a->d[5] | a->d[6] | a->d[7]) == 0; -} - -static int secp256k1_scalar_is_high(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - int yes = 0; - int no = 0; - no |= (a->d[7] < SECP256K1_N_H_7); - yes |= (a->d[7] > SECP256K1_N_H_7) & ~no; - no |= (a->d[6] < SECP256K1_N_H_6) & ~yes; /* No need for a > check. */ - no |= (a->d[5] < SECP256K1_N_H_5) & ~yes; /* No need for a > check. */ - no |= (a->d[4] < SECP256K1_N_H_4) & ~yes; /* No need for a > check. */ - no |= (a->d[3] < SECP256K1_N_H_3) & ~yes; - yes |= (a->d[3] > SECP256K1_N_H_3) & ~no; - no |= (a->d[2] < SECP256K1_N_H_2) & ~yes; - yes |= (a->d[2] > SECP256K1_N_H_2) & ~no; - no |= (a->d[1] < SECP256K1_N_H_1) & ~yes; - yes |= (a->d[1] > SECP256K1_N_H_1) & ~no; - yes |= (a->d[0] > SECP256K1_N_H_0) & ~no; - return yes; -} - -static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { - /* If we are flag = 0, mask = 00...00 and this is a no-op; - * if we are flag = 1, mask = 11...11 and this is identical to secp256k1_scalar_negate */ - uint32_t mask = !flag - 1; - uint32_t nonzero = 0xFFFFFFFFUL * (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(r) == 0); - uint64_t t = (uint64_t)(r->d[0] ^ mask) + ((SECP256K1_N_0 + 1) & mask); - r->d[0] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)(r->d[1] ^ mask) + (SECP256K1_N_1 & mask); - r->d[1] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)(r->d[2] ^ mask) + (SECP256K1_N_2 & mask); - r->d[2] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)(r->d[3] ^ mask) + (SECP256K1_N_3 & mask); - r->d[3] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)(r->d[4] ^ mask) + (SECP256K1_N_4 & mask); - r->d[4] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)(r->d[5] ^ mask) + (SECP256K1_N_5 & mask); - r->d[5] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)(r->d[6] ^ mask) + (SECP256K1_N_6 & mask); - r->d[6] = t & nonzero; t >>= 32; - t += (uint64_t)(r->d[7] ^ mask) + (SECP256K1_N_7 & mask); - r->d[7] = t & nonzero; - return 2 * (mask == 0) - 1; -} - - -/* Inspired by the macros in OpenSSL's crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c. */ - -/** Add a*b to the number defined by (c0,c1,c2). c2 must never overflow. */ -#define muladd(a,b) { \ - uint32_t tl, th; \ - { \ - uint64_t t = (uint64_t)a * b; \ - th = t >> 32; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFE */ \ - tl = t; \ - } \ - c0 += tl; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - th += (c0 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFF */ \ - c1 += th; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c2 += (c1 < th) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified in the next line) */ \ - VERIFY_CHECK((c1 >= th) || (c2 != 0)); \ -} - -/** Add a*b to the number defined by (c0,c1). c1 must never overflow. */ -#define muladd_fast(a,b) { \ - uint32_t tl, th; \ - { \ - uint64_t t = (uint64_t)a * b; \ - th = t >> 32; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFE */ \ - tl = t; \ - } \ - c0 += tl; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - th += (c0 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFF */ \ - c1 += th; /* never overflows by contract (verified in the next line) */ \ - VERIFY_CHECK(c1 >= th); \ -} - -/** Add 2*a*b to the number defined by (c0,c1,c2). c2 must never overflow. */ -#define muladd2(a,b) { \ - uint32_t tl, th, th2, tl2; \ - { \ - uint64_t t = (uint64_t)a * b; \ - th = t >> 32; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFE */ \ - tl = t; \ - } \ - th2 = th + th; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFE (in case th was 0x7FFFFFFF) */ \ - c2 += (th2 < th) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ - VERIFY_CHECK((th2 >= th) || (c2 != 0)); \ - tl2 = tl + tl; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFE (in case the lowest 63 bits of tl were 0x7FFFFFFF) */ \ - th2 += (tl2 < tl) ? 1 : 0; /* at most 0xFFFFFFFF */ \ - c0 += tl2; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - th2 += (c0 < tl2) ? 1 : 0; /* second overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c2 += (c0 < tl2) & (th2 == 0); /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ - VERIFY_CHECK((c0 >= tl2) || (th2 != 0) || (c2 != 0)); \ - c1 += th2; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c2 += (c1 < th2) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ - VERIFY_CHECK((c1 >= th2) || (c2 != 0)); \ -} - -/** Add a to the number defined by (c0,c1,c2). c2 must never overflow. */ -#define sumadd(a) { \ - unsigned int over; \ - c0 += (a); /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - over = (c0 < (a)) ? 1 : 0; \ - c1 += over; /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c2 += (c1 < over) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract */ \ -} - -/** Add a to the number defined by (c0,c1). c1 must never overflow, c2 must be zero. */ -#define sumadd_fast(a) { \ - c0 += (a); /* overflow is handled on the next line */ \ - c1 += (c0 < (a)) ? 1 : 0; /* never overflows by contract (verified the next line) */ \ - VERIFY_CHECK((c1 != 0) | (c0 >= (a))); \ - VERIFY_CHECK(c2 == 0); \ -} - -/** Extract the lowest 32 bits of (c0,c1,c2) into n, and left shift the number 32 bits. */ -#define extract(n) { \ - (n) = c0; \ - c0 = c1; \ - c1 = c2; \ - c2 = 0; \ -} - -/** Extract the lowest 32 bits of (c0,c1,c2) into n, and left shift the number 32 bits. c2 is required to be zero. */ -#define extract_fast(n) { \ - (n) = c0; \ - c0 = c1; \ - c1 = 0; \ - VERIFY_CHECK(c2 == 0); \ -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(secp256k1_scalar *r, const uint32_t *l) { - uint64_t c; - uint32_t n0 = l[8], n1 = l[9], n2 = l[10], n3 = l[11], n4 = l[12], n5 = l[13], n6 = l[14], n7 = l[15]; - uint32_t m0, m1, m2, m3, m4, m5, m6, m7, m8, m9, m10, m11, m12; - uint32_t p0, p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8; - - /* 96 bit accumulator. */ - uint32_t c0, c1, c2; - - /* Reduce 512 bits into 385. */ - /* m[0..12] = l[0..7] + n[0..7] * SECP256K1_N_C. */ - c0 = l[0]; c1 = 0; c2 = 0; - muladd_fast(n0, SECP256K1_N_C_0); - extract_fast(m0); - sumadd_fast(l[1]); - muladd(n1, SECP256K1_N_C_0); - muladd(n0, SECP256K1_N_C_1); - extract(m1); - sumadd(l[2]); - muladd(n2, SECP256K1_N_C_0); - muladd(n1, SECP256K1_N_C_1); - muladd(n0, SECP256K1_N_C_2); - extract(m2); - sumadd(l[3]); - muladd(n3, SECP256K1_N_C_0); - muladd(n2, SECP256K1_N_C_1); - muladd(n1, SECP256K1_N_C_2); - muladd(n0, SECP256K1_N_C_3); - extract(m3); - sumadd(l[4]); - muladd(n4, SECP256K1_N_C_0); - muladd(n3, SECP256K1_N_C_1); - muladd(n2, SECP256K1_N_C_2); - muladd(n1, SECP256K1_N_C_3); - sumadd(n0); - extract(m4); - sumadd(l[5]); - muladd(n5, SECP256K1_N_C_0); - muladd(n4, SECP256K1_N_C_1); - muladd(n3, SECP256K1_N_C_2); - muladd(n2, SECP256K1_N_C_3); - sumadd(n1); - extract(m5); - sumadd(l[6]); - muladd(n6, SECP256K1_N_C_0); - muladd(n5, SECP256K1_N_C_1); - muladd(n4, SECP256K1_N_C_2); - muladd(n3, SECP256K1_N_C_3); - sumadd(n2); - extract(m6); - sumadd(l[7]); - muladd(n7, SECP256K1_N_C_0); - muladd(n6, SECP256K1_N_C_1); - muladd(n5, SECP256K1_N_C_2); - muladd(n4, SECP256K1_N_C_3); - sumadd(n3); - extract(m7); - muladd(n7, SECP256K1_N_C_1); - muladd(n6, SECP256K1_N_C_2); - muladd(n5, SECP256K1_N_C_3); - sumadd(n4); - extract(m8); - muladd(n7, SECP256K1_N_C_2); - muladd(n6, SECP256K1_N_C_3); - sumadd(n5); - extract(m9); - muladd(n7, SECP256K1_N_C_3); - sumadd(n6); - extract(m10); - sumadd_fast(n7); - extract_fast(m11); - VERIFY_CHECK(c0 <= 1); - m12 = c0; - - /* Reduce 385 bits into 258. */ - /* p[0..8] = m[0..7] + m[8..12] * SECP256K1_N_C. */ - c0 = m0; c1 = 0; c2 = 0; - muladd_fast(m8, SECP256K1_N_C_0); - extract_fast(p0); - sumadd_fast(m1); - muladd(m9, SECP256K1_N_C_0); - muladd(m8, SECP256K1_N_C_1); - extract(p1); - sumadd(m2); - muladd(m10, SECP256K1_N_C_0); - muladd(m9, SECP256K1_N_C_1); - muladd(m8, SECP256K1_N_C_2); - extract(p2); - sumadd(m3); - muladd(m11, SECP256K1_N_C_0); - muladd(m10, SECP256K1_N_C_1); - muladd(m9, SECP256K1_N_C_2); - muladd(m8, SECP256K1_N_C_3); - extract(p3); - sumadd(m4); - muladd(m12, SECP256K1_N_C_0); - muladd(m11, SECP256K1_N_C_1); - muladd(m10, SECP256K1_N_C_2); - muladd(m9, SECP256K1_N_C_3); - sumadd(m8); - extract(p4); - sumadd(m5); - muladd(m12, SECP256K1_N_C_1); - muladd(m11, SECP256K1_N_C_2); - muladd(m10, SECP256K1_N_C_3); - sumadd(m9); - extract(p5); - sumadd(m6); - muladd(m12, SECP256K1_N_C_2); - muladd(m11, SECP256K1_N_C_3); - sumadd(m10); - extract(p6); - sumadd_fast(m7); - muladd_fast(m12, SECP256K1_N_C_3); - sumadd_fast(m11); - extract_fast(p7); - p8 = c0 + m12; - VERIFY_CHECK(p8 <= 2); - - /* Reduce 258 bits into 256. */ - /* r[0..7] = p[0..7] + p[8] * SECP256K1_N_C. */ - c = p0 + (uint64_t)SECP256K1_N_C_0 * p8; - r->d[0] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; c >>= 32; - c += p1 + (uint64_t)SECP256K1_N_C_1 * p8; - r->d[1] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; c >>= 32; - c += p2 + (uint64_t)SECP256K1_N_C_2 * p8; - r->d[2] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; c >>= 32; - c += p3 + (uint64_t)SECP256K1_N_C_3 * p8; - r->d[3] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; c >>= 32; - c += p4 + (uint64_t)p8; - r->d[4] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; c >>= 32; - c += p5; - r->d[5] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; c >>= 32; - c += p6; - r->d[6] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; c >>= 32; - c += p7; - r->d[7] = c & 0xFFFFFFFFUL; c >>= 32; - - /* Final reduction of r. */ - secp256k1_scalar_reduce(r, c + secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r)); -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_mul_512(uint32_t *l, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { - /* 96 bit accumulator. */ - uint32_t c0 = 0, c1 = 0, c2 = 0; - - /* l[0..15] = a[0..7] * b[0..7]. */ - muladd_fast(a->d[0], b->d[0]); - extract_fast(l[0]); - muladd(a->d[0], b->d[1]); - muladd(a->d[1], b->d[0]); - extract(l[1]); - muladd(a->d[0], b->d[2]); - muladd(a->d[1], b->d[1]); - muladd(a->d[2], b->d[0]); - extract(l[2]); - muladd(a->d[0], b->d[3]); - muladd(a->d[1], b->d[2]); - muladd(a->d[2], b->d[1]); - muladd(a->d[3], b->d[0]); - extract(l[3]); - muladd(a->d[0], b->d[4]); - muladd(a->d[1], b->d[3]); - muladd(a->d[2], b->d[2]); - muladd(a->d[3], b->d[1]); - muladd(a->d[4], b->d[0]); - extract(l[4]); - muladd(a->d[0], b->d[5]); - muladd(a->d[1], b->d[4]); - muladd(a->d[2], b->d[3]); - muladd(a->d[3], b->d[2]); - muladd(a->d[4], b->d[1]); - muladd(a->d[5], b->d[0]); - extract(l[5]); - muladd(a->d[0], b->d[6]); - muladd(a->d[1], b->d[5]); - muladd(a->d[2], b->d[4]); - muladd(a->d[3], b->d[3]); - muladd(a->d[4], b->d[2]); - muladd(a->d[5], b->d[1]); - muladd(a->d[6], b->d[0]); - extract(l[6]); - muladd(a->d[0], b->d[7]); - muladd(a->d[1], b->d[6]); - muladd(a->d[2], b->d[5]); - muladd(a->d[3], b->d[4]); - muladd(a->d[4], b->d[3]); - muladd(a->d[5], b->d[2]); - muladd(a->d[6], b->d[1]); - muladd(a->d[7], b->d[0]); - extract(l[7]); - muladd(a->d[1], b->d[7]); - muladd(a->d[2], b->d[6]); - muladd(a->d[3], b->d[5]); - muladd(a->d[4], b->d[4]); - muladd(a->d[5], b->d[3]); - muladd(a->d[6], b->d[2]); - muladd(a->d[7], b->d[1]); - extract(l[8]); - muladd(a->d[2], b->d[7]); - muladd(a->d[3], b->d[6]); - muladd(a->d[4], b->d[5]); - muladd(a->d[5], b->d[4]); - muladd(a->d[6], b->d[3]); - muladd(a->d[7], b->d[2]); - extract(l[9]); - muladd(a->d[3], b->d[7]); - muladd(a->d[4], b->d[6]); - muladd(a->d[5], b->d[5]); - muladd(a->d[6], b->d[4]); - muladd(a->d[7], b->d[3]); - extract(l[10]); - muladd(a->d[4], b->d[7]); - muladd(a->d[5], b->d[6]); - muladd(a->d[6], b->d[5]); - muladd(a->d[7], b->d[4]); - extract(l[11]); - muladd(a->d[5], b->d[7]); - muladd(a->d[6], b->d[6]); - muladd(a->d[7], b->d[5]); - extract(l[12]); - muladd(a->d[6], b->d[7]); - muladd(a->d[7], b->d[6]); - extract(l[13]); - muladd_fast(a->d[7], b->d[7]); - extract_fast(l[14]); - VERIFY_CHECK(c1 == 0); - l[15] = c0; -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_sqr_512(uint32_t *l, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - /* 96 bit accumulator. */ - uint32_t c0 = 0, c1 = 0, c2 = 0; - - /* l[0..15] = a[0..7]^2. */ - muladd_fast(a->d[0], a->d[0]); - extract_fast(l[0]); - muladd2(a->d[0], a->d[1]); - extract(l[1]); - muladd2(a->d[0], a->d[2]); - muladd(a->d[1], a->d[1]); - extract(l[2]); - muladd2(a->d[0], a->d[3]); - muladd2(a->d[1], a->d[2]); - extract(l[3]); - muladd2(a->d[0], a->d[4]); - muladd2(a->d[1], a->d[3]); - muladd(a->d[2], a->d[2]); - extract(l[4]); - muladd2(a->d[0], a->d[5]); - muladd2(a->d[1], a->d[4]); - muladd2(a->d[2], a->d[3]); - extract(l[5]); - muladd2(a->d[0], a->d[6]); - muladd2(a->d[1], a->d[5]); - muladd2(a->d[2], a->d[4]); - muladd(a->d[3], a->d[3]); - extract(l[6]); - muladd2(a->d[0], a->d[7]); - muladd2(a->d[1], a->d[6]); - muladd2(a->d[2], a->d[5]); - muladd2(a->d[3], a->d[4]); - extract(l[7]); - muladd2(a->d[1], a->d[7]); - muladd2(a->d[2], a->d[6]); - muladd2(a->d[3], a->d[5]); - muladd(a->d[4], a->d[4]); - extract(l[8]); - muladd2(a->d[2], a->d[7]); - muladd2(a->d[3], a->d[6]); - muladd2(a->d[4], a->d[5]); - extract(l[9]); - muladd2(a->d[3], a->d[7]); - muladd2(a->d[4], a->d[6]); - muladd(a->d[5], a->d[5]); - extract(l[10]); - muladd2(a->d[4], a->d[7]); - muladd2(a->d[5], a->d[6]); - extract(l[11]); - muladd2(a->d[5], a->d[7]); - muladd(a->d[6], a->d[6]); - extract(l[12]); - muladd2(a->d[6], a->d[7]); - extract(l[13]); - muladd_fast(a->d[7], a->d[7]); - extract_fast(l[14]); - VERIFY_CHECK(c1 == 0); - l[15] = c0; -} - -#undef sumadd -#undef sumadd_fast -#undef muladd -#undef muladd_fast -#undef muladd2 -#undef extract -#undef extract_fast - -static void secp256k1_scalar_mul(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { - uint32_t l[16]; - secp256k1_scalar_mul_512(l, a, b); - secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(r, l); -} - -static int secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, int n) { - int ret; - VERIFY_CHECK(n > 0); - VERIFY_CHECK(n < 16); - ret = r->d[0] & ((1 << n) - 1); - r->d[0] = (r->d[0] >> n) + (r->d[1] << (32 - n)); - r->d[1] = (r->d[1] >> n) + (r->d[2] << (32 - n)); - r->d[2] = (r->d[2] >> n) + (r->d[3] << (32 - n)); - r->d[3] = (r->d[3] >> n) + (r->d[4] << (32 - n)); - r->d[4] = (r->d[4] >> n) + (r->d[5] << (32 - n)); - r->d[5] = (r->d[5] >> n) + (r->d[6] << (32 - n)); - r->d[6] = (r->d[6] >> n) + (r->d[7] << (32 - n)); - r->d[7] = (r->d[7] >> n); - return ret; -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_sqr(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - uint32_t l[16]; - secp256k1_scalar_sqr_512(l, a); - secp256k1_scalar_reduce_512(r, l); -} - -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM -static void secp256k1_scalar_split_128(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - r1->d[0] = a->d[0]; - r1->d[1] = a->d[1]; - r1->d[2] = a->d[2]; - r1->d[3] = a->d[3]; - r1->d[4] = 0; - r1->d[5] = 0; - r1->d[6] = 0; - r1->d[7] = 0; - r2->d[0] = a->d[4]; - r2->d[1] = a->d[5]; - r2->d[2] = a->d[6]; - r2->d[3] = a->d[7]; - r2->d[4] = 0; - r2->d[5] = 0; - r2->d[6] = 0; - r2->d[7] = 0; -} -#endif - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_eq(const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { - return ((a->d[0] ^ b->d[0]) | (a->d[1] ^ b->d[1]) | (a->d[2] ^ b->d[2]) | (a->d[3] ^ b->d[3]) | (a->d[4] ^ b->d[4]) | (a->d[5] ^ b->d[5]) | (a->d[6] ^ b->d[6]) | (a->d[7] ^ b->d[7])) == 0; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b, unsigned int shift) { - uint32_t l[16]; - unsigned int shiftlimbs; - unsigned int shiftlow; - unsigned int shifthigh; - VERIFY_CHECK(shift >= 256); - secp256k1_scalar_mul_512(l, a, b); - shiftlimbs = shift >> 5; - shiftlow = shift & 0x1F; - shifthigh = 32 - shiftlow; - r->d[0] = shift < 512 ? (l[0 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow | (shift < 480 && shiftlow ? (l[1 + shiftlimbs] << shifthigh) : 0)) : 0; - r->d[1] = shift < 480 ? (l[1 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow | (shift < 448 && shiftlow ? (l[2 + shiftlimbs] << shifthigh) : 0)) : 0; - r->d[2] = shift < 448 ? (l[2 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow | (shift < 416 && shiftlow ? (l[3 + shiftlimbs] << shifthigh) : 0)) : 0; - r->d[3] = shift < 416 ? (l[3 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow | (shift < 384 && shiftlow ? (l[4 + shiftlimbs] << shifthigh) : 0)) : 0; - r->d[4] = shift < 384 ? (l[4 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow | (shift < 352 && shiftlow ? (l[5 + shiftlimbs] << shifthigh) : 0)) : 0; - r->d[5] = shift < 352 ? (l[5 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow | (shift < 320 && shiftlow ? (l[6 + shiftlimbs] << shifthigh) : 0)) : 0; - r->d[6] = shift < 320 ? (l[6 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow | (shift < 288 && shiftlow ? (l[7 + shiftlimbs] << shifthigh) : 0)) : 0; - r->d[7] = shift < 288 ? (l[7 + shiftlimbs] >> shiftlow) : 0; - secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(r, 0, (l[(shift - 1) >> 5] >> ((shift - 1) & 0x1f)) & 1); -} - -#define ROTL32(x,n) ((x) << (n) | (x) >> (32-(n))) -#define QUARTERROUND(a,b,c,d) \ - a += b; d = ROTL32(d ^ a, 16); \ - c += d; b = ROTL32(b ^ c, 12); \ - a += b; d = ROTL32(d ^ a, 8); \ - c += d; b = ROTL32(b ^ c, 7); - -#ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN -#define LE32(p) ((((p) & 0xFF) << 24) | (((p) & 0xFF00) << 8) | (((p) & 0xFF0000) >> 8) | (((p) & 0xFF000000) >> 24)) -#define BE32(p) (p) -#else -#define BE32(p) ((((p) & 0xFF) << 24) | (((p) & 0xFF00) << 8) | (((p) & 0xFF0000) >> 8) | (((p) & 0xFF000000) >> 24)) -#define LE32(p) (p) -#endif - -static void secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const unsigned char *seed, uint64_t idx) { - size_t n; - size_t over_count = 0; - uint32_t seed32[8]; - uint32_t x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12, x13, x14, x15; - int over1, over2; - - memcpy((void *) seed32, (const void *) seed, 32); - do { - x0 = 0x61707865; - x1 = 0x3320646e; - x2 = 0x79622d32; - x3 = 0x6b206574; - x4 = LE32(seed32[0]); - x5 = LE32(seed32[1]); - x6 = LE32(seed32[2]); - x7 = LE32(seed32[3]); - x8 = LE32(seed32[4]); - x9 = LE32(seed32[5]); - x10 = LE32(seed32[6]); - x11 = LE32(seed32[7]); - x12 = idx; - x13 = idx >> 32; - x14 = 0; - x15 = over_count; - - n = 10; - while (n--) { - QUARTERROUND(x0, x4, x8,x12) - QUARTERROUND(x1, x5, x9,x13) - QUARTERROUND(x2, x6,x10,x14) - QUARTERROUND(x3, x7,x11,x15) - QUARTERROUND(x0, x5,x10,x15) - QUARTERROUND(x1, x6,x11,x12) - QUARTERROUND(x2, x7, x8,x13) - QUARTERROUND(x3, x4, x9,x14) - } - - x0 += 0x61707865; - x1 += 0x3320646e; - x2 += 0x79622d32; - x3 += 0x6b206574; - x4 += LE32(seed32[0]); - x5 += LE32(seed32[1]); - x6 += LE32(seed32[2]); - x7 += LE32(seed32[3]); - x8 += LE32(seed32[4]); - x9 += LE32(seed32[5]); - x10 += LE32(seed32[6]); - x11 += LE32(seed32[7]); - x12 += idx; - x13 += idx >> 32; - x14 += 0; - x15 += over_count; - - r1->d[7] = BE32(x0); - r1->d[6] = BE32(x1); - r1->d[5] = BE32(x2); - r1->d[4] = BE32(x3); - r1->d[3] = BE32(x4); - r1->d[2] = BE32(x5); - r1->d[1] = BE32(x6); - r1->d[0] = BE32(x7); - r2->d[7] = BE32(x8); - r2->d[6] = BE32(x9); - r2->d[5] = BE32(x10); - r2->d[4] = BE32(x11); - r2->d[3] = BE32(x12); - r2->d[2] = BE32(x13); - r2->d[1] = BE32(x14); - r2->d[0] = BE32(x15); - - over1 = secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r1); - over2 = secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r2); - over_count++; - } while (over1 | over2); -} - -#undef ROTL32 -#undef QUARTERROUND -#undef BE32 -#undef LE32 - -#endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index fa79057..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,333 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_SCALAR_IMPL_H -#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_IMPL_H - -#include "group.h" -#include "scalar.h" - -#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H -#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" -#endif - -#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) -#include "scalar_low_impl.h" -#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_4X64) -#include "scalar_4x64_impl.h" -#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_8X32) -#include "scalar_8x32_impl.h" -#else -#error "Please select scalar implementation" -#endif - -#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE -static void secp256k1_scalar_get_num(secp256k1_num *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - unsigned char c[32]; - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(c, a); - secp256k1_num_set_bin(r, c, 32); -} - -/** secp256k1 curve order, see secp256k1_ecdsa_const_order_as_fe in ecdsa_impl.h */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(secp256k1_num *r) { -#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) - static const unsigned char order[32] = { - 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, - 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, - 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, - 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - }; -#else - static const unsigned char order[32] = { - 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, - 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFE, - 0xBA,0xAE,0xDC,0xE6,0xAF,0x48,0xA0,0x3B, - 0xBF,0xD2,0x5E,0x8C,0xD0,0x36,0x41,0x41 - }; -#endif - secp256k1_num_set_bin(r, order, 32); -} -#endif - -static void secp256k1_scalar_inverse(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *x) { -#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) - int i; - *r = 0; - for (i = 0; i < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; i++) - if ((i * *x) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 1) - *r = i; - /* If this VERIFY_CHECK triggers we were given a noninvertible scalar (and thus - * have a composite group order; fix it in exhaustive_tests.c). */ - VERIFY_CHECK(*r != 0); -} -#else - secp256k1_scalar *t; - int i; - /* First compute xN as x ^ (2^N - 1) for some values of N, - * and uM as x ^ M for some values of M. */ - secp256k1_scalar x2, x3, x6, x8, x14, x28, x56, x112, x126; - secp256k1_scalar u2, u5, u9, u11, u13; - - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&u2, x); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x2, &u2, x); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&u5, &u2, &x2); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x3, &u5, &u2); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&u9, &x3, &u2); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&u11, &u9, &u2); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&u13, &u11, &u2); - - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x6, &u13); - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x6, &x6); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x6, &x6, &u11); - - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x8, &x6); - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x8, &x8); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x8, &x8, &x2); - - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x14, &x8); - for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x14, &x14); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x14, &x14, &x6); - - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x28, &x14); - for (i = 0; i < 13; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x28, &x28); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x28, &x28, &x14); - - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x56, &x28); - for (i = 0; i < 27; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x56, &x56); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x56, &x56, &x28); - - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x112, &x56); - for (i = 0; i < 55; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x112, &x112); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x112, &x112, &x56); - - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x126, &x112); - for (i = 0; i < 13; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&x126, &x126); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x126, &x126, &x14); - - /* Then accumulate the final result (t starts at x126). */ - t = &x126; - for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u5); /* 101 */ - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { /* 0 */ - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &x3); /* 111 */ - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { /* 0 */ - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u5); /* 101 */ - for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { /* 0 */ - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u11); /* 1011 */ - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u11); /* 1011 */ - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { /* 0 */ - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &x3); /* 111 */ - for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { /* 00 */ - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &x3); /* 111 */ - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { /* 00 */ - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u13); /* 1101 */ - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { /* 0 */ - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u5); /* 101 */ - for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &x3); /* 111 */ - for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { /* 0 */ - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u9); /* 1001 */ - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { /* 000 */ - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u5); /* 101 */ - for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { /* 0000000 */ - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &x3); /* 111 */ - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { /* 0 */ - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &x3); /* 111 */ - for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) { /* 0 */ - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &x8); /* 11111111 */ - for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { /* 0 */ - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u9); /* 1001 */ - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { /* 00 */ - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u11); /* 1011 */ - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u13); /* 1101 */ - for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &x2); /* 11 */ - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { /* 00 */ - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u13); /* 1101 */ - for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { /* 000000 */ - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u13); /* 1101 */ - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, &u9); /* 1001 */ - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { /* 00000 */ - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(t, t, x); /* 1 */ - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { /* 00 */ - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(t, t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(r, t, &x6); /* 111111 */ -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_even(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - return !(a->d[0] & 1); -} -#endif - -static void secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *x) { -#if defined(USE_SCALAR_INV_BUILTIN) - secp256k1_scalar_inverse(r, x); -#elif defined(USE_SCALAR_INV_NUM) - unsigned char b[32]; - secp256k1_num n, m; - secp256k1_scalar t = *x; - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(b, &t); - secp256k1_num_set_bin(&n, b, 32); - secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(&m); - secp256k1_num_mod_inverse(&n, &n, &m); - secp256k1_num_get_bin(b, 32, &n); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(r, b, NULL); - /* Verify that the inverse was computed correctly, without GMP code. */ - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&t, &t, r); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&t)); -#else -#error "Please select scalar inverse implementation" -#endif -} - -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM -#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) -/** - * Find k1 and k2 given k, such that k1 + k2 * lambda == k mod n; unlike in the - * full case we don't bother making k1 and k2 be small, we just want them to be - * nontrivial to get full test coverage for the exhaustive tests. We therefore - * (arbitrarily) set k2 = k + 5 and k1 = k - k2 * lambda. - */ -static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - *r2 = (*a + 5) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; - *r1 = (*a + (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - *r2) * EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_LAMBDA) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; -} -#else -/** - * The Secp256k1 curve has an endomorphism, where lambda * (x, y) = (beta * x, y), where - * lambda is {0x53,0x63,0xad,0x4c,0xc0,0x5c,0x30,0xe0,0xa5,0x26,0x1c,0x02,0x88,0x12,0x64,0x5a, - * 0x12,0x2e,0x22,0xea,0x20,0x81,0x66,0x78,0xdf,0x02,0x96,0x7c,0x1b,0x23,0xbd,0x72} - * - * "Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography" (Hankerson, Menezes, Vanstone) gives an algorithm - * (algorithm 3.74) to find k1 and k2 given k, such that k1 + k2 * lambda == k mod n, and k1 - * and k2 have a small size. - * It relies on constants a1, b1, a2, b2. These constants for the value of lambda above are: - * - * - a1 = {0x30,0x86,0xd2,0x21,0xa7,0xd4,0x6b,0xcd,0xe8,0x6c,0x90,0xe4,0x92,0x84,0xeb,0x15} - * - b1 = -{0xe4,0x43,0x7e,0xd6,0x01,0x0e,0x88,0x28,0x6f,0x54,0x7f,0xa9,0x0a,0xbf,0xe4,0xc3} - * - a2 = {0x01,0x14,0xca,0x50,0xf7,0xa8,0xe2,0xf3,0xf6,0x57,0xc1,0x10,0x8d,0x9d,0x44,0xcf,0xd8} - * - b2 = {0x30,0x86,0xd2,0x21,0xa7,0xd4,0x6b,0xcd,0xe8,0x6c,0x90,0xe4,0x92,0x84,0xeb,0x15} - * - * The algorithm then computes c1 = round(b1 * k / n) and c2 = round(b2 * k / n), and gives - * k1 = k - (c1*a1 + c2*a2) and k2 = -(c1*b1 + c2*b2). Instead, we use modular arithmetic, and - * compute k1 as k - k2 * lambda, avoiding the need for constants a1 and a2. - * - * g1, g2 are precomputed constants used to replace division with a rounded multiplication - * when decomposing the scalar for an endomorphism-based point multiplication. - * - * The possibility of using precomputed estimates is mentioned in "Guide to Elliptic Curve - * Cryptography" (Hankerson, Menezes, Vanstone) in section 3.5. - * - * The derivation is described in the paper "Efficient Software Implementation of Public-Key - * Cryptography on Sensor Networks Using the MSP430X Microcontroller" (Gouvea, Oliveira, Lopez), - * Section 4.3 (here we use a somewhat higher-precision estimate): - * d = a1*b2 - b1*a2 - * g1 = round((2^272)*b2/d) - * g2 = round((2^272)*b1/d) - * - * (Note that 'd' is also equal to the curve order here because [a1,b1] and [a2,b2] are found - * as outputs of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm on inputs 'order' and 'lambda'). - * - * The function below splits a in r1 and r2, such that r1 + lambda * r2 == a (mod order). - */ - -static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - secp256k1_scalar c1, c2; - static const secp256k1_scalar minus_lambda = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( - 0xAC9C52B3UL, 0x3FA3CF1FUL, 0x5AD9E3FDUL, 0x77ED9BA4UL, - 0xA880B9FCUL, 0x8EC739C2UL, 0xE0CFC810UL, 0xB51283CFUL - ); - static const secp256k1_scalar minus_b1 = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( - 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, - 0xE4437ED6UL, 0x010E8828UL, 0x6F547FA9UL, 0x0ABFE4C3UL - ); - static const secp256k1_scalar minus_b2 = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( - 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFEUL, - 0x8A280AC5UL, 0x0774346DUL, 0xD765CDA8UL, 0x3DB1562CUL - ); - static const secp256k1_scalar g1 = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( - 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x00003086UL, - 0xD221A7D4UL, 0x6BCDE86CUL, 0x90E49284UL, 0xEB153DABUL - ); - static const secp256k1_scalar g2 = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( - 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x0000E443UL, - 0x7ED6010EUL, 0x88286F54UL, 0x7FA90ABFUL, 0xE4C42212UL - ); - VERIFY_CHECK(r1 != a); - VERIFY_CHECK(r2 != a); - /* these _var calls are constant time since the shift amount is constant */ - secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(&c1, a, &g1, 272); - secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(&c2, a, &g2, 272); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&c1, &c1, &minus_b1); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&c2, &c2, &minus_b2); - secp256k1_scalar_add(r2, &c1, &c2); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(r1, r2, &minus_lambda); - secp256k1_scalar_add(r1, r1, a); -} -#endif -#endif - -#endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_low.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_low.h deleted file mode 100644 index 5836feb..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_low.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2015 Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H -#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H - -#include - -/** A scalar modulo the group order of the secp256k1 curve. */ -typedef uint32_t secp256k1_scalar; - -#endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_low_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_low_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index d6fdead..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scalar_low_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,120 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2015 Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H -#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H - -#include "scalar.h" - -#include - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_even(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - return !(*a & 1); -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_clear(secp256k1_scalar *r) { *r = 0; } -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_set_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int v) { *r = v; } -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_set_u64(secp256k1_scalar *r, uint64_t v) { *r = v % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; } - -SECP256K1_INLINE static unsigned int secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(const secp256k1_scalar *a, unsigned int offset, unsigned int count) { - if (offset < 32) - return ((*a >> offset) & ((((uint32_t)1) << count) - 1)); - else - return 0; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static unsigned int secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(const secp256k1_scalar *a, unsigned int offset, unsigned int count) { - return secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(a, offset, count); -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { return *a >= EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; } - -static int secp256k1_scalar_add(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { - *r = (*a + *b) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; - return *r < *b; -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int bit, int flag) { - if (flag && bit < 32) - *r += (1 << bit); -#ifdef VERIFY - VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r) == 0); -#endif -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(secp256k1_scalar *r, const unsigned char *b32, int *overflow) { - const int base = 0x100 % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; - int i; - *r = 0; - for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { - *r = ((*r * base) + b32[i]) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; - } - /* just deny overflow, it basically always happens */ - if (overflow) *overflow = 0; -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(unsigned char *bin, const secp256k1_scalar* a) { - memset(bin, 0, 32); - bin[28] = *a >> 24; bin[29] = *a >> 16; bin[30] = *a >> 8; bin[31] = *a; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - return *a == 0; -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - if (*a == 0) { - *r = 0; - } else { - *r = EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - *a; - } -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_one(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - return *a == 1; -} - -static int secp256k1_scalar_is_high(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - return *a > EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER / 2; -} - -static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) { - if (flag) secp256k1_scalar_negate(r, r); - return flag ? -1 : 1; -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_mul(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { - *r = (*a * *b) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; -} - -static int secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, int n) { - int ret; - VERIFY_CHECK(n > 0); - VERIFY_CHECK(n < 16); - ret = *r & ((1 << n) - 1); - *r >>= n; - return ret; -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_sqr(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - *r = (*a * *a) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; -} - -static void secp256k1_scalar_split_128(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a) { - *r1 = *a; - *r2 = 0; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_eq(const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) { - return *a == *b; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const unsigned char *seed, uint64_t n) { - *r1 = (seed[0] + n) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; - *r2 = (seed[1] + n) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; -} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scratch.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scratch.h deleted file mode 100644 index fef377a..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scratch.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2017 Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef _SECP256K1_SCRATCH_ -#define _SECP256K1_SCRATCH_ - -#define SECP256K1_SCRATCH_MAX_FRAMES 5 - -/* The typedef is used internally; the struct name is used in the public API - * (where it is exposed as a different typedef) */ -typedef struct secp256k1_scratch_space_struct { - void *data[SECP256K1_SCRATCH_MAX_FRAMES]; - size_t offset[SECP256K1_SCRATCH_MAX_FRAMES]; - size_t frame_size[SECP256K1_SCRATCH_MAX_FRAMES]; - size_t frame; - size_t max_size; - const secp256k1_callback* error_callback; -} secp256k1_scratch; - -static secp256k1_scratch* secp256k1_scratch_create(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, size_t max_size); - -static void secp256k1_scratch_destroy(secp256k1_scratch* scratch); - -/** Attempts to allocate a new stack frame with `n` available bytes. Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure */ -static int secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t n, size_t objects); - -/** Deallocates a stack frame */ -static void secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(secp256k1_scratch* scratch); - -/** Returns the maximum allocation the scratch space will allow */ -static size_t secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(const secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t n_objects); - -/** Returns a pointer into the most recently allocated frame, or NULL if there is insufficient available space */ -static void *secp256k1_scratch_alloc(secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t n); - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scratch_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scratch_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index abed713..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/scratch_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,86 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2017 Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef _SECP256K1_SCRATCH_IMPL_H_ -#define _SECP256K1_SCRATCH_IMPL_H_ - -#include "scratch.h" - -/* Using 16 bytes alignment because common architectures never have alignment - * requirements above 8 for any of the types we care about. In addition we - * leave some room because currently we don't care about a few bytes. - * TODO: Determine this at configure time. */ -#define ALIGNMENT 16 - -static secp256k1_scratch* secp256k1_scratch_create(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, size_t max_size) { - secp256k1_scratch* ret = (secp256k1_scratch*)checked_malloc(error_callback, sizeof(*ret)); - if (ret != NULL) { - memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret)); - ret->max_size = max_size; - ret->error_callback = error_callback; - } - return ret; -} - -static void secp256k1_scratch_destroy(secp256k1_scratch* scratch) { - if (scratch != NULL) { - VERIFY_CHECK(scratch->frame == 0); - free(scratch); - } -} - -static size_t secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(const secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t objects) { - size_t i = 0; - size_t allocated = 0; - for (i = 0; i < scratch->frame; i++) { - allocated += scratch->frame_size[i]; - } - if (scratch->max_size - allocated <= objects * ALIGNMENT) { - return 0; - } - return scratch->max_size - allocated - objects * ALIGNMENT; -} - -static int secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t n, size_t objects) { - VERIFY_CHECK(scratch->frame < SECP256K1_SCRATCH_MAX_FRAMES); - - if (n <= secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(scratch, objects)) { - n += objects * ALIGNMENT; - scratch->data[scratch->frame] = checked_malloc(scratch->error_callback, n); - if (scratch->data[scratch->frame] == NULL) { - return 0; - } - scratch->frame_size[scratch->frame] = n; - scratch->offset[scratch->frame] = 0; - scratch->frame++; - return 1; - } else { - return 0; - } -} - -static void secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(secp256k1_scratch* scratch) { - VERIFY_CHECK(scratch->frame > 0); - scratch->frame -= 1; - free(scratch->data[scratch->frame]); -} - -static void *secp256k1_scratch_alloc(secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t size) { - void *ret; - size_t frame = scratch->frame - 1; - size = ((size + ALIGNMENT - 1) / ALIGNMENT) * ALIGNMENT; - - if (scratch->frame == 0 || size + scratch->offset[frame] > scratch->frame_size[frame]) { - return NULL; - } - ret = (void *) ((unsigned char *) scratch->data[frame] + scratch->offset[frame]); - memset(ret, 0, size); - scratch->offset[frame] += size; - - return ret; -} - -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/secp256k1.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/secp256k1.c deleted file mode 100644 index 159768a..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/secp256k1.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,637 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013-2015 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#include "include/secp256k1.h" - -#include "util.h" -#include "num_impl.h" -#include "field_impl.h" -#include "scalar_impl.h" -#include "group_impl.h" -#include "ecmult_impl.h" -#include "ecmult_const_impl.h" -#include "ecmult_gen_impl.h" -#include "ecdsa_impl.h" -#include "eckey_impl.h" -#include "hash_impl.h" -#include "scratch_impl.h" - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR -# include "include/secp256k1_generator.h" -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_COMMITMENT -# include "include/secp256k1_commitment.h" -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RANGEPROOF -# include "include/secp256k1_rangeproof.h" -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_BULLETPROOF -# include "include/secp256k1_bulletproofs.h" -#endif - -#define ARG_CHECK(cond) do { \ - if (EXPECT(!(cond), 0)) { \ - secp256k1_callback_call(&ctx->illegal_callback, #cond); \ - return 0; \ - } \ -} while(0) - -static void default_illegal_callback_fn(const char* str, void* data) { - (void)data; - fprintf(stderr, "[libsecp256k1] illegal argument: %s\n", str); - abort(); -} - -static const secp256k1_callback default_illegal_callback = { - default_illegal_callback_fn, - NULL -}; - -static void default_error_callback_fn(const char* str, void* data) { - (void)data; - fprintf(stderr, "[libsecp256k1] internal consistency check failed: %s\n", str); - abort(); -} - -static const secp256k1_callback default_error_callback = { - default_error_callback_fn, - NULL -}; - - -struct secp256k1_context_struct { - secp256k1_ecmult_context ecmult_ctx; - secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context ecmult_gen_ctx; - secp256k1_callback illegal_callback; - secp256k1_callback error_callback; -}; - -secp256k1_context* secp256k1_context_create(unsigned int flags) { - secp256k1_context* ret = (secp256k1_context*)checked_malloc(&default_error_callback, sizeof(secp256k1_context)); - ret->illegal_callback = default_illegal_callback; - ret->error_callback = default_error_callback; - - if (EXPECT((flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_MASK) != SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT, 0)) { - secp256k1_callback_call(&ret->illegal_callback, - "Invalid flags"); - free(ret); - return NULL; - } - - secp256k1_ecmult_context_init(&ret->ecmult_ctx); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_init(&ret->ecmult_gen_ctx); - - if (flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN) { - secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_build(&ret->ecmult_gen_ctx, &ret->error_callback); - } - if (flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY) { - secp256k1_ecmult_context_build(&ret->ecmult_ctx, &ret->error_callback); - } - - return ret; -} - -secp256k1_context* secp256k1_context_clone(const secp256k1_context* ctx) { - secp256k1_context* ret = (secp256k1_context*)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, sizeof(secp256k1_context)); - ret->illegal_callback = ctx->illegal_callback; - ret->error_callback = ctx->error_callback; - secp256k1_ecmult_context_clone(&ret->ecmult_ctx, &ctx->ecmult_ctx, &ctx->error_callback); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_clone(&ret->ecmult_gen_ctx, &ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &ctx->error_callback); - return ret; -} - -void secp256k1_context_destroy(secp256k1_context* ctx) { - if (ctx != NULL) { - secp256k1_ecmult_context_clear(&ctx->ecmult_ctx); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_clear(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx); - - free(ctx); - } -} - -void secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(secp256k1_context* ctx, void (*fun)(const char* message, void* data), const void* data) { - if (fun == NULL) { - fun = default_illegal_callback_fn; - } - ctx->illegal_callback.fn = fun; - ctx->illegal_callback.data = data; -} - -void secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(secp256k1_context* ctx, void (*fun)(const char* message, void* data), const void* data) { - if (fun == NULL) { - fun = default_error_callback_fn; - } - ctx->error_callback.fn = fun; - ctx->error_callback.data = data; -} - -secp256k1_scratch_space* secp256k1_scratch_space_create(const secp256k1_context* ctx, size_t max_size) { - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - return secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, max_size); -} - -void secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy(secp256k1_scratch_space* scratch) { - secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); -} - -static int secp256k1_pubkey_load(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ge* ge, const secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey) { - if (sizeof(secp256k1_ge_storage) == 64) { - /* When the secp256k1_ge_storage type is exactly 64 byte, use its - * representation inside secp256k1_pubkey, as conversion is very fast. - * Note that secp256k1_pubkey_save must use the same representation. */ - secp256k1_ge_storage s; - memcpy(&s, &pubkey->data[0], sizeof(s)); - secp256k1_ge_from_storage(ge, &s); - } else { - /* Otherwise, fall back to 32-byte big endian for X and Y. */ - secp256k1_fe x, y; - secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&x, pubkey->data); - secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&y, pubkey->data + 32); - secp256k1_ge_set_xy(ge, &x, &y); - } - ARG_CHECK(!secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&ge->x)); - return 1; -} - -static void secp256k1_pubkey_save(secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey, secp256k1_ge* ge) { - if (sizeof(secp256k1_ge_storage) == 64) { - secp256k1_ge_storage s; - secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&s, ge); - memcpy(&pubkey->data[0], &s, sizeof(s)); - } else { - VERIFY_CHECK(!secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(ge)); - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&ge->x); - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&ge->y); - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(pubkey->data, &ge->x); - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(pubkey->data + 32, &ge->y); - } -} - -int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey, const unsigned char *input, size_t inputlen) { - secp256k1_ge Q; - - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); - memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey)); - ARG_CHECK(input != NULL); - if (!secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&Q, input, inputlen)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &Q); - secp256k1_ge_clear(&Q); - return 1; -} - -int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *outputlen, const secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey, unsigned int flags) { - secp256k1_ge Q; - size_t len; - int ret = 0; - - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(outputlen != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(*outputlen >= ((flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION) ? 33 : 65)); - len = *outputlen; - *outputlen = 0; - ARG_CHECK(output != NULL); - memset(output, 0, len); - ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); - ARG_CHECK((flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_MASK) == SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION); - if (secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &Q, pubkey)) { - ret = secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&Q, output, &len, flags & SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION); - if (ret) { - *outputlen = len; - } - } - return ret; -} - -static void secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_scalar* r, secp256k1_scalar* s, const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig) { - (void)ctx; - if (sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) == 32) { - /* When the secp256k1_scalar type is exactly 32 byte, use its - * representation inside secp256k1_ecdsa_signature, as conversion is very fast. - * Note that secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save must use the same representation. */ - memcpy(r, &sig->data[0], 32); - memcpy(s, &sig->data[32], 32); - } else { - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(r, &sig->data[0], NULL); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(s, &sig->data[32], NULL); - } -} - -static void secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig, const secp256k1_scalar* r, const secp256k1_scalar* s) { - if (sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) == 32) { - memcpy(&sig->data[0], r, 32); - memcpy(&sig->data[32], s, 32); - } else { - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&sig->data[0], r); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&sig->data[32], s); - } -} - -int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig, const unsigned char *input, size_t inputlen) { - secp256k1_scalar r, s; - - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(input != NULL); - - if (secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_parse(&r, &s, input, inputlen)) { - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(sig, &r, &s); - return 1; - } else { - memset(sig, 0, sizeof(*sig)); - return 0; - } -} - -int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig, const unsigned char *input64) { - secp256k1_scalar r, s; - int ret = 1; - int overflow = 0; - - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(input64 != NULL); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&r, &input64[0], &overflow); - ret &= !overflow; - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s, &input64[32], &overflow); - ret &= !overflow; - if (ret) { - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(sig, &r, &s); - } else { - memset(sig, 0, sizeof(*sig)); - } - return ret; -} - -int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *outputlen, const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig) { - secp256k1_scalar r, s; - - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(output != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(outputlen != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); - - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, sig); - return secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_serialize(output, outputlen, &r, &s); -} - -int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output64, const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig) { - secp256k1_scalar r, s; - - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(output64 != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); - - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, sig); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&output64[0], &r); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&output64[32], &s); - return 1; -} - -int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigout, const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigin) { - secp256k1_scalar r, s; - int ret = 0; - - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(sigin != NULL); - - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, sigin); - ret = secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s); - if (sigout != NULL) { - if (ret) { - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s, &s); - } - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(sigout, &r, &s); - } - - return ret; -} - -int secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig, const unsigned char *msg32, const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey) { - secp256k1_ge q; - secp256k1_scalar r, s; - secp256k1_scalar m; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); - ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(sig != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&m, msg32, NULL); - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, sig); - return (!secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s) && - secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &q, pubkey) && - secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &r, &s, &q, &m)); -} - -static SECP256K1_INLINE void buffer_append(unsigned char *buf, unsigned int *offset, const void *data, unsigned int len) { - memcpy(buf + *offset, data, len); - *offset += len; -} - -static int nonce_function_rfc6979(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *algo16, void *data, unsigned int counter) { - unsigned char keydata[112]; - unsigned int offset = 0; - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 rng; - unsigned int i; - /* We feed a byte array to the PRNG as input, consisting of: - * - the private key (32 bytes) and message (32 bytes), see RFC 6979 3.2d. - * - optionally 32 extra bytes of data, see RFC 6979 3.6 Additional Data. - * - optionally 16 extra bytes with the algorithm name. - * Because the arguments have distinct fixed lengths it is not possible for - * different argument mixtures to emulate each other and result in the same - * nonces. - */ - buffer_append(keydata, &offset, key32, 32); - buffer_append(keydata, &offset, msg32, 32); - if (data != NULL) { - buffer_append(keydata, &offset, data, 32); - } - if (algo16 != NULL) { - buffer_append(keydata, &offset, algo16, 16); - } - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, keydata, offset); - memset(keydata, 0, sizeof(keydata)); - for (i = 0; i <= counter; i++) { - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, nonce32, 32); - } - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(&rng); - return 1; -} - -const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979 = nonce_function_rfc6979; -const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_default = nonce_function_rfc6979; - -int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *signature, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *seckey, secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, const void* noncedata) { - secp256k1_scalar r, s; - secp256k1_scalar sec, non, msg; - int ret = 0; - int overflow = 0; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); - ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(signature != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); - if (noncefp == NULL) { - noncefp = secp256k1_nonce_function_default; - } - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, &overflow); - /* Fail if the secret key is invalid. */ - if (!overflow && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec)) { - unsigned char nonce32[32]; - unsigned int count = 0; - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&msg, msg32, NULL); - while (1) { - ret = noncefp(nonce32, msg32, seckey, NULL, (void*)noncedata, count); - if (!ret) { - break; - } - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&non, nonce32, &overflow); - if (!overflow && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&non)) { - if (secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &r, &s, &sec, &msg, &non, NULL)) { - break; - } - } - count++; - } - memset(nonce32, 0, 32); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&msg); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&non); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); - } - if (ret) { - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(signature, &r, &s); - } else { - memset(signature, 0, sizeof(*signature)); - } - return ret; -} - -int secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const unsigned char *seckey) { - secp256k1_scalar sec; - int ret; - int overflow; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, &overflow); - ret = !overflow && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); - return ret; -} - -int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, const unsigned char *seckey) { - secp256k1_gej pj; - secp256k1_ge p; - secp256k1_scalar sec; - int overflow; - int ret = 0; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); - memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey)); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); - ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, &overflow); - ret = (!overflow) & (!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec)); - if (ret) { - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pj, &sec); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&p, &pj); - secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &p); - } - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); - return ret; -} - -int secp256k1_ec_privkey_negate(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *seckey) { - secp256k1_scalar sec; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, NULL); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&sec, &sec); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(seckey, &sec); - - return 1; -} - -int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey) { - int ret = 0; - secp256k1_ge p; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); - - ret = secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &p, pubkey); - memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey)); - if (ret) { - secp256k1_ge_neg(&p, &p); - secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &p); - } - return ret; -} - -int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *seckey, const unsigned char *tweak) { - secp256k1_scalar term; - secp256k1_scalar sec; - int ret = 0; - int overflow = 0; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(tweak != NULL); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&term, tweak, &overflow); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, NULL); - - ret = !overflow && secp256k1_eckey_privkey_tweak_add(&sec, &term); - memset(seckey, 0, 32); - if (ret) { - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(seckey, &sec); - } - - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&term); - return ret; -} - -int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, const unsigned char *tweak) { - secp256k1_ge p; - secp256k1_scalar term; - int ret = 0; - int overflow = 0; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); - ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(tweak != NULL); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&term, tweak, &overflow); - ret = !overflow && secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &p, pubkey); - memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey)); - if (ret) { - if (secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_add(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &p, &term)) { - secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &p); - } else { - ret = 0; - } - } - - return ret; -} - -int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *seckey, const unsigned char *tweak) { - secp256k1_scalar factor; - secp256k1_scalar sec; - int ret = 0; - int overflow = 0; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(tweak != NULL); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&factor, tweak, &overflow); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, NULL); - ret = !overflow && secp256k1_eckey_privkey_tweak_mul(&sec, &factor); - memset(seckey, 0, 32); - if (ret) { - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(seckey, &sec); - } - - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&factor); - return ret; -} - -int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, const unsigned char *tweak) { - secp256k1_ge p; - secp256k1_scalar factor; - int ret = 0; - int overflow = 0; - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx)); - ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(tweak != NULL); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&factor, tweak, &overflow); - ret = !overflow && secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &p, pubkey); - memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey)); - if (ret) { - if (secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_mul(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &p, &factor)) { - secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &p); - } else { - ret = 0; - } - } - - return ret; -} - -int secp256k1_context_randomize(secp256k1_context* ctx, const unsigned char *seed32) { - VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL); - ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx)); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, seed32); - return 1; -} - -int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubnonce, const secp256k1_pubkey * const *pubnonces, size_t n) { - size_t i; - secp256k1_gej Qj; - secp256k1_ge Q; - - ARG_CHECK(pubnonce != NULL); - memset(pubnonce, 0, sizeof(*pubnonce)); - ARG_CHECK(n >= 1); - ARG_CHECK(pubnonces != NULL); - - secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&Qj); - - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &Q, pubnonces[i]); - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&Qj, &Qj, &Q); - } - if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&Qj)) { - return 0; - } - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&Q, &Qj); - secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubnonce, &Q); - return 1; -} - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH -# include "modules/ecdh/main_impl.h" -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY -# include "modules/recovery/main_impl.h" -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR -# include "modules/generator/main_impl.h" -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_COMMITMENT -# include "modules/commitment/main_impl.h" -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RANGEPROOF -# include "modules/rangeproof/main_impl.h" -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_BULLETPROOF -# include "modules/bulletproofs/main_impl.h" -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_WHITELIST -# include "modules/whitelist/main_impl.h" -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SURJECTIONPROOF -# include "modules/surjection/main_impl.h" -#endif diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/testrand.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/testrand.h deleted file mode 100644 index 8259959..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/testrand.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_TESTRAND_H -#define SECP256K1_TESTRAND_H - -#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H -#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" -#endif - -/* A non-cryptographic RNG used only for test infrastructure. */ - -/** Seed the pseudorandom number generator for testing. */ -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_rand_seed(const unsigned char *seed16); - -/** Generate a pseudorandom number in the range [0..2**32-1]. */ -static uint32_t secp256k1_rand32(void); - -/** Generate a pseudorandom number in the range [0..2**bits-1]. Bits must be 1 or - * more. */ -static uint32_t secp256k1_rand_bits(int bits); - -/** Generate a pseudorandom number in the range [0..range-1]. */ -static uint32_t secp256k1_rand_int(uint32_t range); - -/** Generate a pseudorandom 32-byte array. */ -static void secp256k1_rand256(unsigned char *b32); - -/** Generate a pseudorandom 32-byte array with long sequences of zero and one bits. */ -static void secp256k1_rand256_test(unsigned char *b32); - -/** Generate pseudorandom bytes with long sequences of zero and one bits. */ -static void secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(unsigned char *bytes, size_t len); - -/** Generate a pseudorandom 64-bit integer in the range min..max, inclusive. */ -static int64_t secp256k1_rands64(uint64_t min, uint64_t max); - -#endif /* SECP256K1_TESTRAND_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/testrand_impl.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/testrand_impl.h deleted file mode 100644 index 0db523d..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/testrand_impl.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,127 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013-2015 Pieter Wuille, Gregory Maxwell * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_TESTRAND_IMPL_H -#define SECP256K1_TESTRAND_IMPL_H - -#include -#include - -#include "testrand.h" -#include "hash.h" - -static secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 secp256k1_test_rng; -static uint32_t secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed[8]; -static int secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed_used = 8; -static uint64_t secp256k1_test_rng_integer; -static int secp256k1_test_rng_integer_bits_left = 0; - -SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_rand_seed(const unsigned char *seed16) { - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&secp256k1_test_rng, seed16, 16); -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static uint32_t secp256k1_rand32(void) { - if (secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed_used == 8) { - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&secp256k1_test_rng, (unsigned char*)(&secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed[0]), sizeof(secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed)); - secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed_used = 0; - } - return secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed[secp256k1_test_rng_precomputed_used++]; -} - -static uint32_t secp256k1_rand_bits(int bits) { - uint32_t ret; - if (secp256k1_test_rng_integer_bits_left < bits) { - secp256k1_test_rng_integer |= (((uint64_t)secp256k1_rand32()) << secp256k1_test_rng_integer_bits_left); - secp256k1_test_rng_integer_bits_left += 32; - } - ret = secp256k1_test_rng_integer; - secp256k1_test_rng_integer >>= bits; - secp256k1_test_rng_integer_bits_left -= bits; - ret &= ((~((uint32_t)0)) >> (32 - bits)); - return ret; -} - -static uint32_t secp256k1_rand_int(uint32_t range) { - /* We want a uniform integer between 0 and range-1, inclusive. - * B is the smallest number such that range <= 2**B. - * two mechanisms implemented here: - * - generate B bits numbers until one below range is found, and return it - * - find the largest multiple M of range that is <= 2**(B+A), generate B+A - * bits numbers until one below M is found, and return it modulo range - * The second mechanism consumes A more bits of entropy in every iteration, - * but may need fewer iterations due to M being closer to 2**(B+A) then - * range is to 2**B. The array below (indexed by B) contains a 0 when the - * first mechanism is to be used, and the number A otherwise. - */ - static const int addbits[] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 1, 0}; - uint32_t trange, mult; - int bits = 0; - if (range <= 1) { - return 0; - } - trange = range - 1; - while (trange > 0) { - trange >>= 1; - bits++; - } - if (addbits[bits]) { - bits = bits + addbits[bits]; - mult = ((~((uint32_t)0)) >> (32 - bits)) / range; - trange = range * mult; - } else { - trange = range; - mult = 1; - } - while(1) { - uint32_t x = secp256k1_rand_bits(bits); - if (x < trange) { - return (mult == 1) ? x : (x % range); - } - } -} - -static void secp256k1_rand256(unsigned char *b32) { - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&secp256k1_test_rng, b32, 32); -} - -static void secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(unsigned char *bytes, size_t len) { - size_t bits = 0; - memset(bytes, 0, len); - while (bits < len * 8) { - int now; - uint32_t val; - now = 1 + (secp256k1_rand_bits(6) * secp256k1_rand_bits(5) + 16) / 31; - val = secp256k1_rand_bits(1); - while (now > 0 && bits < len * 8) { - bytes[bits / 8] |= val << (bits % 8); - now--; - bits++; - } - } -} - -static void secp256k1_rand256_test(unsigned char *b32) { - secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(b32, 32); -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int64_t secp256k1_rands64(uint64_t min, uint64_t max) { - uint64_t range; - uint64_t r; - uint64_t clz; - VERIFY_CHECK(max >= min); - if (max == min) { - return min; - } - range = max - min; - clz = secp256k1_clz64_var(range); - do { - r = ((uint64_t)secp256k1_rand32() << 32) | secp256k1_rand32(); - r >>= clz; - } while (r > range); - return min + (int64_t)r; -} - -#endif /* SECP256K1_TESTRAND_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/tests.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/tests.c deleted file mode 100644 index 7b0af8a..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/tests.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5231 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013-2015 Pieter Wuille, Gregory Maxwell * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H -#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" -#endif - -#include -#include -#include - -#include - -#include "secp256k1.c" -#include "include/secp256k1.h" -#include "testrand_impl.h" - -#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS -#include "openssl/bn.h" -#include "openssl/ec.h" -#include "openssl/ecdsa.h" -#include "openssl/obj_mac.h" -# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L -void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps) {*pr = sig->r; *ps = sig->s;} -# endif -#endif - -#include "contrib/lax_der_parsing.c" -#include "contrib/lax_der_privatekey_parsing.c" - -#if !defined(VG_CHECK) -# if defined(VALGRIND) -# include -# define VG_UNDEF(x,y) VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED((x),(y)) -# define VG_CHECK(x,y) VALGRIND_CHECK_MEM_IS_DEFINED((x),(y)) -# else -# define VG_UNDEF(x,y) -# define VG_CHECK(x,y) -# endif -#endif - -static int count = 64; -static secp256k1_context *ctx = NULL; - -static void counting_illegal_callback_fn(const char* str, void* data) { - /* Dummy callback function that just counts. */ - int32_t *p; - (void)str; - p = data; - (*p)++; -} - -static void uncounting_illegal_callback_fn(const char* str, void* data) { - /* Dummy callback function that just counts (backwards). */ - int32_t *p; - (void)str; - p = data; - (*p)--; -} - -void random_field_element_test(secp256k1_fe *fe) { - do { - unsigned char b32[32]; - secp256k1_rand256_test(b32); - if (secp256k1_fe_set_b32(fe, b32)) { - break; - } - } while(1); -} - -void random_field_element_magnitude(secp256k1_fe *fe) { - secp256k1_fe zero; - int n = secp256k1_rand_int(9); - secp256k1_fe_normalize(fe); - if (n == 0) { - return; - } - secp256k1_fe_clear(&zero); - secp256k1_fe_negate(&zero, &zero, 0); - secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&zero, n - 1); - secp256k1_fe_add(fe, &zero); - VERIFY_CHECK(fe->magnitude == n); -} - -void random_group_element_test(secp256k1_ge *ge) { - secp256k1_fe fe; - do { - random_field_element_test(&fe); - if (secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(ge, &fe, secp256k1_rand_bits(1))) { - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&ge->y); - break; - } - } while(1); -} - -void random_group_element_jacobian_test(secp256k1_gej *gej, const secp256k1_ge *ge) { - secp256k1_fe z2, z3; - do { - random_field_element_test(&gej->z); - if (!secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&gej->z)) { - break; - } - } while(1); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z2, &gej->z); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&z3, &z2, &gej->z); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&gej->x, &ge->x, &z2); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&gej->y, &ge->y, &z3); - gej->infinity = ge->infinity; -} - -void random_scalar_order_test(secp256k1_scalar *num) { - do { - unsigned char b32[32]; - int overflow = 0; - secp256k1_rand256_test(b32); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(num, b32, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(num)) { - continue; - } - break; - } while(1); -} - -void random_scalar_order(secp256k1_scalar *num) { - do { - unsigned char b32[32]; - int overflow = 0; - secp256k1_rand256(b32); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(num, b32, &overflow); - if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(num)) { - continue; - } - break; - } while(1); -} - -void run_util_tests(void) { - int i; - uint64_t r; - uint64_t r2; - uint64_t r3; - int64_t s; - CHECK(secp256k1_clz64_var(0) == 64); - CHECK(secp256k1_clz64_var(1) == 63); - CHECK(secp256k1_clz64_var(2) == 62); - CHECK(secp256k1_clz64_var(3) == 62); - CHECK(secp256k1_clz64_var(~0ULL) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_clz64_var((~0ULL) - 1) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_clz64_var((~0ULL) >> 1) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_clz64_var((~0ULL) >> 2) == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(&r, INT64_MAX) == 0); - CHECK(r == INT64_MAX); - CHECK(secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(&r, INT64_MAX - 1) == 0); - CHECK(r == INT64_MAX - 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(&r, INT64_MIN) == 1); - CHECK(r == (uint64_t)INT64_MAX + 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(&r, INT64_MIN + 1) == 1); - CHECK(r == (uint64_t)INT64_MAX); - CHECK(secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(&r, 0) == 0); - CHECK(r == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(&r, 1) == 0); - CHECK(r == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(&r, -1) == 1); - CHECK(r == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(&r, 2) == 0); - CHECK(r == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(&r, -2) == 1); - CHECK(r == 2); - for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { - CHECK(secp256k1_clz64_var((~0ULL) - secp256k1_rand32()) == 0); - r = ((uint64_t)secp256k1_rand32() << 32) | secp256k1_rand32(); - r2 = secp256k1_rands64(0, r); - CHECK(r2 <= r); - r3 = secp256k1_rands64(r2, r); - CHECK((r3 >= r2) && (r3 <= r)); - r = secp256k1_rands64(0, INT64_MAX); - s = (int64_t)r * (secp256k1_rand32()&1?-1:1); - CHECK(secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(&r2, s) == (s < 0)); - CHECK(r2 == r); - } -} - -void run_context_tests(void) { - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - secp256k1_pubkey zero_pubkey; - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; - unsigned char ctmp[32]; - int32_t ecount; - int32_t ecount2; - secp256k1_context *none = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); - secp256k1_context *sign = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); - secp256k1_context *vrfy = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - secp256k1_context *both = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - - secp256k1_gej pubj; - secp256k1_ge pub; - secp256k1_scalar msg, key, nonce; - secp256k1_scalar sigr, sigs; - - memset(&zero_pubkey, 0, sizeof(zero_pubkey)); - - ecount = 0; - ecount2 = 10; - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(vrfy, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount2); - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, counting_illegal_callback_fn, NULL); - CHECK(vrfy->error_callback.fn != sign->error_callback.fn); - - /*** clone and destroy all of them to make sure cloning was complete ***/ - { - secp256k1_context *ctx_tmp; - - ctx_tmp = none; none = secp256k1_context_clone(none); secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx_tmp); - ctx_tmp = sign; sign = secp256k1_context_clone(sign); secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx_tmp); - ctx_tmp = vrfy; vrfy = secp256k1_context_clone(vrfy); secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx_tmp); - ctx_tmp = both; both = secp256k1_context_clone(both); secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx_tmp); - } - - /* Verify that the error callback makes it across the clone. */ - CHECK(vrfy->error_callback.fn != sign->error_callback.fn); - /* And that it resets back to default. */ - secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(sign, NULL, NULL); - CHECK(vrfy->error_callback.fn == sign->error_callback.fn); - - /*** attempt to use them ***/ - random_scalar_order_test(&msg); - random_scalar_order_test(&key); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&both->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pubj, &key); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&pub, &pubj); - - /* Verify context-type checking illegal-argument errors. */ - memset(ctmp, 1, 32); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(vrfy, &pubkey, ctmp) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(sign, &pubkey, ctmp) == 1); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(vrfy, &sig, ctmp, ctmp, NULL, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - VG_UNDEF(&sig, sizeof(sig)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(sign, &sig, ctmp, ctmp, NULL, NULL) == 1); - VG_CHECK(&sig, sizeof(sig)); - CHECK(ecount2 == 10); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(sign, &sig, ctmp, &pubkey) == 0); - CHECK(ecount2 == 11); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(vrfy, &sig, ctmp, &pubkey) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(sign, &pubkey, ctmp) == 0); - CHECK(ecount2 == 12); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(vrfy, &pubkey, ctmp) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(sign, &pubkey, ctmp) == 0); - CHECK(ecount2 == 13); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(vrfy, &pubkey) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(sign, &pubkey) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(sign, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount2 == 14); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(vrfy, &zero_pubkey) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(vrfy, &pubkey, ctmp) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - CHECK(secp256k1_context_randomize(vrfy, ctmp) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 4); - CHECK(secp256k1_context_randomize(sign, NULL) == 1); - CHECK(ecount2 == 14); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(vrfy, NULL, NULL); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(sign, NULL, NULL); - - /* This shouldn't leak memory, due to already-set tests. */ - secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_build(&sign->ecmult_gen_ctx, NULL); - secp256k1_ecmult_context_build(&vrfy->ecmult_ctx, NULL); - - /* obtain a working nonce */ - do { - random_scalar_order_test(&nonce); - } while(!secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(&both->ecmult_gen_ctx, &sigr, &sigs, &key, &msg, &nonce, NULL)); - - /* try signing */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(&sign->ecmult_gen_ctx, &sigr, &sigs, &key, &msg, &nonce, NULL)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(&both->ecmult_gen_ctx, &sigr, &sigs, &key, &msg, &nonce, NULL)); - - /* try verifying */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&vrfy->ecmult_ctx, &sigr, &sigs, &pub, &msg)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&both->ecmult_ctx, &sigr, &sigs, &pub, &msg)); - - /* cleanup */ - secp256k1_context_destroy(none); - secp256k1_context_destroy(sign); - secp256k1_context_destroy(vrfy); - secp256k1_context_destroy(both); - /* Defined as no-op. */ - secp256k1_context_destroy(NULL); -} - -void run_scratch_tests(void) { - int32_t ecount = 0; - secp256k1_context *none = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); - secp256k1_scratch_space *scratch; - - /* Test public API */ - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(none, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - - scratch = secp256k1_scratch_space_create(none, 1000); - CHECK(scratch != NULL); - CHECK(ecount == 0); - - /* Test internal API */ - CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(scratch, 0) == 1000); - CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(scratch, 1) < 1000); - - /* Allocating 500 bytes with no frame fails */ - CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, 500) == NULL); - CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(scratch, 0) == 1000); - - /* ...but pushing a new stack frame does affect the max allocation */ - CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(scratch, 500, 1 == 1)); - CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(scratch, 1) < 500); /* 500 - ALIGNMENT */ - CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, 500) != NULL); - CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, 500) == NULL); - - CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(scratch, 500, 1) == 0); - - /* ...and this effect is undone by popping the frame */ - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(scratch, 0) == 1000); - CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_alloc(scratch, 500) == NULL); - - /* cleanup */ - secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy(scratch); - secp256k1_context_destroy(none); -} - -/***** HASH TESTS *****/ - -void run_sha256_tests(void) { - static const char *inputs[8] = { - "", "abc", "message digest", "secure hash algorithm", "SHA256 is considered to be safe", - "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq", - "For this sample, this 63-byte string will be used as input data", - "This is exactly 64 bytes long, not counting the terminating byte" - }; - static const unsigned char outputs[8][32] = { - {0xe3, 0xb0, 0xc4, 0x42, 0x98, 0xfc, 0x1c, 0x14, 0x9a, 0xfb, 0xf4, 0xc8, 0x99, 0x6f, 0xb9, 0x24, 0x27, 0xae, 0x41, 0xe4, 0x64, 0x9b, 0x93, 0x4c, 0xa4, 0x95, 0x99, 0x1b, 0x78, 0x52, 0xb8, 0x55}, - {0xba, 0x78, 0x16, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0x01, 0xcf, 0xea, 0x41, 0x41, 0x40, 0xde, 0x5d, 0xae, 0x22, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x03, 0x61, 0xa3, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7a, 0x9c, 0xb4, 0x10, 0xff, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x00, 0x15, 0xad}, - {0xf7, 0x84, 0x6f, 0x55, 0xcf, 0x23, 0xe1, 0x4e, 0xeb, 0xea, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xe1, 0x55, 0x0c, 0xad, 0x5b, 0x50, 0x9e, 0x33, 0x48, 0xfb, 0xc4, 0xef, 0xa3, 0xa1, 0x41, 0x3d, 0x39, 0x3c, 0xb6, 0x50}, - {0xf3, 0x0c, 0xeb, 0x2b, 0xb2, 0x82, 0x9e, 0x79, 0xe4, 0xca, 0x97, 0x53, 0xd3, 0x5a, 0x8e, 0xcc, 0x00, 0x26, 0x2d, 0x16, 0x4c, 0xc0, 0x77, 0x08, 0x02, 0x95, 0x38, 0x1c, 0xbd, 0x64, 0x3f, 0x0d}, - {0x68, 0x19, 0xd9, 0x15, 0xc7, 0x3f, 0x4d, 0x1e, 0x77, 0xe4, 0xe1, 0xb5, 0x2d, 0x1f, 0xa0, 0xf9, 0xcf, 0x9b, 0xea, 0xea, 0xd3, 0x93, 0x9f, 0x15, 0x87, 0x4b, 0xd9, 0x88, 0xe2, 0xa2, 0x36, 0x30}, - {0x24, 0x8d, 0x6a, 0x61, 0xd2, 0x06, 0x38, 0xb8, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0x26, 0x93, 0x0c, 0x3e, 0x60, 0x39, 0xa3, 0x3c, 0xe4, 0x59, 0x64, 0xff, 0x21, 0x67, 0xf6, 0xec, 0xed, 0xd4, 0x19, 0xdb, 0x06, 0xc1}, - {0xf0, 0x8a, 0x78, 0xcb, 0xba, 0xee, 0x08, 0x2b, 0x05, 0x2a, 0xe0, 0x70, 0x8f, 0x32, 0xfa, 0x1e, 0x50, 0xc5, 0xc4, 0x21, 0xaa, 0x77, 0x2b, 0xa5, 0xdb, 0xb4, 0x06, 0xa2, 0xea, 0x6b, 0xe3, 0x42}, - {0xab, 0x64, 0xef, 0xf7, 0xe8, 0x8e, 0x2e, 0x46, 0x16, 0x5e, 0x29, 0xf2, 0xbc, 0xe4, 0x18, 0x26, 0xbd, 0x4c, 0x7b, 0x35, 0x52, 0xf6, 0xb3, 0x82, 0xa9, 0xe7, 0xd3, 0xaf, 0x47, 0xc2, 0x45, 0xf8} - }; - int i; - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - unsigned char out[32]; - secp256k1_sha256 hasher; - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&hasher); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(inputs[i]), strlen(inputs[i])); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&hasher, out); - CHECK(memcmp(out, outputs[i], 32) == 0); - if (strlen(inputs[i]) > 0) { - int split = secp256k1_rand_int(strlen(inputs[i])); - secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&hasher); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(inputs[i]), split); - secp256k1_sha256_write(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(inputs[i] + split), strlen(inputs[i]) - split); - secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&hasher, out); - CHECK(memcmp(out, outputs[i], 32) == 0); - } - } -} - -void run_hmac_sha256_tests(void) { - static const char *keys[6] = { - "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b", - "\x4a\x65\x66\x65", - "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa", - "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19", - "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa", - "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa" - }; - static const char *inputs[6] = { - "\x48\x69\x20\x54\x68\x65\x72\x65", - "\x77\x68\x61\x74\x20\x64\x6f\x20\x79\x61\x20\x77\x61\x6e\x74\x20\x66\x6f\x72\x20\x6e\x6f\x74\x68\x69\x6e\x67\x3f", - "\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd\xdd", - "\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd\xcd", - "\x54\x65\x73\x74\x20\x55\x73\x69\x6e\x67\x20\x4c\x61\x72\x67\x65\x72\x20\x54\x68\x61\x6e\x20\x42\x6c\x6f\x63\x6b\x2d\x53\x69\x7a\x65\x20\x4b\x65\x79\x20\x2d\x20\x48\x61\x73\x68\x20\x4b\x65\x79\x20\x46\x69\x72\x73\x74", - "\x54\x68\x69\x73\x20\x69\x73\x20\x61\x20\x74\x65\x73\x74\x20\x75\x73\x69\x6e\x67\x20\x61\x20\x6c\x61\x72\x67\x65\x72\x20\x74\x68\x61\x6e\x20\x62\x6c\x6f\x63\x6b\x2d\x73\x69\x7a\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79\x20\x61\x6e\x64\x20\x61\x20\x6c\x61\x72\x67\x65\x72\x20\x74\x68\x61\x6e\x20\x62\x6c\x6f\x63\x6b\x2d\x73\x69\x7a\x65\x20\x64\x61\x74\x61\x2e\x20\x54\x68\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79\x20\x6e\x65\x65\x64\x73\x20\x74\x6f\x20\x62\x65\x20\x68\x61\x73\x68\x65\x64\x20\x62\x65\x66\x6f\x72\x65\x20\x62\x65\x69\x6e\x67\x20\x75\x73\x65\x64\x20\x62\x79\x20\x74\x68\x65\x20\x48\x4d\x41\x43\x20\x61\x6c\x67\x6f\x72\x69\x74\x68\x6d\x2e" - }; - static const unsigned char outputs[6][32] = { - {0xb0, 0x34, 0x4c, 0x61, 0xd8, 0xdb, 0x38, 0x53, 0x5c, 0xa8, 0xaf, 0xce, 0xaf, 0x0b, 0xf1, 0x2b, 0x88, 0x1d, 0xc2, 0x00, 0xc9, 0x83, 0x3d, 0xa7, 0x26, 0xe9, 0x37, 0x6c, 0x2e, 0x32, 0xcf, 0xf7}, - {0x5b, 0xdc, 0xc1, 0x46, 0xbf, 0x60, 0x75, 0x4e, 0x6a, 0x04, 0x24, 0x26, 0x08, 0x95, 0x75, 0xc7, 0x5a, 0x00, 0x3f, 0x08, 0x9d, 0x27, 0x39, 0x83, 0x9d, 0xec, 0x58, 0xb9, 0x64, 0xec, 0x38, 0x43}, - {0x77, 0x3e, 0xa9, 0x1e, 0x36, 0x80, 0x0e, 0x46, 0x85, 0x4d, 0xb8, 0xeb, 0xd0, 0x91, 0x81, 0xa7, 0x29, 0x59, 0x09, 0x8b, 0x3e, 0xf8, 0xc1, 0x22, 0xd9, 0x63, 0x55, 0x14, 0xce, 0xd5, 0x65, 0xfe}, - {0x82, 0x55, 0x8a, 0x38, 0x9a, 0x44, 0x3c, 0x0e, 0xa4, 0xcc, 0x81, 0x98, 0x99, 0xf2, 0x08, 0x3a, 0x85, 0xf0, 0xfa, 0xa3, 0xe5, 0x78, 0xf8, 0x07, 0x7a, 0x2e, 0x3f, 0xf4, 0x67, 0x29, 0x66, 0x5b}, - {0x60, 0xe4, 0x31, 0x59, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0xb6, 0x7f, 0x0d, 0x8a, 0x26, 0xaa, 0xcb, 0xf5, 0xb7, 0x7f, 0x8e, 0x0b, 0xc6, 0x21, 0x37, 0x28, 0xc5, 0x14, 0x05, 0x46, 0x04, 0x0f, 0x0e, 0xe3, 0x7f, 0x54}, - {0x9b, 0x09, 0xff, 0xa7, 0x1b, 0x94, 0x2f, 0xcb, 0x27, 0x63, 0x5f, 0xbc, 0xd5, 0xb0, 0xe9, 0x44, 0xbf, 0xdc, 0x63, 0x64, 0x4f, 0x07, 0x13, 0x93, 0x8a, 0x7f, 0x51, 0x53, 0x5c, 0x3a, 0x35, 0xe2} - }; - int i; - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { - secp256k1_hmac_sha256 hasher; - unsigned char out[32]; - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(keys[i]), strlen(keys[i])); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(inputs[i]), strlen(inputs[i])); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hasher, out); - CHECK(memcmp(out, outputs[i], 32) == 0); - if (strlen(inputs[i]) > 0) { - int split = secp256k1_rand_int(strlen(inputs[i])); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(keys[i]), strlen(keys[i])); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(inputs[i]), split); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(&hasher, (const unsigned char*)(inputs[i] + split), strlen(inputs[i]) - split); - secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(&hasher, out); - CHECK(memcmp(out, outputs[i], 32) == 0); - } - } -} - -void run_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_tests(void) { - static const unsigned char key1[65] = {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x4b, 0xf5, 0x12, 0x2f, 0x34, 0x45, 0x54, 0xc5, 0x3b, 0xde, 0x2e, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0xd2, 0xb7, 0xe3, 0xd1, 0x60, 0x0a, 0xd6, 0x31, 0xc3, 0x85, 0xa5, 0xd7, 0xcc, 0xe2, 0x3c, 0x77, 0x85, 0x45, 0x9a, 0}; - static const unsigned char out1[3][32] = { - {0x4f, 0xe2, 0x95, 0x25, 0xb2, 0x08, 0x68, 0x09, 0x15, 0x9a, 0xcd, 0xf0, 0x50, 0x6e, 0xfb, 0x86, 0xb0, 0xec, 0x93, 0x2c, 0x7b, 0xa4, 0x42, 0x56, 0xab, 0x32, 0x1e, 0x42, 0x1e, 0x67, 0xe9, 0xfb}, - {0x2b, 0xf0, 0xff, 0xf1, 0xd3, 0xc3, 0x78, 0xa2, 0x2d, 0xc5, 0xde, 0x1d, 0x85, 0x65, 0x22, 0x32, 0x5c, 0x65, 0xb5, 0x04, 0x49, 0x1a, 0x0c, 0xbd, 0x01, 0xcb, 0x8f, 0x3a, 0xa6, 0x7f, 0xfd, 0x4a}, - {0xf5, 0x28, 0xb4, 0x10, 0xcb, 0x54, 0x1f, 0x77, 0x00, 0x0d, 0x7a, 0xfb, 0x6c, 0x5b, 0x53, 0xc5, 0xc4, 0x71, 0xea, 0xb4, 0x3e, 0x46, 0x6d, 0x9a, 0xc5, 0x19, 0x0c, 0x39, 0xc8, 0x2f, 0xd8, 0x2e} - }; - - static const unsigned char key2[64] = {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xe3, 0xb0, 0xc4, 0x42, 0x98, 0xfc, 0x1c, 0x14, 0x9a, 0xfb, 0xf4, 0xc8, 0x99, 0x6f, 0xb9, 0x24, 0x27, 0xae, 0x41, 0xe4, 0x64, 0x9b, 0x93, 0x4c, 0xa4, 0x95, 0x99, 0x1b, 0x78, 0x52, 0xb8, 0x55}; - static const unsigned char out2[3][32] = { - {0x9c, 0x23, 0x6c, 0x16, 0x5b, 0x82, 0xae, 0x0c, 0xd5, 0x90, 0x65, 0x9e, 0x10, 0x0b, 0x6b, 0xab, 0x30, 0x36, 0xe7, 0xba, 0x8b, 0x06, 0x74, 0x9b, 0xaf, 0x69, 0x81, 0xe1, 0x6f, 0x1a, 0x2b, 0x95}, - {0xdf, 0x47, 0x10, 0x61, 0x62, 0x5b, 0xc0, 0xea, 0x14, 0xb6, 0x82, 0xfe, 0xee, 0x2c, 0x9c, 0x02, 0xf2, 0x35, 0xda, 0x04, 0x20, 0x4c, 0x1d, 0x62, 0xa1, 0x53, 0x6c, 0x6e, 0x17, 0xae, 0xd7, 0xa9}, - {0x75, 0x97, 0x88, 0x7c, 0xbd, 0x76, 0x32, 0x1f, 0x32, 0xe3, 0x04, 0x40, 0x67, 0x9a, 0x22, 0xcf, 0x7f, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x2e, 0xac, 0x39, 0x0e, 0x58, 0x1f, 0xea, 0x09, 0x1c, 0xe2, 0x02, 0xba, 0x94} - }; - - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 rng; - unsigned char out[32]; - int i; - - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, key1, 64); - for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, out, 32); - CHECK(memcmp(out, out1[i], 32) == 0); - } - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(&rng); - - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, key1, 65); - for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, out, 32); - CHECK(memcmp(out, out1[i], 32) != 0); - } - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(&rng); - - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, key2, 64); - for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, out, 32); - CHECK(memcmp(out, out2[i], 32) == 0); - } - secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(&rng); -} - -/***** RANDOM TESTS *****/ - -void test_rand_bits(int rand32, int bits) { - /* (1-1/2^B)^rounds[B] < 1/10^9, so rounds is the number of iterations to - * get a false negative chance below once in a billion */ - static const unsigned int rounds[7] = {1, 30, 73, 156, 322, 653, 1316}; - /* We try multiplying the results with various odd numbers, which shouldn't - * influence the uniform distribution modulo a power of 2. */ - static const uint32_t mults[6] = {1, 3, 21, 289, 0x9999, 0x80402011}; - /* We only select up to 6 bits from the output to analyse */ - unsigned int usebits = bits > 6 ? 6 : bits; - unsigned int maxshift = bits - usebits; - /* For each of the maxshift+1 usebits-bit sequences inside a bits-bit - number, track all observed outcomes, one per bit in a uint64_t. */ - uint64_t x[6][27] = {{0}}; - unsigned int i, shift, m; - /* Multiply the output of all rand calls with the odd number m, which - should not change the uniformity of its distribution. */ - for (i = 0; i < rounds[usebits]; i++) { - uint32_t r = (rand32 ? secp256k1_rand32() : secp256k1_rand_bits(bits)); - CHECK((((uint64_t)r) >> bits) == 0); - for (m = 0; m < sizeof(mults) / sizeof(mults[0]); m++) { - uint32_t rm = r * mults[m]; - for (shift = 0; shift <= maxshift; shift++) { - x[m][shift] |= (((uint64_t)1) << ((rm >> shift) & ((1 << usebits) - 1))); - } - } - } - for (m = 0; m < sizeof(mults) / sizeof(mults[0]); m++) { - for (shift = 0; shift <= maxshift; shift++) { - /* Test that the lower usebits bits of x[shift] are 1 */ - CHECK(((~x[m][shift]) << (64 - (1 << usebits))) == 0); - } - } -} - -/* Subrange must be a whole divisor of range, and at most 64 */ -void test_rand_int(uint32_t range, uint32_t subrange) { - /* (1-1/subrange)^rounds < 1/10^9 */ - int rounds = (subrange * 2073) / 100; - int i; - uint64_t x = 0; - CHECK((range % subrange) == 0); - for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) { - uint32_t r = secp256k1_rand_int(range); - CHECK(r < range); - r = r % subrange; - x |= (((uint64_t)1) << r); - } - /* Test that the lower subrange bits of x are 1. */ - CHECK(((~x) << (64 - subrange)) == 0); -} - -void run_rand_bits(void) { - size_t b; - test_rand_bits(1, 32); - for (b = 1; b <= 32; b++) { - test_rand_bits(0, b); - } -} - -void run_rand_int(void) { - static const uint32_t ms[] = {1, 3, 17, 1000, 13771, 999999, 33554432}; - static const uint32_t ss[] = {1, 3, 6, 9, 13, 31, 64}; - unsigned int m, s; - for (m = 0; m < sizeof(ms) / sizeof(ms[0]); m++) { - for (s = 0; s < sizeof(ss) / sizeof(ss[0]); s++) { - test_rand_int(ms[m] * ss[s], ss[s]); - } - } -} - -/***** NUM TESTS *****/ - -#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE -void random_num_negate(secp256k1_num *num) { - if (secp256k1_rand_bits(1)) { - secp256k1_num_negate(num); - } -} - -void random_num_order_test(secp256k1_num *num) { - secp256k1_scalar sc; - random_scalar_order_test(&sc); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(num, &sc); -} - -void random_num_order(secp256k1_num *num) { - secp256k1_scalar sc; - random_scalar_order(&sc); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(num, &sc); -} - -void test_num_negate(void) { - secp256k1_num n1; - secp256k1_num n2; - random_num_order_test(&n1); /* n1 = R */ - random_num_negate(&n1); - secp256k1_num_copy(&n2, &n1); /* n2 = R */ - secp256k1_num_sub(&n1, &n2, &n1); /* n1 = n2-n1 = 0 */ - CHECK(secp256k1_num_is_zero(&n1)); - secp256k1_num_copy(&n1, &n2); /* n1 = R */ - secp256k1_num_negate(&n1); /* n1 = -R */ - CHECK(!secp256k1_num_is_zero(&n1)); - secp256k1_num_add(&n1, &n2, &n1); /* n1 = n2+n1 = 0 */ - CHECK(secp256k1_num_is_zero(&n1)); - secp256k1_num_copy(&n1, &n2); /* n1 = R */ - secp256k1_num_negate(&n1); /* n1 = -R */ - CHECK(secp256k1_num_is_neg(&n1) != secp256k1_num_is_neg(&n2)); - secp256k1_num_negate(&n1); /* n1 = R */ - CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&n1, &n2)); -} - -void test_num_add_sub(void) { - int i; - secp256k1_scalar s; - secp256k1_num n1; - secp256k1_num n2; - secp256k1_num n1p2, n2p1, n1m2, n2m1; - random_num_order_test(&n1); /* n1 = R1 */ - if (secp256k1_rand_bits(1)) { - random_num_negate(&n1); - } - random_num_order_test(&n2); /* n2 = R2 */ - if (secp256k1_rand_bits(1)) { - random_num_negate(&n2); - } - secp256k1_num_add(&n1p2, &n1, &n2); /* n1p2 = R1 + R2 */ - secp256k1_num_add(&n2p1, &n2, &n1); /* n2p1 = R2 + R1 */ - secp256k1_num_sub(&n1m2, &n1, &n2); /* n1m2 = R1 - R2 */ - secp256k1_num_sub(&n2m1, &n2, &n1); /* n2m1 = R2 - R1 */ - CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&n1p2, &n2p1)); - CHECK(!secp256k1_num_eq(&n1p2, &n1m2)); - secp256k1_num_negate(&n2m1); /* n2m1 = -R2 + R1 */ - CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&n2m1, &n1m2)); - CHECK(!secp256k1_num_eq(&n2m1, &n1)); - secp256k1_num_add(&n2m1, &n2m1, &n2); /* n2m1 = -R2 + R1 + R2 = R1 */ - CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&n2m1, &n1)); - CHECK(!secp256k1_num_eq(&n2p1, &n1)); - secp256k1_num_sub(&n2p1, &n2p1, &n2); /* n2p1 = R2 + R1 - R2 = R1 */ - CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&n2p1, &n1)); - - /* check is_one */ - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s, 1); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n1, &s); - CHECK(secp256k1_num_is_one(&n1)); - /* check that 2^n + 1 is never 1 */ - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n2, &s); - for (i = 0; i < 250; ++i) { - secp256k1_num_add(&n1, &n1, &n1); /* n1 *= 2 */ - secp256k1_num_add(&n1p2, &n1, &n2); /* n1p2 = n1 + 1 */ - CHECK(!secp256k1_num_is_one(&n1p2)); - } -} - -void test_num_mod(void) { - int i; - secp256k1_scalar s; - secp256k1_num order, n; - - /* check that 0 mod anything is 0 */ - random_scalar_order_test(&s); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&order, &s); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s, 0); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n, &s); - secp256k1_num_mod(&n, &order); - CHECK(secp256k1_num_is_zero(&n)); - - /* check that anything mod 1 is 0 */ - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s, 1); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&order, &s); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n, &s); - secp256k1_num_mod(&n, &order); - CHECK(secp256k1_num_is_zero(&n)); - - /* check that increasing the number past 2^256 does not break this */ - random_scalar_order_test(&s); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n, &s); - /* multiply by 2^8, which'll test this case with high probability */ - for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { - secp256k1_num_add(&n, &n, &n); - } - secp256k1_num_mod(&n, &order); - CHECK(secp256k1_num_is_zero(&n)); -} - -void test_num_jacobi(void) { - secp256k1_scalar sqr; - secp256k1_scalar small; - secp256k1_scalar five; /* five is not a quadratic residue */ - secp256k1_num order, n; - int i; - /* squares mod 5 are 1, 4 */ - const int jacobi5[10] = { 0, 1, -1, -1, 1, 0, 1, -1, -1, 1 }; - - /* check some small values with 5 as the order */ - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&five, 5); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&order, &five); - for (i = 0; i < 10; ++i) { - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&small, i); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n, &small); - CHECK(secp256k1_num_jacobi(&n, &order) == jacobi5[i]); - } - - /** test large values with 5 as group order */ - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&order, &five); - /* we first need a scalar which is not a multiple of 5 */ - do { - secp256k1_num fiven; - random_scalar_order_test(&sqr); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&fiven, &five); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n, &sqr); - secp256k1_num_mod(&n, &fiven); - } while (secp256k1_num_is_zero(&n)); - /* next force it to be a residue. 2 is a nonresidue mod 5 so we can - * just multiply by two, i.e. add the number to itself */ - if (secp256k1_num_jacobi(&n, &order) == -1) { - secp256k1_num_add(&n, &n, &n); - } - - /* test residue */ - CHECK(secp256k1_num_jacobi(&n, &order) == 1); - /* test nonresidue */ - secp256k1_num_add(&n, &n, &n); - CHECK(secp256k1_num_jacobi(&n, &order) == -1); - - /** test with secp group order as order */ - secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(&order); - random_scalar_order_test(&sqr); - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&sqr, &sqr); - /* test residue */ - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n, &sqr); - CHECK(secp256k1_num_jacobi(&n, &order) == 1); - /* test nonresidue */ - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&sqr, &sqr, &five); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n, &sqr); - CHECK(secp256k1_num_jacobi(&n, &order) == -1); - /* test multiple of the order*/ - CHECK(secp256k1_num_jacobi(&order, &order) == 0); - - /* check one less than the order */ - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&small, 1); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&n, &small); - secp256k1_num_sub(&n, &order, &n); - CHECK(secp256k1_num_jacobi(&n, &order) == 1); /* sage confirms this is 1 */ -} - -void run_num_smalltests(void) { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < 100*count; i++) { - test_num_negate(); - test_num_add_sub(); - test_num_mod(); - test_num_jacobi(); - } -} -#endif - -/***** SCALAR TESTS *****/ - -void scalar_test(void) { - secp256k1_scalar s; - secp256k1_scalar s1; - secp256k1_scalar s2; -#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE - secp256k1_num snum, s1num, s2num; - secp256k1_num order, half_order; -#endif - unsigned char c[32]; - - /* Set 's' to a random scalar, with value 'snum'. */ - random_scalar_order_test(&s); - - /* Set 's1' to a random scalar, with value 's1num'. */ - random_scalar_order_test(&s1); - - /* Set 's2' to a random scalar, with value 'snum2', and byte array representation 'c'. */ - random_scalar_order_test(&s2); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(c, &s2); - -#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&snum, &s); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&s1num, &s1); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&s2num, &s2); - - secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(&order); - half_order = order; - secp256k1_num_shift(&half_order, 1); -#endif - - { - int i; - /* Test that fetching groups of 4 bits from a scalar and recursing n(i)=16*n(i-1)+p(i) reconstructs it. */ - secp256k1_scalar n; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&n, 0); - for (i = 0; i < 256; i += 4) { - secp256k1_scalar t; - int j; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&t, secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(&s, 256 - 4 - i, 4)); - for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { - secp256k1_scalar_add(&n, &n, &n); - } - secp256k1_scalar_add(&n, &n, &t); - } - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&n, &s)); - } - - { - /* Test that fetching groups of randomly-sized bits from a scalar and recursing n(i)=b*n(i-1)+p(i) reconstructs it. */ - secp256k1_scalar n; - int i = 0; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&n, 0); - while (i < 256) { - secp256k1_scalar t; - int j; - int now = secp256k1_rand_int(15) + 1; - if (now + i > 256) { - now = 256 - i; - } - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&t, secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(&s, 256 - now - i, now)); - for (j = 0; j < now; j++) { - secp256k1_scalar_add(&n, &n, &n); - } - secp256k1_scalar_add(&n, &n, &t); - i += now; - } - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&n, &s)); - } - -#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE - { - /* Test that adding the scalars together is equal to adding their numbers together modulo the order. */ - secp256k1_num rnum; - secp256k1_num r2num; - secp256k1_scalar r; - secp256k1_num_add(&rnum, &snum, &s2num); - secp256k1_num_mod(&rnum, &order); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&r, &s, &s2); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&r2num, &r); - CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&rnum, &r2num)); - } - - { - /* Test that multiplying the scalars is equal to multiplying their numbers modulo the order. */ - secp256k1_scalar r; - secp256k1_num r2num; - secp256k1_num rnum; - secp256k1_num_mul(&rnum, &snum, &s2num); - secp256k1_num_mod(&rnum, &order); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r, &s, &s2); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&r2num, &r); - CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&rnum, &r2num)); - /* The result can only be zero if at least one of the factors was zero. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&r) == (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s) || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s2))); - /* The results can only be equal to one of the factors if that factor was zero, or the other factor was one. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&rnum, &snum) == (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s) || secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&s2))); - CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&rnum, &s2num) == (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s2) || secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&s))); - } - - { - secp256k1_scalar neg; - secp256k1_num negnum; - secp256k1_num negnum2; - /* Check that comparison with zero matches comparison with zero on the number. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_num_is_zero(&snum) == secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s)); - /* Check that comparison with the half order is equal to testing for high scalar. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s) == (secp256k1_num_cmp(&snum, &half_order) > 0)); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&neg, &s); - secp256k1_num_sub(&negnum, &order, &snum); - secp256k1_num_mod(&negnum, &order); - /* Check that comparison with the half order is equal to testing for high scalar after negation. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&neg) == (secp256k1_num_cmp(&negnum, &half_order) > 0)); - /* Negating should change the high property, unless the value was already zero. */ - CHECK((secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s) == secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&neg)) == secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s)); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&negnum2, &neg); - /* Negating a scalar should be equal to (order - n) mod order on the number. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&negnum, &negnum2)); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&neg, &neg, &s); - /* Adding a number to its negation should result in zero. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&neg)); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&neg, &neg); - /* Negating zero should still result in zero. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&neg)); - } - - { - /* Test secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var. */ - secp256k1_scalar r; - secp256k1_num one; - secp256k1_num rnum; - secp256k1_num rnum2; - unsigned char cone[1] = {0x01}; - unsigned int shift = 256 + secp256k1_rand_int(257); - secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(&r, &s1, &s2, shift); - secp256k1_num_mul(&rnum, &s1num, &s2num); - secp256k1_num_shift(&rnum, shift - 1); - secp256k1_num_set_bin(&one, cone, 1); - secp256k1_num_add(&rnum, &rnum, &one); - secp256k1_num_shift(&rnum, 1); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&rnum2, &r); - CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&rnum, &rnum2)); - } - - { - /* test secp256k1_scalar_shr_int */ - secp256k1_scalar r; - int i; - random_scalar_order_test(&r); - for (i = 0; i < 100; ++i) { - int low; - int shift = 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(15); - int expected = r.d[0] % (1 << shift); - low = secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&r, shift); - CHECK(expected == low); - } - } -#endif - - { - /* Test that scalar inverses are equal to the inverse of their number modulo the order. */ - if (!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s)) { - secp256k1_scalar inv; -#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE - secp256k1_num invnum; - secp256k1_num invnum2; -#endif - secp256k1_scalar_inverse(&inv, &s); -#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE - secp256k1_num_mod_inverse(&invnum, &snum, &order); - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&invnum2, &inv); - CHECK(secp256k1_num_eq(&invnum, &invnum2)); -#endif - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&inv, &inv, &s); - /* Multiplying a scalar with its inverse must result in one. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&inv)); - secp256k1_scalar_inverse(&inv, &inv); - /* Inverting one must result in one. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&inv)); -#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE - secp256k1_scalar_get_num(&invnum, &inv); - CHECK(secp256k1_num_is_one(&invnum)); -#endif - } - } - - { - /* Test commutativity of add. */ - secp256k1_scalar r1, r2; - secp256k1_scalar_add(&r1, &s1, &s2); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&r2, &s2, &s1); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &r2)); - } - - { - secp256k1_scalar r1, r2; - secp256k1_scalar b; - int i; - /* Test add_bit. */ - int bit = secp256k1_rand_bits(8); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&b, 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&b)); - for (i = 0; i < bit; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_add(&b, &b, &b); - } - r1 = s1; - r2 = s1; - if (!secp256k1_scalar_add(&r1, &r1, &b)) { - /* No overflow happened. */ - secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(&r2, bit, 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &r2)); - /* cadd is a noop when flag is zero */ - secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(&r2, bit, 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &r2)); - } - } - - { - /* Test commutativity of mul. */ - secp256k1_scalar r1, r2; - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r1, &s1, &s2); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r2, &s2, &s1); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &r2)); - } - - { - /* Test associativity of add. */ - secp256k1_scalar r1, r2; - secp256k1_scalar_add(&r1, &s1, &s2); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&r1, &r1, &s); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&r2, &s2, &s); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&r2, &s1, &r2); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &r2)); - } - - { - /* Test associativity of mul. */ - secp256k1_scalar r1, r2; - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r1, &s1, &s2); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r1, &r1, &s); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r2, &s2, &s); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r2, &s1, &r2); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &r2)); - } - - { - /* Test distributitivity of mul over add. */ - secp256k1_scalar r1, r2, t; - secp256k1_scalar_add(&r1, &s1, &s2); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r1, &r1, &s); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r2, &s1, &s); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&t, &s2, &s); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&r2, &r2, &t); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &r2)); - } - - { - /* Test square. */ - secp256k1_scalar r1, r2; - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&r1, &s1); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r2, &s1, &s1); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &r2)); - } - - { - /* Test multiplicative identity. */ - secp256k1_scalar r1, v1; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&v1,1); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r1, &s1, &v1); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &s1)); - } - - { - /* Test additive identity. */ - secp256k1_scalar r1, v0; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&v0,0); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&r1, &s1, &v0); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &s1)); - } - - { - /* Test zero product property. */ - secp256k1_scalar r1, v0; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&v0,0); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&r1, &s1, &v0); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &v0)); - } - -} - -void scalar_chacha_tests(void) { - unsigned char expected1[64] = { - 0x76, 0xb8, 0xe0, 0xad, 0xa0, 0xf1, 0x3d, 0x90, - 0x40, 0x5d, 0x6a, 0xe5, 0x53, 0x86, 0xbd, 0x28, - 0xbd, 0xd2, 0x19, 0xb8, 0xa0, 0x8d, 0xed, 0x1a, - 0xa8, 0x36, 0xef, 0xcc, 0x8b, 0x77, 0x0d, 0xc7, - 0xda, 0x41, 0x59, 0x7c, 0x51, 0x57, 0x48, 0x8d, - 0x77, 0x24, 0xe0, 0x3f, 0xb8, 0xd8, 0x4a, 0x37, - 0x6a, 0x43, 0xb8, 0xf4, 0x15, 0x18, 0xa1, 0x1c, - 0xc3, 0x87, 0xb6, 0x69, 0xb2, 0xee, 0x65, 0x86 - }; - unsigned char expected2[64] = { - 0x45, 0x40, 0xf0, 0x5a, 0x9f, 0x1f, 0xb2, 0x96, - 0xd7, 0x73, 0x6e, 0x7b, 0x20, 0x8e, 0x3c, 0x96, - 0xeb, 0x4f, 0xe1, 0x83, 0x46, 0x88, 0xd2, 0x60, - 0x4f, 0x45, 0x09, 0x52, 0xed, 0x43, 0x2d, 0x41, - 0xbb, 0xe2, 0xa0, 0xb6, 0xea, 0x75, 0x66, 0xd2, - 0xa5, 0xd1, 0xe7, 0xe2, 0x0d, 0x42, 0xaf, 0x2c, - 0x53, 0xd7, 0x92, 0xb1, 0xc4, 0x3f, 0xea, 0x81, - 0x7e, 0x9a, 0xd2, 0x75, 0xae, 0x54, 0x69, 0x63 - }; - unsigned char expected3[64] = { - 0x47, 0x4a, 0x4f, 0x35, 0x4f, 0xee, 0x93, 0x59, - 0xbb, 0x65, 0x81, 0xe5, 0xd9, 0x15, 0xa6, 0x01, - 0xb6, 0x8c, 0x68, 0x03, 0x38, 0xff, 0x65, 0xe6, - 0x56, 0x4a, 0x3e, 0x65, 0x59, 0xfc, 0x12, 0x3f, - 0xa9, 0xb2, 0xf9, 0x3e, 0x57, 0xc3, 0xa5, 0xcb, - 0xe0, 0x72, 0x74, 0x27, 0x88, 0x1c, 0x23, 0xdf, - 0xe2, 0xb6, 0xcc, 0xfb, 0x93, 0xed, 0xcb, 0x02, - 0xd7, 0x50, 0x52, 0x45, 0x84, 0x88, 0xbb, 0xea - }; - - secp256k1_scalar exp_r1, exp_r2; - secp256k1_scalar r1, r2; - unsigned char seed1[32] = { 0 }; - - secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(&r1, &r2, seed1, 0); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&exp_r1, &expected1[0], NULL); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&exp_r2, &expected1[32], NULL); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&exp_r1, &r1)); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&exp_r2, &r2)); - - seed1[31] = 1; - secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(&r1, &r2, seed1, 0); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&exp_r1, &expected2[0], NULL); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&exp_r2, &expected2[32], NULL); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&exp_r1, &r1)); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&exp_r2, &r2)); - - secp256k1_scalar_chacha20(&r1, &r2, seed1, 100); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&exp_r1, &expected3[0], NULL); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&exp_r2, &expected3[32], NULL); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&exp_r1, &r1)); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&exp_r2, &r2)); -} - -void run_scalar_tests(void) { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < 128 * count; i++) { - scalar_test(); - } - - scalar_chacha_tests(); - - { - /* (-1)+1 should be zero. */ - secp256k1_scalar s, o; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s, 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&s)); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&o, &s); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&o, &o, &s); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&o)); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&o, &o); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&o)); - } - -#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE - { - /* A scalar with value of the curve order should be 0. */ - secp256k1_num order; - secp256k1_scalar zero; - unsigned char bin[32]; - int overflow = 0; - secp256k1_scalar_order_get_num(&order); - secp256k1_num_get_bin(bin, 32, &order); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&zero, bin, &overflow); - CHECK(overflow == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&zero)); - } -#endif - - { - /* Does check_overflow check catch all ones? */ - static const secp256k1_scalar overflowed = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( - 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, - 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL - ); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(&overflowed)); - } - - { - /* Static test vectors. - * These were reduced from ~10^12 random vectors based on comparison-decision - * and edge-case coverage on 32-bit and 64-bit implementations. - * The responses were generated with Sage 5.9. - */ - secp256k1_scalar x; - secp256k1_scalar y; - secp256k1_scalar z; - secp256k1_scalar zz; - secp256k1_scalar one; - secp256k1_scalar r1; - secp256k1_scalar r2; -#if defined(USE_SCALAR_INV_NUM) - secp256k1_scalar zzv; -#endif - int overflow; - unsigned char chal[33][2][32] = { - {{0xff, 0xff, 0x03, 0x07, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, - {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xff}}, - {{0xef, 0xff, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, - {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xe0, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff}}, - {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0x3f, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00}, - {0x00, 0x00, 0xfc, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x80, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x0f, 0x00, 0xe0, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7f, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}}, - {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x1e, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfd, 0xff}, - {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x1f, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0x03, 0x00, 0xe0, - 0xff, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xff, - 0xf3, 0xff, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, - {{0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x1c, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, - {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, 0x00, - 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f, - 0x00, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xdf, 0xff, 0xff}}, - {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x0f, 0xfc, 0x9f, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, - 0xff, 0x0f, 0xfc, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00}, - {0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, - 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0x0f, 0xc0, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x07, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}}, - {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xf7, 0xff, 0xff, 0xef, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf0}, - {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}}, - {{0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0x03, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, - 0x00, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, - 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, 0xc0, 0xff, 0x0f, 0xfc, 0xff}, - {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3f, 0x00, 0xc0, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}}, - {{0x8f, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0x7f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00}, - {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, - {{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0x7f}, - {0xff, 0xcf, 0xff, 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0xc0, 0xff, 0xcf, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xbf, 0xff, 0x0e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, - {{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0xfc, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, - 0xff, 0x01, 0xfc, 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xff}, - {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xc0, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, 0x00}}, - {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0x7f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80}, - {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xe0, 0xff, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, - {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0x00}, - {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, - 0xfc, 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f, 0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f, - 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0x07, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x0f, 0x7e, 0x00, 0x00}}, - {{0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x07, 0x00}, - {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xfb, 0xff, 0x07, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x60}}, - {{0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x0f, 0x00, - 0x80, 0x7f, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, - {0xff, 0xff, 0x1f, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, - {{0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, - {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xf1, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}}, - {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, - 0x7e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0xc0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xcf, 0xff, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80}, - {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f, 0x00, 0x7e, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, - {{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfc, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7c, 0x00}, - {0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, - 0xff, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}}, - {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x80, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, - 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00}, - {0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, - 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0x7f, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0x1f, 0x00, 0xfe}}, - {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0x03, 0xfe, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x07}, - {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, - 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x01, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00}}, - {{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, - {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, - 0xba, 0xae, 0xdc, 0xe6, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xa0, 0x3b, - 0xbf, 0xd2, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xd0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x40}}, - {{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01}, - {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, - {{0x7f, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, - {0x7f, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}}, - {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0xc0, - 0xff, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x7f}, - {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, - 0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x07, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x01, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}}, - {{0x7f, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, - {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02}}, - {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, - 0xba, 0xae, 0xdc, 0xe6, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xa0, 0x3b, - 0xbf, 0xd2, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xd0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x40}, - {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01}}, - {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0x7e, 0x00, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xff, 0xff, 0x07, 0x00, - 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0xfc, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, - {0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x80, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}}, - {{0xff, 0xff, 0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, - 0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, - 0x00, 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x01, - 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, - {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0x3f, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0x3f, 0x00, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xf1, 0x7f, 0x00}}, - {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00}, - {0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x01, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, - 0xff, 0x7f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x1f, - 0x00, 0x00, 0xfc, 0xff, 0xff, 0x01, 0xff, 0xff}}, - {{0x00, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, - 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0x03, 0xe0, 0x01, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfc, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00}, - {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xf0, 0x07, 0x00, 0x3c, 0x80, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0x07, 0xe0, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, - {{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, - 0xfc, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x07, 0xf8, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80}, - {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x0c, 0x80, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xc0, 0x7f, 0xfe, 0xff, 0x1f, - 0x00, 0xfe, 0xff, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xff}}, - {{0xff, 0xff, 0x81, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, - 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x83, - 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, - 0xff, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf0}, - {0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x00, - 0xf8, 0x07, 0x00, 0x80, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xc7, 0xff, 0xff, 0xe0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}}, - {{0x82, 0xc9, 0xfa, 0xb0, 0x68, 0x04, 0xa0, 0x00, - 0x82, 0xc9, 0xfa, 0xb0, 0x68, 0x04, 0xa0, 0x00, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x6f, 0x03, 0xfb, - 0xfa, 0x8a, 0x7d, 0xdf, 0x13, 0x86, 0xe2, 0x03}, - {0x82, 0xc9, 0xfa, 0xb0, 0x68, 0x04, 0xa0, 0x00, - 0x82, 0xc9, 0xfa, 0xb0, 0x68, 0x04, 0xa0, 0x00, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x6f, 0x03, 0xfb, - 0xfa, 0x8a, 0x7d, 0xdf, 0x13, 0x86, 0xe2, 0x03}} - }; - unsigned char res[33][2][32] = { - {{0x0c, 0x3b, 0x0a, 0xca, 0x8d, 0x1a, 0x2f, 0xb9, - 0x8a, 0x7b, 0x53, 0x5a, 0x1f, 0xc5, 0x22, 0xa1, - 0x07, 0x2a, 0x48, 0xea, 0x02, 0xeb, 0xb3, 0xd6, - 0x20, 0x1e, 0x86, 0xd0, 0x95, 0xf6, 0x92, 0x35}, - {0xdc, 0x90, 0x7a, 0x07, 0x2e, 0x1e, 0x44, 0x6d, - 0xf8, 0x15, 0x24, 0x5b, 0x5a, 0x96, 0x37, 0x9c, - 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0xe4, 0x70, 0x30, 0x34, 0xbc, 0x52, 0x7c, 0x55, - 0xa6, 0xec, 0x80, 0xa4, 0xe5, 0xd2, 0xdc, 0x73}, - {0x08, 0xf1, 0x03, 0xcf, 0x16, 0x73, 0xe8, 0x7d, - 0xb6, 0x7e, 0x9b, 0xc0, 0xb4, 0xc2, 0xa5, 0x86, - 0x02, 0x77, 0xd5, 0x27, 0x86, 0xa5, 0x15, 0xfb, - 0xae, 0x9b, 0x8c, 0xa9, 0xf9, 0xf8, 0xa8, 0x4a}}, - {{0x8b, 0x00, 0x49, 0xdb, 0xfa, 0xf0, 0x1b, 0xa2, - 0xed, 0x8a, 0x9a, 0x7a, 0x36, 0x78, 0x4a, 0xc7, - 0xf7, 0xad, 0x39, 0xd0, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x7a, 0x41, - 0xce, 0xd6, 0xd6, 0x4c, 0x20, 0x21, 0x6b, 0xc7}, - {0xc6, 0xca, 0x78, 0x1d, 0x32, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x06, - 0x91, 0xf2, 0x1a, 0xe8, 0x43, 0x16, 0xea, 0x04, - 0x3c, 0x1f, 0x07, 0x85, 0xf7, 0x09, 0x22, 0x08, - 0xba, 0x13, 0xfd, 0x78, 0x1e, 0x3f, 0x6f, 0x62}}, - {{0x25, 0x9b, 0x7c, 0xb0, 0xac, 0x72, 0x6f, 0xb2, - 0xe3, 0x53, 0x84, 0x7a, 0x1a, 0x9a, 0x98, 0x9b, - 0x44, 0xd3, 0x59, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x57, 0x41, 0x40, - 0x78, 0xa7, 0x30, 0x2f, 0x4c, 0x9c, 0xb9, 0x68}, - {0xb7, 0x75, 0x03, 0x63, 0x61, 0xc2, 0x48, 0x6e, - 0x12, 0x3d, 0xbf, 0x4b, 0x27, 0xdf, 0xb1, 0x7a, - 0xff, 0x4e, 0x31, 0x07, 0x83, 0xf4, 0x62, 0x5b, - 0x19, 0xa5, 0xac, 0xa0, 0x32, 0x58, 0x0d, 0xa7}}, - {{0x43, 0x4f, 0x10, 0xa4, 0xca, 0xdb, 0x38, 0x67, - 0xfa, 0xae, 0x96, 0xb5, 0x6d, 0x97, 0xff, 0x1f, - 0xb6, 0x83, 0x43, 0xd3, 0xa0, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x7a, - 0x64, 0x05, 0x4c, 0xa7, 0xc1, 0xa5, 0x21, 0x51}, - {0xe4, 0xf1, 0x23, 0x84, 0xe1, 0xb5, 0x9d, 0xf2, - 0xb8, 0x73, 0x8b, 0x45, 0x2b, 0x35, 0x46, 0x38, - 0x10, 0x2b, 0x50, 0xf8, 0x8b, 0x35, 0xcd, 0x34, - 0xc8, 0x0e, 0xf6, 0xdb, 0x09, 0x35, 0xf0, 0xda}}, - {{0xdb, 0x21, 0x5c, 0x8d, 0x83, 0x1d, 0xb3, 0x34, - 0xc7, 0x0e, 0x43, 0xa1, 0x58, 0x79, 0x67, 0x13, - 0x1e, 0x86, 0x5d, 0x89, 0x63, 0xe6, 0x0a, 0x46, - 0x5c, 0x02, 0x97, 0x1b, 0x62, 0x43, 0x86, 0xf5}, - {0xdb, 0x21, 0x5c, 0x8d, 0x83, 0x1d, 0xb3, 0x34, - 0xc7, 0x0e, 0x43, 0xa1, 0x58, 0x79, 0x67, 0x13, - 0x1e, 0x86, 0x5d, 0x89, 0x63, 0xe6, 0x0a, 0x46, - 0x5c, 0x02, 0x97, 0x1b, 0x62, 0x43, 0x86, 0xf5}} - }; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&one, 1); - for (i = 0; i < 33; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&x, chal[i][0], &overflow); - CHECK(!overflow); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&y, chal[i][1], &overflow); - CHECK(!overflow); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&r1, res[i][0], &overflow); - CHECK(!overflow); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&r2, res[i][1], &overflow); - CHECK(!overflow); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&z, &x, &y); - CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(&z)); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r1, &z)); - if (!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&y)) { - secp256k1_scalar_inverse(&zz, &y); - CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(&zz)); -#if defined(USE_SCALAR_INV_NUM) - secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&zzv, &y); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&zzv, &zz)); -#endif - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&z, &z, &zz); - CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(&z)); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&x, &z)); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&zz, &zz, &y); - CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(&zz)); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&one, &zz)); - } - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&z, &x, &x); - CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(&z)); - secp256k1_scalar_sqr(&zz, &x); - CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(&zz)); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&zz, &z)); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&r2, &zz)); - } - } -} - -/***** FIELD TESTS *****/ - -void random_fe(secp256k1_fe *x) { - unsigned char bin[32]; - do { - secp256k1_rand256(bin); - if (secp256k1_fe_set_b32(x, bin)) { - return; - } - } while(1); -} - -void random_fe_test(secp256k1_fe *x) { - unsigned char bin[32]; - do { - secp256k1_rand256_test(bin); - if (secp256k1_fe_set_b32(x, bin)) { - return; - } - } while(1); -} - -void random_fe_non_zero(secp256k1_fe *nz) { - int tries = 10; - while (--tries >= 0) { - random_fe(nz); - secp256k1_fe_normalize(nz); - if (!secp256k1_fe_is_zero(nz)) { - break; - } - } - /* Infinitesimal probability of spurious failure here */ - CHECK(tries >= 0); -} - -void random_fe_non_square(secp256k1_fe *ns) { - secp256k1_fe r; - random_fe_non_zero(ns); - if (secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&r, ns)) { - secp256k1_fe_negate(ns, ns, 1); - } -} - -int check_fe_equal(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) { - secp256k1_fe an = *a; - secp256k1_fe bn = *b; - secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&an); - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&bn); - return secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&an, &bn); -} - -int check_fe_inverse(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *ai) { - secp256k1_fe x; - secp256k1_fe one = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&x, a, ai); - return check_fe_equal(&x, &one); -} - -void run_field_convert(void) { - static const unsigned char b32[32] = { - 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, - 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, - 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28, 0x29, - 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x40 - }; - static const secp256k1_fe_storage fes = SECP256K1_FE_STORAGE_CONST( - 0x00010203UL, 0x04050607UL, 0x11121314UL, 0x15161718UL, - 0x22232425UL, 0x26272829UL, 0x33343536UL, 0x37383940UL - ); - static const secp256k1_fe fe = SECP256K1_FE_CONST( - 0x00010203UL, 0x04050607UL, 0x11121314UL, 0x15161718UL, - 0x22232425UL, 0x26272829UL, 0x33343536UL, 0x37383940UL - ); - secp256k1_fe fe2; - unsigned char b322[32]; - secp256k1_fe_storage fes2; - /* Check conversions to fe. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&fe2, b32)); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&fe, &fe2)); - secp256k1_fe_from_storage(&fe2, &fes); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&fe, &fe2)); - /* Check conversion from fe. */ - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(b322, &fe); - CHECK(memcmp(b322, b32, 32) == 0); - secp256k1_fe_to_storage(&fes2, &fe); - CHECK(memcmp(&fes2, &fes, sizeof(fes)) == 0); -} - -int fe_memcmp(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) { - secp256k1_fe t = *b; -#ifdef VERIFY - t.magnitude = a->magnitude; - t.normalized = a->normalized; -#endif - return memcmp(a, &t, sizeof(secp256k1_fe)); -} - -void run_field_misc(void) { - secp256k1_fe x; - secp256k1_fe y; - secp256k1_fe z; - secp256k1_fe q; - secp256k1_fe fe5 = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5); - int i, j; - for (i = 0; i < 5*count; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_storage xs, ys, zs; - random_fe(&x); - random_fe_non_zero(&y); - /* Test the fe equality and comparison operations. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(&x, &x) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&x, &x)); - z = x; - secp256k1_fe_add(&z,&y); - /* Test fe conditional move; z is not normalized here. */ - q = x; - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&x, &z, 0); - VERIFY_CHECK(!x.normalized && x.magnitude == z.magnitude); - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&x, &x, 1); - CHECK(fe_memcmp(&x, &z) != 0); - CHECK(fe_memcmp(&x, &q) == 0); - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&q, &z, 1); - VERIFY_CHECK(!q.normalized && q.magnitude == z.magnitude); - CHECK(fe_memcmp(&q, &z) == 0); - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&x); - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&z); - CHECK(!secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&x, &z)); - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&q); - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&q, &z, (i&1)); - VERIFY_CHECK(q.normalized && q.magnitude == 1); - for (j = 0; j < 6; j++) { - secp256k1_fe_negate(&z, &z, j+1); - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&q); - secp256k1_fe_cmov(&q, &z, (j&1)); - VERIFY_CHECK(!q.normalized && q.magnitude == (j+2)); - } - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&z); - /* Test storage conversion and conditional moves. */ - secp256k1_fe_to_storage(&xs, &x); - secp256k1_fe_to_storage(&ys, &y); - secp256k1_fe_to_storage(&zs, &z); - secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&zs, &xs, 0); - secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&zs, &zs, 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&xs, &zs, sizeof(xs)) != 0); - secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&ys, &xs, 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&xs, &ys, sizeof(xs)) == 0); - secp256k1_fe_from_storage(&x, &xs); - secp256k1_fe_from_storage(&y, &ys); - secp256k1_fe_from_storage(&z, &zs); - /* Test that mul_int, mul, and add agree. */ - secp256k1_fe_add(&y, &x); - secp256k1_fe_add(&y, &x); - z = x; - secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&z, 3); - CHECK(check_fe_equal(&y, &z)); - secp256k1_fe_add(&y, &x); - secp256k1_fe_add(&z, &x); - CHECK(check_fe_equal(&z, &y)); - z = x; - secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&z, 5); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&q, &x, &fe5); - CHECK(check_fe_equal(&z, &q)); - secp256k1_fe_negate(&x, &x, 1); - secp256k1_fe_add(&z, &x); - secp256k1_fe_add(&q, &x); - CHECK(check_fe_equal(&y, &z)); - CHECK(check_fe_equal(&q, &y)); - } -} - -void run_field_inv(void) { - secp256k1_fe x, xi, xii; - int i; - for (i = 0; i < 10*count; i++) { - random_fe_non_zero(&x); - secp256k1_fe_inv(&xi, &x); - CHECK(check_fe_inverse(&x, &xi)); - secp256k1_fe_inv(&xii, &xi); - CHECK(check_fe_equal(&x, &xii)); - } -} - -void run_field_inv_var(void) { - secp256k1_fe x, xi, xii; - int i; - for (i = 0; i < 10*count; i++) { - random_fe_non_zero(&x); - secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&xi, &x); - CHECK(check_fe_inverse(&x, &xi)); - secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&xii, &xi); - CHECK(check_fe_equal(&x, &xii)); - } -} - -void run_field_inv_all_var(void) { - secp256k1_fe x[16], xi[16], xii[16]; - int i; - /* Check it's safe to call for 0 elements */ - secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(xi, x, 0); - for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { - size_t j; - size_t len = secp256k1_rand_int(15) + 1; - for (j = 0; j < len; j++) { - random_fe_non_zero(&x[j]); - } - secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(xi, x, len); - for (j = 0; j < len; j++) { - CHECK(check_fe_inverse(&x[j], &xi[j])); - } - secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(xii, xi, len); - for (j = 0; j < len; j++) { - CHECK(check_fe_equal(&x[j], &xii[j])); - } - } -} - -void run_sqr(void) { - secp256k1_fe x, s; - - { - int i; - secp256k1_fe_set_int(&x, 1); - secp256k1_fe_negate(&x, &x, 1); - - for (i = 1; i <= 512; ++i) { - secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&x, 2); - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&x); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&s, &x); - } - } -} - -void test_sqrt(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *k) { - secp256k1_fe r1, r2; - int v = secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&r1, a); - CHECK((v == 0) == (k == NULL)); - - if (k != NULL) { - /* Check that the returned root is +/- the given known answer */ - secp256k1_fe_negate(&r2, &r1, 1); - secp256k1_fe_add(&r1, k); secp256k1_fe_add(&r2, k); - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&r1); secp256k1_fe_normalize(&r2); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&r1) || secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&r2)); - } -} - -void run_sqrt(void) { - secp256k1_fe ns, x, s, t; - int i; - - /* Check sqrt(0) is 0 */ - secp256k1_fe_set_int(&x, 0); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&s, &x); - test_sqrt(&s, &x); - - /* Check sqrt of small squares (and their negatives) */ - for (i = 1; i <= 100; i++) { - secp256k1_fe_set_int(&x, i); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&s, &x); - test_sqrt(&s, &x); - secp256k1_fe_negate(&t, &s, 1); - test_sqrt(&t, NULL); - } - - /* Consistency checks for large random values */ - for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { - int j; - random_fe_non_square(&ns); - for (j = 0; j < count; j++) { - random_fe(&x); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&s, &x); - test_sqrt(&s, &x); - secp256k1_fe_negate(&t, &s, 1); - test_sqrt(&t, NULL); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&t, &s, &ns); - test_sqrt(&t, NULL); - } - } -} - -/***** GROUP TESTS *****/ - -void ge_equals_ge(const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_ge *b) { - CHECK(a->infinity == b->infinity); - if (a->infinity) { - return; - } - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&a->x, &b->x)); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&a->y, &b->y)); -} - -/* This compares jacobian points including their Z, not just their geometric meaning. */ -int gej_xyz_equals_gej(const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_gej *b) { - secp256k1_gej a2; - secp256k1_gej b2; - int ret = 1; - ret &= a->infinity == b->infinity; - if (ret && !a->infinity) { - a2 = *a; - b2 = *b; - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&a2.x); - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&a2.y); - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&a2.z); - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&b2.x); - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&b2.y); - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&b2.z); - ret &= secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(&a2.x, &b2.x) == 0; - ret &= secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(&a2.y, &b2.y) == 0; - ret &= secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(&a2.z, &b2.z) == 0; - } - return ret; -} - -void ge_equals_gej(const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_gej *b) { - secp256k1_fe z2s; - secp256k1_fe u1, u2, s1, s2; - CHECK(a->infinity == b->infinity); - if (a->infinity) { - return; - } - /* Check a.x * b.z^2 == b.x && a.y * b.z^3 == b.y, to avoid inverses. */ - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z2s, &b->z); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&u1, &a->x, &z2s); - u2 = b->x; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&u2); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&s1, &a->y, &z2s); secp256k1_fe_mul(&s1, &s1, &b->z); - s2 = b->y; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&s2); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&u1, &u2)); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&s1, &s2)); -} - -void test_ge(void) { - int i, i1; -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - int runs = 6; -#else - int runs = 4; -#endif - /* Points: (infinity, p1, p1, -p1, -p1, p2, p2, -p2, -p2, p3, p3, -p3, -p3, p4, p4, -p4, -p4). - * The second in each pair of identical points uses a random Z coordinate in the Jacobian form. - * All magnitudes are randomized. - * All 17*17 combinations of points are added to each other, using all applicable methods. - * - * When the endomorphism code is compiled in, p5 = lambda*p1 and p6 = lambda^2*p1 are added as well. - */ - secp256k1_ge *ge = (secp256k1_ge *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, sizeof(secp256k1_ge) * (1 + 4 * runs)); - secp256k1_gej *gej = (secp256k1_gej *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, sizeof(secp256k1_gej) * (1 + 4 * runs)); - secp256k1_fe *zinv = (secp256k1_fe *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, sizeof(secp256k1_fe) * (1 + 4 * runs)); - secp256k1_fe zf; - secp256k1_fe zfi2, zfi3; - - secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&gej[0]); - secp256k1_ge_clear(&ge[0]); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&ge[0], &gej[0]); - for (i = 0; i < runs; i++) { - int j; - secp256k1_ge g; - random_group_element_test(&g); -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - if (i >= runs - 2) { - secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&g, &ge[1]); - } - if (i >= runs - 1) { - secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&g, &g); - } -#endif - ge[1 + 4 * i] = g; - ge[2 + 4 * i] = g; - secp256k1_ge_neg(&ge[3 + 4 * i], &g); - secp256k1_ge_neg(&ge[4 + 4 * i], &g); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&gej[1 + 4 * i], &ge[1 + 4 * i]); - random_group_element_jacobian_test(&gej[2 + 4 * i], &ge[2 + 4 * i]); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&gej[3 + 4 * i], &ge[3 + 4 * i]); - random_group_element_jacobian_test(&gej[4 + 4 * i], &ge[4 + 4 * i]); - for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { - random_field_element_magnitude(&ge[1 + j + 4 * i].x); - random_field_element_magnitude(&ge[1 + j + 4 * i].y); - random_field_element_magnitude(&gej[1 + j + 4 * i].x); - random_field_element_magnitude(&gej[1 + j + 4 * i].y); - random_field_element_magnitude(&gej[1 + j + 4 * i].z); - } - } - - /* Compute z inverses. */ - { - secp256k1_fe *zs = checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, sizeof(secp256k1_fe) * (1 + 4 * runs)); - for (i = 0; i < 4 * runs + 1; i++) { - if (i == 0) { - /* The point at infinity does not have a meaningful z inverse. Any should do. */ - do { - random_field_element_test(&zs[i]); - } while(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&zs[i])); - } else { - zs[i] = gej[i].z; - } - } - secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var(zinv, zs, 4 * runs + 1); - free(zs); - } - - /* Generate random zf, and zfi2 = 1/zf^2, zfi3 = 1/zf^3 */ - do { - random_field_element_test(&zf); - } while(secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&zf)); - random_field_element_magnitude(&zf); - secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&zfi3, &zf); - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&zfi2, &zfi3); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&zfi3, &zfi3, &zfi2); - - for (i1 = 0; i1 < 1 + 4 * runs; i1++) { - int i2; - for (i2 = 0; i2 < 1 + 4 * runs; i2++) { - /* Compute reference result using gej + gej (var). */ - secp256k1_gej refj, resj; - secp256k1_ge ref; - secp256k1_fe zr; - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&refj, &gej[i1], &gej[i2], secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&gej[i1]) ? NULL : &zr); - /* Check Z ratio. */ - if (!secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&gej[i1]) && !secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&refj)) { - secp256k1_fe zrz; secp256k1_fe_mul(&zrz, &zr, &gej[i1].z); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&zrz, &refj.z)); - } - secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&ref, &refj); - - /* Test gej + ge with Z ratio result (var). */ - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&resj, &gej[i1], &ge[i2], secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&gej[i1]) ? NULL : &zr); - ge_equals_gej(&ref, &resj); - if (!secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&gej[i1]) && !secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&resj)) { - secp256k1_fe zrz; secp256k1_fe_mul(&zrz, &zr, &gej[i1].z); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&zrz, &resj.z)); - } - - /* Test gej + ge (var, with additional Z factor). */ - { - secp256k1_ge ge2_zfi = ge[i2]; /* the second term with x and y rescaled for z = 1/zf */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&ge2_zfi.x, &ge2_zfi.x, &zfi2); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&ge2_zfi.y, &ge2_zfi.y, &zfi3); - random_field_element_magnitude(&ge2_zfi.x); - random_field_element_magnitude(&ge2_zfi.y); - secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(&resj, &gej[i1], &ge2_zfi, &zf); - ge_equals_gej(&ref, &resj); - } - - /* Test gej + ge (const). */ - if (i2 != 0) { - /* secp256k1_gej_add_ge does not support its second argument being infinity. */ - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&resj, &gej[i1], &ge[i2]); - ge_equals_gej(&ref, &resj); - } - - /* Test doubling (var). */ - if ((i1 == 0 && i2 == 0) || ((i1 + 3)/4 == (i2 + 3)/4 && ((i1 + 3)%4)/2 == ((i2 + 3)%4)/2)) { - secp256k1_fe zr2; - /* Normal doubling with Z ratio result. */ - secp256k1_gej_double_var(&resj, &gej[i1], &zr2); - ge_equals_gej(&ref, &resj); - /* Check Z ratio. */ - secp256k1_fe_mul(&zr2, &zr2, &gej[i1].z); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&zr2, &resj.z)); - /* Normal doubling. */ - secp256k1_gej_double_var(&resj, &gej[i2], NULL); - ge_equals_gej(&ref, &resj); - } - - /* Test adding opposites. */ - if ((i1 == 0 && i2 == 0) || ((i1 + 3)/4 == (i2 + 3)/4 && ((i1 + 3)%4)/2 != ((i2 + 3)%4)/2)) { - CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&ref)); - } - - /* Test adding infinity. */ - if (i1 == 0) { - CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&ge[i1])); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&gej[i1])); - ge_equals_gej(&ref, &gej[i2]); - } - if (i2 == 0) { - CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&ge[i2])); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&gej[i2])); - ge_equals_gej(&ref, &gej[i1]); - } - } - } - - /* Test adding all points together in random order equals infinity. */ - { - secp256k1_gej sum = SECP256K1_GEJ_CONST_INFINITY; - secp256k1_gej *gej_shuffled = (secp256k1_gej *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, (4 * runs + 1) * sizeof(secp256k1_gej)); - for (i = 0; i < 4 * runs + 1; i++) { - gej_shuffled[i] = gej[i]; - } - for (i = 0; i < 4 * runs + 1; i++) { - int swap = i + secp256k1_rand_int(4 * runs + 1 - i); - if (swap != i) { - secp256k1_gej t = gej_shuffled[i]; - gej_shuffled[i] = gej_shuffled[swap]; - gej_shuffled[swap] = t; - } - } - for (i = 0; i < 4 * runs + 1; i++) { - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&sum, &sum, &gej_shuffled[i], NULL); - } - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&sum)); - free(gej_shuffled); - } - - /* Test batch gej -> ge conversion with and without known z ratios. */ - { - secp256k1_fe *zr = (secp256k1_fe *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, (4 * runs + 1) * sizeof(secp256k1_fe)); - secp256k1_ge *ge_set_table = (secp256k1_ge *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, (4 * runs + 1) * sizeof(secp256k1_ge)); - secp256k1_ge *ge_set_all = (secp256k1_ge *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, (4 * runs + 1) * sizeof(secp256k1_ge)); - for (i = 0; i < 4 * runs + 1; i++) { - /* Compute gej[i + 1].z / gez[i].z (with gej[n].z taken to be 1). */ - if (i < 4 * runs) { - secp256k1_fe_mul(&zr[i + 1], &zinv[i], &gej[i + 1].z); - } - } - secp256k1_ge_set_table_gej_var(ge_set_table, gej, zr, 4 * runs + 1); - secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(ge_set_all, gej, 4 * runs + 1, &ctx->error_callback); - for (i = 0; i < 4 * runs + 1; i++) { - secp256k1_fe s; - random_fe_non_zero(&s); - secp256k1_gej_rescale(&gej[i], &s); - ge_equals_gej(&ge_set_table[i], &gej[i]); - ge_equals_gej(&ge_set_all[i], &gej[i]); - } - free(ge_set_table); - free(ge_set_all); - free(zr); - } - - free(ge); - free(gej); - free(zinv); -} - -void test_add_neg_y_diff_x(void) { - /* The point of this test is to check that we can add two points - * whose y-coordinates are negatives of each other but whose x - * coordinates differ. If the x-coordinates were the same, these - * points would be negatives of each other and their sum is - * infinity. This is cool because it "covers up" any degeneracy - * in the addition algorithm that would cause the xy coordinates - * of the sum to be wrong (since infinity has no xy coordinates). - * HOWEVER, if the x-coordinates are different, infinity is the - * wrong answer, and such degeneracies are exposed. This is the - * root of https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/issues/257 - * which this test is a regression test for. - * - * These points were generated in sage as - * # secp256k1 params - * F = FiniteField (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFC2F) - * C = EllipticCurve ([F (0), F (7)]) - * G = C.lift_x(0x79BE667EF9DCBBAC55A06295CE870B07029BFCDB2DCE28D959F2815B16F81798) - * N = FiniteField(G.order()) - * - * # endomorphism values (lambda is 1^{1/3} in N, beta is 1^{1/3} in F) - * x = polygen(N) - * lam = (1 - x^3).roots()[1][0] - * - * # random "bad pair" - * P = C.random_element() - * Q = -int(lam) * P - * print " P: %x %x" % P.xy() - * print " Q: %x %x" % Q.xy() - * print "P + Q: %x %x" % (P + Q).xy() - */ - secp256k1_gej aj = SECP256K1_GEJ_CONST( - 0x8d24cd95, 0x0a355af1, 0x3c543505, 0x44238d30, - 0x0643d79f, 0x05a59614, 0x2f8ec030, 0xd58977cb, - 0x001e337a, 0x38093dcd, 0x6c0f386d, 0x0b1293a8, - 0x4d72c879, 0xd7681924, 0x44e6d2f3, 0x9190117d - ); - secp256k1_gej bj = SECP256K1_GEJ_CONST( - 0xc7b74206, 0x1f788cd9, 0xabd0937d, 0x164a0d86, - 0x95f6ff75, 0xf19a4ce9, 0xd013bd7b, 0xbf92d2a7, - 0xffe1cc85, 0xc7f6c232, 0x93f0c792, 0xf4ed6c57, - 0xb28d3786, 0x2897e6db, 0xbb192d0b, 0x6e6feab2 - ); - secp256k1_gej sumj = SECP256K1_GEJ_CONST( - 0x671a63c0, 0x3efdad4c, 0x389a7798, 0x24356027, - 0xb3d69010, 0x278625c3, 0x5c86d390, 0x184a8f7a, - 0x5f6409c2, 0x2ce01f2b, 0x511fd375, 0x25071d08, - 0xda651801, 0x70e95caf, 0x8f0d893c, 0xbed8fbbe - ); - secp256k1_ge b; - secp256k1_gej resj; - secp256k1_ge res; - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&b, &bj); - - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&resj, &aj, &bj, NULL); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res, &resj); - ge_equals_gej(&res, &sumj); - - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&resj, &aj, &b); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res, &resj); - ge_equals_gej(&res, &sumj); - - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&resj, &aj, &b, NULL); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res, &resj); - ge_equals_gej(&res, &sumj); -} - -void run_ge(void) { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < count * 32; i++) { - test_ge(); - } - test_add_neg_y_diff_x(); -} - -void test_ec_combine(void) { - secp256k1_scalar sum = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); - secp256k1_pubkey data[6]; - const secp256k1_pubkey* d[6]; - secp256k1_pubkey sd; - secp256k1_pubkey sd2; - secp256k1_gej Qj; - secp256k1_ge Q; - int i; - for (i = 1; i <= 6; i++) { - secp256k1_scalar s; - random_scalar_order_test(&s); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&sum, &sum, &s); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &Qj, &s); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&Q, &Qj); - secp256k1_pubkey_save(&data[i - 1], &Q); - d[i - 1] = &data[i - 1]; - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &Qj, &sum); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&Q, &Qj); - secp256k1_pubkey_save(&sd, &Q); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &sd2, d, i) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&sd, &sd2, sizeof(sd)) == 0); - } -} - -void run_ec_combine(void) { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < count * 8; i++) { - test_ec_combine(); - } -} - -void test_group_decompress(const secp256k1_fe* x) { - /* The input itself, normalized. */ - secp256k1_fe fex = *x; - secp256k1_fe fez; - /* Results of set_xquad_var, set_xo_var(..., 0), set_xo_var(..., 1). */ - secp256k1_ge ge_quad, ge_even, ge_odd; - secp256k1_gej gej_quad; - /* Return values of the above calls. */ - int res_quad, res_even, res_odd; - - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&fex); - - res_quad = secp256k1_ge_set_xquad(&ge_quad, &fex); - res_even = secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&ge_even, &fex, 0); - res_odd = secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&ge_odd, &fex, 1); - - CHECK(res_quad == res_even); - CHECK(res_quad == res_odd); - - if (res_quad) { - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&ge_quad.x); - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&ge_odd.x); - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&ge_even.x); - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&ge_quad.y); - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&ge_odd.y); - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&ge_even.y); - - /* No infinity allowed. */ - CHECK(!ge_quad.infinity); - CHECK(!ge_even.infinity); - CHECK(!ge_odd.infinity); - - /* Check that the x coordinates check out. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&ge_quad.x, x)); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&ge_even.x, x)); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&ge_odd.x, x)); - - /* Check that the Y coordinate result in ge_quad is a square. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_quad_var(&ge_quad.y)); - - /* Check odd/even Y in ge_odd, ge_even. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&ge_odd.y)); - CHECK(!secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&ge_even.y)); - - /* Check secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var. */ - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&gej_quad, &ge_quad); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(&gej_quad)); - do { - random_fe_test(&fez); - } while (secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&fez)); - secp256k1_gej_rescale(&gej_quad, &fez); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(&gej_quad)); - secp256k1_gej_neg(&gej_quad, &gej_quad); - CHECK(!secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(&gej_quad)); - do { - random_fe_test(&fez); - } while (secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&fez)); - secp256k1_gej_rescale(&gej_quad, &fez); - CHECK(!secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(&gej_quad)); - secp256k1_gej_neg(&gej_quad, &gej_quad); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(&gej_quad)); - } -} - -void run_group_decompress(void) { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < count * 4; i++) { - secp256k1_fe fe; - random_fe_test(&fe); - test_group_decompress(&fe); - } -} - -/***** ECMULT TESTS *****/ - -void run_ecmult_chain(void) { - /* random starting point A (on the curve) */ - secp256k1_gej a = SECP256K1_GEJ_CONST( - 0x8b30bbe9, 0xae2a9906, 0x96b22f67, 0x0709dff3, - 0x727fd8bc, 0x04d3362c, 0x6c7bf458, 0xe2846004, - 0xa357ae91, 0x5c4a6528, 0x1309edf2, 0x0504740f, - 0x0eb33439, 0x90216b4f, 0x81063cb6, 0x5f2f7e0f - ); - /* two random initial factors xn and gn */ - secp256k1_scalar xn = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( - 0x84cc5452, 0xf7fde1ed, 0xb4d38a8c, 0xe9b1b84c, - 0xcef31f14, 0x6e569be9, 0x705d357a, 0x42985407 - ); - secp256k1_scalar gn = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( - 0xa1e58d22, 0x553dcd42, 0xb2398062, 0x5d4c57a9, - 0x6e9323d4, 0x2b3152e5, 0xca2c3990, 0xedc7c9de - ); - /* two small multipliers to be applied to xn and gn in every iteration: */ - static const secp256k1_scalar xf = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x1337); - static const secp256k1_scalar gf = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x7113); - /* accumulators with the resulting coefficients to A and G */ - secp256k1_scalar ae = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); - secp256k1_scalar ge = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); - /* actual points */ - secp256k1_gej x; - secp256k1_gej x2; - int i; - - /* the point being computed */ - x = a; - for (i = 0; i < 200*count; i++) { - /* in each iteration, compute X = xn*X + gn*G; */ - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &x, &x, &xn, &gn); - /* also compute ae and ge: the actual accumulated factors for A and G */ - /* if X was (ae*A+ge*G), xn*X + gn*G results in (xn*ae*A + (xn*ge+gn)*G) */ - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ae, &ae, &xn); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&ge, &ge, &xn); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&ge, &ge, &gn); - /* modify xn and gn */ - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&xn, &xn, &xf); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&gn, &gn, &gf); - - /* verify */ - if (i == 19999) { - /* expected result after 19999 iterations */ - secp256k1_gej rp = SECP256K1_GEJ_CONST( - 0xD6E96687, 0xF9B10D09, 0x2A6F3543, 0x9D86CEBE, - 0xA4535D0D, 0x409F5358, 0x6440BD74, 0xB933E830, - 0xB95CBCA2, 0xC77DA786, 0x539BE8FD, 0x53354D2D, - 0x3B4F566A, 0xE6580454, 0x07ED6015, 0xEE1B2A88 - ); - - secp256k1_gej_neg(&rp, &rp); - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&rp, &rp, &x, NULL); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&rp)); - } - } - /* redo the computation, but directly with the resulting ae and ge coefficients: */ - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &x2, &a, &ae, &ge); - secp256k1_gej_neg(&x2, &x2); - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&x2, &x2, &x, NULL); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&x2)); -} - -void test_point_times_order(const secp256k1_gej *point) { - /* X * (point + G) + (order-X) * (pointer + G) = 0 */ - secp256k1_scalar x; - secp256k1_scalar nx; - secp256k1_scalar zero = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); - secp256k1_scalar one = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); - secp256k1_gej res1, res2; - secp256k1_ge res3; - unsigned char pub[65]; - size_t psize = 65; - random_scalar_order_test(&x); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&nx, &x); - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &res1, point, &x, &x); /* calc res1 = x * point + x * G; */ - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &res2, point, &nx, &nx); /* calc res2 = (order - x) * point + (order - x) * G; */ - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&res1, &res1, &res2, NULL); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&res1)); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_valid_var(&res1) == 0); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res3, &res1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&res3)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_valid_var(&res3) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&res3, pub, &psize, 0) == 0); - psize = 65; - CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&res3, pub, &psize, 1) == 0); - /* check zero/one edge cases */ - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &res1, point, &zero, &zero); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res3, &res1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&res3)); - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &res1, point, &one, &zero); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res3, &res1); - ge_equals_gej(&res3, point); - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &res1, point, &zero, &one); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res3, &res1); - ge_equals_ge(&res3, &secp256k1_ge_const_g); -} - -void run_point_times_order(void) { - int i; - secp256k1_fe x = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2); - static const secp256k1_fe xr = SECP256K1_FE_CONST( - 0x7603CB59, 0xB0EF6C63, 0xFE608479, 0x2A0C378C, - 0xDB3233A8, 0x0F8A9A09, 0xA877DEAD, 0x31B38C45 - ); - for (i = 0; i < 500; i++) { - secp256k1_ge p; - if (secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&p, &x, 1)) { - secp256k1_gej j; - CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_valid_var(&p)); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&j, &p); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_valid_var(&j)); - test_point_times_order(&j); - } - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x, &x); - } - secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&x); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&x, &xr)); -} - -void ecmult_const_random_mult(void) { - /* random starting point A (on the curve) */ - secp256k1_ge a = SECP256K1_GE_CONST( - 0x6d986544, 0x57ff52b8, 0xcf1b8126, 0x5b802a5b, - 0xa97f9263, 0xb1e88044, 0x93351325, 0x91bc450a, - 0x535c59f7, 0x325e5d2b, 0xc391fbe8, 0x3c12787c, - 0x337e4a98, 0xe82a9011, 0x0123ba37, 0xdd769c7d - ); - /* random initial factor xn */ - secp256k1_scalar xn = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( - 0x649d4f77, 0xc4242df7, 0x7f2079c9, 0x14530327, - 0xa31b876a, 0xd2d8ce2a, 0x2236d5c6, 0xd7b2029b - ); - /* expected xn * A (from sage) */ - secp256k1_ge expected_b = SECP256K1_GE_CONST( - 0x23773684, 0x4d209dc7, 0x098a786f, 0x20d06fcd, - 0x070a38bf, 0xc11ac651, 0x03004319, 0x1e2a8786, - 0xed8c3b8e, 0xc06dd57b, 0xd06ea66e, 0x45492b0f, - 0xb84e4e1b, 0xfb77e21f, 0x96baae2a, 0x63dec956 - ); - secp256k1_gej b; - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&b, &a, &xn, 256); - - CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_valid_var(&a)); - ge_equals_gej(&expected_b, &b); -} - -void ecmult_const_commutativity(void) { - secp256k1_scalar a; - secp256k1_scalar b; - secp256k1_gej res1; - secp256k1_gej res2; - secp256k1_ge mid1; - secp256k1_ge mid2; - random_scalar_order_test(&a); - random_scalar_order_test(&b); - - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&res1, &secp256k1_ge_const_g, &a, 256); - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&res2, &secp256k1_ge_const_g, &b, 256); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&mid1, &res1); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&mid2, &res2); - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&res1, &mid1, &b, 256); - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&res2, &mid2, &a, 256); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&mid1, &res1); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&mid2, &res2); - ge_equals_ge(&mid1, &mid2); -} - -void ecmult_const_mult_zero_one(void) { - secp256k1_scalar zero = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); - secp256k1_scalar one = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); - secp256k1_scalar negone; - secp256k1_gej res1; - secp256k1_ge res2; - secp256k1_ge point; - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&negone, &one); - - random_group_element_test(&point); - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&res1, &point, &zero, 3); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res2, &res1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&res2)); - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&res1, &point, &one, 2); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res2, &res1); - ge_equals_ge(&res2, &point); - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&res1, &point, &negone, 256); - secp256k1_gej_neg(&res1, &res1); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res2, &res1); - ge_equals_ge(&res2, &point); -} - -void ecmult_const_chain_multiply(void) { - /* Check known result (randomly generated test problem from sage) */ - const secp256k1_scalar scalar = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST( - 0x4968d524, 0x2abf9b7a, 0x466abbcf, 0x34b11b6d, - 0xcd83d307, 0x827bed62, 0x05fad0ce, 0x18fae63b - ); - const secp256k1_gej expected_point = SECP256K1_GEJ_CONST( - 0x5494c15d, 0x32099706, 0xc2395f94, 0x348745fd, - 0x757ce30e, 0x4e8c90fb, 0xa2bad184, 0xf883c69f, - 0x5d195d20, 0xe191bf7f, 0x1be3e55f, 0x56a80196, - 0x6071ad01, 0xf1462f66, 0xc997fa94, 0xdb858435 - ); - secp256k1_gej point; - secp256k1_ge res; - int i; - - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&point, &secp256k1_ge_const_g); - for (i = 0; i < 100; ++i) { - secp256k1_ge tmp; - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&tmp, &point); - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&point, &tmp, &scalar, 256); - } - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&res, &point); - ge_equals_gej(&res, &expected_point); -} - -void run_ecmult_const_tests(void) { - ecmult_const_mult_zero_one(); - ecmult_const_random_mult(); - ecmult_const_commutativity(); - ecmult_const_chain_multiply(); -} - -typedef struct { - secp256k1_scalar *sc; - secp256k1_ge *pt; -} ecmult_multi_data; - -static int ecmult_multi_callback(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *cbdata) { - ecmult_multi_data *data = (ecmult_multi_data*) cbdata; - *sc = data->sc[idx]; - *pt = data->pt[idx]; - return 1; -} - -static int ecmult_multi_false_callback(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *cbdata) { - (void)sc; - (void)pt; - (void)idx; - (void)cbdata; - return 0; -} - -void test_ecmult_multi(secp256k1_scratch *scratch, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_func ecmult_multi) { - int ncount; - secp256k1_scalar szero; - secp256k1_scalar sc[32]; - secp256k1_ge pt[32]; - secp256k1_gej r; - secp256k1_gej r2; - ecmult_multi_data data; - secp256k1_scratch *scratch_empty; - - data.sc = sc; - data.pt = pt; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&szero, 0); - - /* No points to multiply */ - CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, NULL, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 0)); - - /* Check 1- and 2-point multiplies against ecmult */ - for (ncount = 0; ncount < count; ncount++) { - secp256k1_ge ptg; - secp256k1_gej ptgj; - random_scalar_order(&sc[0]); - random_scalar_order(&sc[1]); - - random_group_element_test(&ptg); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&ptgj, &ptg); - pt[0] = ptg; - pt[1] = secp256k1_ge_const_g; - - /* only G scalar */ - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &r2, &ptgj, &szero, &sc[0]); - CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &sc[0], ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 0)); - secp256k1_gej_neg(&r2, &r2); - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&r, &r, &r2, NULL); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); - - /* 1-point */ - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &r2, &ptgj, &sc[0], &szero); - CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 1)); - secp256k1_gej_neg(&r2, &r2); - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&r, &r, &r2, NULL); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); - - /* Try to multiply 1 point, but scratch space is empty */ - scratch_empty = secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, 0); - CHECK(!ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch_empty, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 1)); - secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch_empty); - - /* Try to multiply 1 point, but callback returns false */ - CHECK(!ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_false_callback, &data, 1)); - - /* 2-point */ - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &r2, &ptgj, &sc[0], &sc[1]); - CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 2)); - secp256k1_gej_neg(&r2, &r2); - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&r, &r, &r2, NULL); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); - - /* 2-point with G scalar */ - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &r2, &ptgj, &sc[0], &sc[1]); - CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &sc[1], ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 1)); - secp256k1_gej_neg(&r2, &r2); - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&r, &r, &r2, NULL); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); - } - - /* Check infinite outputs of various forms */ - for (ncount = 0; ncount < count; ncount++) { - secp256k1_ge ptg; - size_t i, j; - size_t sizes[] = { 2, 10, 32 }; - - for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) { - for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { - random_scalar_order(&sc[i]); - secp256k1_ge_set_infinity(&pt[i]); - } - CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, sizes[j])); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); - } - - for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) { - for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { - random_group_element_test(&ptg); - pt[i] = ptg; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sc[i], 0); - } - CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, sizes[j])); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); - } - - for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) { - random_group_element_test(&ptg); - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - random_scalar_order(&sc[2*i]); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&sc[2*i + 1], &sc[2*i]); - pt[2 * i] = ptg; - pt[2 * i + 1] = ptg; - } - - CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, sizes[j])); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); - - random_scalar_order(&sc[0]); - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - random_group_element_test(&ptg); - - sc[2*i] = sc[0]; - sc[2*i+1] = sc[0]; - pt[2 * i] = ptg; - secp256k1_ge_neg(&pt[2*i+1], &pt[2*i]); - } - - CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, sizes[j])); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); - } - - random_group_element_test(&ptg); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sc[0], 0); - pt[0] = ptg; - for (i = 1; i < 32; i++) { - pt[i] = ptg; - - random_scalar_order(&sc[i]); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&sc[0], &sc[0], &sc[i]); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&sc[i], &sc[i]); - } - - CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 32)); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); - } - - /* Check random points, constant scalar */ - for (ncount = 0; ncount < count; ncount++) { - size_t i; - secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&r); - - random_scalar_order(&sc[0]); - for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { - secp256k1_ge ptg; - sc[i] = sc[0]; - random_group_element_test(&ptg); - pt[i] = ptg; - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&r, &r, &pt[i], NULL); - } - - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &r2, &r, &sc[0], &szero); - CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 20)); - secp256k1_gej_neg(&r2, &r2); - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&r, &r, &r2, NULL); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); - } - - /* Check random scalars, constant point */ - for (ncount = 0; ncount < count; ncount++) { - size_t i; - secp256k1_ge ptg; - secp256k1_gej p0j; - secp256k1_scalar rs; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&rs, 0); - - random_group_element_test(&ptg); - for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { - random_scalar_order(&sc[i]); - pt[i] = ptg; - secp256k1_scalar_add(&rs, &rs, &sc[i]); - } - - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&p0j, &pt[0]); - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &r2, &p0j, &rs, &szero); - CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 20)); - secp256k1_gej_neg(&r2, &r2); - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&r, &r, &r2, NULL); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); - } - - /* Sanity check that zero scalars don't cause problems */ - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sc[0]); - CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 20)); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sc[1]); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sc[2]); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sc[3]); - secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sc[4]); - CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 6)); - CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 5)); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); - - /* Run through s0*(t0*P) + s1*(t1*P) exhaustively for many small values of s0, s1, t0, t1 */ - { - const size_t TOP = 8; - size_t s0i, s1i; - size_t t0i, t1i; - secp256k1_ge ptg; - secp256k1_gej ptgj; - - random_group_element_test(&ptg); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&ptgj, &ptg); - - for(t0i = 0; t0i < TOP; t0i++) { - for(t1i = 0; t1i < TOP; t1i++) { - secp256k1_gej t0p, t1p; - secp256k1_scalar t0, t1; - - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&t0, (t0i + 1) / 2); - secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&t0, t0i & 1); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&t1, (t1i + 1) / 2); - secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&t1, t1i & 1); - - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &t0p, &ptgj, &t0, &szero); - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &t1p, &ptgj, &t1, &szero); - - for(s0i = 0; s0i < TOP; s0i++) { - for(s1i = 0; s1i < TOP; s1i++) { - secp256k1_scalar tmp1, tmp2; - secp256k1_gej expected, actual; - - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&pt[0], &t0p); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&pt[1], &t1p); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sc[0], (s0i + 1) / 2); - secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&sc[0], s0i & 1); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sc[1], (s1i + 1) / 2); - secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&sc[1], s1i & 1); - - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tmp1, &t0, &sc[0]); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&tmp2, &t1, &sc[1]); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&tmp1, &tmp1, &tmp2); - - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &expected, &ptgj, &tmp1, &szero); - CHECK(ecmult_multi(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &actual, &szero, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 2)); - secp256k1_gej_neg(&expected, &expected); - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&actual, &actual, &expected, NULL); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&actual)); - } - } - } - } - } -} - -void test_secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(void) { - int i; - - CHECK(secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(0) == 0); - for(i = 1; i <= PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW; i++) { -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - /* Bucket_window of 8 is not used with endo */ - if (i == 8) { - continue; - } -#endif - CHECK(secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window(secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(i)) == i); - if (i != PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW) { - CHECK(secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window(secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(i)+1) > i); - } - } -} - -/** - * Probabilistically test the function returning the maximum number of possible points - * for a given scratch space. - */ -void test_ecmult_multi_pippenger_max_points(void) { - size_t scratch_size = secp256k1_rand_int(256); - size_t max_size = secp256k1_pippenger_scratch_size(secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW-1)+512, 12); - secp256k1_scratch *scratch; - size_t n_points_supported; - int bucket_window = 0; - - for(; scratch_size < max_size; scratch_size+=256) { - scratch = secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, scratch_size); - CHECK(scratch != NULL); - n_points_supported = secp256k1_pippenger_max_points(scratch); - if (n_points_supported == 0) { - secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); - continue; - } - bucket_window = secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window(n_points_supported); - CHECK(secp256k1_scratch_allocate_frame(scratch, secp256k1_pippenger_scratch_size(n_points_supported, bucket_window), PIPPENGER_SCRATCH_OBJECTS)); - secp256k1_scratch_deallocate_frame(scratch); - secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); - } - CHECK(bucket_window == PIPPENGER_MAX_BUCKET_WINDOW); -} - -/** - * Run secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var with num points and a scratch space restricted to - * 1 <= i <= num points. - */ -void test_ecmult_multi_batching(void) { - static const int n_points = 2*ECMULT_PIPPENGER_THRESHOLD; - secp256k1_scalar scG; - secp256k1_scalar szero; - secp256k1_scalar *sc = (secp256k1_scalar *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, sizeof(secp256k1_scalar) * n_points); - secp256k1_ge *pt = (secp256k1_ge *)checked_malloc(&ctx->error_callback, sizeof(secp256k1_ge) * n_points); - secp256k1_gej r; - secp256k1_gej r2; - ecmult_multi_data data; - int i; - secp256k1_scratch *scratch; - - secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&r2); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&szero, 0); - - /* Get random scalars and group elements and compute result */ - random_scalar_order(&scG); - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &r2, &r2, &szero, &scG); - for(i = 0; i < n_points; i++) { - secp256k1_ge ptg; - secp256k1_gej ptgj; - random_group_element_test(&ptg); - secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&ptgj, &ptg); - pt[i] = ptg; - random_scalar_order(&sc[i]); - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &ptgj, &ptgj, &sc[i], NULL); - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&r2, &r2, &ptgj, NULL); - } - data.sc = sc; - data.pt = pt; - - /* Test with empty scratch space */ - scratch = secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, 0); - CHECK(!secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &scG, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 1)); - secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); - - /* Test with space for 1 point in pippenger. That's not enough because - * ecmult_multi selects strauss which requires more memory. */ - scratch = secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, secp256k1_pippenger_scratch_size(1, 1) + PIPPENGER_SCRATCH_OBJECTS*ALIGNMENT); - CHECK(!secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &scG, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 1)); - secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); - - secp256k1_gej_neg(&r2, &r2); - for(i = 1; i <= n_points; i++) { - if (i > ECMULT_PIPPENGER_THRESHOLD) { - int bucket_window = secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window(i); - size_t scratch_size = secp256k1_pippenger_scratch_size(i, bucket_window); - scratch = secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, scratch_size + PIPPENGER_SCRATCH_OBJECTS*ALIGNMENT); - } else { - size_t scratch_size = secp256k1_strauss_scratch_size(i); - scratch = secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, scratch_size + STRAUSS_SCRATCH_OBJECTS*ALIGNMENT); - } - CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &r, &scG, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, n_points)); - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&r, &r, &r2, NULL); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); - secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); - } - free(sc); - free(pt); -} - -void run_ecmult_multi_tests(void) { - secp256k1_scratch *scratch; - - test_secp256k1_pippenger_bucket_window_inv(); - test_ecmult_multi_pippenger_max_points(); - scratch = secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, 819200); - test_ecmult_multi(scratch, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var); - test_ecmult_multi(scratch, secp256k1_ecmult_pippenger_batch_single); - test_ecmult_multi(scratch, secp256k1_ecmult_strauss_batch_single); - secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); - - /* Run test_ecmult_multi with space for exactly one point */ - scratch = secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, secp256k1_strauss_scratch_size(1) + STRAUSS_SCRATCH_OBJECTS*ALIGNMENT); - test_ecmult_multi(scratch, secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var); - secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); - - test_ecmult_multi_batching(); -} - -void test_wnaf(const secp256k1_scalar *number, int w) { - secp256k1_scalar x, two, t; - int wnaf[256]; - int zeroes = -1; - int i; - int bits; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&x, 0); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&two, 2); - bits = secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(wnaf, 256, number, w); - CHECK(bits <= 256); - for (i = bits-1; i >= 0; i--) { - int v = wnaf[i]; - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x, &x, &two); - if (v) { - CHECK(zeroes == -1 || zeroes >= w-1); /* check that distance between non-zero elements is at least w-1 */ - zeroes=0; - CHECK((v & 1) == 1); /* check non-zero elements are odd */ - CHECK(v <= (1 << (w-1)) - 1); /* check range below */ - CHECK(v >= -(1 << (w-1)) - 1); /* check range above */ - } else { - CHECK(zeroes != -1); /* check that no unnecessary zero padding exists */ - zeroes++; - } - if (v >= 0) { - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&t, v); - } else { - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&t, -v); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&t, &t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_add(&x, &x, &t); - } - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&x, number)); /* check that wnaf represents number */ -} - -void test_constant_wnaf_negate(const secp256k1_scalar *number) { - secp256k1_scalar neg1 = *number; - secp256k1_scalar neg2 = *number; - int sign1 = 1; - int sign2 = 1; - - if (!secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(&neg1, 0, 1)) { - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&neg1, &neg1); - sign1 = -1; - } - sign2 = secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&neg2, secp256k1_scalar_is_even(&neg2)); - CHECK(sign1 == sign2); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&neg1, &neg2)); -} - -void test_constant_wnaf(const secp256k1_scalar *number, int w) { - secp256k1_scalar x, shift; - int wnaf[256] = {0}; - int i; - int skew; - int bits = 256; - secp256k1_scalar num = *number; - - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&x, 0); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&shift, 1 << w); - /* With USE_ENDOMORPHISM on we only consider 128-bit numbers */ -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) { - secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&num, 8); - } - bits = 128; -#endif - skew = secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf, num, w, bits); - - for (i = WNAF_SIZE_BITS(bits, w); i >= 0; --i) { - secp256k1_scalar t; - int v = wnaf[i]; - CHECK(v != 0); /* check nonzero */ - CHECK(v & 1); /* check parity */ - CHECK(v > -(1 << w)); /* check range above */ - CHECK(v < (1 << w)); /* check range below */ - - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x, &x, &shift); - if (v >= 0) { - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&t, v); - } else { - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&t, -v); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&t, &t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_add(&x, &x, &t); - } - /* Skew num because when encoding numbers as odd we use an offset */ - secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(&num, skew == 2, 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&x, &num)); -} - -void test_fixed_wnaf(const secp256k1_scalar *number, int w) { - secp256k1_scalar x, shift; - int wnaf[256] = {0}; - int i; - int skew; - secp256k1_scalar num = *number; - - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&x, 0); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&shift, 1 << w); - /* With USE_ENDOMORPHISM on we only consider 128-bit numbers */ -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) { - secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&num, 8); - } -#endif - skew = secp256k1_wnaf_fixed(wnaf, &num, w); - - for (i = WNAF_SIZE(w)-1; i >= 0; --i) { - secp256k1_scalar t; - int v = wnaf[i]; - CHECK(v == 0 || v & 1); /* check parity */ - CHECK(v > -(1 << w)); /* check range above */ - CHECK(v < (1 << w)); /* check range below */ - - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&x, &x, &shift); - if (v >= 0) { - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&t, v); - } else { - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&t, -v); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&t, &t); - } - secp256k1_scalar_add(&x, &x, &t); - } - /* If skew is 1 then add 1 to num */ - secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(&num, 0, skew == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&x, &num)); -} - -/* Checks that the first 8 elements of wnaf are equal to wnaf_expected and the - * rest is 0.*/ -void test_fixed_wnaf_small_helper(int *wnaf, int *wnaf_expected, int w) { - int i; - for (i = WNAF_SIZE(w)-1; i >= 8; --i) { - CHECK(wnaf[i] == 0); - } - for (i = 7; i >= 0; --i) { - CHECK(wnaf[i] == wnaf_expected[i]); - } -} - -void test_fixed_wnaf_small(void) { - int w = 4; - int wnaf[256] = {0}; - int i; - int skew; - secp256k1_scalar num; - - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&num, 0); - skew = secp256k1_wnaf_fixed(wnaf, &num, w); - for (i = WNAF_SIZE(w)-1; i >= 0; --i) { - int v = wnaf[i]; - CHECK(v == 0); - } - CHECK(skew == 0); - - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&num, 1); - skew = secp256k1_wnaf_fixed(wnaf, &num, w); - for (i = WNAF_SIZE(w)-1; i >= 1; --i) { - int v = wnaf[i]; - CHECK(v == 0); - } - CHECK(wnaf[0] == 1); - CHECK(skew == 0); - - { - int wnaf_expected[8] = { 0xf, 0xf, 0xf, 0xf, 0xf, 0xf, 0xf, 0xf }; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&num, 0xffffffff); - skew = secp256k1_wnaf_fixed(wnaf, &num, w); - test_fixed_wnaf_small_helper(wnaf, wnaf_expected, w); - CHECK(skew == 0); - } - { - int wnaf_expected[8] = { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 0xf }; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&num, 0xeeeeeeee); - skew = secp256k1_wnaf_fixed(wnaf, &num, w); - test_fixed_wnaf_small_helper(wnaf, wnaf_expected, w); - CHECK(skew == 1); - } - { - int wnaf_expected[8] = { 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0 }; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&num, 0x01010101); - skew = secp256k1_wnaf_fixed(wnaf, &num, w); - test_fixed_wnaf_small_helper(wnaf, wnaf_expected, w); - CHECK(skew == 0); - } - { - int wnaf_expected[8] = { -0xf, 0, 0xf, -0xf, 0, 0xf, 1, 0 }; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&num, 0x01ef1ef1); - skew = secp256k1_wnaf_fixed(wnaf, &num, w); - test_fixed_wnaf_small_helper(wnaf, wnaf_expected, w); - CHECK(skew == 0); - } -} - -void run_wnaf(void) { - int i; - secp256k1_scalar n = {{0}}; - - /* Sanity check: 1 and 2 are the smallest odd and even numbers and should - * have easier-to-diagnose failure modes */ - n.d[0] = 1; - test_constant_wnaf(&n, 4); - n.d[0] = 2; - test_constant_wnaf(&n, 4); - /* Test 0 */ - test_fixed_wnaf_small(); - /* Random tests */ - for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { - random_scalar_order(&n); - test_wnaf(&n, 4+(i%10)); - test_constant_wnaf_negate(&n); - test_constant_wnaf(&n, 4 + (i % 10)); - test_fixed_wnaf(&n, 4 + (i % 10)); - } - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&n, 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&n, 1) == -1); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&n)); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&n, 0) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&n)); -} - -void test_ecmult_constants(void) { - /* Test ecmult_gen() for [0..36) and [order-36..0). */ - secp256k1_scalar x; - secp256k1_gej r; - secp256k1_ge ng; - int i; - int j; - secp256k1_ge_neg(&ng, &secp256k1_ge_const_g); - for (i = 0; i < 36; i++ ) { - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&x, i); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &r, &x); - for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { - if (j == i - 1) { - ge_equals_gej(&secp256k1_ge_const_g, &r); - } - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&r, &r, &ng); - } - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); - } - for (i = 1; i <= 36; i++ ) { - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&x, i); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&x, &x); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &r, &x); - for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { - if (j == i - 1) { - ge_equals_gej(&ng, &r); - } - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&r, &r, &secp256k1_ge_const_g); - } - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&r)); - } -} - -void run_ecmult_constants(void) { - test_ecmult_constants(); -} - -void test_ecmult_gen_blind(void) { - /* Test ecmult_gen() blinding and confirm that the blinding changes, the affine points match, and the z's don't match. */ - secp256k1_scalar key; - secp256k1_scalar b; - unsigned char seed32[32]; - secp256k1_gej pgej; - secp256k1_gej pgej2; - secp256k1_gej i; - secp256k1_ge pge; - random_scalar_order_test(&key); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pgej, &key); - secp256k1_rand256(seed32); - b = ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx.blind; - i = ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx.initial; - secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, seed32); - CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_eq(&b, &ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx.blind)); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pgej2, &key); - CHECK(!gej_xyz_equals_gej(&pgej, &pgej2)); - CHECK(!gej_xyz_equals_gej(&i, &ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx.initial)); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&pge, &pgej); - ge_equals_gej(&pge, &pgej2); -} - -void test_ecmult_gen_blind_reset(void) { - /* Test ecmult_gen() blinding reset and confirm that the blinding is consistent. */ - secp256k1_scalar b; - secp256k1_gej initial; - secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, 0); - b = ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx.blind; - initial = ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx.initial; - secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&b, &ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx.blind)); - CHECK(gej_xyz_equals_gej(&initial, &ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx.initial)); -} - -void run_ecmult_gen_blind(void) { - int i; - test_ecmult_gen_blind_reset(); - for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { - test_ecmult_gen_blind(); - } -} - -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM -/***** ENDOMORPHISH TESTS *****/ -void test_scalar_split(void) { - secp256k1_scalar full; - secp256k1_scalar s1, slam; - const unsigned char zero[32] = {0}; - unsigned char tmp[32]; - - random_scalar_order_test(&full); - secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(&s1, &slam, &full); - - /* check that both are <= 128 bits in size */ - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s1)) { - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s1, &s1); - } - if (secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&slam)) { - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&slam, &slam); - } - - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(tmp, &s1); - CHECK(memcmp(zero, tmp, 16) == 0); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(tmp, &slam); - CHECK(memcmp(zero, tmp, 16) == 0); -} - -void run_endomorphism_tests(void) { - test_scalar_split(); -} -#endif - -void ec_pubkey_parse_pointtest(const unsigned char *input, int xvalid, int yvalid) { - unsigned char pubkeyc[65]; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - secp256k1_ge ge; - size_t pubkeyclen; - int32_t ecount; - ecount = 0; - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - for (pubkeyclen = 3; pubkeyclen <= 65; pubkeyclen++) { - /* Smaller sizes are tested exhaustively elsewhere. */ - int32_t i; - memcpy(&pubkeyc[1], input, 64); - VG_UNDEF(&pubkeyc[pubkeyclen], 65 - pubkeyclen); - for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { - /* Try all type bytes. */ - int xpass; - int ypass; - int ysign; - pubkeyc[0] = i; - /* What sign does this point have? */ - ysign = (input[63] & 1) + 2; - /* For the current type (i) do we expect parsing to work? Handled all of compressed/uncompressed/hybrid. */ - xpass = xvalid && (pubkeyclen == 33) && ((i & 254) == 2); - /* Do we expect a parse and re-serialize as uncompressed to give a matching y? */ - ypass = xvalid && yvalid && ((i & 4) == ((pubkeyclen == 65) << 2)) && - ((i == 4) || ((i & 251) == ysign)) && ((pubkeyclen == 33) || (pubkeyclen == 65)); - if (xpass || ypass) { - /* These cases must parse. */ - unsigned char pubkeyo[65]; - size_t outl; - memset(&pubkey, 0, sizeof(pubkey)); - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - ecount = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeyc, pubkeyclen) == 1); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - outl = 65; - VG_UNDEF(pubkeyo, 65); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, pubkeyo, &outl, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); - VG_CHECK(pubkeyo, outl); - CHECK(outl == 33); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkeyo[1], &pubkeyc[1], 32) == 0); - CHECK((pubkeyclen != 33) || (pubkeyo[0] == pubkeyc[0])); - if (ypass) { - /* This test isn't always done because we decode with alternative signs, so the y won't match. */ - CHECK(pubkeyo[0] == ysign); - CHECK(secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &ge, &pubkey) == 1); - memset(&pubkey, 0, sizeof(pubkey)); - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - secp256k1_pubkey_save(&pubkey, &ge); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - outl = 65; - VG_UNDEF(pubkeyo, 65); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, pubkeyo, &outl, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED) == 1); - VG_CHECK(pubkeyo, outl); - CHECK(outl == 65); - CHECK(pubkeyo[0] == 4); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkeyo[1], input, 64) == 0); - } - CHECK(ecount == 0); - } else { - /* These cases must fail to parse. */ - memset(&pubkey, 0xfe, sizeof(pubkey)); - ecount = 0; - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeyc, pubkeyclen) == 0); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(ecount == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &ge, &pubkey) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - } - } - } - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx, NULL, NULL); -} - -void run_ec_pubkey_parse_test(void) { -#define SECP256K1_EC_PARSE_TEST_NVALID (12) - const unsigned char valid[SECP256K1_EC_PARSE_TEST_NVALID][64] = { - { - /* Point with leading and trailing zeros in x and y serialization. */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x52, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x64, 0xef, 0xa1, 0x7b, 0x77, 0x61, 0xe1, 0xe4, 0x27, 0x06, 0x98, 0x9f, 0xb4, 0x83, - 0xb8, 0xd2, 0xd4, 0x9b, 0xf7, 0x8f, 0xae, 0x98, 0x03, 0xf0, 0x99, 0xb8, 0x34, 0xed, 0xeb, 0x00 - }, - { - /* Point with x equal to a 3rd root of unity.*/ - 0x7a, 0xe9, 0x6a, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x7c, 0x07, 0x10, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x47, 0x9e, 0xac, 0x34, 0x34, 0xe9, - 0x9c, 0xf0, 0x49, 0x75, 0x12, 0xf5, 0x89, 0x95, 0xc1, 0x39, 0x6c, 0x28, 0x71, 0x95, 0x01, 0xee, - 0x42, 0x18, 0xf2, 0x0a, 0xe6, 0xc6, 0x46, 0xb3, 0x63, 0xdb, 0x68, 0x60, 0x58, 0x22, 0xfb, 0x14, - 0x26, 0x4c, 0xa8, 0xd2, 0x58, 0x7f, 0xdd, 0x6f, 0xbc, 0x75, 0x0d, 0x58, 0x7e, 0x76, 0xa7, 0xee, - }, - { - /* Point with largest x. (1/2) */ - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x2c, - 0x0e, 0x99, 0x4b, 0x14, 0xea, 0x72, 0xf8, 0xc3, 0xeb, 0x95, 0xc7, 0x1e, 0xf6, 0x92, 0x57, 0x5e, - 0x77, 0x50, 0x58, 0x33, 0x2d, 0x7e, 0x52, 0xd0, 0x99, 0x5c, 0xf8, 0x03, 0x88, 0x71, 0xb6, 0x7d, - }, - { - /* Point with largest x. (2/2) */ - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x2c, - 0xf1, 0x66, 0xb4, 0xeb, 0x15, 0x8d, 0x07, 0x3c, 0x14, 0x6a, 0x38, 0xe1, 0x09, 0x6d, 0xa8, 0xa1, - 0x88, 0xaf, 0xa7, 0xcc, 0xd2, 0x81, 0xad, 0x2f, 0x66, 0xa3, 0x07, 0xfb, 0x77, 0x8e, 0x45, 0xb2, - }, - { - /* Point with smallest x. (1/2) */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, - 0x42, 0x18, 0xf2, 0x0a, 0xe6, 0xc6, 0x46, 0xb3, 0x63, 0xdb, 0x68, 0x60, 0x58, 0x22, 0xfb, 0x14, - 0x26, 0x4c, 0xa8, 0xd2, 0x58, 0x7f, 0xdd, 0x6f, 0xbc, 0x75, 0x0d, 0x58, 0x7e, 0x76, 0xa7, 0xee, - }, - { - /* Point with smallest x. (2/2) */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, - 0xbd, 0xe7, 0x0d, 0xf5, 0x19, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x4c, 0x9c, 0x24, 0x97, 0x9f, 0xa7, 0xdd, 0x04, 0xeb, - 0xd9, 0xb3, 0x57, 0x2d, 0xa7, 0x80, 0x22, 0x90, 0x43, 0x8a, 0xf2, 0xa6, 0x81, 0x89, 0x54, 0x41, - }, - { - /* Point with largest y. (1/3) */ - 0x1f, 0xe1, 0xe5, 0xef, 0x3f, 0xce, 0xb5, 0xc1, 0x35, 0xab, 0x77, 0x41, 0x33, 0x3c, 0xe5, 0xa6, - 0xe8, 0x0d, 0x68, 0x16, 0x76, 0x53, 0xf6, 0xb2, 0xb2, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0xcf, 0xaa, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x07, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x2e, - }, - { - /* Point with largest y. (2/3) */ - 0xcb, 0xb0, 0xde, 0xab, 0x12, 0x57, 0x54, 0xf1, 0xfd, 0xb2, 0x03, 0x8b, 0x04, 0x34, 0xed, 0x9c, - 0xb3, 0xfb, 0x53, 0xab, 0x73, 0x53, 0x91, 0x12, 0x99, 0x94, 0xa5, 0x35, 0xd9, 0x25, 0xf6, 0x73, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x2e, - }, - { - /* Point with largest y. (3/3) */ - 0x14, 0x6d, 0x3b, 0x65, 0xad, 0xd9, 0xf5, 0x4c, 0xcc, 0xa2, 0x85, 0x33, 0xc8, 0x8e, 0x2c, 0xbc, - 0x63, 0xf7, 0x44, 0x3e, 0x16, 0x58, 0x78, 0x3a, 0xb4, 0x1f, 0x8e, 0xf9, 0x7c, 0x2a, 0x10, 0xb5, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x2e, - }, - { - /* Point with smallest y. (1/3) */ - 0x1f, 0xe1, 0xe5, 0xef, 0x3f, 0xce, 0xb5, 0xc1, 0x35, 0xab, 0x77, 0x41, 0x33, 0x3c, 0xe5, 0xa6, - 0xe8, 0x0d, 0x68, 0x16, 0x76, 0x53, 0xf6, 0xb2, 0xb2, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0xcf, 0xaa, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x07, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, - }, - { - /* Point with smallest y. (2/3) */ - 0xcb, 0xb0, 0xde, 0xab, 0x12, 0x57, 0x54, 0xf1, 0xfd, 0xb2, 0x03, 0x8b, 0x04, 0x34, 0xed, 0x9c, - 0xb3, 0xfb, 0x53, 0xab, 0x73, 0x53, 0x91, 0x12, 0x99, 0x94, 0xa5, 0x35, 0xd9, 0x25, 0xf6, 0x73, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, - }, - { - /* Point with smallest y. (3/3) */ - 0x14, 0x6d, 0x3b, 0x65, 0xad, 0xd9, 0xf5, 0x4c, 0xcc, 0xa2, 0x85, 0x33, 0xc8, 0x8e, 0x2c, 0xbc, - 0x63, 0xf7, 0x44, 0x3e, 0x16, 0x58, 0x78, 0x3a, 0xb4, 0x1f, 0x8e, 0xf9, 0x7c, 0x2a, 0x10, 0xb5, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 - } - }; -#define SECP256K1_EC_PARSE_TEST_NXVALID (4) - const unsigned char onlyxvalid[SECP256K1_EC_PARSE_TEST_NXVALID][64] = { - { - /* Valid if y overflow ignored (y = 1 mod p). (1/3) */ - 0x1f, 0xe1, 0xe5, 0xef, 0x3f, 0xce, 0xb5, 0xc1, 0x35, 0xab, 0x77, 0x41, 0x33, 0x3c, 0xe5, 0xa6, - 0xe8, 0x0d, 0x68, 0x16, 0x76, 0x53, 0xf6, 0xb2, 0xb2, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0xcf, 0xaa, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x07, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x30, - }, - { - /* Valid if y overflow ignored (y = 1 mod p). (2/3) */ - 0xcb, 0xb0, 0xde, 0xab, 0x12, 0x57, 0x54, 0xf1, 0xfd, 0xb2, 0x03, 0x8b, 0x04, 0x34, 0xed, 0x9c, - 0xb3, 0xfb, 0x53, 0xab, 0x73, 0x53, 0x91, 0x12, 0x99, 0x94, 0xa5, 0x35, 0xd9, 0x25, 0xf6, 0x73, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x30, - }, - { - /* Valid if y overflow ignored (y = 1 mod p). (3/3)*/ - 0x14, 0x6d, 0x3b, 0x65, 0xad, 0xd9, 0xf5, 0x4c, 0xcc, 0xa2, 0x85, 0x33, 0xc8, 0x8e, 0x2c, 0xbc, - 0x63, 0xf7, 0x44, 0x3e, 0x16, 0x58, 0x78, 0x3a, 0xb4, 0x1f, 0x8e, 0xf9, 0x7c, 0x2a, 0x10, 0xb5, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x30, - }, - { - /* x on curve, y is from y^2 = x^3 + 8. */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03 - } - }; -#define SECP256K1_EC_PARSE_TEST_NINVALID (7) - const unsigned char invalid[SECP256K1_EC_PARSE_TEST_NINVALID][64] = { - { - /* x is third root of -8, y is -1 * (x^3+7); also on the curve for y^2 = x^3 + 9. */ - 0x0a, 0x2d, 0x2b, 0xa9, 0x35, 0x07, 0xf1, 0xdf, 0x23, 0x37, 0x70, 0xc2, 0xa7, 0x97, 0x96, 0x2c, - 0xc6, 0x1f, 0x6d, 0x15, 0xda, 0x14, 0xec, 0xd4, 0x7d, 0x8d, 0x27, 0xae, 0x1c, 0xd5, 0xf8, 0x53, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, - }, - { - /* Valid if x overflow ignored (x = 1 mod p). */ - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x30, - 0x42, 0x18, 0xf2, 0x0a, 0xe6, 0xc6, 0x46, 0xb3, 0x63, 0xdb, 0x68, 0x60, 0x58, 0x22, 0xfb, 0x14, - 0x26, 0x4c, 0xa8, 0xd2, 0x58, 0x7f, 0xdd, 0x6f, 0xbc, 0x75, 0x0d, 0x58, 0x7e, 0x76, 0xa7, 0xee, - }, - { - /* Valid if x overflow ignored (x = 1 mod p). */ - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x30, - 0xbd, 0xe7, 0x0d, 0xf5, 0x19, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x4c, 0x9c, 0x24, 0x97, 0x9f, 0xa7, 0xdd, 0x04, 0xeb, - 0xd9, 0xb3, 0x57, 0x2d, 0xa7, 0x80, 0x22, 0x90, 0x43, 0x8a, 0xf2, 0xa6, 0x81, 0x89, 0x54, 0x41, - }, - { - /* x is -1, y is the result of the sqrt ladder; also on the curve for y^2 = x^3 - 5. */ - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x2e, - 0xf4, 0x84, 0x14, 0x5c, 0xb0, 0x14, 0x9b, 0x82, 0x5d, 0xff, 0x41, 0x2f, 0xa0, 0x52, 0xa8, 0x3f, - 0xcb, 0x72, 0xdb, 0x61, 0xd5, 0x6f, 0x37, 0x70, 0xce, 0x06, 0x6b, 0x73, 0x49, 0xa2, 0xaa, 0x28, - }, - { - /* x is -1, y is the result of the sqrt ladder; also on the curve for y^2 = x^3 - 5. */ - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x2e, - 0x0b, 0x7b, 0xeb, 0xa3, 0x4f, 0xeb, 0x64, 0x7d, 0xa2, 0x00, 0xbe, 0xd0, 0x5f, 0xad, 0x57, 0xc0, - 0x34, 0x8d, 0x24, 0x9e, 0x2a, 0x90, 0xc8, 0x8f, 0x31, 0xf9, 0x94, 0x8b, 0xb6, 0x5d, 0x52, 0x07, - }, - { - /* x is zero, y is the result of the sqrt ladder; also on the curve for y^2 = x^3 - 7. */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x8f, 0x53, 0x7e, 0xef, 0xdf, 0xc1, 0x60, 0x6a, 0x07, 0x27, 0xcd, 0x69, 0xb4, 0xa7, 0x33, 0x3d, - 0x38, 0xed, 0x44, 0xe3, 0x93, 0x2a, 0x71, 0x79, 0xee, 0xcb, 0x4b, 0x6f, 0xba, 0x93, 0x60, 0xdc, - }, - { - /* x is zero, y is the result of the sqrt ladder; also on the curve for y^2 = x^3 - 7. */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x70, 0xac, 0x81, 0x10, 0x20, 0x3e, 0x9f, 0x95, 0xf8, 0xd8, 0x32, 0x96, 0x4b, 0x58, 0xcc, 0xc2, - 0xc7, 0x12, 0xbb, 0x1c, 0x6c, 0xd5, 0x8e, 0x86, 0x11, 0x34, 0xb4, 0x8f, 0x45, 0x6c, 0x9b, 0x53 - } - }; - const unsigned char pubkeyc[66] = { - /* Serialization of G. */ - 0x04, 0x79, 0xBE, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xF9, 0xDC, 0xBB, 0xAC, 0x55, 0xA0, 0x62, 0x95, 0xCE, 0x87, 0x0B, - 0x07, 0x02, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0x2D, 0xCE, 0x28, 0xD9, 0x59, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x5B, 0x16, 0xF8, 0x17, - 0x98, 0x48, 0x3A, 0xDA, 0x77, 0x26, 0xA3, 0xC4, 0x65, 0x5D, 0xA4, 0xFB, 0xFC, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x08, - 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x17, 0xB4, 0x48, 0xA6, 0x85, 0x54, 0x19, 0x9C, 0x47, 0xD0, 0x8F, 0xFB, 0x10, 0xD4, - 0xB8, 0x00 - }; - unsigned char sout[65]; - unsigned char shortkey[2]; - secp256k1_ge ge; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - size_t len; - int32_t i; - int32_t ecount; - int32_t ecount2; - ecount = 0; - /* Nothing should be reading this far into pubkeyc. */ - VG_UNDEF(&pubkeyc[65], 1); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - /* Zero length claimed, fail, zeroize, no illegal arg error. */ - memset(&pubkey, 0xfe, sizeof(pubkey)); - ecount = 0; - VG_UNDEF(shortkey, 2); - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, shortkey, 0) == 0); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(ecount == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &ge, &pubkey) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - /* Length one claimed, fail, zeroize, no illegal arg error. */ - for (i = 0; i < 256 ; i++) { - memset(&pubkey, 0xfe, sizeof(pubkey)); - ecount = 0; - shortkey[0] = i; - VG_UNDEF(&shortkey[1], 1); - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, shortkey, 1) == 0); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(ecount == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &ge, &pubkey) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - } - /* Length two claimed, fail, zeroize, no illegal arg error. */ - for (i = 0; i < 65536 ; i++) { - memset(&pubkey, 0xfe, sizeof(pubkey)); - ecount = 0; - shortkey[0] = i & 255; - shortkey[1] = i >> 8; - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, shortkey, 2) == 0); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(ecount == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &ge, &pubkey) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - } - memset(&pubkey, 0xfe, sizeof(pubkey)); - ecount = 0; - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - /* 33 bytes claimed on otherwise valid input starting with 0x04, fail, zeroize output, no illegal arg error. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeyc, 33) == 0); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(ecount == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &ge, &pubkey) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - /* NULL pubkey, illegal arg error. Pubkey isn't rewritten before this step, since it's NULL into the parser. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, NULL, pubkeyc, 65) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - /* NULL input string. Illegal arg and zeroize output. */ - memset(&pubkey, 0xfe, sizeof(pubkey)); - ecount = 0; - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, NULL, 65) == 0); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &ge, &pubkey) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - /* 64 bytes claimed on input starting with 0x04, fail, zeroize output, no illegal arg error. */ - memset(&pubkey, 0xfe, sizeof(pubkey)); - ecount = 0; - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeyc, 64) == 0); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(ecount == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &ge, &pubkey) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - /* 66 bytes claimed, fail, zeroize output, no illegal arg error. */ - memset(&pubkey, 0xfe, sizeof(pubkey)); - ecount = 0; - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeyc, 66) == 0); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(ecount == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &ge, &pubkey) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - /* Valid parse. */ - memset(&pubkey, 0, sizeof(pubkey)); - ecount = 0; - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeyc, 65) == 1); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(ecount == 0); - VG_UNDEF(&ge, sizeof(ge)); - CHECK(secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &ge, &pubkey) == 1); - VG_CHECK(&ge.x, sizeof(ge.x)); - VG_CHECK(&ge.y, sizeof(ge.y)); - VG_CHECK(&ge.infinity, sizeof(ge.infinity)); - ge_equals_ge(&secp256k1_ge_const_g, &ge); - CHECK(ecount == 0); - /* secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize illegal args. */ - ecount = 0; - len = 65; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, NULL, &len, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(len == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, sout, NULL, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - len = 65; - VG_UNDEF(sout, 65); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, sout, &len, NULL, SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED) == 0); - VG_CHECK(sout, 65); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - CHECK(len == 0); - len = 65; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, sout, &len, &pubkey, ~0) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 4); - CHECK(len == 0); - len = 65; - VG_UNDEF(sout, 65); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, sout, &len, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED) == 1); - VG_CHECK(sout, 65); - CHECK(ecount == 4); - CHECK(len == 65); - /* Multiple illegal args. Should still set arg error only once. */ - ecount = 0; - ecount2 = 11; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, NULL, NULL, 65) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - /* Does the illegal arg callback actually change the behavior? */ - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx, uncounting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount2); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, NULL, NULL, 65) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(ecount2 == 10); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx, NULL, NULL); - /* Try a bunch of prefabbed points with all possible encodings. */ - for (i = 0; i < SECP256K1_EC_PARSE_TEST_NVALID; i++) { - ec_pubkey_parse_pointtest(valid[i], 1, 1); - } - for (i = 0; i < SECP256K1_EC_PARSE_TEST_NXVALID; i++) { - ec_pubkey_parse_pointtest(onlyxvalid[i], 1, 0); - } - for (i = 0; i < SECP256K1_EC_PARSE_TEST_NINVALID; i++) { - ec_pubkey_parse_pointtest(invalid[i], 0, 0); - } -} - -void run_eckey_edge_case_test(void) { - const unsigned char orderc[32] = { - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, - 0xba, 0xae, 0xdc, 0xe6, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xa0, 0x3b, - 0xbf, 0xd2, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xd0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x41 - }; - const unsigned char zeros[sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)] = {0x00}; - unsigned char ctmp[33]; - unsigned char ctmp2[33]; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey2; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey_one; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey_negone; - const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkeys[3]; - size_t len; - int32_t ecount; - /* Group order is too large, reject. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, orderc) == 0); - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, orderc) == 0); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); - /* Maximum value is too large, reject. */ - memset(ctmp, 255, 32); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, ctmp) == 0); - memset(&pubkey, 1, sizeof(pubkey)); - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp) == 0); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); - /* Zero is too small, reject. */ - memset(ctmp, 0, 32); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, ctmp) == 0); - memset(&pubkey, 1, sizeof(pubkey)); - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp) == 0); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); - /* One must be accepted. */ - ctmp[31] = 0x01; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, ctmp) == 1); - memset(&pubkey, 0, sizeof(pubkey)); - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp) == 1); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) > 0); - pubkey_one = pubkey; - /* Group order + 1 is too large, reject. */ - memcpy(ctmp, orderc, 32); - ctmp[31] = 0x42; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, ctmp) == 0); - memset(&pubkey, 1, sizeof(pubkey)); - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp) == 0); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); - /* -1 must be accepted. */ - ctmp[31] = 0x40; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, ctmp) == 1); - memset(&pubkey, 0, sizeof(pubkey)); - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp) == 1); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) > 0); - pubkey_negone = pubkey; - /* Tweak of zero leaves the value unchanged. */ - memset(ctmp2, 0, 32); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp, ctmp2) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(orderc, ctmp, 31) == 0 && ctmp[31] == 0x40); - memcpy(&pubkey2, &pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp2) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); - /* Multiply tweak of zero zeroizes the output. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(ctx, ctmp, ctmp2) == 0); - CHECK(memcmp(zeros, ctmp, 32) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp2) == 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); - memcpy(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)); - /* Overflowing key tweak zeroizes. */ - memcpy(ctmp, orderc, 32); - ctmp[31] = 0x40; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp, orderc) == 0); - CHECK(memcmp(zeros, ctmp, 32) == 0); - memcpy(ctmp, orderc, 32); - ctmp[31] = 0x40; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(ctx, ctmp, orderc) == 0); - CHECK(memcmp(zeros, ctmp, 32) == 0); - memcpy(ctmp, orderc, 32); - ctmp[31] = 0x40; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, orderc) == 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); - memcpy(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, &pubkey, orderc) == 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); - memcpy(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)); - /* Private key tweaks results in a key of zero. */ - ctmp2[31] = 1; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp2, ctmp) == 0); - CHECK(memcmp(zeros, ctmp2, 32) == 0); - ctmp2[31] = 1; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp2) == 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); - memcpy(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)); - /* Tweak computation wraps and results in a key of 1. */ - ctmp2[31] = 2; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp2, ctmp) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(ctmp2, zeros, 31) == 0 && ctmp2[31] == 1); - ctmp2[31] = 2; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp2) == 1); - ctmp2[31] = 1; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey2, ctmp2) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); - /* Tweak mul * 2 = 1+1. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp2) == 1); - ctmp2[31] = 2; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, &pubkey2, ctmp2) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); - /* Test argument errors. */ - ecount = 0; - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - CHECK(ecount == 0); - /* Zeroize pubkey on parse error. */ - memset(&pubkey, 0, 32); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, ctmp2) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); - memcpy(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)); - memset(&pubkey2, 0, 32); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, &pubkey2, ctmp2) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey2, zeros, sizeof(pubkey2)) == 0); - /* Plain argument errors. */ - ecount = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, ctmp) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - ecount = 0; - memset(ctmp2, 0, 32); - ctmp2[31] = 4; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, NULL, ctmp2) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - ecount = 0; - memset(ctmp2, 0, 32); - ctmp2[31] = 4; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, NULL, ctmp2) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, &pubkey, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - ecount = 0; - memset(ctmp2, 0, 32); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, NULL, ctmp2) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, ctmp, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - ecount = 0; - memset(ctmp2, 0, 32); - ctmp2[31] = 1; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(ctx, NULL, ctmp2) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(ctx, ctmp, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - ecount = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, NULL, ctmp) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - memset(&pubkey, 1, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); - /* secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine tests. */ - ecount = 0; - pubkeys[0] = &pubkey_one; - VG_UNDEF(&pubkeys[0], sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey *)); - VG_UNDEF(&pubkeys[1], sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey *)); - VG_UNDEF(&pubkeys[2], sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey *)); - memset(&pubkey, 255, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeys, 0) == 0); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, NULL, pubkeys, 1) == 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - memset(&pubkey, 255, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &pubkey, NULL, 1) == 0); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - pubkeys[0] = &pubkey_negone; - memset(&pubkey, 255, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeys, 1) == 1); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) > 0); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - len = 33; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, ctmp, &len, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, ctmp2, &len, &pubkey_negone, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(ctmp, ctmp2, 33) == 0); - /* Result is infinity. */ - pubkeys[0] = &pubkey_one; - pubkeys[1] = &pubkey_negone; - memset(&pubkey, 255, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeys, 2) == 0); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - /* Passes through infinity but comes out one. */ - pubkeys[2] = &pubkey_one; - memset(&pubkey, 255, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeys, 3) == 1); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) > 0); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - len = 33; - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, ctmp, &len, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, ctmp2, &len, &pubkey_one, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(ctmp, ctmp2, 33) == 0); - /* Adds to two. */ - pubkeys[1] = &pubkey_one; - memset(&pubkey, 255, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - VG_UNDEF(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeys, 2) == 1); - VG_CHECK(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, zeros, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey)) > 0); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx, NULL, NULL); -} - -void random_sign(secp256k1_scalar *sigr, secp256k1_scalar *sigs, const secp256k1_scalar *key, const secp256k1_scalar *msg, int *recid) { - secp256k1_scalar nonce; - do { - random_scalar_order_test(&nonce); - } while(!secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, sigr, sigs, key, msg, &nonce, recid)); -} - -void test_ecdsa_sign_verify(void) { - secp256k1_gej pubj; - secp256k1_ge pub; - secp256k1_scalar one; - secp256k1_scalar msg, key; - secp256k1_scalar sigr, sigs; - int recid; - int getrec; - random_scalar_order_test(&msg); - random_scalar_order_test(&key); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pubj, &key); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&pub, &pubj); - getrec = secp256k1_rand_bits(1); - random_sign(&sigr, &sigs, &key, &msg, getrec?&recid:NULL); - if (getrec) { - CHECK(recid >= 0 && recid < 4); - } - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sigr, &sigs, &pub, &msg)); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&one, 1); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&msg, &msg, &one); - CHECK(!secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sigr, &sigs, &pub, &msg)); -} - -void run_ecdsa_sign_verify(void) { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < 10*count; i++) { - test_ecdsa_sign_verify(); - } -} - -/** Dummy nonce generation function that just uses a precomputed nonce, and fails if it is not accepted. Use only for testing. */ -static int precomputed_nonce_function(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *algo16, void *data, unsigned int counter) { - (void)msg32; - (void)key32; - (void)algo16; - memcpy(nonce32, data, 32); - return (counter == 0); -} - -static int nonce_function_test_fail(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *algo16, void *data, unsigned int counter) { - /* Dummy nonce generator that has a fatal error on the first counter value. */ - if (counter == 0) { - return 0; - } - return nonce_function_rfc6979(nonce32, msg32, key32, algo16, data, counter - 1); -} - -static int nonce_function_test_retry(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *algo16, void *data, unsigned int counter) { - /* Dummy nonce generator that produces unacceptable nonces for the first several counter values. */ - if (counter < 3) { - memset(nonce32, counter==0 ? 0 : 255, 32); - if (counter == 2) { - nonce32[31]--; - } - return 1; - } - if (counter < 5) { - static const unsigned char order[] = { - 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, - 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFE, - 0xBA,0xAE,0xDC,0xE6,0xAF,0x48,0xA0,0x3B, - 0xBF,0xD2,0x5E,0x8C,0xD0,0x36,0x41,0x41 - }; - memcpy(nonce32, order, 32); - if (counter == 4) { - nonce32[31]++; - } - return 1; - } - /* Retry rate of 6979 is negligible esp. as we only call this in deterministic tests. */ - /* If someone does fine a case where it retries for secp256k1, we'd like to know. */ - if (counter > 5) { - return 0; - } - return nonce_function_rfc6979(nonce32, msg32, key32, algo16, data, counter - 5); -} - -int is_empty_signature(const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig) { - static const unsigned char res[sizeof(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature)] = {0}; - return memcmp(sig, res, sizeof(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature)) == 0; -} - -void test_ecdsa_end_to_end(void) { - unsigned char extra[32] = {0x00}; - unsigned char privkey[32]; - unsigned char message[32]; - unsigned char privkey2[32]; - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature signature[6]; - secp256k1_scalar r, s; - unsigned char sig[74]; - size_t siglen = 74; - unsigned char pubkeyc[65]; - size_t pubkeyclen = 65; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey_tmp; - unsigned char seckey[300]; - size_t seckeylen = 300; - - /* Generate a random key and message. */ - { - secp256k1_scalar msg, key; - random_scalar_order_test(&msg); - random_scalar_order_test(&key); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(privkey, &key); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(message, &msg); - } - - /* Construct and verify corresponding public key. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, privkey) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, privkey) == 1); - - /* Verify exporting and importing public key. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, pubkeyc, &pubkeyclen, &pubkey, secp256k1_rand_bits(1) == 1 ? SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED : SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED)); - memset(&pubkey, 0, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, pubkeyc, pubkeyclen) == 1); - - /* Verify negation changes the key and changes it back */ - memcpy(&pubkey_tmp, &pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(ctx, &pubkey_tmp) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey_tmp, &pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)) != 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(ctx, &pubkey_tmp) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey_tmp, &pubkey, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); - - /* Verify private key import and export. */ - CHECK(ec_privkey_export_der(ctx, seckey, &seckeylen, privkey, secp256k1_rand_bits(1) == 1)); - CHECK(ec_privkey_import_der(ctx, privkey2, seckey, seckeylen) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(privkey, privkey2, 32) == 0); - - /* Optionally tweak the keys using addition. */ - if (secp256k1_rand_int(3) == 0) { - int ret1; - int ret2; - unsigned char rnd[32]; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey2; - secp256k1_rand256_test(rnd); - ret1 = secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(ctx, privkey, rnd); - ret2 = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(ctx, &pubkey, rnd); - CHECK(ret1 == ret2); - if (ret1 == 0) { - return; - } - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey2, privkey) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); - } - - /* Optionally tweak the keys using multiplication. */ - if (secp256k1_rand_int(3) == 0) { - int ret1; - int ret2; - unsigned char rnd[32]; - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey2; - secp256k1_rand256_test(rnd); - ret1 = secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(ctx, privkey, rnd); - ret2 = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(ctx, &pubkey, rnd); - CHECK(ret1 == ret2); - if (ret1 == 0) { - return; - } - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey2, privkey) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, &pubkey2, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0); - } - - /* Sign. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &signature[0], message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &signature[4], message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &signature[1], message, privkey, NULL, extra) == 1); - extra[31] = 1; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &signature[2], message, privkey, NULL, extra) == 1); - extra[31] = 0; - extra[0] = 1; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &signature[3], message, privkey, NULL, extra) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&signature[0], &signature[4], sizeof(signature[0])) == 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&signature[0], &signature[1], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&signature[0], &signature[2], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&signature[0], &signature[3], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&signature[1], &signature[2], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&signature[1], &signature[3], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); - CHECK(memcmp(&signature[2], &signature[3], sizeof(signature[0])) != 0); - /* Verify. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[0], message, &pubkey) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[1], message, &pubkey) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[2], message, &pubkey) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[3], message, &pubkey) == 1); - /* Test lower-S form, malleate, verify and fail, test again, malleate again */ - CHECK(!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(ctx, NULL, &signature[0])); - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, &signature[0]); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s, &s); - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(&signature[5], &r, &s); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[5], message, &pubkey) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(ctx, NULL, &signature[5])); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(ctx, &signature[5], &signature[5])); - CHECK(!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(ctx, NULL, &signature[5])); - CHECK(!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(ctx, &signature[5], &signature[5])); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[5], message, &pubkey) == 1); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s, &s); - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(&signature[5], &r, &s); - CHECK(!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(ctx, NULL, &signature[5])); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[5], message, &pubkey) == 1); - CHECK(memcmp(&signature[5], &signature[0], 64) == 0); - - /* Serialize/parse DER and verify again */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, sig, &siglen, &signature[0]) == 1); - memset(&signature[0], 0, sizeof(signature[0])); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &signature[0], sig, siglen) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[0], message, &pubkey) == 1); - /* Serialize/destroy/parse DER and verify again. */ - siglen = 74; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, sig, &siglen, &signature[0]) == 1); - sig[secp256k1_rand_int(siglen)] += 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &signature[0], sig, siglen) == 0 || - secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &signature[0], message, &pubkey) == 0); -} - -void test_random_pubkeys(void) { - secp256k1_ge elem; - secp256k1_ge elem2; - unsigned char in[65]; - /* Generate some randomly sized pubkeys. */ - size_t len = secp256k1_rand_bits(2) == 0 ? 65 : 33; - if (secp256k1_rand_bits(2) == 0) { - len = secp256k1_rand_bits(6); - } - if (len == 65) { - in[0] = secp256k1_rand_bits(1) ? 4 : (secp256k1_rand_bits(1) ? 6 : 7); - } else { - in[0] = secp256k1_rand_bits(1) ? 2 : 3; - } - if (secp256k1_rand_bits(3) == 0) { - in[0] = secp256k1_rand_bits(8); - } - if (len > 1) { - secp256k1_rand256(&in[1]); - } - if (len > 33) { - secp256k1_rand256(&in[33]); - } - if (secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&elem, in, len)) { - unsigned char out[65]; - unsigned char firstb; - int res; - size_t size = len; - firstb = in[0]; - /* If the pubkey can be parsed, it should round-trip... */ - CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&elem, out, &size, len == 33)); - CHECK(size == len); - CHECK(memcmp(&in[1], &out[1], len-1) == 0); - /* ... except for the type of hybrid inputs. */ - if ((in[0] != 6) && (in[0] != 7)) { - CHECK(in[0] == out[0]); - } - size = 65; - CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&elem, in, &size, 0)); - CHECK(size == 65); - CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&elem2, in, size)); - ge_equals_ge(&elem,&elem2); - /* Check that the X9.62 hybrid type is checked. */ - in[0] = secp256k1_rand_bits(1) ? 6 : 7; - res = secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&elem2, in, size); - if (firstb == 2 || firstb == 3) { - if (in[0] == firstb + 4) { - CHECK(res); - } else { - CHECK(!res); - } - } - if (res) { - ge_equals_ge(&elem,&elem2); - CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&elem, out, &size, 0)); - CHECK(memcmp(&in[1], &out[1], 64) == 0); - } - } -} - -void run_random_pubkeys(void) { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < 10*count; i++) { - test_random_pubkeys(); - } -} - -void run_ecdsa_end_to_end(void) { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < 64*count; i++) { - test_ecdsa_end_to_end(); - } -} - -int test_ecdsa_der_parse(const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, int certainly_der, int certainly_not_der) { - static const unsigned char zeroes[32] = {0}; -#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS - static const unsigned char max_scalar[32] = { - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, - 0xba, 0xae, 0xdc, 0xe6, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xa0, 0x3b, - 0xbf, 0xd2, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xd0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x40 - }; -#endif - - int ret = 0; - - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig_der; - unsigned char roundtrip_der[2048]; - unsigned char compact_der[64]; - size_t len_der = 2048; - int parsed_der = 0, valid_der = 0, roundtrips_der = 0; - - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig_der_lax; - unsigned char roundtrip_der_lax[2048]; - unsigned char compact_der_lax[64]; - size_t len_der_lax = 2048; - int parsed_der_lax = 0, valid_der_lax = 0, roundtrips_der_lax = 0; - -#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS - ECDSA_SIG *sig_openssl; - const BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; - const unsigned char *sigptr; - unsigned char roundtrip_openssl[2048]; - int len_openssl = 2048; - int parsed_openssl, valid_openssl = 0, roundtrips_openssl = 0; -#endif - - parsed_der = secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig_der, sig, siglen); - if (parsed_der) { - ret |= (!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, compact_der, &sig_der)) << 0; - valid_der = (memcmp(compact_der, zeroes, 32) != 0) && (memcmp(compact_der + 32, zeroes, 32) != 0); - } - if (valid_der) { - ret |= (!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, roundtrip_der, &len_der, &sig_der)) << 1; - roundtrips_der = (len_der == siglen) && memcmp(roundtrip_der, sig, siglen) == 0; - } - - parsed_der_lax = ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax(ctx, &sig_der_lax, sig, siglen); - if (parsed_der_lax) { - ret |= (!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, compact_der_lax, &sig_der_lax)) << 10; - valid_der_lax = (memcmp(compact_der_lax, zeroes, 32) != 0) && (memcmp(compact_der_lax + 32, zeroes, 32) != 0); - } - if (valid_der_lax) { - ret |= (!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, roundtrip_der_lax, &len_der_lax, &sig_der_lax)) << 11; - roundtrips_der_lax = (len_der_lax == siglen) && memcmp(roundtrip_der_lax, sig, siglen) == 0; - } - - if (certainly_der) { - ret |= (!parsed_der) << 2; - } - if (certainly_not_der) { - ret |= (parsed_der) << 17; - } - if (valid_der) { - ret |= (!roundtrips_der) << 3; - } - - if (valid_der) { - ret |= (!roundtrips_der_lax) << 12; - ret |= (len_der != len_der_lax) << 13; - ret |= (memcmp(roundtrip_der_lax, roundtrip_der, len_der) != 0) << 14; - } - ret |= (roundtrips_der != roundtrips_der_lax) << 15; - if (parsed_der) { - ret |= (!parsed_der_lax) << 16; - } - -#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS - sig_openssl = ECDSA_SIG_new(); - sigptr = sig; - parsed_openssl = (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&sig_openssl, &sigptr, siglen) != NULL); - if (parsed_openssl) { - ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig_openssl, &r, &s); - valid_openssl = !BN_is_negative(r) && !BN_is_negative(s) && BN_num_bits(r) > 0 && BN_num_bits(r) <= 256 && BN_num_bits(s) > 0 && BN_num_bits(s) <= 256; - if (valid_openssl) { - unsigned char tmp[32] = {0}; - BN_bn2bin(r, tmp + 32 - BN_num_bytes(r)); - valid_openssl = memcmp(tmp, max_scalar, 32) < 0; - } - if (valid_openssl) { - unsigned char tmp[32] = {0}; - BN_bn2bin(s, tmp + 32 - BN_num_bytes(s)); - valid_openssl = memcmp(tmp, max_scalar, 32) < 0; - } - } - len_openssl = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig_openssl, NULL); - if (len_openssl <= 2048) { - unsigned char *ptr = roundtrip_openssl; - CHECK(i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig_openssl, &ptr) == len_openssl); - roundtrips_openssl = valid_openssl && ((size_t)len_openssl == siglen) && (memcmp(roundtrip_openssl, sig, siglen) == 0); - } else { - len_openssl = 0; - } - ECDSA_SIG_free(sig_openssl); - - ret |= (parsed_der && !parsed_openssl) << 4; - ret |= (valid_der && !valid_openssl) << 5; - ret |= (roundtrips_openssl && !parsed_der) << 6; - ret |= (roundtrips_der != roundtrips_openssl) << 7; - if (roundtrips_openssl) { - ret |= (len_der != (size_t)len_openssl) << 8; - ret |= (memcmp(roundtrip_der, roundtrip_openssl, len_der) != 0) << 9; - } -#endif - return ret; -} - -static void assign_big_endian(unsigned char *ptr, size_t ptrlen, uint32_t val) { - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < ptrlen; i++) { - int shift = ptrlen - 1 - i; - if (shift >= 4) { - ptr[i] = 0; - } else { - ptr[i] = (val >> shift) & 0xFF; - } - } -} - -static void damage_array(unsigned char *sig, size_t *len) { - int pos; - int action = secp256k1_rand_bits(3); - if (action < 1 && *len > 3) { - /* Delete a byte. */ - pos = secp256k1_rand_int(*len); - memmove(sig + pos, sig + pos + 1, *len - pos - 1); - (*len)--; - return; - } else if (action < 2 && *len < 2048) { - /* Insert a byte. */ - pos = secp256k1_rand_int(1 + *len); - memmove(sig + pos + 1, sig + pos, *len - pos); - sig[pos] = secp256k1_rand_bits(8); - (*len)++; - return; - } else if (action < 4) { - /* Modify a byte. */ - sig[secp256k1_rand_int(*len)] += 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255); - return; - } else { /* action < 8 */ - /* Modify a bit. */ - sig[secp256k1_rand_int(*len)] ^= 1 << secp256k1_rand_bits(3); - return; - } -} - -static void random_ber_signature(unsigned char *sig, size_t *len, int* certainly_der, int* certainly_not_der) { - int der; - int nlow[2], nlen[2], nlenlen[2], nhbit[2], nhbyte[2], nzlen[2]; - size_t tlen, elen, glen; - int indet; - int n; - - *len = 0; - der = secp256k1_rand_bits(2) == 0; - *certainly_der = der; - *certainly_not_der = 0; - indet = der ? 0 : secp256k1_rand_int(10) == 0; - - for (n = 0; n < 2; n++) { - /* We generate two classes of numbers: nlow==1 "low" ones (up to 32 bytes), nlow==0 "high" ones (32 bytes with 129 top bits set, or larger than 32 bytes) */ - nlow[n] = der ? 1 : (secp256k1_rand_bits(3) != 0); - /* The length of the number in bytes (the first byte of which will always be nonzero) */ - nlen[n] = nlow[n] ? secp256k1_rand_int(33) : 32 + secp256k1_rand_int(200) * secp256k1_rand_int(8) / 8; - CHECK(nlen[n] <= 232); - /* The top bit of the number. */ - nhbit[n] = (nlow[n] == 0 && nlen[n] == 32) ? 1 : (nlen[n] == 0 ? 0 : secp256k1_rand_bits(1)); - /* The top byte of the number (after the potential hardcoded 16 0xFF characters for "high" 32 bytes numbers) */ - nhbyte[n] = nlen[n] == 0 ? 0 : (nhbit[n] ? 128 + secp256k1_rand_bits(7) : 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(127)); - /* The number of zero bytes in front of the number (which is 0 or 1 in case of DER, otherwise we extend up to 300 bytes) */ - nzlen[n] = der ? ((nlen[n] == 0 || nhbit[n]) ? 1 : 0) : (nlow[n] ? secp256k1_rand_int(3) : secp256k1_rand_int(300 - nlen[n]) * secp256k1_rand_int(8) / 8); - if (nzlen[n] > ((nlen[n] == 0 || nhbit[n]) ? 1 : 0)) { - *certainly_not_der = 1; - } - CHECK(nlen[n] + nzlen[n] <= 300); - /* The length of the length descriptor for the number. 0 means short encoding, anything else is long encoding. */ - nlenlen[n] = nlen[n] + nzlen[n] < 128 ? 0 : (nlen[n] + nzlen[n] < 256 ? 1 : 2); - if (!der) { - /* nlenlen[n] max 127 bytes */ - int add = secp256k1_rand_int(127 - nlenlen[n]) * secp256k1_rand_int(16) * secp256k1_rand_int(16) / 256; - nlenlen[n] += add; - if (add != 0) { - *certainly_not_der = 1; - } - } - CHECK(nlen[n] + nzlen[n] + nlenlen[n] <= 427); - } - - /* The total length of the data to go, so far */ - tlen = 2 + nlenlen[0] + nlen[0] + nzlen[0] + 2 + nlenlen[1] + nlen[1] + nzlen[1]; - CHECK(tlen <= 856); - - /* The length of the garbage inside the tuple. */ - elen = (der || indet) ? 0 : secp256k1_rand_int(980 - tlen) * secp256k1_rand_int(8) / 8; - if (elen != 0) { - *certainly_not_der = 1; - } - tlen += elen; - CHECK(tlen <= 980); - - /* The length of the garbage after the end of the tuple. */ - glen = der ? 0 : secp256k1_rand_int(990 - tlen) * secp256k1_rand_int(8) / 8; - if (glen != 0) { - *certainly_not_der = 1; - } - CHECK(tlen + glen <= 990); - - /* Write the tuple header. */ - sig[(*len)++] = 0x30; - if (indet) { - /* Indeterminate length */ - sig[(*len)++] = 0x80; - *certainly_not_der = 1; - } else { - int tlenlen = tlen < 128 ? 0 : (tlen < 256 ? 1 : 2); - if (!der) { - int add = secp256k1_rand_int(127 - tlenlen) * secp256k1_rand_int(16) * secp256k1_rand_int(16) / 256; - tlenlen += add; - if (add != 0) { - *certainly_not_der = 1; - } - } - if (tlenlen == 0) { - /* Short length notation */ - sig[(*len)++] = tlen; - } else { - /* Long length notation */ - sig[(*len)++] = 128 + tlenlen; - assign_big_endian(sig + *len, tlenlen, tlen); - *len += tlenlen; - } - tlen += tlenlen; - } - tlen += 2; - CHECK(tlen + glen <= 1119); - - for (n = 0; n < 2; n++) { - /* Write the integer header. */ - sig[(*len)++] = 0x02; - if (nlenlen[n] == 0) { - /* Short length notation */ - sig[(*len)++] = nlen[n] + nzlen[n]; - } else { - /* Long length notation. */ - sig[(*len)++] = 128 + nlenlen[n]; - assign_big_endian(sig + *len, nlenlen[n], nlen[n] + nzlen[n]); - *len += nlenlen[n]; - } - /* Write zero padding */ - while (nzlen[n] > 0) { - sig[(*len)++] = 0x00; - nzlen[n]--; - } - if (nlen[n] == 32 && !nlow[n]) { - /* Special extra 16 0xFF bytes in "high" 32-byte numbers */ - int i; - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - sig[(*len)++] = 0xFF; - } - nlen[n] -= 16; - } - /* Write first byte of number */ - if (nlen[n] > 0) { - sig[(*len)++] = nhbyte[n]; - nlen[n]--; - } - /* Generate remaining random bytes of number */ - secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(sig + *len, nlen[n]); - *len += nlen[n]; - nlen[n] = 0; - } - - /* Generate random garbage inside tuple. */ - secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(sig + *len, elen); - *len += elen; - - /* Generate end-of-contents bytes. */ - if (indet) { - sig[(*len)++] = 0; - sig[(*len)++] = 0; - tlen += 2; - } - CHECK(tlen + glen <= 1121); - - /* Generate random garbage outside tuple. */ - secp256k1_rand_bytes_test(sig + *len, glen); - *len += glen; - tlen += glen; - CHECK(tlen <= 1121); - CHECK(tlen == *len); -} - -void run_ecdsa_der_parse(void) { - int i,j; - for (i = 0; i < 200 * count; i++) { - unsigned char buffer[2048]; - size_t buflen = 0; - int certainly_der = 0; - int certainly_not_der = 0; - random_ber_signature(buffer, &buflen, &certainly_der, &certainly_not_der); - CHECK(buflen <= 2048); - for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) { - int ret = 0; - if (j > 0) { - damage_array(buffer, &buflen); - /* We don't know anything anymore about the DERness of the result */ - certainly_der = 0; - certainly_not_der = 0; - } - ret = test_ecdsa_der_parse(buffer, buflen, certainly_der, certainly_not_der); - if (ret != 0) { - size_t k; - fprintf(stderr, "Failure %x on ", ret); - for (k = 0; k < buflen; k++) { - fprintf(stderr, "%02x ", buffer[k]); - } - fprintf(stderr, "\n"); - } - CHECK(ret == 0); - } - } -} - -/* Tests several edge cases. */ -void test_ecdsa_edge_cases(void) { - int t; - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; - - /* Test the case where ECDSA recomputes a point that is infinity. */ - { - secp256k1_gej keyj; - secp256k1_ge key; - secp256k1_scalar msg; - secp256k1_scalar sr, ss; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ss, 1); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&ss, &ss); - secp256k1_scalar_inverse(&ss, &ss); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sr, 1); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &keyj, &sr); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&key, &keyj); - msg = ss; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 0); - } - - /* Verify signature with r of zero fails. */ - { - const unsigned char pubkey_mods_zero[33] = { - 0x02, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xfe, 0xba, 0xae, 0xdc, 0xe6, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xa0, - 0x3b, 0xbf, 0xd2, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xd0, 0x36, 0x41, - 0x41 - }; - secp256k1_ge key; - secp256k1_scalar msg; - secp256k1_scalar sr, ss; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ss, 1); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg, 0); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sr, 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&key, pubkey_mods_zero, 33)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 0); - } - - /* Verify signature with s of zero fails. */ - { - const unsigned char pubkey[33] = { - 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x01 - }; - secp256k1_ge key; - secp256k1_scalar msg; - secp256k1_scalar sr, ss; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ss, 0); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg, 0); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sr, 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&key, pubkey, 33)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 0); - } - - /* Verify signature with message 0 passes. */ - { - const unsigned char pubkey[33] = { - 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x02 - }; - const unsigned char pubkey2[33] = { - 0x02, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xfe, 0xba, 0xae, 0xdc, 0xe6, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xa0, - 0x3b, 0xbf, 0xd2, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xd0, 0x36, 0x41, - 0x43 - }; - secp256k1_ge key; - secp256k1_ge key2; - secp256k1_scalar msg; - secp256k1_scalar sr, ss; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ss, 2); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg, 0); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sr, 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&key, pubkey, 33)); - CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&key2, pubkey2, 33)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key2, &msg) == 1); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&ss, &ss); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key2, &msg) == 1); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ss, 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key2, &msg) == 0); - } - - /* Verify signature with message 1 passes. */ - { - const unsigned char pubkey[33] = { - 0x02, 0x14, 0x4e, 0x5a, 0x58, 0xef, 0x5b, 0x22, - 0x6f, 0xd2, 0xe2, 0x07, 0x6a, 0x77, 0xcf, 0x05, - 0xb4, 0x1d, 0xe7, 0x4a, 0x30, 0x98, 0x27, 0x8c, - 0x93, 0xe6, 0xe6, 0x3c, 0x0b, 0xc4, 0x73, 0x76, - 0x25 - }; - const unsigned char pubkey2[33] = { - 0x02, 0x8a, 0xd5, 0x37, 0xed, 0x73, 0xd9, 0x40, - 0x1d, 0xa0, 0x33, 0xd2, 0xdc, 0xf0, 0xaf, 0xae, - 0x34, 0xcf, 0x5f, 0x96, 0x4c, 0x73, 0x28, 0x0f, - 0x92, 0xc0, 0xf6, 0x9d, 0xd9, 0xb2, 0x09, 0x10, - 0x62 - }; - const unsigned char csr[32] = { - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, - 0x45, 0x51, 0x23, 0x19, 0x50, 0xb7, 0x5f, 0xc4, - 0x40, 0x2d, 0xa1, 0x72, 0x2f, 0xc9, 0xba, 0xeb - }; - secp256k1_ge key; - secp256k1_ge key2; - secp256k1_scalar msg; - secp256k1_scalar sr, ss; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ss, 1); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg, 1); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sr, csr, NULL); - CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&key, pubkey, 33)); - CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&key2, pubkey2, 33)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key2, &msg) == 1); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&ss, &ss); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key2, &msg) == 1); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ss, 2); - secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&ss, &ss); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key2, &msg) == 0); - } - - /* Verify signature with message -1 passes. */ - { - const unsigned char pubkey[33] = { - 0x03, 0xaf, 0x97, 0xff, 0x7d, 0x3a, 0xf6, 0xa0, - 0x02, 0x94, 0xbd, 0x9f, 0x4b, 0x2e, 0xd7, 0x52, - 0x28, 0xdb, 0x49, 0x2a, 0x65, 0xcb, 0x1e, 0x27, - 0x57, 0x9c, 0xba, 0x74, 0x20, 0xd5, 0x1d, 0x20, - 0xf1 - }; - const unsigned char csr[32] = { - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, - 0x45, 0x51, 0x23, 0x19, 0x50, 0xb7, 0x5f, 0xc4, - 0x40, 0x2d, 0xa1, 0x72, 0x2f, 0xc9, 0xba, 0xee - }; - secp256k1_ge key; - secp256k1_scalar msg; - secp256k1_scalar sr, ss; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ss, 1); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg, 1); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&msg, &msg); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sr, csr, NULL); - CHECK(secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&key, pubkey, 33)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 1); - secp256k1_scalar_negate(&ss, &ss); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 1); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ss, 3); - secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&ss, &ss); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sr, &ss, &key, &msg) == 0); - } - - /* Signature where s would be zero. */ - { - secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; - size_t siglen; - int32_t ecount; - unsigned char signature[72]; - static const unsigned char nonce[32] = { - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, - }; - static const unsigned char nonce2[32] = { - 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, - 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFE, - 0xBA,0xAE,0xDC,0xE6,0xAF,0x48,0xA0,0x3B, - 0xBF,0xD2,0x5E,0x8C,0xD0,0x36,0x41,0x40 - }; - const unsigned char key[32] = { - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, - }; - unsigned char msg[32] = { - 0x86, 0x41, 0x99, 0x81, 0x06, 0x23, 0x44, 0x53, - 0xaa, 0x5f, 0x9d, 0x6a, 0x31, 0x78, 0xf4, 0xf7, - 0xb8, 0x12, 0xe0, 0x0b, 0x81, 0x7a, 0x77, 0x62, - 0x65, 0xdf, 0xdd, 0x31, 0xb9, 0x3e, 0x29, 0xa9, - }; - ecount = 0; - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx, counting_illegal_callback_fn, &ecount); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg, key, precomputed_nonce_function, nonce) == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg, key, precomputed_nonce_function, nonce2) == 0); - msg[31] = 0xaa; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg, key, precomputed_nonce_function, nonce) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, NULL, msg, key, precomputed_nonce_function, nonce2) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, NULL, key, precomputed_nonce_function, nonce2) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg, NULL, precomputed_nonce_function, nonce2) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg, key, precomputed_nonce_function, nonce2) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, key) == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, NULL, msg, &pubkey) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 4); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, NULL, &pubkey) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 5); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 6); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg, &pubkey) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 6); - CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 7); - /* That pubkeyload fails via an ARGCHECK is a little odd but makes sense because pubkeys are an opaque data type. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg, &pubkey) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 8); - siglen = 72; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, NULL, &siglen, &sig) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 9); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, signature, NULL, &sig) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 10); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, signature, &siglen, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 11); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, signature, &siglen, &sig) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 11); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, NULL, signature, siglen) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 12); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, NULL, siglen) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 13); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(ctx, &sig, signature, siglen) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 13); - siglen = 10; - /* Too little room for a signature does not fail via ARGCHECK. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, signature, &siglen, &sig) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 13); - ecount = 0; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(ctx, NULL, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 1); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, NULL, &sig) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 2); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, signature, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, signature, &sig) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 3); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(ctx, NULL, signature) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 4); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &sig, NULL) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 5); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &sig, signature) == 1); - CHECK(ecount == 5); - memset(signature, 255, 64); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &sig, signature) == 0); - CHECK(ecount == 5); - secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(ctx, NULL, NULL); - } - - /* Nonce function corner cases. */ - for (t = 0; t < 2; t++) { - static const unsigned char zero[32] = {0x00}; - int i; - unsigned char key[32]; - unsigned char msg[32]; - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig2; - secp256k1_scalar sr[512], ss; - const unsigned char *extra; - extra = t == 0 ? NULL : zero; - memset(msg, 0, 32); - msg[31] = 1; - /* High key results in signature failure. */ - memset(key, 0xFF, 32); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg, key, NULL, extra) == 0); - CHECK(is_empty_signature(&sig)); - /* Zero key results in signature failure. */ - memset(key, 0, 32); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg, key, NULL, extra) == 0); - CHECK(is_empty_signature(&sig)); - /* Nonce function failure results in signature failure. */ - key[31] = 1; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg, key, nonce_function_test_fail, extra) == 0); - CHECK(is_empty_signature(&sig)); - /* The retry loop successfully makes its way to the first good value. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg, key, nonce_function_test_retry, extra) == 1); - CHECK(!is_empty_signature(&sig)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig2, msg, key, nonce_function_rfc6979, extra) == 1); - CHECK(!is_empty_signature(&sig2)); - CHECK(memcmp(&sig, &sig2, sizeof(sig)) == 0); - /* The default nonce function is deterministic. */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig2, msg, key, NULL, extra) == 1); - CHECK(!is_empty_signature(&sig2)); - CHECK(memcmp(&sig, &sig2, sizeof(sig)) == 0); - /* The default nonce function changes output with different messages. */ - for(i = 0; i < 256; i++) { - int j; - msg[0] = i; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig2, msg, key, NULL, extra) == 1); - CHECK(!is_empty_signature(&sig2)); - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &sr[i], &ss, &sig2); - for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { - CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_eq(&sr[i], &sr[j])); - } - } - msg[0] = 0; - msg[31] = 2; - /* The default nonce function changes output with different keys. */ - for(i = 256; i < 512; i++) { - int j; - key[0] = i - 256; - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig2, msg, key, NULL, extra) == 1); - CHECK(!is_empty_signature(&sig2)); - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &sr[i], &ss, &sig2); - for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { - CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_eq(&sr[i], &sr[j])); - } - } - key[0] = 0; - } - - { - /* Check that optional nonce arguments do not have equivalent effect. */ - const unsigned char zeros[32] = {0}; - unsigned char nonce[32]; - unsigned char nonce2[32]; - unsigned char nonce3[32]; - unsigned char nonce4[32]; - VG_UNDEF(nonce,32); - VG_UNDEF(nonce2,32); - VG_UNDEF(nonce3,32); - VG_UNDEF(nonce4,32); - CHECK(nonce_function_rfc6979(nonce, zeros, zeros, NULL, NULL, 0) == 1); - VG_CHECK(nonce,32); - CHECK(nonce_function_rfc6979(nonce2, zeros, zeros, zeros, NULL, 0) == 1); - VG_CHECK(nonce2,32); - CHECK(nonce_function_rfc6979(nonce3, zeros, zeros, NULL, (void *)zeros, 0) == 1); - VG_CHECK(nonce3,32); - CHECK(nonce_function_rfc6979(nonce4, zeros, zeros, zeros, (void *)zeros, 0) == 1); - VG_CHECK(nonce4,32); - CHECK(memcmp(nonce, nonce2, 32) != 0); - CHECK(memcmp(nonce, nonce3, 32) != 0); - CHECK(memcmp(nonce, nonce4, 32) != 0); - CHECK(memcmp(nonce2, nonce3, 32) != 0); - CHECK(memcmp(nonce2, nonce4, 32) != 0); - CHECK(memcmp(nonce3, nonce4, 32) != 0); - } - - - /* Privkey export where pubkey is the point at infinity. */ - { - unsigned char privkey[300]; - unsigned char seckey[32] = { - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, - 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, - 0xba, 0xae, 0xdc, 0xe6, 0xaf, 0x48, 0xa0, 0x3b, - 0xbf, 0xd2, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xd0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x41, - }; - size_t outlen = 300; - CHECK(!ec_privkey_export_der(ctx, privkey, &outlen, seckey, 0)); - outlen = 300; - CHECK(!ec_privkey_export_der(ctx, privkey, &outlen, seckey, 1)); - } -} - -void run_ecdsa_edge_cases(void) { - test_ecdsa_edge_cases(); -} - -#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS -EC_KEY *get_openssl_key(const unsigned char *key32) { - unsigned char privkey[300]; - size_t privkeylen; - const unsigned char* pbegin = privkey; - int compr = secp256k1_rand_bits(1); - EC_KEY *ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp256k1); - CHECK(ec_privkey_export_der(ctx, privkey, &privkeylen, key32, compr)); - CHECK(d2i_ECPrivateKey(&ec_key, &pbegin, privkeylen)); - CHECK(EC_KEY_check_key(ec_key)); - return ec_key; -} - -void test_ecdsa_openssl(void) { - secp256k1_gej qj; - secp256k1_ge q; - secp256k1_scalar sigr, sigs; - secp256k1_scalar one; - secp256k1_scalar msg2; - secp256k1_scalar key, msg; - EC_KEY *ec_key; - unsigned int sigsize = 80; - size_t secp_sigsize = 80; - unsigned char message[32]; - unsigned char signature[80]; - unsigned char key32[32]; - secp256k1_rand256_test(message); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&msg, message, NULL); - random_scalar_order_test(&key); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(key32, &key); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &qj, &key); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&q, &qj); - ec_key = get_openssl_key(key32); - CHECK(ec_key != NULL); - CHECK(ECDSA_sign(0, message, sizeof(message), signature, &sigsize, ec_key)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_parse(&sigr, &sigs, signature, sigsize)); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sigr, &sigs, &q, &msg)); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&one, 1); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&msg2, &msg, &one); - CHECK(!secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &sigr, &sigs, &q, &msg2)); - - random_sign(&sigr, &sigs, &key, &msg, NULL); - CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_serialize(signature, &secp_sigsize, &sigr, &sigs)); - CHECK(ECDSA_verify(0, message, sizeof(message), signature, secp_sigsize, ec_key) == 1); - - EC_KEY_free(ec_key); -} - -void run_ecdsa_openssl(void) { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < 10*count; i++) { - test_ecdsa_openssl(); - } -} -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH -# include "modules/ecdh/tests_impl.h" -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY -# include "modules/recovery/tests_impl.h" -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR -# include "modules/generator/tests_impl.h" -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_COMMITMENT -# include "modules/commitment/tests_impl.h" -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RANGEPROOF -# include "modules/rangeproof/tests_impl.h" -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_BULLETPROOF -# include "modules/bulletproofs/tests_impl.h" -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_WHITELIST -# include "modules/whitelist/tests_impl.h" -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SURJECTIONPROOF -# include "modules/surjection/tests_impl.h" -#endif - -int main(int argc, char **argv) { - unsigned char seed16[16] = {0}; - unsigned char run32[32] = {0}; - /* find iteration count */ - if (argc > 1) { - count = strtol(argv[1], NULL, 0); - } - - /* find random seed */ - if (argc > 2) { - int pos = 0; - const char* ch = argv[2]; - while (pos < 16 && ch[0] != 0 && ch[1] != 0) { - unsigned short sh; - if (sscanf(ch, "%2hx", &sh)) { - seed16[pos] = sh; - } else { - break; - } - ch += 2; - pos++; - } - } else { - FILE *frand = fopen("/dev/urandom", "r"); - if ((frand == NULL) || fread(&seed16, sizeof(seed16), 1, frand) != sizeof(seed16)) { - uint64_t t = time(NULL) * (uint64_t)1337; - seed16[0] ^= t; - seed16[1] ^= t >> 8; - seed16[2] ^= t >> 16; - seed16[3] ^= t >> 24; - seed16[4] ^= t >> 32; - seed16[5] ^= t >> 40; - seed16[6] ^= t >> 48; - seed16[7] ^= t >> 56; - } - if (frand) { - fclose(frand); - } - } - secp256k1_rand_seed(seed16); - - printf("test count = %i\n", count); - printf("random seed = %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x\n", seed16[0], seed16[1], seed16[2], seed16[3], seed16[4], seed16[5], seed16[6], seed16[7], seed16[8], seed16[9], seed16[10], seed16[11], seed16[12], seed16[13], seed16[14], seed16[15]); - - /* initialize */ - run_context_tests(); - run_scratch_tests(); - ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - if (secp256k1_rand_bits(1)) { - secp256k1_rand256(run32); - CHECK(secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, secp256k1_rand_bits(1) ? run32 : NULL)); - } - - run_rand_bits(); - run_rand_int(); - run_util_tests(); - - run_sha256_tests(); - run_hmac_sha256_tests(); - run_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_tests(); - -#ifndef USE_NUM_NONE - /* num tests */ - run_num_smalltests(); -#endif - - /* scalar tests */ - run_scalar_tests(); - - /* field tests */ - run_field_inv(); - run_field_inv_var(); - run_field_inv_all_var(); - run_field_misc(); - run_field_convert(); - run_sqr(); - run_sqrt(); - - /* group tests */ - run_ge(); - run_group_decompress(); - - /* ecmult tests */ - run_wnaf(); - run_point_times_order(); - run_ecmult_chain(); - run_ecmult_constants(); - run_ecmult_gen_blind(); - run_ecmult_const_tests(); - run_ecmult_multi_tests(); - run_ec_combine(); - - /* endomorphism tests */ -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - run_endomorphism_tests(); -#endif - - /* EC point parser test */ - run_ec_pubkey_parse_test(); - - /* EC key edge cases */ - run_eckey_edge_case_test(); - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH - /* ecdh tests */ - run_ecdh_tests(); -#endif - - /* ecdsa tests */ - run_random_pubkeys(); - run_ecdsa_der_parse(); - run_ecdsa_sign_verify(); - run_ecdsa_end_to_end(); - run_ecdsa_edge_cases(); -#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS - run_ecdsa_openssl(); -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY - /* ECDSA pubkey recovery tests */ - run_recovery_tests(); -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR - run_generator_tests(); -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RANGEPROOF - run_rangeproof_tests(); -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_BULLETPROOF - run_bulletproofs_tests(); -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_WHITELIST - /* Key whitelisting tests */ - run_whitelist_tests(); -#endif - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SURJECTIONPROOF - run_surjection_tests(); -#endif - - secp256k1_rand256(run32); - printf("random run = %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x\n", run32[0], run32[1], run32[2], run32[3], run32[4], run32[5], run32[6], run32[7], run32[8], run32[9], run32[10], run32[11], run32[12], run32[13], run32[14], run32[15]); - - /* shutdown */ - secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx); - - printf("no problems found\n"); - return 0; -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/tests_exhaustive.c b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/tests_exhaustive.c deleted file mode 100644 index ab9779b..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/tests_exhaustive.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,511 +0,0 @@ -/*********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2016 Andrew Poelstra * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H -#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" -#endif - -#include -#include - -#include - -#undef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION - -#ifndef EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER -/* see group_impl.h for allowable values */ -#define EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER 13 -#define EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_LAMBDA 9 /* cube root of 1 mod 13 */ -#endif - -#include "include/secp256k1.h" -#include "group.h" -#include "secp256k1.c" -#include "testrand_impl.h" - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY -#include "src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h" -#include "include/secp256k1_recovery.h" -#endif - -/** stolen from tests.c */ -void ge_equals_ge(const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_ge *b) { - CHECK(a->infinity == b->infinity); - if (a->infinity) { - return; - } - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&a->x, &b->x)); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&a->y, &b->y)); -} - -void ge_equals_gej(const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_gej *b) { - secp256k1_fe z2s; - secp256k1_fe u1, u2, s1, s2; - CHECK(a->infinity == b->infinity); - if (a->infinity) { - return; - } - /* Check a.x * b.z^2 == b.x && a.y * b.z^3 == b.y, to avoid inverses. */ - secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z2s, &b->z); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&u1, &a->x, &z2s); - u2 = b->x; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&u2); - secp256k1_fe_mul(&s1, &a->y, &z2s); secp256k1_fe_mul(&s1, &s1, &b->z); - s2 = b->y; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&s2); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&u1, &u2)); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&s1, &s2)); -} - -void random_fe(secp256k1_fe *x) { - unsigned char bin[32]; - do { - secp256k1_rand256(bin); - if (secp256k1_fe_set_b32(x, bin)) { - return; - } - } while(1); -} -/** END stolen from tests.c */ - -int secp256k1_nonce_function_smallint(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *msg32, - const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *algo16, - void *data, unsigned int attempt) { - secp256k1_scalar s; - int *idata = data; - (void)msg32; - (void)key32; - (void)algo16; - /* Some nonces cannot be used because they'd cause s and/or r to be zero. - * The signing function has retry logic here that just re-calls the nonce - * function with an increased `attempt`. So if attempt > 0 this means we - * need to change the nonce to avoid an infinite loop. */ - if (attempt > 0) { - *idata = (*idata + 1) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; - } - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s, *idata); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(nonce32, &s); - return 1; -} - -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM -void test_exhaustive_endomorphism(const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < order; i++) { - secp256k1_ge res; - secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&res, &group[i]); - ge_equals_ge(&group[i * EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_LAMBDA % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER], &res); - } -} -#endif - -void test_exhaustive_addition(const secp256k1_ge *group, const secp256k1_gej *groupj, int order) { - int i, j; - - /* Sanity-check (and check infinity functions) */ - CHECK(secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&group[0])); - CHECK(secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&groupj[0])); - for (i = 1; i < order; i++) { - CHECK(!secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(&group[i])); - CHECK(!secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&groupj[i])); - } - - /* Check all addition formulae */ - for (j = 0; j < order; j++) { - secp256k1_fe fe_inv; - secp256k1_fe_inv(&fe_inv, &groupj[j].z); - for (i = 0; i < order; i++) { - secp256k1_ge zless_gej; - secp256k1_gej tmp; - /* add_var */ - secp256k1_gej_add_var(&tmp, &groupj[i], &groupj[j], NULL); - ge_equals_gej(&group[(i + j) % order], &tmp); - /* add_ge */ - if (j > 0) { - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&tmp, &groupj[i], &group[j]); - ge_equals_gej(&group[(i + j) % order], &tmp); - } - /* add_ge_var */ - secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&tmp, &groupj[i], &group[j], NULL); - ge_equals_gej(&group[(i + j) % order], &tmp); - /* add_zinv_var */ - zless_gej.infinity = groupj[j].infinity; - zless_gej.x = groupj[j].x; - zless_gej.y = groupj[j].y; - secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(&tmp, &groupj[i], &zless_gej, &fe_inv); - ge_equals_gej(&group[(i + j) % order], &tmp); - } - } - - /* Check doubling */ - for (i = 0; i < order; i++) { - secp256k1_gej tmp; - if (i > 0) { - secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(&tmp, &groupj[i], NULL); - ge_equals_gej(&group[(2 * i) % order], &tmp); - } - secp256k1_gej_double_var(&tmp, &groupj[i], NULL); - ge_equals_gej(&group[(2 * i) % order], &tmp); - } - - /* Check negation */ - for (i = 1; i < order; i++) { - secp256k1_ge tmp; - secp256k1_gej tmpj; - secp256k1_ge_neg(&tmp, &group[i]); - ge_equals_ge(&group[order - i], &tmp); - secp256k1_gej_neg(&tmpj, &groupj[i]); - ge_equals_gej(&group[order - i], &tmpj); - } -} - -void test_exhaustive_ecmult(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, const secp256k1_gej *groupj, int order) { - int i, j, r_log; - for (r_log = 1; r_log < order; r_log++) { - for (j = 0; j < order; j++) { - for (i = 0; i < order; i++) { - secp256k1_gej tmp; - secp256k1_scalar na, ng; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&na, i); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ng, j); - - secp256k1_ecmult(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, &tmp, &groupj[r_log], &na, &ng); - ge_equals_gej(&group[(i * r_log + j) % order], &tmp); - - if (i > 0) { - secp256k1_ecmult_const(&tmp, &group[i], &ng, 256); - ge_equals_gej(&group[(i * j) % order], &tmp); - } - } - } - } -} - -typedef struct { - secp256k1_scalar sc[2]; - secp256k1_ge pt[2]; -} ecmult_multi_data; - -static int ecmult_multi_callback(secp256k1_scalar *sc, secp256k1_ge *pt, size_t idx, void *cbdata) { - ecmult_multi_data *data = (ecmult_multi_data*) cbdata; - *sc = data->sc[idx]; - *pt = data->pt[idx]; - return 1; -} - -void test_exhaustive_ecmult_multi(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) { - int i, j, k, x, y; - secp256k1_scratch *scratch = secp256k1_scratch_create(&ctx->error_callback, 4096); - for (i = 0; i < order; i++) { - for (j = 0; j < order; j++) { - for (k = 0; k < order; k++) { - for (x = 0; x < order; x++) { - for (y = 0; y < order; y++) { - secp256k1_gej tmp; - secp256k1_scalar g_sc; - ecmult_multi_data data; - - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&data.sc[0], i); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&data.sc[1], j); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&g_sc, k); - data.pt[0] = group[x]; - data.pt[1] = group[y]; - - secp256k1_ecmult_multi_var(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, scratch, &tmp, &g_sc, ecmult_multi_callback, &data, 2); - ge_equals_gej(&group[(i * x + j * y + k) % order], &tmp); - } - } - } - } - } - secp256k1_scratch_destroy(scratch); -} - -void r_from_k(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_ge *group, int k) { - secp256k1_fe x; - unsigned char x_bin[32]; - k %= EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; - x = group[k].x; - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&x); - secp256k1_fe_get_b32(x_bin, &x); - secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(r, x_bin, NULL); -} - -void test_exhaustive_verify(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) { - int s, r, msg, key; - for (s = 1; s < order; s++) { - for (r = 1; r < order; r++) { - for (msg = 1; msg < order; msg++) { - for (key = 1; key < order; key++) { - secp256k1_ge nonconst_ge; - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; - secp256k1_pubkey pk; - secp256k1_scalar sk_s, msg_s, r_s, s_s; - secp256k1_scalar s_times_k_s, msg_plus_r_times_sk_s; - int k, should_verify; - unsigned char msg32[32]; - - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s_s, s); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&r_s, r); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg_s, msg); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sk_s, key); - - /* Verify by hand */ - /* Run through every k value that gives us this r and check that *one* works. - * Note there could be none, there could be multiple, ECDSA is weird. */ - should_verify = 0; - for (k = 0; k < order; k++) { - secp256k1_scalar check_x_s; - r_from_k(&check_x_s, group, k); - if (r_s == check_x_s) { - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s_times_k_s, k); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&s_times_k_s, &s_times_k_s, &s_s); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &r_s, &sk_s); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &msg_s); - should_verify |= secp256k1_scalar_eq(&s_times_k_s, &msg_plus_r_times_sk_s); - } - } - /* nb we have a "high s" rule */ - should_verify &= !secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s_s); - - /* Verify by calling verify */ - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_save(&sig, &r_s, &s_s); - memcpy(&nonconst_ge, &group[sk_s], sizeof(nonconst_ge)); - secp256k1_pubkey_save(&pk, &nonconst_ge); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(msg32, &msg_s); - CHECK(should_verify == - secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pk)); - } - } - } - } -} - -void test_exhaustive_sign(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) { - int i, j, k; - - /* Loop */ - for (i = 1; i < order; i++) { /* message */ - for (j = 1; j < order; j++) { /* key */ - for (k = 1; k < order; k++) { /* nonce */ - const int starting_k = k; - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; - secp256k1_scalar sk, msg, r, s, expected_r; - unsigned char sk32[32], msg32[32]; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg, i); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sk, j); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(sk32, &sk); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(msg32, &msg); - - secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg32, sk32, secp256k1_nonce_function_smallint, &k); - - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, &sig); - /* Note that we compute expected_r *after* signing -- this is important - * because our nonce-computing function function might change k during - * signing. */ - r_from_k(&expected_r, group, k); - CHECK(r == expected_r); - CHECK((k * s) % order == (i + r * j) % order || - (k * (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - s)) % order == (i + r * j) % order); - - /* Overflow means we've tried every possible nonce */ - if (k < starting_k) { - break; - } - } - } - } - - /* We would like to verify zero-knowledge here by counting how often every - * possible (s, r) tuple appears, but because the group order is larger - * than the field order, when coercing the x-values to scalar values, some - * appear more often than others, so we are actually not zero-knowledge. - * (This effect also appears in the real code, but the difference is on the - * order of 1/2^128th the field order, so the deviation is not useful to a - * computationally bounded attacker.) - */ -} - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY -void test_exhaustive_recovery_sign(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) { - int i, j, k; - - /* Loop */ - for (i = 1; i < order; i++) { /* message */ - for (j = 1; j < order; j++) { /* key */ - for (k = 1; k < order; k++) { /* nonce */ - const int starting_k = k; - secp256k1_fe r_dot_y_normalized; - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature rsig; - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; - secp256k1_scalar sk, msg, r, s, expected_r; - unsigned char sk32[32], msg32[32]; - int expected_recid; - int recid; - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg, i); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sk, j); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(sk32, &sk); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(msg32, &msg); - - secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(ctx, &rsig, msg32, sk32, secp256k1_nonce_function_smallint, &k); - - /* Check directly */ - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, &recid, &rsig); - r_from_k(&expected_r, group, k); - CHECK(r == expected_r); - CHECK((k * s) % order == (i + r * j) % order || - (k * (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - s)) % order == (i + r * j) % order); - /* In computing the recid, there is an overflow condition that is disabled in - * scalar_low_impl.h `secp256k1_scalar_set_b32` because almost every r.y value - * will exceed the group order, and our signing code always holds out for r - * values that don't overflow, so with a proper overflow check the tests would - * loop indefinitely. */ - r_dot_y_normalized = group[k].y; - secp256k1_fe_normalize(&r_dot_y_normalized); - /* Also the recovery id is flipped depending if we hit the low-s branch */ - if ((k * s) % order == (i + r * j) % order) { - expected_recid = secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r_dot_y_normalized) ? 1 : 0; - } else { - expected_recid = secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r_dot_y_normalized) ? 0 : 1; - } - CHECK(recid == expected_recid); - - /* Convert to a standard sig then check */ - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(ctx, &sig, &rsig); - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, &sig); - /* Note that we compute expected_r *after* signing -- this is important - * because our nonce-computing function function might change k during - * signing. */ - r_from_k(&expected_r, group, k); - CHECK(r == expected_r); - CHECK((k * s) % order == (i + r * j) % order || - (k * (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - s)) % order == (i + r * j) % order); - - /* Overflow means we've tried every possible nonce */ - if (k < starting_k) { - break; - } - } - } - } -} - -void test_exhaustive_recovery_verify(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) { - /* This is essentially a copy of test_exhaustive_verify, with recovery added */ - int s, r, msg, key; - for (s = 1; s < order; s++) { - for (r = 1; r < order; r++) { - for (msg = 1; msg < order; msg++) { - for (key = 1; key < order; key++) { - secp256k1_ge nonconst_ge; - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature rsig; - secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; - secp256k1_pubkey pk; - secp256k1_scalar sk_s, msg_s, r_s, s_s; - secp256k1_scalar s_times_k_s, msg_plus_r_times_sk_s; - int recid = 0; - int k, should_verify; - unsigned char msg32[32]; - - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s_s, s); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&r_s, r); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg_s, msg); - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sk_s, key); - secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(msg32, &msg_s); - - /* Verify by hand */ - /* Run through every k value that gives us this r and check that *one* works. - * Note there could be none, there could be multiple, ECDSA is weird. */ - should_verify = 0; - for (k = 0; k < order; k++) { - secp256k1_scalar check_x_s; - r_from_k(&check_x_s, group, k); - if (r_s == check_x_s) { - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s_times_k_s, k); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&s_times_k_s, &s_times_k_s, &s_s); - secp256k1_scalar_mul(&msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &r_s, &sk_s); - secp256k1_scalar_add(&msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &msg_s); - should_verify |= secp256k1_scalar_eq(&s_times_k_s, &msg_plus_r_times_sk_s); - } - } - /* nb we have a "high s" rule */ - should_verify &= !secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s_s); - - /* We would like to try recovering the pubkey and checking that it matches, - * but pubkey recovery is impossible in the exhaustive tests (the reason - * being that there are 12 nonzero r values, 12 nonzero points, and no - * overlap between the sets, so there are no valid signatures). */ - - /* Verify by converting to a standard signature and calling verify */ - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_save(&rsig, &r_s, &s_s, recid); - secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(ctx, &sig, &rsig); - memcpy(&nonconst_ge, &group[sk_s], sizeof(nonconst_ge)); - secp256k1_pubkey_save(&pk, &nonconst_ge); - CHECK(should_verify == - secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pk)); - } - } - } - } -} -#endif - -int main(void) { - int i; - secp256k1_gej groupj[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER]; - secp256k1_ge group[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER]; - - /* Build context */ - secp256k1_context *ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); - - /* TODO set z = 1, then do num_tests runs with random z values */ - - /* Generate the entire group */ - secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&groupj[0]); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&group[0], &groupj[0]); - for (i = 1; i < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; i++) { - /* Set a different random z-value for each Jacobian point */ - secp256k1_fe z; - random_fe(&z); - - secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&groupj[i], &groupj[i - 1], &secp256k1_ge_const_g); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&group[i], &groupj[i]); - secp256k1_gej_rescale(&groupj[i], &z); - - /* Verify against ecmult_gen */ - { - secp256k1_scalar scalar_i; - secp256k1_gej generatedj; - secp256k1_ge generated; - - secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&scalar_i, i); - secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &generatedj, &scalar_i); - secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&generated, &generatedj); - - CHECK(group[i].infinity == 0); - CHECK(generated.infinity == 0); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&generated.x, &group[i].x)); - CHECK(secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&generated.y, &group[i].y)); - } - } - - /* Run the tests */ -#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM - test_exhaustive_endomorphism(group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); -#endif - test_exhaustive_addition(group, groupj, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); - test_exhaustive_ecmult(ctx, group, groupj, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); - test_exhaustive_ecmult_multi(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); - test_exhaustive_sign(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); - test_exhaustive_verify(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); - -#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY - test_exhaustive_recovery_sign(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); - test_exhaustive_recovery_verify(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER); -#endif - - secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx); - return 0; -} - diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/util.h b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/util.h deleted file mode 100644 index aca79d7..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/util.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,147 +0,0 @@ -/********************************************************************** - * Copyright (c) 2013-2015 Pieter Wuille, Gregory Maxwell * - * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying * - * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.* - **********************************************************************/ - -#ifndef SECP256K1_UTIL_H -#define SECP256K1_UTIL_H - -#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H -#include "libsecp256k1-config.h" -#endif - -#include -#include -#include - -typedef struct { - void (*fn)(const char *text, void* data); - const void* data; -} secp256k1_callback; - -static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_callback_call(const secp256k1_callback * const cb, const char * const text) { - cb->fn(text, (void*)cb->data); -} - -#ifdef DETERMINISTIC -#define TEST_FAILURE(msg) do { \ - fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg); \ - abort(); \ -} while(0); -#else -#define TEST_FAILURE(msg) do { \ - fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: %s\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, msg); \ - abort(); \ -} while(0) -#endif - -#ifdef HAVE_BUILTIN_EXPECT -#define EXPECT(x,c) __builtin_expect((x),(c)) -#else -#define EXPECT(x,c) (x) -#endif - -#ifdef DETERMINISTIC -#define CHECK(cond) do { \ - if (EXPECT(!(cond), 0)) { \ - TEST_FAILURE("test condition failed"); \ - } \ -} while(0) -#else -#define CHECK(cond) do { \ - if (EXPECT(!(cond), 0)) { \ - TEST_FAILURE("test condition failed: " #cond); \ - } \ -} while(0) -#endif - -/* Like assert(), but when VERIFY is defined, and side-effect safe. */ -#if defined(COVERAGE) -#define VERIFY_CHECK(check) -#define VERIFY_SETUP(stmt) -#elif defined(VERIFY) -#define VERIFY_CHECK CHECK -#define VERIFY_SETUP(stmt) do { stmt; } while(0) -#else -#define VERIFY_CHECK(cond) do { (void)(cond); } while(0) -#define VERIFY_SETUP(stmt) -#endif - -static SECP256K1_INLINE void *checked_malloc(const secp256k1_callback* cb, size_t size) { - void *ret = malloc(size); - if (ret == NULL) { - secp256k1_callback_call(cb, "Out of memory"); - } - return ret; -} - -static SECP256K1_INLINE void *checked_realloc(const secp256k1_callback* cb, void *ptr, size_t size) { - void *ret = realloc(ptr, size); - if (ret == NULL) { - secp256k1_callback_call(cb, "Out of memory"); - } - return ret; -} - -/* Extract the sign of an int64, take the abs and return a uint64, constant time. */ -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_sign_and_abs64(uint64_t *out, int64_t in) { - uint64_t mask0, mask1; - int ret; - ret = in < 0; - mask0 = ret + ~((uint64_t)0); - mask1 = ~mask0; - *out = (uint64_t)in; - *out = (*out & mask0) | ((~*out + 1) & mask1); - return ret; -} - -SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_clz64_var(uint64_t x) { - int ret; - if (!x) { - return 64; - } -# if defined(HAVE_BUILTIN_CLZLL) - ret = __builtin_clzll(x); -# else - /*FIXME: debruijn fallback. */ - for (ret = 0; ((x & (1ULL << 63)) == 0); x <<= 1, ret++); -# endif - return ret; -} - -/* Macro for restrict, when available and not in a VERIFY build. */ -#if defined(SECP256K1_BUILD) && defined(VERIFY) -# define SECP256K1_RESTRICT -#else -# if (!defined(__STDC_VERSION__) || (__STDC_VERSION__ < 199901L) ) -# if SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(3,0) -# define SECP256K1_RESTRICT __restrict__ -# elif (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER >= 1400) -# define SECP256K1_RESTRICT __restrict -# else -# define SECP256K1_RESTRICT -# endif -# else -# define SECP256K1_RESTRICT restrict -# endif -#endif - -#if defined(_WIN32) -# define I64FORMAT "I64d" -# define I64uFORMAT "I64u" -#else -# define I64FORMAT "lld" -# define I64uFORMAT "llu" -#endif - -#if defined(HAVE___INT128) -# if defined(__GNUC__) -# define SECP256K1_GNUC_EXT __extension__ -# else -# define SECP256K1_GNUC_EXT -# endif -SECP256K1_GNUC_EXT typedef unsigned __int128 uint128_t; -#endif - -#endif /* SECP256K1_UTIL_H */ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/panic_cb.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/panic_cb.go deleted file mode 100644 index e0e9034..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/panic_cb.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2015 The go-ethereum Authors -// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. -// -// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify -// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by -// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or -// (at your option) any later version. -// -// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, -// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of -// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the -// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. -// -// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License -// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . - -package secp256k1 - -import "C" -import "unsafe" - -// Callbacks for converting libsecp256k1 internal faults into -// recoverable Go panics. - -//export secp256k1GoPanicIllegal -func secp256k1GoPanicIllegal(msg *C.char, data unsafe.Pointer) { - panic("illegal argument: " + C.GoString(msg)) -} - -//export secp256k1GoPanicError -func secp256k1GoPanicError(msg *C.char, data unsafe.Pointer) { - panic("internal error: " + C.GoString(msg)) -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/secp256.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/secp256.go deleted file mode 100644 index e72f524..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/secp256.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,172 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2015 The go-ethereum Authors -// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. -// -// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify -// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by -// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or -// (at your option) any later version. -// -// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, -// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of -// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the -// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. -// -// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License -// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . - -// Package secp256k1 wraps the bitcoin secp256k1 C library. -package secp256k1 - -/* -#cgo CFLAGS: -I./libsecp256k1 -#cgo CFLAGS: -I./libsecp256k1/src/ -#define USE_NUM_NONE -#define USE_FIELD_10X26 -#define USE_FIELD_INV_BUILTIN -#define USE_SCALAR_8X32 -#define USE_SCALAR_INV_BUILTIN -#define NDEBUG -#define ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR -#define ENABLE_MODULE_BULLETPROOF -#define SECP256K1_MODULE_BULLETPROOF_TESTS -#include "./libsecp256k1/src/secp256k1.c" -#include "./libsecp256k1/src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h" -#include "./libsecp256k1/src/bench_bulletproof.c" -#include "./libsecp256k1/src/modules/bulletproofs/tests_impl.h" -#include "ext.h" - -typedef void (*callbackFunc) (const char* msg, void* data); -extern void secp256k1GoPanicIllegal(const char* msg, void* data); -extern void secp256k1GoPanicError(const char* msg, void* data); -extern void test_rangeproof(); -extern void setup_rangeproof(zkrp_t *dt); -extern void commit_rangeproof(zkrp_t *dt); -extern void prove_rangeproof(zkrp_t *dt); -extern int verify_rangeproof(zkrp_t *dt); -*/ -import "C" - -import ( - "errors" - "unsafe" -) - -var context *C.secp256k1_context - -func init() { - // around 20 ms on a modern CPU. - context = C.secp256k1_context_create_sign_verify() - C.secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(context, C.callbackFunc(C.secp256k1GoPanicIllegal), nil) - C.secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(context, C.callbackFunc(C.secp256k1GoPanicError), nil) -} - -var ( - ErrInvalidMsgLen = errors.New("invalid message length, need 32 bytes") - ErrInvalidSignatureLen = errors.New("invalid signature length") - ErrInvalidRecoveryID = errors.New("invalid signature recovery id") - ErrInvalidKey = errors.New("invalid private key") - ErrSignFailed = errors.New("signing failed") - ErrRecoverFailed = errors.New("recovery failed") -) - -// Sign creates a recoverable ECDSA signature. -// The produced signature is in the 65-byte [R || S || V] format where V is 0 or 1. -// -// The caller is responsible for ensuring that msg cannot be chosen -// directly by an attacker. It is usually preferable to use a cryptographic -// hash function on any input before handing it to this function. -func Sign(msg []byte, seckey []byte) ([]byte, error) { - if len(msg) != 32 { - return nil, ErrInvalidMsgLen - } - if len(seckey) != 32 { - return nil, ErrInvalidKey - } - seckeydata := (*C.uchar)(unsafe.Pointer(&seckey[0])) - if C.secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(context, seckeydata) != 1 { - return nil, ErrInvalidKey - } - - var ( - msgdata = (*C.uchar)(unsafe.Pointer(&msg[0])) - noncefunc = C.secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979 - sigstruct C.secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature - ) - if C.secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(context, &sigstruct, msgdata, seckeydata, noncefunc, nil) == 0 { - return nil, ErrSignFailed - } - - var ( - sig = make([]byte, 65) - sigdata = (*C.uchar)(unsafe.Pointer(&sig[0])) - recid C.int - ) - C.secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(context, sigdata, &recid, &sigstruct) - sig[64] = byte(recid) // add back recid to get 65 bytes sig - return sig, nil -} - -// RecoverPubkey returns the the public key of the signer. -// msg must be the 32-byte hash of the message to be signed. -// sig must be a 65-byte compact ECDSA signature containing the -// recovery id as the last element. -func RecoverPubkey(msg []byte, sig []byte) ([]byte, error) { - if len(msg) != 32 { - return nil, ErrInvalidMsgLen - } - if err := checkSignature(sig); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - var ( - pubkey = make([]byte, 65) - sigdata = (*C.uchar)(unsafe.Pointer(&sig[0])) - msgdata = (*C.uchar)(unsafe.Pointer(&msg[0])) - ) - if C.secp256k1_ecdsa_recover_pubkey(context, (*C.uchar)(unsafe.Pointer(&pubkey[0])), sigdata, msgdata) == 0 { - return nil, ErrRecoverFailed - } - return pubkey, nil -} - -func checkSignature(sig []byte) error { - if len(sig) != 65 { - return ErrInvalidSignatureLen - } - if sig[64] >= 4 { - return ErrInvalidRecoveryID - } - return nil -} - -//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// -// Rangeproofs functions: should be separated from this file in the near future -//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// - -/*func RunRangeproof() { - C.test_rangeproof() -} - -func SetupRangeproof(nbits _Ctype_ulong) (*C.zkrp_t) { - var dt *C.zkrp_t - dt = new(C.zkrp_t) - dt.nbits = nbits - C.setup_rangeproof(dt) - return dt -} - -func PrintRangeproof(dt *C.zkrp_t) { - C.myprint(C.CString("GO print"), dt) -} - -func CommitRangeproof(dt *C.zkrp_t) { - C.commit_rangeproof(dt) -} - -func ProveRangeproof(dt *C.zkrp_t) { - C.prove_rangeproof(dt) -} - -func VerifyRangeproof(dt *C.zkrp_t) (bool) { - return (C.verify_rangeproof(dt) == 1) -}*/ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/secp256_test.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/secp256_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index 7877855..0000000 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/crypto/secp256k1/secp256_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,263 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2015 The go-ethereum Authors -// This file is part of the go-ethereum library. -// -// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify -// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by -// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or -// (at your option) any later version. -// -// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, -// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of -// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the -// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. -// -// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License -// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . - -package secp256k1 - -import ( - "testing" - "fmt" - "time" - "crypto/ecdsa" - "crypto/elliptic" - "crypto/rand" - "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common/math" - "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/randentropy" - "bytes" - "encoding/hex" -) - -const TestCount = 1000 - -func generateKeyPair() (pubkey, privkey []byte) { - key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(S256(), rand.Reader) - if err != nil { - panic(err) - } - pubkey = elliptic.Marshal(S256(), key.X, key.Y) - return pubkey, math.PaddedBigBytes(key.D, 32) -} - -func randSig() []byte { - sig := randentropy.GetEntropyCSPRNG(65) - sig[32] &= 0x70 - sig[64] %= 4 - return sig -} - -// tests for malleability -// highest bit of signature ECDSA s value must be 0, in the 33th byte -func compactSigCheck(t *testing.T, sig []byte) { - var b int = int(sig[32]) - if b < 0 { - t.Errorf("highest bit is negative: %d", b) - } - if ((b >> 7) == 1) != ((b & 0x80) == 0x80) { - t.Errorf("highest bit: %d bit >> 7: %d", b, b>>7) - } - if (b & 0x80) == 0x80 { - t.Errorf("highest bit: %d bit & 0x80: %d", b, b&0x80) - } -} - -func TestSignatureValidity(t *testing.T) { - pubkey, seckey := generateKeyPair() - msg := randentropy.GetEntropyCSPRNG(32) - sig, err := Sign(msg, seckey) - if err != nil { - t.Errorf("signature error: %s", err) - } - compactSigCheck(t, sig) - if len(pubkey) != 65 { - t.Errorf("pubkey length mismatch: want: 65 have: %d", len(pubkey)) - } - if len(seckey) != 32 { - t.Errorf("seckey length mismatch: want: 32 have: %d", len(seckey)) - } - if len(sig) != 65 { - t.Errorf("sig length mismatch: want: 65 have: %d", len(sig)) - } - recid := int(sig[64]) - if recid > 4 || recid < 0 { - t.Errorf("sig recid mismatch: want: within 0 to 4 have: %d", int(sig[64])) - } -} - -func TestInvalidRecoveryID(t *testing.T) { - _, seckey := generateKeyPair() - msg := randentropy.GetEntropyCSPRNG(32) - sig, _ := Sign(msg, seckey) - sig[64] = 99 - _, err := RecoverPubkey(msg, sig) - if err != ErrInvalidRecoveryID { - t.Fatalf("got %q, want %q", err, ErrInvalidRecoveryID) - } -} - -func TestSignAndRecover(t *testing.T) { - pubkey1, seckey := generateKeyPair() - msg := randentropy.GetEntropyCSPRNG(32) - sig, err := Sign(msg, seckey) - if err != nil { - t.Errorf("signature error: %s", err) - } - pubkey2, err := RecoverPubkey(msg, sig) - if err != nil { - t.Errorf("recover error: %s", err) - } - if !bytes.Equal(pubkey1, pubkey2) { - t.Errorf("pubkey mismatch: want: %x have: %x", pubkey1, pubkey2) - } -} - -func TestSignDeterministic(t *testing.T) { - _, seckey := generateKeyPair() - msg := make([]byte, 32) - copy(msg, "hi there") - - sig1, err := Sign(msg, seckey) - if err != nil { - t.Fatal(err) - } - sig2, err := Sign(msg, seckey) - if err != nil { - t.Fatal(err) - } - if !bytes.Equal(sig1, sig2) { - t.Fatal("signatures not equal") - } -} - -func TestRandomMessagesWithSameKey(t *testing.T) { - pubkey, seckey := generateKeyPair() - keys := func() ([]byte, []byte) { - return pubkey, seckey - } - signAndRecoverWithRandomMessages(t, keys) -} - -func TestRandomMessagesWithRandomKeys(t *testing.T) { - keys := func() ([]byte, []byte) { - pubkey, seckey := generateKeyPair() - return pubkey, seckey - } - signAndRecoverWithRandomMessages(t, keys) -} - -func signAndRecoverWithRandomMessages(t *testing.T, keys func() ([]byte, []byte)) { - for i := 0; i < TestCount; i++ { - pubkey1, seckey := keys() - msg := randentropy.GetEntropyCSPRNG(32) - sig, err := Sign(msg, seckey) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("signature error: %s", err) - } - if sig == nil { - t.Fatal("signature is nil") - } - compactSigCheck(t, sig) - - // TODO: why do we flip around the recovery id? - sig[len(sig)-1] %= 4 - - pubkey2, err := RecoverPubkey(msg, sig) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("recover error: %s", err) - } - if pubkey2 == nil { - t.Error("pubkey is nil") - } - if !bytes.Equal(pubkey1, pubkey2) { - t.Fatalf("pubkey mismatch: want: %x have: %x", pubkey1, pubkey2) - } - } -} - -func TestRecoveryOfRandomSignature(t *testing.T) { - pubkey1, _ := generateKeyPair() - msg := randentropy.GetEntropyCSPRNG(32) - - for i := 0; i < TestCount; i++ { - // recovery can sometimes work, but if so should always give wrong pubkey - pubkey2, _ := RecoverPubkey(msg, randSig()) - if bytes.Equal(pubkey1, pubkey2) { - t.Fatalf("iteration: %d: pubkey mismatch: do NOT want %x: ", i, pubkey2) - } - } -} - -func TestRandomMessagesAgainstValidSig(t *testing.T) { - pubkey1, seckey := generateKeyPair() - msg := randentropy.GetEntropyCSPRNG(32) - sig, _ := Sign(msg, seckey) - - for i := 0; i < TestCount; i++ { - msg = randentropy.GetEntropyCSPRNG(32) - pubkey2, _ := RecoverPubkey(msg, sig) - // recovery can sometimes work, but if so should always give wrong pubkey - if bytes.Equal(pubkey1, pubkey2) { - t.Fatalf("iteration: %d: pubkey mismatch: do NOT want %x: ", i, pubkey2) - } - } -} - -// Useful when the underlying libsecp256k1 API changes to quickly -// check only recover function without use of signature function -func TestRecoverSanity(t *testing.T) { - msg, _ := hex.DecodeString("ce0677bb30baa8cf067c88db9811f4333d131bf8bcf12fe7065d211dce971008") - sig, _ := hex.DecodeString("90f27b8b488db00b00606796d2987f6a5f59ae62ea05effe84fef5b8b0e549984a691139ad57a3f0b906637673aa2f63d1f55cb1a69199d4009eea23ceaddc9301") - pubkey1, _ := hex.DecodeString("04e32df42865e97135acfb65f3bae71bdc86f4d49150ad6a440b6f15878109880a0a2b2667f7e725ceea70c673093bf67663e0312623c8e091b13cf2c0f11ef652") - pubkey2, err := RecoverPubkey(msg, sig) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("recover error: %s", err) - } - if !bytes.Equal(pubkey1, pubkey2) { - t.Errorf("pubkey mismatch: want: %x have: %x", pubkey1, pubkey2) - } -} - -func TestRangeproof(t *testing.T) { - RunRangeproof() - startTime := time.Now() - dt := SetupRangeproof(32) - setupTime := time.Now() - fmt.Println("Setup time:") - fmt.Println(setupTime.Sub(startTime)) - CommitRangeproof(dt) - commitTime := time.Now() - fmt.Println("Commit time:") - fmt.Println(commitTime.Sub(setupTime)) - ProveRangeproof(dt) - proveTime := time.Now() - fmt.Println("Prove time:") - fmt.Println(proveTime.Sub(commitTime)) - result := VerifyRangeproof(dt) - verifyTime := time.Now() - fmt.Println("Verify time:") - fmt.Println(verifyTime.Sub(proveTime)) - fmt.Println("result:") - fmt.Println(result) -} - -func BenchmarkSign(b *testing.B) { - _, seckey := generateKeyPair() - msg := randentropy.GetEntropyCSPRNG(32) - b.ResetTimer() - - for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ { - Sign(msg, seckey) - } -} - -func BenchmarkRecover(b *testing.B) { - msg := randentropy.GetEntropyCSPRNG(32) - _, seckey := generateKeyPair() - sig, _ := Sign(msg, seckey) - b.ResetTimer() - - for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ { - RecoverPubkey(msg, sig) - } -} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/main.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/main.go index 641db6a..439313a 100644 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/main.go +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/main.go @@ -8,60 +8,63 @@ import ( ) func main() { - var ( - zkrpX zkproofs.Bp - zkrpY zkproofs.Bp - zkrpZ zkproofs.Bp - ) - // common setup - zkrpX.Setup(0, 4294967296) - zkrpY.Setup(0, 4294967296) - zkrpZ.Setup(0, 4294967296) // value x := new(big.Int).SetInt64(30) y := new(big.Int).SetInt64(20) z := new(big.Int).SetInt64(10) // get blind factor, pedersen commit and zkproof - // 这里会更新 zkrpX，所以 zkrpX 和 proofX 都需要保存下来 - blindFactorX, commitmentX, proofX, _ := zkrpX.Prove(x) + blindFactorX, tX, hX, pX, proofX, _ := zkproofs.GetZkrp().GenerateProof(x) + + proofDataX, _ := zkproofs.DumpProof(tX, hX, pX, &proofX) + + verifier, proof, _ := zkproofs.LoadProof(proofDataX) - // zkrp, _ := zkproofs.LoadParamFromDisk("setup.dat") var ok bool - // proofX中包含commitmentX，如果修改了proofX.V 验证也不会通过 - ok, err := zkrpX.Verify(proofX) + ok, err := verifier.Verify(*proof) if !ok { fmt.Println("proofX failed!!!") fmt.Println(ok) fmt.Println(err) + } else { + fmt.Println("proofX verified >0.") } - blindFactorY, commitmentY, proofY, _ := zkrpY.Prove(y) + blindFactorY, tY, hY, pY, proofY, _ := zkproofs.GetZkrp().GenerateProof(y) - // zkrp, _ = zkproofs.LoadParamFromDisk("setup.dat") - ok, _ = zkrpY.Verify(proofY) + proofDataY, _ := zkproofs.DumpProof(tY, hY, pY, &proofY) + + verifier, proof, _ = zkproofs.LoadProof(proofDataY) + ok, _ = verifier.Verify(proofY) if !ok { fmt.Println("proofY failed!!!") + } else { + fmt.Println("proofY verified >0.") } - blindFactorZ, commitmentZ, proofZ, _ := zkrpZ.Prove(z) - // zkrp, _ = zkproofs.LoadParamFromDisk("setup.dat") - ok, err = zkrpZ.Verify(proofZ) + blindFactorZ, tZ, hZ, pZ, proofZ, _ := zkproofs.GetZkrp().GenerateProof(z) + + proofDataZ, _ := zkproofs.DumpProof(tZ, hZ, pZ, &proofZ) + + verifier, proof, _ = zkproofs.LoadProof(proofDataZ) + ok, _ = verifier.Verify(proofZ) if !ok { fmt.Println("proofZ failed!!!") + } else { + fmt.Println("proofZ verified >0.") } + + // 佩德森承诺检查输入之和与输出之和是否相等 blindOut := new(big.Int).Add(blindFactorY, blindFactorZ) blindDiff := new(big.Int).Sub(blindFactorX, blindOut) - commitmentOut := commitmentY.Add(commitmentY, commitmentZ) - commitmentDiff := commitmentX.Add(commitmentX, commitmentOut.Neg(commitmentOut)) - - fmt.Printf("blind diff: %d\n", blindDiff) - fmt.Printf("pedersen commitment diff: ( %d , %d )\n", commitmentDiff.X, commitmentDiff.Y) - - check := zkproofs.Mult(zkrpX.H, blindDiff) - fmt.Printf("check diff: ( %d , %d )\n", check.X, check.Y) - fmt.Println(check.X.Cmp(commitmentDiff.X) == 0) - fmt.Println(check.Y.Cmp(commitmentDiff.Y) == 0) + check := zkproofs.VerifyPedersenCommitment([]*zkproofs.PedersenCommitment{proofX.V}, []*zkproofs.PedersenCommitment{proofY.V, proofZ.V}, blindDiff) + fmt.Println("pedersen verify result:", check) } + +// 最好能抽象出一个独立的 zkrp.Bp 出来，然后 +// 主要有两个 challenge值 y 和 z 应该是由 verifier 那边根据A 和 S 生成的，这边把这个交互过程省略了，所以最后应该把 +// zkrp.Zkip.Hh = hprime +// zkrp.Zkip.Cc = tprime +// 这两个值也放在 proof 中发过去，有个问题：G 和 H 用户是否应该知道？ diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/main_test.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/main_test.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e52e916 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/main_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +package main + +import ( + "fmt" + "math/big" + "testing" + + "./zkproofs" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" +) + +func TestCTx(t *testing.T) { + // value + x := new(big.Int).SetInt64(30) + y := new(big.Int).SetInt64(20) + z := new(big.Int).SetInt64(10) + + blindFactorX, tX, hX, pX, proofX, _ := zkproofs.GetZkrp().GenerateProof(x) + var ok bool + verifier := zkproofs.GetVerifier(tX, hX, pX) + ok, _ = verifier.Verify(proofX) + assert.True(t, ok) + + blindFactorY, tY, hY, pY, proofY, _ := zkproofs.GetZkrp().GenerateProof(y) + verifier = zkproofs.GetVerifier(tY, hY, pY) + ok, _ = verifier.Verify(proofY) + assert.True(t, ok) + + blindFactorZ, tZ, hZ, pZ, proofZ, _ := zkproofs.GetZkrp().GenerateProof(z) + verifier = zkproofs.GetVerifier(tZ, hZ, pZ) + ok, _ = verifier.Verify(proofZ) + assert.True(t, ok) + + // 佩德森承诺检查输入之和与输出之和是否相等 + blindOut := new(big.Int).Add(blindFactorY, blindFactorZ) + blindDiff := new(big.Int).Sub(blindFactorX, blindOut) + + check := zkproofs.VerifyPedersenCommitment([]*zkproofs.PedersenCommitment{proofX.V}, []*zkproofs.PedersenCommitment{proofY.V, proofZ.V}, blindDiff) + fmt.Println("pedersen verify result:", check) + assert.True(t, check) +} + +func TestCTx2(t *testing.T) { + // value + x := new(big.Int).SetInt64(30) + y := new(big.Int).SetInt64(40) + z := new(big.Int).SetInt64(10) + + blindFactorX, tX, hX, pX, proofX, _ := zkproofs.GetZkrp().GenerateProof(x) + var ok bool + verifier := zkproofs.GetVerifier(tX, hX, pX) + ok, _ = verifier.Verify(proofX) + assert.True(t, ok) + + blindFactorY, tY, hY, pY, proofY, _ := zkproofs.GetZkrp().GenerateProof(y) + verifier = zkproofs.GetVerifier(tY, hY, pY) + ok, _ = verifier.Verify(proofY) + assert.True(t, ok) + + blindFactorZ, tZ, hZ, pZ, proofZ, _ := zkproofs.GetZkrp().GenerateProof(z) + verifier = zkproofs.GetVerifier(tZ, hZ, pZ) + ok, _ = verifier.Verify(proofZ) + assert.True(t, ok) + + // 佩德森承诺检查输入之和与输出之和是否相等 + blindOut := new(big.Int).Add(blindFactorY, blindFactorZ) + blindDiff := new(big.Int).Sub(blindFactorX, blindOut) + + check := zkproofs.VerifyPedersenCommitment([]*zkproofs.PedersenCommitment{proofX.V}, []*zkproofs.PedersenCommitment{proofY.V, proofZ.V}, blindDiff) + fmt.Println("pedersen verify result:", check) + assert.False(t, check) +} + +func TestCTx3(t *testing.T) { + // value + x := new(big.Int).SetInt64(30) + y := new(big.Int).SetInt64(40) + z := new(big.Int).SetInt64(-10) + + blindFactorX, tX, hX, pX, proofX, _ := zkproofs.GetZkrp().GenerateProof(x) + var ok bool + verifier := zkproofs.GetVerifier(tX, hX, pX) + ok, _ = verifier.Verify(proofX) + assert.True(t, ok) + + blindFactorY, tY, hY, pY, proofY, _ := zkproofs.GetZkrp().GenerateProof(y) + verifier = zkproofs.GetVerifier(tY, hY, pY) + ok, _ = verifier.Verify(proofY) + assert.True(t, ok) + + blindFactorZ, tZ, hZ, pZ, proofZ, _ := zkproofs.GetZkrp().GenerateProof(z) + verifier = zkproofs.GetVerifier(tZ, hZ, pZ) + ok, _ = verifier.Verify(proofZ) + assert.False(t, ok) + + // 佩德森承诺检查输入之和与输出之和是否相等 + blindOut := new(big.Int).Add(blindFactorY, blindFactorZ) + blindDiff := new(big.Int).Sub(blindFactorX, blindOut) + + check := zkproofs.VerifyPedersenCommitment([]*zkproofs.PedersenCommitment{proofX.V}, []*zkproofs.PedersenCommitment{proofY.V, proofZ.V}, blindDiff) + fmt.Println("pedersen verify result:", check) + assert.True(t, check) +} diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bb.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bb.go index 70ef505..fd4a401 100644 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bb.go +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bb.go @@ -24,11 +24,13 @@ Eurocrypt 2004 */ import ( + "bytes" "crypto/rand" "errors" "math/big" - "../crypto/bn256" + // "../crypto/bn256" + bn256 "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/bn256/google" ) type keypair struct { @@ -43,14 +45,15 @@ func keygen() (keypair, error) { var ( kp keypair e error - res bool + res error ) kp.privk, e = rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) if e != nil { return kp, e } - kp.pubk, res = new(bn256.G1).Unmarshal(new(bn256.G1).ScalarBaseMult(kp.privk).Marshal()) - if res { + kp.pubk = new(bn256.G1).ScalarBaseMult(kp.privk) + _, res = new(bn256.G2).Unmarshal(kp.pubk.Marshal()) + if res != nil { return kp, errors.New("Could not compute scalar multiplication.") } return kp, e @@ -61,12 +64,13 @@ sign receives as input a message and a private key and outputs a digital signatu */ func sign(m *big.Int, privk *big.Int) (*bn256.G2, error) { var ( - res bool + res error signature *bn256.G2 ) inv := ModInverse(Mod(Add(m, privk), bn256.Order), bn256.Order) - signature, res = new(bn256.G2).Unmarshal(new(bn256.G2).ScalarBaseMult(inv).Marshal()) - if res != false { + signature = new(bn256.G2).ScalarBaseMult(inv) + _, res = new(bn256.G2).Unmarshal(signature.Marshal()) + if res != nil { return signature, nil } else { return nil, errors.New("Error while computing signature.") @@ -80,11 +84,13 @@ true if and only if the signature is valid. func verify(signature *bn256.G2, m *big.Int, pubk *bn256.G1) (bool, error) { // e(y.g^m, sig) = e(g1,g2) var ( - gm *bn256.G1 - e, res bool + gm *bn256.G1 + res bool + e error ) // g^m - gm, e = new(bn256.G1).Unmarshal(new(bn256.G1).ScalarBaseMult(m).Marshal()) + gm = new(bn256.G1).ScalarBaseMult(m) + _, e = new(bn256.G2).Unmarshal(gm.Marshal()) // y.g^m gm = gm.Add(gm, pubk) // e(y.g^m, sig) @@ -94,10 +100,11 @@ func verify(signature *bn256.G2, m *big.Int, pubk *bn256.G1) (bool, error) { g2 := new(bn256.G2).ScalarBaseMult(new(big.Int).SetInt64(1)) p2 := bn256.Pair(g1, g2) // p1 == p2? - p2 = p2.Neg(p2) - p1 = p1.Add(p1, p2) - res = p1.IsOne() - if e != false { + // p2 = p2.Neg(p2) + // p1 = p1.Add(p1, p2) + // res = p1.IsOne() + res = bytes.Equal(p1.Marshal(), p2.Marshal()) + if e != nil { return res, nil } return false, errors.New("Error while computing signature.") diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bulletproofs.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bulletproofs.go index 37c13c6..1ac5bb7 100644 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bulletproofs.go +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/bulletproofs.go @@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ func (zkrp *Bp) Delta(y, z *big.Int) (*big.Int, error) { SetupPre is responsible for computing the common parameters. */ func (zkrp *Bp) SetupPre(a, b int64) { - res, _ := LoadParamFromDisk("setup.dat") + res, _ := LoadParamFromDisk("setup.json") zkrp = res // Setup Inner Product zkrp.Zkip.Setup(zkrp.H, zkrp.Gg, zkrp.Hh, new(big.Int).SetInt64(0)) @@ -826,13 +826,13 @@ func (zkrp *Bp) Setup(a, b int64) { // Setup Inner Product zkrp.Zkip.Setup(zkrp.H, zkrp.Gg, zkrp.Hh, new(big.Int).SetInt64(0)) - // zkrp.SaveToDisk("setup.dat", nil) + // zkrp.SaveToDisk("setup.json", nil) } /* Prove computes the ZK proof. */ -func (zkrp *Bp) Prove(secret *big.Int) (*big.Int, *p256, proofBP, error) { +func (zkrp *Bp) GenerateProof(secret *big.Int) (*big.Int, *big.Int, []*p256, *p256, proofBP, error) { var ( i int64 sL []*big.Int @@ -972,7 +972,7 @@ func (zkrp *Bp) Prove(secret *big.Int) (*big.Int, *p256, proofBP, error) { zkrp.Zkip.Cc = tprime commit, _ := CommitInnerProduct(zkrp.Gg, hprime, bl, br) - proofip, _ := zkrp.Zkip.Prove(bl, br, commit) + proofip, _ := zkrp.Zkip.GenerateProof(bl, br, commit) proof.V = V proof.A = A @@ -985,8 +985,8 @@ func (zkrp *Bp) Prove(secret *big.Int) (*big.Int, *p256, proofBP, error) { proof.Proofip = proofip proof.Commit = commit - // zkrp.SaveToDisk("setup.dat", &proof) - return gamma, V, proof, nil + // zkrp.SaveToDisk("setup.json", &proof) + return gamma, tprime, hprime, zkrp.Zkip.P, proof, nil } /* @@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@ func (zkip *bip) Setup(H *p256, g, h []*p256, c *big.Int) (bip, error) { /* Prove is responsible for the generation of the Inner Product Proof. */ -func (zkip *bip) Prove(a, b []*big.Int, P *p256) (proofBip, error) { +func (zkip *bip) GenerateProof(a, b []*big.Int, P *p256) (proofBip, error) { var ( proof proofBip n, m int64 diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/ccs08.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/ccs08.go index 687f717..2aca8b4 100644 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/ccs08.go +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/ccs08.go @@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ import ( "math/big" "strconv" - "../crypto/bn256" + bn256 "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/bn256/google" + // "../crypto/bn256" ) /* @@ -148,7 +149,9 @@ func ProveSet(x int64, r *big.Int, p paramsSet) (proofSet, error) { // Initialize variables proof_out.D = new(bn256.G2) - proof_out.D.SetInfinity() + // proof_out.D.SetInfinity() + _, _, epz, _ := proof_out.D.CurvePoints() + epz.SetZero() proof_out.m, _ = rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) D := new(bn256.G2) @@ -165,7 +168,7 @@ func ProveSet(x int64, r *big.Int, p paramsSet) (proofSet, error) { proof_out.t, _ = rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) proof_out.a = bn256.Pair(G1, proof_out.V) proof_out.a.ScalarMult(proof_out.a, proof_out.s) - proof_out.a.Invert(proof_out.a) + proof_out.a.Neg(proof_out.a) proof_out.a.Add(proof_out.a, new(bn256.GT).ScalarMult(E, proof_out.t)) } else { return proof_out, errors.New("Could not generate proof. Element does not belong to the interval.") @@ -208,7 +211,9 @@ func ProveUL(x, r *big.Int, p paramsUL) (proofUL, error) { proof_out.zsig = make([]*big.Int, p.l, p.l) proof_out.zv = make([]*big.Int, p.l, p.l) proof_out.D = new(bn256.G2) - proof_out.D.SetInfinity() + // proof_out.D.SetInfinity() + _, _, epz, _ := proof_out.D.CurvePoints() + epz.SetZero() proof_out.m, _ = rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) // D = H^m @@ -222,7 +227,7 @@ func ProveUL(x, r *big.Int, p paramsUL) (proofUL, error) { proof_out.t[i], _ = rand.Int(rand.Reader, bn256.Order) proof_out.a[i] = bn256.Pair(G1, proof_out.V[i]) proof_out.a[i].ScalarMult(proof_out.a[i], proof_out.s[i]) - proof_out.a[i].Invert(proof_out.a[i]) + proof_out.a[i].Neg(proof_out.a[i]) proof_out.a[i].Add(proof_out.a[i], new(bn256.GT).ScalarMult(E, proof_out.t[i])) ui := new(big.Int).Exp(new(big.Int).SetInt64(p.u), new(big.Int).SetInt64(i), nil) @@ -279,7 +284,7 @@ func VerifySet(proof_out *proofSet, p *paramsSet) (bool, error) { p1.ScalarMult(p1, proof_out.c) p2 = bn256.Pair(G1, proof_out.V) p2.ScalarMult(p2, proof_out.zsig) - p2.Invert(p2) + p2.Neg(p2) p1.Add(p1, p2) p1.Add(p1, new(bn256.GT).ScalarMult(E, proof_out.zv)) @@ -321,7 +326,7 @@ func VerifyUL(proof_out *proofUL, p *paramsUL) (bool, error) { p1.ScalarMult(p1, proof_out.c) p2 = bn256.Pair(G1, proof_out.V[i]) p2.ScalarMult(p2, proof_out.zsig[i]) - p2.Invert(p2) + p2.Neg(p2) p1.Add(p1, p2) p1.Add(p1, new(bn256.GT).ScalarMult(E, proof_out.zv[i])) diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/p256.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/p256.go index d80f936..7342d33 100644 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/p256.go +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/p256.go @@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ import ( "strconv" "../byteconversion" - "../crypto/secp256k1" + "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/secp256k1" + // "../crypto/secp256k1" ) var ( @@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ Elliptic Curve Point struct. type p256 struct { X, Y *big.Int } +type PedersenCommitment = p256 /* IsZero returns true if and only if the elliptic curve point is the point at infinity. @@ -68,6 +70,11 @@ func (p *p256) Add(a, b *p256) *p256 { return p } + if a.X.Cmp(b.X) == 0 { + p.X = new(big.Int) + p.Y = new(big.Int) + return p + } resx, resy := CURVE.Add(a.X, a.Y, b.X, b.Y) p.X = resx p.Y = resy @@ -144,6 +151,11 @@ func (p *p256) Multiply(a, b *p256) *p256 { p.Y = resy return p } + if a.X.Cmp(b.X) == 0 { + p.X = new(big.Int) + p.Y = new(big.Int) + return p + } resx, resy := CURVE.Add(a.X, a.Y, b.X, b.Y) p.X = resx p.Y = resy diff --git a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/util.go b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/util.go index 1a644b8..340ddab 100644 --- a/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/util.go +++ b/src/ConfidentialTx/zkproofs/util.go @@ -18,10 +18,12 @@ package zkproofs import ( "crypto/sha256" + "encoding/json" "math/big" "../byteconversion" - "../crypto/bn256" + bn256 "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/bn256/google" + // "../crypto/bn256" ) //Constants that are going to be used frequently, then we just need to compute them once. @@ -115,3 +117,67 @@ func GetBigInt(value string) *big.Int { i.SetString(value, 10) return i } + +/* +Get common base +*/ +func GetZkrp() *Bp { + var zkrp Bp + zkrp.Setup(0, 4294967296) + return &zkrp +} + +/* +Get zkrp verifier +*/ +func GetVerifier(t *big.Int, h []*p256, p *p256) *Bp { + zkrp := GetZkrp() + zkrp.Zkip.Cc = t + zkrp.Zkip.Hh = h + zkrp.Zkip.P = p + return zkrp +} + +/* +Pedersen Commitment verification, check input_sum == output_sum ? +*/ +func VerifyPedersenCommitment(input, output []*PedersenCommitment, blindDiff *big.Int) bool { + inputCommitment := new(PedersenCommitment) + outputCommitment := new(PedersenCommitment) + for _, p := range input { + inputCommitment = inputCommitment.Add(inputCommitment, p) + } + for _, p := range output { + outputCommitment = outputCommitment.Add(outputCommitment, p) + } + // 计算佩德森承诺输入输出之差 + diffCommitment := inputCommitment.Add(inputCommitment, outputCommitment.Neg(outputCommitment)) + // 根据盲因子计算理论值 + H, _ := MapToGroup(SEEDH) + checkCommitment := Mult(H, blindDiff) + // 比较是否相等 + return checkCommitment.X.Cmp(diffCommitment.X) == 0 && checkCommitment.Y.Cmp(diffCommitment.Y) == 0 + +} + +type ProofData struct { + Proof *proofBP + T *big.Int + Hh []*p256 + P *p256 +} + +func DumpProof(t *big.Int, h []*p256, p *p256, proof *proofBP) ([]byte, error) { + zkrproof := &ProofData{proof, t, h, p} + data, err := json.Marshal(zkrproof) + return data, err +} + +func LoadProof(data []byte) (*Bp, *proofBP, error) { + var p ProofData + err := json.Unmarshal(data, &p) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + return GetVerifier(p.T, p.Hh, p.P), p.Proof, nil +} From ee693b85446aee39a114f8e6697a8c687a6dd256 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: daniel Date: Wed, 1 Jan 2020 09:39:41 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 28/68] Add:a Hyperledger Fabric 1.4 LTS course in fabric --- README.md | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 1c7b2f9..a6023d0 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -279,6 +279,7 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo [](https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/fabric) - [doc](https://hyperledger-fabric-docs-zh-cn.readthedocs.io/zh_CN/latest/) +- [IBM OpenTech Hyperledger Fabric 1.4 LTS Course](https://space.bilibili.com/102734951/channel/detail?cid=69148) #### [FISCO-BCOS](https://github.com/FISCO-BCOS/Wiki) From ad7ee427fb604a476dc9dae2a4901dfc9a8baf36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: daniel Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2020 17:27:53 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 29/68] Add: Edx - Introduction to Hyperledger Blockchain Technologies --- README.md | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index a6023d0..50e7c06 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo - [doc](https://hyperledger-fabric-docs-zh-cn.readthedocs.io/zh_CN/latest/) - [IBM OpenTech Hyperledger Fabric 1.4 LTS Course](https://space.bilibili.com/102734951/channel/detail?cid=69148) +- [edx: Introduction to Hyperledger Blockchain Technologies Free Course](https://www.edx.org/course/introduction-to-hyperledger-blockchain-technologie) #### [FISCO-BCOS](https://github.com/FISCO-BCOS/Wiki) From 2a7d72917e73396e4139289eb65be489940f6e59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: dannyexodus <58447383+dannyexodus@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sat, 25 Jan 2020 14:33:07 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 30/68] Add more wallet suggestions There are now more wallets with XMR support. Adding to list of suggestions --- Extension/monero.md | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Extension/monero.md b/Extension/monero.md index 28f1d92..b6c61d5 100644 --- a/Extension/monero.md +++ b/Extension/monero.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ ## Wallets - [Official GUI]() - [Mymonero.com](https://mymonero.com) - Web wallet of fluffypony, core dev of Monero +- [Exodus](https://www.exodus.io/monero-wallet/) - Popular multicurrency wallet with in-app exchange for desktop and mobile +- [Monerujo](https://www.monerujo.io/) - Android wallet with ability to pay Bitcoin addresses using XMR.to - *Warning: fluffypony (core dev of Monero) is suspicious ([Link](https://monero.stackexchange.com/questions/897/does-monero-have-any-mobile-wallets-available) of those 2 wallets. Do your own research.* - [Android Wallet By Freewallet](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=xmr.org.freewallet.app&hl=en) - [IOS Wallet By Freewallet](https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/monero-wallet-by-freewallet/id1126426159?mt=8) @@ -52,4 +54,4 @@ - [Bytecoin](https://bytecoin.org/) - The first cryptonote implementation - [FantomCoin](http://fantomcoin.org) - FantomCoin, allows merge mining with Monero - [Aeon](https://github.com/aeonix/aeon) - Aeon coin, a fork of Monero - - [Digital Note](http://digitalnote.org) \ No newline at end of file + - [Digital Note](http://digitalnote.org) From 4cb0be2152d755de4b254bdc1e3cfd335855fc16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: dannyexodus <58447383+dannyexodus@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sat, 25 Jan 2020 14:39:28 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 31/68] Suggested Exodus - wallet with 4m+ downloads Suggested addition of Exodus, highly-rated wallet with 4 million+ downloads Reviews: https://apps.apple.com/us/app/exodus-crypto-wallet/id1414384820 https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=exodusmovement.exodus&hl=en_US --- Extension/eos.md | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Extension/eos.md b/Extension/eos.md index d2037df..8fc229f 100644 --- a/Extension/eos.md +++ b/Extension/eos.md @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ - [PocketEOS-IOS](https://github.com/OracleChain/PocketEOS-IOS) - Open source wallet for IOS. - [PocketEOS-Android](https://github.com/OracleChain/PocketEOS-Android) - Open source wallet for Android. - [EOS REACH Android](https://github.com/memtrip/eosreach) - Open source wallet for Android. +- [Exodus](https://www.exodus.io/eos-wallet) - Popular multicurrency wallet with in-app exchange for desktop and mobile. ## Language Support @@ -68,4 +69,4 @@ https://developers.eos.io/ - [MonsterEOS](https://github.com/leordev/monstereos) - Tamagotchi game, integrates `eosio.token` with account balances, randomization etc. - [DecenTwitter](https://github.com/kesar/decentwitter) - Decent(ralized) Twitter - ZERO!!! Ram Cost -- [Everipedia](https://github.com/EveripediaNetwork/Everipedia) - IPFS integration, tokenization and governance \ No newline at end of file +- [Everipedia](https://github.com/EveripediaNetwork/Everipedia) - IPFS integration, tokenization and governance From fb1f96f7407357c9abd7399c6893b57428c6b2d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yuanjunjie Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2020 11:24:33 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 32/68] add eth token material --- README.md | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 50e7c06..7197fd2 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -11,50 +11,49 @@ The blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions that ## Contents
Click to expand -- [Awesome Blockchain](#Awesome-Blockchain) - - [Contents](#Contents) - - [Frequently Asked Questions (F.A.Q.s) & Answers](#Frequently-Asked-Questions-FAQs--Answers) - - [Basic Introduction](#Basic-Introduction) - - [Encryption knowledge](#Encryption-knowledge) - - [Consensus](#Consensus) - - [Account and transaction model](#Account-and-transaction-model) - - [Exchange](#Exchange) - - [Applications](#Applications) - - [Governance](#Governance) - - [Digital currency ranking](#Digital-currency-ranking) - - [Development Tutorial](#Development-Tutorial) - - [BitCoin](#BitCoin) - - [Ethereum](#Ethereum) - - [Consortium Blockchain](#Consortium-Blockchain) - - [Fabric](#Fabric) - - [FISCO-BCOS](#FISCO-BCOS) - - [Releated Tools](#Releated-Tools) - - [Solidity](#Solidity) +- [Awesome Blockchain](#awesome-blockchain) + - [Contents](#contents) + - [Frequently Asked Questions (F.A.Q.s) & Answers](#frequently-asked-questions-faqs--answers) + - [Basic Introduction](#basic-introduction) + - [Consensus](#consensus) + - [Account and transaction model](#account-and-transaction-model) + - [Exchange](#exchange) + - [Applications](#applications) + - [Governance](#governance) + - [Digital currency ranking](#digital-currency-ranking) + - [Development Tutorial](#development-tutorial) + - [BitCoin](#bitcoin) + - [Ethereum](#ethereum) + - [Consortium Blockchain](#consortium-blockchain) + - [Fabric](#fabric) + - [FISCO-BCOS](#fisco-bcos) + - [Releated Tools](#releated-tools) + - [Solidity](#solidity) - [truffle](#truffle) - [web3.js](#web3js) - - [Implementation of Blockchain](#Implementation-of-Blockchain) - - [Projects and Applications](#Projects-and-Applications) - - [Quorum](#Quorum) - - [Monero](#Monero) - - [IOTA](#IOTA) - - [EOS](#EOS) - - [IPFS](#IPFS) - - [Filecoin](#Filecoin) - - [BigchainDB](#BigchainDB) - - [BitShares](#BitShares) - - [Further Extension](#Further-Extension) - - [Papers](#Papers) - - [Books](#Books) - - [Applications](#Applications-1) - - [Identity Applications](#Identity-Applications) - - [Public Blockchain Identity](#Public-Blockchain-Identity) - - [Blockchain as a collateral](#Blockchain-as-a-collateral) - - [Unclear](#Unclear) - - [Guidance](#Guidance) - - [Internet of Things Applications](#Internet-of-Things-Applications) - - [Energy Applications](#Energy-Applications) - - [Media and Journalism](#Media-and-Journalism) - - [Contribute](#Contribute) + - [Implementation of Blockchain](#implementation-of-blockchain) + - [Projects and Applications](#projects-and-applications) + - [Quorum](#quorum) + - [Monero](#monero) + - [IOTA](#iota) + - [EOS](#eos) + - [IPFS](#ipfs) + - [Filecoin](#filecoin) + - [BigchainDB](#bigchaindb) + - [BitShares](#bitshares) + - [Further Extension](#further-extension) + - [Papers](#papers) + - [Books](#books) + - [Applications](#applications-1) + - [Identity Applications](#identity-applications) + - [Public Blockchain Identity](#public-blockchain-identity) + - [Blockchain as a collateral](#blockchain-as-a-collateral) + - [Unclear](#unclear) + - [Guidance](#guidance) + - [Internet of Things Applications](#internet-of-things-applications) + - [Energy Applications](#energy-applications) + - [Media and Journalism](#media-and-journalism) + - [Contribute](#contribute)
@@ -233,15 +232,17 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo - [Ethash C API Example Usage](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Ethash-C-API) - [Accounts, Transactions, Gas, and Block Gas Limits in Ethereum](https://hudsonjameson.com/2017-06-27-accounts-transactions-gas-ethereum/) - [Ethereum Improvement Proposals](https://eips.ethereum.org/) -- [Important EIPs and ERCs](https://github.com/ethereumbook/ethereumbook/blob/develop/appdx-standards-eip-erc.asciidoc#table-of-most-important-eips-and-ercs) +- [Important EIPs and ERCs](https://github.com/ethereumbook/ethereumbook/blob/develop/appdx-standards-eip-erc.asciidoc#table-of-most-important-eips-and-ercs) / [EIP list](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs) - Security - [Ethereum Smart Contract Security Best Practices](https://consensys.github.io/smart-contract-best-practices/) / [Chinese version](https://github.com/ConsenSys/smart-contract-best-practices/blob/master/README-zh.md) - [Onward with Ethereum Smart Contract Security](https://blog.zeppelin.solutions/onward-with-ethereum-smart-contract-security-97a827e47702) - [The Hitchhiker's Guide to Smart Contracts in Ethereum](https://blog.zeppelin.solutions/the-hitchhikers-guide-to-smart-contracts-in-ethereum-848f08001f05) - - [**OpenZeppelin**](https://openzeppelin.org/) - - [**ZeppelinOS**](https://zeppelinos.org/) + - [**OpenZeppelin**](https://docs.openzeppelin.com/openzeppelin/) + - [**openzeppelin contracts**](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts) / [doc](https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/2.x/) + - [openzepplin sdk](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-sdk) - Token - - [ERC20](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-20.md) + - [ERC20](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-20.md) / [impl](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/tree/master/contracts/token/ERC20) + - [ERC721](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-721.md) / [impl](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/tree/master/contracts/token/ERC721) + Utils + [Ethereum Blockchain Explorer](https://etherscan.io/) From b6068d1cbd3273457e25f6d6ce1e87ba074cccb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yuanjunjie Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 18:29:31 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 33/68] add xuperchain --- .gitignore | 2 ++ README.md | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+) create mode 100644 .gitignore diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d25d3ed --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +*mod +*sumdb \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 7197fd2..6b69e40 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ The blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions that - [Ethereum](#ethereum) - [Consortium Blockchain](#consortium-blockchain) - [Fabric](#fabric) + - [XuperChain](#xuperchain) - [FISCO-BCOS](#fisco-bcos) - [Releated Tools](#releated-tools) - [Solidity](#solidity) @@ -283,6 +284,21 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo - [IBM OpenTech Hyperledger Fabric 1.4 LTS Course](https://space.bilibili.com/102734951/channel/detail?cid=69148) - [edx: Introduction to Hyperledger Blockchain Technologies Free Course](https://www.edx.org/course/introduction-to-hyperledger-blockchain-technologie) +#### [XuperChain](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuperchain) +[](https://xchain.baidu.com/) + +- [Baidu Blockchain Engine](https://cloud.baidu.com/product/bbe.html) +- [Homepage](https://xchain.baidu.com/) +- [Doc](https://xuperchain.readthedocs.io/zh/latest/index.html) +- [Wiki](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuperchain/wiki) / [English version](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuperchain/wiki/Wiki-in-English) + ++ [Getting start](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuperchain/wiki/3.-Getting-Started) ++ SDK + + [Go SDK](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuper-java-sdk) + + [Javascript SDK](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuper-sdk-js) + + [Java SDK](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuper-python-sdk) + + [Python SDK](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuper-python-sdk) + #### [FISCO-BCOS](https://github.com/FISCO-BCOS/Wiki) ## Releated Tools From 396c01eac05869f2b2c40c9e55a4734f2bf40720 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yuanjunjie Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 18:35:53 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 34/68] update xuperchain --- README.md | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 6b69e40..e94fbdc 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -287,6 +287,27 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo #### [XuperChain](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuperchain) [](https://xchain.baidu.com/) +**XuperChain**, the first open source project of XuperChain Lab, introduces a highly flexible blockchain architecture with great transaction performance. + +**XuperChain** is the underlying solution for union networks with following highlight features: + +**High Performance** +* Creative XuperModel technology makes contract execution and verification run parallelly. +* TDPoS ensures quick consensus in a large scale network. +* WASM VM using AOT technology. + +**Solid Security** +* Contract account protected by multiple private keys ensures assets safety. +* Flexible authorization system supports weight threshold, AK sets and could be easily extended. + +**High Scalability** +* Robust P2P network supports a large scale network with thousands of nodes. +* Branch management on ledger makes automatic convergence consistency and supports global deployment. + +**Multi-Language Support**: Support pluggable multi-language contract VM using XuperBridge technology. + +**Flexibility**: Modular and pluggable design provides high flexibility for users to build their blockchain solutions for various business scenarios. + - [Baidu Blockchain Engine](https://cloud.baidu.com/product/bbe.html) - [Homepage](https://xchain.baidu.com/) - [Doc](https://xuperchain.readthedocs.io/zh/latest/index.html) From 3be0a1b46002e9e91c02498377439ac8c6f2045c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yuanjunjie Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2020 12:04:39 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 35/68] update xuperchain --- README.md | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index e94fbdc..0160557 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -293,18 +293,18 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo **High Performance** * Creative XuperModel technology makes contract execution and verification run parallelly. -* TDPoS ensures quick consensus in a large scale network. +* [TDPoS](https://xuperchain.readthedocs.io/zh/latest/design_documents/xpos.html) ensures quick consensus in a large scale network. * WASM VM using AOT technology. **Solid Security** * Contract account protected by multiple private keys ensures assets safety. -* Flexible authorization system supports weight threshold, AK sets and could be easily extended. +* [Flexible authorization system](https://xuperchain.readthedocs.io/zh/latest/design_documents/permission_model.html) supports weight threshold, AK sets and could be easily extended. **High Scalability** -* Robust P2P network supports a large scale network with thousands of nodes. +* Robust [P2P](https://xuperchain.readthedocs.io/zh/latest/design_documents/p2p.html) network supports a large scale network with thousands of nodes. * Branch management on ledger makes automatic convergence consistency and supports global deployment. -**Multi-Language Support**: Support pluggable multi-language contract VM using XuperBridge technology. +**Multi-Language Support**: Support pluggable multi-language contract VM using [XuperBridge](https://xuperchain.readthedocs.io/zh/latest/design_documents/XuperBridge.html) technology. **Flexibility**: Modular and pluggable design provides high flexibility for users to build their blockchain solutions for various business scenarios. @@ -314,11 +314,17 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo - [Wiki](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuperchain/wiki) / [English version](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuperchain/wiki/Wiki-in-English) + [Getting start](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuperchain/wiki/3.-Getting-Started) + + [Account operation](https://xuperchain.readthedocs.io/zh/latest/advanced_usage/contract_accounts.html) + + [Multiple nodes deployment](https://xuperchain.readthedocs.io/zh/latest/advanced_usage/multi-nodes.html) + + [Wasm contract](https://xuperchain.readthedocs.io/zh/latest/advanced_usage/create_contracts.html) + + [Proposal](https://xuperchain.readthedocs.io/zh/latest/advanced_usage/initiate_proposals.html) + + [Parallel chain](https://xuperchain.readthedocs.io/zh/latest/advanced_usage/parallel_chain.html) + SDK + [Go SDK](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuper-java-sdk) + [Javascript SDK](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuper-sdk-js) + [Java SDK](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuper-python-sdk) + [Python SDK](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuper-python-sdk) ++ [Detailed FAQs](https://xuperchain.readthedocs.io/zh/latest/FAQs.html) #### [FISCO-BCOS](https://github.com/FISCO-BCOS/Wiki) From 5237c872348278a5d79367ece4bd7ba91f5e265e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yuanjunjie Date: Sun, 26 Apr 2020 16:05:32 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 36/68] update xuperchain --- README.md | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 0160557..2f68955 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -325,6 +325,7 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo + [Java SDK](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuper-python-sdk) + [Python SDK](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuper-python-sdk) + [Detailed FAQs](https://xuperchain.readthedocs.io/zh/latest/FAQs.html) ++ [Comparation with Fabric and Ethereum](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuperchain/wiki/%E9%99%84-%E8%AF%84%E6%B5%8B%E6%95%B0%E6%8D%AE%E5%AF%B9%E6%AF%94) #### [FISCO-BCOS](https://github.com/FISCO-BCOS/Wiki) From 57062dbc57d69ea9303ff1be8e728122742f6f08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ipcenas <47504178+ipcenas@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:12:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 37/68] Added Permissioned Blockchains in Action --- README.md | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 2f68955..399f3c6 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -660,6 +660,14 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: Web UI for decentralized apps ++ Identity, privacy and security techniques ++ On-chain and off-chain data storage_ + + - [**Permissioned Blockchains in Action**](https://www.manning.com/books/permissioned-blockchains-in-action) by Mansoor Ahmed-Rengers & Marta Piekarska-Geater, early access -- + _A guide to creating innovative applications using blockchain technology ++ + Writing smart contracts and distributed applications using Solidity ++ + Configuring DLT networks ++ + Designing blockchain solutions for specific use cases ++ + Identity management in permissioned blockchains networks_ + ### Applications From 52c6b21e0bfcf276a9df21cf8575a033c1b3ed5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ipcenas <47504178+ipcenas@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:13:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 38/68] Added Permissioned Blockchains in Action --- README.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 399f3c6..6474627 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: Identity, privacy and security techniques ++ On-chain and off-chain data storage_ - - [**Permissioned Blockchains in Action**](https://www.manning.com/books/permissioned-blockchains-in-action) by Mansoor Ahmed-Rengers & Marta Piekarska-Geater, early access -- +- [**Permissioned Blockchains in Action**](https://www.manning.com/books/permissioned-blockchains-in-action) by Mansoor Ahmed-Rengers & Marta Piekarska-Geater, early access -- _A guide to creating innovative applications using blockchain technology ++ Writing smart contracts and distributed applications using Solidity ++ Configuring DLT networks ++ From 68785c417a4d9245249f6aba2a3e3ec0170c600f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Haochuan Guo Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 11:28:40 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 39/68] Add Defi Portfolio Tracker With DeFi, it's more difficult to grasp an overview of one's assets/debts across many ethereum projects. This product helps solve that problem. --- README.md | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 6474627..82688b0 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo + [Ethereum Blockchain Explorer](https://etherscan.io/) + [Eth Gas Station](https://ethgasstation.info/) + [Eth Network Status](https://ethstats.net/) + + [Defi Portfolio Tracker](https://debank.com/) - [**EEA** - Enterprise Ethereum: Private Blockchain For Enterprises](https://101blockchains.com/enterprise-ethereum/) From 65cf1e08cf8b349f52b59db950bcc94d9510908f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Haochuan Guo Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2020 12:04:52 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 40/68] Move Defi Portfolio Tracker to a new tools section --- README.md | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 82688b0..f28bdd7 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo + [Ethereum Blockchain Explorer](https://etherscan.io/) + [Eth Gas Station](https://ethgasstation.info/) + [Eth Network Status](https://ethstats.net/) + ++ Tools + [Defi Portfolio Tracker](https://debank.com/) From 9d1f8df29dd31f8fb980407f655ece2bc68c9cee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Haochuan Guo Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2020 11:59:28 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 41/68] Update README.md --- README.md | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index f28bdd7..b240d1d 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -250,9 +250,6 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo + [Eth Gas Station](https://ethgasstation.info/) + [Eth Network Status](https://ethstats.net/) -+ Tools - + [Defi Portfolio Tracker](https://debank.com/) - - [**EEA** - Enterprise Ethereum: Private Blockchain For Enterprises](https://101blockchains.com/enterprise-ethereum/) - [What Is Enterprise Ethereum?](https://101blockchains.com/enterprise-ethereum/#1) @@ -263,6 +260,10 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo - [Ethereum Blockchain as a Service Providers](https://101blockchains.com/enterprise-ethereum/#6) - [Real-World Companies Using Enterprise Ethereum](https://101blockchains.com/enterprise-ethereum/#7) - [Final Words](https://101blockchains.com/enterprise-ethereum/#8) +### DeFi (Decentralised Finance) + ++ Tools + + [Defi Dashboard](https://debank.com/): portfolio tracker, project lists, rankings, etc. ### Consortium Blockchain * **Theory** From 280ed6c5e804fb88423047b45cc3f06fcce2314d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yjjnls Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2020 13:58:07 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 42/68] Update README.md add defi content --- README.md | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index b240d1d..4327ae0 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -260,10 +260,6 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo - [Ethereum Blockchain as a Service Providers](https://101blockchains.com/enterprise-ethereum/#6) - [Real-World Companies Using Enterprise Ethereum](https://101blockchains.com/enterprise-ethereum/#7) - [Final Words](https://101blockchains.com/enterprise-ethereum/#8) -### DeFi (Decentralised Finance) - -+ Tools - + [Defi Dashboard](https://debank.com/): portfolio tracker, project lists, rankings, etc. ### Consortium Blockchain * **Theory** @@ -733,6 +729,11 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: - [PopChest](https://popchest.com) - Incentivized distributed video platform. - [Civil](https://joincivil.com) - Decentralized newsmaking platform. +#### DeFi (Decentralised Finance) + ++ Tools + + [Defi Dashboard](https://debank.com/): portfolio tracker, project lists, rankings, etc. + --- ## Contribute From 688a23e0e746d7f4dc2001a2eb4a06f3f3dabf78 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ipcenas <47504178+ipcenas@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2020 15:47:45 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 43/68] Added Programming Hyperledger Fabric --- README.md | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 6474627..05c2f30 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -667,6 +667,14 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: Configuring DLT networks ++ Designing blockchain solutions for specific use cases ++ Identity management in permissioned blockchains networks_ + + - [**Programming Hyperledger Fabric**](https://www.manning.com/books/programming-hyperledger-fabric) by Siddharth Jain, early access -- + _A guide to developing blockchain applications for enterprise use cases ++ + Where Fabric fits in to the blockchain landscape ++ + The ins and outs of deploying real-world applications ++ + Developing smart contracts and client applications in Node ++ + Debugging and troubleshooting ++ + Securing production applications_ From 70b2da836daa26c04e3daddc27867b0c7a99ad9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ipcenas <47504178+ipcenas@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2020 15:48:40 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 44/68] Added Programming Hyperledger Fabric --- README.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 05c2f30..2127735 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: Designing blockchain solutions for specific use cases ++ Identity management in permissioned blockchains networks_ - - [**Programming Hyperledger Fabric**](https://www.manning.com/books/programming-hyperledger-fabric) by Siddharth Jain, early access -- +- [**Programming Hyperledger Fabric**](https://www.manning.com/books/programming-hyperledger-fabric) by Siddharth Jain, early access -- _A guide to developing blockchain applications for enterprise use cases ++ Where Fabric fits in to the blockchain landscape ++ The ins and outs of deploying real-world applications ++ From 15bae86551a143e4544a8ee95e7ce04b150bffbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: chainvisions <67360117+chainvisions@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2020 18:35:37 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 45/68] Add DeFi protocols and tools Added a few DeFi protocols and tools to the list --- README.md | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index d6a66c5..cbcae9a 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -739,8 +739,13 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: #### DeFi (Decentralised Finance) +- [Uniswap](https://uniswap.org) - Decentralized exchange powered by the Automated Market Maker model (AMM). +- [Compound](https://compound.finance) - Decentralized lending and borrowing. +- [1inch Exchange](https://1inch.exchange) - Get the best rates among multiple DEXes. + + Tools + [Defi Dashboard](https://debank.com/): portfolio tracker, project lists, rankings, etc. + + [Zapper](https://zapper.fi/): dashboard for viewing and managing your DeFi investments. --- ## Contribute From f0292d5873c00321f20f8e384e69f1739c4a131d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: chainvisions <67360117+chainvisions@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2020 20:15:24 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 46/68] Add Furucombo --- README.md | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index cbcae9a..f1fa0dd 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -746,6 +746,7 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: + Tools + [Defi Dashboard](https://debank.com/): portfolio tracker, project lists, rankings, etc. + [Zapper](https://zapper.fi/): dashboard for viewing and managing your DeFi investments. + + [Furucombo](https://furucombo.app/): easily create flashloans without writing a single line of code. --- ## Contribute From 32318327e131fa9342ff6d50deb4166b104a3ecf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: chainvisions <67360117+chainvisions@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2020 20:22:24 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 47/68] Add Synthetix --- README.md | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index f1fa0dd..b7f07c8 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -742,6 +742,7 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: - [Uniswap](https://uniswap.org) - Decentralized exchange powered by the Automated Market Maker model (AMM). - [Compound](https://compound.finance) - Decentralized lending and borrowing. - [1inch Exchange](https://1inch.exchange) - Get the best rates among multiple DEXes. +- [Synthetix](https://synthetix.io/) - Protocol for synthetic assets. + Tools + [Defi Dashboard](https://debank.com/): portfolio tracker, project lists, rankings, etc. From 21c286ec8d3fe5c6db632484bcf42299cf333f3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yuanjunjie Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2020 16:05:14 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 48/68] add fabric explorer --- README.md | 11 ++++------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index b7f07c8..4b4b999 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -15,12 +15,6 @@ The blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions that - [Contents](#contents) - [Frequently Asked Questions (F.A.Q.s) & Answers](#frequently-asked-questions-faqs--answers) - [Basic Introduction](#basic-introduction) - - [Consensus](#consensus) - - [Account and transaction model](#account-and-transaction-model) - - [Exchange](#exchange) - - [Applications](#applications) - - [Governance](#governance) - - [Digital currency ranking](#digital-currency-ranking) - [Development Tutorial](#development-tutorial) - [BitCoin](#bitcoin) - [Ethereum](#ethereum) @@ -45,7 +39,7 @@ The blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions that - [Further Extension](#further-extension) - [Papers](#papers) - [Books](#books) - - [Applications](#applications-1) + - [Applications](#applications) - [Identity Applications](#identity-applications) - [Public Blockchain Identity](#public-blockchain-identity) - [Blockchain as a collateral](#blockchain-as-a-collateral) @@ -284,6 +278,9 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo - [IBM OpenTech Hyperledger Fabric 1.4 LTS Course](https://space.bilibili.com/102734951/channel/detail?cid=69148) - [edx: Introduction to Hyperledger Blockchain Technologies Free Course](https://www.edx.org/course/introduction-to-hyperledger-blockchain-technologie) +- [Explorer Proposal](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1GuVNHZ5Jqq-gTVKflnZ1YiJfEoozvugqenC6QEQFQj4/edit) +- [Explorer doc](https://blockchain-explorer.readthedocs.io/en/master/architecture/index.html) + #### [XuperChain](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuperchain) [](https://xchain.baidu.com/) From 1f76886b1157a5da1c83c43b8fbaba1a8691887b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yuanjunjie Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 22:23:42 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 49/68] add fabric wiki --- README.md | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 4b4b999..5a87f25 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ The blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions that - [BitCoin](#bitcoin) - [Ethereum](#ethereum) - [Consortium Blockchain](#consortium-blockchain) - - [Fabric](#fabric) + - [Hyperledger](#hyperledger) - [XuperChain](#xuperchain) - [FISCO-BCOS](#fisco-bcos) - [Releated Tools](#releated-tools) @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ The blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions that - [Internet of Things Applications](#internet-of-things-applications) - [Energy Applications](#energy-applications) - [Media and Journalism](#media-and-journalism) + - [DeFi (Decentralised Finance)](#defi-decentralised-finance) - [Contribute](#contribute)
@@ -270,10 +271,18 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo - [How to Set Up a Private Ethereum Blockchain in 20 Minutes](https://arctouch.com/blog/how-to-set-up-ethereum-blockchain/) -#### Fabric +#### Hyperledger [](https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/fabric) +- [Hyperledger Org](https://wiki.hyperledger.org/) +- [Fabric Org](https://wiki.hyperledger.org/display/Fabric) +- [Fabric Design Documents](https://wiki.hyperledger.org/display/fabric/Design+Documents) +- [Fabric Wiki](https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/latest/) + - 1.4 [En](https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/release-1.4/) / [Zn](https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/zh_CN/release-1.4/) + - 2.2 [En](https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/release-2.2/) / [Zn](https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/zh_CN/release-2.2/) + + - [doc](https://hyperledger-fabric-docs-zh-cn.readthedocs.io/zh_CN/latest/) - [IBM OpenTech Hyperledger Fabric 1.4 LTS Course](https://space.bilibili.com/102734951/channel/detail?cid=69148) - [edx: Introduction to Hyperledger Blockchain Technologies Free Course](https://www.edx.org/course/introduction-to-hyperledger-blockchain-technologie) From 906500a7a208f52c060c2c40aeee47f95c26dd65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matt M <41485426+robroyhobbs@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2020 18:26:15 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 50/68] arcblock --- README.md | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 5a87f25..3553685 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ The blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions that - [Filecoin](#filecoin) - [BigchainDB](#bigchaindb) - [BitShares](#bitshares) + - [ArcBlock](#arcblock) - [Further Extension](#further-extension) - [Papers](#papers) - [Books](#books) @@ -518,6 +519,9 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: ### BitShares - [White paper]() / [Chinese version](https://www.8btc.com/article/3369) +### ArcBlock +- [Blockchain Developer Platform](https://www.arcblock.io) / [White Paper](https://www.arcblock.io/en/whitepaper/latest) + --- ## Further Extension ### [Papers](https://github.com/decrypto-org/blockchain-papers) From 8324e10e95df7cec375119d853195e6dd2d4dfe4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Siddharth Jain Date: Sat, 12 Dec 2020 09:21:39 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 51/68] fixed hyperlink to Programming Hyperledger Fabric --- README.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 3553685..b226838 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: Designing blockchain solutions for specific use cases ++ Identity management in permissioned blockchains networks_ -- [**Programming Hyperledger Fabric**](https://www.manning.com/books/programming-hyperledger-fabric) by Siddharth Jain, early access -- +- [**Programming Hyperledger Fabric**](https://www.amazon.com/dp/0578802228) by Siddharth Jain, -- _A guide to developing blockchain applications for enterprise use cases ++ Where Fabric fits in to the blockchain landscape ++ The ins and outs of deploying real-world applications ++ From 2c3663bbd96a6b78f7c26196f6bfdf2a533937c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yuanjunjie Date: Thu, 31 Dec 2020 17:49:24 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 52/68] add fabric material --- README.md | 19 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index b226838..7878ae5 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -277,19 +277,22 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo [](https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/fabric) - [Hyperledger Org](https://wiki.hyperledger.org/) -- [Fabric Org](https://wiki.hyperledger.org/display/Fabric) -- [Fabric Design Documents](https://wiki.hyperledger.org/display/fabric/Design+Documents) -- [Fabric Wiki](https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/latest/) - - 1.4 [En](https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/release-1.4/) / [Zn](https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/zh_CN/release-1.4/) - - 2.2 [En](https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/release-2.2/) / [Zn](https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/zh_CN/release-2.2/) +- Fabric + - [Fabric Org](https://wiki.hyperledger.org/display/Fabric) + - [Fabric Design Documents](https://wiki.hyperledger.org/display/fabric/Design+Documents) + - [Fabric Wiki](https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/latest/) + - 1.4 [En](https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/release-1.4/) / [Zn](https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/zh_CN/release-1.4/) / [Release](https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/_/downloads/en/release-1.4/pdf/) + - 2.2 [En](https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/release-2.2/) / [Zn](https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/zh_CN/release-2.2/) + - [Fabric Source Code Analyse](https://yeasy.gitbook.io/hyperledger_code_fabric/overview) + - [A Kafka-based Ordering Service for Fabric](https://docs.google.com/document/d/19JihmW-8blTzN99lAubOfseLUZqdrB6sBR0HsRgCAnY/edit) +- Explorer + - [Explorer Proposal](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1GuVNHZ5Jqq-gTVKflnZ1YiJfEoozvugqenC6QEQFQj4/edit) + - [Explorer doc](https://blockchain-explorer.readthedocs.io/en/master/architecture/index.html) -- [doc](https://hyperledger-fabric-docs-zh-cn.readthedocs.io/zh_CN/latest/) - [IBM OpenTech Hyperledger Fabric 1.4 LTS Course](https://space.bilibili.com/102734951/channel/detail?cid=69148) - [edx: Introduction to Hyperledger Blockchain Technologies Free Course](https://www.edx.org/course/introduction-to-hyperledger-blockchain-technologie) -- [Explorer Proposal](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1GuVNHZ5Jqq-gTVKflnZ1YiJfEoozvugqenC6QEQFQj4/edit) -- [Explorer doc](https://blockchain-explorer.readthedocs.io/en/master/architecture/index.html) #### [XuperChain](https://github.com/xuperchain/xuperchain) [](https://xchain.baidu.com/) From b730de7466774d2d62b970f5ae37f2c9f167bc96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sharif Elfouly Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 23:10:29 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 53/68] 3blue1brown video on bitcoin --- README.md | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 7878ae5..948d3f0 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ The "classic" Satoshi-blockchain is like a git repo with a single master branch - [Mastering BitCoin](https://github.com/bitcoinbook/bitcoinbook) / [Chinese version](http://book.8btc.com/books/6/masterbitcoin2cn/_book/) / [pdf download](http://book.8btc.com/master_bitcoin?export=pdf) - [Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIPs)](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/) ++ [But how does bitcoin actually work?](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bBC-nXj3Ng4) + [Mining visualization](http://www.yogh.io/#mine:last) + [Wallets](./BitCoin/awesome.md#wallets-api) + [Explorers](./BitCoin/awesome.md#blockchain-explorers) From c86b1220d2dfef0674fb5f8004f12e832da15ff7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Phungnm Date: Sun, 11 Jul 2021 22:04:05 +0700 Subject: [PATCH 54/68] Add covalent --- README.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 948d3f0..cf7d890 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: + [Defi Dashboard](https://debank.com/): portfolio tracker, project lists, rankings, etc. + [Zapper](https://zapper.fi/): dashboard for viewing and managing your DeFi investments. + [Furucombo](https://furucombo.app/): easily create flashloans without writing a single line of code. - + + [Covalent](https://www.covalenthq.com/): an unified API bringing visibility to billions of blockchain data points. --- ## Contribute From f8a578020333cc42c0c57791a40346b261562beb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Stjepan=20Jurekovi=C4=87?= Date: Mon, 1 Nov 2021 17:57:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 55/68] Added Self-Sovereign Identity Hi, Stjepan from Manning here. I thought this title might be a good match for your list. Thank you for considering it. Best, --- README.md | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index cf7d890..776c1a9 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -689,6 +689,12 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: Developing smart contracts and client applications in Node ++ Debugging and troubleshooting ++ Securing production applications_ + +- [**Self-Sovereign Identity**](https://www.manning.com/books/self-sovereign-identity) by Alex Preukschat and Drummond Reed, -- + _In Self-Sovereign Identity: Decentralized digital identity and verifiable credentials++ + you’ll learn how SSI empowers us to receive digitally-signed credentials++ + store them in private wallets++ + and securely prove our online identities._ From 527b266967dc0ab3ae2dc01e5b432ba22da69ab6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Petros Demetrakopoulos Date: Sun, 16 Jan 2022 18:13:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 56/68] Update README.md - Added a reference to Ethair Balloons library --- README.md | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 776c1a9..8949ddc 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -526,6 +526,10 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: ### ArcBlock - [Blockchain Developer Platform](https://www.arcblock.io) / [White Paper](https://www.arcblock.io/en/whitepaper/latest) +[](https://github.com/petrosDemetrakopoulos/ethairballoons)) +### [**EthAir Balloons**](https://github.com/petrosDemetrakopoulos/ethairballoons) +- A strictly typed ORM library for Ethereum blockchain. It allows you to use Ethereum blockchain as a persistent storage in an organized and model-oriented way without writing custom complex Smart contracts. + --- ## Further Extension ### [Papers](https://github.com/decrypto-org/blockchain-papers) From e58fdcac582a05d6de343bd7d103232cfa3d1ae8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Petros Demetrakopoulos Date: Sun, 16 Jan 2022 18:14:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 57/68] Update README.md --- README.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 8949ddc..ffa9d00 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -526,8 +526,8 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: ### ArcBlock - [Blockchain Developer Platform](https://www.arcblock.io) / [White Paper](https://www.arcblock.io/en/whitepaper/latest) -[](https://github.com/petrosDemetrakopoulos/ethairballoons)) -### [**EthAir Balloons**](https://github.com/petrosDemetrakopoulos/ethairballoons) +[](https://github.com/petrosDemetrakopoulos/ethairballoons) +### [EthAir Balloons](https://github.com/petrosDemetrakopoulos/ethairballoons) - A strictly typed ORM library for Ethereum blockchain. It allows you to use Ethereum blockchain as a persistent storage in an organized and model-oriented way without writing custom complex Smart contracts. --- From 12bcc623c0f5627163ad3f2345aab7ff2ea12103 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Petros Demetrakopoulos Date: Sun, 16 Jan 2022 18:15:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 58/68] Update README.md --- README.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index ffa9d00..ae283f5 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: [](https://github.com/petrosDemetrakopoulos/ethairballoons) ### [EthAir Balloons](https://github.com/petrosDemetrakopoulos/ethairballoons) -- A strictly typed ORM library for Ethereum blockchain. It allows you to use Ethereum blockchain as a persistent storage in an organized and model-oriented way without writing custom complex Smart contracts. +- A strictly typed ORM library for Ethereum blockchain. It allows developers to use Ethereum blockchain as a persistent storage in an organized and model-oriented way without writing custom complex Smart contracts. --- ## Further Extension From 33ded574a0713e819fbdba186a2bd4a98c4d8f8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: tinkerbaj Date: Sun, 1 May 2022 18:32:35 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 59/68] Fix jeiwan url for golang blockchain tutorial --- README.md | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index ae283f5..922215d 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -356,13 +356,13 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo - [**Crystal**: _Write your own blockchain and PoW algorithm using Crystal_](https://medium.com/@bradford_hamilton/write-your-own-blockchain-and-pow-algorithm-using-crystal-d53d5d9d0c52) - [**C++**: _Blockchain from Scratch_](https://github.com/openblockchains/awesome-blockchains/tree/master/blockchain.cpp) - [**Go: _Building Blockchain in Go_**](https://github.com/Jeiwan/blockchain_go) / [Chinese version 1](https://github.com/liuchengxu/blockchain-tutorial/blob/master/content/part-1/basic-prototype.md) / [Chinese version 2](https://zhangli1.gitbooks.io/dummies-for-blockchain/content/) - - [_Part 1: Basic Prototype_](https://jeiwan.cc/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-1/) - - [_Part 2: Proof-of-Work_](https://jeiwan.cc/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-2/) - - [_Part 3: Persistence and CLI_](https://jeiwan.cc/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-3/) - - [_Part 4: Transactions 1_](https://jeiwan.cc/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-4/) - - [_Part 5: Addresses_](https://jeiwan.cc/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-5/) - - [_Part 6: Transactions 2_](https://jeiwan.cc/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-6/) - - [_Part 7: Network_](https://jeiwan.cc/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-7/) + - [_Part 1: Basic Prototype_](https://jeiwan.net/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-1/) + - [_Part 2: Proof-of-Work_](https://jeiwan.net/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-2/) + - [_Part 3: Persistence and CLI_](https://jeiwan.net/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-3/) + - [_Part 4: Transactions 1_](https://jeiwan.net/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-4/) + - [_Part 5: Addresses_](https://jeiwan.net/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-5/) + - [_Part 6: Transactions 2_](https://jeiwan.net/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-6/) + - [_Part 7: Network_](https://jeiwan.net/posts/building-blockchain-in-go-part-7/) - [**Go**: _Building A Simple Blockchain with Go_](https://www.codementor.io/codehakase/building-a-simple-blockchain-with-go-k7crur06v) - [**Go**: _Code your own blockchain in less than 200 lines of Go_](https://medium.com/@mycoralhealth/code-your-own-blockchain-in-less-than-200-lines-of-go-e296282bcffc) - [**Go**: _Code your own blockchain mining algorithm in Go_](https://medium.com/@mycoralhealth/code-your-own-blockchain-mining-algorithm-in-go-82c6a71aba1f) From ff4b38247708aeaa818e3c370ebdecd2be5b3546 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Prasanna Brabourame Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 09:42:29 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 60/68] Update Truflle BlockChain KickStarter From Scratch using truffle This blog contains 5 step process to learn the basics of Blockchain to build and deploy an blockchain application --- README.md | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index ae283f5..3ae6037 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -346,6 +346,7 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo - [doc](https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/develop/index.html) / [Chinese version](https://solidity-cn.readthedocs.io/zh/develop/) ### truffle +- [BlockChain KickStarter From Scratch](https://prasannabrabourame.medium.com/blockchain-kickstarter-from-scratch-9a3906596cd0) ### web3.js - [doc](https://web3js.readthedocs.io/en/1.0/) / [Chinese version](http://web3.tryblockchain.org/Web3.js-api-refrence.html) From 8242e406503f8f9668955688baa262adf627aa05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: kandikits <95465112+kandikits@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 25 Jul 2022 15:28:27 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 61/68] Update README.md Explore Blockchain added under 'Implementation' section. Request review and approval. Thanks! --- README.md | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index bd4aa3a..5dc3398 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ These apps run on a custom built **blockchain, an enormously powerful shared glo - [_Transaction relaying_](https://lhartikk.github.io/jekyll/update/2017/07/10/chapter5.html) - [_Wallet UI and blockchain explorer_](https://lhartikk.github.io/jekyll/update/2017/07/09/chapter6.html) - [**TypeScript**: _NaivecoinStake: a tutorial for building a cryptocurrency with the Proof of Stake consensus_](https://naivecoinstake.learn.uno/) +- [Explore Blockchain OSS, libraries, packages, source code, cloud functions and APIs](https://kandi.openweaver.com/explore/blockchain) --- ## Projects and Applications From 0b6fc584d647e9a6e0df37eca7d51a1a75208ffb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: shivaenigma Date: Fri, 16 Sep 2022 23:04:04 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 62/68] Updated bitcoin blockexplorers --- BitCoin/awesome.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/BitCoin/awesome.md b/BitCoin/awesome.md index 9c5c90d..657034e 100644 --- a/BitCoin/awesome.md +++ b/BitCoin/awesome.md @@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ - [BlockTrail](https://www.blocktrail.com/BTC) - [Bitcoin Transaction Explorer](https://github.com/JornC/bitcoin-transaction-explorer) - [Blockexplorer.com](https://blockexplorer.com) -- [Smartbit](https://www.smartbit.com.au) -- [Bitkit](https://bitkit.live) - Real time transaction updates +- [Blockonomics](https://www.blockonomics.co) + ## Libraries From 942e6566ba1ab189e859b31d5c4f269415afc8af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dennis Zoma <3930150+wottpal@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sat, 21 Jan 2023 18:03:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 63/68] Add refernce to awesome list curating all decentralized domain name services --- README.md | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 5dc3398..6864e0e 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -710,6 +710,7 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: ##### Public Blockchain Identity +- [Awesome Name Services](https://github.com/scio-labs/awesome-name-services/) – Awesome list curating all decentralized domain name services (DNS). - [Blockstack](https://blockstack.org) - Platform for decentralized, server-less apps where users control their data. Identity included. - [Evernym](http://www.evernym.com) - Self-Sovereign identity built on top of open source permissioned blockchain. - [Jolocom](https://jolocom.com) - Self-sovereing identity wallet. From 570538d543c16e2d7ae2fd78e956dba7e0022d01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: syedmouaazfarrukh <97732099+syedmouaazfarrukh@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2023 07:35:33 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 64/68] Update README.md --- README.md | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 5dc3398..2f8cc1e 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ The blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions that - [Energy Applications](#energy-applications) - [Media and Journalism](#media-and-journalism) - [DeFi (Decentralised Finance)](#defi-decentralised-finance) + - [Roadmaps](#roadmap) - [Contribute](#contribute) @@ -776,6 +777,11 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: + [Furucombo](https://furucombo.app/): easily create flashloans without writing a single line of code. + [Covalent](https://www.covalenthq.com/): an unified API bringing visibility to billions of blockchain data points. --- + +### Roadmaps + +- [**Blockchain Developer Roadmap**](https://roadmap.sh/blockchain) by @kamranahmedse -- Roadmap to become a Blockchain Developer. + ## Contribute Contributions welcome! From a1e1afe97177a19171d7b7251b9769e8dfad28f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: syedmouaazfarrukh <97732099+syedmouaazfarrukh@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2023 07:37:02 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 65/68] Update README.md --- README.md | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 2f8cc1e..e3efec9 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -776,12 +776,13 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: + [Zapper](https://zapper.fi/): dashboard for viewing and managing your DeFi investments. + [Furucombo](https://furucombo.app/): easily create flashloans without writing a single line of code. + [Covalent](https://www.covalenthq.com/): an unified API bringing visibility to billions of blockchain data points. ---- ### Roadmaps - [**Blockchain Developer Roadmap**](https://roadmap.sh/blockchain) by @kamranahmedse -- Roadmap to become a Blockchain Developer. +--- + ## Contribute Contributions welcome! From 6642a9b749957d8546ac66a2c480c0cb6adc7fc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: syedmouaazfarrukh <97732099+syedmouaazfarrukh@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2023 07:37:36 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 66/68] Update README.md --- README.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index e3efec9..be680c9 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ The blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions that - [Energy Applications](#energy-applications) - [Media and Journalism](#media-and-journalism) - [DeFi (Decentralised Finance)](#defi-decentralised-finance) - - [Roadmaps](#roadmap) + - [Roadmaps](#roadmaps) - [Contribute](#contribute) From 0ce939be81494f4bc3bb03dbec3af32220cb93e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: syedmouaazfarrukh <97732099+syedmouaazfarrukh@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2023 07:41:58 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 67/68] Update README.md --- README.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index be680c9..016d3c3 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: ### Roadmaps -- [**Blockchain Developer Roadmap**](https://roadmap.sh/blockchain) by @kamranahmedse -- Roadmap to become a Blockchain Developer. +- [**Blockchain Developer Roadmap**](https://roadmap.sh/blockchain) -- Roadmap to become a Blockchain Developer. --- From c95ae536cacc19d116589b05e1f035168d122756 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shaki <112879608+shaki150697@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2023 08:01:45 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 68/68] Update README.md --- README.md | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 5dc3398..6b73aca 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -519,6 +519,9 @@ Key enhancements over go-ethereum: #### [Filecoin](https://filecoin.io/) - [White paper](https://filecoin.io/filecoin.pdf) / [Chinese version](http://chainx.org/paper/index/index/id/13.html) +#### [Polybase](https://polybase.xyz) +- [White paper](https://framerusercontent.com/modules/assets/GRv4t0d6jQOJbIO7ZOFgonnXqM~f7GLGr1YpwfK85uVr8su7Mxe_3b6VkIZW94sRev8jj4.pdf) / [Docs](https://github.com/polybase/docs) + #### [BigchainDB](https://www.bigchaindb.com/) - [White paper](https://www.bigchaindb.com/whitepaper) / [Chinese version](http://blog.csdn.net/fengqing79/article/details/70154076)