Building Your Own WAF as a Service and Forgetting about False Positives





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Overview

- Introduction to WAF & deployment modes
- WAF as a service
- Blocking attacks without false positives or increased latency
- Demo



WAF?

- Web Application Firewall
- Mainly used to protect against Application Attacks
- SQLi, RCE, Protocol Violations, Rate Limiting ...



Deployment mode - Inline

• Pros:

- Traffic inspection
- Ability to block
- Transparent for web servers

Cons:

- Network placement
- Latency






Deployment mode - Out of band

• Pros:

- Traffic inspection
- Transparent for web servers
- Simpler network placement

Cons:

- Can't block attacks
- o PFS





Deployment mode - Agent

• Pros:

- **Easier network placement**
- Simple to scale

Cons:

- More invasive on deployment environment
- Can be less efficient on resource allocation










Deployment mode - Cloud

• Pros:

- Simple to setup and scale
- Network effect

• Cons:

- Out of your control
- Latency added





Caveats with typical WAF Solutions

- Network placement
- Availability and performance concerns
- False positive rate
- Lack of control from developers



Building the WAF as a Service

- Removes FP by having an understanding of the application context
- No need for an appliance, just add an API call
- Blocking behaviour is decided by the application
- Ability to avoid latency for regular users




How could you build one?

- Open source components already exist
- Creating a log processing pipeline
- Building a WAF API
- Library for logs and calling API



Case study: Web application

- Setup in Google Cloud
- Flask microframework
- Code available in github






Finding a middle ground

- Out of band mode removes concerns of latency added to users
- Inline mode provides security by blocking attacks
- Could we get the best of both worlds?



Components - Web application





Components - Web application

- Can decide which mode to work on
 - Inline
 - Out of band
- Sends logs with partial request data encrypted


Example: Flask





Components - Agent


- Acts as a reverse proxy
- Minimal footprint
- Application agnostic
- Can get settings from the application






Components - Library

- Simple to implement
- Inherent risks
- Strategy for this talk









- Pluggable architecture
- Parallel nature of their components
- Applications can decide how to react



- Open source components
 - Modsecurity



Naxsi



- Proprietary software or appliances
 - Reduced complexity of installation
 - Simple way of evaluation



- Custom modules
 - Apply custom business logic




- Implement simple services
 - Rate limiting
 - Rule engine for blocking
- ML models






WAF service






Components - Log processing






Components - Log processing

- Replays logs that were not in line against WAF
- Calculates scores through windows of time





Components - Detection






Components - Detection

- Triggered by Log Processing
- Business value
- Patterns of behaviour for FP





Components - State store






Components - State store

- Allows to store configuration
- Ideally fast lookup for caching











- Easily understand activity
- Visibility on attacks
- Performance metrics

Example: ELK











Wafs	fsearch							K. N
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	Time 🔻	waf_request_time_spent	waf_mode	$waf_request_answer.modsecurity.alerts.alert.log data$	waf_block	waf_status	waf_request_answer.rate_limiter	r.is_aı
•	November 29th 2018, 19:04:30.882	0.4041290283203125	identifier	Matched Data: s)&(s found within ARGS:id: 1') OR NOT 5749=6432 AND ('YQom' LIKE 'YQom	REQUEST	Attack	0	
•	November 29th 2018, 19:04:28.703	0.3751790523529053	identifier	Matched Data: s&sos found within ARGS:id: 1' OR NOT 6486=6486 AND 'vqoO'='vqoO	REQUEST	Attack	0	

<pre># waf_request_answer.modsecurity.is_attack</pre>	@ Q 🗆 * 1
<pre># waf_request_answer.rate_limiter.is_attack</pre>	@ Q 🗆 * 0
<pre># waf_request_answer.rule_engine.is_attack</pre>	@ Q II * 0
t waf_request_answer.status	ℚ Q □ * Attack



Components - Management

root@waf-5c65c	c789c8–sx	zr6:/# python	/api/manage.py	show-co	nfig=1				
WAF Configurat	tion								
Config	Config Status								
Request St Response S Waf Proxy Ro Scoring thre	Stage outing	identifier disabled disabled 5							
WAF Identifier	r based ro	outing:							
Identifier	Valu	ie	Added at		ted by				
ip 10.40.1.8 ip 62.140.137.1			8-11-29 22:45:23 8-11-29 22:45:26		r_script				
Virtual patchi	ing routin	======= ng: +				======			
Endpoint	Endpoint Added at								
ping 2	ping 2018–11–29 22:49:58								
Block Rules Co	onfigured:								
+							Added at	Created by	
user-agent mozilla/5.0 (windows nt 6.1; win64; x64; rv:58.0) gecko/20100101 firefox/58.0 2018-11-29 22:49:44 manage_script									
Rate limit cou	unters:		=========			======			
Time Bud	cket	Identifier		Counter	TTL				
+	22:49:00 22:50:00	ip user-agent ip user-agent	10.40.1.8 notsequelmap 10.40.1.8 notsequelmap	50 50 3 3	55 55 59 59				
root@waf-5c65d			t						



How to block?

- Detection decides when to send traffic to the WAF
- Can also be triggered manually



Traffic routing

- Fingerprint based routing
 - Blocks based on scores

Storage

WAF

WebApp

Customer

- IP, client_id, combinations, 0day signatures ...
- Added automatically or manually



Traffic routing

- Net block based routing
 - ISP
 - Hosting providers
 - Tor exit nodes / Proxies



Traffic routing

- Virtual Patching
 - Always route particular vulnerable endpoints
 - Select for combination of parameters if needed
 - Example: website.com/?vuln_param=



- Detection FP vs blocking FP
- Key to allow blocking without impacting users
- Acceptable rate might change per application
- Tuning can become unbearable in highly changing applications



- Business logic
 - How trustworthy is a user/ip?
 - Key business activity
 - What would be the impact on blocking them



- Historical Analysis
 - How normal is this type of request for this endpoint?
 - How does this user compare with others
 - How common are detection FP in this endpoint



- Context analysis
 - How many times have they triggered a FP
 - How many requests have they sent



- Example: Sleep(
 - message="I will sleep(1 or 2 days)"
 - Might be detected as SQLI
 - Probability of FP is independent from each other



- Independant SQLI FP rate: 0.1%
- Our aim, 0.00001% (0.01^5)
- Score needed => 5 * Reputation Score
- Aimed at attacks that need volume



Hybrid mode

- Benefits
 - WAF does not add latency for good users
 - Flexibility
 - Removes FP's



Hybrid mode


- Caveats
 - Delayed response time for blocking when using identifier mode
 - Increased complexity








Request lifetime - Initial request






Request lifetime - Cache check






Request lifetime - Request encapsulation






Request lifetime - Out of band processing






Request lifetime - Attack detection






Request lifetime - Additional requests






Request lifetime - Cache update





Request lifetime - Inline behaviour





Summary (1/2)

- Reduced customer impact
 - Use hybrid mode to only add latency to malicious actors
 - Stops false positives from affecting customers through understanding history, context and business metrics
 - Specify different behaviour based on endpoint's risk



Summary (2/2)

- Flexibility
 - Extensible through third party products or custom plugins
 - Allows developers to integrate through api calls where needed



What now?

- Try it!
- https://github.com/89berner/waf-api-talk
- git clone https://github.com/89berner/waf-api-talk && cd waf-api-talk; ./setup \$YOUR_GCP_PROJECT
- Questions?

